SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE - GENERAL (RECOMMENDATION NO. 15 OF THE 4 OCTOBER 1961 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01083A000100130012-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: June 29, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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USIB-D- 34.4/ 2
Revised
29 June 1962
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT Scientific and Technical Intelligence - General
(Recommendation No. 15 of the 4 October 1961
Report to the President by the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board)
REFERENCE: USIB-D-34.4/2, 21 May 1962
1. The attached revised first, fourth, and fifth pages of
Attachment B to the reference, which were prepared by the Coordination'
Staff, should be substituted for the corresponding pages in USIB-D-
34. 4/ 2 as initially circulated on 21 May.
2. Members are advised that we now plan to place the subject
matter on the agenda of the 18 July Board meeting, subject, however,
to completion of Board action on the Coordination Staff report regarding
the committee structure of USIB (USIB-D-27. 1/18, 31 May).
Attachments
Executive Secret y
Gr`eup 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
MORI/CDF Pages _2-32
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USIB-D-34. 4/2
21 May 1962
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT Scientific and Technical Intelligence - General
(Recommendation No. 15 of the 4 October 1961 Report
to the President by the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board)
REFERENCE: USIB-D-34. 4/ 1, 30 October 1961
1. Enclosed for Board review is a draft report by the Coordination
Staff containing, pursuant to the requirement indicated in the reference,
an assessment of and recommendations for USIB action on the problem
of improving the collection, coordination and analysis of intelligence
concerning the scientific and technical capabilities of the Soviet Bloc.
2. We presently plan to place this matter on the agenda of an
early USIB meeting (probably that of 13. June), for discussion and
approval of the Coordination Staff report and recommendations regarding
the above problem, including the proposed memorandum response to
Mr. McGeorge Bundy and the President's Board on the subject.
Colonel, USAF
Acting Executive Secretary
A - Memorandum for Chairman, USIB,
from Assistant for Coordination/DCI
B - Proposed Memorandum for Special Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
and President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board
C - Assessment by Coordination Staff of Scientific
and Technical Intelligence
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Office of
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Washington 25, D. C.
Attachment A
USIB-D-34.4/2
21 May 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board
SUBJECT : Scientific and Technical Intelligence - General
(Recommendation No. 15 of the 4 October 1961
Report to the President by the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board)
REFERENCE : USIB-D-34.4/1 dated 30 October 1961
1. In accordance with the reference, the attached draft report
containing an assessment and recommended actions on the problem of
improving the collection, coordination and analysis of intelligence
concerning the scientific and technical capabilities of the Soviet
Bloc is submitted for consideration by the United States Intelligence
Board (USIB) as a response to the subject recommendation. This report
was originally prepared for submission in December, 1961, but was
deferred at the request of the Director of Central Intelligence so
that certain additional information could be examined and incorporated
in the report.
2. As directed, the attached report has been prepared by the
Coordination Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence in con-
sultation with appropriate agencies and chairmen of USIB committees.
3. In preparing this report, members of the Coordination Staff
have visited and held discussions with the Army Technical Intelligence
Field Agency; the Navy's Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center;
the Air Force Intelligence Center; the Directorate of Foreign Technology
and the Foreign Technology Division, Air Force Systems Command; the
Office of the Science Advisor and Office of the Special Assistant for
Atomic Energy and Outer Space of the Department of State; the Defense
Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the Office of the
General Counsel, Department of Defense; the Office of Scientific
Intelligence, Office of Operations, Office of National Estimates, Office
of the Deputy Director, Plans, and the National Photographic Interpre-
tation Center, of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Naval Ordnance
Test Station. In addition, the following non-governmental organizations
and individuals were contacted:
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In addition, the Coordination Staff has con-
duals in the intelligence community knowledgeable
in this area of intelligence activity, including the Chairman of the
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, the Guided Missile and Astro-
nautics Intelligence Committee, the Scientific Intelligence Committee,
and the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee.
4. It is recommended that the USIB approve the attached draft
memorandum, with its accompanying assessment, to the Special Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs and to the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Boa-d.
SW ET
L./
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Lit r i Attachment B
UsIB-n_34. 4/2
DRAFT 21 May 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
SUBJECT Scientific and Technical Intelligence - General
(Recommendation No. 15 of the 4 October 1961
Report to the President by the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board)
1._ In accordance with Mr. Bundy's memorandum of 11 October 1961,
subject as above, the United States iu ligeuce L 1 (USIB) submits
herewith a report containing an assessment of a=.: .le-~sures for improving
the collection, coordination and analysis of inteligence concerning
the scientific and technical capabilities of the Soviet Bloc.
