SEC'S CHAIRMAN TO TAKE NEW JOB

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R001400160001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 30, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2001/0tiffil:
EC'sChairman
To Ta te New Job
By STEPHEN M. AUG
, Star-News Staff WrItor
/- William J. Casey will leave
/ his post as chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Com-
mission shortly to take anoth-
er job in the Nixon administra-
tion.-
Casey conceded in a tele-
phone interview last night,
that he has been receiving
foreign policy briefings ?
ut he specifically denied a
2t).
report that he was going to
V he Central Intelligence Agen-
cy.
There has been speculation
that Casey ? one of the most
..- activist SEC chairmen ever ?
. would become director of the
v// CIA, replacing Richard
? Helms. Casey said not only is
be not going to be CIA direc-
tor, but he is not going. to the
: agency. He declined, however,
: to say where in the adminis-
tration he is going.
Reportedly, presidential ad-
viser Henry Kissinger has
been briefing Casey on foreign
policy. .
Considerable Controversy
ObserVers note that among
the government officials con-
ferring with the President at
Camp David over the past
weeks was U.N. Ambassador
George Bush. Should Bush .
step aside or be moed to an-
other assignment his job could
be filled by'Casey.
Various ambassadorial posi-
tions overseas ? notably that
of the U.S. envoy to France ?
. are being weighed and some
speculation exists that Casey
could be being considered for
such duty.
Reports that Casey was
going to the CIA arose partly
because during World War II
he helped coordinate activities
of the.-French resistance inci-
dent to the Normandy landings
and was chief of the Office of
Strategic Services intelligence
operations in the European
Theater in 1944-45.
Casey, whose Senate confir-
mation became the subject of
? considerable controversy after
allegations that his private
business activities may have
violated SEC rules, leaves the
SEC at a time when the mar-
ket and securities industry are
A p tts* d tireft Re I elaie
? i ,
0-01601
Part of the changes ? a
whole new format for commis-
sion rates, controversies over
who may become securities
exchange_ members ? among
others ? are the math of de-
cisions made under Casey's
leadership.
Casey realizes this, and. said
in the interview that he has
not decided yet when to leave
the SEC. He pointed out that
there are a number of mat-
ters he wants to see complet-
ed before he departs.
Sensitive Matters
He pointed out that the
five-member agency currently
has only three active mem-
bers. There is one vacancy
and Commissioner A. Sydney
Herlong Jr., a Democrat, is -
recovering from surgery.
The vacancy on the agency
? which regulates securities
markets, and governs the
truthfulness of corporate fi-
nancial disclosures among
other things.? was created
when James J. Needham re-
signed to become the first
fulltime paid chairman of the
New York Stock Exchange.
? The SE C staff is expected
soon to develop a white paper
on the essence of a central
market system ? essentially
the creation of a truly nation-
wide securities market. The
white paper would be designed
to clarify questions raised by
the securities industry. The
document is expected to be
completed by year's end.
Precisely how Nixon could
change the complexion of the
SEC is difficult to say. Actual-
ly, he would have three vacan-
cies to fill: Casey's, Need-
ham's and that of Commis-
sioner Philip A. Loomis, a Re-
publican, who continues to
serve although his term ex-
pired last June 30. Loomis,
however, is expected to be
reappointed. He is en SEC ca-
reer employe and former gen-
eral counsel.
2 General Aims
When Casey joined the agen-
on will have to find a Demo-
regulatory agencies may not
have more than a bare majori-
ty of members from the same
political party. Commissioners
receive $38,000 a year, but in
many cases, especially when
they come from lucrative pri-
vate law practices ? ?as did
Casey ? the salary is not the
attraction.
When Casy joined the agen-
cy nearly two years ago he
said he had two general aims:
To develop greater clarity in
rules that govern securities
transactions, a nd to farce
corporations to issue better re-
ports. He said he also wanted
to mold the computer into the
marketplace to develop better
communication for trading,
' quotations and gathering mar-
ket information.
. o At the time be described his
role at his old law firm as "a
generalist supported by techni-
cians . . . a policy man. . . a
grand strategist."
STATI NTL
0C0100gettikteili*-01601R001400160001-2
WASHINGTON PO.ST
Approved For Release 2001/03/0t ? CifiHRIFfflrNifte1
ig EP
TA) (cTi trA,
11,_ \,1/4"
By Sanford J. Ungar
Washingtotri Post Staff Writer
Sen. Mike Gravel, the
?maverick Alaska Democrat,
.was invited to visit Hanoi
'last spring for talks with
,North Vietnamese govern-
ment officials.
? No member of The U.S.
i.Congress has ever made
such a journey.
? Gravel came close to
'being the first, but changed
his mind after the North Vi-
;etnamese refused to define
the "parameters" of the trip
or to let him draw up his
own itinerary and agenda.
What the 'senator specifi-
.'eally had in mind as the
?goal of his visit--which he
now acknowledges was "na-
ive"----was a unilateral North
Vietnamese release of large
numbers of American pris-
-onus of Nvar, a gesture he
telt could have ended the
(..inflict before last spring's
new Vietnamese communist
alensive. ?
? Unknown to his Senate
cplleagnes and many mem-
bers of his staff, Gravel did
Make a secret weekend trip
to Paris in March, in an ef-
fbrt to establish ground
.rples that he felt would per-
mit him to go on to Hanoi
?
.
But the senator revealed,
tn an interview last week,
that after extensive discus-
sions with Xuan Thuy,
North Vietnamese delega-
tion chief at the Paris peace
talks, he ?"came away frus-
? trated."
"I wanted something con-
for the purpose of my
trip" .to Hanoi, Gravel said.
wasn't satisfied with just
going. , As a United States
senator, I couldn't be just a
- tourist."
.Gravel was initially reluc-
Pint to discuss details of the
till?secret episode, lest his
decision not to go reflect
. negatively on the recent
North Vietnamese visits of
former Attorney General
llamsey Clark and actress
Jane Fonda. ?. ? ? ?
?P He said he approved of
their trips, but felt that, as a
senator, "I have other re-
770-!_art use
government--with a mem-
ber of Congress.
Gravel's invitation came.
at a time when he had as-
sumed an outspoken and in-
erasingly controversial role
as an opponent of American
policy in Southeast Asia. '
Tie had sought to force
the Senate either to declare
war against North Vietnam
or legislate immediate with-
drawal of American troops.
At the same time, the Su-
preme Court was consider-
ing a case involving the Jus-
tice Department's effort to
subpoena a Gravel aide be-
fore a Boston grand jury in-
vestigating disclosure of the
top-secret Pentagon papers.
Breaking with precedent
and angering his colleagues,
Gravel had called a mid-
night senate subcommittee
session in June, 1971, to put
substantial sections of the
papers on the public record..
During a meeting early this
year with Al Hubbard, then
a national coordinator of
Vietnam Veterans Against
the War, Gravel had let it
be known that he might be
interested in visiting Hanoi,
he said in the interview last
week.
He also discussed the mat-
ter with Cora Weiss, a
leader of the Committee of
Liaison, when he was in
New York City for a speak-
ing engagement.
SEN. MIKE GRAVEL
... sought 'parameters'
free-lance journalist who
had once been held captive
by Communist forces in
Cambodia and who is the
author of a recent biography
of Democratic presidential
candidate George McGovern.
The invitation was vague,
Gravel said. His visit was to
be "of indefinite duration ?
a week or two ? and the de-
tails would be worked out
only when I got there." The
senator was told he could be
accompanied only by one or
two staff members. .
"I knew I couldn't negoti-
ate, because that would be
Before long, Gravel said, against the law," Gravel re-
Hubbard was back to him called, and he sought to find
with an invitation to North out whether he could do
Vietnam, presumably ob- anything in North Vietnam
tamed through the VVAW besides viewing the damage
leader's own contacts in from American bombing
Paris. The invitation was an and visiting a few U.S. pris-
oral one and never commit- oners.
ted to writing.
At first, the senator said,
Although the IIanoi gov- ? the North Vietnamese de-
ernment has long taken the dined, through the interme-
position that any American diaries, to meet with him in
congressman would be wel- Paris to discuss guidelines
come there, it was made for any trip to Hanoi.
clear that Gravel's invita-
tion was as specific as that
extended to several Ameri-
can labor union officials, in-
cluding Harold Gibbons, a
Teamsters leader from St.
Louis.
As envisioned by VVAW
at the time, Gravel's trip
would be cbordinated with
But Gravel was insistent,
especially because of his de-
clining popularity in Alaska
and his worry that this situ.-
ation might be aggravated
by an undefined trip that
could be misinterpreted by
his home-state opponents.
When the North Vietnam-
ese relented, however,
?and perhaps filmed during Gravel quietlY flew off to
The ? chronology of his --a visit of a film crew from Paris on Thursday night,
aborted-visit provides a rare the National Educational March 9. Only after his re-
110
0
9 Tal 011
A STATINTL
trip, a. id Gravel said he has
.never discussed it with any
other senators.
Before going to Paris
Gravel obtained "educa-
tional brie.fings" from the
Central Intelligence Agency
and two non-governmental
experts on Vietnam.
?
(A spokesman for the CIA
said last week that such
briefings .are often provided
"as a courtesy to members
of Congress, at their own re-
quest.")
The senator siad he did
not contact the State De-
partment of the White
House?"although l'm surC?
they found out . from the
CIA"--because he felt that
officials there would be hos-
itle to his project. "I wanted
no aspersions cast on my
motivation," he explained,
In Paris, Gravel said, he
had no communication with
representatives - .of? the
United States, South Viet-
nam or the Provisional Rev-
olutionary Government of
South Vietnam (the National
Liberation ? Front or Viet-
cong), hut he spent consider-
able time wiht the North Vi-
etnamese -and with a Veit-
namese Catholic priest be-
fore returning here on Sun-
day, March 12. .
"Pm sure that French in-
telligence was aware of my
presence," the senator ob-
served, noting that French
plainsclothes policemen at
the gate to the Hanoi dele-
gation "knew who I was." ,
The North Vietnamese, he
recalled, wanted to speak in
Vietnamese and have the
senator use English. They
provided an interpreter. But
Gravel, who was born in
Masschusetts of French-Ca-
nadian parents, "kept going
into French, so we could
talk directly."
Gravel said he spent al-
most the full day of Satur-
day, March 11, meeting with
Xuan Thuy. found that it,
continued
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Approved For Release 2oagici4#94voCIAADP80-13.
22 AUG 7972
, ? -
Torn Brit den
STATI NTL
McGovern's ZigZag on
SEN. GEORGE Mc-
GOVERN is a little bit wor-
..ried about the effect of his
refusal to accept a briefing
from Henry Kissinger.
McGovern's staff is wor-
ried, too. They do not want
it to appear that McGovern
.is .unwilling to listen to the
facts. But neither% do they
want Ki'ssinger or President
? Nixon'to be able to criticize
? 'McGovern. ? ' for campaign
? statements which they
, might allege are based on
' seeret briefings.
It was this last reason
ewhich' caused McGovern to
turn down the presidential
Offer. If his refusal seems to
, evoke a negative public re-
action; McGovern can still
accept the Kissinger brief-
ing. Meanwhile, he has. des-
ignated Paul Warnke, for-
: merly. deputy .to Clark M.
Clifford, ? President Lyndon
B. Johnson's.. last,,secretary
of defense, to accept the
briefing on his behalf.
Circumstances indicate,
however, that McGovern un-
derwent several changes of
heart about the Kissinger
. briefing. Originally, Mc-
Govern' accepted the invita-
.
? tion and a date was set in
his Senate ?office. That had
to he canceled because it
.was scheduled during the precedent of doing the job
week when the nominee was himself. .
occupied with the Eagleton McGovern's change of.
affair and with choosing a mind about the -Kissinger
new running mate. KisSin: briefing avoided what.might
ger then suggested another. have been an embarrassing
date and got the Warnke
nomination In reply.
IT WAS President Nixon's
idea that Kissinger should
brief McGovern at the be
ginning of the campaign and
. that thereafter the job
should 'be taken over by the
Central Intelligence Agency
director, Richard Helms.
confrontation. It is difficult
to imagine Kissinger telling
McGovern ..about the quan-
tity of bombs dropped on
Vietnam during ? a given
week without provoking
McGovern's .sense- of out, ?
rage, ; t ?
The senator from South
Dakota believes that the ,
Nixon-Kissinger policy of
trying to -hammer North.
Witham into accepting their
Briefings by the CIA have V terms by turning the coun-
been given to presidential try into a bomb pit Is lm-
candidates not In office moral. Moreover, he thinks
since 1952.? In that year, Jit will not work.
CIA's Office .of Current In-
telligence briefed candidates .IN ADDITION; he is sus-
Dwight Eisenhower and picious of Kissinger's fre-
Adlai Stevenson. In 1959, quept trips to Paris. He sees
the same office briefed Ste- them .as a sign of despera-
venson. In 1990, CIA Direc- _tion. If North Vietnam has
tor Allen W. Dulles person- "":" not accepted President Nix.
ally briefed candidates Rich- on's terms by October, Mc-
ard Nixon and John Ken- Govern thinks it possiiile
nedy. In 1904, Republican that the President and. Kis-
candidate Barry Goldwater Vsinger will soften their
declined to be briefed. But terms, perhaps to the point
the pattern was restored in . of tossing South Vietnam's
1903 for both Hubert Hum- President Thieu overboard.
phrey and George Wallace Thus the President could go
though Director Helms did VbCfore the electorate having
not carry on the Dulles fulfilled his promise to end
the war. His terms would be
McGovern's terms, camou-
flaged no doubt by lan-
guage. In any event, such a.
move
move would destroy one of
McGovern's principal cam=,
paign issues and might de-
stroy his chance of getting
elected.
So much for the way Mc-
Govern sees Kissinger. Kis-
singer, .on the other hand,.
views McGovern as the man
who stands beween himself .
and a negotiated settlement.
The ?President's latest terms
are the best that have ever
been offered._ Kissinger ex?-
pected North Vietnam to ac-
cept them. Kissinger be-
lieves that the only reason
the enemy continues to re-
fuse them is the possibility
that George McGovern will
be elected and offer better,
terms.
'McGovern .and Kissinger
are acquaintances who see
each other occasionally in
Washington. But events
have made them natural en-
emies. Each believes that.
the other is dead wrong.
Each believes that the other
is secretly plotting his down-.
fall. Under the circum- -
stances, perhaps it is just as
well that a formal confron-
tation will not take place.
