PALESTINIANS' MUNICH DISCLAIMER TAKEN WITH A GRAIN OF SALT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R001400130001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 16, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

CITRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
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1 6 SEP 1972
'Palestinians Munich disclaimer
taken with a grain of salt
Special to The Christian Science Monitor
Beirut, Lebanon
The belated statement by the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) disclaiming
responsibility for the Munich attack by the
Black September organization is a formal
and tactical move that should not be taken too
literally.
Much of its significance turns on the
meaning to be given to the word "responsi-
bility." If this is taken to mean "with the
prior knowledge and the prior approval of"
then the PLO can truthfully deny its responsi-
bility.
It had no prior knowledge because Black
September is the one Palestine guerrilla
group that has managed to maintain tight
secrecy around itself and its operations, and
it is well known that there is little or no
secrecy in the PLO. And there would not have
been prior approval, for the young men and
women in Black September broke away
simply because of what they felt was the
pussyfooting moderation of the older organi-
zations grouped in the PLO. (Till as late as
1969 Al-Fatah, the largest group, was insist-
ing that its attacks should be on military
targets and personnel.)
But if "responsibility" means "with the
approval of," then the PLO was telling a
tactful tactical untruth in disclaiming respon-
sibility because Palestinians at all levels ?
from university professor to truck driver 7
approve of Black September unanimously,
proudly, and defiantly.
This approval, subsequent to the event, is
certainly felt, privately, by members of the
PLO executive committee which issued the
disclaimer.
After all, only one Arab ruler, King Hussein
of Jordan, has expressed disapproval of
Munich.
There are, of course, precedents for such
formal disclaimers. The State Department
would deny responsibility for some of the
activities of the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy's undercover operations. And, more apro-
pos, the Jewish Agency in the 1940's always
denied responsibility for the violent acts of
the Stern Gang and the lrgun Zvei Leumi,
though it is now known, backed by a decision
of the Israeli Supreme Court, that they were
all part of a single overall organization. The
PLO is thus simply stating its position for the
record.
The Israelis are unlikely to believe it
because Tel Aviv newspapers are issuing
what they claim to be lists of the names of
leaders of Black September which link that
group which Al-Fatah. But these are no more
than guesses and part of the propaganda
game.
More important is the fact that in its last
few meetings, the PLO executive committee
made progress, though painfully slowly,
toward the unification of its various groups.
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WASl11 TON POST
71T
ji 67F (enr
LI
U./ ti)6ii.
-
Ly Jack Anderson
An estimated 1,500 intelli-
gence agents have quietly in-
filtrated the State Department
where they carry on their
spying activities in diplomatic
Operatives from the Central
Intelligence Agency, Defense
intelligence Agency and Na-
tional Security Agency have
taken over many key posts,
7 AUG 1972
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,e-O ,eili ' ' ,es .0.-r,
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This has caused considera-
ble grumbling and grievances
among old-line foreign service
officers. They have charged
privately that promotions have
been rigged, transfers ar-
ranged and even a few resig-
Lations -forced to clear -foreign
service officers out of the way
so intelligence agents ?can take
over their jobs,
One grievance case, hushed
up by the State Department,
involves foreign service offi-
cer Charles Anderson, who
,clahns he, was bumped from
his political job in Sofia to
make room or a CIA agent.
When Anderson complained
about the transfer, he .41lOt a
Jew efficiency rating for his
pains.
Anderson refused to corn-
.(7) ./.,;
11 j.4d Lri
State Department sources de- (D?Ala.)has scheduled a closed A spokesman for the A
scribed how the cloak-and-dog. session to consider the latest can Banking Associalum ne-?
ger boys were moving into the bonanza for the banks. This knowledged that S.:31.552 had
diplomatic service. The 1,500 bill, carried on the Senate been drafted by the hankeii;.;
figure came from personnel docket as 5-3052, was actually but claimed it merely chained
officers. An official spokes- drafted by the American recommendations made by the
man, however, refused to com-
ment on the number of CIA
and related spies in the de-
partment.
Bank Benefits
The nation's tax laws have
sprung so many leaks that,
half the money due the gov-
ernment now escapes into the much as a billion dollars- a
pockets of the privileged. year in tax revenues and pos-
Treasury experts claim the tax sibly more.".
rate could be cut in half, with Citing figures supplied by
Bankers Associatiom Federal Reserve ' Board. The
A Senate, staff study, dated bill was introduced, he said,
Aug. 1 and stamped "Gonfi- by Sen. Wallace Bennett (it-
cliental," calls the bill "the 'Utah) at the request of the
most unconscionable example bankers.
of special interest legislation n, r
1 (I.:Aleut Grpnrf.t
(we) have seen" recently.
The staff estimates that the George INIeG-overn, in his
hill "thald cost the states as search for a new running
mate, first tried Ted Kennedy,
then Hubert Dumphrey. Both
men turned him down but of-
fered to campaign for him ...
out reducing federal revenue the Federal Reserve. Board, IluillPhroY found his old
a slugle cent, if Congress the memo alleges that the av- friend McGovern despondent
would only plug the tax loop- crane business firm has a rela- over the ordeal of choosing a-
_
holes.
Instead, Congress keeps
poking new loopholes in the
laws until the taxpayers have
their dander up.
Few special interests have
tivo state and local tax bur- running mate . . . -.Atet,or ern
den four times greater than never asked his former run-
commercial banks. It add-s: ,fling mate, Tom Eagleton, for
"Once state legislatures ins .opinion on a succi,531', But
?? g thought f o r in e r Dcroo mai c
Ea{`,1eton told us he
wake up to this great dis?par- Pri-vatelY,
't * they-,' IA ? ?11. --1.
. ..,.- ....
wangled more benefits out of to raise the low level of taxes Party Cl4e1- Larry a?ft`.1e-11\7as
Congress than the banking I paid by banks. If banks were the best available man, . . .
lobby. Banking legislation -is i taxed at the same rate. as -.11cGovern was uneasy, inci-
handled by the Senate and other business firms, state and dentally, that . head sl rong
House Banking Committees, local tax revenues would be members of the Dernocrai ic.
which . always seem to be increased by $2.2 billion," National Committee might not
dreaming .up new benefits for This bill, warned the *memo, 'act_ept his recumn'endy'ii`''l
he banks, . would block the states from and ,mi2;h1.-.. Put up Ike r
charging banks the same tax candittC 1-,-)C 'v,i,:! 3.1----?:dent.
rates as other businesses_ . C u.
?
'Tient, but ? his friends told us For Tuesdv, . Senate Bank-
about his grievance. Other Lug Chatrxnan John Sparkman
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June 28, 197'2 CONGRESSIONAL RE
on 16 of the issues, I believe, and we executive branch participating in foreign
accepted 11. We think the ones we got policy matters. I suppose anyone who
them to recede on were perhaps more im- has taken a look at the broad field of
portant than the others, We had to corn- the executive branch of the Government
promise on something, and this is one would recognize that shifts in responsi-
of the things we reluctantly compro- bility might be made. The President has
mised on. suggested certain shifts and consolida,
Mr. MAILLIARD. Mr. Speaker, the tions within the executive branch, but
chairman has explained the problems in in the field of foreign policy I would sup-
this conference report. I rise in support pose there is not going to be any major
of this report on the conference with restructuring of my Government clo-
the Senate to resolve differences in the partments or agencies.
authorizing legislation for the Depart- We are supposed 1,0 authorize this
ment of State, the U.S. Information Commission to make recommendations
Agency, the U.S. Arms Control and Dis- with respect to "more effective arrange-
armament Agency, and the Peace Corps. ments between the executiye branch and
I am pleased to report that your con- Congress, which will better enable each
forces were generally successful in pro- to carry out its Constitutional responsi-
tooting the House position. bilities." Well, Mr. Speaker, I know
We had a vigorous discussion of the that there are Members of the other
Senate language establishing a grievance body which have a kind of persetution
procedure for foreign service personnel, complex with respect to the executive
While I agree that a grievance procedure branch in the field of foreign policy. ?t
should be established, I am plea sed that may be they want some kind of instru-
the Senate conferees agreed to. let us mentality to help define what the vela-
handle the legislation in a more orderly tionships should be between the executive
manner. Our subcommittee on State De- branch and the legislative branch in this
partment Organization and Foreign Op- area, but I would think this search for
orations began hearings this week mid "more effective arrangements" is going
will eontinue them on July 18, following to be a difficult responsibility.
the recess. What are we alining at? What kind of
However, I am not pleased with the ,more effective arrangements between the
necessity of our acceptance of the Sen- executive branch and the Congress could
ate proposal for a Study Commission re- a commission suggest that we legislators
lating to foreign policy. We did ,succeed might not think of if we do not think the
relationships are good?
