LETTER TO(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01139A000300050016-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: October 27, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2006/E 92S"` IA-RDP80B01I39A0003000 16-9
V4W
Roan - Headquarters
Dear Bob,
This is just a personal and informal note de-
signed to give you for the record two main points:
(1) I want you to rest assured that NPIC will
always be at your service and ready to assist you
in any way as you pursue your tasks in the infor-
mation handling field, and (2) I want to register
my concern with the thrust of the memo to USIB
labelled CODIB-D-111/1.6/8 and dated 8 August
1967. I think this report as related to NPIC
matters is gratuitous, naive, inapplicable, super-
ficial, and in some respects overtaken by the
JIIRG Report, the NTP, and the establishment of
OOMIREX, etc. I understand that this report has
been referred by USIB to you. We hope it dies a
quick death. We would be happy to make our
concerns known specifically if you want us to, but
I think a reading of the report by you will bring
instant agreement.
Best regards,
proved For Release 2006/09 ,IA-RDP80B01139A000300050016-9
 Approved F,r Release 2006/09/25: CIA-RDP80B01?W3 A000316-9
Recommendations for invigorating and
coordinating the community's develop-
ment of data-handling systems.
R&D FOR INTELLIGENCE PROCESSING
CODIB Task Team VI I
The team considered conceptual and managerial aspects of estab-
lishing R&D programs for intelligence data handling to be more cru-
cial and more in need of immediate attention than technical aspects.
Rather than concern itself with what technical approaches should be
adopted, what type of equipment is best suited to a particular applica-
tion, and the like, it therefore sought answers to such questions as the
following. To what degree are the several USIB members' R&D
programs for intelligence data handling mutually supportive? Are
existing and planned programs adequate in size, balanced in content,
technically sound, and adequately organized, managed, and funded?
Can the technical leadership for such programs be improved? How
should policy be established for a coordinated community program?
What outstanding opportunities might be seized as immediate practical
objectives of R&D? How might shortcomings in present data handling
be translated into R&D requirements and communicated to the tech-
nical leadership of the community?
Community Objectives
The team set out to find a framework of R&D goals with respect to
data handling in the intelligence community to which to relate specific
managerial and technical tasks and within which to identify deficien-
cies and achievements. It discovered instead that the community, as
governed by USIB under established intelligence directives, has no
organized set of R&D objectives (except as NSA and NPIC are in-
1 Adapted from portions of its report dated 28 September 1965. The team,
charged in the preceding March with defining interagency goals for R&D in the
processing of intelligence data, had representation from all USIB agencies except
the FBI and AEC and the help of consultants provided by the National Science
Foundation. It was chaired by Dr. Ruth M. Davis of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense. This adaption does not necessarily reflect the views of USIB or its
Committee on Documentation; neither body has yet completed action on the report.
SECRET 43
Approved For Release 2006/09/25 : CIA-RDP80B01139PAMp0050016-9
 Ap rej i For Fase 2006/09/25: CIA-RDP80B0l139A 3ROQQ50016-9
dividually charged with R&D for their respective specialized pur-
poses), no policy for establishing objectives, and no mechanism for
either. Although the federal government as a whole has similarly
no explicitly stated R&D goals, there is a formal mechanism within
the executive branch for advising the President on R&D, coordinating
agency programs, and picking particular areas for concentrated atten-
tion-the Scientific Advisor to the President, his staff in the Office of
Science and Technology, and the panels and committees over which
he presides. The USIB community is represented in this mechanism
only insofar as its member agencies are individually represented.
The intelligence community in many ways functions as a self-
contained entity isolated from the rest of the federal structure by
organizational, managerial, and security barriers. This isolation causes
it little or no distress in operational affairs, but scientific and tech-
nical activities are another matter. Here the community is not self-
sufficient. These activities, not only managerial and R&D but testing,
engineering, evaluation, and implementation, are often delegated in
part or whole to groups outside the community.