0 1972 Los Angeles Tinos
STATI NTL
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1 7 AUG 1972
McGovern
J
On
e
1 11 e
TV3.
1,4r1;
In
Cr
By Carroll Kilpatrick
Washington Post Staff Writer
The White House and Sen. 1 But, McGovern said, he
George McGovern were at could accept no restrictions on
odds yesterday over whether his right "to speak out on the
the Democratic presidential issues or to make use of infer-
Candidate should receive per- mation and advice which (I)
sonal briefings on the interna- may obtain from independent
tional situation and whether
such briefings are worthwhile.
The White ..House labeled
?
McGovern's cemplaint that ad-
ministration ' briefings "go
wide. of the mark" as itself
wide of the mark because it tie campaign schedule,
said he hasn't received any of- would like to appoint Mr. Paul
ficial briefings. Warnke .to be my repro-
sources."
"On this basis, I welcome
and accept your offer," Mc-
Govern said. "To facilitate
regular and secure communi-
cation in the context of a lice-
McGovern told a news con-
ference in Youngstown, Ohio,
Tuesday that he had 'declined
presidential offer of intelli-
gence ;briefings because he
found those he had received
from presidential aide Henry
A. Kissinger "interesting, but
they haven't shed any new
light on the Vietnam prob-
lem." - ?
The Democratic candidate
said he had .responded to
President ?- Nixon's offer of
?briefings by asking that they
be given to Paul C. Warnke,
an assistant secretary of de-
fense- in the Johnson adminis-
tration, and that the White
House had named Maj. Gen.
Alexander M. Haig Jr., to
brief Warnke.
Responding to McGovern's
comments, White House press
secretary Ronald L. Ziegler
read a cable from Kissinger,
now in South Vietnam, saying
he last met ? McGovern at a
dinner With approximately 30
people in January.
Kissinger said he had con-
ferred in his office twice with
McGovern, the last time in
March 1971. McGovern had
told his news conference he
had met Kissinger "a number
of times." ?
In a letter to the President
Aug.- 7, McGovern said: "I ap-
preciate your offer to keep me
currently informed of national
security developments, includ-
ing those relating to the war
In Southeast Asia, during the
courskrArtevednptcr Rol
sentative at briefing sessions."
On Aug. 11, Kissinger wrote
to Warlike saying that "the
President has directed" that
Haig "initiate a series of regu-
lar briefings for you on na-
tional 'security issues."
There is known to have
been a debate in McGovern's
office over whether he should
accept the President's offer in
any way. Some of his advisers
urged that since foreign issues,
are the central ones in this
campaign he should avoid any
chance of ? having his hands
tied.
They pointed, out that the
briefing of presidential candi-
dates began in World War II
and continued in the Cold
War period, when there was
general bi-partisan agreement
on foreign policy. ?
Franklin D. Roosevelt saw
to it that his challenger in
1944, Thomas E.. Dewey, was
fully briefed on foreign policy
matters. Dewey, for example,
was told about plans to de;
velop an atomic bomb well
over a year before the ? public
received such information.
In 1948, Dewey was again
the Republican nominee and
President Truman saw that
Dewey was fully informed on
foreign policy matters..
"One of the things I tried to
keep out of the campaign was
foreign policy," Mr. Truman
wrote in his memoirs. !`There
should be no break in the bi-
artilgighitbolicy A
413i UP
!particularly .during a national
election. ?
STATI NTL
`.`I even asked that a tele-
'type ?machine be set up on the
Dewey train ?so that the Re-
publican candidate personally
could be informed on all the
foreign developments as they
?
progiessed, and I did so, be-
cause I did not want to en-
courage the possibility of a
partisan, political approach to
foreign policy."
Briefings were regularly
provided presidential candi-
dates in the 1930s and 1960s,
with the exception of 1964
when Republican Barry Gold- ?
water declined an offer of
briefings from President John-
solOtne of the better known
briefings was held Aug. 12,
1968, just after Richard M.
Nixon was nominated by the
Republican convention when
President Johnson asked hint
to fly. to the LBJ Ranch in .
Texas. . ? .
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1 3 AUG.,197Z
L7avern to
k34 0
? By SAUL KOHLER
Newhouse News Service
Sen. George McGovern will
accept a White House briefing
on foreign policy and the Viet-
nam war, despite warnings
from his staff that President
Nixon "is not the Wizard of ?
Oz" and the intelligence corn-
munity is far from infallible.
The briefings were offered
to McGovern immediately aft-
er last month's Democratic
? convention. The date was set
for the candidate to meet with
Dr Henry Kissinger, White
House foreign policy adviser.
? But that turned out to be the
day on which McGovern held ?
his historic meeting with Sen.
Thomas P. Eagleton, his for-
mer vice presidential running
mate, and the Democratic
standard bearer asked for a ?
postponement.
McGovern adviser, Fred
Dutton, said: ? "The whole
.myth that the President has
much more information is
bunkum. The press is on top of
it as. much as the intelligence
community.
"So long as the candidate
: knows this and keeps -in mind
that as a. United States senator
he knows a good -bit himself,
:. he'll not fall into any traps."
? Dutton said that because of
his own political activity in the
?McGovern campaign, he
would not attend the briefings,
and that the senator probably
. would he accompained to the
White house by retired Gen.
' James Gavin and former As- '
sistant Secretary of Defense
Paul Warnke. .
? Dutton said he doesn't be-
lieve that a briefing by Kissin-
ger, no matter how intense,
would inhibit McGovern from
commenting on the adminis-
tration policy in Southeast'
Asia and elsewhere.
a Rd
"After all, they're not going
to turn over the code. keys for
the nuclear devices," he coin-
111 ented.
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SPOKANE, WASH.
SPOKESMAN-REVIEW
JUL 1 51372'
- 84,759
S - 127,047
? Good Saletritard
The offer of President Nixon to provide :
'Democratic presidential nominee George ,
.. .McGovern with intelligence briefings is not a ,
.new thing. Other presidents have done the
,same for their adversaries, but it is never-
-illieless a. matter of choice Oil the part of any
it
t.. incumbent president,
- The offer is courteous, ethical and serves a
, public purpose.
, Should matters of International concern be
i.
k in delicate flux during an election campaign,
any presidential challenger should know. This
could help prevent harm being iinnocently
,...? done. to?diplomatic negotiations or to other
r 'matters of national security.
The briefings involve some political risk to
: the incumbent. By giving his opponent secret
1 information on matters under government
: control, the challenger could turn that infor-
mation to his own advantage.
i
When Thomas E. Dewey was running
..---
against Franklin D. Roosevelt. during World
'"War II, he learned through his own source's
?'of the breaking of the Japanese military
4.' .communications code. When the administra-
lion learned he had that information, Gen.
'George C. Marshall asked Dewey .not to use
the information in the campaign. He did not
'-do so and he subsequently lost the election.
Whether he could ? have used it to his oWn .
.!,advantage is not certain, but in any event he
-,:lid not do so.
., The briefings as offered by Nixon will not
,? be cursory. Presidential Press Secretary
i I Ronald L. Ziegler has said .Sen. McGovern
i ?
would be kepi "fully apprised" of foreign '
1..developments throughout the campaign. The
?
4..briefings are cypected to be conducted by
'Richard Helms, director of the Centr;11 latICJ.:-.... 1/-
-ligerice. Agency, or by members of Henry
rinTglirgm's?National Security Council staff. .
'-: While such briefings for presidential aspi-
:-;rants art. not unusual here, the practice
, seems unique to this country. No oilier gov-
?ernmcnt in the world provides political chal-
lengers with information during an election
campaign. That, in itself, is R tribute to the
7:kind of government we enjoy in this country' -
and the kind of men elected. to the president- /
-by , in both parties. ?
., 1'
.. ?
.. bummary: The practice of briefing presi-
dential nominees is an excellent example of
? fair? play and serves also as a natfOnal safe-
'guard.
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OrtEGO JOIMAY 2 6I11F,
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Approved
511Intinth
Lostiy Har
By DON BACON
Journal Washington Bureau
MOSCOW?The weather
.:was perfect, and with every-
thing in bloom, Moscow's
beauty was at its peak. So
President Nixon most days
walked from his residence in
the Kremlin to the office
where he met with Secretary
? General Leonid I. Brezhnev
of the Soviet Communist par-
ty.:
;- The idea of an American
president living inside the
Kremlin walls took some get-
ting used to, both for the
Russians and Americans.
lb see the Stars and Stripes
waving from a pole over the
Grand Kremlin Palace was
even more mind-boggling.
But the Nixons settled into
? their palace digs with re-
markable ease, and by
I week's end seemed to be
,-enjoying all that royal splen-
dor, which has been pre-
:served as a mockery to the
past by the Soviet govern-
ment.
THE AMERICAN press
saw little of Nixon during the
' week and had to piece to-
gether his activities from re-
ports provided by those close
aides who hovered around
him and tended to his needs.
. When Nixon was not meet-
ing with Brezhnev or with
the Soviet "Big Three," he
- worked alone in a relatively
modest office at his guest
quarters. He worked at a
walnut desk, dictating into a
? machine brought from the
White House and making last
touches on the important
speech he was to make over
: -Soviet television.
:'?
Even with the-President in
Moscow, routine work of the
White House must go on. A
: part of every day had to be
set aside for worldwide intel-
ligence briefings, Vietnam
War reports, review of bills
? and resolutions passed by
Congress and other govern-
ment matters that would net
? wait until he returned home.
NIXON ALSO received
staff briefings daily, and fre-
quently summoned his for-
F q.ligtOtkelf, g5/4031S-4
cussions, presumably on ne-
gotiating strategy,.
7.-71
,IleSS..f
',77 ':,?.
Oil
`\"
.-/\
ternoon, Nixon would again!
be alone. Sitting back in one
of the modernistic chairs in :
his office, he would study the.:
summit briefing books-14 of
them packed in two brown
-
leather suitcases?which had
been prepared in Washing-
ton.
One of those books, it may
be assumed, was labeled
"Breemev" and contained -:
every ? significant fact that)
the Centr ajJnte1Jigence!
Agency had bee-ii? able to
gather on the Soviet boss.
It would include personal
data and psychological im-
pressions for Nixon to study.
and later weigh as he met
across the negotiating table.;
Brezhnev would have pre-
pared himself likewise.
STATI NTL
MUCH OF the husinesg of
summitry is really just hard .;
work and intense prepara-.
tion. The Russians have been
masters of the game for cen--
-furies, the Americans? singu-
larly unsuccessful at
"Summitry," noted Lon-
don's Sunday Telegraph last
week, "is not, at the best of
times, a form of diplomatic
prowess at which the Amen-
can's excel. And this, to say:
the least, is not the best of)
times."
Nixon has long been aware -
.of the U.S. experience in:
summitry and had vowed to
makethis important confer-, -
ence produce Gomething:
positive.
GOOD WILL and hopeful
atmospherics, he said, mean:
little; the only significant:
thing, for the -long term, is.:
whether the two sides can '
come to substantive agree-
ments on the issues that cll.:
vide them.
All of the agreements an
nounced last week, impor-
tant as they are, wilt mean-.
little if Nixon and the Soviet '
leaders have failed to create:
at least some measure of
trust in each other.
Trust comes extremely.
hard for the inherently suspi-
cious Soviets. Nixon won't
break down their harriers '-
entirely, but he may have'
: it04$01150804041001400160001-2
here has been the most seri.?
`ous and well prepared of a: '
NEW YORK TIMES
Approved For Release 2001/01/1MARMA-RDP80-01601
Kissinger Under Aitack"
By House Foreign Panel
? By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Tan
WASHINGTON, Feb. 29 to make the State Department
Henry A. Kissinger, President as responsive to the two Con-
Nixon's assistant for national gressional committees princi-
pally involved with foreign poi-
security, came under severe ?
icy as it has traditionally been
criticism today from membersito the two appropriations corn-
of Congress who accused him mittees whose members are
of pre-empting the State De- normally less versed in foreign
partment's traditional role in affai
formulating United States for-
eign policy.
Representative Wayne 1 L.
Much of Mr. Fulbright's in-
sistence has been based on
mounting irritation over Mr.
J flays, Democrat of Ohio, chair- Kissinger,
s persistent unwilling-
man of the Foreign Affairs Sub- ness to testify before Congress
'committee on State Department ?except in strict privacy and
!Organization arid Foreign Oper- informally. From the tone of
ations, charged that Mr. Kis- remarks made at the hearings,
singer had "taken over the the Senator's irritation appears
policymaking functions of the to be shared by seyeral senior
State Department." . members of the House sub-
"He and his ever-growing committee. '
National Security Council staff Would Restore 'Primacy'
are making policy," Mr. Hays
charged. ''He's flown off on Sub-committee members re-
12 or 14 secret trips. He's gotpeaWdly called on Mr. Macom-
a string of 25 or 30 starlets ber to help strengthen the
he takes out. He seems to State Department's "primacy"
pack 36 hours into every day.in foreign policy and, by im-
where the rest of us have only plication, to stave off what
24." . ' many called the National Se-
Mr. Hay's comments came as curity Council's inroads into the
William B. Macomber Jr., depu- if oreign policy process.
ty Under Secretary of State for I Representative John Buchan-
Management, appeared before,an,Republican of Alabama,
the subcommittee to ask au- lasserted that the State Depart-
thorization for a $563.4-million ,meat had "declined in .power
budget for the department for and prestige." Representative
the fiscal year ending June 30, Donald M. Fraser, Democrat of
1973. Minnesota, called on the de-
partment to upgrade its role in
political and military affairs to
This was the first time that offset what he termed the De-
the department has been fense Department's "scare"
obliged to seek authorization tactics.
-.from Congress for its annual "I've become a great defen-
operating budget as well as der of the Central Intelligence / ?
requesting appropriations of Agency in recent years," Mr.
the funds themselves. Fraser said, "because every
The -new requirement results time I get briefed on stategic
from an amendment to the For- weaponry the .C.I.A. gives the
eign Assistance Act of 1971, impression of being more-bal-
sponsored by J. W. Fulbright, anced and objective than the
Democrat of Arkansas, Chair- Pentagon. The Pentagon is al-
man of the Senate Foreign Re- ways trying to scare you. They
lations Committee. always put forward the worst
Mr. Fulbright has long sought imaginable case."
