CHIEF, CGS COMMENTS ON THE CLARKE REVIEW OF THE IG RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000400070014-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: March 17, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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Chief CGS Comments on the Review of the IG Recommendations
Regarding Foreign Inte igence Collection Requirements
RECOMMENDATION 1 and 2 - The PNIO's
Chief, CGS Comments:
Concur. The combination of the new DCID 1/3--PNIO's--and
DCID 1/2--CNIOts__should incorporate those subjects and geographical
areas which do, not warrant the development and allocation of intelli-
gence resource .`_This would go a long way toward setting a base for
a more consistent process of validating requirements and, within
broad limits, of setting priorities. The success of this will depend
on the clarity and brevity of the "national survival" DCID 1/3.
I urge strongly that, whatever the composition of the ad hoc
group and of the "suitable mechanism ... to recommend to USIB
specific ... actions", CGS be included from the outset. The "suitable
mechanism" might very well be the production-conscious membership of
the Collection Guidance Advisory Group recommended in No. 8, together
with representatives of collection elements for this specific purpose.
Such a body might begin upon the task of bringing about better
synchronization than seems now possible between the programming of
intelligence production and that of related collection.
A. cautionary note, however: My experience with the PNIO Review
Group under in 1963 and the abortive Collection Guidance
Committee w ich ried to set up indicates that the problems of
communication within such a group as is recommended here, the
disparity of interests among the members, and the ephemeral nature
of its tasks makes its successful operation quite problematical. The
Collection Guidance Committee met only twice. I would suggest that
CGS, aware of both substantive needs and collection capabilities might
be of considerable assistance to the chairman in structuring agendas,
marshalling contributions and clarifying varying views. CGS' service
in the past to D/DCI/NIPE recommends our participation as suggested
under Comment (d) on a community-wide basis.
We concur in the proposal to rescind the need for annual and
quarterly revisions. If the initial group can be kept concerned
and involved, with CGS functioning as its day-by-day continuity, it
should be able to revise these documents as real-world events
dictate, at least for the first round or so. After that, who knows;
it might revert to the BNE.
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RECOMMENDATION 4 - The IPC
Chief, CGS Comments:
Agree with Bruce's comments on Recommendation 4. We can
prepare and coordinate the proposed notice, but the function and
responsibilities of the CIA Member of the IPC will need considerable
expansion and detailed description which in turn will need sub-
stantial working out with DD/P. We can take the initiative in this
after DCID 5/5 has been revised.
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RECOMMENDATION 5 - FI Staff
Chief, CGS Comments:
Though this is not among those considered by
group, it seems to me necessary for CGS to play some role wi
respect to FI Staff's rejection of "ad hoc requirements which do 25X1
not clearly satisfy the criteria for clandestine collection". I
recommend that FI Staff be specifically directed to discuss
questionable requirements with CGS before finally rejecting them;
it may merely be a matter of rewording or highlighting that part
of the problem susceptible for clandestine collection. This
raises the question of the CGS role in screening requirements from
the DD/I and DD/S&T and from DIA and other agencies bound for
clandestine collection. We feel we should be able to indicate
where some of th a re uirements might be covered by other
collectors--DCS, system, or even COMOR or NSA,
and thus serve as shield for DDVP and FI Staff. We should do
this at least for all requirements on DD/P originating within CIA.
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Chief, CGS Comments:
Concur with the revised recommendation, except to change
"encourage" to "ensure". I strongly agree that the implementation
of other recommendations will have more to do with general improve-
ment than the mechanical revision of Form 986. Nevertheless, I
differ with Bruce's implication that "few persons feel it necessary
or useful to meet the validation criteria conscientiously." This
is a comment of major importance buried with a minor recommendation.
A large number of the deficiencies noted in the IG Report would be
alleviated, if not cured, by more consistent application of
validation criteria all along the line, but this depends upon some
authority somewhere to say "no" to an "invalid" requirement. Neither
has fixed this responsibility to say no. Under proposals here, it
is diffused among "supervisors", the Collection Guidance Advisory
Group, CGS and the line authority of office chiefs and others.
