TRANSMITTAL OF LETTER TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01138A000100010015-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: April 20, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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20 April 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR. Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT ; Transmittal of Letter to Secretary of
Defense
The attached letter was prepared under, and is intended
to include, consideration of the following ground rules:
1. That you had made a commitment to furnish
your Ideas to Secretary of Defense.
Z. Appropriate deference should be made to the
conclusions of study, already given to
Secretary of Defense.
3. A reference to the possible use of nonnuclear
Polaris missiles must be made, however, without your
complete and unequivocal commitment to that course of
action.
4. That the primary responsibility for running
the YN war rests with DOD.
Si. Nothing should be included which violates
basic fact or feasibility. either in the intelligence or.
technical information.
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Something new and constructive must be
(In this regard: the systematic.. repeatedly
ted approach represents the major new idea.
7. There should be included no criticism of
DOD either direct or implied, except that unavoidably
associated with making what we consider as a good
gestion which has not yet been tried.
S. Complete objectivity must be maintained
oughout the letter.
believe that the attached letter meets and exists
e above ground rules. Furthermore. I believe that the
provocative sin-trivial, and will contribute toward
sn of a difficult but serious problem. I recommend
hat you sign the attached letter.
Chief, Systems Analysts Staff
DD/S&T
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TUP-MR
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
The Honorable Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
Washington, D. C.
As an outgrowth of our meeting on 5 March 1966 and
because of my real concern about the capability for supplies
being delivered to the Viet Cong, I have had my staff take a
look at the problem. Our concern has been centered around
the objective of increasing the difficulty of resupply rather
seeking complete stoppage. Intelligence information tells us
that material reaching a VC unit from other than SVN sources
is collected at one of several depots in South China, is trans-
shipped to Hanoi by two main rail routes (or by sea), is
transported by road or rail down NVN to a series of routes
from southern NVN into Laos, down the Laotian panhandle and
thence through a series of routes into distribution points within
SVN, from where internal distribution takes place. If the source
USSR, the economic material is introduced by sea to Hanoi
d military equipment by rail through China, and then follows
the rest of the route south. On the surface, this is a very
complex logistical supply line. However, the total amount,
currently estimated at a few tons per day, which travels all
ay into SVN is small, both in absolute magnitude and as
compared to the road capacity. Additionally, the characteristics
of the material -- small arms, ammunition, medical supplies,
etc. .,, _ facilitate, packaging adaptable to small or large trucks
or to human carriage. Since the total amount taken into SVN
is small compared to what enters NVN by rail or ship from
China or USSR, very large reductions, by attack, of depots
North Vietnam would appear necessary to affect the thruput
SVN. Furthermore, attacks on the relatively extensive
TS-194748-66
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road system of NVN would need to be very severe to impact
the small. number of trucks per day moving south for SVN.
There are, however, several relative choke points in and
near the Laotian traverse where attacks might be examined.
Obviously, the distribution points within SVN, when and if
located, become very high value targets since they represent
large logistical investment. It must be remembered, however,
that the material imports represent only a relatively small
friction of the needs of the VC, the rest of which is derived
locally.
With respect to the choke. points, there appears
currently to be three main ones. The Mu Gia pass is one
of these three. The recent attack. by B-52's on this pass must
be considered as a large first step toward impacting the
ucture. Continuing these attacks appears useful
ey are augmented by a comprehensive reconnaissance
effort designed to evaluate the impact on a day-to-day basis.
With this rapid feedback system, newer and perhaps more
effective weapons can be given a. calibratable test. Though
similar efforts during WW-11 and Korea were not, in general,
completely successful, it is just possible that with the newer
weapons, large increments in increased difficulties might
result. Taking maximum advantage of the geography,. one
might use the tripwire anti-personnel mine, the Dragontooth,
penetrating cratering bombs for road disruption, etc. Among
the more novel newer weapons might be
transponders planted along a road which under all weather
conditions locate and mark operating trucks for offset homing
weapons. There are several others. For example, if and
when defenses are injected, these might be stifled or destroyed
by a non-nuclear modified Polaris which, I am told, could be
configured to provide accurate all-weather destruction areas
of appreciable size. We have performed an in-house study
which indicates that there is reason for some optimism, if
not now, at least in the next year or two. In any event, the
TS-194748
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OP SECRET
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Distribution:
Copies 1&Z - Addressee
3 DDCI
4 - DD/I
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7 DCI Signee File
8-ER
SAS/D:D/S&T: :ccj (19 April)
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TS194748
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Date Aril 1966
oc.
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