STAGE I REPORT OF THE STAFF FOR THE COMMUNITY INFORMATION PROCESSING STUDY (SCIPS)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01139A000200100014-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 84
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: March 16, 1964
• Content Type: MF

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USLB-D-39. 7/5
16 March 1964
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT Stage I Report of the Staff for the Community
Information Processing Study (SCIPS)
REFERENCES : a. USIB-D-39. 7/1, 24 July 1961
b. USIB-D-39. 7/3, 23 February 1962
c. USIB -M-202, 23 February 1962
1. The attached report on the subject, submitted by the Committee
on Documentation (CODIB) pursuant to USIB direction in reference c.,
is circulated herewith for consideration by the USIB.
2. The attachment hereto consists of a report by CODIB containing
recommendations for USIB action, to which are appended the following:
Tab A - Volume I of the SCIPS Report containing the Summary,
Conclusions, and Recommendations of that Report, together with a Table
of Contents for all volumes.
Tab B - A selection of 20 of 193 charts from the body of the
SCIPS Report.
Tab C - A report of the Consultant Panel Evaluation of the
SCIPS Report.
3. The remaining Volumes It through VI of the SCIPS Report are
available to USIB member agencies through their respective CODTB
members.
GROUP 1
Excluded fromtornatis
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16 March 1964
USIB Action Requested
4. The attached Report will be scheduled on the agenda of an early
USIB meeting for appropriate USIB action along the following lines:
a. Noting the Stage I SCIPS Report and the Consultant
Panel Evaluation thereof.
b. Consideration of the Report of CODD3 attached hereto, with
specific reference to the recommendations for USIB approval contained in
pages 20, 21 and 22 thereof.
Attachment
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Executive ecreary
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. SECRET
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION
Stage 1 Report of the Staff for the Community
Information Processing Study (SC IPS)
USIB?D-39.7/5
CODIB?D-82/28
GROUP I
Excluded from outornatic
SECRET downProding ..d
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and '794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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USIB-D-39.7/5 CODIB-D-82/28
26 February 1964
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION
Stage I Report of the Staff for the Community Information
Processing Study (SCIPS)
REFERENCES: (a) USIB-D-39.7/1, 24 July 1961
(b) USIB-D-39.7/3, 23 February 1962
(c) USIB-M-202, 23 February 1962
1. This is a report on Stage I of the Community Information Processing Study
which was undertaken by CODIB pursuant to USIB direction contained in Reference (c).
The original terms of reference were set forth in Reference (a) and modified and
reduced in scope in Reference (b), which constitutes the Stage I plan for this study,
completion of which is now reported.
2. Information processing, as used in the SCIPS Stage I Report and in this
report, includes those activities sequentially following initial or field acquisition
and preceding intelligence analysis, except that language translation and photo
interpretation activities are included. Thus the term as used by SCIPS is primarily
concerned with receipt, dissemination, indexing, storage and retrieval functions.
GROUP I
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3. The directive to the Staff called tit ssentially for doing four things:
a. To inventory intelligence information holdings;
b. To measure the flow of information between intelligence activities;
c. To recommend format and indexing specifications, particularly as
required by automated systems;
d. To recommend what further study should be made in the information
processing area (defined as the portion of the intelligence cycle
between the collection of information and the production of
intelligence therefrom).
4. The SCIPS Report does include an inventory of intelligence information
holdings (or files) in a large part of the Intelligence Community; and it identifies
and has measured the flow of information between the many components surveyed.
The study effort did not yield the hoped-for specifications, because automated
systems generally have not been implemented or in some cases even developed
to a level where input requirements are determinable. Recommendations are made
concerning what to do next.
5. Our plan of presentation in this paper is first, to comment on the study
effort itself, since this is necessary to an understanding of what the Report is or
Is not; second to summarize the major SCIPS findings with CODIB comment thereon,
giving cross-references to the relevant portions of the SCIPS Report; third, to
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present some additional CODIB observations; fourth, to present our own (i.e.,
CODIB's) recommendations for USIB action.
COMMENTS ON THE STUDY EFFORT
6. The SCIPS Report consists of six volumes; its sheer bulk and various
classifications preclude its submission as a single unit. Volume I, which contains
the Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations as well as a Table of Contents
for all volumes, is attached hereto as Tab A. The remaining volumes are being
forwarded separately to the USIB member agencies. A selection of 20 of 193
charts from the body of the report is also attached as Tab 13. Z.To minimize possible
misinterpretation of the charts, they should be studied together with the text of
? Volume H, of which they are a part./
7. In spite of the necessary curtailment of the scope of the survey as originally
conceived, the results represent the most comprehensive fact-finding study of this
kind that has yet been undertaken in the Intelligence Community, covering perhaps
one half of the Community's information processing activities. The extensive data base
that has been created will continue for some time to yield information of considerable
value to the individual participating agencies as well as to the community as a whole.
This data base consists of the Stage I Report itself and, in addition, exhibits, survey
forms, punched cards, magnetic tape files, tally sheets, and machine listings.
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The machined portion contains statistical information on the kinds and quantities of
people, equipment, files, processes, documents and document movement in the
Intelligence Community. The analysis contained in the SCIPS report, although
appreciable, has not by any means exhausted the potential of the data.
8. Softie '250 organizational components were considered to be Of significance
in the total processing system; 62 were covered in the Stage I study. Of this number,
42 were surveyed on site by members of the SCIPS Staff who had themselves
participated in the formulation of the intricate and detailed survey system described
in the report. These surveyors, on assignment from the various USIB agencies,
were almost all experienced intelligence officers in the senior grades, some of
them with extensive backgrounds in the area of information processing, but
virtually none with previous experience in this type of systems study. Another
10 components were surveyed by SCIPS personnel from existing documents and the
10 remaining were surveyed on site by personnel provided by the component being
studied. The average size of the SCIPS Staff during this exercise was 15; a total of
81 persons participated in the Study for varying periods of time. A list of all of the
components covered is given in Volume V, Appendix G, Section XIV h.
9. Some conception of the magnitude of the SCIPS effort may be obtained
by citing a few statistics from the report. Almost 3000 different units, many of
which are outside the Intelligence Community, were identified as sending or
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receiving intelligence items. In size these might vary from a one-man attache
post to a 1500-man reconnaissance squadron. About 7000 personnel were recorded
in the components surveyed. The SCIPS Data Base identified some 14,000 individual
Intelligence items, primarily document or publication series, such as the ME, the
Air Force Information Report, or PRAVDA. Of the total, some 10,000 were in the
foreign publications field. It is estimated that there are annually about 7 million
issues of various intelligence items which are produced in about 150 million copies.
More than 1000 files of great diversity in composition and varying in size from under
100 to over 9,000,000 records were identified in the activities studied. It is estimated
that there are 220 million unit records in the central reference files of the Community
(excluding analyst, management, archival files and the like) and tnat the present net
growth of these files is at the rate of 30 million unit records per year - a doubling
in seven years. Of the total number of unit records, about 35% or 78 million are
in files using some degree of mechanization; about half of these consist of punched
card indexes to hard copy document files. Not counting oral responses, the
components surveyed service over one million requests per year for documents or
other file outputs, only 2b% of which are levied directly from elements external
to the organizations maintaining the files.
10. In order to obtain the benefits of an objective and independent analysis
of the results of the Stage I study, a panel of outside experts in related fields
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was convened to review the data base and the findings over a period of five days.
The following served in this capacity:
Mr. Willard R. Fazar, Bureau of the Budget
Dr. John H. Kennedy, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
In addition, Dr. William 0. Baker, Vice President (Research), Bell Laboratories,
and a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, spent a
day at SCIPS headquarters while the panel was in session. The report of the panel
has been considered by CODIB in reaching its conclusions and is attached as Tab C
for information.
11. The members of CODIB, members of the SCIPS Staff, and others spent
25X1 two days at
for the purpose of reviewing the report
and its findings. The group was unanimous in concluding that the SCIPS Staff,
25X1 and in particular its director, should be commended for
a useful job well done.
12. A word should be said about the factual data reported and the conclusions
reached by SCIPS. In the main, the information may be considered one year old,
though it varies in age from 8 to 24 months. However, since processing procedures
change more slowly than organizations or subject interests, it is believed that
these data will remain valid and useful for some time even if not updated. It should
further be noted that not all conclusions reached by SCIPS were derived directly
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from the factual data alone. Some conclusions were reached as a result of the broad
experience acquired by the Staff during their long and intensive exposure to the survey's
environment, supplemented by a high degree of expertise in this field that some of them
already possessed. Conclusions so reached may be no less valid or valuable, but
the reader should know that judgment as well as fact played parts in their formulation.
Those conclusions which seem less valid or even, in our judgment,, invalid if based
on the data accumulated will be noted in the CODIB comments. The mixture of
subjective conclusions with a presentation perhaps sometimes overdrawn for purposes
of emphasis, presents a picture of the Intelligence Community which must be carefully
examined if misinterpretation or unsound action are to be avoided.
13. One further note. The study consists, virtually, of a picture of considerable
size of files and flows. By its terms of reference it did not study the analyst - the user
of these files and the recipient of these flows. Hence, some of the dynamics of the
situation are missing. We know a good deal about what goes on, but little about why.
Moreover, the study deals primarily with the flow of documents, not of information;
careful consideration must be given any recommended action to insure that its impact
would not impair the flow of information.
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SELECTED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE SCIPS EFFORT
14. The SCIPS effort was, first of all, a pioneering venture to determine
whether such a comprehensive and complex investigation was in fact feasible.
It was launched with few precedents for guidance and carried out on the basis of
curtailed terms of reference and with limited manpower. Nevertheless, the first
conclusion of this report, and perhaps the most significant one, is that the SCIPS
effort has indeed demonstrated that such a study is feasible. It has succeeded in
developing a highly useful methodology for gathering, collating and evaluating a
great mass of valuable data on information processing for the use of management
at various levels of the Community.
15. The "findings" which are contained in Volumes II and VI of the SCIPS
Report, and summarized in Volume I, attached hereto, constitute the main product
of this survey. Given below, in very abbreviated form, is a selection of some of
the major broad findings and conclusions of the report as well as a few selected
problems which hold promise for special study.
Selected Findings
a. Systems
(1) The present USIB "systems" are strongly oriented to method
of collection of information. There is, however, an apparent
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absence of an effective information correlation capability
across sources (human observation, photography, SIGINT, etc.).
(See Section I, A, 1, Vol . I)
CODIB Comment: The intent here, we gather, is to indicate
that existing retrieval systems are not sufficiently all-
source oriented to ensure that all information relevant to
a given request but originating either from sensitive
compartmented sources or sources whose products are
indexed by different techniques is made available by a
request to files. With this we agree. There is information
flow between analysts which was outside the scope of the
study and which can be quite effective even though often
fortuitous rather than controlled.
(2) Because of the number, size, organization and orientation of
existing files, it may often be more expeditious to reacquire a
specific item of information from the field than to determine
that it has already been acquired, where it has been filed, and
to retrieve it therefrom. (See Section I, A, 1. Vol. I)
CODIB Comment: This is, in part, based on SCIPS judgment,
not supported except indirectly by the collected data. Some
controls do exist to assist in reducing unnecessary collection
and to attempt to insure that information sought isn't already
on file; their extent and effectiveness were beyond the scope
of the study.
(3) The information holdings of the Comrounity generally appear
to be deficient in their capability to make available the results
of individual analysis of reports or items of information.
