WHY THE INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE SHOULD BE ORGANIZED ALONG GEOGRAPHIC LINES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B00023A001000070020-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2006
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: August 4, 1976
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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4 August 1976
Why the Intelligence Directorate
Should be Organized Along
Geographic Lines
I. The primary problems with the current organization that I will
address in espousing a geographic organization for the DDI are:
--the existence of bureaucratic barriers to inter-
disciplinary analysis.
--overlapping responsibilities and duplication of
effort.
--awkward interface between Production offices and
the NIO system and with our customers and other
members of the community who are by and large
organized geographically.
--and the last problem is that the DDT has lost a
great part of his leadership role in intelligence
production to the NIOs.
I will argue that the 2L1111 way to solve these problems is by a
complete reorganization of the Directorate along geographic
lines.
II. Now, why should we organize geographically? First, the single
thread that 'runs through all our activities is geography.
This then is the common denominator for our activities. I
would argue that organization specialists would recommend that
geography should be the first cut in any organization of our
resources. For example,
--Questions come to us along geographic lines: More often
than not, our customers want to know about:
Chrome in Rhodesia;
Civil defense in China;
Coup in Peru;
Soviet SS-X20.
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--Products go out along same geographic lines.
--Geographic organization would put us in a better
posture to deal with customers. Our highest level
consumers (President, Sec State, NSC Council, and even
Sec Defense) are inter-disciplinary; they must deal
with the problem in Rhodesia, including the political,
military and economic implications. They do not have
the luxury of dealing with the Rhodesian chrome problem
independent of other implications, nor is it possible
for them to do so.
III. Geographic organization would put us in a better osture to relate
to the rest of the Agency and the community.
--Re our relations with the DDO, they are not good or bad.
They are uneven. If productive relations exist, it is
because individuals have made it work. There is no
parallel organization structures to facilitate coopera-
tion and coordination.
--Re relations with community, other agencies such as NSA
and INR are organized geographically.
IV. There is overlap and duplication between offices that would be
eliminated/reduced if organized geographically. For example:
--OSR/OER: Soviet economics;
--OSR/OWI/OSI: Military programs;
--OCI/OPR/OER: Free World;
--OGCR/OER: Grain;
--OGCR/IAS: both analyzing imagery.
.V. Adversarial relations exist now which would be diminished if
the Directorate were organized geographically. Institutional
biases hurt us. There is a built-in mind-set, for example,
for OCI analysts to look down on OER pieces submitted for OCI
publications. There is the feeling that "we can do it better."
It hurts cooperation and cannot be good for our product.
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VI. Our present organization does not permit us to coordinate regional
analysis very well. The NIO provides whatever leadership and
coordination of Mid East analysis that is done. There is no one
else to do it. Directorate managers are cut out of it and can
only grouse about loss of control over their resources.
--If we had a geographic organization of the Directorate,
the Chief of the Middle East unit would provide the
leadership, management and coordination of all Direc-
torate analysis of the Middle East. argues 2 5X1
that this same person would be able to prove e coordina-
tion and correlation of the community product in line
with the original intentions of the National Security
Act of 1947 and thereby make the NIOs superfluous.
r,
VII. There is fall-out benefit from reorganizing that applies whether
you go geographic or some other way but it should be mentioned.
And that is the opportunity that would be created to achieve
efficiencies and economies. Each office now has its publishing
shop, methodology staff, EEO officer, etc. There could be savings.
VIII. There is also the advantage of really being able to shake up
the bureaucracy. Would create a feeling of moving into a new
era. Would provide the DDI the ability to select absolutely
the best people for the new assignments and an opportunity to
replace the many informal "organizations within the organization"
which are powerful lobbies for the status quo.
IX. Finally, external forces are looking for something that approaches,
or at least looks like, major reform. If we can find a major
reform that does us some good, perhaps we should do it. If we
take some half-way solution, then it will look like patchwork
on an old tire. The point here is that people. inside and outside
the Agency expect and are prepared for major change.
--We have a new DDI--the time for him to strike is now.
Remember, we also have a new DDCI who knows this
Directorate. He may have his own ideas if we don't
move-out with a strong program.
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The purpose of this inquiry into the organization and management
of the DD/I should be driven by three principal concerns:
1. To consider ways of institutionalizing a mechanism that
will ensure the multidisciplinary treatment of a selected
number of intelligence problems. Any arrangement must, at the
same time, preserve the existence of organizations comprising
people with common professional disciplines and tools in sufficient
,size to nurture professional development.
2. To develop ways of adopting a more adventurous approach
to the analysis of appropriate problems and to the gresentati.on
of intelligence products.
3. To investigate ways of fostering the analytical ethos
of the directorate and creating a cultural environment in which
its analysts can flourish. This emphasis on the analyst must
take into account as well the critical importance of those
members of the directorate whose principal function is to suggest
analysis.
The considerations pursued should not be driven by a desire to
reduce manpower levels, but it must be noted that:
1. There is widespread contention that the reorganization
of the DDI would result in considerable manpower savings.
2. It will become increasingly difficult, if possible at
all, to augment internal manpower in the coming years.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: D c 6 I
Attached "strawman" on geographic organization
is for our meeting on Thursday, 10:45.
25X1
Executive utricer
Directorate of Intelligence
Date 4 Aug 76
S
E 5 . 7 5 101 E U D I T I O N S P R E V I O U S
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