? 11 )
STATI NTL
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\A,
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EALT.Ital,3.E.' '71TO
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f),
1"ll....6 *972
? President Nixon knows that his leverage on
the Soviet Union by his Peking trip has several
unrevealed limitations. The first is the
U.S.S.R.'s widely reported fear of China on
Russia's 4,150-mile border.
Nikon? regards this as hokey, hokus,
In only the 31'years, 1%-tween 1870 and 1901,
Great Britain acquired 4.7 million square miles
of territory; France, 3.6 million; Germany, one
million; Belgium, -one million ? 77 times
Belgium's own size. Most of these were in
Africa and Asia. But Russia had been in there
. carving up China for nearly two centuries.
The result is today's 4,150-mile Russian-
Chinese border, the longest in the world. It runs.
something like the distance from New York to
Honolulu.'
.WHAT PRESIDENT NIXON obtained from
Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard
M. Helms' final briefing at the White House
before he left is that Mao's military position on
the Russian border is much weaker than sup-
posed.. ? . ?
. .
order Issue
?
War starts with terrain. The Soviet axis for
its position opposite China is Khabarovsk, 400
.miles north of Vladivostok. The 'border friction
incidents have been concentrated i n
Heilungkiang Province and along the Ussuri
River, which is a part of the border. ?
MR. HELMS told President Nixon that the
Soviet has n crack divisions on this border,
' controlled from Khabarovsk. Nine are
mechanized. The terrain, he said, is excellent
for their deployment. We hear much about So-
viet intercontinental ballistic missiles and
bombers. But Mr. Helms emphasized that the
Soviet has a large and .extremely effective tac-
tical air force for troop support as well. Mao
has none. ?
What Mr. Nixon is trying to determine in the
border issue is: Who is provoking whom?
China can do the shouting and talking and
street demonstrating, as for a long time. But
President Nixon believes that if anybody is
really picking a fight in this situation the
weight of evidence is that the one who would
pick a fight as a precaution against the future
is, the U.S.S.R. ? .
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I ? ?
Approved For Release 203111Ctale4MCIAIROPMFPN1R00
26 DEC 19T1
3bilim ramastay,
sicacy'zi Ta Efilamd,
IIaa7z-zdz1a'3 COMMT
WASHINGTON.
FEW days after John Tunney
was elected to the United
States Senate, he was walking
through the Capitol building when he
ran into a senior Senator from one
of the Southern states. The Senator,
who was with a group of his con-
stituents, introduced his colleague-
to-be from California: "Gentlemen,
this man has just been elected to
the United States Senate, and I'm
sure you all know his daddy, who
used to be the heavyweight cham-
pion of the world. I'd like you all to
meet Senator Dempsey."
? The slip's implication that Tunney's
JACQUES LESLIE was until recently
a freelance in Washington, D.C. Now
with. The Los Angeles Times, he will
leave shortly for an assignment as a
correspondent for the paper in Saigon.
success is based on faded memories
of his father is one that many of his
critics would agree with. According
to their line of reasoning, Tunney is
the son of a famous boxer who di-
verted the spotlight from his father
to himself. Tall, handsome and ath-
letic-looking, married to an attractive
Dutch woman who has just launched
her own rock 'n' roll singing career,'
the son appears in society pages as
much as in news stories; though
glamorous, his critics suggest he is
? intellectually second-rate, as befits
the son of a boxer, a "political light-
weight," to wrap up the metaphor.
*Mieke Tunney has cut a rock 'n' roll
record entitled, "Habit of Love."
Another of his possible
shortcomings is exuressed by
Representative James Cor-
man, a California Democrat
who supported Tunney in the
Senate primary and says- "If
I had to pick a weakness, it's
that he tends to vacillate. I
think John considers it a
weakness not to take a stand
on things. He considers it a
By JACQUES LESLIE
that time?not so much con-
cerned with whether we ought
to be over there or not, but
very concerned about the way
we were handling the situa-
tion. It was more a question
of methodology than ultimate
goals. I felt that we were
making terrible mistakes. I
also began to realize that we
weren't being told the truth,
because Bernard Fall had such
a reservoir of knowledge that
he could take the statements
that were being made and ex-
plain them in context, with a
perspective. And then in '67
I began to seriously doubt the
wisdom of our being there.
John McAlister (now a politi-
cal science teacher at Stanford
University and author of
"Vietnam: The Origins of Retro.
lution"], who was on my staff
as a research assistant, and I
began seeing a good deal of
each other. He was sharply
critical of the war. So in '67
I began to really change, and
in '68 I campaigned as a
dove." .
Tunney has changed his
mind on two key issues,
Vietnam (he is now a firm
dove) and the SST (after
first coming out against,
then in favor, he finally
voted against it). His change
of heart on the SST in
particular tends to bear out
what Corman says. During his
Senate campaign, Tunney said
that he was opposed to the.
SST, then, after the election,
he held aerospace hearings in
Los Angeles and came out in
favor of it. He says now, "I
am afraid that I was some-
what confused. . . . At those
hearings we had one witness
after another come forward
and say that the SST should
be built and that it was going
to be great employment for
California and that the en-
vironmental problems could
be resolved, and that it was
economically feasible. . . .But
when I got back here I real-
ized after reacUng the Sena-
torial hearings that it was not
a good program and that we
should use the $290-million
elsewhere."
Tunney explains his change
of heart on Vietnam this way:
"When I went to Vietnam [as
a Congressman] in 1965, I
didn't know anything about
the war. And I didn't know
anything about the Vietnamese
people. Before going over, I
had the State Department, the
C.I.A. and the military brief
me on it, and I went there
with what I thought was a
fairly decent matrix of infor-
mation upon which to build.
When I got over there every-
thing that I heard was the
same as the Stateside brief-
ings. It dovetailed and seemed
to me to be representative of
the truth. And I therefore
came back a flaming hawk.
STATI NTL
1
wftpremtdolzensiFte lease 2001/01941:EGIAditiD01311.1)1601R001400160001-2
facts. Because of those two Fall in 1966 and began to get
things, he tends to change his
mind too ouicldv." very concerned about it at
-
1\3 c S e K
A voct,,her' 1'17 I
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?
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STATINTL
TEE L_A_CIDAD 01:31::1V.C;11
Approved For Release 16014M3:1/1341: CIA-RDP8M1601ROC
1. ????'?7 -i'-'?-::'-"') (7-I
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STATI NTL
.Plyrneuth car Rom the CIA
delivers a stiff,' grey, legal-,
? sized 'elder ? Marked .'Presi-
?dent's daily briefing' to the
New 'Yovli, Mo'nd'ay .
White House,
Newsweek. Magazine' said yesterday President Only three other copies oil
Nixon had written a super-secret memorandum the report are delivered ? one:
slnirplYciii cismg th.e U..S. intellig,ene.e network to Secretary of State
? kagers, one to Defence .Secre-;
for a series..o.1 fivc recent failures. -
1-311..in Laird, and one to',
?
The Ialest issue of the magazine -said the real Attoncy-General John Mit-1
reasons for Mr. N.Ixon's . re -organisation of U.S.. dell. ..
intelligence activities spelled out in ip The to read his co-prof the:
met ? de- t-Lit? the President does not
tor
-tail in the top-secret document. to Secret report. Instead, he
. Newsweek said the pisesiclen-gence diserepan-cies. on haw
tial nbuked U.S. intelli- ?veI1
...cud detect Pcs- Xissinar, to summarise it for
' _gence. for .rumlway budgets, for sible Soviet -violations of anY hirn,? Newsweek claimed.
isu;plying more facts than ana- arms control agreement.
lysis, and for just plain faulty Ne,wsv.-eek ilso described. .
intelligence,. ? how the Central ? Intelligence
Mr. Nixon, the report said, Agency -planned and . carried'
i singled' out five main failures: t or, the overthrow of Antoine,'
? Failure to predict the Gizenga:s Congolese gover4
ferocity 01.Lihcraticn Army re- inept. -
sistFinee .to the Laotin cam- At ene toint, accordinc,
saign earlier this yetr; the. Magazine's account . a ed.--
? . ,
llisinferination .tha-t led te ef Kalashnikey- rifles mea'A
to an elaberately-planned coin- for the rebels ? and disguis`Zr1
rnando? -raid 'en to.i ,empty iviso. 2s Red. Cross ?nackages for
?
ner V;',7, at Son Tay iugecs Was allowed to
(10.,i,!,-,; says Newsweek; still and- br?eak open while bcvg.
? .Tariklas- the White House), unloaded from a Cze:.:hoslovk
? Incorrect estimates ef the ship. in Khartoum.
'number of Liberation. Army Newsw-celt said a CIA9t
W.Cip0/1S anc: supplies flowing later successfully stole 'from.--a
.41rrou-gh the Cambodian port courier at Khartoum airporta
" 61 Siliancul-ville; ? suitcase containing .330,0p
EcIated discovery of sur- U.S. dollais. This had been sR--
''face-to-air misAles that sudcle- 'plied by the Soviet KG-B aiJ
?
? nly sprouted in the Middle Vi2S also bound fcr Gizenga-Y41
- East ceasefire zone last year; troops, it said. -
' anct an eight-month delay Referring to how Mr.?Nixoni? in.:
the strategic arms limita- reccives his daily intelligence
.
tH'n. talks while the White briefing, Newsweek said that:
Hous.e.lnied to 4,ort. out early' every morning a black-
asks his advisor, D.r. Henry:
? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400160001-2
THE STAT INTL
BAM.D.A.D OBEiWER
Approved For Release 2091/8a/04.: CIA-ROM-94114-MR
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. th.ii 11.\c
. i
. . .
. ,..._
it
j.
.L il-i
euletes the' lenqth of the re-
. . .? -. '? ? .: ? . , ?
ii
roeining life-span Of foreign
Derscnalities who interest the
., . . .. .. , United States. Its doctors saV.
* ' . ' -....:_?._
(PIERRE- NORD,. an InIernationally known expert on espionage, descri? they do not bother with lead-
.1)0 stibveith'e iv:ii* ?:- the ttItiniale Weapon ? in his book "L'intoxication" - hag American figures: that iS
{Editioils rayiircl). It is it Ciftliiitaril, n first-hand ntemoire. .. In. it, he, trates false on the -face of it because
the Clevi,..16iiiiitiiit of the great contempbrary affairs a Ilil CVO'ideS. little-hnOWil ? it is. the latter who determine '
facets of the 1939-1945 world conflict and the subversive, revolutionai.y,
. eVz.rybotly's future. ,.
. ideological cold war that ?has changed the, face of the World Shice 1945 .: . -As for the private lives and .
.here are passages froin his chapter on the.1.1filtod State's Central Intellige- financial affairs .of these per-
._ nee Agency ? C.I.A.). sonalities:, the C.I.A.'s lead in'
? eva. lua:e 1 i
, . .
,,.. le:,; ill eX1JErt.S, secountpts and
--...
The C.I.A.'.s headquarters is l'he results of these soace
, . . _ , . ., i. c, n !urns (:).?710.1iiiintic:hieicrGs:
-_- ! pohee officers' often know
.Sheliered from the enrious in a 1 eyes, translated into film and 'he CIA 's
. 4. re than their -colleagues iii
Vii . tape, recordings, graphs and ST4FF. - - z--' - - .
-acre park. at Langley,
ginia, twchty Minutes by cai,. Erjirniarfes. anti...vs .the direct:3:7. ,,,,,000 permanent . . 1 i.ethiociosgiu:tjse,ct's hom'iand. ?
A very scl:.tct company of so- '
fi'oin the. V.Thite House. Infer; to count Sovi2t missiles stock "d
sonic writers h ,cmployee\v.s1
eccnoniists, historia-
The C.I.A. decliires ?son.'e
ed 2.t Sven:lcsk, or to deter- aallici
Motion .has assumed that the egxrapoeihte:s
next Chinese nuclear. experiyotalsalue60:0LOirie-i-! Idgi'lvvieedeVnLitoillr:eL'rl political experts and' financiers: .
President of the United .States, !rine' Elle advar-ced state of CI
,'?.iuns the secret services. bim- or less equally between the - intcirret an enefinOuls InaSs Of
ment, or to hear Moscow's OP-
et: (!) and is as close to the
to its submarines cruising cover and
o.r:\er,rhaittee_ r, Linder ,informOtion collected on . each
:tzilher wer . of it, services, the?- aers. 's `%shey antagonistic, neutral or allied
Tentagen,* jo5,b t ? headq Floida's coast or to
uarters .slont chzek in at LarAey ar.d its state i
r,
oI- them an Aeric General Staff follow t ou
'ne cntdc \yn 01 SoYuz bra nclizs eve day .and .cannot _ .
. ry. - ?
ind the U,S Deoa-tment of rocket "Number X" atBaiko- cert.:cal them lits se. ,
Defence
. _ . _
?. 0 , . . ?tnout in the' farthest reaches of ?"ILLACii-" agents get data
.T...gyrir.i C.I.A . clirecter, head,. the Soviet Union ,as ni-,ily as al its -source bverSeas under i
4, American secret war:are, they can cliet-1: the pi:yires,2 of COL-Cr as ;min.-Isis, journalists,
zSpiona.ge zetivity, and subver- i'.-cii,-.. ova AnLIto -..31,i.:..r_ \??? businessmen or diplomats.
;ion' in ,forein . Countries, iS at Cape T-:eiiiie'dy. :1.11 hist:H.1M These ale the real 'secret
ist;?d .by two, other men: th,; ' -agents. The "VIIITES" incluE
tilers of. the Intelli;ence Divi- . A SECRET . "A Z-KY"
On and ,131ans DiviSicn,' . and I. it is onenly reported that de a tccTinoli,Ci,..:al tlite .3:
sod ? knoWs what .cornbisation i-the American secret service is ? researchers, scientists, the-
i -
if ,O.eeti' onic brainS ? , an ariny of hundreds of ''thou- - mists, metallurci?ists,T matt.e-
and robots! ?
t...S.,1!YING IN LUXURY ' isand ,,n
ins of ,.. .
That is plainlY maliciaus, bicIo,sists, .electri-
I
?1,... Or, r,Lp;cTRoNIcs . - ,an exaiTgeration: but it w.oulC.1 'clan's, elextrentcs ? .experts,
? '0 otorcri ],_ ll,
/ t-t:The C.:I:A. director' s ?:. sun. k be leis so if the venal foreign .1-1 0 ? .ers, Electors, fores.
./ ?,i)uncicd by luxury, and cam in .an
on the manthly payroll ters, dicteticians and even
? and freelance soies were coun- raei.1Clans
liCir Langley office, dressed? in - " . - ??
