INTRA-AGENCY SECURITY COMMITTEE MINUTES OF FIFTH MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000200130009-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2006
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 17, 1972
• Content Type: MIN

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IASEC-M-5 (Draft)
17 January 1972
INTRA-AGENCY SECURITY COMMITTEE
Fifth Meeting
Room 4 E 64, CIA Headquarters Building
Monday, 17 January 1972, 1430 Hours
Acting Chairman
presiding
MEMBERS PRESENT:
Present for Part of Meting
REPRESENTING:
National Intelligence Programs
Evaluation
Deputy Director for Support
Office of General Counsel
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Plans
Deputy Director for Science
and Technology
SiF I/CCDF
GROUP I
lixclud.ed from automatic
S-E-C-R-E-T downgrading and
t las si ication
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DD/I
FI Staff
Office of Logistics
Office of Security
CIA Top Secret Control Officer
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IASEC-M-5 (Draft)
17 January 1972
The Intra-Agency Security Committee was convened by the
Acting Chairman, Mr. at 1430 hours on 17 January
1972 in the Office of. Security conference room, 4E64,
I I
sentatives attending for the first time, set forth the background
material which formed the basis for the instant meeting. He stated
that in January of last year Dr. Henry Kissinger sent out a. memo-
randum requesting a study on classification in government as a result
of the President's Directive to initiate a review of the current security
classification procedures contained in Executive Order 10501, as
amended. An Interagency Committee was established, chaired by the
Department of Justice and comprised of representatives from the CIA,
DoD, NSC, State Department, and AEC.
The Committee met intermittently until August 1971 when a
draft revision of EO 10501 was circulated to the membership for
comment. Since then, no meetings were held to consider differences.
The matter remained dormant until an announcement by Congress that
hearings would be held on the subject of classification of information.
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for the information of those- Directorate repre-
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Subsequently, Mrs
Staff Secretary of the National
Security Council submitted a final draft of a proposed revision of
Executive Order 10501 for the selection of alternatives and comment.
noted that the raft contained many items of which
he and the IASEC had been unaware.
The Acting Chairman further commented that throughout the
Rehnquist Committee deliberations the Agency representatives directed
his attention to certain broad security principles important to CIA.
They were:
1. The need to protect intelligence sources and
methods over a long period of time;
2. Classified information in existence cannot
automatically be declassified without prior
review;
3. Lifting out the requirements already set
forth in DCID No. 1/7 relating to the
protection of intelligence sources and
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methods and appropriate markings, including
being subjected to special requirements before
being released to the public, and placing them
in the proposed Executive Order 10501.
Mr. tested that the current draft encompasses the three
principles with one exception; namely, it requires automatic declassi-
fication after 30 years. This is not acceptable to the Agency because
the Clandestine Service still makes regular "hits" when checking
current names against OSS records.
The Acting Chairman and the members present then proceeded
to review the draft submitted by the Staff Secretary, NSC and the
following proposed revisions were recommended:
a. The Order could be shortened by deleting the
list of thirty-nine departments and agencies in
Section 2(c), pages 4A and B, excepting only
ACTION and the Tennessee Valley Authority.
Assuming that the heads of ACTION and the
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Tennessee Valley Authority are meant to
possess authority for classification of
"Confidential" only, Section 2(f)(2) would
be deleted and Section 2(f)(3) would be
changed to read. "officials designated in
writing by a superior in the same vertical
chain of command or supervision who has
'Top Secret' or 'Secret' classification
authority. "
b. In the production of finished intelligence items,
such as the President's Daily Brief and the
Central Intelligence Bulletin, there is no
practical way to break out various classi-
fications of a particular article because the
variety of sources are woven together into the
whole. The requirement set forth in Section 2(g)
would significantly increase the time required to
both produce current intelligence and report
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intelligence information and decrease the
readability of the product. We, therefore,
recommend that Section 2(g), page 6, com-
mence with the phrase "To the extent
practicable. "
c. Section 2(h), pages 6 and 7, is unworkable within
the Central Intelligence Agency in that its provi-
sions would violate the "need-to-know" principle
and the statutory responsibility of the Director of
Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources
and methods. Individuals who have a "need-to-
know" for the contents of intelligence documents
do not have the same "need-to-know" for the
identity of certain Central Intelligence Agency
employees, particularly those engaged in
operations abroad. A considerable portion of
CIA produced data is originally classified over-
seas. It is recommended that this section be
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deleted or that documents containing intelligence
information be exempted.