They are also supposed to make recom-
mendations for 'improved procedures
among departments?to provide im-
proved coordination"?I suppose it was
just an accident that they speak of im-
proved procedures to provide improved
coordination. No one doubts there is need
for coordination in the field of foreign
policy within the executive branch. In-
deed, this conference report pinpoints a
major responsibility in the Department
of State by designating a new position of
Under Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs. In the field of foreign economic:
Policy, there is unquestionably need for
additional coordination and control with
respect to the foreign policy questions,
but I doubt very much whether any
commission is going to throw much light
on what should be the proper relation.-
ships between the various agencies of our
Government.
The responsibilities in subparagraphs
(4) and (5) on page 10, include "the abo-
lition of services, activities, and functions
not necessary to the efficient conduct of
foreign policy"?that could point in any
direction or in no direction. What ac-
tivities of the Federal Government in the
field of foreign policy are not necessary
to its efficient conduct? I suppose there
must be some. The Senate must have had
something in mind, or the sponsors of
this proposal must have had something in
mind, in making this suggestion.
In sum, what I am saying, MT. Speaker,
is that we need to be careful about a pro-
posal of this kind, because the field is so
because the responsibilities of both
the executive and legislative branches of
our Government arc so intermixed that a
commission with the best of intentions
might muddy the waters.
And if a commission were to do thor-
Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I thank
the gentleman for yielding. I rise in sup-
port of the conference report.
Mr. Speaker, rise in support of this
conference report. I believe the confer-
ees have done a fine job under the eir-
cums Lances.
I am, of course, gratified that adop-
tion of this conference report will rep-
resent final action by the Congress in
approving the $85 million of aid to Israel
to help with the resettlement of the Jew-
ish refugees from the Soviet Union which
I proposed, along with Congressman
HALPERN and many 'cosponsors in H.R.
13022 on February 8, 1972.
I sincerely hope that the Appropria-
tions Committee will act promptly to
Provide the fluids required to carry out
tins authorization.
Mr. MAILLIARD. I yield such time 'as
he may consume to the gentleman from
New York.
(Mr. FRELINGIMYSEN asked and
was given permission to revise and ex-
410 his remarks.)
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Speaker,
as a conferee on this conference report,
I rise to support it, but I do so with some
reluctance. My reservations about the
report have to do with the proposed study
commission relating to foreign policy. I
might point out that one House conferee
did not sign the conference report at
all?Mr. THolasoN of Wisconsin. I do not
in improving the Senate language, but 1 ' wish to speak for him, but I know he, too,
find little merit in the proposal. It is not has serious reservations about the wis-
at all clear to me what useful purpose dour of authorizing a commission of this
this Commission is supposed to serve. kind. I would like to suggest that the
This is the first time funds have had Appropriations Committee take a very
to be specificallyauthorized for the De- close look at what is -proposed, take a
partment of State and USIA as required close look at what a commission of this
by a provision of last year's Foreign As- kind would got into, and how much it
sistance Act. The authorization for State would cost.
The chairman of the Foreign Affairs
Department includes funds for admin-
istration of foreign affairs, international Committee said that none of the House
organizations and conferences, educa- conferees is very happy with the pro-
tional exchanges, and migration and Posal, and the gentleman from California
refugee assistance. These amounts total said that at least the commission will
$648,354,000, of which $65 million is to die in 1974. My view is that we should
assist in the resettlement of Soviet Jew- really not allow it to be born. The very
ish refugees in Israel. broad mandate which it is given has to
The USIA authorization amounts to me the earmarks of a fishing expedition.
$200,249,000 for fiscal year 1973. Of this It takes the form of a little Hoover
amount, $194 million is for salaries and commission with 12 members, eight of
expenses, including the funding of van- whom are to be appointed by the legisla,-
ous media programs. The remaining two branch of the Government.
funds are largely for international ex- Take a look at the language regarding
hibitions. what should be its duties. I refer to the
The Arms Control and Disarmament
language on pages 9 and 10. It begins at
the bottom of page 9!
Agency would receive an authorization
"
In the amount of $22 million for the .2 It says: The Commission shall study
fiscal years, 1973 and 1974. The recent and investigate." I am not sure what
that means. Is to study something else
SALT agreement is, I believe, ample evi-
dence of the value of ACDA's work, than to investigate? It goes on: "the
organization, methods of operation, and
The Peace Corps authorization is for powers of all departments, agencies, in-
$88,027,000, tho amount agreed to by dependent establishments, and instru-
both the House and the Senate. mentalities of the United States Govern-
I urge approval of this conference re- ment participating in the formulation
port, in spite of my reservations con- and implementation of United States f or-
cerning the creation of another commis- eignpolicy." It 'aCies on to say the Com-
sion whose function is of dubious value. nussion "shall make recommendations
iny judgment. which the Commission considers al)-
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield as propriate to provide improved govern-
much time as lie may consume to the mental processes and programs"?I am
gentleman from New York (Mr. Dirra- not sure what that means.
HAM). The specific recommendations have
(Mr. BINGHAM asked and was given to do with "the reorganization of the de-
permission to revise and extend his partments, agencies, independent estab-
remarks.) lishments, and instrumentalities of the ough job, they would require, I would
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NOTES
The Ten Commandments of
the foreign -affairs bureaucracy
by Leslie H. Gelb
? and.Morton H. Halperin
r3-HE AVERAGE READER of the New
14, York Times in the 1950s must
have asked: why don't we take some
of our troops out of-Europe? Ike him-
self said we didn't need them all
there. Later, in 1961, after the tragi-
comic Bay of Pigs invasion, the
reader . asked: how did President
? Kennedy ever decide to *do such a
damn fool thing? Or later about Viet-
nam: why does President Johnson
keep.. on bombing North Vietnam
when :the b?ombing prevents negotia-
tions and doesn't get Hanoi to stop,
the fighting?
Sometimes the answer to these
questions is simple. It can be attrib-
uted squarely. to ?the President: He
thinks it's right. Or he believes he has
no choice. As Often as not, though,
the ans-wer lies elsewhere?in the spe-
cial interests and procedures of the
bureaucracy and the convictions of
the bureaucrats.
If you look at. foreign policy as a
largely. .rational process of gathering
information, setting the alternatives,
defining the national interest, and
making.decisions,.then much of what
the President. does will not make
sense. But if you look at foreign.
policy as bureaucrats pursuing orga-
? nizatiorial, personal, and, domestic
political interests, as well as their own
beliefs about what is right, you can
explain much of the inexplicable.
In. pursuing these interests and be-
liefs, bureaucrats (and that means
everyone from Cabinet officials to
political appointees to .career civil
servants) usually follow their own
version of the' Ten Commandments:
1. Don't discuss domestic pol-
ities on issues involving war and
Peace.
. On May lAriplimillscliraprIRetira
Truman held a meeting in the White
House to discuss recognition .of the
L
_.r
q 4 .1;711,,7'
,
?
ASSU.., tar. Pasimit...
STATINTL?
new state of Israel. Secretary of State
George Marshall and State 0
Under-
secretary Robert Lovett spoke first.
They were' against it. It would un-
necessarily alienate forty million
Arabs. 'ft-tin-Ian next asked Clark
Clifford, then Special Counsel to the
President, to speak. Arguing for the
moral element of U.S. policy and
the need to contain Communism in
the Middle East, Clifford favored rec..
ognition. As related 'by Dan Kurzman
in Genesis 19-18, Marshall exploded:
'Mr. President, this is not a matter to
be determined on the basis' of politics.
Unless politics were involved, Mr.
Clifford would not even be -at this
confetetice. This is a serious matter
of foreign policy determination . .
Clifford remained at the meeting, and
after some hesitation, the U.S. rec-
ognized Israel.