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There is not sufficient motivation for analyst input (feedback)
into the data base nor is such input facilitated. (See Section I,
8,7,b, Vol. I)
CODIB Comment: While positive steps are being taken in some
agencies to overcome this problem, it certainly does exist;
it is true that such feedback has not been obtained on an
organized basis in the past. It must be remembered, that
the SCIPS conclusion relates only to central files; analysts'
conclusions are maintained in thousands of files in the
organizations surveyed or in finished intelligence which is
not indexed in depth. Such conclusions in file could be
separate, identifiable entries and are, theoretically,
retrievable; we would agree that such feedback should be a
part of information systems design.
b. Information Control
(1) The present system fails to exercise significant content control
coding early enough in the processing cycle to permit effective
filter operations and thus to prevent the movement of large
quantities of redundant information throughout the successive
processing levels of the Community. (See Section I, A, 2, Vol. I)
CODIB Comment: This finding, although probably true, does not
rise directly from the data gathered. Since the SCIPS analysis
covered, essentially, document flows, not information, the
degree of redundancy cannot be determined. This problem
deserves study in its own right, but careful distinction between
corroboration and redundancy would be required; the feasibility
of attempting this distinction at the publication point rather than
in an analytical environment is not clear. The logic of attempting
to stem the paper flood somehow, is clear.
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(2) There is a proliferation of copies of items of information at all
levels for local use, and for lateral and onward distribution
with or without analysis. Because of the tendency for the
source identification to become progressively obscured during
the processing cycle, the consumer may receive both raw and
processed information without knowing that they both emanate
from the same original source. (See Section 1,A, 2, Vol. I)
CODIS Comment: This finding represents an overstatement of the
available facts. In gross terms (total no. of copies 14,000
items), an average of 20 copies of each issue are produced,
although some 500 items are common to many files, hence the
copy average is much higher. There seems little basis for
evaluating whether this is too many or too few. Our inclination
Is to agree subjectively that, in general, there is a proliferation
of copies and that there is a possibility that repeated information
can enter the production cycle undetected. False confirmation
is bad in even one case but the extent to which it occurs is not
determinable from the SCIPS data. On the other hand the survey
Itself found considerable space in machine records devoted to
the identification of sources.
c. Information Exchange
(1) In the area of information exchange within the Community,
there is an apparent tendency for all elements to attempt to
acquire everything in order to be reasonably sure of obtaining
what is actually needed. In view of the size, variety, and
dispersion of the items and files identified in this study, it is
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doubtful that, even under the present policy of "full exchange
of information", an analyst can in fact be held responsible for
considering all pertinent available information. (See Section I,
B,1, Vol. I).
CODIB Comment: This finding in one sense is contrary to the
facts collected by SCIPS, since there is evidence that if
organizations are "trying" to acquire everything they are not
successful; the data shows that no one agency gets everything
and that duplication of input to files is not as extensive as
intuitively thought. No factual basis for amment on the
undesirability of what overlap does exist can be derived from
the SCIPS data. We are agreed that it is both desirable and
possible through retrieval systems to better organize, across
sources, information relevant to an analysts needs. When
this is done, the analyst can feel more sure of his access to
more relevant information than is now the case.
(2) On the other hand, the study of item-flow in the Community
does not support the view that all or most elements are now
getting everything, whatever their intent; on the contrary,
the danger exists that items are missed by those who should
have them. (See Section I, B,5, Vol. I)
CODIB Comment: This danger is inevitable. See CODIB recommendations
below for ameliorative action.
d. Indexing and Item Identification
There does not exist at present a single set of indexing tools
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which will fill a majority of the Community's needs.
(See Section I, B, 2, Vol . I)
CODIB Comment: Concur.
e. Report Formatting
Survey results on the status of report formatting requirements
for automatic input were essentially negative. The present
state-of-the-art in Information Processing does not permit
automatic input except to a very limited degree and the present
systems are generally not developed to a level where requirements
for such inputs are determinable. (See Section I, B, 3, Vol. I)
CODIB Comment: The statement made above that automatic input is
beyond the state-of-the-art is for the most part true but has
been overtaken somewhat, and in limited areas, by events;
specifically, systems for automatic input processing of air
movements reports and shipping intelligence have been
demonstrably effective. The development of the World Wide
Military Command and Control System can be expected to lend
further impetus to the development of formatting requirements.
? f. Systems Integration
The most pressing problems of systems integration or
interface appear to be between components within agencies
rather than between agencies. (See Section I, B, 4, Vol. I)
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CODIB Comment: This statement is probably true and deserves
careful consideration. This is not to say that information
processing does not warrant Community consideration to a
considerably greater degree than it has had to date -- it does;
but this finding does reflect a logical first-things-first
philosophy. (See Recommendation 6.d.)
The State-of-the-Art
A state-of-the-art survey was not made in Stage I. However,
many computer applications were observed and the SCIPS data
base itself constituted an actual application from which valuable
experience was obtained. The report raises doubts whether the
present general-purpose computers will ever solve the bulk
information processing problems of the substantive Intelligence
Community and yet points out that the use of ADP remains one of
the few hopes for real progress. The present computers are
generally successful when used for highly structured and
circumscribed processing of specific problems but may not
offer much promise as a base upon which to build an entire
information processing system. (See Section I,B,4 and 7
and Section II, A, Vol. I).
CODIB Comment: U. S. intelligence elements must learn towalk
before they run. Mass storage techniques are demonstrating
considerable utility in intelligence information processing.
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The 'promise" of ADP should not be underestimated any more
than overestimated. Present R&D programs on non-numerical
data processing, automatic input devices, associative memories,
etc., show more promise than is reflected by this finding; however,
the magnitude of the basic problem suggests that the present effort
may be both inadequate and unbalanced.
Major Conclusions
h. Content Control Coding
In order to improve our ability to deliver potentially
significant information in forms useful for exploitation and
to allocate limited exploitation resources, there are needed
immediate system-wide adjustments leading to sufficient
information content control coding to provide for adequate
cross-source correlation. Content control coding must be
applied at a point where items of information are being put
into comprehensible report form but before great numbers of
copies have been released. This means that this control and
filtering must be introduced at an early stage in processing and
must apply to information obtained from all forms of intelligence
collection. Such a uniform system of shallow content control
coding, applied early enough in the processing cycle would
permit identification and elimination of redundant reporting
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and thus provide more specific information support
than is supplied by the present dissemination system.
(See Sections I, A, 1 and 2 and I, B, 1 and 2, Volume I)
1. Standard Item Identification System
There is need for instituting a standard method for identifying
information items throughout the Community in order to provide
for more efficient management of flow, procesing, and filing.
A standard item identification system combined with a standard
coding system would constitute a significant first step in inter-
system compatibility and data exchange on a Community scale.
(See Section I, B, 2, Volume 1)
j. System Identification
There is evident a great need to develop in detail the specifications
of the intelligence information processing problems to be solved
as a basis for applied research and systems engineering directed
at new EDP solutions. The SCIPS Field Survey System is one of
the best tools thus far developed to assist in such an undertaking.
(See Section I, B, 4, Volume I).
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Selected Special Problems
k. In the course of their broad systems studies, SCIPS also
undertook certain vertical analyses on a problem basis in
special areas that seemed to offer fruitful opportunities for
improved operations. Among these were foreign publications,
biographic reporting, and photographic interpretation.
For example, they have pointed to significant advantages
that would accrue from the establishment of a central
bibliographic reference system for foreign publications,
while leaving exploitation in this field on a decentralized
basis as at present. In the biographic field mutual sharing
of certain types of information and processing techniques
might prove to be profitable. Photographic intelligence is
cited as an activity which would lend itself to standardization
of report forms and of selected procedures throughout the
Co malty. (See Appendix F, Volume II; Section III, B, 5,
Volume Ti; and Appendix H, Volume VI)
RELATION OF SCIPS FINDINGS TO CURRENT UNDERTAKINGS
16. There remains the need to ascertain what impact the present findings
should have upon steps recently taken by the Intelligence Community to accelerate
the search for solutions to critical information processing problems.
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17. In his report* to the Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, the DCI on 9 September stated that USIB would:
"a. Consider the feasibility of establishing a national service
of common concern to centrally index all documents now
being processed on a decentralized basis. The index data
so developed would be available to all the members of the
Community.
"b. Consider organizing a small permanent group of technical
experts from within the Community whose sole responsibility
would be to concentrate on technical information processing
problems in the Community."
Further, that the "USIB will undertake to accelerate external research in perfecting
the art of processing language automatically."
18. The SCIPS Report is not directly responsive to the question of a central
documents indexing activity (para. 17.a. above), but such findings as do relate to
this question suggest that other problems may be more pressing (e.g., biographic
*See: CODIB-D-107/4, 16 Sept 63, paras. 6 and 7
CODIB-D-56/1, 14 Oct 63
CODIB-D-107/5, 18 Oct 63
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Intelligence, and open publications referred to on page 17 above). The finding that
a single deep indexing system is presently unfeasible is directly relevant to the
question. In addition, it was the consensus of the SCIPS group that such a central
indexing activity is both unnecessary and unwise. This proposal should be re-examined
in the future when state-of-the-art developments indicate that a new look might be in
order.
19. The proposal (para. 17.b. above) to organize a small permanent group of
technical experts from within the Community is similar to the SCIPS recommendation
that either a Systems Coordination Staff or a Community Operations Research Center
be created. What needs yet to be determined is what each USIB member agency would
wish such an organization to accomplish that could not be accomplished without
creating new machinery. In any event, experience indicates that the establishment
of a competent permanent staff might take years. CODIB, therefore, supports the
establishment of ad hoc groups, supported by a full time secretariat, to tackle the
major problems identified by SCIPS.
20. As to steps taken to accelerate research in the art of processing non-
numerical data automatically (para. 17 above), General Carter on 17 October wrote
the Scientific Advisor to the President for his views on how best to proceed
inasmuch as this matter is of concern to the entire Government. The response,
dated 24 February, is now under study in CIA. Copies have been sent to CODIB
members for information.
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21. The SCIPS Report underlines a fact recognized by USIB in authorizing
the study; namely, that USIB will in the future find it necessary to devote more
attention to the information processing portion of the intelligence cycle than has
hitherto been the case.
22. Cost considerations: The immediate cost implication of the following
25X1 recommendations is limited to
Office space would be required and best
provided either in CIA or DIA Headquarters, or, perhaps, at a midway point such
25X1 as
Additional costs not estimable in any firm
sense now would include the part-time services of departmental representatives
on ad hoc groups such as those suggested in Recommendation 4 below. Long range
costs of stimulating standardization of processes or equipment compatibility are
impossible to forecast, but a corollary purpose in developing a Community approach
toward information processing is the introduction of economies, particularly in
research and development and large-scale computer-based systems design.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that USIB:
1. Note the general findings and conclusions of the SCIPS Stage I Study;
2. Request the several member agencies to study the detailed findings
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as set forth in the six volumes of the report, plus the SCIPS data base, with a view
to relating these findings to their own processing problems;
3. Direct CODIB to establish a permanent Executive Secretariat of
five persons;
4. Direct CODIB to establish ad hoc groups to) .(:) .Lttt-, -)goll 6-sa :
a. Develop the Community coordinated content control code.
b. Develop and publish a standard item list.
c. Develop and implement standarized item description lists.
d. Develop a standard installation description format.
e. Develop a Community coordinated R&D program in the areas of
non-numerical data processing, associative memories, and machine translation.
. Develop a biographic intelligence processing plan.
g. Develop a coordinated plan for processing bibliographic data on
foreign publications.
h. Develop proposals for improved analyst-to-analyst communication,
including the feasibility of a centralized Intelligence Community directory service.
i. Develop a standard photographic chip, exploring the feasibility of
.,
adopting the recently developed DoD standard.
ie. Extend USIB-S- 3.1/4, subject: Automatic Data Processing, dated
,
24 M S' 1963/c c er th evelo ent of data fi and sy- ems y rary a d the
?