Much such delegation of R&D on data handling is useful, often
essential. The bulk of technical competence in general information
handling-information sciences technology-lies outside the intelli-
gence community, and many aspects of intelligence data handling
are identical to those of general information handling. Multi-font
optical readers, for example, new storage media, large random-access
memories, automatic translation, and improved man-machine commu-
nications are needed equally in intelligence and outside. There is no
reason why USIB agencies should bear a disproportionate share of
such R&D costs. Sharing these with others should permit the intelli-
gence community to concentrate its limited resources on those data-
handling needs which are of unique or primary concern to its mis-
sions, not only those of NSA and NPIC but also the indications and
warning mission and many others.
Thus the concentration outside the intelligence community of tech-
nical competence with respect to intelligence data handling may be
viewed without alarm. Lack of competence within the community
in the applications of data-handling techniques to intelligence prob-
lems or systems is unjustified, however, and the team believes that
at present such competence is marginal at best. This belief is backed
by the frequent use of contractors for system design and development,
the mediocrity of data-handling techniques and systems currently
44
proved For Release 2006/09/25: CIA-RDP80B01139AOO 050016-9
Ap
 Approv l,f lease 2006/09/25: CIA-RDP80B011W00030gQ~%% ,6-9
used in the community, and the apparent lack of concrete planning
for the application of more sophisticated technology.
It is frequently asserted that a lack of federal or national objectives
can be compensated for by well-structured and documented individual
agency objectives, so it may be that well-founded USIB member
agency R&D objectives in intelligence data handling would provide
a suitable substitute for the lacking community goals. The task
team attempted, then, to discover individual agency objectives in
order to assess their suitability. It was found that DIA, the military
departments of DoD, and NSA had documented objectives. The
State Department had none. The existence of CIA objectives was
not determined, and the NSA objectives were not released to the
team. It was obvious, however, that the objectives identified were
not uniform in structure, were neither comprehensive nor cohesive,
were grossly incomplete with respect to managerial considerations, and
were not intended as guidelines for R&D efforts. It was necessary
to conclude that the aggregate of agency objectives could not substi-
tute for USIB objectives and that the individual objectives were of
little use in judging or interrelating R&D efforts planned or under way.
In view of the importance of R&D in intelligence data handling, the
need for sharing responsibility for it with groups outside the USIB
community, the absence of any USIB goals, policies, or mechanism to
further the necessary R&D, and the lack of coordination among present
and planned R&D efforts, the task team recommended a set of actions.
These actions are aimed at improving the managerial position of the
community not only in handling its internal operational requirements
but in its dealings with other federal offices and groups outside the
government. It appears axiomatic that both the community and its
member agencies will benefit in their individual and joint contacts
with outside entities if they can assume a uniform and professional
negotiating posture. The actions recommended are discussed below.
Policy mechanism. The USIB should set up a permanent body to
establish community objectives and policies for R&D in intelligence
data handling. This body should have representation from all mem-
ber agencies and a full-time executive secretary. It should coordinate
the agencies' objectives, plans, policies, and evaluations and be the
principal advisor to Chairman, USIB, in this field. In critical R&D
areas it might, if deemed advisable, develop its own plans and rec-
ApproveFd For Release 2006/09/25 : CIA-RDP80BOl139A000300050& 6-9
 CRET
Approv d For Oftease 2006/09/25 : CIA-RDP80B0113~ 0 3p0050016-9
R&D
ommend where the R&D responsibility should be delegated. It should
have authority to get information on the agencies' R&D planning and
budgeting but none to approve plans. Since its membership could
not have the technical competence necessary to cover the whole field
of intelligence data handling, it should have continuous access to
consultants both within and outside the community. It should meet
at least monthly.
Reporting service. The USIB should establish a formal mechanism
to disseminate technical information concerning current and planned
data-handling R&D in the community. This service would handle
only classified information, and it would utilize channels affording the
needed security. It would be given access to information in the
agencies, select that to be disseminated, and give it maximum sanitiza-
tion before dissemination. It has been found that linking technology
to the sponsoring organization or to the operational use for which it
is intended normally increases the security classification of a document
and consequently the inaccessibility of the technical data in it.
For open-source materials, existing information services appear to
be adequate. If it is found that they are not, additional requirements
can be levied on them so that the USIB reporting system does not
have to handle such easily accessible information.
