LETTER TO ADMIRAL GEORGE W. ANDERSON, JR., USN (RET.) FROM W.E. COLBY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000400030009-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2005
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: LETTER

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., USN (Ret.)
Chairman, President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Admiral:
I am writing now concerning heightened anxiety in the community
and in my own mind over leaks to the press of sensitive intelligence
data. I want to share with you and the Board my present a.ppre iation
of the problem and to seek your advice and recommendations.
As you well know, unauthorized public disclosures of intell. genre
information have occurred frequently in recent years. A. more impor-
tant consideration, however, is that press revelations have cor e
increasingly to include explicit and generally accurate details a out
the methods we use to obtain and exploit sensitive information.
the past year we have witnessed a further upswing in the number :In
and
severity of damaging intelligence leaks-.,a situation I can only describe
as a virtual hemorrhaging of the security control system. And if ' - se
clear that journalists are not just being briefed orally: they are nowems
being given direct access to highly classified documents.
Recently I had my staff take a fresh look at the problem to see
if there were not some as yet untried way--within the means at rhy
disposal-..to halt and reverse this trend. Although I did this wit a
sense of having been through the exercise many times before, it as
still essential to try again, not only because of the damage individual
leaks can cause to our long-term capabilities, but because the present
situation also generates widespread discouragement and frustraton
even cynicism.--within the ranks of the intelligence community itIelf.
This has the potential for lowering security discipline even mare,
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In the past, expressions of serious concern over intelligence teaks
have been voiced by successive Presidents and their department h~ads
following a particularly grave leak or a series of damaging leaks.,! My
predecessors and I have responded largely by trying to improve dcu-
ment and personnel security practices, issuing guidelines toGove nrnent
departments on procedures for sanitizing the intelligence to be us d by
administration officials for public purposes, and carrying out investigations
of the more flagrant and damaging leaks. These are all necessary steps,
but clearly they have been insufficient, and simply repeating them will--
in my view-prove no more effective now than in the past.
To tackle this problem constructively, I believe we must be quite
frank. We have, I believe, focused so intently on the conditions t at
make intelligence leaks possible that we have slighted considerati n of
the climate of opinion in and out of Government that actually encourages
them.
The widespread public dissemination of classified intelligence
information does not represent a direct breakdown of the elaborate
system of classification, document controls, personnel security hecks,
indoctrination practices, and application of the "need-to-know" principle
which we use to minimize the risks of exposing sensitive data to he many
persons who must work on and use them. The overwhelming nurrber of
such disclosures come not from the rank and file of analysts and drafters
who were privy to the materials within the intelligence community. Rather,
most represent deliberate disclosures by senior or relatively senior
officials with an unquestionable "need to know"--most of them outside
the intelligence community-"who evidently believe that the public benefits
of disclosing the information far outweigh the damage or risks involved.
Many disclosures identifiably represent a calculated "officia~ " Judg-
ment at departmental level that previously classified material--E ay, on
ICBM deployments--could be properly declassified and released. While
other disclosures are usually less easy to pinpoint as to source, most of
them appear designed to promote the programs, policies, or int rests
of particular elements within the Government--or to rebut those f
others--as part of the continuing process in which national, security
policies are hammered out. Relatively few can be readily construed
as the disclosures of a disgruntled or venal underling.
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Most of the "official" disclosures noted above, and quite a few
of the others, have probably involved no serious threat to intellig nee
sources and methods. A good deal of the intelligence we collect,
notably in the area of overhead reconnaissance, is less sensitive
than it once was. What is increasingly disregarded, however, is
that there remain many sensitive areas of information and analys s,
often identifiable as such only by intelligence specialists, where
disclosure could be highly detrimental. Unfortunately, however,
there is no established Government-wide procedure for determining
who can declassify intelligence information and for assuring that it
is properly sanitized before release, and there is a marked reluc-
tance within the responsible Government departments to pursue
investigations of potentially damaging disclosures that point town d
relatively senior levels of officials. Meanwhile, the increasing
frequency of disclosures of classified intelligence information?
whether "official" or not--encourages the growth of a permissive
atmosphere in which it seen-is that almost anything goes.
I see the press as largely an instrument in this process--notl a
direct cause of it. While there are examples of what I consider
gratuitous and irresponsible exposure of sensitive data on the paxjt
of individual journalists, most of these persons see themselves as
conforming to a widespread and generally accepted standard. Mdch
of what they report has been made available to them by presumably
responsible officials who clearly intended to have the information
made public. And in the present atmosphere of disclosures, small
wonder that many of the more energetic reporters feel that any
information they can dig out is fair game.
In sum, I believe our basic problem is with an increasingly
prevalent state of mind among many senior officials in the Execu ive
Branch, among members of. the press, and among many in the C tigress.
