STATEMENT ON 'DISTORTION' OF INTELLIGENCE TO SERVE POLICY PURPOSES

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80B01495R000400030005-3
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 18, 2006
Sequence Number: 
5
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 17, 1975
Content Type: 
MF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80B01495R000400030005-3.pdf319.86 KB
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VOW 0 L U J y (I 7c 0 fr I;+CIIIC 75-3857 17 November 1975 /f; MEMORANDUM FORS Director of Central Intelligence Statement on "Distortion" of Intelligence to Serve Policy Purposes 1. When you reviewed the Action Plan Task Force paper which responded to the allegation that intelligence is "distorted" for policy purposes you returned a note on 10 November requesting a draft statement on the subject which you could include in a wrap-u opening statement. Z. Attached is such a draft statement, prepared bL__] the 1VIO representative on the task group. r /s! Sc. uc1 V. ~; i_son Samuel V. Wilson Lieutenant General, USA Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community Attachment: As stated Distribution: Orig. Addressee (w/att) 1 - DDCI(w/o att) DR (w/aft) f _ f' /att) 25X1 1 (w/ att) 2 - ronos (w/o att) 1 - IC Registry !DCI/ICS/C (17 November Approved For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-R?P80B0 1495R00040003000543 ? Approved For Release-2006 -R D P80 B01495R000400030005J3 17 November- 197 RESPONSE TO CHARGES ABOUT !'DISTORTION" OF INTELLIGENCE FOR POLICY PURPOSES Allegations that CIA intelligence has been distorted to sui~ particular policies or policymakers are. substantially untrue. For one thing, there have been remarkably few attempts from the policy side over the years to dictate intelligence judgments. Arid the few times such has been tried, it has been resisted. At worst, on a few occasions, some sharp debate between intelligence officers and those on the policy side over contentious! issues has led to solutions which satisfied no one entirely, but- w re as good as could be arrived at given the then-current state of information. Even those who believe the most serious charges levied against the intelligence system (by Sam Adams, for example) have to acknowledge that the process gave the dissident view a hearing, right .up to the top. The -single most important reason for this record is pe, p' Most professional intelligence officers know (or soon learn) that credibility is their most precious stock in trade, and most polio I- officials come-to appreciate this and to live. with it.. Those on eiiherr side who do. not soon become discounted by their colleagues. ' If these intrinsic disciplines are ever weakened in the profession, no am unt I Approved For Release 2006/11106 495R000- luuu,5000573 . Approved For Release 2006LB~I ' II -RDP80BO 1495R00040003.0005 judgment on particular issues or broad points of view. T~7e vast majority of these have been honest, legitimate differences of opinion on the evidence. A small number have been designed to support particular policies. These; have been few and far between, they stand on the record for al~ to see, and they fouled no n.n.e a.f iihe a rnn n_r _3xac _~ T1,e pr 4 c.-SE .of institutional tinkering could guarantee objectivity, and if this if_' regulating spirit remains strong, almost any reasonable institutional system can produce objective intelligence. Thus, the overriding need for intelligence is to have competent and dedicated professionals, and CIA has these aplenty. These people can be helped by procedural and burcau.cra.ti. which encourages and even requires dissents thus serves safeguards. A number of such institutional arrangements have boen used over the years. For example: a. The process of coordination of national intelligence carried with it not merely the right but the obligation of l dissent. Time and again, National Intelligence Estimates and similar assessments have recorded c.-_fferences of only as a hedge against. enforced conformity, but also for j es both the; majority and minority to lay their views on the line, identified as such, with supporting evidence and rationale. This is a good inducement to responsibility- -not only in terms 2 Approved For Release 20061 &f# ,,:'CkA-6DP80BO1495R000400030005-'3 ..Approved For Release 2006/1 1bI-~ R.DP80-B01495R000400030005 .w . 