EFFECTS OF THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM BOMB DAMAGE, CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, AND MORALE IN NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B00023A001000010011-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: August 16, 1967
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release -
No. 1.378/67
Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
16 August 1967
Attacks ate,
Vietnam
1967. Damage
e
.early severe
try , haw*ver, does not play a v
_
n North VieEta's ability to suet the needs
Peace or to tinue the war. Despite the widening
air war the Io1l Thunder gars r+ ins pre
doni tly- an interdiction campaign against a any
weed substantial
,c ion and repair of
rsions have not significantly
to infiltrate trs into
vzeznan anc viii not cripple the economy.
Civilian casualties in North Vietnam are r
as the scope and intensity of the air war increase
.
The estimated total n - of civilian casualties--
- Neworandum was produced solely by CIA.
rspared jointly by the Office of roo e a
and the Office of current IntmiUgescs.
Movement has boome move diffic .t, :taut
backed
from other C. t c
d 11anoi to neet, its own needs and
neurc cy in South Vietnam,. attacks
seats have been disruptive, but
er-all military capabilities have
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43,000 killed and wound--r
in relation to the population of 19
the 172,000 attack sorties against
north ..
Pudic morale ire Mirth Viet
holding up fairly well, despite crow
Although signs of war-weariness are becc .nq
evident, the people in general appear willing to put
up with their many difficulties and to respond to
the Hanoi regime** direction. There have heen no
ruts of open opposition. It is too early to
the effects of the recent bceZing of targets
i area, previously regarded as
casualties, and hardships i of nt,
pressed to k rep salt: at a
The evidence to date sagests,
orals is not likely to pose a ;Jor
an the air future.
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and si ti Tar ets
Of hsical_ le
Almost 64,000 attack sorties were flown in the
months of 1967E compared to 82,000 in 1966.
jor industrial plants and important
s have given new dimensions to the air
war in 1967. In terms of sorties, haver, the Roll-
ing Thunder Program r ins preponderantly are inter-
diction effort against transportation routes and other
logistic targets primarily in the southern part of
the country.
2. The cumulative effects of
us management a;
rt of the insurgency in
Vietnam. The movement of n and supplies has become
more difficult and time consuming and a substantial
volume of war and war-supporting material has been de-
stroyed in transit. As shown in the following tabula--
tion, the estimated direct cost of damage inflicted
for the first seven months of 1967 than
for the year 1966; damage to military targets so far
in 1967 has been more than double the amount inflicted
in 1966.*
1966
Jan-Jul
93.3
95.3
95.3
19.1
44.8
.7
12.4
140.1
a I for dstaiis.
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SSCM
been significantly impeded.
se have been able to
c activities and thus supply
of the population while cc
4. North Vietnam has been able to absorb the
pauLabsnot of the air war largely because of the aid
it ha received from of Fr Cu a ist curies. ",'he
flow of aid has boon increasing and far exceeds the
cost of danago inflicted from Use air.
1967 (1st 140
seven
gi
rths )
Indust
5. The extension of the Rolling Thunder Irc r
during 1967 to include attacks against important in-
dustrial facilities has significantly damaged north
Vietnams sesfl =Aera industry. Large-scale indus-
trial production has virtually ceased. About 80 per-
cent of the central electric generating capacity is
currently out of operation. All of the central generat-
ing
plants in the main 3anoi-aaipheng network, with
the exception of the g i plant itself, have been
out of service since early June.
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6. The country's only cement plant--at
production because of bosom
e and the loss of its electric power supply.
for two years and the production of apatite
The coutry's only metallurgical plant--at Thai
Nguyen-which produce pig iron for export and
fabricated metal products from imported steel has
ceased production for the same reasons. The
only explosives plant has been out of operation
coal, both previously exported in quantity,
on has been reduced by 80 percent.
production in the small fertilizer and chemical
industry has been. curtailed; and paper pr uc-
try's two textile plants has been wily
have been drastically reduced. One of the coun-
7. Mad ern industry, however, does not play
Vietnam's ability to continue
a plant in Alexandria generates
e power that all of North Vietn
power plants produced before the bombing. The
economy is essentially agrarian and most of the
for consumer goods is met by local and
nce the start of the bombing.
handicraft industries which have been expanded
ortation
attacked, as well as numerous sidin+s, spurs. ai
$100 #illion in damage has been inflicted on the
transportation system and transport equipment.
9. Over 660 instances of serious damage have
been recorded against highway and railroad bridges
and various types of bypasses. At least 50 major
railroad yards on all of the railroad lines have been
Attacks against transportation have been
throughout the Rolling Thunder progr. yearly
transshipment areas, fords, and supply areas have
also been heavily damaged. Transportation equipment
has been attacked extensively. Pilots reported
destroying nearly 4,000 trucks and nearly 2,000 cars
through July 1967.
cata.ons. highway facilities such as truck parks.