., :And this is no joke... Going
hid-sleeves and slippers if tel c', -
t'ner: The Americans, . ..
? .?.,.C.Y?llke t'peir ea,E.c --.can e''W.H.0 'CAN. say how many: even far
and the Soviets moreover have
-
they, like their ?..e ? cnn ex- aic work in IncloChina 'alone?:;
plait the li:bours of the -Natio- It 'i be well below . the:. been eXperiiiirnting in thought:
Pal Aeronautics and Space mark if scientific and indust...!, transzr. issicn, and what has 111. .
Administration and its satelli- rial workers who conceive and). t-tcri through of the first re-= ?
tes ca.7rying Out oatrols- for. build the esnionage machinery: SUItS could shake the most ra- - P.ichard. I.:alines ?.
. , ;.tional. thiha...,.
Ahem. in the StratosPlicre .:,.. a t . Were counted ,
.. ' - - ' ? - the new Cl boss. ? /
- 40,000 miles an hour; the MI-. Spyin0 an, c :-... ..on::-Y ' - ?
r,las 11 detecting missiles, 7 the. h i,..-ve become vital industries 'row CI:0SE TO DEATH? Being the most ? ex-pensively
? × series" and oth'ir :sys- snd electronic values arc the.. But it is cre'rtainly the Medi- a,d i,-, v.v. ,v.o.i-id, -they app :,a:
. . workhorsis of Wail Street, the 1 cal serviee which is the Agen:.
iqPu-alified4e-no'ili to conclude
01115 rtAii:1'5 oliotograohs ... T.c: '
? - '' i cys avant-garde. 'Among its ,. is ? ?
nib Qrbitting .snace New York Steck EXchange.Here ov0,11 a t helisrecti.lict:lisittari;.1-c:c,f,-si.l.
st.ations will 1.14
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This is the 10th of 15 excerpts that point Rusk stated that if we made -group's Written report was dfsffibuted.
. .... ..
a peace proposal, it should be specific, to everybne at the table.. The report'
.. from former President Johnson's He suggested that we might stop first described the Wheeler-Westmore-
' book, The Vantage Point,". an bombing at the 20th parallel, or stop land proposal for troop increases ancl.
account of his ? presidency, to be bombing altogether if Hanoi would Wheeler's suggestions for building up'
-- -publisit-ed -shortly. . withdraw military forces from Quang, our strategic reserves at home. By call-
. , 'In province, just belovl the DMZ. - in up reserves, thereasing draft calls,
. McNamara's third option was to main- and extending terms of service, the
? ? ?
"THE, MAIIING ,OF A DECISION" fain the status quo on troop commit-, total package would have increased
..VIETNA,M 1967-1963 ments and change our strategy, pro- our armed forees by 511,000. men by
- (Part Two) feeling only "essential" areas and re- June 30, 1969.
. . .. , . clueing offensive Operations in unpopu- The Clifford ?soup recommended:
.', The two :weeks before and two ]at ed regions. . an immediate decision to send ap-
. , months following Tet represented a pe- I returned to Washington at 2 a,m, proxima.tely-`2'3,000 additional men to .
.tsiod ofactivity as intense as any of my on February 28. Wheeler arrived from. Vietnam; . ?
. 'Presidency. My cidvisers and I followed Saigon four hours later, and we met a strong reiweentation to the South
. developments in Vietnam 011 a daily, for lo..eakfast. - ? Vietnamese in them to improve
;sometimes hourly, basis. It was Wheeler's judgment that 'their'performance; .
I hacl cle.cided by this time to scud 'Westmoreland needed a reserve force early approval of a reserve call-up of
, -?
General Wheeler to'Saigon for consul- of "about two divisions." He recom-. about. 245,000 men;
. . tations wth J3unkor and Westmoreland. mended that we seriously consider the reservimr judgme:nt on the tOtal.
I thought we would benefit Irwin a full 20Ti,000 package and examination of
'three-phase increase he and Westinore- recoil ements ?week by wnk,?;
0 assessment by this level-Ileftded alld land had worked out.
an in-depth study of possible new
experienced soldier. I asked him to go I asked Secretary McNamara how'
"political
.oVer the entire situation with West- we could raise the troops to meet the . and strategic. guidance" for
our operations in Vietnam and of
rnoreland and to ft.mn his own judg- Wheeler-Westmoreland proposal, if we our overall Vietnam policy;
-
merit: of what should be done. I in- decided to do so. McNamara said that "no new peace initiative on Viet-
strueted. him to find out Wlicit West- we would have to call up about 250,000 ripm.? .
- , moreland felt ?hi had to have to meet . reserves for all services, mostly for the ? on bombing
p1;an Cy, opinions in the
present needs;and what he thought fu- Army. We would have to extend enlist- -Clifford group were divided. Some
ture needs would he for troops, equip-. ments by six months for men already, wanted a "substantial extension of tar-
, ment, or other support. Finally, I in service. He estimated that we would gets and authority" including mining
'wanted Wheeler to find out how the have to increase our budget by $10 bib Haiphorm; harbor; others proposed
South Vietnamese army was perform- lion in 1969 and by $1.5 billion In 1970. only a' "seasonal 'step-up through the
? . ing and what additicmal help we could I asked him whether he accepted thewithout new targets. .
r ?
provide to enable it to fight more forecast that would have to expect Tile tp.,port and its attachments ad-
spring,"
effectively and improve more rapidly. to give up territory if we did not send dressed the various questions I had
Wheeler and 'Westmoreland undoubt- men in the numbers being discussed. raised in my directive of February 28,
- edly presumed that a large buildup of 111cNarmira said he disagreed. Ile
thought that adding 200,00D men would tailSom; e 0 qua ons
tq tiJrCerCei aacilicIsiTeiorieladl de hers.143;
our armed forces was possible, if not
likely. They also anticipated a high- not make a major difference, since the and analysis. As I read the Clifford
level review of our war strategy.. This North Vietnamese would probably add group's report and its attachments and
had influenced their suggestions as to , men to meet our Increase. Ile believed listened t (Ito discussion around the
what could be done to strengthen our that the key was the South Vietnamese Cabinet table,. I detected. among a few
position .in Vietnam, army?how fast it could be expanded advisers a sense of pessimism far
-and how well it would fight. 'deeper than I myself felt. I had much
-
. .Their preliminary proposal was that
we consider assigning, About 308,000 I told my advisers that I was not pre- greater confidence in Westmoreland
pre- pared to make any jud m
gent at that and his staff in V m ietna titan m
an an
men over the next two months, y
. time. We pare another 42,000 by Sept ember, arid needed answers to many
program a final group of 55,000 by the questions. I asked Clark Clifford to pople in Washington, especially Pen-
e
end of 1968. The total to be readied for head a group to consider these de- tagon civilians. I also had more confi-
possible assignment was slightly more manding problems. The last thing I deuce in the of the South Vietnamese people to d ribility and dCter mination
- than 203,000.. said was: "Give me the lesser of evils,. fend themselves. On the other hand, I
e-
At the February 27 meeting Mc- Give me your recommendations. " was deeply co
Namara presented three options for I know ?that one of- the first _things nscious Of t he gro wing
. .
.
consideration. One was to accept the :the Clifford group had done was to pcii;ei criticism wefvi.,:oe aNiv someere r evCoecka'llIl fromeytizens.
Othe,
Whceler-Westinoreland proposal.. This make a sharp distinction between pros-
would require an increase in military _ent needs ancl capabilities and the . The aspect of the Clifford group's re-
strength of about 400,000 men, he Said, longcr-run question of strengthening; port that troubled me most was its to-
' and an expenditure of an additional our overall military position during' tallY negative approach to any possible,
. $10 billion in fiscal 1969. The second the nex mu. mt.i.o nee-oticitions. On the basis ,of remarks
cApprovediForiRelwomov
t - -, Ti. full r'2 -rt I re- n-i'cde earlier by Rusk, McNamara, all
.. .. '`r* A -7"' 7 ? r? C .by various. C1V1111-111S 111 Jle i omagon
" 8041601R110,4400t-ciO, 0,A,1?-,2e
. option was to ?
crease with a new peace initiative. At
co.tatirma
Tpsn-AN,MpmeFt For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01
PRESS _sou az 191i
E - 16,317
W ash.mgton. report
, - ?
STATI NTL
. IeCorfoinY - and bureaucracy, I,
: land use Chou's brand of in- .
'Oternational diplomacy t o '
i secure massive. trade and aid !
I? from the U.S. The other group'
. .Cr ? wants to stick with Mao and '
1,ea Ci
Lin Piao. They favor a strict;
' conformity with M a o s
r
!thoughts, and the succession
. Hof Lin Piao to M a o - I i lt e,'
11 OW in Mosco\vi. but why: -
A_ . ) .leadership. . . ?
. . ,
? I of lri.
,
' - after Mao's death
acs, provided. for in for _in t?he
5rn9t.inist Party Constitution
? - --. --? . -', If those supporting Mao and
of Premier Chou En-lai._
, ac- -Lin Piao win out in' the
cording to Chinese Nationalist political struggle, it is the
diplomatic sources here. The
New China News Agency, Of-
ficial organ of the Chinese
C o m m u n i s t government,
described Yeh as now being
a member of the Chinese
Communist Party Politburo
WASHINGTON ? A strange
? new note has been added to
,', the mysterious disappearance
:of a number . of high-ranking
; Chinese Cominunist military
; officers. ,
One of the most important
i .
.
of this group was spotted in
j- Moscow recently by a highly
. :reliable source for the, Central
7,jntelligence Agency 1,l'ill o's-e
i inforMatiOn?has --b e e n ex-
tremely accurate in the past.
By
Paul A.
Scott
Press
. Writer
Special and as 1.,-ice chairman of .the. light on who is really running
Central Miliatry A f f a i r s ? china.
Soviet Union, Chen-i i. s Commission. ? I * 4,
believed to til ve an
ll be alid
. His emergency in Peking, In briefing , c on g r essional '
.. , * * * also in Mogco.a although the
"( '.The "missing" Chinese of- CIA has not yet been able to coinciding as it does with the ' leaders on his u p c o m i n g .
f, continued "disappearance" of Moscow trip, President Nixon
'-fic'er is Gen. IIolung, one of confirm this.
I. t h reported that Soviet Foreign
China's 10 field marshals Holung's unexpe c t e d ap- Marshal Lin Piao, 6 ,
before the People's Liberation pearance in . Moscow ,could designated heir of Mao, has Secretary Andrei Groinyko .
1..,. increased speculation h e r e had suggested he visit Russia
Army dispensed with ranks mean one of several things.
during ? t h e nation-shaking * *. * that he was summoned to the .in July.
' 1 " Chinese ? capital to represent , In proposing May instead,
1:Cultural Revolution." One group of CIA experts
? Before his my s t e r i o u s , believes Gen. Holung defected the military in the talks now he President stated: "I told
under way with. -:Dr. Henry ;roirtyko that July would. be
disappearance several months to Russia and is now working
1 . Kissinoer, the P r e s i d e nt's . o close to, the star of the
I ago, Hotting was the corn- chiefforeign policy adviser. . with the Kremlin for the , 1972 presidenial .campaign."
i * i .
- mancler .of the First Field' ' overthrow of ailing Mao Tse-
* * The Dem ocrbts hold their
: Army, one of the five in the ? tung, the Chinese . Communist Before departing for Pek- party's national convention in
Chinese . People's Liberation Party chairman, and Lin., ing, 'Kissinger was given a iarni in July.
: Army. It is located in the i Piao, the deputy party chair- CIA b r i e.f i n g -on the * * *
' .strategic northwest region of man and defense minister, background of Gen. Yeh and V Rallies criticizing Pakistan
' China and consiSts of a force The "defector"theary s his riSing importance witbin for the situation in t h e
of more than 350,000 military based on recent i is
the Chinese military leader_ Eastern part of the country .
; personnel. " that Russia has set up a ship and his close relationship 'are b e i n g held throoghout :
.. . Exactly what Gen. Hotting Chinese Communist govern- ,with Chou En-lai. P1ussia, according to the CIA,. :
. . .
' is, doing in MoscoW or how , ment in exile in Moscow an ? CIA Director R i c h a r a . his is being taken as a sign he got therei s still ?a mystery is now?recruiting ?supPorters at the White House that Rus-
whether the, President's pro- sia is planning to step up its
military aid to India. I
i
,? All the CIA's source in Mos- Shao Chi to fill its ranks. Helms also asked Kissinger to .
determine; if p o s s ib 1 e ,
in intelligence *circles here, of deposed head of . state Liu
cow was able to provide offi- . Another group within the posed visit had anything to do-
! Cials here. was definite proof CIA contends that Holunq is with the political power
i?
f that the Chinese officer spot- on a secret mission to Mos: struggle now under way in '
ted was Holung, and that he cow for the Chinese military poking, .
was with a group of high- leadership. To support this The request was the result
` ranking Russian military of- theory, they stress that there of aBritish intelligence
ficers. ' , has been no official Peking- ?estimate passed on the the
? , i * * I announcenient of a replace- .CIA that the Nixon trip had
.. ', ..Still in i s s I n g ?and unac- ment for Gen. Holung as the acted as a catalyst among the '
C u u n t .e d for are 73 other commander of the First Field leaders of the Pekino. regime, .
, senior military Chinese of-., Army_
. upsetting ?the p o IT t i c al
licers of general . rank who* 4, *
? equilibrium of the government
- 'have been missinab since the ' The recent appearance in
. by splitting the military men,
, "Cultural Revolution". Among Peking of Yeh Chien-ying, an who- now dominate the power
.these officers is Gen. Chen-i, area commander under the, structure, into two camps.
-commander of the - powerful . _"missing" Gen. Chen-i, has
* * *
Third C h in e s e Communist ? raised questions about the .
One group. of military men,
Field Army, a, _which contrgls_ rolkliat he mialit_be DLy.ino
the 'East c Ap prggmoaor or teasegAQViipicW:ceRDID8(Itial 601 R001400160001-2
to go- along with the orderly .
China.. Chinese Communist capital.
rnanaoement of C II i n a.* s
Known to be
China,,
to Gen.. Yeli is a close friend ? ? .
;
conclusion of the British in-
telligence estimate that the .
Nixon trip will be canceled.
President Nixon and his in- .
telligence advisers are .
hopeful Kissinger's visit tri
Peking will shed Some new
CHI CACI? 'il-111131J2U',.?.