The task team believes that the classified information can be drawn
from existing agency reporting mechanisms functioning with little
change. Bleed-off from these established systems should suffice ini-
tially, at least, and should serve to point up new requirements, if any,
which would have to be imposed on them. If judicious use is made
of individual agency personnel through the USIB policy body, this
reporting service should need funds only for administrative support-
clerical and mail services, etc.
Stimulation of personnel. Those responsible for R&D in intelli-
gence data handling need to be impressed with the importance of
keeping up with others' pertinent research and development. IDH/
R&D personnel should be vigorously encouraged, if not gently coerced,
to make use of the open-source information services available to them
as government employees. They should be subjected to scheduled
evaluation to measure their effectiveness, competence, and awareness
of current R&D. The importance of their functions in terms of the
responsiveness of the intelligence community to any situation, crisis
or normal, cannot be overestimated; and yet they exist as an un-
structured, unrecognized, and uncoordinated group with no group
allegiances and no reward-punishment mechanism.
roved For Release 2006/09/25: CIA-RDP80B01139A 0 8050016-9
 Approved HFor Release 2006/09/25: CIA-RDP80B01 3 A00030S050016-9 R*O
The task team had extreme difficulty in even identifying those re-
sponsible for R&D in intelligence data handling and certainly found
no IDH/R&D community. Many who had responsibility for a data-
handling project were not even aware of anyone else having similar
responsibilities. The policy body recommended above should estab-
lish an agreed-upon organizational listing of IDH/R&D components
and a directory of IDH/R&D personnel giving their individual
specialties.
IDH/R&D technical personnel presumably do not differ generally
in work habits from other government technical personnel. A DoD
study of the information usage habits of government scientists and
engineers made last spring should accordingly. be applicable to them,
and no separate survey of them should be needed. This DoD study,
along with other evidence, points to either misuse or inadequate use
of information services by technical personnel and attributes it pri-
marily to lack of instruction. The team's recommendation, therefore,
is that USIB arrange for the compilation of a report listing the 400-500
available information services and giving details on their accessibility
and procedures for their use. Twelve months after distribution of the
report, a study should be made to evaluate changes in information
usage patterns brought about by it. This could then be the basis for
recommendations for improvements. These measures-a directory of
IDH/R&D personnel, a report on available information services, and
a follow-up study of usage patterns-could be accomplished by a
contractor under USIB supervision.
Feedback system. Feedback from users of intelligence is not sys-
tematized, nor is the extent of feedback and its impact known. The
mechanisms now existing-post mortems, validity studies, field com-
ment, consumer comment-provide limited return and this largely
confined to National Intelligence Estimates. There has been little
contact between intelligence analysts and IDH/R&D personnel.
It would thus appear that the nature, level and extent of feedback
should be studied and the feasibility of more systematic dialogue
between producer and consumer at various levels explored. The
study would require the services of personnel particularly talented in
the production process to work with experts in techniques for evaluat-
ing output.
The Price of Inaction
If these recommendations are not accepted and some such line of
action taken, the intelligence community will continue vulnerable to
Approv o~ Release 2006/09/25 : CIA-RDP80B01139A00030005016-9
 Approved For Lase 2006/09/25 : CIA-RDP80B011390300050016-9
SECRET Imo. R&D
external investigative and evaluative groups, with no recognized nego-
tiating position from which to meet questions concerning intelligence
data handling. The field of information sciences and services is a
highly populated one in the scientific community. The product of the
intelligence community is information, and intelligence data handling
is analogous to information sciences technology. So one can expect
a high outside interest in the intelligence community's R&D in data
handling. Such interest is good and should; be maintained; and in-
vestigations can be extremely productive if a comprehensive picture
is presented to the investigators. But this has often not been the
case in the past.
It is elementary management doctrine that when there is a respon-
sible coordinating mechanism deficiencies are fewer and those which
do exist are easier both to find and to correct. It would help both the
external investigators and the community to have such a coordinating
mechanism. Regardless of how well intentioned an investigating
group may be, when the data presented it are fragmentary and not
interrelated, its recommendations are even more fragmentary and
unrelated to the real problems. They may "remove a thorn and by
so doing implant a tumor." The intelligence community can ill
afford any more such investigations.