SECRET
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10. U x strikes against transportation curing
the first the of 1967 followed the same general
in 1965 and 1966, with
f Hari but with some attars aqa
yards farther north and against brig on
railroad lip, especially the
A.- The road system was not
hough traffic was s1med at
11.
attacks have b carr;
thern railroad lines
system in the South have also
and damage to tr p nation equipment of all types
have reach" now highs. More recently, in August,
kW tar* etls in the former restricted areas aromd
danoi and in the 25- e buffer sone, along the chi-
nese have been struck, including the impost
r Bridge over tie Red Rtiver,, the bridges Ca le$ at Rapider ride, and several and Lang
Son near the border. Chinese This recent damage
will present the rth Viet with formidable
In view of the demonstrated ability
damage, these
serious declini
?swats
12. The damage inflicted on military targets
has had-little
- little significant impact an North Vietna 's
tbili
ry capaties. Attacks against
however, disrt -teed n I mili-
Lea, caused the aband o t of many
such barracks and supply depots, and
dis sal of equipment. nitio n:
y military targets that have been
tly. Nonetheless,, the loss of
t of un tion s for a capacity ims
n the availability of
a now supplies can be
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i is fiiiiing it hard to rs it t
plants. Most of the rebni ]a
n technical and r t 'ial assistance
az konq pox-lo" of construction. Persistent
effort* to restors, dan"ed power plants partial
operation ding 1965 and 1966 were 1-argoly thwarted
dafflaqO inflicted
of 1967 appears to have
r+asu
efforts.
no chb- served r
main facilities
.4crthx Viatna has countered the lace
11aft0i to SUPP10=nt t lia it supply in
that city. The imported di. l units c t re-
place vore than about ton percent of the capacity
of central +w r tents out of operation, but
they prc ly price Sufficient electricity for
war-related activities and for eases tia2 servi
industry. A few of the larger diesel
Pocted are lated in u? o f
cover the demands of heavy,
of central generating plants y 3rting
2,000 diesel-driven generating sets during the
t two years. MOSt Of the "31060 12 are small,
however, and canac3t be readily operated in parallel
within a power transmission network, nor can tuey
~f reconstruction
i effort at sewn of the
bulk storage
as percent of
.. This less tins
r, by ext n
=iai g' set rk .
ge, t of hie.
da-_mue curr d
More than 100 Well concealed or of ,
ors aiso -provides, additional storage cam
out North Via . Ti w, widespread of 5S--j
30,000 and 40,000 tom, arm now dispersed thro
wttli a total estimated capacity c
flexibility,. The remainina bulk
Vietnam a storage capacity equal to ut two-thirds
of prestrike bulk capacity.
bzC.RxT
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21. z its of pet=le nave not only be f.
or IV b7, Alt WU imports decreased dUr
end of July were esti t
120 days of supply
ing of petroleum
Vie 's ability
s aak the infiltration of _ meu and &u
the diversions not signilio tly limit its ability
workers rt only mantel _labor retiiri
,
special skills, and can easily be recruited
groups of city evacuees,, farms
and Mia i
,
g
wite a ainimm of dislocation to the e
as the ilatioc n continues to support that
regimes 4" iRpoxu of necessan equipment contin
shortage of labor, unless losses and/or infiltration
in the South, increase abarply.
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Value of Damage
con c F' ciliti
ay Bridges
"Muf as r
Petro1
7.1
59.2
27.3
17.
7.4
1.9
148.6
25,4
42.5
.3
Of c snt neo,ssittt
C9am4t Plant.
of in 40r uttu as t
arhitraril?tt-dtrstr$tt t tsat
being, an unknown part it the sett of tithe
x 0attt4*.
Y 196
kwwni ttior. g
Vehicle
Depots
.'.' C Cat ions
4.6
10..0
as of
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TIa tO Our ;-OW -work
**We and intensi,
increase. The
'.ties--43*0 k
tas in and Mar theze
hawwrox, ra tite to the population
aad to t 172,000 attack ads mat
t Mort. :a Vietnamese r..^ Gen
Qy i tl in authoritative rtj
Civilian
f civilian
,ea , a as the
1 the cveratian
ea. alativeli few
losses zare if-
ity of the enemy
accidental bawbing 0:
3. Led civi
Ply i5 - J%me 1967 are
tabulation. Thirty to forty per,
casualties are eastinated to have been k.
iir
cau-
?; a heavy
Usually have
"lorth Vietnam
1967
Jan-Je
17,800
'sic Sts Of Lei and
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4. La t3juat
tit axe set
ril 1%7 st.at nt by a r poi itele
ni
calculatins these est.
Ft 20,000 North Vietnam,-
:gust 1964
Rely cores to our stir
ivil.a rA-Iitai-y rse,
1967. The n er f civilian
killod .r t148 period raziqa4
SST
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25X~
I
icd eas Mlal c