The moral merits of U.S. support
of Israel notwithstanding, no one
doubts Jewish influence on Washing-
ton's policy toward the Middle East.
And yet, years later, in their memoirs,
both Truman and Dean Acheson de-
nied at great length that the decision
to recognize the state of Israel was
in any way affected by U.S:domestic
politics.
A powerful myth is at work here.
It holds that national security is too
important, too sacred, to be tainted
by cross domestic political considera-
tions. It is a matter of lives and the
safety of the. nation. Votes and in-
fluence at home .should count for
nothing. Right? Wrong.- National se-
curity and domestic reactions are in-
separable. What could be clearer than
the fact that President Nixon' Viet-
nam troop reductions are geared more
to American public opinion than to
the readiness of .the Saigon foices.to for an American-su tfl invasion
defend the elves?. Yet the myth
makes, it bad form for government
officials to talk about domestic poli-
tics (except to friends and to repor-
ters off the record) or even to write
about politics later in their memoirs.
And what is bad form on the inside
would be politically disastrous if it
were leaked to- the outside. Imagine
the press getting hold of a. secret goV-
eminent document that said: ''Presi-
dent Nixon has dedided to visit China
to: capture the peace issue for the '72
elections. He does not intend or ex-:
'pect anything of substance to be
achieved by his trip--except to scare
the Russians a little." Few things are
more serious than the charge of play-
ing, _politics with security.
Nevertheless, the President pays a
? price for the silence imposed by the
myth. One cost is that.the President's
assumptions about what- public opin-
ion will and.will not support are never
questioned. No official, for example,.
ever dared to write a scenario for
President Johnson showing him how
to forestall the right-wing, McCarthy-
ite reaction he feared if the U.S.
pulled ,out of Vietnam. Another cost
is that bureaucrats, in their ignorance
of Presidential views, - will use their
own notions of -domestic politics to
screen information from the Presi-
dent or to eliminate options from his
consideration.
2. Say what will
what you believe.
In the early months of the Kennedy
Administration, CIA officials respon-
sible for covert operations faced a
difficult challenge. President Eisen-
hower had permitted them to begin
training a group of Cuban refugees
cod RCM 4041 T5t. carry
convince, not
e eII ? ? i
e t'?ele mos of t e :rook.
ings Institution and tomer officials of the out the plan, they then had to win ap-
national,security bureaucrac; n-oval from ? P i 1
a skepticalnew res ent
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MAY 1972
(Or Bureaucratic Survival
For Fun and Profit)
STATI NTL
DAVID D. 1-1EMOM
1IN the field; Foreign Service
officers receive tantalizing hints of
the complexity Of foreign policy
making. They deal with members of
the country team representing Other
agencies. They ?witness the some-
times 'tortured replies which come
back to requests to the Department.
In the field, diplomats, have been
protected by .the fact that the De-
partment had the ultimate responsi-
bility. They make recommenda-
tions; they could indulge in advoca-
cy, but in most cases theirs is not
the final. word. In the Department
there is no recourse. How can FSOs
best ?contribute to that leadership in
foreign affairs for which we in the
Department are'responsible?
First, it is essential to understand
the environment. Don't rail against.
the complexity. It is there. Learn its
demands and requirements.
The President of the United
States needs answers in times of
crises. He needs recommendations
for longer-range problems. He
needs them quickly, concisely, and
Mr. Newsom has been Assistant out must
Secre-
tary of StateAbff
July 1969. Ar #
nEst041641 ffgreaseL?
e 4 . t- part of it, must recognize it and
Foreign Service and President .of the 197L work with it. The Foreign Service is
accurately. He needs them within a
broad framework of his own policies
and politics. Furthermore, the field
of foreign policy?while of great
importance to him?is only one of
several critical areas in which he
must make decisions involving do-
mestic policies, other international
obligations, public mood and public
opinion, the Congress, the personal-
ities around him, his own broad
objectives. He and the men around
him have no time for patience, for
prolonged arguments or for costly
mistakes.
The Secretary of State and the
Department ? beneath him must
Association. He has served at Karachi,
provide- prompt, intelligent and
effective responses in the field of
foreign affairs that 'will mean suc-
cess both internationally and do-
mestically or the President will look
elsewhere. That is what contem-
porary controversy about State is-all
about.
This.broader view seems,to come
hard to an FSO. They resent those
looking over their shoulders whom
they classify as outsider's or "politi-
cals." FSOs forget that, even though
professionals, they are part of a
system based essentially and happi-
ly on a democratic political process.
They are not truly sensitive to the
fact "the outsider" may have corre-
sponding doubts about the profes-
sional. The career man is not associ-
ated with an administration, has not
faced the battering of a political
campaign, and does not depend
upon the political success of an ad-
ministration for his future.
In Washington; therefore, For-
eign Service officers have no special
status. They are, in fact, members
of a group which traditionally in the
White House and by the political
level of the Department is often
regarded with suspicion and doubt.
To be effective in Washington, they
must prove their understanding of
SOM is. a member of the Board of the Service League Career service award in
d ? 11. jUU Art
. 2 4 APR 1972
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Decline a
. By ROBERT KEATLEY i
WASHINGTON?The Japanese have de
mended equal time and will get it: Henry
Kissinger, at liberty between Mexico and
Moscow, will soon spend three days in Tokyo
explaining U.S. policies to business and po-
litical leaders there.
From Japan's viewpoint it 'seems only fit-
ting. After all, the Chinese were awarded
. three visits by the senior White House adviser
and the Russians will soon get their turn?so
why not the Japanese too? Japan is dismayed
,by some Ameridaii diplomatic tactics, and
leaders want an explanation from someone
who, in their eyes, really counts.
For Mr. Kissinger, it's an opportunity to
do vital service. Japan remains the main U.S.
friend in Asia, as the President repeatedly
states, and so reassuring Toyko is important
work. Though the White House aide has lim-
ited respect ihr Japanese sophistication in
foreign affairs, his usual erudition and intel-
lectual brilliance may well calm Tokyo's as-
sorted fears. .
But back at the State Department the dip-
lomats are increasingly dismayed. The com-
ing Kissinger journey is just one more sign?
in case another is needed?that foreign policy
!
! has become a White House preserve, and that influence of the department and Secretary of
State Rogers is often marginal at best.
Two Questions
Much has been written about this shift of
authority from Foggy Bottom, as State's
neighborhood is rather inelegantly called. So
perhaps two questions should be raised: Who
really cares? And what difference does it
make?
- Well, some people do care a great deal.
Foremost, of course, are the foreign service
officers themselves. About 3,000 strong, at
home and. abroad, they joined the diplomatic
ranks under the illusion they would help steer
the ship of state. Now they often find them.
selves shuffling papers for Henry Kissinger,
deeply suspicious that the White House is
burying them in busy work while it makes the
decisions on its own. They have little sense of
Participation, and a spreading belief that
their chosen profession has grown irrelevant.
Assorted internal bureaucratic problems
add to their gloom. The service is top-heavy
With rank just when its overall size is shrink-
ing for policy and budgetary reasons; this
-rneans fewer promotions and fewer challeng-
ing jobs to go around. Moreover, the genial
Mr. Rogers displays only intermittent interest
in the bureaucracy he nominally heads. His
loyalty is basically to Mr. Nixon. Many diplo-
mats think he just doesn't care much about
State's complex problems, and many subordi-
nates complain that he doesn't work hard
enough.
But outside these directly affected bureau-
crat% there seem to be few worries. Sen.
Pulbright and a few other legislators talk oc-
casionally about putting affairs of state back
in the State Department. And some Capitol
Bill staffers?former foreign service officers 8
among them?also wring their hands, while
e State DeparVnent_press ,y1WMIP.VIFAyi4s
revives the issiaPIREQtVaWnE OMR
nd Fall at Fo
' say Inez tne power transfer is not a matter of
great public concern.
So What does it matter? Can critics prov
that U.S. foreign policy is bad because State'
. experts oftert neither devise it nor execute it
Doing so would be difficult. Even some o
the most righteously indignant diplomats con
cede admiration for the main lines of Nixon
foreign policy. He is pulling troops fron
Southeast Asia rather than sending more in
(The current air buildup is dismissed, to
lightly perhaps, as a temporary aberration)
Two decades of misguided China policy have
been reversed, and to popular acclaim. More
serious negotiations, about more things, are
now ? under way with the Soviet Union thai
ever before. Meantime, relations with West
ern Europe?still the prime U.S. foreign pol
Icy concern?seem smoother than during the
1960s. Indeed, many argue that policy is now
more innovative precisely because it has been
wrested from a sluggish State Department.