(9-
exchang of file for al types, f intell gence data.
1 -D4-1/44(0i) 6 piaLA. Pero a A a..k cs, -(- 14.s a.).,_ i C-tpicu.i..5 111.Lria,tti gta.l i IL.
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4-Y c La-u-ftppko*LtoraReMtast,39.914/1/08,:t511-R12*P8SX1.11i262?022R4Onia Z..;
ytu 0, 0-uski r.,19 rAvvt i. u..4.4..,4 Lisi )3 - S- t . I ) 44- .
.?
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6. Pending establishment of the Executive Secretariat, direct CODIB to
continue the Director, SCIPS, and a small staff (CIA-2; DIA-2) on duty to:
a. Provide referral service from the SCIPS Data Base;
b. Prepare for CODIB consideration additional guidelines for
the further development and implementation of procedures for improving information
processing in the Intelligence Community;
c. Review the SCIPS data on hand to evaluate the success of present
storage and retrieval systems by types of system and agency;
d. Develop for CODIB consideration a workable policy on responsibility
of agency reference facilities as Community resources;
7. Authorize the release of this CODIB Report to Mr. Bundy for
information and as indication of actions taken to date relevant to Intelligence
Objective No. 3 of his letter of 17 June 1963.
8. Authorize the release of this CODIB Report and the SCIPS Report to
the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, pursuant to Mr. Coyne's
request therefor of 30 September 1963.
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SECRET
STAFF FOR THE COMMUNITY
INFORMATION PROCESSING STUDY
(SCI PS)
STAGE I REPORT
Volume I
Summary and Conclusions, Recommendations,
A List of References, and A List of Illustrations
October 1963
25X1
SECRET
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Published by
the
Central Intelligence Agency
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SECRET
STAFF FOR THE COMMUNITY INFORMATION PROCESSING STUDY
STAGE I REPORT
Volume I
25X1
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, A LIST OF REFERENCES,
AND A LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
October 1963
SECRET
25X1
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STAFF FOR THE COMMUNITY INFORMATION PROCESSING STUDY
(sciPs)
SCIPS D-2/3
17 October 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board
THROUGH : Chairman, Committee on Documentation,
United States Intelligence Board
SUBJECT : Transmittal of Stage I Report
REFERENCE (a) CODIB D-82/9 and USIB D-39.7/1, 24 July 1961
(Terms of Reference)
(b) CODIB D-82/16 and USIB D-39.7/31 23 February 1962
(Stage I Plan)
(c) USIB M-202, 28 February 1962
Transmitted in accordance with references is the SCIPS Stage I
report, which is submitted in six volumes. Volumes II through VI are
of varying security classifications and are published under separate
cover. Volume I, forwarded herewith, contains the summary and con-
clusions, the recommendations, a list of references, and a list of
illustrations, together with a table of contents for all volumes.
Director/SCIPS
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FOREWORD
The USIB Committee on Documentation (CODIB), like its sister com-
mittees, exists as a mechanism for interagency coordination of an in-
telligence activity. In the case of CODIB the activity being coordi-
nated is that activity called "information processing" (IP). Informa-
tion processing is that central part of the intelligence cycle between
intelligence collection and intelligence analysis-production. There
is relatively common agreement as to what activities belong in the core
of the IF sector, but the edges are not so distinct or agreed. This
vagueness of boundaries is due to (1) an inability to agree on useful
criteria as to when "information" becomes "intelligence" and (2) the
fact that formal organizational structure is influenced by many factors
other than functional division. With this situation pertaining, it is
very safe to say that CODIB is not the only USIB committee trying to
coordinate in the area of information processing. But it was CODIB
that conceived and initiated and (with subsequent support from the
Joint Study Group and the Director's Coordination Staff) was given
monitorship by USIB over a unique study effort known as SCIPS (Staff
for the Community Information Processing Study). The term "unique" is
an understatement of description. The SCIPS effort is not unique in
outward appearance ("another committee," "another feasibility study,"
"another coordination staff," and so forth), but it is unique in the
scope and area of application of the methods used. Even more important,
and unique in the intelligence community, is the tenet governing the
approach and content of the SCIPS effort to date. That tenet is that
the lack of factual and statistical information about current opera-
tions is the major cause of present problems and inadequacies and of
the corollary to it -- that if such information were available, manage-
ment at the respective levels would utilize it to the net benefit of
the intelligence community.
The following report and its appendages, both here published and
unpublished, is the formal, but not the sole, product of Stage I of
the SCIPS effort. The story is long and the product so voluminous
that surely no one person will ever read it all -- but, then, what
better time to test the basic tenet and corollary?
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Introduction
"Intelligence information processing'' resides in two or three
worlds simultaneously:
1. From an organizational point of view, it is a
part of the several independent departmental
operations.
2. From the point of view of its mission, it is an
integral part of the United States Intelligence
Community.
3. From the point of view of discipline, it is his-
torically part of the "library" and more recently
the scientific and technical information process-
ing world.
As used in this study, intelligence information is defined as in-
formation about foreign persons, activities, subjects, places, and
things. Again, "processing" refers to activities sequentially follow-
ing initial or field acquisition and preceding intelligence analysis.
Thus the term as used herein excludes the processing of the following:
1. Business-type data (payroll, budget, inventory,
and so forth)
2. Management control data (monthly status reports,
research and developAent ER & D], and so forth),
and internal security (badge control system,
employee clearance records, and so forth)
3. Scientific computation
The study does include, in addition to substantive foreign information,
the procedures and files used for the control of the processing of
substantive information. It is a certainty that automatic data process-
ing (ADP) and the computer are only minority constituents of intelli-
gence information processing.
The composition of the US Intelligence Community has to be defined
usefully for each purpose under consideration. The composition of the
community for information processing purposes is the broadest because
processing occurs all the way from every initiating point inbound to
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every receiving point outbound. The scope and depth of study envisioned
for SCIPS in Stage I and ultimately is given in Appendix G, as are the
authorization, terms of reference, and other documentation.
Size, time pressures, security classifications, varying audience
interest, and reproduction limitations all prompted publication of the
report in separate volumes:
Volume I Contains the summary and conclusions,
(SECRET/NO FOREIGN the recommendations, a list of refer-
DISSEM) ences, and a list of illustrations,
together with a table of contents
for all volumes.
Volume II
(TOP SECRET/
LIMITED DISSEM)
Volume III
(TOP SECRET/
LIMITED DISSEM)
Volume IV
(CONFIDENTIAL)
Contains the study findings and dis-
cussion, both narrative and graphic
(Appendix A), including Appendix F,
which is integral to the findings
but separable on a security clas-
sification basis of SECRET.
Contains Appendixes B-1, C, DI and E,
which are essentially reproductions
of computer print-outs from the
SCIPS data files selected on the
basis of broad interest. The fact
that Appendix B-1 was hand-
typewritten from a computer print-
out is the more obvious sad com-
mentary on the state-of-the-art.
Contains Appendix B-2, which also is
a reproduction of a computer print-
out considered to be more useful on
a broad basis at the lower classi-
fication that it enjoys.
Volume V Contains Appendix G, the narrative
(SECRET) "SCIPS story," together with the
exhibits and a list of references
that document the story, the survey
system, and the computer data base
system. Not included in the volume
are three exhibits on the computer
system. These exhibits are already
available in a limited number of
copies and were not reproduced.
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LIMITED DISSEM)
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Contains Appendix H, which deals with
photographic information processing.
The report is extensive because
1. A great volume of valuable and useful information
was produced,
2. The potential audience is wide and varied,
3. Periodically, comprehensive summarization of
accumulated findings is needed so that fragments
can be discarded and forward progress enhanced, and
4. The SCIPS Stage I Report may be the terminal report.
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Foreword
Introduction
S-E-C-R-E-T
SCIPS STAGE I REPORT
TAME OF CONTENTS
(All Volumes)
Volume Page
I.
Summary and Conclusions (SECRET)
I
1
A. The Situation
1
1. The Present System of Systems
1
2. Information Control
4
B. Information Processing Problems
5
1. Information Exchange
5
2. Indexing and Information Control
6
3. Report Formatting
8
4. Systems Integration and State-of-the-Art
9
5. Item Identification
11
6. Other Observations
14
7. Problems Identified
18
C. The SCIPS Effort
20
D. Community Management of Information Processing
21
Present
21
Future ?
23
1. Alternatives
23
2. Needs
27
3. Conditions
28
Recommendations (SECRET)
I
31
A. Summary Conclusion
31
B. Recommendations
31
List of References
33
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Volume Page
List of Illustrations [Contained in Volume II] .
Findings and Discussion (TOP SECRET/LIMITED DISSEM) ?
A. Picture of Community Information Processing . .
Introduction
The Intelligence Context
The Present Information Processing System ? ?
I 35
II
1
1
1
4
1.
Organizations, People, and Equipment ?
. ?
?
5
a. Organizations
5
b. Personnel
7
c. Equipment
8
2.
Items
9
a. Definitions
9
b. Item Categories
10
c. Items by Information Types
11
d. Item Descriptions
12
e. Items by Class
15
f. Items by Originator
. ?
?
16
g. Specific Items
17
3.
Flows
18
a. General
18
b. Over-All Departmental Flow Patterns
?
?
19
c. Interdepartmental Flow Patterns
21
d. "World" Flow Patterns
23
e. Selected Item Flow Patterns
25
4.
Processes
27
a. General
27
b. Process Descriptions
27
c. Over-All Picture
27
d. Selected Items
28
e. Selected Processes
? ?
?
29
f. Selected Organizations ......
? ?
?
29
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5. FilesII
Volume Rap
29
a.
General
29
b.
Total Files and Size of Files
30
c.
Age of Files
31
d.
Present Rates of Growth of Files
?
?
?
?
32
e.
Future Rates of Growth of Files
32
f.
Purge Criteria
33
g.
Files with Standard Formats
33
h.
Manual Versus Machine Files
34
i.
Types of Files
34
j.
File Content Categories
35
k.
Purpose of Files
36
1.
Intended Utilization of Files
36
m.
Security Classification of Files
?
?
36
n.
Dissemination Controls on Files .
?
?
?
37
o.
Consumer Access to Files
38
p.
Physical Form of File Items
38
q.
Order of Files
39
r.
Correlation of Machine Files
41
(1) Consumer Access
41
(2) Types of Files
41
(3) Content of Files
41
s. Correlation of the Rates of Growth
of Files with Other Factors
(1) Security Classification
(2) Security Classification Versus
Form
t. Correlation of the Form of Files
with Other Factors 43
(1) Security Classification 43
(2) Effective Date 43
(3) Purge Criteria 44
(4) Order of Files 45
(5) Content of Files 46
u. Filing Criteria 46
B. Information Processing Problems 47
Introduction 47
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Volume Page
1. Indexing
II
49
2. Data Exchange
51
3. Report Formatting
54
4. System Utilization
55
5. Biographic Information
57
6. Definition of Intelligence
70
C.
General Discussion
77
1. The Information Flood
77
2. The "All-Source" Problem .....
?
?
?
?
79
3. The All-Source Index
81
4. Security and Information Processing
83
5. State-of-the-IP-Art in Intelligence
86
D.
The Stage I Study
91
1. Other Data
91
2. The Study Experience
91
Appendixes
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Volume Page
Introduction
II
107
110
Scope Note
109
1110
Findings
111
IV.
Discussion
125
V.
Conclusions
and Recommendations ? ? ? ?
?
127
Attachment 1
- Cover to Cover Translations
.
129
Attachment 2
- List of Selected Files . .
.
133
G. Study Documentation and Exhibits (SECRET)
.
.
V
I.
Genesis of the Study
1
II.
The Terms of Reference
3
III.