Approved For Release 2001/113gOde:f0MttROPEgYFIAIMATIRO
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'By Lyndon B. Johns-on
, In spite of More than. three decades of public service, I 'Me Vantage Point," former President Lyndon L. John-
. .
knew I was an unknown quantity to many of my countrymen son's own story of his five years in the White House, is one of
the hey books of our time. 1n this highly personal record, and
and to much of the world when I assumed office.
.
? . in, this, the second in a series of 12 excerpts, President Johnson
. / suffered another handicap, since 'I had come to the recalls the days of transition after he t00% office on that grim..
Presidency not thru the collective will of the people but in the November day in Dallas. ?
1..vahe of tragedy. I had no mandate from the voters. - ,
,. A fe:v -people were openly bitter about my becoming ?President de Caulks,, accordin : to the report, had said
;..
Pi:esi6ent. T und hey fo it impossible to transfer their intense .that the United States could not :- counted on in such an
loyalties from ona President to 'another. I could understand onlergeno.Y. lie Men ti 0E0 Ll that rle U. S. had been latc. in.
this, Oho it complicated my task. Others were apprehensive, arriving in two world wars and That it had required the holo-
This was particularly true within the black community. just eaust.of Pearl :Harbor to bring us into the latter.
when the blacks had had their hopes for equality and justice With this account fresh in my mind, I met with the French
raised, after Centuries of misery and despair, they-awoke one president. I thanked him for crossing . the Atlantic -to express
mon lug to discover that, their future was in the hands of .a ? GK.: sympathy of France. in our hour Of Sadne?Ss.. - -
-President born in the South. . .. ..; .
, . . ?
. ? ? ' ? ? The genuat spoke of the affection that both he and the
? ? ? ?
' Yet in spite of those yearnings for a fallen leader, in French people had felt for John Kennedy.- lie theno-went on to
spite of some bitterness, in spite of apprehensions, I knew it say that the difficulties between our two countries had been
was imperative that I. grasp the reins -of power and do so greatly exaggerated, and tha v;hile changing times. called
.Vithout delay. Any- hesitation or wavering, any -false step, for certain adjustments in our respective roles the important
any sign of self-doubt, could have been disastrous. thing was that Frenchmen knew perfectly well they could
. `
? ' ? count on the U. S. if France were attacked.
Ave.;.aged. /1 17010'S Sleep
. . ?
I stared hard at the, French president, suppressing a
... Doling my first thirty days in office I believe I averaged .smile. In the years that followed, when De Gaulle's criticism
no more than four or five hours' sleep a night. If I had of our rot* in Viet Nam became intense, I had many occasiohs
single moment when I could go off alone, relax, and forget to remember that Conversation. The French loader doubted?:
'
the pressures of -business, I don't recall it. .
, in private, at least?the will of the United States to live up to
- 'On Saturday morning, Nov. 23, I walked into McGeorge its commitments: He did not believe .we would honor our s.
Bundis office in the basement of the white 'House and re- NATO obligations, yet he criticized us for honoring a commit.-
j ceived an international intelligence briefing from John Mc-
meat elsewhere in the world. If we had taken Ms advice to
Cone, director of the Central InIalgenee Agency. On that sad
abandon Viet Nam, I suspect he might have cited that as
November morning in 1563 the ii:ternational front was about . "proof" of what he had been saying all along: that the Ti. S.
as peacefulas it ever gets in these turbulent times. The world, _ could not be counted on in times of trouble. . ?
it seemed, imd ceased its turmoil for a moment-sseaught in
I Having met with the leader of France, bur oldest ally; I
:the shock ,of Jon Kennedy's death.
? I. turned to our relations with an adversary: the Soviet Union.
.. 'President Kennedy had kept me well informed on world On Tuesday morning, Nov. 26, Soviet Denuty Preirder Anastas
events, so I was ?not expecting any major surprises in that , Mikoyan came to my office. I knew that I was dealing with
first intelligence. briefing. - ? . ? ? ? 1 , one of the shrewdest men ever to come up thru the Comm-
??? '' Only -South Viet Nam. gave me real cause for concern. Dist, hierarchy. One of the few surviving Bolsheviks with real
The next. ?day, Nov. 24, I received my first full-dress briefing . power, Mil-zoyan had been brought to Moscow by Stalin in 1026,
from Henry Cabot Lodge, who had just returned to Washington . had escaped innumerable purges and had demonstrated an
from his post as ambassador in Saigon. But. compared with . uncanny ability to survive and to associate himself with the
later periods, even the. situation in Viet Nam at that point , right faction at the right time.
appeared to be relatively free from the pressure of immediate :,
decisions. . . , , i ; Not Ali.PI.eacantries
'
The most important foreign ?poliCy problem I faced .was , . We talked for 55 minutes and the conversation was not all
; thrit of signalhig to the x.vorld what kind of roan I was ancl diplomatic pl.easantries. I remembered how Nikita Khrushchev
::::!1?t 'sort of policies I intended to carry out. , bad u
misjdd P
geresident Kennedy's character and underesti-
, mated his toughness after their 1561 meeting in Vienna. That
with BeGaulle
misjudgment, many people believe, led Khrushchev to test the
On .Monclay, Nov. 25, I met with President Charles de
U. S. with a new crisis in Berlin. I considered it essential to
?
. - Gaulle of 'Zrc.nce. Just a few hours before our conversatian,
let Mikoyan understand that while the U. S. wanted peace
I received a report from Paris of a recent meeting, lietween
more than anything else in the world, it would pot allow its
De Gaulle and an allied ambassador. They had discussed . r
1k04:4,0,11406 Ikeddi[456.1
what the EaropkilirwAsr, vr.birbRielte?in200fAMOA14*
invasion of IVern1-,i_
.6ontinuca
LOS 41IGET0ES `.0-1,1ES
1 SEP 1971
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01
fr.')
flh
;1
8,
.flY HELEN THOZJAS
up!. stw.y/ritq.
WASHINGTON ? The
so-called 'back-grounder'
for newsmen is taking a
beating in Saigon these
days?much to the amuse-
ment of White House re-
porters who mut st main-
tain the in of an
unidentified "spol;esman"
or 'a White House offi-
cial' in many news stories
on top policy.
More and more the cover
is being blown off ? the
background, source, and
soon it may become a
thing of the past as a mule
of trailsi'aitting important,
but unattributable infor-
mation. ?
Three weeks ago, U.S.
A In b a ssedor E'llsworth
L'unker summoned a cc;
lect group of reporters to
the American Embassy to
a ns.w c 1' questions 'on
background" on his 'neu-
tral" involvement in see-
ing that there 'would be a
contested election in
South Vietnam Oct. 3. The
statements he made,
. ascribed to an 'informed
source," v,rere easily iden-
tifiable and quickli:
blasted by President'
Nguyen Van Thieu's op!
ponents, Con. 3.)ttong Van
(Big) ;\linh and Vice Pres-
ident Nguyen Can Ky.
. Fiat Att?..itrution
In follow - up stories,
.A.mcrican nenvspaper cor-
re.spondeuts flatly attri-
.
? buted. the ? statementa to
Bunker.
The same was .true on a
"backgrounder" 'Ky gave
to a group of reporterS
during. which he threa-,
tencd to "destroy" Thicu
and raised the possibility
I of a coup. Soon after Ky
' was identified as the
source of the threats.
Despite the precarious-
ness_ of the "background"
briefing these clays, it is
still used at the Whitc:;
Hous e. But few of the
world's chancelleries -.stre:
fooled when a "high. Ad-
m in is tra ion' spokesrilan
rai out on Chiir-. Cuba,
the Soviet Union or touchy
relations eLewhere in the
would, They -:.s.surno., quite
rightly, th:-.1t, itie the Pres-
ident's national security
affairs advi:rier, 'Henry A.
Kissinger.
Reporters, would prefer
to have the' information
straight ? and attributa-
ble. Bi.tt they settle for less
when the White House is
willing to give a candid as-
:;essmont or its policy.
Also interesting to note
Is the number of times flat
denials of news stories are
put in the realm of "ofE-
the record" by the White
House.
'STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001400160001-2
iGOLl sTAR
*Approved For Release 2001/03/1:64=IXRDP80-01601R0
Dovisti?P-ilit.,.. I S HEW JOB
11
ri LI
41
a?-x, ? 1:4-At
By onn EELLY
-
' ?
- -Star Staff Writer. - ? -`-"The senior members were on 3 ?Are individual rights bah g
-I Shortly after Congress returns the Central Intelligence subcom- ?protected? Nedzi is aware that
from ils August recess, five con-, Imittee and we were not privy to 'military intelligence people have
gressmon will turn off the; their deliberations. We had abso- been told to cut out their domes-
George -Washington Memorial; llutely no information on the tic intelligence activities, lht.he
Parkway at an unmarked exit,; budgets of the agencies or what wants to make sure the new
swing back across the parkway; !,they were up to. Periodically, ? rules al-e being obeyed. ?
we . got intelligence reports," 4---- Is it proper for the CIA
Nazi said. manage operations such as then
The five-man subcommittee in Laos?
was, in the past, made up of the "There is a question of wheth
chairmen of the full committee er we should be involved in such
and the two senior members operations and the further clues-
from each party. The senior tions of whether this agency is I
members serving with Nedzi the proper one to do it," Nedzi
will be Reps. Melvin Price, said.
ID-Ill., 0. C. Fisher, D-Tex, Wil- : 5-- Should the whole system of
ham G. Bray, R-Ind., and Alvin security classification be re-
E. O'Konski, R-Wis. ;
; vised?
on thcri overpass and suddenly,
emerge into a spacious, tree- I
dotted parking lot surrounding a;
gleaming white building.
Only after they have parked
and entered the building will!
they see their first solid evi-;
dence --- inlaid into the floor in a'
giant seal -- that this is the
headquarters of the Central In-
telligence Agency.
1-leading the little group of
congressmen will be Rep. Lui, Nedzi had some brief exposure! -"That this is a difficult area, I
cien Norbert Nedzi, a jto the intelligence field when hel
!realize," Nedzi said, "and I'm
45-year-old Democrat who has!: served on a special subcommit-. I not sure we're going to be able
to come un with a Solomon-like
decision." ?
represented the eastern pot hon tee looking into the capLure of
of Detroit since 1952, and who the U.S.S. Pueblo by the North;
has just .been named ? to the 'Koreans.
surprise of many--as the chair-
m .
an:of the House Armed Serv-
Has Met Helms
ices Committee's subcommittee He has met Richard Helms,'
on central intelligence. ; director of Central Intelligence,st
? Nedzi's record has not been on several occasions when
the kind that; would, on the sur-, ; Helms has appeared before the
face, endear him to the more committee and he thinks highly
senior ? and generally morel I of him. But Nedzi has never vis-
conservative ? members of the I lied the CIA, has never called on
committee. He co-sponsored an; the CIA for a special intelligence
end-the-war ammendment in the I briefing, and does not know Lt..
House, has opposed the El Gen, Donald V. Bennett, director:
bomber and the Safeguard mis-, of the Defense -Intelligeuce
site 'defense system, and is one; Acencv or Vice Mm. Noel Gay-
of a tiny group of rebels on the
41-man committee known as the
Fearless Five.
Why did Rep. F. Edward He-
bert, a Democrat from Louisi-
ana, choose Nedzi for one of the
most important subcommittee
aSsignments ? a post tradition-
ally held by the chairman him-
self? ?
Nedzi Explains Choice
"The chairman was generally
Interested in having a review of
this area," Nedzi explained in
an interview "My experience
'with him has been eXcellent ?
we understand.. each other. I
know where he stands, and he
knows where I stand; I have
never deeived him and he has
never reflected deception to me.
"Hp feels that we need to call
a spade a spade and he feels I'll
do just that.
Nedzi comes to his new assign-
ment -- which will cover all in-
telligence agencies, not just the
CIA ? with few preconceptions
and, in fact,AppreVedoR
edge of the field.
ler, director of the super-secret
National Security Agency.
IT'he ?only time a top intelli-
gence official has appeared in
an open hearing in the last dec-
ade, was on June 2, 1931 when
Helms, then No. 2 man in the
CIA, testified before a Senate
Judiciary subcommittee. Nor-
mally, Helms and other CIA offi-
cials not only testify in closed
hearings but their names and
the name of their agency are
deleted before a transcript On
the hearing is made public. -
Sets Priorities
6? How are the national intel-
ligence estimates arrived at?
What really is the basis for ar-
riving at decisions?
? Since his selection for the new
job announced earlier this week,
Nedzi said, his phone has been
constantly busy with callers N?ol-
nntee.ring information about U.S.
intelligence operations. .
"We will give them an ?appro-
priate audience," he said. "We
are hearing fi?oin people with all
sorts of axes ;to grind. We'll
screen them all for substance,
but no one .is peremptorily dis-
missed."
STATINTL
Despite his lack of experience
in the area; Nedzi has a pretty
good idea of the areas he would
like to explore and he listed
them this way:
1? Is there too much overlap-
ping of functions among the CIA
and the State and Defense De-
partment intelligence opera-
tions?
2 --Are the budgets the proper
size _ and doaaeall Lhe_iifirma-1
rtiKeilea50 104d1C IA-RDP80-01601 R001400160001 -2
get to the man who needs it
when he reeds it?
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-
CHICAGO, ILL
BUN-TIMES
6 ,108 .
7?9
fait_ 3 1
I
,OSS
?
St?n-Iims
--- Sen. Acliai
Stevenson III said
Friday that the State Depart-
in e n t has advised China
against admitting any senators
Or congressmen prior to Presi- ?
dent Nixon's visit, He felt'
"sure" Peking would comply.
Stevenson indicated support
lor the State Department pol-
icy and saiq he bad passed the
word to Peking that he did not
think it - would be "appro-
priate" for him to visit China
t::ifil.after Mr. Nixon's trip.
i-The senator applied for a
Visa a few hours before the
IZresident made his surprif::?
July 15 announcement ii he
plans to go to China before
? next May.
To talk t(,
Stevenson called`a-pres's con-
ferened to make a formal ae.
nouncement of his plans to
take a .25-clay trip to Asia .and
t Is e Soviet Union starting
Wednesday.
His Asian stops will be Hong.
.Kong,. Thailand, South Viet-
nam and Japan.