2. The United States Intelligence Board has approved the following
actions based wry . . `iis report :
(a) Efforts to devGlL:p a pr.;ctical macr.ine trG lation capability
should be continued on an uccele-at:d basis. See Section 2)
(b) CIA should explore the feasibility of allocating additional
funds to its present program for exploitation of Soviet Bloc
scientific and technical literature. (See Section 2)
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(d) The Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence
9ti( n/
Agency should jointly review present procedures for the acquisition
and exploitation of Soviet Bloc material, and submit recommendations
for improvement to USIB, (See,Section
(e) CIA shouldevelop and carry out a long-range program for
the clandestine collection of scientific and technical information
from the Soviet Bloc, (See Section 5)
(f) The Director, National Security Agency (NSA), sliouid
continue and expand, if feasible, the use of facilities outside
the intelligence community which have been established for collec-
tion and analysis of U. S. missile and space telemetry for the
collection and analysis of Soviet telemetry, (See Sectipn 6)
(g) The Secretary of Defense should submit recommendations to
USIB concerning the division of responsibility for telemetry analysis
between NSA. and the other departments and agencies in the intelli-
gence community. (See Section 6)
(h)-Plans for any new technical collection methods intended
to meet national and interdepartmental intelligence needs should
be submitted to the United States Intelligence Board by the
originating.agency in order that the Board may express its views
as to the intelligence value of the proposed project. (See
.Section T)
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(i) The Secretary of Defense should establish procedures
with the military services which will permit both further use of
designated operational components in connection with specific
technical collection systems and expeditious deployment of
additional facilities when dictated by a particular Soviet,Bloc
activity. (See Section 7)
(j) CIA should re-examine its program and activities for the
production of scientific and technical intelligence in the light
of changes now taking place in the intelligence community, and in,
consultation with the Defense Intelligence Agency. (See Section 8)
(k) The Department of Defense should make arrangements for
scientific and technical intelligence which will provide, under
the staff supervision of the Defense Intelligence Agency, for the
continuation and strengthening of programs designed to render
support to and receive assistance from research and development
components, and for the utilization of the resources and services
of such programs in preparing contributions to intelligence
estimates. (See Section 8)
(1) CIA should continue and strengthen its program of support
to research and development components of the government outside
the Department of Defense other than the Atomic Energy Commission.
(See Section 8)
will continue to follow intelligence community activities concerning the
scientific`and technical capabilities of the Soviet Bloc.
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Assessment of Scientific and Technical Intelligence
1. General
The intelligence community at present is providing the policy and
planning elements of the government with reasonably adequate intelligence
on the overall basic scientific and technical capabilities of the Soviet
Bloc. Although in the aggregate this intelligence is 'satisfactory, it
is not completely comprehensive and on a few areas of basic science and
technology,
intelligence coverage of Soviet Bloc activity is incomplete.
Generally, however, such areas are those which have been deemed after
-careful consideration, to be of lesser importance or in which significant
scientific and technical advances are least likely to occur in the
immediate future. A significant body of information is available on a
continuous basis from overt sources and other collection facilities
relating to Soviet Bloc basic scientific and technical capabilities.
Although certain steps are desirable to increase the receipt of such
information., the most urgent problems relate to the translation and
organization of this information so that it can be disseminated and made
readily accessible to intelligence analysts and other users.
Intelligence on the application of Soviet Bloc basic scientific
'capabilities to the achievement of specific objectives and end products,
however, is inadequate. This inadequacy is becoming more acute due to
the world wide technological "explosion" and the concomitant increasing
competence and sophistication of Soviet science and technology. The
principal deficiency is the lack of hard, factual information on the
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policy, planning, research and design phases in the development of a
Soviet weapon, weapons system, or other technological achievement. Past
experience indicates that factual information on these phases of Soviet
activity is not likely to be available through overt sources, or sus-
ceptible to collection by technical methods. Although clandestine
collection has not as yet produced significant information on these
phases of Soviet activity, nevertheless it is apparent that the coamnuiity
will of necessity have to place urgent emphasis on clandestine collection
means to fill this serious gap.