The Basic Study Plan
9
IV.
Preliminary Substantive Work
15
V.
Modification of the Study Plan
17
VI.
Staffing for Stage I
27
VII.
Development of Study Parameters
29
VIII.
Design of the Field Survey System
35
IX.
Field Survey
41
X.
Data Reduction and Machine System
63
XI.
Interim Reporting to CODIB
75
XII.
Analysis and Report Writing Phase
? .
?
?
?
77
XIII.
List of References
79
XIV.
List of Exhibits
81
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SC IFS STAGE I REPORT
VOLUME I
I. Summary and Conclusions
The summarization of a long and complex effort such as that repre-
sented in the following report is most difficult. On the other hand,
the summary and conclusions are fortunately not so important as the
findings, from which the diligent can draw his own conclusions. This
summary is divided into three sections -- hopefully one or another
section will be that which a given member of the varied audience is
seeking, and some intersectional redundancy will thereby be forgiven.
The conclusions reached are not the result of a poll of experts or even
of system operators. Rather, the conclusions are those resulting from
a small group of people who had a unique look at the situation. Those
who seek the answer will be disappointed. Those who seek specific
remedies for local symptoms of system failure also will be disappointed.
The report will be of assistance, however, for the person who is seek-
ing a perspective and framework of guidelines within which to do some
long-term planning and capital investment in improving information
processing in the community.
The first section (A) deals with the present total system or
situation -- that is, what is the problem? The second section (B)
points out and discusses some of the major problem areas of information
processing and then itemizes other selected findings and problems iden-
tified during the study. The third section (C) concerns the SCIPS
effort itself, past and future. The last section (D) considers com-
munity management factors together with a range of alternatives, needs,
and conditions for future action.
A. The Situation
1. The PZesent System of Systems
Information processing for intelligence purposes can be
regarded as a cyclic sequence of operations. Within the community,
there is a definite tendency for each component to attempt to gain con-
trol over all the information that it needs from the point of acquisi-
tion through all phases of processing, production, and presentation.
When this is not possible, the component will attempt to receive the
information in as raw a form as possible and establish and maintain
control from that point on, through the remaining processing, produc-
tion, and presentation. Thus the community system can be characterized
as comprising several acquisition-oriented processing systems.
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Adjustments are continually being made among these com-
ponent operations to achieve maximum performance. Many of the same
items of information, however, are continually being acquired and
processed by more than one organizational "system." In view of present
acquisition-processing "system" autonomy, many potentially significant
information intersections among these systems are overlooked during
"normal" operations. This fact is particularly striking, for during
times of stress these very correlations are sought by concentrating the
focus of all available acquisition-processing systems on critical sub-
jects or areas.
During normal operations, correlations between systems are
obscured by the following:
a. Different reporting criteria and
characteristics,
b. Different technical processing re-
quirements imposed by method of
acquisition,
c. Different lapse times from acquisition
to initial and subsequent exploita-
tion, and
d. Different formatting, different subject-
area content representation and coding
requirements presently applied within
each acquisition-processing system
throughout their processing cycles.
An examination of present information processes conducted
by USIB components reveals certain fundamental orientations that may
explain "why we are the way we axe" and what might reasonably be done
to improve our condition.
The "picture" of information processing (items, flows,
processes, and files) reveals that present USIB "systems" are strongly
oriented to method of acquisition of the information. Thus we have
major acquisition-processing systems associated with human observation
and reporting; photography; interception of communications in a variety
of forms; and product exploitation, both publications and material.
Some of these acquisition-processing systems employ various
techniques and devices that require strict access control to provide
source-method protection. Consequently, information acquired by high
risk methods retains high risk controls through much if not all of its
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processing. Much information will remain in rigid control channels
as long as its existence in US hands could have come about only by
the employment of a certain acquisition technique. A tool in lowering
access restrictions is the existence of collateral coverage whereby
low or no risk methods are directed to acquiring identical information
and thus permit wider access to the same information with credibility
remaining at the restricted access level. Directed acquisition of this
"collateral" information need only be undertaken after it has been
determined that such information has not been already acquired and is
residing in one or more intelligence community files.
However, our inability to identify information in files only
adds further confusion and frustration. From the number and size of,
and the limited access points to, the existing files as presented in
the findings section, it would appear often to be more expeditious to
reacquire a specific item of information from the field than to deter-
mine that it has already been acquired and where it has been filed and
to retrieve it therefrom. In numerous instances the analyst does not
have time to exercise either option -- he must proceed with what he
has or can acquire in a short period of time.
Such conditions must continue to obtain in the absence of
an effective information correlation capability across "sources." In
addition, until such information control is achieved our ability to
evaluate performance capabilities of acquisition-processing "systems"
will remain largely intuitive, sufficient to justify the implementa-
tion of additional acquisition methods but not sufficient to demon-
strate which of the present methods deliver unique information in a
timely manner and which, if any, do not do so.
The need to improve our ability to deliver potentially
significant information in forms useful for exploitation and to allo-
cate limited exploitation resources justifies immediate system-wide
adjustments leading to sufficient information control to enable cross-
source correlation. These adjustments should address at th_ outset
those processing variations and accommodations that cause an item of
information to lose its identity to a degree that cross-source correla-
* tion becomes impossible and retrospective research must be done at the
document rather than item of information level.
? Furthermore, these adjustments should be made at that
point in the process where they will do the most good. This will, in
many cases, seem to impinge on the "private preserves" of our source-
oriented systems. This initial control point has to be after meaning-
ful form is derived but before great proliferation. Therefore, the
real impingement on present "technical exploitation" organization ele-
ments will be in the form of different but greater responsibilities.
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However, the only alternative seems to be the present practice, which
is to gain control over information content only after it reaches the
analytic support environment. This practice results of course in the
reproduction, transformation, processing, and filing of the items when
and wherever it is deemed desirable and resources permit. The increas-
ing flow of unfiltered, uncontrolled information into fourth and fifth
echelon processing (all-source synthesis) implies that the community is
already following this course of action on a pragmatic basis, even
though its resources are and always will be demonstrably insufficient
to do so.
2. Information Control
Technical processing, source protection, time of receipt,
format design, content representation techniques, and personal and
organizational preference all militate against efforts to identify and
maintain control of relationships existing in items of information
acquired and processed independently. As items of information are
acquired and reduced to comprehensible form, they are reproduced for
local and lateral as well as onward distribution. Once this occurs,
this information finds its way into post, station, and command sum-
maries, briefs, and digests which in turn receive local and lateral
distribution and also are placed into the main streams of dissemina-
tion. In some cases, source identification may be obscured and second-
order reporting might be regarded as corroboration rather than repe-
tition. Items received at numerous processing points may be reproduced,
if necessary, and filed in a manner to provide local access. The in-
formation as initially acquired from collection or reacquired from files
is incorporated in analytic outputs that are published and disseminated
to consumers, many of whom also receive the "raw" take. Both of these
may be considered as equally "raw" to that consumer who will reestimate
in accordance with the dictates of command, need, point of view, or
capability.
There is always the hope of "filter" operations at suc-
cessive levels in the collection-analysis cycle. ("Filter" means to
associate fragmentary information on a rational basis and forward to
the next level only, but all of, the nonredundant significant informa-
tion.)
It must be recognized that the ability, particularly of
intermediaries, to determine what is or will be of significant intelli-
gence value, even when based on experience, is suspect. The threat of
reserving to the user the determination of significance is inundation
of the user in duplicative and insignificant reporting. This need not
be the case if (a) judgment as. to significance is made only after re-
dundant reporting, within a source-system has been eliminated by the
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technical processors and if (b) the information has been brought under
initial content control. Standard formats are not necessarily a pre-
requisite of content control. This approach would impinge on the
present de facto prerogatives of the source-oriented systems in three
respects: (a) requiring their effective elimination of duplicate re-
porting (and this could be a tremendous burden in some source-systems),
(b) imposition of content control, and (c) filtering for significance
based on content control against consumer requirements expressed in the
same content control terms. Prerogatives notwithstanding, if our prob-
lems are to be solved, not salved, system adjustments must be made at
points in the process where they will do the most good. Such a point
occurs where items of information are being put into a comprehensible
report form but before great numbers of copies have been released. This
implies, as a generalization, that some content control and related
filtering must be introduced at the second not the first or fourth
echelons, and it must be done in all intelligence 'worlds" including
Photographic, Foreign Publications, Foreign Broadcasts, Communications
Intelligence, Human Observation, and so forth. It is believed that
this information control can be achieved without jeopardy to the early
warning or watch function, the primary products for which would not
have to be delayed. On the other hand, achieving this content control
would require severe and basic changes in the present division of func-
tional responsibility, not so much between agencies as between elements
within each source-oriented system. The collectors, the technical ex-
ploiters, the reference servicer, and the consumer would be redividing
the load -- and the present division is deeply ingrained.
B. Information Processing Problems
1. Information Exchange
The present policy of free information exchange dare not
be questioned in the face of "anti-Pearl Harbor" missions and in the
absence of a good alternative, but the result of this practice is the
rapidly approaching situation where "everyone needs everything to do
anything," and consequently there may soon be no small or medium-size
information processing problems, only large ones. If this day does
arrive, then the supposedly "only" policy of free exchange will have
failed and ith alternative policy will have to evolve. The alterna-
tive may lie in the possibility that nobody really needs or even
wants everything but is forced to require everything for even reason-
able assurance of getting what is needed. It is believed that the
latter situation is the true one and that the policy is ineffective
in that regard. More important than changing the policy, ?however,
is to facilitate selectivity through better content-control practices,
because the other and more important result of the policy is lack of
responsibility in providing information support. The manifestation of
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this most serious situation is the list of items and the list of files
appended to this report. Can an analyst really be held responsible to
"consider all pertinent available information" when it is of this
variety, dispersion, and form? Are the present file holders responsible
for information support to outside analysts? The only responsibility
on the books is to the policy of "free exchange of information," and
that is legally satisfied by the initial dissemination system. In
addition, if a specific document is cited, it will even be reproduced
and again provided, but it is a certainty that no other component has
a need-to-know for the entire file, and the file is not built to ex-
tract on those criteria for which there is a need-to-know by other
analysts or components. If the file is big enough to ensure founder-
ing by the recipient, it might be provided at cost despite lack of
full need-to-know. It does not seem possible that the policy as
stated could be wrong, but when it becomes a substitute or provides
an escape for needed functional responsibility, then it is wrong.
2. Indexing and Information Control
Indexing is still, as it was when this study started, con-
sidered central to all the major problems of data exchange, intersystem
compatibility, report formatting, and duplicate processing. The dif-
:1_.-cnce now is that the indexing problem is not what it seemed. The
indexing problem is not the codes used but the elements of infor-
mation to be controlled. Analysis of formatted files shows that only
about one-half of the elements are concerned with information content
control, while 10 percent are concerned with local processing factors
not essential to information exchange, and the rest are ephemeral or
document description type elements. It is this latter group that
should be the first concern of data exchange, and although it appears
Tnlerpbla to standardization, it has not been attacked. For the infor-
mation elements providing content control the number of different in-
dexing tc'cls and -,rocedures is multitudinous, and yet this is the area
of past standardization efforts.
As discussed previously, the point at which standardiza-
tion of content control has been sought in the past is too late in the
process to be achieved on a community-wide basis and may not be desir-
able. Some of the failure to achieve a greater degree of standardiza-
tion is due to deficiencies in the tools. There is no present single
set of indexing tools that would seem to fill a majority of the com-
munity's needs. The Intelligence Subject Code (ISC) would be a better
tool if a fully hierarchic notation scheme were developed and issued
together with full conversion equivalents to the present notation.