Stevenson said be intends to
concentrate on political and
economic, rather than mili-
tary, problems. However, he
said he will discuss the war in
Laos with officials of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency at the
CIA headeluarters at Udorn in
;northern Thailand.
In Saigon, he?said he hopes
to see President Nguyen Van
Thicu, Vice President Nguyen
Cao Yy and Gm. Duong Van
(Big) Ming, who, with I-Cy, is
? threatening to challenge. Thim
in next October's presidential
electio;1.
'A special interest' _
Stevenson said he has
"special interest" in the politi-
cal scene in South Vietnam.
since he fears, after an in-
vestment of 50,fir.;0 American
lives and MO the U.S.
involvement will end in what is
"perceived to be a crooked
election (with) a. U.S. dictated
outcome."
Stevenson said he intends to
enter the Soviet Union from
the east, stopping in Siberia at
Kitabaivsk and Trinttsk before
going on to Moscow and Lenin-
grad. He expressed the hope of
ar-ranging. a meeting with
Prime Minister Alexei
ygin and other high Soviet offi-
cials. ?
He is scheduled to return
directly from :Russia to Chi?
cago on Aug. 29. He will be ac-
companied by Thomas Wag-
ner, his administrative assis-
tant, and John Lev-As, director
of the Center for East Asian
Studies at Stanfc;rd Univer-.
sity.
?
i"?Ui
;)
1
12.-)
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,Plan ]ln
STATINTL
2g`PArte6A-Fspmcmim6
-
ongrem Happy o ozdy
?
$olite Want Information,
But House Voted To
-t Keep Status Quo
' By GENE GISIii
Washington Bureau of The Sun
s Washington ? Does Congress
:really want to know everything
;the United States government
does?
On
St" On balance, the answer is
probably no, despite a renewed
t drive in Congress to dislodge
'foreign policy secrets from the
,executive branch.,
Resolution Rejected
-In fact, the House last week
rejected, 261. to 118, a reso-
- lution asking the State Depart-
ment for documents related to
/. U.S. bombing and CIA opera-
tions in Laos.
Representative Joe D. Wag-
' goner, Jr., (D., La.) said dur-
ing the debate: "There are
'some things that some people in;
:this country had better not know
,for the security and future well-
];being of this country. Therefore,
they [the administration] must
..keep some information from me
07Ind they must keep some infor-
mation froM you for the benefit
.of the future security of this
country. It is better that infor-
t /nation as a rule be overclassi-
fled than underclassified."
t Mr. Wagg,onner also ex-
pressed a widely held view that
. some members of Congress, if
given secret in!ormation, could
not resist the temptation of leak-
ing some of it "to the New York
,Times or some other whistle
blower."
`.! The debate underscored a tac-
]it assumption long held in Con-
gress that the country is better
;served if legisjators?except for
:A select few?are not told of
everything the United States has
done or is currently doing in the
field of foreign affairs.
Being Challenged
This assumption, however, is
now being challenged, unsuc-
cessfully in the case of the
House resolution asking for
more information on Laos.
But an even more sweeping
bill has been introduced in the
Senate by John Shermsn ?top-
er (R., Ky.), who wants to give
every member of Congress reg-
ular access to all intelligence
reports anclAnibisomedsFed
"1?,/ for the executiVe'-braneht 1St the
CIA.
SENATOR COOPER
Seeks more disclosures
Mr. Cooper is one of the moti
!highly regarded members of the
! Senate, and this is a factor of
some importance in its club-like':
!atmosphere in which the success
or failure of a bill can hirfge on '
!who its sponsor is. -
But Senator Cooper?a senior
member of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee?must get his
bill through the Armed Serviceslj
Committee, which together with
the Appropriations -Committee
has jurisdiction over the CIA.
And even without national seal-
:Irity considerations, congression-
al committees instinctively re-
sist encroachment upon their
areas of competence.
norifun
Sec:Eve-Li
Senate sources indicate that
senators, too, impose a certain"
amount of self-censorship during
these intelligence briefings. One!
'source said he has never heardI
a question pertaining to the so- ?
called "dirty tricks" aspect of
CIA operations.
"For example," he said, ;
"we've never asked, 'Mr. ,
Helms, how many people did /
you lose in your clandestine
service last year?! Maybe we
should ask it, but we never
have."
But it is virtually impossible
to ascertain precisely what even
the select few who attend CIA
briefings know about the agen-
cy's activities.
As Mr. Mahon, the Appropria-
tions chairman, notes, he picks
only those "who won't talk."
Then, he refused to say who
they are.
He said he WEI$ opposed to the
Cooper bill, saying, "If you give
it [CIA information] to every V
Richard Helms, Director of ;member of Congress it would be
Central Intelligence, at least ! like giving it to the New York
once a year gives separate intel- ;Times."
Tgence briefings to small groups I Chairman Hebert of Armed
within the Armed Services and !Services questioned the need to
Appropriations committees in 'know everything.
both houses of Congress and "I don't know everything," he
even to the full Senate Foreign said, "and I'm not bitching
Relations Committee, even 'about it."
RICHARD HELMS
Knows all tho secrets
Leverett Saltonstall, a Massa-
chusetts Republican, was quoted
recently as saying when he was
a member of the Senate: "They
[the CIA1 do things I'd just as/
soon not know about." ,
i The last time an attempt was
!made to break the Armed Serv-
ices Committee's lock on the
'CIA was in 1566, when then Sen-
ator Eugene J. McCarthy (D.
Minn.) made a comparatively
modest proposal to create a spe-
cial CIA committee, made up of
! representatives of Armed Serv-
ices, Appropriations and the
Foreign Relations committees.
The late Senator Richard B.
Russell (D., Ga.), then chair-
man of the Armed Services
Committee, blocked the bill
from coming to a floor vote on a
'procedural point, effectively
killing the measure.
The Coopee bill is not likely to;
get far in the legislative process ,
either. Aside from the jurisdic-
tional problems, most members I
much.
what the question was." I crcts.
though it does not have direct On the other side of the issue,
i
critics of the present system say
jurisdiction over the agency.
1
' that congress had deliberately
The annual briefings,
accord- ? remained ignorant to avoid re- ,
,ing to congressional sources, sponsibility. I
I consist of "around-the-world. ' Representative Benjamin S.
' assessments of the United Rosenthal (D., N.Y.) said dur-
: tates' military and intelligence in_
the House debate last
posture. Other special brief g ings week: "I fear Mr. Speaker, that
might deal with such topics as many of us did not want to know
deployment and strength of all of - the facts of our involve-.
Saviet nuclear missiles. e.tri nt in Vietnam in 1965 or 1968
George H. Mahon (D., Texas), or even yesterday. I think that
chairman of the House Appro- I the Congress has remained
!much too long in self-imposed
priations Committee, and F. Ed-
yard Hebert (D., La.), chain! insulation s... We feared that
man of the House Armed Serv-1 more knowledge would mean
ices Committee, said, as did: ore responsibility for us."
Senate sources, that Mr. Helm Others argued that the infor-
has never refused to answer a: mation the House was seeking
question during these briefings, was already well known to the,
Mr. Hebert said there was_
: enemy so it could not be' with-
only one exception, when he in-; held for national security rea-
structed Mr. Helms not to an- 1 sons. As the House vote inclicat-
! swer a question put to him by sled, they represented a minority
member of his panel.
: "I took it on my own resporns?i-1 vieFOr the moment, at least, the
to
1
- eltAIRDP8OLO1V3V.9q114?P)09PCdr4
"and, of course, I won share
el ? u 1 . e i e aria se-
.
Ig4013260/
ee fib ?
??&
WI t XORK TIMES
STATINTL 9 JUL 1977 _s? TA-rim
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP801-016.0
A. Says
er-7?-s L 17P 112 b TP C't
?/ P e kg) 0
The State Department press
addition', it repackages Hanoi's upon whom Ilanoi and the Viet-
By TAD SZULCofficer Charles W. Bray 3 demands for a political settle- cong? had looked with faVor in
, e, . ,
- Sivetzt to The New York Times . merit in South Vietnam M a the past. ?
said here about the Bruce pro- .
WASHINGTON, July 8?
The Central Intelligence
Agency has. told President
Nixon, that the, new Vietcong
peace proposal is aimed at
embarrassing?the United States
"both at home and overseas"
and encouraging the opponents
of President Nguyen Van Thieu
In South Vietnam. .
Other negative comments on
'the 'plan were contained in a
? detailed analysis submitted to
Mr. Nixon and other top Ad-
ministration officials last Friday
a day after Mrs. Nguyen Thi
Binh, the chief 'Vietcong dele-
gate, offered her proposals at
Ithe Paris talks. , ?
The agency's evaluation, ac-
cording to senior Administra-
tion officials, was one of
several .tog-level studies of
the Communist plan on which
?resident Nixon and. Secretary
of State William P. Rogers
.based their decision to
struet the United States dele-
gation in Paris to seek further
clarifications today from the
:Communist -side in "restricted
'sessions," or private talks.
Reservations Expressed
. The evaluation as well as Ore
parallel studios prepared in re-
cent days by the State and De-
fense Departments and the Na-
tional Security Council staff
have expressed numerous seri-
Ous reservations about the Viet-
cong plan.
But all the studies also -found
new elements in the plan. The
C.I.A. paper, for example, noted
rthat .".it softens" the Cominu-
nist position on the American
prisoners of war and presents
"two new nuances" on the
South Vietnamese political set-
tlement. For this reason, senior
.officials said, the Administra-
tion chose to seek to engage in
what officials here termed
"meaningful negotiations."
Senior officials emphasized
that they .did not consider the
fact that the Cominunists had
not . responded immediately to
the proposal for "restricted"
sessions, made today in Paris
by David K. E. Bruce, the chief
United States negotiator, as an
outright rejection.
They said that "something
resembling a negotiating proc-
ess may be in the making."
At ? . San ? Clemente; Calif.,
where President Nixon and Mr.
Rogers conferred for the third
time this week on strategy in
the Paris talks, a White House
spokesman, Gerald L. Warren,
said that Mr. Bruce was at-
tempting to start "meaningful
negotiations."
? Approved F
pose! that "we regret that the
superficially more attractive The. analysis said that the
-
North Vietnamese and the Viet- form. ? -- Vietcong plan's first ."new nu-
mong did not respond affirraa- New Nuances Recognized ance" was that, instead of de-
lively to this suggestgon hut The analysis recognized, how- manding a coalition regime in
Hanoi, it "simply demands that
the United States 'cease back-
ing the bellicose group' headed
by Thieu."
The other nuance, it said, is
that the Communists no longer
ask a "three-segment" 'regime,
including Communists, but a
brogd "government of national
concord" to be negotiated .by
the Vietcong with a "post-Thieu
administration."
"The Communists seem to be
trying to leave the impression
in Saigon as the condition for a that: the form of government is
political settlement, [open to negotiation," the docu-
But after analyzing the plan, Iment said. 'Moreover, the ion-
the C. I. A. offered this assess- Igunge of this section?and in
ment of the Communist motives kieed much of the statement?
in presenting. their July 1 pro-is cast to convey an image of
continue to -hope that they will
do so."
Nixon Expected to Wait "
Hiefily-placed officials indi-
ever, that "there are two .new
nuances.in_the Communist posi-
tion on a political settlement in
South Vietnam,"
The principal features of Mrs.
Cated their belief that President Binh's plan were the Commit-
Nixon would refrain from pub- nist readiness to start releasing
licly -expressing his views On United States- war prisoners os
the developments in the American troops begin with-
talks until the situation became drawing from Vietnam after a
"much .clearer" through public date "in 1971" is set by Wash-
or private exchanges in Paris. ington, and the dropping of the
They said that only after Communists' long-standing in-
such clarifications would Mr. sistence on a coalition regime
Nixon address the nation on
the state of ? the negotiations.
They recalled that last year lie
had waited nearly three weeks
after the Communists presented
their peace plan on Sept. 17
before making his counter- posals: .
proposal on Oct. .7. "The Communists doubtless
' "At this stage, we are not hope that their iniatiative on
prepared to reject or to accept the prisoners?coupled as it is
anything as a package," na. with a restatement of their
senior official said. "We are basic position on United States
looking and we ge probing withdrawals?will make things
because this is the business of aWk?varcl for the United States
diplomacy." Government both at home and
Other officials said that the overseas."
negotiating situation would he "They may also believe that
reviewed again when Henry A. their political 'proposals will
, appeal to many in the United
Kissinger joins Mr. Nixon and. States who are, looking for a
face-saving way out of the war.
They probably are also hoping
that'the new proposal will fuel
worries in Saigon about Wash-
ington's longer-term support.
? "The new formula for a po-
litical settlement in South Viet-
nam, by its fuzziness and air
of reasonableness, is designed
both to encourage individuals
In South Vietnam whose sup-
port of - the war is wavering
and -to give some ammunition
to those who are already work-
ing to build an anti-Thieu, anti
war constituency."
Coincidence of Beliefs .
This aspeet of the analysis'
was known to goincide with'
the belief in other AcIministra-,
Tuesday. ? ? tion quarters that the Commue
Officials familiar with various nist peace plan was launched;
Administration evaluations ofgat least in part, to influence the
the Vietcong plan said that the outcome of the October 'elece
C. L A. analysis was "perhaps tions in South Vietnam, where
the -most pessimistic?but also"President Nguyen Van Thieu is
the most realistic?of the lot." seeking re-election.
Its over-all conclusion, con- In this context, the analysis_
tamed in the first paragraph of
the document, said: noted that "among other things
the Communists seem intent on
"The Vietcong's new seven- creating the impression that the
point proposal softens the election of Big Minh could
Communists' position on the prove an initial step toward
prisoner-of-war release but re- peace..
tains and amplifies a very "Big Minl " is 'Gen. Duong
tough line on United States dis- Van Minh, a potential hut un-:
Mr. Rogers in San Clemente on
Sunday. The next screduled
session of the Paris talks is
next Thursday.
Mr. Kissinger, the President's
special assistant for national
security affairs, visited Saigon
last weekend and is to confer
with Mr. Bruce in Paris on
Saturday.
Richard Helms, the Directag
of Central Intelligence, whose
agency was reported to have
drafted the first analysis of
the Vietcong plan, participated
in the discussions on the United
States response to the Commu-
nist proposals after he flew to
San Clemente with President
Nixon and Mr. Rogers last
-tnewar, n declared presidential candidate
or Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-0160TR001400160001-2
!condi ia lion and reasonable-
ness without committing Hanoi ?
to. anything specific."