Until this responsibility is fixed and has been made operational,
the need for applying validation criteria will not be taken seriously
among those who originate and endorse requirements. More on this
below.
the IG's Report nor the revision of recommendations by
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RECOMMENDATION 7 - Analyst-Collector Communication
Chief, CGS Comments:
Concur in the reworded recommendation with the additional
stipulation that the appropriate element of CGS be kept informed
of the general trend of analyst-collector interchange and of any
commitments arising therefrom. Paragraph 66 on Page 111-38, which
precedes this recommendation, notes that the effort to persuade
the collector to mount a collection operation should be between
the di ector of an office and his counterpart in Clandestine Services
or thel I submit that it is impossible for CGS to do its work
in monitoring the flow of requirements and responses thereto if CGS
I is not made party to the dialogue between a production office and
eta collector. We have never interposed any barrier to analyst-
collector communication and in fact have encouraged it wherever it
seemed helpful to either side. One of the difficulties referred
to in the IG Report is the fact that numerous requirements are
served upon collectors directly, bypassing CGS, preempting collection
resources which could be better used for satisfaction of other,
perhaps of higher priority, needs. In short, it is damn difficult
to know what can be done to meet a requirement if we are unable to
know how much a collector's capacities have already been taxed in
private bilateral deals. Analyst-collector contacts are good and
useful; we ask only that contacts be on established programs and
that we be kept in the loop.
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RECOMMENDATION 8 - CGS and the Collection Guidance Advisory Group
Chief, CGS Comments
I agree that collection requirements problems arectheecommnn
problems of intelligence producers attempting
machinery work effectively for their needs, and in this sense CGS
should bear the same functional relationship to the producing
offices of DD/S&T as we do to those of DD/I. In a way the proposed
Collection Guidance Advisory Group is a device to offset the fact
that the production offices are not in a single directorate and
therefore require some bridge for common action across directorate
lines. The effectiveness of this recommendation as revised depends
heavily upon two factors: the effectiveness of the proposed
Collection Guidance Advisory Group and the ultimate agreement of
all involved as to what is and is not included in the term "technical
assistance". We would prefer the term "specialized assistance" to
avoid confusion with technical matters of resolution, frequencies,
etc. Further, inasmuch as Bruce's comments recognize CGS responsibi-
lities for handling the requirements process, and in keeping with
the intent of the report, we suggest that the recommendation be
phrased as follows:
hold the Collection Guidance Staff responsible for
managing the collection requirements process and providing
specialized assistance in the field of collection guidance to
their producing offices so as to:
a. Mitigate the deleterious effects of the Information
Explosion that are already being felt.
b. Apply strict selective criteria to all foreign intelli-
gence requirements in order to prevent the Information Explosion
from getting completely out of hand.
c. Introduce progressively more order and system into
human-source requirements.
There is in the Charter of CGS (DDI Notice 1-130-20 of 6 May
1964) a list of our functions which would form one definition of
what is subsumed under "technical assistance". In practice over the
intervening years these bare-bone descriptions of functions have been
fleshed out to establish for CGS a major role in intelligence manage-
ment. This role includes, in addition to the mechanical steps of our
original Charter, the tasks of formulating and recommending collection
programs, costing alternative collection proposals, developing
specifications for technical collection systems, recommending
collection policy positions within the Agency and before USIB,
evaluating collection system performance and bringing together analysts,
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R&D people and collectors in imaginative programs to develop new
ways of answering old and tough problems. Through all these
roles, CGS has evolved well beyond the routine tasks of its
predecessor units in transmitting "blue ditto" requirements from
the analysts to the collectors. As the complexity of both pro-
duction and collection problems has increased during our years,
these management functions have emerged in response. Today's
collection world requires that these functions be performed somewhere;
CGS is the logical place.