3 of the formal written product, but in terms of`an aina.l.ytical~ rp o c e s s which washes out. the shoddy, holding up to the light of discussion and debate any special pleading or poli.dy hard-sell. b. Another form of self-policing or quality control is frequent reviews of past performance. CIA and the Community have engaged in many retrospective as se s srfle ts, post mortems of various kinds in which the record is weighed. in hindsight for, am.3ng other things, conscious or unconscious policy biases. Indeed, the Intelligence: Community proba ly does more of this than any other area of Government opeations? c. An active dialogue with scholars from the academil community and other sources of expertise is carried on y all production officers in CIA, State/INR. and DIA. This program assures that perceptions and insights of both specialists nd generalists from outside are brought both to review past) production and to suggest further approaches. In a revese flow, all the intelligence agencies have active programs for sending their own personnel occasionally. to academic centers for further training. . -When.allthis has been. said, the question of objectivity i intelligence must be discussed with certain realistic consider in mind. CT. Approved.. For Rele'a'se 2006/11/0 7A-RDP80B01495R000400030005I3 Approved For Release 2006/111b6"VGA-~6P80B01495R000400030005 only to a few leaders in closed societies, and sorneti es are - literally unknowable to anyone anywhere at the time of writing. b. Secondly, it must help the policy officer make intelligent choices. If it tells him only what he wants to hear, it fails. But if it addresses only irrelevant or easy qul stion.s, or the right questions at the wrong time, it loses in us fulness whatever it might gain in a kind of accuracy. c. Thirdly, the more important the question, espe ially in areas where knowledge is incomplete, the more clo ely and xi ica%iy wi: deli sign m irev ~onu at me figenc rep ?rti_s estimates.---And while it maybe-argued that-here i P_r2SSur2S to d1stm-? S?_' supprea '-e=mnst 7i any o a?ri. , it is also true that precisely here is where competent pro essionals ---Appfowed-F- -R-ele-ase,;2A0-, .I,1.Q6 ; CIA-RDP80B01495R000400030005 a. First, intelligence is not prepared in an ivory tower and is not prepared primarily to provide the stuff of ost mortems. It is prepared in the real world for the re 1 use of real policymakers. It is also prepared constantlyf-daily, weekly, monthly, and yearly--from a stream of incc plete,, fragmentary,. and often conflicting evidence. It must ry to provide answers--repertorial, analytical or estimative--to, tough questions, the answers to which are sometimes kriown Approved For Release 2006/11/06: ClA-RDP80B01495R0004000300053 .will be most. jealous of their credibility. If they are tis.ble to stick to obecti ' J soon learn or be told as much. tn.at_the v_-cannot- compel .national leaders to ''read r -4 ' and inwardly digest" every Pronouncement of i ,te i'g , ce3= ~'h - leaders are their otvn men, possessed Of Powers and seized of in operational situations pr llexns often having to factor into their decisions d. Finally, unless there is effective comxr~uni.catio between policy and intelligence, the one will be illy-i[nform ~ ed and the other academic. Close communication betweei them inevitably produces some tensions, some clashes of perspective, some divergences of aim, Policy makers have objectives and preferences, and it-is only human of ther.~ to value what helps them toward their goals and to be i rrit~:te d at what hinders them. Presidential memoirs and many contemporary documents allude often to the inconvenient voice of intelligence getting in the way of what leaders w~nted to do. Sometimes intelligence prevailed, sometimes it as overridden by other considerations. Intelligence is, after all, one important input to decision making, but it is not the d cy one. asiU zne_ nz j E.SaSe= %VI~it7C> ry '.nave iearnned, -over T-t4c T Approved For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP80B01495R000400030005~3 Ye standards in dialogue with the policy side, they do not belong in the profession and will ro ab l I' ly Approved For Release 200kS1E 1 -RDP80BO1495RO00400030005I3 matters which are well beyond the province of foreign intelligence But intelligence does have a right to be heard, and this right has been observed over 25 or more years. Policy makers cannot be forced to heed intelligence but we and they know that they can ignore it only at their peril. In the last analysis, we cannot hope for mo Approved For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP80BO1495R000400030005=3