Bottom
foreign service officer, who adds candidly;
"He is often right about that."
Long-Range Considerations
All these reasons may expla In why State
has suffered even if foreign policy has not, at
least not so far. Yet there are some longer-
range considerations that suggest the Nixon-
Kissinger management could eventually do
L. disservice to the national interest.
For one thing, many thoughtful officials
? believe policy revolves too much around the
person of Mr. Kissinger?no man to allocate
authority and acclaim to others. Despite he-
roic workdays, he just doesn't have time for
eVerything, and important matters can slide
while his attention is focused on the crisis of
the day.
For example, South Asian policy may have
gone sour partly because the White House
worried mainly about strategic arms limita-
tion talks and China, ignoring early warnings
from State. By his own admission, the senior
advisor has little interest in international eco-
nomic problems; he has tended to slough
them off. Even Mr. Kissinger's own staff
grumbles about its inability to get his atten-
tion when some alleged crisis preoccupies
him; the system funnels everything to him
and has no other outlets.
Likewise, the Security Council system has
grown complex partly because the Nixon-Kis-
singer team believes State incapable of initia-
tive and action. Yet this alternate structure
seems sure to stifle innovation; despite the
administration's talks about seeking "op-
tions," the structure it relies most upon often .
Chokes off backtalk and rival policies. For
some, it .seems an attempt to ? cure State's
stodginess by guaranteeing that it will grow
even inore dull.
Diplomats wonder if encouraging such me-
diocrity is really what the White House wants.
Unless some practices are changed, they see
a foreign service stripped of its best men
(many now seem to be ?seeking other work),
leaving plodders charged with representing
U.S. interests abroad. Some even say the
quality of young people seeking jobs at State
has dropped. This doesn't bode well for ira-
pdrtant international negotiations, nor for the
vital flow of information needed for policy-
making. Bad intelligence can only lead to bad
policy, these diplomats contend.
Finally, State's denizens grumble becduse
outsiders so clearly realize where power now
les. The Japanese, for example, weren't sat-
shied with the visit last March of Assistant
Secretary Marshall Green, the top Asian hand
at State. In requesting a higher-powered per-
sonage, they didn't ask for Mr. Rogers; they
asked for Mr. Kissinger.
This transfer wasn't a simple matter of a
nimble Kissinger out-flanking a lethargic
Rogers, as some would have it. Mr. Kissinger
Is a rather cunning bureaucrat in his own
right, with proven ability to operate within
the framework of President Nixon's work
style and prejudices.. But as the principals ex-
plain it, the power shifted basically because
Mr. Nixon wanted it to,
He sees management of the federal bu-
reaueray as a key problem of any presi-
dency. Bureaucracies, he thinks, spend too
much time administering themselves and pro-
tecting their own interests and not enough in
creating and administering innovative poli-
cies or in responding to the President's de-
sires. Mr. Kissinger seems to share .this view.
Mr Kissinger, for example, believes the
policy meetings he heads are leaner than
those run by senior State Department offi-
cials. In his view, 'he is ruthless about who
can attend; State lets in anybody with a mar-
ginal interest in the subject at hand. His
meetings end with crisp decisions; State's
ramble on to mushy compromises. When ap-
propriate, his give Mr. Nixon a range of op-
tions to choose from; State too often serves
up a bureaucratic consensus for the Chief Ex-
ecutive to ratify or reject in its entirety.
Close observers believe there were other,
more personal, reasons that Mr. Nixon
wanted foreign policy shifted to the White
House.
They think the President has held a grudge
against State ever since Alger Hiss days,
when he attacked the department Vigorously.
Intensifying that grudge may be galling mem-
ories of the 1960s, when Mr. Nixon, a political
loser, traveled widely. Sometimes he got off-
hand treatment from U.S. embassy personnel
who saw him as a has-been; he is not a man
to forget such slights. The President may also
still see himself as a poor California boy bat-
tling an entrenched Eastern establishment.
More generally, Mr. Nixon is said to con-
ider the entire federal bureaucracy a Demo-
retie enclave opposed to Republican rule a
teD
esult of the FDR days. "He also_ logiallau-
e20.01403104w:-ZikR 3,60
hink in slyeeping, global terms," says one
Time and Trends
The problem is that the White House ad-
viser hasn't time for all who demand his at-
tention?even if he had the urge to see them.
Meantime, the structure designed for such
business calls, over at State, is under-used. .
1R001400130001-41
NEWSWEEK
Approved For Release 2001/03/8414:165\j*Fmouoi ROO
BY STEWART ALSOP
THE GHOST AT FOGGY BOTTOM
WASHINGTON?Secretary of State
ham Rogers is an able and likable man,
but there is beginning to be something
faintly translucent about him. Despite
his. claim a few days ago that he was
"not dispirited" and that in Peking he
did not feel "excluded at all," there is
a certain ghastliness about the Secre-
tary since the Peking journey.
A major political figure in this cruel
town becomes ghostly as soon as it is
generally believed that he is on his
way out. A chief subject of speculation
in Washington now is not whether but
when Secretary Rogers will leave the
State Department, and thus he has be-
come a ghost.
? Secretary Rogers was already, as in
the children's game, two-thirds of a
ghost before the Peking trip. He began
to look a bit translucent long ago, when
it first became evident that henry Kis-
singer had far more real influence on
.foreign policy than the Secretary of
State. But it was Mao Tse-tung and
Chou En-lai who really made Rogers
. a ghost.
It has been widely assumed that his
old friend, President Nixon, humiliated
the Secretary of State for reasons of his
own when he excluded him from the
key meetings with Mao and Chou. But
' that is not really how it happened.
. What really happened is that the Presi-
dent, as soon as he realized that Rogers
was in an embarrassing position in Pe-
king, made a real effort to save his Sec-
retary's face; but the Chinese refused
to cooperate with the face-saving effort.
SURPRISE
On the same day the President land-
. ed in Peking, he was summoned to a
meeting with Mao. Henry Kissinger?
and no one else?was invited to the au-
dience. The President, taken by sur-
prise, acquiesced. He also acquiesced
in the arrangement for the negotiating
session starting the next day, in which
he and Kissinger met with Chou En-lai,
while Rogers was assigned to confer
; fruitlessly with the 'newly appointed
Chinese Foreign Minister, who ranks
low in the party hierarchy.
When the President realized that the
exclusion of Rogers from the key meet-
ings was being interpreted at home as
a humiliation for Rogers, he set about
trying to restore his Secretary's pres-
tige. H cat__gin rhoetween
Rogers a#1rattMilinlieCkrOMbilaS
answer, and Rogers had to be satisfied
Chou, plus a conversation on a plane.
The President had naturally expect-
ed that he would himself have a final,
wrap-up meeting with Mao, if only for
ceremonial purposes. He made it clear
that in -a second meeting he expected
Rogers to accompany him. Again, the
answer was dusty?and there was no
second meeting.
In short, there seems in retrospect to
have been a conscious intention on the
part of the Chinese to exclude the
American Secretary of State from seri-
ous negotiation, and thus downgrade
him. There are several theories. .to ex-
plain this intention. One is the obvious
one?the Chinese believed that the real
power of decision lay with Nixon and
Kissinger, not with Rogers:
SECRECY
The Chinese may also have been de-
termined to keep the meetings as small
as possible because they wanted to
keep the substance of what was dis-
cussed as secret as possible?especially
from Moscow and Hanoi. They knew
that bringing in Rogers meant bringing
in the State Department?and the State
Department might leak. They may also
have been concerned that stories pic-
turing Mao as old and unwell?which
he is?would emerge from any larger
meeting.
In any case, it was the Peking mission
that made Rogers one of Washington's
ghosts. To see why he has become
ghostly, it is only necessary to imagine
President Truman taking Sidney Souers
?the Kissinger of that era?into major
summit negotiations and not Dean
Acheson; or President Eisenhower tak-
ing Robert Cutler and not John Foster
Dulles. Acheson or Dulles would have
resigned on the spot.