Several intelligence agencies have developed and are using with
success a variety of technical methods which enable the community to
detect and identify the end products of the Soviet effort early in their
test stages and to ascertain, to some degree, their characteristics,
production, and use. In the absence of significant information on the
planning and design phases of Soviet Bloc development activity, the
community relies increasingly on technical-collection methods and devices
to provide information on the applications which the Soviets have made of
their capabilities. Despite the limitations of such reliance in terms of
adequate advance warning of the direction and scope of Soviet efforts,
it is clear that this situation will obtain for the immediate future.
Even if significant progress can be made in the field of clandestine
collection to meet this urgent requirement for planning and design
information, it will be necessary to develop new technical methods for
end product detection in order to keep pace with Soviet technological
S-CM.
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The analytical efforts of the intelligence community in scientific
and technical intelligence serve two quite distinct kinds of customers.
On the one hand are the policy makers and operational officials of the
government, on the other hand, the research and development organizations
and activities of the government. The needs of these two types of con-
sumers are different (although not incompatible) and this fact raises
some problems with respect to the organization and coordination of the
analytical effort as a whole.
There are within all elements of the community a recognition of the
importance of scientific and technical intelligence concerning the Soviet
Bloc, and a desire to take every possible step to improve the United
States capability to foresee and to profit by Soviet scientific and
technical developments.
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2. Exploitation of open literature
Several studies have been undertaken to determine whether Soviet
scientific and technical trends and capabilities might be assessed, well
in advance, from available open literature, if such literature were
adequately exploited. Although these studies have not been conclusive,
having the element of hindsight, it is possible to generalize that a
vast amount of scientific and technical information does exist in
unexploited literature. This information is of use and value to the
U. S. scientific community at large, as well as to the intelligence
community, and the problems involved in making it readily available are
shared by both groups.
The first step in making the scientific and technical information
contained in Soviet Bloc literature available is that of converting it,
by translation (or by abstracts, which necessitate translation), into
the English language. The current effort in thus exploiting such
literature is almost entirely dependent upon human, manual translation
to English text. Of the estimated 3.5 million pages of Soviet Bloc
literature available, approximately one-half are believed to contain
information of some scientific or technical intelligence value, and only
300,000 pages are being translated annually. It is generally recognized
that unless a practical machine translation capability can be developed.,
there may be no practicable solution to this problem. Considerable progress
has been made toward this end, although additional efforts and funds will be
required before the adequate capability can be realized in practice.
Therefore, efforts to develop such capability should be continued on an
accelerated basis.
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In the interim, however, greater use should be made of available
human resources to accomplish translations. There are approximately
qualified translators, with scientific and technical competence, presently
available under contractual arrangements with CIA as part of its service
of common concern. Due to a limitation of funds, many of these trans-
lators are not now being fully utilized. CIA should explore the feasi-
bility of allocating additional funds to permit full utilization, (on a
carefully selective basis), of this translator resource. The allocation
for example, would more than double the
amount of scientific and technical information currently being obtained
from Soviet Bloc open literature. Both human and machine translation
efforts must be accompanied by increased endeavors to improve the process
of selecting that portion of the body of literature which does, in.fact,
contain useful information.
The problem of processing and storing the mass of unclassified data
obtained from open literature in a manner which will permit its speedy
retrieval is a matter of concern to the scientific community as well as
to the intelligence community. No mechanism entirely satisfactory to either
group now exists. It is clearly desirable, however, that the intelligence.
community cooperate as fully as possible with scientific groups seeking
to resolve this problem in order to avoid unnecessary duplication and take
full advantage of non-intelligence activities and arrangements. It is
noted that a comprehensive study has been approved by the United States
Intelligence Board which, among other objectives, attacks some aspects
of this problem.
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~+. loitation of Materiel
A certain amount of Soviet Boc materiel (hardware) has been
collected and exploited by the intelligence community to further the
assessment of the scientific and technical capabilities of the Soviet
Bloc. In some instances, however, there has been duplicative effort
in acquiring the same types of equipment, although for some types of
materiel duplicate acquisition is desirable in order to permit thorough
exploitation. Additionally, for budgetary or other reasons, some
equipment which has been collected has not been fully analyzed and
exploited on a timely basis. Moreover, it appears that there is
available some Soviet Bloc materiel which could be of use to the intelli-
gence effort which has, in fact, not been -collected. Consequently, a
much greater community-wide effort should be directed toward: (1)
acquisition of Soviet Bloc materiel and (2) full and timely intelligence
exploitation. This will require community-wide coordination to ensure
prompt evaluation by technically qualified personnel and timely
dissemination of finished intelligence reports to the community and to
the research and development activities responsible for U. S. offensive
and defensive weapons systems. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
and CIA should jointly review this matter and submit recommendations for
United States-Intelligence Board (USIB) consideration.