I have some concerns about the Collection Guidance Advisory
Group (CGAG). By its membership this group will be composed of
busy men among whose duties the requirements problem and collection
management occupy a relatively minor place. Requirements will be
the least sexy of their concerns for the most part, and the tendency
to delegate representation downward in their organizations will be
very great indeed. Whatever the initial enthusiasm and resolve of
the members, it seems likely that the job will pass from the deputy
directors' offices down to special assistants and from them probably
even further down. This means the membership of this group will not
be able to take actions or make decisions without reference to
authorities in their own offices, and so, progressively, the group
will be reduced to a discussion body and actions will have to be
worked out between CGS and the office concerned. The variety of
roles proposed for the CGAG in Bruce's recommendations means that
there will be a large number of topics to be discussed at a CGAG
meeting, relayed back to the deputy director by his stand-in, further
discussion without benefit of the group's views, further reference
to the office director, and then a subsequent meeting in order to
take action. While it is true that all the production offices listed
in the revised recommendation have collection problems, there is very
little commonality in substance among those problems. While both
FMSAC and OCI, or OSI and ORR will have requirements to take up with
CGS, those requirements will be for quite different answers and will
involve quite different resources. While the CGAG would probably be
of great use in adopting common procedures, in recognizing common
mechanical problems, and in working out uniform criteria in general
terms, it is more than likely that substantive requirements and their
management will require bilateral discussions between CGS and the
substantive office concerned. I am willing to give the proposal a
try and I'm hopeful that useful results will be obtained, but this
will depend on the continuity of senior representation from the
offices and in the durability of their interest in the problems and
intricacies of collection management.
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If any progress is to be made in confining the information
explosion and in screening the chaff out of the requirements system,
then this CGAG must be given explicit powers to say no to require-
ments it considers invalid. If it can do this and this alone, it
might very well be a major answer to the deficiencies the IG group
scolds so about.
Incidentally, if the intent of this revised, recommendation is
to be served, it would be useful to propose rescinding the
era "Special Relationship`' paper which puts CGS' role in relation
to DD/S&T offices on an "as requested" basis. The CGAG will not
work if there is a conspicuous difference among its members in their
relationship to CGS.
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RECOMMENDATION 9 - Personnel Exchange
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Chief,.CGS Comments:
I share with his reservations as to the efficacy
of exchanging personnel with FI Staff in improving our communications
with them. I concur in his substitute recommendation that we attempt
a series of regular meetings with FI Staff first, and on the basis of
our experience with that process then decide whether personnel
exchanges would be further beneficial. If the IPC List and Committee
revive, contacts with FI Staff under that aegis could serve this
exploratory purpose also. CGS is anxious for more productive
contact with FI Staff but has increasingly come to realize that
direct contact with the DD/P divisions is often necessary to get
the job done. As analyst-collector contacts should be encouraged,
so too should be contacts between CGS and collectors.
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Chief, CGS Comments:
Agree that this is minor, but would also note that this would
be a first and useful step on the way to giving the CTRL official
status required to solve some of the problems we have in obtaining
analyst participation in reviewing and updating the contents. This
would be no minor improvement.
RECOMMENDATION 11 - CIRL "Preface"
Chief, CGS Comments:
Concur with revised recommendation and also the idea
of handling this on a trial basis at first. The CGAG should be
brought into this process to maintain balance among the "more
important needs". I would substitute the CGAG for the "informal
meeting of representatives from each office".
RECOMMENDATION 12 - CIRL Background Statements
Chief, CGS Comments:
As with No. 10 above, any measure which brings about partici-
pation in the production of the CIRL by senior and responsible
members of the production offices is a step forward. I would
recommend that CGS be charged to initiate and perhaps do first
drafts of background statements (their scope and nature to be
defined by experience). With the collaboration of office analysts,
who should take final responsibility for the statements, these
should then be reviewed by the CGAG as suggested in my change to
Recommendation 11.