. This difficult exercise in imagination
also suggests the low estate to which
the Department of State has fallen. It
has never been lower?not even when
Joe McCarthy was snapping at Ache-
son's heels. In those days there was at
least no doubt who was the real Secre-
tary of State and where foreign policy
was really made.
The low estate of the Department of
State is a most serious matter, The Unit-
ed States does, after all, need a foreign
office to carry on its relations with other wildly popular in the State Depart-
countries. The State Department has ment. But it is hard to think of anyone
been ailin for years, but it is now mori- else who could make the State Depart-
e 200n1Y06
with the dream of establishing a secret
office of 30 people or so to run foreign
policy while maintaining the State De-
partment as a facade in which people
might contentedly carry papers from
bureau to bureau." The State Depart-
ment is now precisely such a "facade"
?except that the paper carriers are by
no means contented. This is not surpris-
ing.. There are many able people in the
State Department, What keeps able
people in Washington is power, a com-
modity as important in Washington as
money in Wall Street. The State De-
partment has been drained of all real
power, which is why it is moribund.
It cannot now be revived by William
Rogers. Rogers has introduced useful
reforms in the department. He has per-
formed usefully in other areas too?no-
tably on Capitol Hill, where he has
been an expert pourer of oil on trou-
bled waters, and in the Middle East,
the one foreign-policy area in which
his influence has been real. Moreover,
the President is clearly determined to
."tilt" toward Rogers, in an effort to
patch up his prestige.
REVIVAL
?
But it is universally assumed that
Rogers will leave the State Department
fairly soon, although probably not be-
fore the election. It is this universal as-
sumption that accounts for the Secre-
tary's ghastliness. A chief subject of
speculation is the identity of his succes-
sor. Most of the speculation centers on
. Nelson Rockefeller or Elliot Richardson.
. Rockefeller and Richardson are both
strong-minded men. Neither would be
inclined to play second -fiddle, and both
would try hard to revive the State De-
partment. What the State Department
needs for its revival is a Secretary of
State with the absolute confidence of
the President, unlimited energy and
toughness, total mastery of the bureau-
cratic machinery, and great expertise
in foreign policy.
This is a tough bill to fill, and neither
Rockefeller nor Richardson entirely fills
it. There is one man who does?Henry
A. Kissinger. Admittedly, it is a bit diffi-
cult to imagine a Secretary of State
with a German accent, however faint.
Admittedly, Henry Kissinger is not
?
I.
beekei-ROPetp-9,1601
R cunt *Mai yiuOt to be and
d ? " t divert himself of power.
Arthur Schlesinger wrote t at resi- on s true centers
with a'? pro forma hotel meeting with dent Kenne y use o
IVA.SHINGION POST'
Approved For Release 2001/03/04MAC14,13DIDTATd4B1R
gers
Policy R
? By Murrey Marder
Washtnaton Post Staff Writer
:Senate concern over the
"erosion" of the State Depart-
ment's theoretical primacy in
foreign affairs was disputed
and brushed aside yesterday
by Secretary of State William
P. Rogers.
"I am perfectly satisfied
with the way it ; operating,"
said Rogers. The State Depart-
? ment is "happy to play a role"
. in foreign policy, and "Mr.
' Kissinger has a role," said Rog-
ers, but "the people elected
the President" to "make for-
- eign policy."
? Rogers refused in that fash-
? lion, to debate
whether he is
? ;being overshadowed by presi-
dential security adviser Henry
A. Kissinger. That conformed
with his insistence on Monday
that, "I didn't feel excluded at
all" during the President's
trip to China.
As a result, Rogers' words
deflected the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee yester-
day from its own groping ef-
forts to enhance the State De-
partment's: share in formulat-
? ing foreign policy..
The .committee, headed by
Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-
Ark.) held its first hearing ,
on $563 million requested in ,
authorization funds for the
? State Department as required'
by a rider it attached to last ?
year's foreign aid act. A major '
purpose, as Fulbright noted
yesterday, is "restoring Con-
gress' proper- role in the mak-
ing of foreign policy."
With Kissinger beyond The
official reach of the committee
because he is a White House
adviser, Fulbright and other
senators hoped Rogers would
Join in seeking to strengthen
State's hand in policy making.
In theory, that would
strengthen the role of Con?
-
gress, because State is obliged
to be more resonsive to Con-
gress than is the White House..
Rogers, however, pro-
flounced himself quite satis-
fied with the status quo.
He disclaimed , any concerni
eferids tate e ar men
le at Senate Heailng
about having State Departmen
positions lost in the National
Security Council staff machin-
ery that Kissinger controls. If
anything develops "contrary
to what I think should b
done," said Rogers, "take it u
with the President."
"The system is working ver,
well," Rogers insisted. e
foreign policy is very effec
tive "
Rogers also came uncle'
close questioning yesterday
1 about the need to jettison
what several senators called
(remnants of the cold war.
Sen. Frank Church (D-I-
1, dent's China trip, said it is.
time to eliminate all vestiges,
of the "China demon fixation"
in U.S. policy. Church said
there is "no relic" that more
deserves being "tossed in the
ash can" of history than the.
Southeast Asian Collective De-
fense Treaty of 1954.
i
The SEATO treaty is "a
corpse," said Church. long
abandoned by France, Britain
and Pakistan: invoked as "an
after thought" to help justify
U.S. involvement in the Indo-1
china war, but now deserving !
"decent burial" to avoid use in
other entanglements.
?
t ous" and would suggest "a bright suggested various ap- '
180-degree turn" in U.S. pol-
icy.
Church countered that since
ancient Rome, "no other coun-
e try in history has undertaken
P so many formal commitments
as the government of the
Un!tei States?to 44 coun-
tries."
Bogers also was challenged
by Ftdbright and Sen. Stuart
'1 Symington (D-Mo.) on adminis-
tration support of funds until.
June 1973 for Radio Free Eu-
rope and Radio Liberty. They
were previously financed cov-
ertly by the CIA. The dispute
is in a Senate-House confer-
funding only until June 30 of
. this
a o), commending the Presi-
?
?
'ence, with the Senate favoring ?
year.
The U.S.-C commu-
nique, pledging peaceful co-ex- I i
proaches for strengthening
the State Department's posi-
tion in foreign affairs, includ
ing a -"unified budget for for
eign affairs." Rogers said that
would be "too complex." Ful-
bright noted that other agen-
cies, including CIA and De-
fense, haVe "seven or eight
times as many people in our
embassies as the State Depart-
ment does." Rogers said State
has only 16 per cent of its own
employees in embassies over-
seas, and State's total employ-
ees were listed at 13,236 -
Rogers disagreed, however,
with Fulbright's claim that the
growing National Security
Council structure, which Kis-
singer beads, has overstepped
ts intended authority.
Rogers, however, told
Church "your timing is partic-
ularly unfortunate."
Following the President's
China trip, said Rogers. the
United States is now reassur-
ing its Asian allies that it will
abide by all --its "c ommi t-
ments." To abandon the I
SEATO treaty now, said Rog.'
ers, could be "quite danger- i
? _
istence, Fulbright said, 'is
quite inconsistent with what
you are doing in Russia." The
broadcasts beamed into the ;
Soviet Union, said Fulbright, g
continue "old, obsolete pro- !
grams created at the begin-j
fling of the cold war, at the
height of the McCarthy Pe- ?
riod." ?
Fulbright claimed 'that con-
tinuation of such broadcasts
could result in `.'a lack of cred-
ibility" about U.S. intentions
to negotiate in the strategic
arms control talks (SALT) and
to reduce tensions. Rogers dis-
agreed. He said he sees the
radio as no "interference in
the internal affairs of other
countries," and he? expressed
_optimism for a SALT agree-
ment this year. ??
- - ; During the hearing, Ful)
.TATINTL
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PITTaT tCTE27C:13
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View from the fudge factory
By David
? Washington
It looks the same, outwardly ? endless
antiseptic corridors; subdued lighting; anon-
ymous doors opening into hushed offices;
the flags and the globe and the slippery
floor of the diplomatic entrance -on C
Street. . . .