Internally, the deleterious effects of having no over-all interagency
or USIB objectives or policy in data-handling R&D are felt in every
phase of the R&D activity. There is no structure on which to hang
R&D efforts other than the shapeless objective of satisfying users'
"requirements." The assignment to particular agencies of respon-
sibility for urgent projects is difficult; it must be done outside of
normal community channels when it is done at all. Failure to assign
responsibility results in duplicative efforts on the part of every agency
having some interest in the project; examples of this can be cited and
documented.
Security barriers prevent personnel in one agency from acquainting
themselves with R&D going on in another. Another lamentably fre-
quent occurrence is failure to set up any criteria against which to
judge when a particular R&D effort has been pursued far enough and
should either be abandoned or declared satisfactory.
The recommended USIB objectives and policies should be neither
so broad as to lose meaning nor so narrow as to be less than com-
prehensive in aggregate. To be useful, they should provide for mak-
ing the best possible use of community R&D laboratories, facilities,
A$Oroved For Release 2006/09/25: CIA-RDP80B01139A& 3050016-9
 Approved F pr Release 2006/09/25 : CIA-RDP80B0'1,9A00030e%p16-9
IDH R
funds, and manpower; they should authorize and encourage inter-
agency communication and coordination; they should make the most
of resources and results external to the community; they should re-
quire interchange between the community and other government
agencies and between the intelligence and scientific communities;
they must support federal objectives; and they should provide for
measuring their own impact on community requirements and in-
dividual agency resources. Without such policy and objectives, the
continuing development of more expensive equipment and more com-
plex and intellectually demanding technology will consume more and
more of the community's resources, even without unjustified duplica-
tion among the uncoordinated agencies.
As technology and R&D in data handling become more expensive,
in both talent and funding, the last ounce of usefulness should be
realized from every project. To this end IDH/R&D personnel should
be better informed about completed and current R&D efforts every-
where. As a rough estimate, one tenth of one percent of the intelli-
gence funds earmarked for data-handling R&D in FY 66, if spent on
improvement in the information usage patterns of IDH/R&D officers,
would give each of them throughout the community the equivalent of
a full semester of college-level education during the year. The im-
provement in the resultant R&D effort would conservatively be worth
100 to 1000 times that expenditure. The distribution of the recom-
mended listing of information services and encouragement to use
them is at least a slight first step toward such self-improvement.
Technical Considerations
In its effort to identify discrete areas of intelligence data handling so
as to relate the R&D' to managerial responsibilities, to applications,
to intelligence products, and to funding, the task team after a great
deal of deliberation chose two approaches. The first of these was to
classify data-handling R&D by application, and twenty-two types of
application were enumerated. These range from common ones like
calculation of movements (say trajectories), cryptanalysis, and docu-
ment retrieval to some that may not be obvious-the monitoring of
systems (say lie detection systems), image interpretation, pattern
recognition, predictive calculations (say 4n estimates), planning (say
of penetration operations), problem solving (say in inductive intelli-
gence analysis), etc. This listing provided a basis for assessing cur-
rent efforts and deficiencies.
Approvedt C-8Fkelease 2006/09/25 : CIA-RDP80BOl139A0003000500~96-9
 Approved For Rse 2006/09/25 : CIA-RDP80B01139300050016-9
5 ti.,rl R&D
The second approach was intended primarily to highlight ways in
which R&D in data handling could improve intelligence production
and management in the community. The team believes that such
R&D-comprising the development of theories, advanced techniques,
and equipment and the application of these to the subject in ques-
tion-should have the following aims:
Experimentation with and evaluation of existing data-handling
systems.
Development of criteria and measures for evaluating or designing
data-handling systems.
Improvement of management procedures for allocating resources
in the intelligence community.
Analysis of practices used in exploiting data and data sources.
Development and evaluation of information- or document-
handling systems.
Improvement of techniques for producing and evaluating finished
intelligence (e.g., quality control).
Development of validity criteria for information, including
criteria for data purging.
Development of improved procedures for intelligence training
(e.g., programed instruction).
Development of reporting mechanisms for R&D project funding
and managerial data.