There is still a great need for a good, well-coordinated tool for
"Biographic" and "Organizations" information elements -- either as
additional chapters of the ISC or as separate tools. Surely it is
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recognized by now that a code is only a part of a system -- a tool --
and that neither standard tools alone nor identical equipment will
ensure compatibility of "systems," which include instructions, train-
ing, supervision, items, dictionaries, people, and so forth. The
present ISO does suffer from inadequate coordination during develop-
ment, but the main point is that it is a good tool and no single code
or set of codes is going to fill a broad spectrum of local deep in-
dexing needs. So the object is to provide good tools for local in-
dexing in depth and keep legislation of standards in the content-
control category to a shallow common depth and at a point in the
process where it is implementable.
Although not unanimous, the appropriate "common depth" for
content control seems to be (a) for area: a country code such as the
AFIC or NSA digraph plus bloc codes such as the ISO area trigraph
codes and (b) for subject: somewhere between about 20 categories and
the 300 that would result from the first 3 digits of the ISO (using
a true hierarchic notation scheme), dropping many entries but adding
some for organizations, biographic, and other special popular elements
of information. The area digraph codes are not so far apart, and
direct conversion with other area codes is a reasonable prospect. The
subject code is another matter. The depth of content control will have
to be not the conceptual ideal but a compromise with other factors.
The principal influencing factor is the point in the process where
the content control is first applied. Within a given "source-oriented"
system the flow is typically hourglass in configuration. There are a
great many points of acquisition from which raw information flows to
one or a few technical exploitation/publication points where it is
edited, reproduced, published, and thence disseminated to multitudinous
activities in the community. The "publishers" points are identifiable
within each of the source "worlds" and comprise a relatively few and
finite number for the bulk of information reporting, and therein lies
a reasonable promise of uniformity. Even so the content coding system
must be simple, not allowed to be elaborated until after a long period of
successful application, if ever, and must be put on the master form
of the item from which all successive copies are produced.
are the organi-
zations within the intelligence community that identify and eliminate
redundant reporting and serve as initial distribution points for the
bulk of published intelligence information. A community-sponsored
content control coding (4c) applied by each of the above identified
organizations plus perhaps four to five lesser points (by the editorial
staff in some cases and technical exploiters in others) would provide
some degree of common content control at the most effective point.
Such coding might eliminate some of the necessity for multiple readings
of the source document by disseminators within the community. The 4c
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code also might serve as filing and indexing guides by the individual
research officers or other points where deeper indexing resources are
not available. Such a code must be specific enough so that intersec-
tion of multiple broad subjects and areas will give a useful discrimi-
nation and yet must be shallow enough to facilitate reasonably consistent
application by other than coding specialists. The code also must re-
quire little updating and a minimum of rules and instructions for appli-
cation. It is believed that a code meeting these criteria can be de-
veloped, and relatively easily if too much is not expected of it. There
should not be much invested in its application, and then, too, many
benefits will not be expected to result -- for example, it would not
be expected to replace the ISC, and it would not necessarily enable
automatic dissemination. When combined with standard item identifica-
tion the 4c code would be the first real step, however unsophisticated,
in intersystem compatibility and data exchange on a community scale,
and untold benefits might be achieved, especially in comparison with
the limited results of the past 10 years of reissuing "policies" and
putting official seals on "coordinated codes."
It is believed, as indicated by the element occurrence dis-
tribution in present formatted files, that there are considerable
potential benefits and opportunities in community standardization of
item description elements (versus content description or processing
elements). These elements should be finite in number and less dependent
upon "pOint of view" (and therefore less controversial) than content
elements but would do much to facilitate data exchange and communica-
tion between systems in identifying items, categories of items, and
terms of requests. There needs to be a unique list of such elements
(as well as content control elements) developed (present SCIPS data
base will provide the bulk) for, community use as well as for depart-
mental system designers. There needs to be further specific identifi-
cation (possibly machine-controlled) and publication of coding tools
being used to show who is really doing what with which information
elements, for the use of both system designers and consumers. The
development and publication (not necessarily legislation) of "how to"
handbooks for information control system operators would be useful
tools for the community to sponsor. The general theme of this report
is particularly appropriate for this. section -- the problem of under-
control of information is more critical than duplication of control
processing. Duplicate control processing is symptomatic of the real
problem, which is lack of information control.
3. Report FormattiN
General "report formatting" requirements for true auto-
matic input to files as implied by present file formats are unknown
and will continue to be unknown for a long time to come -- that is,
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not until there is information content control over items and files.
For specially designed automated files the formatting of a few spe-
cific report series will prove to be useful, if machine readable but
not electrically transmitted. These cases are not going to be fre-
quent enough to have serious impact on the community in proportion
to the total system. The first step in automatic input is to iden-
tify the item; then to determine the information elements; then to
standardize on a way to identify (tag) the elements; and then to
consider format, machine readability, and carrier. If taken in this
sequence, there are appreciable processing benefits which result from
each step ani which are not dependent upon the success of the next
step or upon automation.
Although a special survey form was specifically designed
to elicit report formatting requirements for automatic input there
were no responses. It is believed that although part of the "no
response" was due to surveyor deficiencies, there were two other good
and sufficient reasons: (a) the present state-of-the-art in IF does
not enable automatic input, even when machine-readable, and (b) the
present systems are not developed to a level where such requirements
are determinable. There are almost some exceptions to these generaliza-
tions. In the interim and in preparation for the time when those two
conditions are overcome the best community action would be to
a. Standardize item (series) identification,
b. Develop common lists of information ele-
ments from present files,
c. Develop standard element identifications
(standard within a series sometimes and
more often between series), and
d. Then start using the element identifications
in particular series having greatest impact.
Up to and somewhat beyond this point the using systems
probably will have to develop their own input means to fit local system
design. A little further in development fully standard formats might
be considered. The only other interim useful standardization would
be to adopt a standard character set, and the set recently adopted by
the American Standards Association warrants first consideration.
4. Systems Integration and State-of-the-Art
After viewing the dispersion and variety of information
processing (IP) systems just within the scope of the Stage I study,
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it is understandable why everyone is concerned with systems "integra-
tion" or "interface." After viewing the present state of automation
and true information control it is also more understandable why systems
do not seem to "integrate" or "interface." The most pressing systems
integration-interface problems seem to be between components within
agencies more than between agencies, but virtually all agencies have
these problems. It is not only the state-of-the-art that inhibits
system integration-interface -- it is also the inability to identify
the systems in all the necessary terms.
A state-of-the-art survey was not made during Stage I.
However, after viewing present computer applications, examining the
IF problem, and actually experiencing an application (the SCIPS auto-
mated data base), it is doubted that present general-purpose computers
will ever solve the bulk information processing problems in the sub-
stantive intelligence community. It is not that they are not concep-
tually adaptable to the major problems -- it is just that the imple-
mentation requirements are self-defeating. Present computers are only
truly successful when used for highly structured and circumscribed
processing, and even then they take man only halfway to his problem
solution. The present computers must and should be used even more
than they are in the intelligence community, but on specific problems.
The pitfall seems to be the building of an entire information process-
ing system around a general-purpose computer. The IF system should
be designed and performance specifications determined, and then it
will become clear at what points in the system present electronic data
processing (EDP) equipment should be used. It will also become more
clear which functions of the system require research and development
to make significant gains in capabilities. It is believed that intel-
ligence information processing problems include requirements for EDP
equipment quite different from those represented by today's general-
purpose computer. Many of these requirements might well be met by
developments in the electro-optical, content-addressable/associative,
or the analog equipment areas. The state-of-the-art solution will be
successful and timely in direct proportion to the degree of specifica-
tion of the problems to be solved. So what is required is problem
aecification (not statements of objectives or procurement requirements)
by the community and then applied research on the real and significant
problems by the joint efforts of the best people that the community
and private industry have. Unfortunately, in that single-sentence
condition there are five or six specific pitfalls; however, there is
a good probability of success if the pitfalls are avoided. Unless we
recognize those problem areas not susceptible to solution with present
EDP systems and redirect our money, manpower, and attention resources,
significant gain will never be achieved. The present-day computers are
performing an invaluable function on special problems, and more of these
applications should be made (including individual specific problems in
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central reference facilities). Unfortunately, like the policy for
free exchange of information substituting for information support re-
sponsibilities, the computer in "total system" applications has become
a substitute for systems engineering. If the reason for this is the
lack of systems engineers, rather than too much vendor salesmanship
to the executives, then the community has yet another prerequisite to
work on. The first task then, is to identify adequately the system
such that present techniques can be best applied and good focus given
to the development of critical additional techniques. IP systems will
then attain a better degree of information control, which is the key
to systems integration/interface-versus amalgamation. The best ready-
made method known that might provide adequate system identification
that used in the SCIPS field survey system.
5. Item Identification
Items flowing throughout the community contain a variety
of information. In some cases an attempt is made to limit and iden-
tify the scope of the subject matter by establishing specific reports
series for specific subjects. However, these are the exceptions rather
than the rule. In the greater number of cases, a given issue of a
series may contain information on any subject or in extreme cases any
number of subjects. Consequently, it becomes necessary to peruse each
issue to determine information content. This in itself would not
present much of a problem if each issue required only one reading.
Many copies of each issue are produced, which are read over and over
by many different people. Seldom, if ever, is the subject (or subjects)
of the document designated. Generally, external notations on the docu-
ments consist, of routing slips designating the organization components
which should get the document but no indication as to why they are
getting it. The result is that every component and subcomponent that
gets a document must read the document to determine subject content.
Report titles, even when most appropriate to the individual report,
are often either too general to provide sufficient discrimination on
subject content or are so specific as to become technical and prevent
a nontechnical screener from properly categorizing the item.
When the term "dissemination discrimination" or "informa-
tion control" is used, most reactions are negative because of the
inference of more restrictive practices. This reaction is based on
the false belief that everybody is now getting everything. The Stage I
data base is proof enough that this is not the case [see Figures III r
(1-24)].* The 32,000 locally identified items were resolved into some
14,0o0 items. On the average, of the 14,000 items identified during
survey, any one of them occurred in only 2.3 of the some 50 organizations
* For the illustrations, see Appendix A, Volume II.
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surveyed. Even subtracting the 10,000 foreign publications, the ratio
is less than four organizations for the same item. Failure to identify
items accounts for some of this lack of commonness, but the uncommon
occurrences of items is still dramatic. Although not yet analyzed, it
is suspected that there are some 500 to 1,000 of the 4,000 non-foreign-
publication items that account for most of even the 4 to 1 ratio --
meaning that the other 3,000 or so items are almost unique to one
organization. Whatever overstatement of the case the study figures
cause, there can be no doubt that there is a high degree of selectivity
over-all, even though "everybody" gets a certain group of items. The
general implication of concern here is not costly duplication but the
danger of missed items.
A remarkable aspect of the community's information process-
ing operations, as implied by the inability to collect (at least readily)
the survey information, is that present systems do not know, and do not
seem to care to know, what individual items in what volume are coming into
the system for processing or from whom. Neither do they know what spe-
cific items are going into which file, and often they do not know the file
size or growth rate. Although the foregoing is of course a generalization,
it was so common that in retrospect it seems a phenomenon. These same
systems usually had prolific records on their own processes occurrences,
but not on the items to which the processes were applied.
It was realized very early in the study that if we were to
trace the flow of information in the community, we must be able to
identify specific items of information uniquely regardless of where
they appeared or what they were called. However, it was also recognized
that we would not know what the specific items were until after the com-
pletion of the survey. It was therefore necessary first to establish
an item concept and then during the initial survey to record descrip-
tive information about items for subsequent comparison and identifica-
tion. This descriptive information consisted primarily of the organi-
zation being surveyed, the originating organization of each item, the
series or serial designation (if any), and the item title.