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8, The Analysis Task
National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 3,
para. 7.c., assigns responsibility for the production of scientific and
technical intelligence to CIA as a service of common concern. The
directive also states (para, 7.b.): "The Department of Defense shall
produce military intelligence. This production shall include scientific,
technical and economic intelligence directly pertinent to the missions
of the various components of the Department of Defense."lthough
explicit definition of and delineation between these two responsibili-
ties has not been stated and indeed perhaps is not susceptible to such
statement, there is, in fact, relatively little unwarranted duplication
or overlap of effort between the analysis activities of the military
services and CIA. Among the military services themselves there is a
natural division of effort, based upon their respective operational and
research and development responsibilities within the Department of
Defense. There are, however, certain problems in the scientific and
technical intelligence field (of which the Soviet anti-ballistic missile
program, the development of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles,
the Soviet submarine program, and Soviet space activities are examples)
which are of priority importance to the national security, and on which
it is difficult to reach firm intelligence conclusions. Consequently
all agencies are justified in devoting to these problems such resources
and analytical efforts as are available. In these fields diversified
approaches will increase the likelihood of reaching a sound understanding
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of Soviet activities, capabilities and vulnerabilities. Under these
circumstances, it is essential that there be a full exchange of information
among the participating agencies, and that each be kept aware of the analytical
efforts of the others in these fields. This is generally being done,
both through liaison at the technical working level, and through the
facilities of the Scientific Intelligence Committee, the Guided Missile
and Astronautics Intelligence Committee and the Joint Atomic Energy
Intelligence Committee.
Nevertheless, there is evidence that, aside from problems of
overriding national concern, some duplication of effort exists between
CIA and the military services, for which justification is not entirely
clear. For example, CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence inclu
an "fir and Naval Weapons Branch" engaged in analysis of Soviet air an
naval weapons development, despite the more extensive and thorough
coverage of these fields by Air Force and Navy.
CIS has made conscientious and largely successful efforts to
eliminate unwarranted duplication of its effort with that of components
of the Department of Defense; at this time, however, CIA should further
re-examine its programs and activities in the light of changes now taking
place in the intelligence community, and in consultation with DIM
We are aware that duplication of effort may exist in certain
technical fields between elements of the intelligence community in
Washington on the one hand and intelligence organizations of certain
military commands on the other. We note that the Department of Defense
is currently examining the allocation of intelligence resources to the
various military commands.
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There is general agreement among the elements of the community
engaged in the analysis of Soviet Bloc scientific and technical capabili-
ties that there are basically two types of consumers of the product of
their analyses: (a) policy and operating officials, and (b) research
and development components. It is also recognized that, although the
needs of these two consumers are different, they are not incompatible,
but are in some respects complementary, in that work devoted to meeting
either need assists in meeting the other. There is no doubt that
intelligence, by furnishing knowledge and information on foreign
scientific and technical capabilities, trends and developments, can
significantly assist and expedite our own research and development
effort, and that for this assistance to be most effective, the intelli-
gence components concerned must be put into a close and harmonious
relationship with research and development activities. Conversely, this
relationship can be of great benefit to intelligence, through the
availability and use of the scientific talent within the research and
development community, in solving problems of intelligence analysis and
collection.
The United States Intelligence Board believes that arrangements
within the Department of Defense for scientific and technical intelligence
should provide, under the staff supervision of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, for the strengthening of organizations and programs designed to
render intelligence support to and receive assistance from research and
development components, and for the utilization of the resources and
services of such organizations and programs in preparing contributions
to intelligence estimates. Similarly, CIA should continue and strengthen
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its program of support to research and development components of the
government outside the Department of Defense, other than the Atomic
Energy Commission. The Atomic Energy Commission should similarly continue
and strengthen its program of intelligence support to its own research
and development activity.as veil as its contribution to the intelligence
community.
In drawing conclusions and making estimates as to Soviet activities
and developments, intelligence analysts frequently base their reasoning,
in whole or part, upon analogous U. S. experiences in the particular
activity in question. While it is recognized that in some cases the
paucity of information on a Soviet activity leaves no alternative except
to rely largely upon analogous U. S. experience, this kind of reasoning
can lead to false or misleading conclusions, and every effort should be
made to avoid undue reliance upon it in drawing conclusions as to the
nature of Soviet scientific or technical developments.
SEC4