This is home to that body of men and
women whom Franklin D. Roosevelt called
"cookie pushers," and whom John F. Ken-
nedy characterized as "those people over
there who smile a lot"?the professional
?-diplomatic corps of the United States.
But the "fudge factory" .(as the State
Department has ingloriously been dubbed)
is not the same at all, really. To a vvitser__
returning after several years, it is even
more subdued than it was in the late 'CO's.
It feels even less in the mainstream of U.S.
policymaking than it felt in Lyndon John-
son's day; morale is low, and the talk of
the building is often about what might be
done to redress the balance.
? ? The thoughts come thick and fast as Presi-
? dent Nixon's party heads to Peking. Dip-
lomats at the State Department welcome
Mr. Nixon's initiative toward the People's
Republic. They want to see it succeed. Some
of them helped in preliminary staff work,
writing papers for Dr. Henry Kissinger and
his national security staff. And yet, even
those officials who would normally expect to
know the ins and outs of evolving U.S. strat-
egy toward Peking were frank to admit in
private conyersation a few days ago that
they did not know the exact state of play.
It hardly .needs 'restating: Major Ameri-
can foreign policy is formed and executed
largely in the White House these days. The
Kissinger staff, according to a late report,
numbers 46 assistants, with 105 adminis-
trative personnel. Both Mr. Nixon and Dr.
Kissinger like to plan quietly?and to move
quickly. Neither demonstrates much regard
for the diplomatic bureaucracy. They ask it
. questions, but not for crucial policy recom-
mendations?or so one is led to understand.
They do not ignore it entirely, but neither
do they keep it informed of just who is say-
ing what to whom when Dr. Kissinger
makes his dramatic, secret journeys: to Pe-
king, to Paris.
Some diplomats, unsurprisingly, don't
like it at all. No one man, or two men, no
matter how brilliant, can cover every nu-
ance in dealings with nations such as China
or North Vietnam, they say. Others are
seriously concerned with the quality of
recent appointments to the rank of ambas-
sador: former Treasury Secretary David
Kennedy to NATO, for instance (consid-
ered by some too old, by others too inex-
perienced); Borg-Warner's Robert Inger-
soll to Tokyo (recognized, as a gracious
businessman, an expert in business, but
largely inexperienced in Japanese affairs
outside business, and a newcomer to Asian
diplomacy i ppro wad nFic? lb RedeaSt0
play what the professionals consider an
enormously significant part).
K, Willis
Granted, it is said, that Mr. Nixon has dis-
liked the Foreign Service since 1954 when
the Republicans came to power with a fistful
of new slogans such as "massive retalia-
tion." And Mr. Nixon was right: The pro-
fessionals didn't like him, or President
Eisenhower, or John Foster Dulles.. But
those days have gone. The world has
changed.
Issues are increasingly complex. The bu-
reaucracy of State and the Central Intelli-
gence Agency does possess expertise., built
up over the years. True, bureaucracy grinds
slowly?and true, it needs shaking up from
time to time: prodding, cajoling, pushing.
Yet, by cutting State out from the crucial
decisions, the view maintains, the White
House runs clear and definite risks, both
now and for the future.
How, then, to marry professional exper-
tise to the need of the White House to move
fast and flexibly? One answer: the White
House could cut in six or .seven top profes-
sional diplomats on China and Vietnam
strategy. This could serve several purposes,
it is said: ensure that .all? policy bases are
covered; prevent further atrophy of State,
which is becoming more and more cautious
about making firm recommendations to
Dr. Kissinger's people ("Where is Henry
right now, while we're talking?" asked one
source with a grin; "in Pyongyang? Could
be . . ."), thereby lowering its standing in
the White House still more. It could even
help prevent "leaks" from the bureau,cracy
of the kind that Mr. Nixon detests. Where
no one knows anything, the argument runs,
disgruntlement can lead to erroneous specu-
lating to friendly journalistic ears; it is
safer, paradoxically, if a few people know
a lot.
Professional diplomats have deep respect
for Dr. Kissinger, and, they say, for Mr.
Nixon's approaches; privately, however,
many feel that the quality of the national
security staff does not equal the best men
in State. The professionals acknowledge
that State needs to find ways to keep se-
crets better?to show Mr.. Nixon that it can
indeed be trusted.
It asks for the chance.
David Willis, Monitor American news
editor, was this newspaper's State De-
partment correspondent for four years
from 1965.
20011031?: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400130001.-5
Los 1.:cELEs nras
Approved For Release 2001/p/q/3 9h-RDP80-016
Hopes PinneCi
on Vast Refora
at Staid Dept.
? BY PAUL HOUSTON
? ?-Times Stall Writer ?
WASHINGTON?As is
the.. practice of diplomats,
William B. Macomber ush-
ered the visitor away from
his -desk and over to the
more 'relaxed setting of
couch and side chairs.
? "Somebody said the on-
ly thing that had changed
in American diplomacy
over all these years was
_
ganda) into the foreign . . __
policy arena in a big way. recently retired. "A lot of.
State was slow to learn the old corps spirit has
that it was losing prom- been not only permitted to
inence by dealing with die but encouraged to die."
t h e s e "interlopers" at What rubs old guards-
arm's length. . men most is the develop-
ment of a collective bar-.
Security Council Rises gaining 0 unit among
Meanwhile, Congress in foreign service officers
1047 established a Nation- sasai the establishment of
al Security. Council to re- strong employe grievance
view, coordinate and con- procedures. . . .
trol American foreign poli- One disgruntled senior
cy. This led to the eclipse official says, "There's a
of State's traditional quar- great deal of outcry for .
te.rback role in the foreign rights and benefits, but
policy process. there is very little talk of
- It is the hope?some say duty."
the vain dream?of many '
400 Changes Made
in the foreign service that
reforms will .persuade fu- Despite these criticisms,
ture presidents to have the reform ? s.eern to have
the State Department take gained wide acceptance in
over some of the National a bureaucracy that- must
. Security Council's duties. have the biggest group of
the invention of Abe ?tele; There is not much belief ? frustrated intellectuals in
graph," Macomber that President Nixon will government. ? ?-?
laughed. "Well, now we change his preference for ? Macomber, 'noted that
? have about 400 0th e.r a National Security Coun- 400 recommendations for
thing i
s." - ? 0 cil directing foreign policy change have been mple-
? Macomber, deputy un- . under a special assistant, mented out of 500 put for-
dersecretary of state for. Henry A. Kissinger. ward in an inch-thick plan
management, is in charge Charles W. Bray III, f-ls, 17 months ago.
of implementing a vast re- 1.s one of the aging "Young He cites the following
form program that rather Turks" who prodded the changes as ''solid and sig-
desperately seeks .to re- State Department into in- nificant, although not the
store to the State Depart- siituting a massive intro- millenium"; -
merit some measure of its spective study that led to ?Modern management
old clout-4f not its former the reforms. - techniques have been in-
preeminence, . - "Historically," he says, stituted using s y s t e in s
New Catchwords ? 'the foreign service has analysis a n d ? interdisci-
?
? Hence, Foggy Bottom been a very closed corpor.. plinary teams of senior of-
hasation with a highly pater- f? ? I TI ? ? t 'cl
icia s. -ie aim is o i en-
nalistic system of internal tify priority issues, assign
some new catchwords:
more contact with the rest administration. . .. the right kind of manpow-
--"Openness" (seeking ?
of the foreign affairs corn- "To some of us; the de- er to each issue and re-
munity);
partment's isolation from view policies periodically
--"Creativity" -' (encoUr-- the American mainstream in toughminded adversary
aging more dissent from and its declining influence
' proceedings.the official line); -- , in Washington, were in- Computer Indexing
? ?"Democratization,' tolerable." With the micromfilming
(ridding foreign. missions As . one indication of and- computer indexing of
of the hierarchal struc- changing department atti- 25,000 documents requir-
ture topped by an authori- tudes, there was a time ing action at the State De-
tarian ambassador); when Bray's foreign .ser- partment every year, it is
?"Functional speciali- vice career was in doubt. hoped ,there will be no re-
zation" - (turning all-pur- His agitating almost got peats of the kind of mbar-
pose diplomats into politi- him ? exiled. But then, 9. rassment that hit the de-
cal, economicaadministra- reform became the "in partment in .1967 during
tive ' and consular?visa- thing, Bray rose with un- the Arab-Israeli six-day
stamping?specialists), c o M in a n swiftness last war. .