After the information collected on the survey sheets had
been entered in the SCIPS item file, computer print-outs were made and
unique SCIPS item numbers were assigned to each locally described item.
Unfortunately it was not always possible for the surveyor to identify
individual items at every organization surveyed, because records (if
any) were not kept in the same way. Items were very often included in
aggregations that forced the use of "item group" and "super item" iden-
tification numbers. Obviously, when the items could no longer be
identified uniquely, the study of the further flow and processing of
the item could not be done. However, when the SCIPS item numbering
was possible, it permitted us to develop flow patterns of information
and greatly facilitated the manipulation and analysis of the data.
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If there is to be efficient management of the flow,
processing, and filing of information in the community, or further
study thereof, it is important that some standard method be instituted
to identify the information items. Such a method should result in a
published and maintained authoritative list of items (something like
Appendix B-1, Volume III) which would be used in management record
keeping and facilitate intersystem document identification for infor-
mation exchange. Just the availability of such a list, even without
legislating its use, would result in some degree of improvement in
record keeping and communication.
One approach to the establishment of such an authoritative
item list would be as follows:
a. Select from the SCIPS Stage I data the items
already sufficiently identified (see Appen-
dixes B-1 [Volume III] and B-2 [Volume IV]
and Exhibit a [Appendix G, Volume V]).
Make corrections to standardize title and
originator.
b. Reestablish the mechanized item file, uti-
lizing provisions for additions or dele-
tions.
c. Design and print input forms to be used
for additions and deletions to the file.
a. Resume the "product-organization" study
(see Exhibit a, Appendix G, Volume V),
adding items which can be identified
positively.
e. Make print-outs of items by originating
organization. Send the lists and a sup-
ply of forms to the originating organi-
zations for correction, deletion, and
additions. Make provision for continu-
ing additions and deletions by these
organizations.
f. Design and implement a standard community
item numbering system. This would not
be substituted for present originator
numbering systems or necessarily obviate
accession numbering. The only thing
worse than yet another number as here
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proposed is to try to do everything with
one numbering system.
g. Maintain the file and provide periodic item
catalogs on a community wide basis.
6. Other Observations
Given below without further aisctussion are selected obser-
vations and questions deriving from the Stage I data. No significance
or validity factor is implied by the order in which listed. Paren-
thetical references are to particularly related sections or data
figures in Section III (Findings and Discussion), Volume II, of this
Stage I Report.
a. Information processing is not very cen-
tralized within the intelligence agencies
(see Section III, A, 1, Volume II).
b. The recognized central reference activity
is nearly the last place to get EDP (see
Figures III f-i).*
c. There are already more "pieces" of EDP
equipment than EAM, but files are still
by far punched card versus magnetic
tape -- so EDP is present but not im-
pacting on files picture.
d. In general, from the clerical to the pro-
fessional ratio, the IP systems must be
neither particularly sophisticated (re-
quiring a high professional to clerical
ratio) nor routinized (requiring a high
clerical to professional ratio) (see
, Figure III d).
e. The intelligence community is neither mono-
lithic nor isolated -- it has extensive
(in number of points and flow volumes)
contact with non-USIB agencies [see Fig-
ures III r (7-24)].
For the illustrations, see Appendix A, Volume II.
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f. CIA serves as something of a community focal
point for acquisition from noncommunity
elements, but there is no particular focal
point for dissemination-- everybody dis-
seminates his own products [see Figures III r
(7-18)].
g.
The level of intradepartmental IP activity
is four or five times the interdepartmental
IP activity -- so hard to stay concerned
with "community" problems versus depart-
mental problems [see Figures III r (1-24)
and Section III, B, 4, Volume II].
h. Systems that are "source-oriented" tend to
become "all-source" systems, and producers
become consumers [see Figures III r (1-2)-)
and s (1-5)].
i. There seem to be as many as four echelons
of dissemination. There are typically
-about 6 to 10 organizations involved in
the first level, 150 in the second level,
perhaps 400 in the third level, and as
many as 900 in the last level. Is it pos-
sible to divide and subdivide functionally
the intelligence job between some 1,500
organizational elements -- is it possible
to eliminate duplication? [See Figures
III s (1-5) and t (1-12)].
i?
Foreign published information is propor-
tionately and absolutely little processed
in terms of information content control --
supposedly because it is "low-grade ore."
The community exists as a community because
of foreign security restrictions on infor-
mation. Is open literature actually low-
grade, or is it just too voluminous for
available IP techniques? Would full ex-
ploitation of foreign published informa-
tion permit high risk collection to be
done on an ad hoc rather than programmed
basis? (See Appendix F, Volume II, and
Appendix B-2, Volume IV).
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k. A very large variety of information elements
are used as first and second file order
criteria throughout the community. This
does not bode well for standardization
and data exchange when combined with
manual control only [see Figures III v
(68), (74), and (75)].
1. Only about 25 percent of all information
element occurrences in standard format
files are coded (see Section III, B, 1,
and Volume II).
in. We must interfile-communicate in un-
standardized text that requires human
"converters" (see Section III, B, 2,
Volume II, and unpublished SCIPS data
catalogs).
n. The number, size, and variety of files in
community storage and retrieval systems
make the internal and external R & D work
now being done of questionable pertienence
and applicability to community problems
(see Sections III, A, 5, and III, B, 4,
Volume II, and Appendix D, Volume III).
o. Internally consistent formats for file
records is neither a panacea nor neces-
sarily an incentive to data exchange
between files. Over one-third of the
community files (78 million items) have
Internally consistent formats (see Sec-
tion III, A, 5, g, Volume II).
p.
q.
The mall proportion of machine-readable
Items indicates a low degree of true
automation [see Figure III n (7)].
Some 78 million unit
maintained. Should
150 million in file
to 25 million items
year? (See lilt, A,
reference 35J.*)
records are machine-
we machine the other
and the 15 million
added to file each
5, h, Volume II, and
* For a list of references used in all volumes, see p. 33, below.
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r. The general absence of file-purging and
the non-use of time "activity rates" as
a criterion when there is purging are in-
dications of not knowing what is needed
or what is in the file -- that is, no
content control [see Section III, A, 5,
f, Volume II, and Figure III v (13)].
s. There are more file items for control
purposes than there are items being con-
trolled, and "documents" apparently are
unsatisfactory as an information storage
and control form [see Figure III v (26)].
t. Security classification of items seems to
be more of a file access problem than a
criterion for filing. That is, generally,
separate files are not established on the
basis of security classification, nor is
it a file order. Either the not-fully-
cleared go without, or else we multiple-
file (see Section III, A, 5, m, Vol-
ume II).
u. The popularity of "area" ordered files is
not as real as apparent. Most area files
are functionally subject, date, or serial
no. -- ordered files. Only some 10 per-
cent of all unit records are ordered
solely on elements in the USIB-sponsored
Intelligence Subject Code (see Section
III, A, 5, q, Volume II).
v. Authorized Dissemination Controls (DCID 1/7)
are not being used as an access discrimi-
nator to file items. Even more than
security classification, dissemination
controls only restrict utilization of whole
files -- another dimension of file content
being unknown [see Figure III v (33)].
w. Hard copy documents as a file form of infor-
mation are evidently of more perishable
utility than other forms (3 x 5, 5 x 8,
magnetic tape, etc., which files continue
to be added to). This indicates that docu-
ment files might be more susceptible to
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common archiving than other files [see
Figures III v (61-67)].
x. Some items produced by "finished intel-
ligence" producing components are the
type produced by central reference com-
ponents and, in any event, fill central
reference needs (see Appendix B-1,
Volume III, and CIA/OSI-MP/63-3).
7. Problems Identified
One of the principal tasks of the Stage I plan was to iden-
tify information processing problems requiring further study. To the
extent that the problems discussed in 1 through 5, above, have not
been resolved, they head the critical list for future study. In addi-
tion, the following problem areas seem of particular commonness and
importance throughout the intelligence community:
a. The development of additional tools whereby the
intelligence research analysts can inform themselves more rapidly and
more completely on what information exists where that might bear on a
particular problem. (Files inventory plus filing criteria? Item
inventory? Personal contact inventory?) The absence of such tools
results in the analyst's spending too much time, not looking at all,
initiating unnecessary field collection, or drawing wrong conclusions.
b. Loss to the community at large of the results of
individual analysis of a given report or piece of information. There
is insufficient system capability to make generally available either
the analysts' initial assessment of incoming information or, retro-
spectively, the analytic assessment of his file data in sufficient
specificity. There is neither sufficient motivation nor facility for
analyst input to the data base.
c. The lack of quick ad hoc response from automated
information and reference systems. Either you thumb through a thick
print-out correlated six different ways and published periodically --
or you wait until tomorrow or next week -- or you maintain your own
file. The fallacious object seems to be, first to have an "efficient"
computer operation and, second, to provide service.
d. Multiple screening of the same item at multi-
tudinous points throughout the community to determine not how to
process but just whether the item qualifies for the process (content
control code).
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e. Undocumented screening criteria at the thousands
of branch points throughout the community system.
f. Lack of common bibliographic control citing,
limiting retrieval from several reference facilities (see indexing
and common element discussion).
g. Lack of documentation and terminology variations
prohibit communication on depth of indexing being applied.
h. Diversion of ADP system resources from substantive
information processing to administrative-management support work.
i. The lack of ability to test assertions such as
"cable information is either of transient value or is followed up
with hard copy."
j. The feasibility of and basis for allocation of
information processing functional responsibility between agencies or
components in the absence of clear-cut division of intelligence pro-
duction responsibilities.
k. Duplicate processing of foreign documents and un-
wanted long file life of items in many places because there is no
central facility on which to rely.
ditions to
overloaded
1. Specification of a variety of file conversion con-
enable feasible techniques to be devised.
m. Use of ADP evipment as printing presses due to ?
and uncleared printing facilities.
n. Definition of the intelligence community in terms
of an organization identification system -- for information process-
ing and for communication and research purposes.
o: The lack of identification of commonness and un-
commonness of information elements and source items as well as search
terms in systems, such as in "positive" and "counter" intelligence
biographic systems, prevents resolution of questions of integration/
interface between these systems.
p. The question of a special common programming
language for intelligence information processing purposes (COINOL)
versus adequacy of available languages (COBOL).
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q. Identification and specification of the apparent
R & D gap between the NSF-sponsored basic research and departmental
sponsored operational system development. This gap is best described
as techniques application to real intelligence problems.
r. Development of an effective way to integrate sys-
tems, usewise, but leave organizationally and physically separate such
files as the target folders in IR/CR with the indexed documents in the
CIA Library with the computerized target briefs in NPIC with the mag-
netic tape AIF file in DIA against locational-type ad hoc queries from
decentralized users. These four systems represent the four degrees of
storage and retrieval, each containing unique and overlapping informa-
tion in different forms with their respective advantages and disadvan-
tages of cost and usability.
C. The SCIPS Effort
The terns of reference for the study as approved by USIB in
July 1961 are no longer believed to be appropriate without modifica-
tions in light of Stage I findings and experience [see Section
B (Introduction), Volume II]. The Stage I effort and the 7 months'
launching period have finally resulted in products believed to be
more than a bargain for the community in terms of the input (see
Section III, C, Volume II, and Appendix G, Volume V). In addition
to a unique data base of about 30 percent of what's needed, there
is a systems study system appropriate to intelligence information
processing operations and a computerized management information mani-
pulation system. Although there is not an experienced, expert organi-
zation to point to as a product, there are some individuals with in-
creased capabilities'. The effort is believed to have been unique
(at least in degree) as a cooperative community effort in terms of
concrete significant results and in terms of "community" motivation
and orientation. Although the staff members came from specific
agencies and departments, it was found that they could be motivated
to community goals. This is noteworthy and commendable whether there
is a "community" market or not. At the same time, as a result of
being departmentally owned, contributed, and career-obligated indi-
vidually, the staffing as a whole suffered all the other usual dis-
advantages- of "joint" efforts. When it comes down to an individual,
a department usually and understandably determines the utilization of
its talent on the basis of greatest departmental return. By defini-
tion, a component department's objectives are not congruent with com-
munity needs, though temporarily coincident.