This listing served to emphasize the findings of the task team con-
cerning the intelligence community's use of R&D resources in the
data-handling area. There is no question but that this gross func-
tional area is too large and diverse to be managed effectively as an
entity. As its many constituent parts become more sharply defined,
it undoubtedly will and should be split up so as to become more
manageable. But the greater problem at the moment appears rather
to be that a number of its essential sub-areas requiring improvement
are being neglected; they are not thought of as being a part of
intelligence data handling because of the parochial and limited view
taken by many toward this R&D area. It was concern over this
danger that prompted the above listing.
Another feature of R&D in intelligence data handling brought
out by the listing is the unmistakable way it transcends the respon-
sibilities and missions of individual agencies and so is indeed a USIB
community concern. Almost without exception the intelligence pro-
Approved For Release 2006/09/25 : CIA-RDP80B01139MO CQ0050016-9
 Approved For Release 2006/09/25: CIA-RDP80B01-3 A00030ffPV 6-9
IDH ~b
duced by a given agency forms merely one part of the required com-
munity product. Thus the R&D projects of a given agency need with
a few exceptions to recognize related requirements in other agencies;
community priorities rather than individual agency priorities for R&D
are needed; and a USIB mechanism is needed to coordinate and assign
R&D responsibilities among the agencies.
In the course of the research which led to these generalizations the
team uncovered certain R&D areas which seemed to demand in-
creased attention under any criteria that might be established. The
most critical single one of these is discussed below.
Indications Intelligence
Efforts to improve the processing of current intelligence information
for purposes of indications and warning have been under way since
1959. Although millions of dollars and hundreds of man-years have
been expended in applying automatic data processing to this effort,
the results to date have been disappointing. Because of this, the level
of funding for R&D in this field is currently low.
In analyzing the reasons for the past failures, it should be recognized
that indications is one of the most difficult fields in all of intelligence
processing. It is characterized by extremely high volumes of data,
a tendency for input data to be fragmentary, redundant, and of un-
known validity, wide variety in types of data, a dependence on all
types of collection, severe time restrictions on processing, a critical
importance for random and rare events, a tendency toward rapid
changes in focus of attention, and heavy dependence on predictive
evaluations. But the inherent complexity of the processing problem
has been aggravated by the inadequacy of preliminary studies under-
taken prior to system design. The intelligence objectives have usu-
ally been stated in such broad terms as to be practically useless to the
system designer. The designer has usually been versed in some
specific technology but not in intelligence. The intelligence analysts
have known very little about current technology and have been too
hard "pressed keeping up with their work to give enough time to the
system designer. The designers have concentrated heavily on statis-
tical techniques, particularly with reference to level of military ac-
tivity, which tend to obscure important anomalies rather than high-
light them.
The warning problem is more a problem of logical inference and
association than of statistics. Evaluations depend principally on the
Approve8f#CR elease 2006/09/25: CIA-RDP80BO1139A0003000500II-9
 Approved For Lase 2006/09/25 : CIA-RDP80B01139l 0300050016-9
RET lu. R&D
talents of the analyst-his inventiveness and imagination, his ability
to sense a pattern quickly, his inductive reasoning, in short, his
intelligence. R&D in this field must deal, therefore, with human fac-
tors to a large degree. While the human-factors area is one in which
there is much to be accomplished, it has been found to be one in
which accomplishment is most difficult. A spate of human-factors
work in recent years has led to a considerable amount of disillusion-
ment. Nevertheless, several topics in this area do offer promise and
should be considered in an R&D approach:
Data presentation. Many automated techniques can be used to ease
the burden of the analyst in having to handle large volumes of data
rapidly. Information can be so entered into a store that cumulative
data on any particular topic is immediately available. Large amounts
of information can be presented in simplified structure by automatic
arrangement into graphic form. Different fields of information can
be compared directly in combined displays and overlays. Time com-
parisons can similarly be made.
Time compression. Trends which may be too subtle for the analyst
to note with the normal passage of time can be amplified by time-
compression techniques to the threshold of recognition. Chrono-
logically successive displays can be viewed in greatly accelerated
time, and this process can be repeated (or reversed) at the analyst's
desire. Such techniques can be programed on a computer if the data
stores are properly arranged. In addition to bringing out past trends,
they might be useful in suggesting future trends, much like extrapolat-
ing a graph beyond its plotted positions.