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Chief, CGS Comments:
I have always had strong reservations about the virtues of
standard comprehensive collection guidance documents. If they
relate to any real and active substantive problems they are
subject to rapid obsolescence. A few examples, carefully matched
to collectors' capabilities, have been useful--viz. the Cuban
Handbook. The reworded recommendation is acceptable as stated,
provided careful controls are exercised over "as needed" and
"selected intelligence problems". Perhaps the whole approach
could be tried out initially on an aspect of one of the "national
survival" PNIO's generated under Recommendations 1 and 2. For
uniformity in approach, criteria and format it might be well to
put the responsibility for production on CGS in collaboration with
the producing offices, rather than the other way around. Decisions
about need and topic might be made a responsibility of CGAG, so that
all issuances of this kind come under a central control.
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Chief, CGS Comments:
I concur in Bruce's observations, particularly the point that
changes resulting from other recommendations should benefit DCS, at
25X6 least on an interim basis. I should observe also that we have already
had some ex erience with collection guidance programs with the DCS,
notably on atomic energy developments. One question comes to
mind however: DCS has indeed been successful in responding to sub-
-stantive requirements, but there is some question in our minds as to
whether those requirements were valid; the symbiotic relationship
between the General and Life Sciences Divisions of OSI and DCS may
mean that DCS has been chasing a number of requirements which probably
could not stand much examination for validity. This, incidentally,
is a good example of the dangers involved in unfettered analyst-
collector communication.
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Chief, CGS Comments:
The substance and focus of IG recommendations regarding techni-
cal collection systems show a marked change from those bearing on
human source collection. In the main, the former are superficial and
deal with relatively minor aspects of the deep and complex problems
we have with collection guidance for SIGINT and reconnaissance
satellites. The problem adverted to in Recommendation 17 is being
progressively dealt with by the Intelligence Guidance Subcommittee
of the USIB SIGINT Committee on which CGS represents CIA. The over-
haul of COMINT requirements for Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa
took into account at every step the capacities of human source
collection, and the SIGINT requirements were revised accordingly.
This process will continue as other free world Subelements are
addressed.
The solution to the problem in Recommendation 16--Technical
Training and Access--meets only a part of what the real problem is.
This is one of relations between NSA and CIA and, indeed, between NSA
and the rest of the intelligence community. The problems descend from
NSA's defensiveness about its status in the community and the declining
productivity of COMINT. It is suspicious and resentful of any efforts
on our part to get closer to it or to deal in detail with the problems
of information, collection and exploitation which NSA is encountering.
The kind of trust and sharing of problems which is needed here cannot
be legislated. Recommendation 16 as reworded by Bruce is perfectly
acceptable, although I have scant hope of its producing any useful
results.
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Chief, CGS Comments:
I expect that the language of this requirement will be over-
taken shortly by the transfer to the SIGINT Committee of responsi-
bility for SIGINT satellites in conjunction with the conversion of
COMOR into COMIREX. The original intent of Recommendation 20 was
to deal with ouirement r SIGINT satellite collection. I
suggest that rewording be amended "to direct CGS,
with the assistance of producing offices, to establish ... ft and
to include in the last line "CIA Members of COMOR and SIGINT
Committee Working Groups". I should like to see established the
point that CGS has the responsibility for processing all CIA SIGINT
satellite requirements and that CGS provide the CIA Member of the
SIGINT Satellite Working Group, whether it be in COMOR or the SIGINT
Committee. This would conform to the principles in Recommendation 8
that CGS is the locus for the requirements handling process. Because
it may be useful to draw upon the CGAG to assist in the formulation
of long-term satellite collection requirements and because SIGINT
satellites are of material concern to OEL, it might be helpful to
include OEL in the membership of the CGAG, if only on an ad hoc
basis when ELINT matters are to be taken up.