From quite a different point of view, the complexity and con-
ditions of the activities studied were a severe limitation on accom-
plishments. From both points of view the past experience and findings
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lead to the conclusion that as long as it is as difficult to conduct
such a community-wide fact-finding systems study as Stage I was, it
will never be done again. It takes too long to obtain, standardize,
and analyze the necessary information on the spectrum of present
operations. So, still believing that lasting solutions must be
specific and can only evolve from specific factual data in a "broad
system context," there are three things that must be done:
1. Provision of the most advantageous staffing
conditions,
2. Standardization in departmental recording of
management data on IP operations, and
3. Initial simplification of the IP system itself.
Although believing that true solutions generally cannot be legislated,
only facilitated, it might be that the first two cited preconditions
will have to be legislated. The second could be developed by adapta-
tion of the Stage I survey system. The initial simplification of the
present IP systems could be the institution of content control and
filtering on bulk series by "producers" or perhaps just "little"
things like unique item identification, information element lists, and
the common element control (see Section III, B, 7, Volume II).
The principal conclusion on the past effort, bluntly and suc-
cinctly stated, is that by doing it we proved that it could be done,
and at the same time we became convinced that it never will be done
again on the same basis.
D. Community Management of Information Processing
Present
In this section are the principal conclusions and observations
not so relatable to specific data and findings during Stage I. What
follows is the result of accumulated experiences including the recent
past. This is where the problems are seen in relation to mismanagement,
or more often the lack of management.
1. The information processing (IP) sector of the intel-
ligence cycle -- that is, those functional operations between collec-
tion and intelligence production -- has not received the share of
community concern that it warrants. Some indicators of this are as
follows: a review of USIB agenda and minutes shows USIB attention
divided between collection problems and substantive estimates; the
community structure itself reveals four USIB committees on substantive
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production (not including the Board of National Estimates) and four on
collection coordination and one on information processing (CODIB); the
Priority National Intelligence Objectives refer to "collection" and
"research" -- information processing is lost in the shuffle and is
assumed to fall within either production or collection, and nobody
seems to care which. What are the Priority National Intelligence
Objectives for intelligence information processing? Are they the same
as for collection and production, or are they to do backup in non-
priority areas? Until the present situation of not knowing what is
in the file is corrected, both the necessity of collection and the
validity of estimates are suspect.
2. The Imbalance between the amount of information col-
lected and that exploited and content-controlled is evidence of im- ?
balance in allocation of resources, and yet the recent trends are to
shift resources from reference facilities to collection-related activi-
ties.
3. The use of computers for substantive information
processing brings on new management decisions, such as who should own
the computer. As discussed in Section B, 4, the present general-purpose
computer. is not very satisfactory, and yet it is a tool that we have,
and it should be applied to even more IP problems -- but specific
problems. Business administration type applications are almost always
done by closed-shop methods. Scientific computation applications, are
usually done by open-shop methods. Substantive intelligence informa-
tion processing is yet a third and different category that is teeter-
ing between the two camps. At this stage of development, the ADP
application should be done on an open-shop basis from Inception up
through the initial months of routine production. If it is a sub-
stantive analytical problem, the intelligence analyst and the pro-
grammer should work directly with the machine and be inefficient if
necessary, but effective. If it is a reference support problem, the
present system operator and the programmer should have direct access
to the machine. If, when, and as such jobs become stabilized and
routine, they can be done by a centralized computer complex in a
closed-shop fashion. More progress will be made sooner if computer
capability is separately provided for development of applications
on an open-shop basis. Centralized operations control production.
work efficiently and inhibit developmental operations. Decentralized
open-shop developmental work will be very expensive in terms of idle
computer time, but a real bargain in terms of accomplishing long-
range objectives.
4. There is virtually no national assignment of responsi-
bility to provide specific reference services. As a result, each
department, understandably, does not take any chances and relies on
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itself only by getting, processing, and filing all the information
that it can afford. This condition will continue until responsibility
is fixed and until dependable capability to provide information in the
time and form needed is demonstrated, at least to a better degree than
the departmental resources can do. Blanket assignment of responsibility
in general subject areas will not do.
5. It is questionable whether genius could do anything
with the present system; so it is a certainty that mediocrity can not.
Responsibility has never been successfully contracted out. The chief
reason for limitations in the successful use of contractors in infor-
mation system design is the lack of sufficient in-house capability even
to develop adequate system requirements or to monitor the development
and implementation effort.
6. When the solution seems to be "centralization" and a
"national center," it is usually symptomatic of failure to define and
coordinate. The total of community objectives is comprised for the
most part of constituent departmental objectives. At this state of
development of the information processing systems, the greatest needs
are for common relief of burden and a real operating success on other
than a special problem. Either of these two realizations would put
any benefits of centralization or "compatibility" accomplishments to
shame.
7. There is in the community no accepted organization
or system in terms of objective leadership or outstanding acumen or
success in information processing. There is hardly a successful
mousetrap, much less a better one, and successful leadership will not
be legislated.
8. The only community body officially concerned with in-
formation processing is CODIB. This committee is comprised of depart-
mental operators with almost insoluble problems in their own components.
Understandably, they are seeking in committee activities community
assistance in solving their own problems. It is asking too much to
expect such a body to be concerned primarily with community problems,
lpr se, at the monthly meetings, much less the other 160 working hours
in between. The community problems like the departmental problems will
not be solved by such intermittent attention.
Future
1. Alternatives
It is easy enough to say that the whole fault is "bad
management"; the ultimate is to try to specify what good management
would be. This section is the ultimate.
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The following cumulative continuum is presented as the range
of actions that could be considered for improvement of information
processing in the intelligence community:
a. Continued committee coordination (CODIB)
b. Ad hoc problem groups under CODIB
c. Joint Fact Survey Staff (Stage I continued)
d. Joint Information Exchange Staff
e. Systems Coordination Staff
f. Community Operations Research Center
g. Centralized ADP Systems Center
h. Series of Technical Information Processing
Centers
i. Three Information Processing Centers
(Photo, Signals, Documents)
j. One National Information Processing Center
Working from either extreme, some considerations are:
Alternatives a and b represent the past practice in
a coordination mode. The tools used are regular committee action,
formal directives, liaison, ad hoc committees, and problem study groups.
In some instances a contribution to the community is realized from
using these techniques, but mutual benefits of any permanent significance
are very difficult because of (1) a lack of continuous control, (2) operat-
ing on a part-time basis, (3) self-defined objectives, (4) all elements
not being represented, (5) conflict of departmental versus community
objectives, and (6) competition for personnel resources. The present
condition of information processing and the SCIPS terms of reference
attest to limitations of past practice.
Alternatives i and j are put forward most often as the
ultimate objective. Doing i and j is the antithesis of doing a and b --
that is, with complete centralization no coordination is necessary.
After viewing the nonexclusiveness of the existing centers, the size
and nature of the information processing operations, and the divers de-
partmental missions, it is easy to agree with the phraseology of the
President's Science Advisory Committee -- "over-simplification of
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a perplexing problem" and "To expect miracles of management to follow
from centralization of the information system is unjustifiably opti-
mistic ... ."
Alternative c is a natural first consideration -- it
represents a continuation of the present. The only apparent require-
ment is for CODIB and USIB to evaluate that the results of Stage I
warrant a continuation on a Stage II basis and restaff the effort.
The documentation in Appendix G2 Volume V, plus either the Basic
Study Plan of November 1961 or the Stage I Plan would provide the
basis.
Alternative h has some appeal and is in vogue both
inside and outside the intelligence community -- at least it is a
large topic of discussion. In the nonintelligence community the
technical information processing centers are discipline-oriented --
that is, physics, chemistry, medicine, engineering, metallurgy, and
so forth. There are three potential orientations that the intelli-
gence information centers could take:
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The existence of the three alternatives brings to mind. the disadvan-
tages of any one of them, and certainly none of them coincides with
present departmental organization lines, and thereby has the same
disadvantages, though lesser in degree, as alternative i or j.
Alternative d is alternative c plus a facility for the
referral and exchange of information over and above 1-11oRe kinds col-
lected .in Stage I of SCIPS. The need for a central systems-documenta-
tion facility has been expressed recently in CODIB and SIGINT Committee,
and reading the CODIB 5th Annual report attests to the need. Addi-
tionally such a staff could be charged with the functional responsibility
of assisting actively in the interchange of substantive intelligence.
In either case, however, there is an implied continuation -- unlike
alternative cl which could be staged and stopped at any point.
Alternative e is alternative d on a continuing basis
plus a responsibility and authority for the coordination of some spec-
ified range of IF activities, whether it be.R & D projects, reporting
formats, indexing standards, or system changes. The alternative implies
coordination of CODIB-type matters on a full-time continuing basis.
Alternative g is the amalgamation of present.depart-
mental ADP Staffs into one community .operation. This would be cen-
tralizing the staff functions of systems engineering and design,
Whereas line production functions would be centralized under alter-
natives h, J., or j. The appeal is of course commonness of design and,
resultant compatibility of the decentralized operating systems. As
in alternatives h, i, and j, the factor of divers departimental mis-
sions is against centralization of functional activities. In addi-
tion, there is more to do at home than the ADP staffs can get done
now.
Alternative f implies any or all of the aspects of
alternatives a through e but none of g through j. The term "Opera-
tions Research" is the present popular one for the function that
provides the quantitative information input to aid management in
rationally choosing between alternatives, particularly long-term
decisions as to change in equipment and facilities, resource alloca-
tion, and products and markets. The term "community" implies that
the orientation is to common problems and to departmental problems of
community-wide impact. The term "center" implies an appreciable mag-
nitude and a product. This kind of activity is concerned with such
questions as the following: Is the volume of information flowing,
present and projected, exceeding the design potential of present sys-
tems singly or combined? Is there anything in the nature and charac-
teristics of new collection, processing, or production techniques that
might drastically affect present methods, organizational structure,
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or resource allocation? Are demands on operations increasing or de-
creasing? Likewise, is the scope of operations increasing or decreas-
ing? Are capabilities, manpower, and equipment decreasing, static,
increasing, or all three if specified by area of concern such as by
subject, system, organization, and so forth? Are systems of priority
in existence or under development within various organizations that
tend to maximize limited capability? Is there an over-all community
system or priority, or does everybody concentrate on "problems" as
they occur? What are the characteristics of crash efforts to solve
immediate problems? What are the potential benefits of optimizing
total resources across the community if a system of priorities is in
fact necessary?
2. Needs
There was never unanimity of the SCIPS Staff on any sub-
stantive issue, but perhaps the greatest majority consensus developed
on the immediate needs in the community, though not necessarily on the
ultimate community needs or configuration. The following list contains
unfinished Stage I tasks plus reactivation of some of the original
tasks, plus other additional functions, all of which it is felt that
the community needs, to improve intelligence information processing:
a. Cleaning up of present SCIPS data base and re-
cataloging for further analysis.
b. Extending the data base coverage to some 200
other organizations of particular IP concern.
c. Designing survey data collection updating pro-
cedures to make the data base dynamic and
current.
d. Redesigning the machined data base system to
provide cross-file correlation and on-line
query response capability.
e. Providing a data base query and research ser-
vices to departmental operating and management
people.
f. Developing, publishing, and maintaining
standards such as called for in this report --
that is, authoritative items and files inven-
tories, community content control code, unique
information element lists, "how-to" handbooks,
noncontent control element standards, and so
forth.