After World War II, the February to become the.. American officials could
accelerating complexity of department's spokesman not find the copy of a.cru-
i n t e i n a t lo nal affairs at daily press briefings.. cial letter former Secreta-
brought many other As might be expected, .ry of State John Foster
government .departments the reforms have not been Dulles had written to Is-
(Defense, Treasury, Corn- universally cheered. ? raeli Prime Minister Da-
rnerce, Agriculture, ?etc.) "A lot of schisms have vid Ben-Gurion in 1956.
and agencies (for Intl- been created," co. mplains a Sheepishly, the State De-
Fpiicitgraanipbtacravoomvirdinpyroecgraupgraet
iigence,
?New ideas, divergent
opinion and "creative dis-
sent" have been encour-
aged, Macomber says,
through the use of Special
'message channels, n w
staff functions and some-
thing called the Open For-
um Panel. At weekl y,
closed-door meetings of
the panel, younger officers
take issue with various
American policies and ad-
vance their views in pa-
pers to the Secretary of
State.
?A complete overhaul
of the controversial "selec-
tibn out" and promotion
system also is aimed at en-
couraging. officers to take
unpopular positions.
Automatic Retirement
- Formerly, a. lower or
middle - grade officer had
to think twice about stick-
ing his neck out, because
if he failed to win a promo-
tion to the next grade
? within a certain number of
years, he was involuntari-
, ly retired without a pen-
sion.
The system, when fairly.
administered, was inval-
uable in' shedding dead
wood. But was widely
judged to be unfairly arbi-
trary 'in many cases?in-
cluding that of Charles
Thomas.
After Thomas, the father
of three. was selected? out
at the age of sI6, he had no
success with 2.000 job am
plications (b eing over-
qualified or over- age).
Last May he shot himself
to death.
The suicide stirred a
furore and prevented for-
mer State personnel direc-
tor Howard P. Mace from
being . confirmed by the
Senate as ambassador to
Sierra Leone.
Now, after a junior offi-
cer passes a certain low
threshold, he is guar-
anteed tenure of 20 years
plus a pension?and may
gain promotions in compe-
tition. with others in his
specialty,
A major problem re-
mains, however, and . it
will be aggravated by the
tenure system. State is
topheavy Nvith senior offi-
STATI NTL
??ecritater?!al
-13
;Di YORK 'TINES
Approved For Release 2001/Mp1971A-RDP80-01601R
Rogers Eases Cut of Personnel
In Intelligence From 33% to 13%
-
-
WASHINGTON, Feb. 3?Sec-
retary of State William P.
Rogers has reversed a decision
to cut the State Department's
Intelligence branch by approxi-
mately a third, department of-
ficials said today.
They said that, as moddied,
the reduction would be limited briefs Secretary Rogers on glo-
to approximately 13 per cent hal developments once a week
and would involve a shift of and briefs the four under sec-
45 intelligence specialists from retaries and the assistant sen-
a total of 300. The specialists,
who are preponderantly For-
eign Service career officers,
will be shifted to other State
Department assignments.
By BENJAMIN WELLES
Breda? to The New York Times
States diplomatic missions over-
seas and from the Central In-
telligence Agency, satellite pho-
tography and electronic inter-
ceptions.
The bureau, which is headed
by Ray S. Cline, a Harvard-
trained historian and former
deputy director of the C.I.A.,
retaries in charge of geographic
bureaus daily.
A State Department spokes.,
man who confirmed that a cut
of 30 per cent in the Intelli
Career diplomats who have gence Bureau had been under
recently retired and others with active consideration insistedthat
extensive experience in al? the reversal of the decision.
State Department's Bureau cef had been made solely by rank-
Intelligence and Research sa;?,, ing departmental officials based
that the cuts will force further on internal discussions.
diminution of long-rang, polit, Other sources disclosed how-i
ical and economic analysis mi ever, that reports of the
favor of concentration on cur- planned cuts had attracted the
rent cri$is reporting. attention of the White House,
the President's Foreign Intelli-
gence Advisory Board headed by
Adm. George W. Merrson and
fringe" areas as Scandinavia members of ? the intelligence
ui favor of concentration on community. The reversal fol-
the Soviet Union, China andlowed.
The cuts reflect a White
House order last August to
reduce personnel levels through
neat Government by 5 per cent.
They predicted diminished
littehtion in the future to Latin
America, Africa and such
other crisis areas.
The chief function of the in-
telligence and research bureau,
these sources said, is to collate
and analyze for the Secretary The State Department, with an
over-all strength of 23,500?
ha..lf American citizens and half
foreign nationals ? is trying
of State and his senior policy-
Making officials information
from all sources hearing on
foreign political and economic to limit cuts overseas and make
'developments. The sources in- the bulk of the planned re-
4lude reports from 120 Unitedductions here.
?
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400130001-5
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04. :MAlleP80-01601
See Also IFu
ge, Verb Transitive
THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS FUDGE
FACTORY. By John Franklin Campbell.
Basic Books. 298 pp. $6.95.
AAIION EGAL
Mr. Segal is associate professor of govern-
ment at Cornell University.
We are living through the end of the
American Empire. It is a painful process,
still far from complete, that drastically
alters the relationships between this coun-
try and the rest of the world. We are
used to calling, the shots. We have in-
herited from the days when we were
indisputably on top a grotesque machine
for making foreign policy that Joseph
? Kraft wittily dubbed "the foreign affairs
fudge factory."
The late. John Franklin Campbell was
a product of that fudge factory and one
of its most intelligent critics. He had a
vision of a world in which the United
States was neither dominant nor isolated,
and in which its foreign policy was sub-
ject to rational control and direction. A
graduate of Harvard and Berkeley, he
I entered the U.S. Foreign Service in the
halcyon Kennedy days when the United
States still had a sense of world mission.
His rapid career rise contradicted the nor-
mal pattern of a -diplomatic corps that
has many of the symptoms of a geron-
tocracy. He served as an assistant to
Under Secretary of State George Ball,
and then had an assignment as U.S. con-
sul general in Asmara, Ethiopia. His
superiors had him marked out for still
better things and choice Washington posts
were offered to him.
John Campbell was a man of exuber-
ant humor. He took a temporary leave
'of absence from the State Department to
write. this book and to edit?the new and
lively anti-Establishment quarterly, For-
eign Policy. His journalistic talents as
well as his comic sense found their ap-
propriate exercise in exploding the porn-
posities of the bureaucracy in which he
had served his apprenticeship. Yet he
fully intended before his unexpected
death at 31 to return to the State De-
partment and a diplomatic career. Un-
like many of his contemporaries who
abandoned liberalism and its ideals of
public service in disillusion, John Camp-
bell was committed to gradualism and to
working within the system. His mind
focused on the machinery and how to
reform it, and he has left 'us a sturdy and
useful book on the subject..
one from the late Sen. Joseph McCarthy
to the organization experts, bereft of
friends in Congress, and with a budget
inadequate for its mission, the State De-
f?artment fights to get an occasional word
in edgewise on foreign policy matters.
Outweighed by the CIA, the Pentagon,
the Defense Department, the National
Security Council, and thirty other agen-
cies of the federal government who have
permanent staff overseas, it has reacted
to its loss of political importance with.a
singular bureaucratic stunt: it has enor-
mously expanded its staff. The result is
an organization that must be cut in
half if it is ever to function effectively.
As an insider, at once committed and
detached, Campbell analyzes the evolu-
tion of the foreign policy-making ma-
chinery during the growth of the United
States as a global superpower. He traces
the effects of numerous commissions,
studies, reforms, and Presidents which
amount to the steady erosion of the
power and authority of the State De-
partment, and the substitution of Presi-
dential policy making through the White
House entourage; the last Secretary of
State who had the ear of a President was
John Foster Dulles. One result is an over-
emphasis on military and defense con-
siderations, which are in any case more
than adequately represented in the Na-
tional Security Council and other White
House channels.
Indeed, the State Department was
never in the bidding for control of the
new instruments of foreign policy: in.