Query languages. Not only have computers become more powerful
and economically available in recent years, the methods of utilizing
them have been greatly simplified. The recent advances in query
languages make the computer accessible for immediate intercommuni-
cation with the operator, so that it serves him as a direct adjunct and
tool. It is now possible, therefore, for an analyst to game a compli-
cated problem in fragmentary data analysis in which many probabilis-
tic variations have to be considered.
Communication fundamentals. The process of communication
among people involves far more than the simple transfer of informa-
tion. To be considered fully successful it must create a chain or
network of understanding. The physical sciences have mastered the
transfer of information. The behavioral sciences have not been so
successful in the communication of understanding. This is a critical
proved For Release 2006/09/25 : CIA-RDP80B011390050016-9
 Approved dH o R lease 2006/09/25: CIA-RDP80B0l 1 0030 SECRET -9
handicap for the analyst seeking to establish meaning from frag-
mentary information. R&D studies in the behavioral sciences might
answer questions like these: Would the establishment of common
goals improve the quality of communication in the warning process?
Would personal contact improve understanding among the people
concerned? Would group activity among analysts (like "brain-storm-
ing") heighten their imagination and contribute to solutions?
If one were to attempt now to design an ADP system to assist the
indications analyst, the following methodological avenues would have
to be explored:
Document search.
Interrogation of intelligence analysts.
Observation of current manual analytic processes.
Experience with previous automatic systems.
Research on types of indicators.
Analysis of the intelligence infrastructure supporting the system.
Manipulation of the ADP system under laboratory conditions.
Previous systems designers have confined their efforts almost ex-
clusively to the first four methods, probably because these are gen-
erally straightforward and the least costly. Inadequate effort has
been expended on indicator research and the infrastructure, virtually
none on laboratory trials. As a result, there has been little more than
an attempt to automate some part of what is already being done
manually. The value of such an effort is highly questionable, given
the inherent superiority of the human mind over machine capability
in such areas as judgment, imagination, and inductive reasoning.
With reference to indicators, lengthy lists have been prepared by
various intelligence organizations, some officially adopted by the
USIB. The individual indicators are identified as ominous events or
conditions which it is assumed would occur prior to hostilities. But
until recently very little effort was expended on developing lists of
specific phenomena that particular collectors should look for as evi-
dence that these ominous events or conditions are taking place. Thus
what is needed is extensive research to list such indicators of the
indicators, the assignment of individual items on such lists to appro-
priate collection activities, a reporting system designed for rapid com-
munication and processing, and extensive collation of the results in
the respective indications centers.
Approve FERTelease 2006/09/25 : CIA-RDP80B0l139A0003000500 -9
 Approved For lease 2006/09/25 : CIA-RDP80B0113 00300050016-9
SECRET i,,rl R&D
The success or failure of any automated system is heavily dependent
on the related intelligence infrastructure-coding systems, field for-
mats, communications systems (including digital data links), inter-
face between intelligence organizations, etc. Yet system designers
working in the field of current intelligence have traditionally focused
their attention on information within a particular intelligence organi-
zation treated in isolation. The result has been that, on the one hand,
only a part of the data available on any given subject ever enters
the system, and on the other hand, the effort required to convert into
machinable form information available from other organizations
swamps the personnel assigned to the task. Only by treating a given
subject area, say Cuban ground forces order of battle, in its totality
can an effective ADP system be developed for it.
All too little effort has been expended in attempting to analyze
in depth the methods of analysis now utilized in current intelligence.
It is unlikely that this can be done in the operational environment
of an indications center because research and development cannot be
permitted to interfere with its regular day-to-day work. What is
needed, therefore, is a testing of analysis techniques using live in-
formation in a separate facility, as it were a laboratory, and compari-
son of the results with the regular product of the indications center.
In this manner some of the areas which today are considered so diffi-
cult but which seem to offer great potential, such as cross correlation
of different subject files (e.g., personnel movements with missile
tests), can be explored in depth.
In summary, although the results of past efforts to improve process-
ing capabilities in indications intelligence have been disappointing, the
task is not impossible and general lines of approach can be drawn. It
is believed that the present range of manual analysis can be extended
significantly through these new approaches.
