SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN THE LIGHT OF THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01083A000100080070-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2012
• Sequence Number: 70
• Publication Date: October 4, 1955
• Content Type: NIE

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/31: CIA-RDP80B01083A000100080070-0
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4:ArE .15.-13-55 (4 00 1040
'SOVIET mitetoN *DLO IN'tOE tioftt
THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
THE PROBLEM
To assess current Soviet foreign policy in the light of the Summit Conference,
CONCLUSIONS
1. Since Stalin's death, and especially
since early 1955, the Soviet leaders have
been increasingly active in seeking a
gradual reduction in the tensions of the
cold war. At the Geneva meeting in July
and since, the Soviet leaders, while reveal-
ing no change in their positions on dis-
puted issues, have cultivated an atmos-
phere of amicability. (Paras. 6-7. 9)
2. We believe that a number of factors
have been at work to produce this change
in the Soviet posture One of these was
the succession of a new leadership which
apparently believed that Stalin's conduct
of Soviet policy had hardened Western
determination to resist further Commu-
nist advances and created a rearmed
alliance of the Western states. The fact
that this process brought filially a move
to include a rearmed West Germany in
NATO almost certainly gave the Soviet
leaders serious concern and accelerated
the change in Soviet conduct. In addi-
tion, we believe that a growing realization
of the dangers of nuclear conflict con-
vinced the Soviet leaders that it was nec-
essary to minimize risks of general war,
at least until they had narrowed the gap
In nuclear warfare capabilities. At the
same time, the great coat of..ipodern
weapons was apparently forcing- difficult
choices in the allocation of resources so
that if the USSR did continue heavy mili-
tary expenditures, as it could do, it would
probably have to pay a price in reduction
of the high rates of economic growth
which have been a principal aim of Soviet
policy. Finally, the Soviet leaders ap-
parently believed that a reduction in in-
ternational tensions would open up rifts
in the West and bring a decline in the
Western defense effort. (Paras. 12-13,
15-17)
3. We conclude that the Soviet leaders
have not abandoned their long-range
aims. During the current phase, how-
ever, they have embarked on a policy
aimed at a general easing of cold war ten-
sions and apparently pointed toward
these main objectives:
a. To reduce the threat of nuclear con-
flict arising from continued tensions, par-
ticularly during the period of their nu-
clear inferiority;
b. To give time for the Mali to con-
tinue its military build-up and to deal_
with its economic problem* and
? AA*.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/31: CIA-RDP80B01083A000100080070-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/31 : CIA-RDP80B01083A000100080070-0
4. . . ?
to-Open rittlabpPtirttinitteS' iii+tda
trig tile' sttOstexri Porgrers,lerfOning
Western Strength, and: elisndinc Coin-
munist penetration of.Abe tie& *odd.
(Para. 18)
4. The nature of the mOtivations dis-
cussed above suggesta that the Soviet
leaders have adopted the new policy as
more than a short term tactical shift.
Soviet policy has in the past, however,
shown itself capable of sudden reversals.
Such a reversal could again occur if the
present policy failed to achieve its ex-
pected results, or if it led to developments
prejudicial to Soviet interests. On the
whole, we are inclined to believe that it
iii is the present intention of the Sovie
, leaders to continue their current policy
ifor some time. (Para. 19)
5 At the coming Four Power meetings
the USSR will probably try to convey an
impression of flexibility on the issues un-
der discussion without making significant
departures from its present positions. In
-
'moStei
pt,to fOous atteiltiOn. Upo*':
ot StirOpean Sectuity. Tht
*46 bidets May imply a willingness t?o
dompittiliSe ori the form of a, sencity
agretixient, but the purpose of any Soviet
prvosal would be to bring , about, the
collapse of NATO. :;Qn disarmament, the
FS?oviet leaders, without themselves agree-
to unrestricted inspection, will prob-
ably try to commit the West to fixed levels
of armament and, by continuing to press
for a ban on nuclear weapons, will try to
limit Western freedom of action to em-
ploy such weapons. They may, however,
agree to tentative and exploratory steps
to test the effectiveness of inspection in
limited areas. They will make much of
the issue of increased contacts between
nations, mainly with a view to undermin-
ing Western trade controls and to lend-
,;?ing support to the general propaganda
Lline of their present policy. ( Paras. 22-
2-6)
DISCUSSION
I. THE RECENT "CONCILIATORY" TREND IN
SOVIET POLICY
6. Since the death of Stalin, the Soviet leaders
have been increasingly active in seeking a
gradual reduction in the tensions of the cold
war. The latest phase was initiated in early
1955 with the USSR's sudden change of pol,ey
with respect to an Austrian peace treaty
After .Bulganin's favorable reaction in Mich
to the idea of a Four Power meeting of heads
of government. the USSR made a series of con-
ciliatory gestures. They included an appar-
ent willingness to accept some iniviortant, as-
peas of the Westcrn position on disarmament,
marked decline in the use of hostile and
K.4 stun-building themes in domestic and for-
:.ovt)paganda. and a more normal handling
of diplomatic contacts. In addition, the USSR
attempted to improve its position with respect
to individual countries, as in the re-establish-
ment of "normal" relations with Yugoslavia,
By the time of the Summit meeting, even the
special abuse reserved in Soviet propaganda
for US motives and policy had virtually ceased.
7. Despite the atmosphere of amicability
which the USSR cultivated, the positions on
substantive issues which it put forward at the
Summit meeting revealed no significant de-
part are from those previously held. On the
major issue of Germany, the long-sustained
pretense that the USSR desired German unity
at an early date was frankly abandoned. In
the discussion of European security, BulgatIin
made clear Soviet insistence that security
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/31: CIA-RDP80B01083A000100080070-0