d. The last sentence of Section 2(i), page 8, needs
clarification. If it is meant to protect informa-
tion which in the opinion of a contractor should
be classified, it would appear that Section 14,
page 59, would apply and this sentence would
then be redundant.
e. We have no particular preference between
Alternative I and Alternative II of Section 4(a),
pages 13-18. In either case, sensitive intelli-
gence and information relating to intelligence
sources and methods would be protected under
the "Special Categories" provisions contained
in Section 4(b)(1),
f. The adoption of Alternative II, page 19, is
recommended, The qualifying adjective
"highly" in Alternative I is considered unnec-
essary because the word "sensitive" itself
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establishes a need for protection. Alternative
III is already included in Section 4(b)(1)b(ii)
and need not be repeated,
go Since both Alternatives I and II of Section
4(b)(1)c(ii), page 20, relate solely to foreign
policy, we defer to the Department of State,
h. We prefer Alternative II of Section 4(b)(3), page
22, However, A is recommended that Section
4(b)(4) be amended to read as follows: "All
information and material classified pursuant
to Section 4(b)(1)c of this Order shall be reviewed
for declassification after 30 years from the date
of its original classification if it has not earlier
been declassified. " This change is necessary
to protect those persons, systems, plans, and
projects which require protection even after 30
years.
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i. Since the proposed Executive Order will rescind
Executive Order 10964, it is suggested that sub-
paragraph Section 4(i)(l), page 26, be deleted.
j. To protect information and material which relates
to intelligence sources and methods, we most
strongly urge that the following subparagraph be
added to the "Retroactive Application" section
of the Executive Order on page 28: "The exemp-
tion specified in Section 4(b)(1), 4(b)(1)a, and
4(b)(1)b shall apply to information or material
pertaining to intelligence sources and methods
or that containing sensitive intelligence which
was classified under the provisions of previous
Executive Orders. "
k. To avoid misinterpretation, it is suggested that
the last sentence of Section 5(k)(3), page 35, read
as follows: "Failure to comply with the foregoing
could result in the imposition of a fine and/or
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imprisonment and, in addition, in the case of
government personnel, dismissal or other
disciplinary action. "
1. We prefer Alternative I of Section 8(b), page 46,
since the publication of Alternative II would cast
official doubt on the effectiveness of the President's
anti-hijacking program. In any case, heads of
departments and agencies can regulate such
travel if and when they deem it advisable.
m. Alternative III of Section 10(d), page 55, is
preferred because the committee envisioned
under Alternatives I and II would be so large as
to be unmanageable. However, the responsibility
of the committee as set forth in Alternative I
appears to be more realistic than in the other
alternatives. We have no choice as to whether
the chairman of the committee be a member of
the executive branch or the President's staff.
n. IL is noted that Section II is missing from the draft.
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o. Section 15B is obviously in error and not
intended to be a part of the Executive Order.
p. Two minor errors have been noted. In the
last sentence of the preamble the word
"invested" should be "vested. " In Section
1(b), line 3, page 2A, between the words "on"
and "important" there should be added the word
"jeopardizing" or the word "endangering. "
The DD/I reprosentative:a, Messrs.
concurred in the proposed revisions with reservations. They expressed
concern how the DD/I would implement specific portions of the proposed
Executive Order, Strict compliance with certain procedures in this
Executive Order concerning accountability for classified materials
would increase the volume of paper work in this Agency enormously.
This in turn would delay the processing of classified materials and the
production of finished intelligence and would require a very large
increase in CIA's clerical staff, especially in those components
responsible for the receipt, dissemination, storage and retrieval
of documents.
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The Acting Chairman said that the DD/I would have the oppor-
tunity to set forth their reservations in detail when the Committee's
final revision is sent through for coordination within the Directorates
and the OGC.
Adjournment: 1615 hours
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