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Special survey and analysis on a "problem" basis
with individual reports thereon -- such as
archiving, central reference for foreign pubs,
transliteration, and so forth.
h. Development of community requirements and speci-
fications for specific IP techniques.
i. Techniques development, monitoring, testing and
recommendation.
Systems information library:
k. Community-oriented technical and operational feasi-
bility review of IP R & D proposals and system
changes, plus ad hoc technical consultant service
to constituent departments.
1. Continuous review and recommendation to USIB of
functional division of responsibility for infor-
mation processing.
m. Ameans for testing proposed changes for impact
on other community systems without actual trial
and error (system simulation with the SCIPS data
base).
n. An operational training facility tailormade for
community system operators and designers.
3. Conditions
Some discussion of the required conditions and mechanism for
accomplishment of these needs was held within the staff. The necessary
conditions are the following:
a. A large permanent organization with a choice
of staff. Continuity of staff, full range
of skills and grades with internal progres-
sion, and career-volunteer membership.
b.' All-source acceptance of scope (including
SI and CI).
c. Departmental responsive reporting.
d. Contractual funds.
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e. Assured EDP machine support.
f. Continuous departmental logistic support without
departmental identification.
g. Single point direction.
Ii. Community orientation and motivation.
Although the staff did not delinate a specific mechanism, there was a
consensus that the needs (see 2, above) and conditions given above could
be met best by alternative f in the range of alternatives a to j as given
in 1, above. On the hand, no means of accomplishing this alternative and
conditions is descernible by the staff.
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II. Recommendations
A. Summary Conclusion
There is no single action that can be taken which will result
in the solution of the community's information processing problems.
There are a series Of specific actions that will result in improved
intelligence production and operational effectiveness. Corporate com-
munity management has devoted an. inappropriately small proportion of
its attention to the information processing activities. and problems.
The problem of duplicate processing and standardization between agen-
cies is secondary to the major problem of providing more informa-
tion content control and ease of access by the consuming analysts to
collected information and developed intelligence. The constituent
departments need help in.overcoming this deficiency because no one
agency can achieve independently sufficient content control over all
the information that,it needs. With the present quantity, variety,
and scattering of unidentified processed and unprocessed information
the chances of the analyst drawing the right intelligence conclusion
are endangered. The results to date of applying ADP techniques and
equipments to the principal intelligence information processing prob-
lems in the community are not very encouraging, and no particular
factor or development was discerned that would cause a dramatic change
in either the near or the mid-range future, and yet the use of ADP
remains one of the few hopes for real progress.
B. Recommendations
1. That the DCI and USIB devote a greater proportion of their
attention to the functional sector between collection and research,
including thorough study of this report with a view to filling the
identified short-term needs and the need for long-term planning in
community information processing.
2. That a means of implementing alternatives e or f in
Section I, D, 1 (Alternatives), above, be sought. Unless this means
is found with the necessary conditions, it is recommended that SCIPS
not be reconstituted.
3. That a technical review panel, such as the PSAC Ad Hoc
Study Panel on Non-Numerical Information Processing, 4o/ be assembled
to review the detailed findings of the study and provide comments
thereon.
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4. That the Committee on Documentation give full consideration
to the Stage I Report findings and conclusions and concern itself with
determining the means of filling the identified community needs and
recommend to USIB accordingly.
5. That the disposition of the Stage I data base be made
dependent upon the following:
a. That if there is a continuing full-time effort
(alternatives c through g), it be charged with
operating and maintaining the data base and
servicing ad hoc requests therefrom and no
further general dissemination of the data base
be made.
b. That if there is no continuing effort (that is,
alternative a, b, h, i, or j is Implemented),
the machined data base be made fully and
equally available to all USIB principals and
the nonmachined collections be destroyed or
the pieces be returned to the component from
which obtained.
6. That the individual departments and agencies develop and
devote the best possible in-house talent that they can to document
and engineer this engineerable part pf the intelligence cycle.
7. That Stage I of SCIPS be considered completed.
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TAB C
Consultant Panel Evaluation
of the
Report of the Staff for the Community
Information Processing Study
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TAB C
Consultant Panel Evaluation
of the
Report of the Staff for the Community
Information Processing Study
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19 November 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board
SUBJECT: SCIPS Stage I Report
1. At the request of the Chairman, Committee on Documentation, the under-
signed consultants have reviewed the Stage I Report of SCIPS and submit herewith
their comments. The Consultant Panel felt that a technical review of the detailed
findings in the report would be less valuable than comments on the SCIPS effort
and result so far, and on the extension of related Work and its implications for
complementary problem areas, not only within the jurisdiction of USIB but also
elsewhere in the government-: These comments will-accordingly deal with (1)'-
a critique of the SCIPS effort, (2) extension of related efforts within the scope
of the original Terms of Reference (USIB D-39.7/1, Final,. dated 11 July
1961), and (3) recommendations.
2. CODIB and SCIPS deserve high commendation for the Stage I Report.
The effort was a successful pioneering job, which revealed: first, the immensity
of the information processing problem among the intelligence agencies of the
government; second, the large positive benefits that can be derived from an
in-house inter-agency study; third, the complexity of present U.S. organization
of intelligence; and, finally, much of what needs to be done to make the intelli-
gence agencies effective organs for the support of decision-makers at many
levels of government.
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3. No information-processing management can proceed without a solid basis
of data. While the data base in Stage lie incomplete, the sample is very substantial,
and the gaps and lack of currency are clearly identified. The findings and the
inventories represent a unique body of material. They will provide the USIB
principals with many new and startling insights into the orientations, work, and
effectiveness of their organizations. Deficiencies in scope and quality of data
exist by reason of the modification of criteria which became necessary in the
process of planning and executing the SCIPS Survey.
4. The validity of the analyses presented in Volume II depend upon the degree
of comprehensiveness and accuracy of the findings. Their significance depends
upon the respective missions of the agencies studied. An apparent emphasis on
intra-agency processes and problems may be justified in the light of the vertical
relations of the separate USIB agencies to their departmental or? executive chiefs.
Many of the findings should be re-sorted to make the analyses more realistic.
5. Volume I states that the real value of the report is for those who are
doing "long-term planning" to improve information processing among intelligence
agencies. While it is true that the total and tremendous significance of this report
can only be appreciated by and must impact on the USIB principals themselves and
their superiors, the report nevertheless seems to provide some immediate i short-
term payoffs. The very fact that the work got done should be a revelation. The
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findings, even including the study biases, are illuminating. Perhaps the parts are
more valuable than the whole; for while SCIPS seems to proceed on the basic
premise that it is studying a. "system" for a "community" actually the outcome
was the identification of several tJproblernsul and their possible solutions. And
while there is a commonality Of function, there is great divergence of' interests
among the "members" of the community - perhaps in proportion to the stringency
of their non-USIB relationships. While words like "system" and "community" are
useful words, they must be used warily, lest their use draw the USIB agencies
away from realistic solutions. The problem solutions discussed need deeper
exploration, by the agencies and at the levels within the agencies to which the
solutions may be applicable.
-6. The report dramatizes by apparent inadvertence one difficulty that has
long been inherent in the disability of intelligence agencies to deal squarely with
their information processing problems. That is, while the report purports to deal
with information, in fact it deals with documents. Certainly the level of detail
permissible in the survey dictated the identification of information by means of the
documents which contained it. And certainly the state of the art impedesra direct
handling of information or se. On the other hand, the information is more
essential than the vehicles that convey it; and more intense concentration on the
information may lead the way to abating the white flood of documents, which is
one of the major impediments to the effective discharge of intelligence missions.
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7. The Panel is convinced that current means for the handling.of intelligence
information are inadequate. The rate of growth in document generation and
acquisition in recent years has not been accompanied lay comparable advancements
in methods for dealing with the problem. Actions to find improvements are being
implemented in many places. But such diverse efforts must be related to the
total problem as defined in the original Terms of Reference. The Panel believes
that extension of the SCIPS effort is urgently needed in order to exploit the results
of Stage I and to apply present and future developments of the state of the art to?
the entire intelligence cycle, from the establishment of requirements through
end-use for action and decision. The following text highlights some broad aspects
of the problem that merit extension of effort.
a. Orderly extension of the SCIPS effort can best be accomplished
under the guidance of a USIB approval plan and program. A specific
example of such a program is derived from paragraph 30 (Research
Program in support of USIB) of the original Terms of Reference. Such
a program would provide the research base needed to support the
development of a "system of systems" for the intelligence community
(paragraph 29). The SCIPS effort already provides a sample of the
type of research base required.
b. The effectiveness of intelligence is highly sensitive to time.
Elapsed time between determination of an information requirement
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and receipt of the intelligence by the decision maker must be reduced.
Categories of urgency must be established on the basis of all relevant
criteria to determine tolerances of responsiveness. These categories
must provide constraints for processing times throughout the cycle.
The SCIPS Stage I Report contains data that can be used for this
purpose.
c. In addition to timeliness, categories of appropriate detail and
relevance are essential elements of responsiveness. The SCIPS Stage
I Report provides insights for the establishment of filtering procedures
for the dissemination of documents and the transmission of information.
Such procedures would also be appropriate for developing an increased
capability for exploiting open-source literature. Such an increased
capability should lessen the demands on high-risk sources.
d. Confusion over basic terminology hampers the common under-
standing of the members of the intelligence community. A number of
key words and phrases used repetitively mean significantly different
things to different people. The Panel believes an early effort to
define such terms in their various applications is essential.
e. The SCIPS Stage I experience and procedures for investigation
represent an approach that would be enlightening for all persons and
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organizations concerned with information science in and out of Government.
This Panel believes that a description of the SCIPS methodology would be
Invaluable for those with comparable problems outside the intelligence
community.
8. Recommendations
This section summarizes the major recommendations of the Consultant Panel.
a. The Panel strongly recommends that the SCIPS Study be
extended in the full context of the original Terms of Reference.
Stage I of SCIPS has achieved its objectives.
b. USIB should establish a long range plan for research and
development activities to enable the USIB principals to discharge
their major responsibilities.
C. A Joint Information Exchange Staff should be established
Immediately to:
1. Operate, maintain, complete and service the SCIPS data
base;
2. Initiate a study to develop a specific proposal for imple-
mentation of alternative (f). of the SCIPS Stage I Report
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/T. e., the organization of a Community Operations Research
Center/.
This should be operated under the appropriate conditions listed in I D 3
of the Stage I report.
d. The Panel recommends that the ITSIB principals study the SCIPS
Stage I Report for assistance in improving the responsiveness of their
agencies.
e. The Panel recommends that CODIB initiate immediate action to
develop and test the application of standards which show promise of
increasing the effectiveness of intelligence community functions within
the context of the Terms of Reference.
f. The Panel recommends that CODIB initiate immediate action
to define basic terms as used in their various intelligence applications.
g. The Panel recommends that the SCIPS Study experience as
discussed in Volume V Appendix G be edited and published at the
lowest possible classification.
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9. In summary, the Panel feels that USIB must focus more attention on
information processing problems in the functional sector between collection and
estimates. The solution to these problems may be crucial to the discharge of
their responsibilities in the future.
/s/
Willard Fazar
/5/
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John H. Kennedy
EDITORIAL NOTE: Panel members were selected because of their background
and experience in the field of non-numerical information processing and not for
reasons of organizational affiliation. For purposes of identification, however,
it is noted that Mr. Fazar is with the Bureau of the Budget;
and Dr. Kennedy with the Institute of Defense
Analysis/Weapons Systems Evaluation Group.
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