The ..analysts also warned
against pitfalls in the Commu-
nist proposal for releasing the
American prisoners in exchange
for the withdrawal of United
States troops from Vietnam
under a set deadline. This has
appeared to be the most attrac-
live aspect of Mrs. I3inh's peace
package.
But the analysis said that;
while "the formulation on the
prisoner-release question is
new," the Communist demand.
on total United States military,
disengagement '"is as firm as
ever."
"Moreover, by .including for
the first time civilian as well as
military prisoners, the Commu-
nists ere opening the whole
thorny problem,- of the Com-
munist civilian cadre who are
now held by Saigon," it said.
STATI NTL
Approved for Release 2158W1/6415-f-(81.X-21*&80-0160
8 JUL 1971
STATI NTL
_..,..,,,,?..._
0
? ore 11 e- , ,c 1 IA
1 nE*6.1re
....- By FRANK JACKMAN
. . . -., Staff Correspondent of THE NEWS ,
, ; - ? San Clemente, Calif.. July 7?President Nixon met with his top foreign policy
jidvisers at the. western White House today to discuss, among other ? things, what the.
;United States response should be to the seven-point peace proposals put forward by the
.:Viet Gong at the Paris talks last week..
White -House officials woudl Warren said the United States
not disclose the substaVe of say it concerned "foreign policy was continuing to "study" the
!Nixon's 90-minute meeting with matters."
Deputy White House Press Communists' proposals. "Cur po-
Secretary of- State William P. Secretary Gerald C. Warren, sition will be presented in the
Rogers, Central Intelligence Di- asked about the U.S. assessmemt proper forum," he said. Thi press
erector Richard M. Helms, and of Hanoi's new "flexible" stance Side refused to discuss what U.S.
'13.rig. Gen. Alexander Haig, dep at Paris, would say only, "The Ambassador David K. E. Druee's
? iity specialassistant for national United States will continue to 'reply mignt be at tomorrow's-
seek for serious negotiations_ in regular meeting Of the Paris
liecurity affairs,_ other,..than. t?-) Paris." ? ? .?- talks.
?
?:.
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?
-
FFIWI peseiFp91103/04,7.2-plimpFNA.Tp.i..Rio.
, .
Approved
TPABUNE
executtves here, the President i
-Besides meeting with news)
)
'
M -. '76'7 , 7(33 was expected to confer briefly
with local Republican- officials 1
S - 1,016,2'0 ?
, for a general discussion of next '
year's election cam.pign.?_ -.
fdra 7 laTA -., Ronald L. Ziegler, White i
? ...... - - ----1,-.. ? Home press secretary, said I
' VP. -P . Pk" ?I, . ' A ? ?
1 that Nixon would confer with
.\?i?vieet:s ikAzuwesi, ? ?
.? .Richard Helms, director of the
.e.- .. ? v- ? - --- Central Intelljgenee __ Agency,
: .17.C,W,'il, JI.i-,`.:,:a?-it 0
-
nd S erec ary of State William ,
i.------e,.....,......,?.,
, ? . . . ?. - 1
Rogers on the flight from here / 0
.;
? !to San Clt-nnente. They will clis-
i ? ? TV ?ALDO ,BECHMAN . Cuss ? Helms' recent trip to the
? #. -
: ? [Chico Tribun Fres Servisel :Middle East, Ziegler said, but '
:? KANSAS CITY, Mo.,. July .6 h.e?refUsed to give any more do-
-President Nix on came to . /ails,
? Kansas, City today . to discuss - -
? his domestic programs with
? newspaper and broadcast 'exec- ,
,-ntives from . -.13- middle west
-.states.
. ? The 'President. talked to the
: executives near the end of the
?.briefing---one of a number of .
such sessions he has conducted '
thruout the nation. Before he.
spoke, White House Aides Don-
ald Rtunsfeld and John. Ehr-
1
.lichman briefed the partici-
pants, as did Elliot Richard-
son, secretary of health, edu-
cation and welfare. - .
, The President was to fly to.
the Western White House, in.
!day'San ? Clemente, Cal., after ' to-
,to spend. about- two weeks
s briefing. He is expected '
' there..
-?
-.Greeted .by Policemen ;
? #' -Nixon was greeted at Kansas ,
City's Municipal Airport this ,
_afternoon by two Kansas City:
,.policemen, whom he had visit- 2
;.ed in a local. hospital during
ip stopover here for a campaign
'Ispeech last fall. .
Patrolmen Charles .F. Robin-
-son?and Kenneth M. Fleming
both returned to active duty;
'were hospitalized last fall with
Injuries they suffered when a
bomb exploded in a neighbor-
hood contef sponsored by police
in an effort to improve _coin- I
munity relations.
STATINTL .
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400160001-2
NEWODAILyS STATINTL
?
Approved For Release 200Y10t/b4w. CIA-RDP80-01
real e I/0 rig
v.ii;
Po
1111n)
tha rt-Ir.. Vjir e
c'r il-]1)
By FRANK -JACKMAN
Kansas City, Mo., July 6--Cen-
tral Intelligence Director Richard
Helms joined President Nixon
aboard Air Force One today to
brief the Chief Executive on his ?
recent top secret trip to the mid-
dle 'East.
The CIA chief, who returned
to the United States during the
.holiday weekend, is known to
:have stopped in Israel for high-
'level conferences with Israeli of-
ficials.
White House Press Secretary
Ronald Ziegler refused to say
where else Helms visited, declar-
ing it "the judgment of the
agency" that no details be re-
vealed of the spy chief's -travels.
Rogers on Board
- Also aboard the presidential
jetliner for the trip here and then
to the Western White House at
San Clemente) Calif., was Secre-
tary of State William P. Rogers.
'Helms is to return to Washington
tomorrow, but Rogers will stay in
San Clemente throughout the
,President's visit. Nixon briefed
Mdwest news executives on do-
Helms' conference ivith Nixon
:and Rogers prompted speculation
that there might be some move-
? ment on the Middle Bast peace
7front. Last week, so called "per-
sonal" suggestions toward a pos-
..sible plan to reopen the Suez
Canal.; made by Donald Bergus,
American envoy in Cairo, brought
heavy criticism from the Israelis.
Turning to another part of the
.world, Ziegler said the adminis-
s4ration, as always, was interested
in "serious negotiation's with the
.-other side." He was reSponding-
. to reports that Mme. N,?o?uyen Thi
head of the Viet Cong dele-
- gation at the Paris peace talks,-
?had indicated that there was
?-.nothing rigid about the peace pro-
posals the Communists put for-
ward last Thursday, and that she
!would gladly meet privately with
-..an American to discuss the plan.
. Cites Correa Forum
Asked to comment, Ziegler re-
plied that "the other side knows
.:what the appropriate forum is."
.He declinel to be more specific,
nor would he comment on r eporta
,of secret U.S. peace probes.
The White House insisted that
Nixon's stay in California would
be devoted mainly to domestic
matters; such as . ?preliminary
Nork on the budget.
-. ..But it was notable that Rogers
lanned? to stay in San Clenle t
Approved For RelelaSvh2004103104 sriel
that Henry A. Kissinger, Nixon's
?...foreign affairs adviser, was
scheduled to arrive on July 11 in
V
DP80-01601R001400160001-2'
NEW YORE' DAILY N2C7S
ApprovaTF6a1kilease 2001/03/94jucl&RDP80-01
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..
By STAN CARTER
-..Washing,ton, July 6?The Viet. Con -os I test' Tel 'e
propose.' is a sugar-coated pill with a bitter core. If offers'
President Nixon what appears to be a painful chOics be,
tweep obtaining ? the release of American prisoner:-.;
-keeping his promise to give a. non-Communist Soutil
nam a reasomible chance to survive. .
What to`do about the dilemma will .be the No. 1 businesi
Non's working vacation in California.
Secretary of.State William P. Regers and CIA Director-Richerd
? ' .?-.? . Helms flew to San Clemente with the
President today. Presidential'.lul
egENA.Caer Henry Kissinger 'will join :.pefies
- ? . - ? ? huddle at the western White flonea.thi'4-
- '?'? weekend after' -discussing the p ?
10 :CI
L rn:21N.il 7,31 - .'th' Piesid ' t N en.. ee. U.S.with t en T
Saigon and th the df;.eg-attort
inel-callffa at the Paris peace talks. 1.
'It's Sean a n'TV:ro,th cannel Approcch ? ? .
Two things about the Communist proposal have caused e.xcite,
ment in Washington.
The first, of course, is the promise that the PWs would,,.
v?
leased sumultaneously with the pull-out of American force S ,from
I South Vietnam, if the United States accepted total withdrawal this
year. Previously, all that the Communists had promised, was. to .
"discuss" the prisoner question once the United States set A.defnito
date for total withdrawal.
The other is that the proposal did not specifically link-the-things
that the Communists were demanding that the, United States do with
the things they were demanding from the Saigon regime.. .Besides
the first point demanding total U.S. withdrawal, this year, the only
other point calling `for American actien was the sixth, aedemand
that the United States pay reparations for ,war damage to both
North and South Vietnam. ........ ?
"What they are doing," contended fernier Defense Secretary
Clark M. Clifford, "is setting up two parallel lines of negotiations,
saying to the United States, 'We'll negotiate with you on one line
and give the prisoners back,' and on a parallel line setting up their
idea of the kind of political settlement they would expect to make
with South Vietnam.". _ ?
Would It re /l5culdoning fhe Viefnomese
Not all U.S. officials are convinced of this, but whether .the
Communists are prepared to separate the U.S withdrawal end pris-
oner issues front a.solution to the South Vietnamese internal 'political
situation will be one. of the questions Bruce will seek an answer to
in Paris. .
The offer to trade release of the prisoners for total U.S. with-
drawal this year could be a booby-trap all by itself. Pulling ',Out ?
20,000 Americans and dismantling every 11.5. base in South Vietnani
in only six months would leave the South Vietnamese standing alone
against both the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese a full year
before it had been contemplated that -they would be trained and.
equipped.to take over the full burden of their defense.
That is the choice which Nixon faces. At the .same time, he .is ?
under increasing political pressure to at least meet the Communist'.
offer half-way. He is almost sure to make a counter-offer of some
kind.. -
.?
F t4.
. ? Meanwhile, Ambassador DaVid.K. E.
-?? Bruce, the 'chief.- American: negotiator
In Paris; will:sonnd.out the Communists at Thursday's ?seseion. of
the peace 'talks. to -`try to determine whether .there is anVuhing.
negotiable in the' seven-point: proposal put forward by .7.ednine
Nguyen Thi Binh last .week?or .whether it is a, take-it-orrl -i?e4t
'proposition, '-? ? ? ?
- Taken :11.S -a whole,' Madame . -
'Binh's proposal--just as much- as
previous:' Red proposals?is,a
formula.. for -the ? Communists
to take -oVer South Vietnam.
The Viet .Cong delegate's sec-
ond point calla for, creation' of a
three-element--:-coalition govern-
ment, Which the Viet Cong would
dominate, to "organize" general
elections. Her third' point would
permit North Vietnamese armed
forces to remain in the South in-
definitely. Her fourth point states
that the reunification of North
and South Vietnam "will be
achieved step by step by .peace-
ful means, on the baSis of dis-.
'eussions and agreements between
the two zones, without constraint
and annexation from either party,
without: foreign interference."
The new elements are in the
first point of the proposal, headed
"Regarding the Deadline for the
Total Withdrawal of U.S. forces."
After declaring that the United
States .niust stop its policy of
training and equipping South
Vietnamese troops to gradually
assume the burden of the war, must withdraw all troops arid wea-
pons, and must dismantle all U.S. bases in South Vietnam, Madame
Binh made this offer: ?
"If the U.S. government sets a terminal date for the withdrawal
front South Vietnam in 1971 of the totality of U.S. forces and those
of .the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp, the parties will
at the same time agree on the modalities:
"A. Of the withdrawal in safety from South Vietnam of the
totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in
the U.S. camp. ? . .
"B: Of the release of the totality of military men of all .parties
and the civilians captured in the war (including American pilots
captured in North Vietnam), so that they may. all rapidly return to
their homes.
"These two operations will begin onthe same date and eill end
on the same date." .
- --?
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N?,
David K. E. Bruce
He'll test the positions .
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?
By GARNET? D. HORNER
?
? star Staff Write:
SAN CLEMENTE,
President Nixon appears confi-
dent about What he feels are two
?of his most nettlesome problems
? negativism in the nation and
continued involvement in the
Vietnam war.
In a discussion with news and
media executives in Kansas
City, Mo., yesterday, Nixon said
the Unit;cd States is facing the
'kind of decadence that has de-
stroyed civilizations, but has the
touragc, strength and vitality to
survive.
He said he doesn't expect the
Vieteara war to be an issue in
his campaign for re-election
next year.
Economic Issues
?During the talk Nixon also:
? Said the United States must
gied fer escalating competition
With four other "economic suL
perpow e.r s" in the next
quarter-century.
O Celled upon labor and man-
? agement leaders to be "re.spon-
swe and responsible" in their
,wage and poiee decisions to ace
that they are not inflationary. ?
o Vigorously ruled out wage
and price controls because "they
cannot work in peacetime."
o Declared that the United
States "has in its hands the fu-
ture of peace in the world in this
last third Of a century."
o Urged Americans not to "let
the problems of the moment ob-
scure the great etrid 'good things
that are going on in this coun-
try.?
'Rogers and Helms
' Ni:xon spoke to editors and
broadcast news 'executives from
? 13 states during the Kansas City
stop as he flew from Washington
, to his . eliffside home here bra
two-week stay.
He is prepared to devote most
of his time today to studying
papers on the budget for the 1973
fiscal year, beginning. July 1
19
That the President was not
neglecting foreign policy issues,
however, ? was indicated by the
fact that Secretary of State Wil-
liam P. Rogers and Central in-
telligence Agency Director Rich
ard Helms flew to California
with him.
Report on :-.ideast
Helms was returning to Wash-
ingnin today after reporting to
Nixon and 'Rogers on his recent
visit to Mideast countries, in-
ehni:lig Israel.
ito,eens ns CX?CetCd to re-
' . here, ihroJghout the Presi-
c'ent's stay. Henry A. Kissinger,
the President's assistant for ea-
tienal security affairs, is to ar-
rive next week to report on his
mission to South Vietnam . and
the Vietnam peace talks in
Paris. ?
