SOME IMPLICATION OF A SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL ARMAMENTS INSPECTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01083A000100080072-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2012
• Sequence Number: 72
• Publication Date: August 30, 1955
• Content Type: SNIE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/31 :CIA-RDP80B01083A000100080072-8
THL PR08~.EM
~t ~rtt~~.over #.riefx people if they should permit intett~t~ona~ z~aectE~ p~ ~~-~
w,,.?
~~~ f~~s and.~tallations tm hav,~ }i'P~! AI!f`P_CC nnrl m~cmmanf..vti~1,;,~ ids t7 .
To mate: (~} whether the $C~viet rulexa could m.pi.~i~a4.n t~ir t~~ct?d~ 'k;,
~t deg~e sut~t insperticm would give assurance against t2~'. ~Wx>ing ~ ~ ~~r
~crmzestian az~ong themselves and to the exterior withgt~t aa.~ intder~~e,r+
c inspeet+~ra are granted free access and mavemenL v~rft~tliln tdxe t~~;a~
~~ n~ ~xc~ w,vw.u c~auCVC LIILLi~? ~,ri$y cc~ula nlalriLalll Bt3C13 ~+orxtrot; ;~~} ;~ ,~;,
~ ,. ,
t
-~ an egatntnatlon of nnly a few iizzplicatl.ons of an assumed Sov#,~t acceptance aaf in.~~-
,~d any particular proposals i~~r inspection or disarmament. 3'his estimate itgi;
Sov
Iet 3.ntentiar4s zn the spherF of dlsarmanlent, or the probable Soviet attzt~de ~~
preliminary suxv~ey of the questions posed. It does not attempt to deal with ~rttt~l'
~
ment and the nature of the inspection system, this estimate can be no m?re t~ #~
Zn the ai~nce of details regarding the terms of the assumed disal-mam~t agre~b-
CONCl.USI(~NS
~z~ ?~e hid fc}r t~'xe ~c~st
1. ~'~ believe tktat an in terr_atioz gal arm-
aiA#~B ictit~ system would present
nb dsi~gers to t;E~ Soviet s~~stef~~ whi~,h
Sri >t~: be overcome by techniques of
p~tt'gl.. ~ ~~ ~el)Pve f,hp.i the ~Sotiit~t,
~e~a;,~o>.~1c~ ~~biy reRCli t}te same
'~~. I~#~,~t; their decision to ac~-
.~ili,t k;lp,txrrx~.r~1 pectiol~
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/31 :CIA-RDP80B01083A000100080072-8
~. The L7SSR r_ ould have con~hx~,
~i~ht accumulate by etandesti~ ~p~';:
orz~, the numt~ers and topes ~ n~z~Z' ~''":
?
weapons required far 4 feasible ~k c,tt-;
tare i?5. 'I'bfrefari~, tntez->;iatio
t~or? cif ~~zTclPyrt apc~ti~t end
materials ~,lune,,~q~id nc~ ~rotr#d
a3~ce agatri~~ .#~I~i"~tiq~ibility "0~..#
~:ttack. tt '~'.'~'l~'a
me~.z~s of detiv+.`~~~'~ n
 that presently accorded the riipic>t~~tlC~
in the USSR and wouti> w-nuld require the
USSR to made major ~ t~~ai1~;~?~s i3: !ts internal
ser_.urity practices, and wtnalcf ~-+~ns'it.ite a
~?~a~ red m~~ciiflcatior. eat ih< tunr.~,inental Sn-
~~ie: -~nlicv i~f sEr-recy. Tl~ez~' ?~~nul~l hatie~ ~?~'~e
s?.~b.t