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RECOMMENDATION 23 - COMOR
Chief, CGS Comments:
I believe a careful distinction needs to be made between
the functions of the informal group sponsored by Chairman, COMDR,
and the A/DD/I on the one hand and the regular in-Agency machinery
for formulating and coordinating Agency positions on COMOR matters
on the other. The former was created to deal with temporary
problems and technical matters often quite outside subjects on
COMOR agendas; the latter existed before this group was formed, has
operated during the former group's existence and will undoubtedly
continue to exist after the informal arrangenents have been dispensed
with. There need be no bar to discussing Agency positions in the
informal group but those positions should be arrived at outside it.
Responsibility for the development of these positions should continue
to rest in CGS, with the advice and counsel of other interested
Agency elements in the DD/I and DD/S&T. This is the way the CIA
position is worked out for other USIB collection committees, and I
see no reason why COMOR or COMIREX should be an exception. I would
suggest that Recommendation 23 be reworded to state "the DD/I and
DD/S&T direct CGS to formulate and coordinate CIA positions on
requirements for overhead reconnaissance with the assistance of
their producing offices. I do not believe that this recommendation
should or needs to deal with the status of the informal COMOR-A/DD/I
discussion group.
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RECOMMENDATION 24 and 25 - Practical Measures
Chief, CGS Comments:
I concur with Bruce's comments and with the rewording of the
recommendation, except that I would have the DD/I and DD/S&T
charge CGS, with the assistance of the CGAG, with devising, etc.
This is consistent with the recommended change for 26 and places
the responsibility where it belongs, on us. In all cases in
these recommendations, I strongly believe that CGS should be
charged with these tasks, turning to the membership of the CGAG,
individually or collectively, for advice and assistance in getting
the job done. The many steps suggested by the IG Survey for
division heads and, in 26, for office heads to improve the require-
ments situation may very well be the right ones, but to expect this
to be accomplished in the same way by each division head is
unrealistic. I believe that with the assistance of the CGAG we can
work out practical measures, which may not be the same for all
offices, whereby the process of review and validation of require-
ments can be actively carried on. What is necessary is the
methodical attack Bruce refers to on the problems of collection
management, and for this CGS would carry the main responsibility.
Division heads and office heads have other more pressing concerns;
we do not.
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RECOMMENDATION 26 - Necessary Support
Chief, CGS Comments:
Concur in the revision and hope for continuing support from the,,
DD/I and DD/S&T in our efforts to contain the "information explosion.
Suggest that the recommendation be revised to state:
"the DD/I and the DD/S&T designate the Chief, Collection
Guidance Staff, in collaboration with the Collection Guidance
Advisory Group, to be responsible for managing the collection
guidance process and for continuing review and such other efforts
necessary to:
a. As is.
b, As is.
c. As is.
These efforts shall be for the purpose of identifying efficiencies and
making recommendations for appropriate action to the DD/I and DD/S&T.
I believe that the revision establishes the responsibility right where
it needs to be for the long term--on us. If the CGAG carries out its
part actively, imaginatively and consistently, problems of "authority
within the line structure" need not arise; we would look to members of
the CGAG to exercise their line authority to help solve problems at
the analyst level. Meanwhile this recommendation, reworded, gives us
room to evolve and develop new and better procedures and techniques
and to bring them before the DD/I and the DD/S&T for approval
adoption. I feel this recommendation gives us the necessary flexibility
to improve without the rigorous "legislation that some might recommend.
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RECOMMENDATION 27 - Training
Chief, CGS Comments:
Concur in restatement.
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP
DATE 3/8/67
TO:
Mr. Proctor
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
7 E 44
Hdqrs.
REMARKS:
Herewith my observations on
Bruce's comments and recommended
changes. I appreciate your offer
to hear my side of the case in the
fullness of time, and I am parti-
cularly interested in discussing
recommendations 20 and 23 with you.
FROM: Chief, CGS
ROO! NOG. 00
BUILDING Hd rs.
q
1 FFEB ORM 55 24 1 REPLACES FORM 36-8 YY GPO: 1957-0-439445 (47)
WHICH MAY BE USED.
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