For Immediate Action
The task team selected five of its recommendations as in its view
requiring immediate action. These are listed below. They are not
in order of importance or urgency; the team believes they should all
be adopted. They are not interdependent, however, and any one
or any combination of them could stand alone.
The establishment of an R&D policy body to advise the Chairman,
USIB. Without such a body there is nothing to which the
vKpproved For Release 2006/09/25: CIA-RDP80B01139$M?f"b0050016-9
 ApprovedffFor &IPase 2006/09/25 : CIA-RDP80B01139'"AO00300 50016 9
0 SECRET
accomplishment of R&D projects in intelligence data handling
can be related or addressed.
Improvement of indications intelligence. Early expensive failures
in this field have no doubt resulted in burnt fingers; but both
techniques and equipment have since improved, and new efforts
should be undertaken.
Heightened use of information services. This can be promoted
by compiling and disseminating a report on all information
services of use to IDH/R&D officers and how to use them.
Then a survey of usage patterns should follow.
The establishment of criteria for evaluating data-handling sys-
tems. For this purpose two different types of systems now in
use might be singled out for systematic experimentation and
evaluation. In the past, IDH systems have been developed to
meet recognized requirements but without benefit of authorita-
tive criteria to insure that the requirement was fulfilled. It is
anticipated that the development of such criteria will be costly
in both people and resources, but the cost is justified in view
of the extremely large amounts that have been spent on un-
successful developments.
The establishment of a feedback mechanism from consumers of
intelligence to producers and IDH/R&D personnel. No mech-
anism exists to measure and make known the results of good
or bad usage of existing data-handling capabilities in the pro-
duction of finished intelligence. Results are written up and
utilized by USIB with very little if any follow-up to assess
why an estimate proved to be incomplete or in error. An in-
formal review group is recommended which would determine
whether or not the IDH capabilities were adequately exploited
and all the available data properly used. This would encourage
producers of finished intelligence to work more closely with
IDH/R&D personnel. An initial analysis to determine feasible
feedback techniques would require about one year.
SECRET r, r,
Approved or Release 2006/09/25 : CIA-RDP80B01139A0003000500-9
 --?---Approvedf For use 2M6I09/25 CIA-RDP80B0113600300050016-9
SECRET
4 April 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, CODIB
SUBJECT Final Report of Task Team VI - Research and
Development. CODIB-D-111/1.6/5
1. CIA recommends that the Report of Task Team VI be noted
by CODIB. If there develops CODIB agreement on a set of recommendations
to forward to USIB on the subject of this report, this agency proposes that
another form of report -- perhaps comparable to the form submitted by
the author to Studies in Intelligence and published therein in the Spring
1966 issue -- be prepared to accompany the recommendations.
2. The Agency has previously indicated acceptance of the first
recommendation. Such an agency mechanism exists in CIA at present.
3. A concerted Community effort --The Schute Report -- is
underway on recommendation 2 at the present time. CODIB is in no
position to strengthen or to effect an activity of the sort recommended
in the subject report. This recommendation should be dropped.
4. The third recommendation is valid. It seems to us moot
as to how this information might best be developed. The establishment of
a series of policy reference points may provide the sort of access to
R&D activity which is required, particularly if combined with C. 1. a. on
page 48.
5. The objective of the fourth recommendation is valid. The
implicit test conditions are at best unclear and perhaps unnecessary to the
recommendation.
6. There has been a continuous effort by all members of the
Community to achieve the objective of the fifth recommendation. It
GAai:P 1
_ Exchda tram z:rtcmatic
Approved For Release 2006/09/6 "6- 14 P80B0113 A Q O'"00`60dl6-9
 Approved For Rai .te 2006/09/25 : CIA-RDP80B0l139 0300050016-9
SECS 6,
would seem enough to us to observe that we can never cease such activity
even as it may be well to observe we can probably never achieve the
clarity of understanding we all seek.
7. Under the catch-all recommendations, a, b, and c are valid.
The remaining recommendations are under active development in the
Community at the present time and with the exception of Dare beyond 45^ 1/-N
the responsibility and authority of CODIB in any -event.
CIA Member
SECRET
-2-
Approved For Release 2006/09/25 : CIA-RDP80B0l139A000300050016-9