In his remarks at Kansas City,
Nixon did not mention the latest
Viet Cong? peace peo:xsal, cou-
pling an offer to nelease U.S.
prisoners as American forces
withdrew from Vietnam with?
other conditions considered un-
acceptable by the U.S. govern-
ment.
.
?Europe (with Great Britain in
-thc: Common Market), Japan,
the Soviet Union and Communist
/China.
J../ He said passage of his propos-
als for revenue sharing, govern-
ment reorganizatice and welfare
.reform are essential if.. the na-
tion is to deal with competition
from these powers.
Upholding America's moral
strength, the President said it is
sometimes questioned because
"we tend to allow the problems
of the moment to obscure our
vision of the future." '
"We tend to allow our faults,
and we have many, to obscure .s
the Many virtues of our soci-
ety," he said.
'We Obscure Our Vision'
In an oblique reference, how-
ever, he said, "We are actively
pursuing the negotiating chan-
nel" to end American involve-
mont in the war. -
One of America's difficulties
in facing the world today, the
President asserted, is that "we
obscure our vision , with Viet-
nam."
He said the Vietnam issue
certainly will be ended and he
nosed the- rhetorical question of
what the world will look like a
year from now "as Vietnam
moves from our vision, or at
least recedes from it."
, Revenue Sharing "Essential"
Looking beyond Vietnam, Nix-
on pointed ,to four economic "su-
per-powers?" challenging the
U.S. He listed them as Western
? Convinced of Courage
Nixon said the enormous
?strengths of the U.S. can be ap-
preciated only in comparison to
other countries. 'I am speaking
of freedom," he said. "I am
speaking opportunity..."
Nixon said the nation is reach-
ing the period comparable to
that of 'Greece and Rome when
those ancient civilizations "lost
their will to live" and became
subject to "The decadence that
eventually deStroYs the civiliza-
tion." .
But lie said he is convinced
that "We have the -courage, the
strength out through this heart-
land and across the nation that
see to it that 'America not
only is rich and strong, but that
it is healthy in terms of moral
and spiritual strength."
Asserting his belief that the
United States "has in its hands
the future of peace in the werkl
this last third of a century,"
Nixon said he knows America
'cannot- play the great role allot-
ted it by destiny unless "this is a
healthy land, with healthy envi-
ronment, a healthy citizenry, a
healthy economy. . ."
a o iggpsYMIWYied5Se 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400160001-2.
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GA? SAID
TO DOUBT
vi R1
.4?1,
ON MISSILE THREAT
.? ? ?
:Senate G.O.P. Sources SaY
-Agency Thinks Soviet Silos
-
'?-?:* Are for Existing Arms 1.
PROTECTIVE STEP SEEN
? 'Moscow s Believed to Be
, "Hardening' Installations
for Its SS-11's
13y JOHN W. FINNEY
, esfaciaia,lreceawleaaraaa.
aWA5.;IIINGTON, May 25
:Senate Republican sourees rre-
ported today that the Central
Intelligence Agency concluded
that at least two-thirds of the
large new silo holes recently
detected in the Soviet Union
Were intended for the relatively
small 'SS-11 intercontinental
imissile and not for a large new
;weapon as the Defense Depart-
ment has suggested.
' This assessment casts a dif-
ferent light on Moscow's stra-,
tegic intentions at a crucial,
time in the, negotiations with
the ?Soviet Union to achieve,
some )imitation on defensive
-,and offensive strategic weapons
'? It now ?appears to some arms
control specialists that the So-
,vet Union, rather than seeking'
lo achieve a first-strike capa-
13ility against the United States;
.with large new missiles, is fol-
lowing.the American course of
.trying to protect its missiles
against attack with "hardened"
silos. .
60 New Silos Detected
Some 60 large new *missiles,
silos in the Soviet Union have
been detected in recent months1
by means of reconnaissance?
satellites., The C.I.A. was said;
to have concluded that at least,
two-thirds were intended for
th,e SS-I 1 intercontinental mis-
silo, which is comparable to
the Alinufeman ICBM of diet
United States. Approved-,F
. Some. ?tiori-GdVernmenta
sources with access to Central!
Intelligence Agency information
said that all but 15 of the new
holes were situated in existing
SS-11 missile fields.
The Senate Republican
sources said thay had been in-
formed of the C.I.A. assessment
by'non-Governmental arms con-
trol experts who earlier had
been briefed by the intelligenc
agency. These sources declined
to be identified by -name. ?
The Defense Department de-
clined today to comment on the
reported' C.I.A. assessment be-
cause, as a department spokes-
man put it, "We would not
have any comment on a specu-
lative report like that."
But the spokesman said the
department still held to the
interpretation that the Soviet
Union was 'deploying a modi-
%. Fl 1 II 'l 1 1?
?"We cannot tell at this timel sites did not 'seem intended for'
weapons of altered design.
The United States started
hardening its Minuteman silos
some years ago as it saw the
Soviet Union expanding its
ICBM forces, and then. began
"superhardening," them as the
:Soviet Union began deploying
Ithe SS-9 missile.
i Some arms control special-
ists now inaintain that the sr,.
whether it is a modified ver-
sion of the SS-9 ... or whether
it is an entirely new missile
system," he said,
Secretary Gives Warning
Then, in a speech April 22
before the American Newspa-
per Publishers Association, Mr.
Laird said the United States
had fresh intelligence informa-
tion confirming the sobering iviet Union now is turning to
fact that the Soviet Union is :hardening its SS-11 and SS-9
invoved in a new---and appar- missiles as it sees the United
ently extensive--ICBM con- States deploying multiple hide-
atruction program." pendently targeted re-entry ve-
He warned that if this Soviet hides, or multiple warheads,
missile build-up continued, the known as MIRV's, which po-
Defense Department might find tentially could acquire the ac-
it necessary to seek a supple- curacy to strike precisely, at
mentary appropriation for more Soviet missile sites.
,strategic weapons. This was a point made today
Last week, Administration of- before the Senate Appropria-
.ficials were reported to have tions Committee by Dr. Her-
said that the Soviet Union. was bert Scoville Jr., a former. of-
pressing ahead with its new 'ficial of the C.I.A. and the
missile program so rapidly that -- ? - -
test firings of an improved Disarmament and Arms Con-
SS-9 or an entirely new and' ti-el Agency, now chairman of
lied version of its large SS-9 larger ? missile were expected the Strategic Weapons Com-
intercontinental missile or an by this summer.. ? mittee of the Federation of
American Scientists.
entirely new missile system. li
On the basis of new atem- A hardening of the Soviet
Much of the concern and
gence information, the C.I.A. .missile sites, he observed
"would not contribute to a ?
first-strike capability and, if
anything, would be an indica-
tion that a first strike was not
a critical Soviet policy ob-
jective."
If it now .turns out that the
Soviet Union is only hardening
the SS-9 and SS-11 missile
silos, he said, "We must aSk
ourselves how many times wo.
are going to allow the 'vTeap-
oneers' to come before the
Congress and the people shout-
'Mg 'missile gap,' when in real-
ity they are only creating an-
other 'credibility gap.'"
speculation over the intended
purpose for the new silos has
sprung from their unusual size.
According to data obtained
by the satellites, the holes were
larger than those that had pre-
viously been dug for the SS-9,
a large intercontinental missile
that Defense Department offi-
cials have sue gested the Soviet
was said today to have con-
cluded that the larger holes
could be explained not by a
Soviet move to a larger missile
but by an engineering step in-
tended to protect the existing
Soviet missile force.
According to the intelligence
agency's analysis, the larger
Union may be. deploying as a holes can be explained as an of-
'first strike" weapon against fort to "harden the silos, by
the United States's Minuteman emplacement of a concrete
force. This in turn gave rise to shell around them, to protect
official speculation that the So- the weapons against the blast
vict Union was plenning, to de-
ploy an ImProved Version of the,
SS-9 or perhaps an even larger,'
more powerful weapon.
Senator Henry M. Jacksonuanalysis. .
who first disclosed -the detec-' Old Mille Fields Utilized.
tion of the new silo holes on a
national television program
March 7, said at the time that
"the Russians are now in the:
effects of a nuclear explosion.
The larger hole is required to
accommodate the concrete
)iners, according to the C.I.A.
It was said that the first
evidence that the Soviet Union
might be "hardening" its rills-
process of deploying a new silo sites rather than develop-
generation, an advanced goner- ing a new missile system ap-
ataan of offensive systems," peared in the fact that the new
The Washington Democrat, a holes were detected primarily
member of the Senate Armed in existing SS-11 missile fields.
Services Committee, described If the Soviet Union was de-
the development as "ominous ploying a new weapon, it pre-
indead " ? sumably would not situate the
The Defense Department took nesv- missile emplacements
a somewhat more cautious in-;among older missiles, according
telyetation, saying that it had to the C.I.A. view. k
detected new ICBM construe- I The conclusive piece of eat-
tion but .was not sure what the dence was said to have been
Soviet Union's intentions were. received early last week when
But in a .television appear- reconnaissance satellite pic-
ance on March 10, Melvin R. tures were received showing
Laird, the Secretary of Defense, .silo liners arriving at the mis-
said that the silo construction sile holes. The . phetographs
"confirms the fact that the So- were said to have indicated that
viet Union is going forward the liners at neither the SS-11
with construction of .a large nor the SS-9 sites were big
enough to accommodate larger
miCIA-RDP80.4111601
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rR--elease-2001/03/0
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STAT1NTL ! T1.113; M.'.
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M in) Cul? a
?
a,
?Tragedy for the Meo tribes in Laos came unexpectedly
the bright promise of the New Frontier: "Let every
'nation know, whether it wishes us. well or ill, that we
shall pay any price, bear. any burden, meet any hard-
support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the
survival and the sUcc'ess of liberty." Whether, in Janu-
. ? ary 1961, John F. Kennedy had in mind supporting an
:obscure former sergeant in the French army, a Meo
named Vang Pao, to hold back the Comrnunists in the
hills north ?and east of the Mekong valley, preferably
all the way to the China border, is not known; But
'Laos was much in the news at the time of Kennedy's -
inauguration. In December 1960 Gen. Phoumi Nosavan
: and Prince Boun Oum, in a bloody coup, had deposed
:the left-wing cabinet of Quinim Polsona and chased
away Capt. Kong Le and his neutralists. The coup
polarized factions and reopened the civil war, The
?Soviet Union and the US accused each other of support-
ing contending factions, and Eisenhower reportedly re-
e marked to Kennedy that Laos was then a most crucial
. prolalem in foreign affairs: Now, a decade later, the
' Mao ? tribe has been decimated; an entire primitive
people is facing genocide. How did it happen?
:in the first year :of the Kennedy era, foreign service
officials from every department' and agency, 5-purred
on by the attorney general, Robert F. Kennedy, were
dragooned into counterinsurgency courses at the For-
eign Service Ini;titute. The Pentagon's colltribution
was the doctrine of "flexible response." The President
adopted.: the Green Berets. The ,Meos with CIA arnis
and radio training quickly became the secret toast of
the town. ? ?
But by-1962 there was concern that as the number
of Meo under arms reached the thousands there night
be a-shirp;Communist reaction, and the US might then
.
have the task of caring for and feeding the.whole Meo
population in Laos ? all aoo,ocio of them. Averell
'Harriman, then assistant secretary of state for ?the
Far East, was apprehensive, but not enough .to try o
stop the counterinsurgency delirium.. His successor,
Roger Hilsman, nude it his business to approve the
introduction of each rifle and round of amnumition
into the Meo areas, determining which side of a given
rock the Moos were to choose on a mountain trail,
demonstrating his West Point training, World War II
guerrilla experience .and. Department of State control
:over the operation.
I CIA enjoyed its paramilitary role: for once it was
? safe from Pentagon "help" (read take-over). Overt,
? acknowledged intervention in Laos by the Pentagon
Y,'onli,1 have violated the 1954 Geneva Accords; Clan-
destine help, on the other hand; violated only the spirit
'of the agreement, and, both sides were playing that
?game. To this day the CIA has been able to maintain
M pressures on .e leo increase, casualties
rose, so did the sire of US support that flowed through
CIA. Well over lo,000-of "our" Moos were under arms..
* William P. Bundy .(now editor-designate Of Foreign
Affairs) succeeded Hilsman in 1964, :and although he
catnapped through the briefings, he was, still the resi-
dent Laotian guerrilla.exp.ert in the Capital. McGeorge'
Bundy, in his fortress in the White House situation
room, scheduled briefings on the situation from return-
ing CIA officers, just in case President Johnson wanted
an encoUraging word. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara
huddled 'over detail maps of Laos and on occasion
planned. tactieal operations of .regular Lao army units
and.Meo guerrilla bands.
The effort to build a buffer against China through the
Moos pitted a primitive, tough people against the more
sophisticated North Vietnamese and their local sup-
porters, and we are now Witnessing the consequences.
Since 1960 "at least 40-50 percent of the men have
been killed and 25 percent of the women have fallen as
casualties of the war," says Senator FciNcrard Kennedy's
1976 report on refugees. Near the CIA-supported base
of Long Cheng, north and east of Vientiane, almost
2oo,000 Moos depend on air drops of rice (the main
task of the US AID mission) for survival. They cannot
return to their homes in the hills; the Communists are
there. And they cannot survive on the plains because
of climate and the competition from the more advanced
lowland people. The whole Moo tribe is one vast
refugee group., ?.
What has this using of one Asian group to fight
another for US ends taught us? Very little. Indeed,
"let's you and him fight" has become formal US doc-
trine. ". . .? We *hall look to the nation directly
threatened," the President said last November 3., "to
assume the primary .responsibility of providing the
manpower for its defense." (i.e., the Meo nation.) And
the US, said Mr. Nixon, will furnish "anilitary and
economic assitance when requested:" (i.e., the CIA, the
Department of State's chosen 'instrument for the Moo
operation.) The locals supply the bodies. .
Sooner or later, the peoples in the Indochina penin-
sula Nyill have to bind their wounds. In the meantime,
the Meo troops and their families fighting the North
Vietnamese are being pushed over. the mountain wall
into the Mekong valley, refugees of a torn, dying
' culture. The question now is, as The New York .Times
recently put it, "whether the time has come to move
the MeOs out.of the war while there are still enough
men left to assure the nation's survival." It's a grim
end to the first clear test of the logic of the Nixon
Doctrine,
operational ApppipckiEgtgegq1Ag?gr2041 4 : C1A-RDP. 80-01601 R001400160001 -2