SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION THROUGH MID-1959

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01083A000100080067-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2012
• Sequence Number: 67
• Publication Date: September 14, 1954
• Content Type: NIE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/31: CIA-RDP80B01083A000100080067-4
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE - NIE 11-4-54
NI E- I I - - Sy)-
( Sept. 19514
SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES
OF ACTION THROUGH MID-1959
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable courses of action through mid-1959.
CONCLUSIONS
General
1. We believe that the stability and au-
thority of the Soviet regime will not be
significantly affected during the period of
this estimate by conflicts for power or dif-
ferences respecting policy within the
ruling group. Any internal conflicts
arising out of such developments would
probably be resolved within the confines
of the ruling group and the higher eche-
lons of the Communist Party and would
not lead to civil wars or disturbances of
major proportions.
2. The appearance of new leadership in
Moscow has had no apparent effect on the
character of relations between the USSR
and its Satellite states in Eastern Europe.
We believe that Soviet authority over the
Satellite regimes will remain intact dur-
ing the period of this estimate.
3. Communist China is more an ally than
a Satellite of the USSR. It possesses some
capability for independent action, possi-
bly even for action which the USSR might
disapprove but which it would find diffi-
cult to repudiate. We believe that de-
spite potential sources of friction between
the two powers arising from occasional
conflicts of national interests, the cohe-
sive forces in the relationship will be far
greater than the divisive forces through-
out the period of this estimate.
Economic
4. The rate of growth of the Soviet econ-
omy has declined in the past five years
from the very high rate of the immediate
postwar period. We estimate that during
the next two years Soviet gross national
product (GNP) will increase by about 6
or 7 percent, and in 1956-1959 by about
5 or 6 percent, per year. If US GNP
should increase during the period of this
estimate at its long-range annual average
of 3 percent, Soviet GNP would at the end
of the period be about two-fifths of US,
as compared with about one-third in
1953.
5. The pattern of resource allocation in
the Soviet economy in 1953 showed about
14 percent devoted to defense, 28 percent
to investment, and 56 percent to con-
sumption. Current economic programs
indicate that for at least the next two
years the amount of expenditure on de-
fense, instead of continuing the rapid in-
crease that prevailed in 1950-1952, will
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remain about the same, while expendi-
ture on investment and consumption will
increase. We believe the chances are
better than even that the Kremlin will
continue its policies along these lines
throughout the period of this estimate.
The chief emphasis will almost certainly
continue to be on further development of
heavy industry.
6. The chief weakness of the Soviet econ-
omy as a whole has been in agricultural
production, which has remained since
1950 at approximately the prewar level,
though the population is now about 10
percent greater than in 1940. Soviet
leaders appear to have recognized that
continuation of the serious lag in agricul-
ture would ultimately make it difficult to
meet the food requirements of the grow-
ing urban population, the raw material
requirements of the expanding industrial
economy, and the export requirements of
Soviet foreign trade, in which agriculture
plays a major role. To remedy the situ-
ation the regime has embarked on a
vigorous program, with the aim of a-
chieving by 1956 a 50 percent increase in
agricultural production over 1950. We
believe that this goal will not be met, and
that even in 1959 agricultural production
will be no more than 15 to 20 percent
higher than in 1950. Even this increase,
however, would be sufficient to achieve a
moderate increase in the per capita avail-
ability of foodstuffs and textiles.
Military
7. We believe that, generally speaking,
the size of Soviet armed forces-in-being
will remain approximately constant dur-
ing the period of this estimate. However,
the over-all effectiveness of these forces
will increase, mainly because of the fol-
lowing factors:
a. A great increase in numbers of nu-
clear weapons, and in the range of yields
derived from these weapons;
b. An increase in the number of all-
weather fighters and jet medium bombers,
and the introduction of jet heavy bombers
in 1957;
c. A great increase in the number of
long-range submarines;
d. An increase in combat effectiveness
of Soviet ground forces, primarily due to
improved weapons, equipment and organ-
ization, and to changes in doctrine and
tactics designed to increase their capabil-
ities for nuclear warfare.
8. The principal limitations of Bloc
armed forces during the period of this
estimate will be: deficiencies in experi-
ence, training, and equipment for long-
range air operations and air defense; lack
of capability to conduct long-range am-
phibious and naval operations; and the
logistic problems, especially for opera-
tions in the Far East, arising from the
size of Bloc territory and the relatively
inadequate road and rail network and
merchant fleet. The questionable politi-
cal reliability of the Satellite armies
places a significant limitation upon their
military usefulness.
Probable Courses of Action
9. We believe that during the period of
this estimate the Kremlin will try to
avoid courses of action, and to deter Com-
munist China from courses of action,
which in its judgment would clearly in-
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volve substantial risk of general war.'
However, the USSR or one of the Bloc
countries might take action creating a
situation in which the US or its allies,
rather than yield an important position,
would decide to take counteraction in-
volving substantial risk of general war
with the USSR. We believe, moreover,
that the Kremlin would not be deterred
by the risk of general war from taking
counteraction against a Western action
which it considered an imminent threat
to Soviet security. Thus general war
might occur during the period of this esti-
mate as the climax of a series of actions
and counteractions, initiated by either
side, which neither side originally in-
tended to lead to general war.