This involves a line of reasoning containing one or more of the f llowing
elements:
The democratic process requires informed open debate,
and if the price of that is an occasional risk to intelligence, t
must be paid.
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The intelligence community has been overprotective and
unnecessarily secretive about sources and methods everyone
knows it employs. Despite frequent alarms about the alleged
damage caused by past disclosures, the US still has a highly
effective system for collecting intelligence information. The
problem, if any, is rather with how effectively it uses the
material.
The "leakage" issue is at least partially a red herring,
because every administration so far has selectively released
intelligence information to its own advantage. There are
complaints about "leaks" only when information which doesn'
support the official view gets out.
That line of reasoning cannot lightly be dismissed: there is i
fact much truth in it. The price of a free society must be paid if we
are to retain the democratic process. The intelligence community
probably has been overinclined to classify everything as a matter of
course, and often overly shrill in claiming irreparable damage to its
sources and methods when leaks have occurred. And there is soi e
validity to the argument that the Government has at times appeared
to follow a double standard in evaluating damage of intelligence dis-
closures and placing blame according to who makes them and whose
policies they support.
Unfortunately, when the issue is posed in these terms the wrong
dichotomy is emphasized. The proper question is not the public need
to know versus the parochial interests of the intelligence service
and the administration for self-protection. The issue is rather
between the short-term and long-term interests of us all.. In other
words, a sound and defensible balance is needed between the con
temporary domestic imperatives of an. open society and the preserva-
tion of an ability in the future to detect dangers to that society that
originate from abroad.
There are somewhat parallel dilemmas in other areas of
Government which I have often referred to. For example, our
military forces must be responsive to civilian control, but the
public does not demand that detailed war plans be published. Our
judicial system must meet the public's standards of justice, but
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grand jury proceedings are not conducted in the open. It is' even.
necessary for the Congress to conduct some of its business in
executive session, while remaining accountable to the voters for
the legislation it passes. What we no longer can count on is a
general public understanding and acceptance of the need for
similar trade-offs between openness and confidentiality in the
field of foreign intelligence.
To deal with the problem of protecting vital sources and
methods against unwarranted disclosure, there is a clear need
to consider significant departures from the limited approaches
that have been taken in the past. As I see it, there are several
areas that call for careful and simultaneous attention:
Continued efforts within the intelligence community
are needed to limit the opportunity for inadvertent or intende
(but unauthorized) disclosures of classified information when
the disclosures are made by persons in the intelligence services,
and to facilitate successful investigation and application of
penalties. A number of activities are under way within the
USIB arena to study this problem and to make such changes
as are necessary in the classification and compartmentation
system and in controlling the dissemination of sensitive data.]
There is also a need to develop more effective controls
and sanctions relating to disclosures of foreign intelligence
information by officials outside the intelligence services of
Government departments. No adequate procedures or comm n
standards exist for determining accountability for press disci
closures or for guiding the preparation of authorized texts
for public disclosures and for reporting them. This.would
require action by USIB in concert with several other departm6nts
of Government.
Ways need to be devised to discourage and if necessary
penalize unauthorized disclosures by advocates of particular
programs or policies within the Government and by contractor s
with access to intelligence data. The availability of judicial
sanctions would be helpful in this regard--and I have proposed
legislation to that end--but a greater degree of organizational
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and ultimately self-imposed discipline by senior officials wit~ in
Government is equally essential. This is probably the most
difficult of all objectives to achieve. It lies almost wholly
outside the intelligence community's ability to do more than
seek to persuade, and it involves the delicate question of how.
each administration wishes to deal with adversary procedures
within its own ranks. Its achievement would clearly require
a significant change in attitude not only by the officials direcily
involved but ultimately by key elements in the Congress and he
press and the public with whom they must deal. But I feel
certain that the lack of such discipline has come to be a central
weakness in our foreign intelligence security control system
and I would be derelict in not forthrightly saying so.
Finally, the intelligence community needs itself to re-
examine its traditional classification standards and practice ,
with a view to being more forthcoming in making public thos
intelligence findings and materials whose disclosure would not
create security problems or diplomatic difficulties or other Oise
damage the national interest. Only if we are seen to be reagon-
able in such matters can we expect full acceptance of our de ands
for continued protection of data which remains sensitive. Ti this,
a more careful distinction must be made among what I have
termed good secrets, bad secrets, and non-secrets. I am t king
some initiatives in this area but will wish to obtain the view of
others--including the PFIAB--as well.
The situation we face is serious--and getting worse. It is almost
overwhelming in its complexity and resistance to solution. The atti-
tudinal factors which encourage disclosures are the dominant el ments
of my concern right now, because they feed and nourish the tren.1.
And yet there is little I alone can do on that central problem. Ihave
outlined some areas that need attention, and request your early
consideration of them and your thoughts on how to proceed.
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