10. The progress being made by the USSR
in the development of nuclear weapons,
and the increasing Soviet capability to
deliver these weapons, are changing the
world power situation in important re-
spects. Soviet leaders almost certainly
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Direc-
tor of Intelligence, USAF, believe that the fol-
lowing should be substituted for the first sen-
tence of paragraph 9: "Although the Kremlin
will probably try to avoid courses of action and
to deter Communist China from courses of
action that entail substantial risk of involving
the USSR in general war, it may be more willing
to support courses of action that would involve
risk of a localized war between the US and Com-
munist China. The support given such courses
of action would depend largely on Soviet judg-
ment as to the probable outcome of the war. If
the Soviet leaders believed that it would result
in a severe defeat to Communism, or the full-
scale participation of the USSR in general war,
they would probably exert pressure on the Chi-
nese to avoid courses of action which would
precipitate hostilities. On the other hand, if
they estimated that the conflict could be lim-
ited to war localized in the Far East, and that it
would result in greater relative damage to US
strengths than to Communist strengths, they
probably would support more adventurous
courses of action on the part of the Chinese
Communists."
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believe that as Soviet nuclear capabilities
increase, the unwillingness of the US, and
particularly of its allies, to risk general
war will correspondingly increase, and
that the Kremlin will therefore have
greater freedom of action to promote its
objectives without running substantial
risk of general war. In any case, the
USSR will probably be increasingly ready
to apply heavy pressure on the non-Com-
munist world upon any signs of major
dissension or weakness among the US and
its allies. Nevertheless, we believe that
the Kremlin will be extremely reluctant
to precipitate a contest in which the
USSR would expect to be subjected to
nuclear attack. The extent to which the
Kremlin uses its increasing freedom of
action will depend primarily on the de-
termination, strength, and cohesiveness
of the non-Communist world.
11. We believe that the USSR will con-
tinue to pursue its expansionist objectives
and to seek and exploit opportunities for
enlarging the area of Communist control.
It will be unswerving in its determination
to retain the initiative in international
affairs and to capitalize on successes in
order to keep the Free World on the de-
fensive. For the near term, however, the
Kremlin will almost certainly continue to
direct its external policies towards the
immediate objectives of weakening and
disrupting the mutual defense arrange-
ments of non-Communist states, prevent-
ing or retarding the rearmament of Ger-
many and Japan, undermining the eco-
nomic and political stability of non-Com-
munist states, and isolating the US from
its allies and associates in Europe and
Asia. At the same time it will continue
to expand the industrial strength of the
Bloc, and to maintain large modern
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forces-in-being as a guarantee of the in-
tegrity of the Bloc and as an instrument
of intimidation in support of its policies
abroad.
12. The Communists will vary the meth-
ods used to accomplish the foregoing aims
and will time their actions so as to exploit
situations that in their judgment offer
the most favorable opportunities. For
the time being, the Kremlin seems to feel
that its foreign objectives will be best
served by a generally conciliatory pose
in foreign relations, by gestures of "peace-
ful co-existence" and proposals for mu-
tual security pacts, by tempting proffers
of trade, and by playing on the themes
of peace and disarmament. The purpose
of these tactics is to allay fear in some
parts of the non-Communist world, to
create the impression that there has been
a basic change in Soviet policy, and there-
by to destroy the incentive for Western
defense and to undermine US polices. At
the same time, however, the Communists
continue to support and encourage na-
tionalist and anticolonial movements, and
to maintain their efforts to subvert gov-
ernments outside the Bloc. We believe
that the Kremlin will revert to more ag-
gressive and threatening conduct when-
ever it feels that such conduct will bring
increased returns. By such varieties and
combinations of tactics the Soviet leaders
almost certainly consider that they can
improve the chances for further Commu-
munist strategic advances. We do not
believe that such tactics indicate any
change in basic Communist objectives, or
that they will involve any substantial
concessions on the part of the Kremlin.
13. We believe that Southeast Asia offers,
in the Communist view, the most favor-
able opportunities for expansion in the
near future. The Communists will at-
tempt to extend their gains in Indochina,
and will expand their efforts to intimidate
and subvert neighboring countries by po-
litical infiltration and covert support of
local insurrections. We do not believe
that the Communists will attempt to se-
cure their objectives in Southeast Asia by
the commitment of identifiable combat
units of Chinese Communist armed
forces, at least during the early period of
this estimate. However, we find the sit-
uation in this area so fluid that we are
unable to estimate beyond this early
period.
DISCUSSION
I. BASIC COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES AND
BELIEFS
14. The Communist leaders now in power in
the USSR, or any that are likely to succeed
them, almost certainly will continue to con-
sider their basic objective to be the consolida-
tion and expansion of their own power, in-
ternally and externally. In pursuing this
policy most Soviet leaders probably envisage
ultimately: (a) the elimination of every world
power center capable of competing with the
USSR; (b) the spread of Communism to all
parts of the world; and (c) Soviet domination
over all other Communist regimes.
15. Soviet leaders probably are also committed
to the following propositions concerning the
expansion of the power of the USSR:
a. The struggle between the Communist
and the non-Communist world is irreconcil-
able;
b. This struggle may go on for a long time,
with periods of strategic retreat possibly inter-
vening before the final Communist triumph;
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