Campbell's terms, the economic bureau-
cracies and the intelligence and prop- 7
aganda complexes. The CIA and theV
Defense Department, to name only two
of the agencies involved, have a global
intelligence apparatus which dwarfs that
of State and which is in no way respon-
sible to U.S. ambassadors. The Treasury,.
Commerce and Agriculture Departments
have taken international economic policy
away from State. Even the less glamorous
task of exporting the. American ,image
has been captured by the United States
Information Agency. In spite of its being
out of a job the State Departmcnt carries
on its personnel numbers game, and uses
its resources chiefly in make-work.
House, physically and spiritual ; abolish
USIA and turn over U.S. cultural pro-
grams overseas as well as the Peace
Corps to quasi-independent agencies. The
competing intelligence networks would
also be made subject to State Department
control and direction, and the National
Security Council be confined to narrow
military issues. Foreign economic policy
would be coordinated in a sub-depart-
ment of State.
It is odd that so astute an observer
should propose to renovate State through
executive action while bypassing Con-
gress, and fail to discuss the question of
the caliber of the Secretary of State
compared to that of other Presidential
appointees. Unable to gain Congressional
or popular support, State is in fact in-
capable of reforming itself and unwilling
to allow others to do the job. At bottom,
then, this thoughtful, sensible book tells
us how to tinker with the machinery but
leaves aside the question of where the
vessel should be headed. The foreign
affairs fudge factory remains intact be-
cause we are not yet ready to abandon
the global remnants of the American
Empire in favor of new relationships.
Probably that policy will have to change
before we can expect the house that it
built to fall to the ground.' On the other
hand, the example of the Byzantine Em-
pire shows that the trappings of power,
including the hordes of redundant civil -
servants, often outlive the imperial sub-
stance. When the substance itself is
fudge, who can say how long the trap-
pings can carry on with their fudging of
foreign affairs?
Campbell's response to these con-
ditions was a program to resuscitate the
State Department and make it once more
an important instrument of foreign
policy. He proposed a leaner department
that would control a single U.S. foreign
It is clear that the State Depart- affairs budget, with all overseas repre-
ment has lostippirArAfpzen
cifFeigri;roilipaseie2lovriff3f02F 4eITALtR131b800601R001400130001-5
Despised by fnewiruris s as a aven or wan ed o move it c oser to the ite
incompetent snobs, raked over by every-
. _ _
J
J
INE
Approved For ReleaseNTOTER.21a8P80-01601
vs
Zart,103
? WASHINGTON.
what sort of propaganda
about the United States are the
Commie ratf inks of the Krem-
lin dishing out these days to the Rus-
sian people? Perhaps only Richard
Helms and Harry Schwartz know in
detail, but it has lately been stated
in Moscow by Pravda, the Commu-
nist party newspaper, that "the well-
known American journalist Art Buch-
wald" turns out his satirical columns
.about the Nixon Administration un-
der instructions from the Federal
Government, "as a deliberate safety
valve to reduce the impact of such
THOMAS MEEHAN is a frequent
contributor to The New Yorker and to
this magazine.
-------..------...---;--
contemporary American civilization
stuffs it into his shirt pocket. That
developments as Negro and student
appears three times a week in some
riots." In short, Pravda was suggest- is the extent of his research oper-
500 newspapers (400 in the United
ing that I3uchwald is in the pay of ation. Indeed, his staff consists en-
States - and another 100 in foreign
the White House, which should cer- tirely of Miss Collenberg, an attrac-
countries), Buchwald today is by far
tainly come as news to President tive, somewhat Junoesque ash-blonde
the country's best known and finan-
Nixon, who is known to have been of 27 who is originally from New
cially most successful writer of hu-
exceedingly annoyed by several of Orleans and is a graduate of Pem-
mor. So, what is this 5 - foot - 8, be-
the satirically barbed columns that broke College.
spectacled, somewhat plumpish, cigar-
Buchwald has written about him. At about a quarter to 10 on this
smoking agent of the C.I.A. really
Says Buchwald of the charge that like? particular Friday, Miss Collenberg
he's secretly on the Government pay-
roll, "True-1'm an agent of the C.I.A. T,-7
And every third word in my columns L'...1,T 9:30 A.M. on a recent Friday
is part of a coded message to one of morning, Buchwald ambled into his
my fellow agents in Moscow." , office, which is Suite 1311 on the
Oddly enough, Buchwald's columns 13th floor of a new office building
' are often reprinted in Russian at 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, not
newspapers, although they're usually far from the White House, and con-
run there not as comic flights of sists of a small outer reception room,
fancy about Nixon & Co. but as where his secretary has her desk,
straight news dispatches from Wash- and a book-lined inner room, where
ington. A while ago, for instance, he does his writing. (Pravda notwith-
Buchwald wrote a column in which standing, Buchwald has yet to be
he revealed that a top-secret Govern- invited to the White House, and his
ment study, the Dawk Report, had chances of getting an invitation in
recommended that the State Depart- the near future don't look terribly
ment be shut down because its duties
j had been taken over by "the Defense
i Department, the C.I.A. and Henry
Kissinger," and Russian readers were
presented with this as the
Buchwald, of course, gets no money
for his ceApprClrf edtfOiruRetea
who print them without bothering to
ask his permission, but high Wash-
Mitrocapal
aza 7211maaiit.
By THOMAS MEEHAN
STATINTL
ington officials have nonetheless ton Post and The New York Times,
complained to him about the fact and so getting through The Wall
that his columns are being used by Street Journal completed his morning
the Soviets as anti-American propa- stint of catching up with the news.
ganda. "I have a two-word answer unlike most Washington-based jour-
to White House types wno come to nalists, Buchwald does no leg work
me with that complaint," says Buch- to gather material for his column.
wald with a smile, "and my answer "I never talk to anybody. Facts just
is, 'Stop them.'" get in my way," says Buchwald. So,
he instead gets just about all of his
That Pravda should single out
ideas for columns from reading news-
toolBuchwald for special mention as a
papers, or from scanning such of the White House is indicative
zines as Newsweek and Time, or
maga-
of how enormously famous Buchwald
from watching TV news programs.
has become both in the United
As he .goes through newspapers and
States and abroad during the last
magazines, he frequently clips a story
several years. Indeed, as hisi syn-
that he senses might be a taking-off
dicated column of ' mild - mannered
point for one of his columns and he
satire on politics, domestic goings-
then either places the clipping in a
on, and assorted other aspects of
? ? ? ? file folder or more often simply
trooped into Buchwald's, inner office
?the door to which, even when he is
writing his column, is. never closed?
and placed a stack of some 20 letters,
the morning mail, before him. Buch-
wald receives an . enormous amount
of mail from his millions of readers,
and he 'frankly finds most of it a
time-consuming pain in the neck to
answer. "I could be a son-of-a-bitch
and not answer reader mail, but
I somehow can't quite bring myself
to do it," says Buchwald, and so he
spends about half of each of his
working days in the office answering
1,etters from readers. People often
good.) Buchwald smilingly greeted send Buchwald amateur manuscripts,
his secretary, Islfargi Collenberg, and most of which are painfully lame
then roamed inside to his desk to attempts at humor, and to the writ-
read The Wall Street Journal. At ers of these he has contrived a pair
truth.home, in his minimansion in ?the of standard replies: either "Your
fashionable Wesley Heights section sample of humor was magnificent?
.
Z01:001P4I'llokrteldb tit#004114 agriniier
he'd already seen The Washing- than anything I've ever read by Rus-cont irmeci
. NEW XORK TIMES
Approved For Release 2001)4110419n1A-RDIgEWM-pq ROO
U.S.DiplomatsinWetnam
Said to Face Moral issue
. By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times
? WASHINGTON, Dec. 29?As-
signments to Vietnam?par-
ticularly to the pacification
-when we're given thel
facts," a Pentagon spokesman
said, "we always look into
....
The article . Says that the
sonne or ie nam,
Vietnam experience has "sharp- jority enjoy the experience
ened the generation gap" be_
tween young and older diplo- once they go."
mats. The younger officers, it Living conditions often are
says, often returned disillu- pleasant and, the article says,
they find "the country and
sioned with what they regard
as deliberate suppression by especially the women fascinat-
,
senior officers of criticism eith- \
er of the Vietnamese authori- V. hen these officers are as-
ties or of the United States signed elsewhere, it states, "the
military return to a more traditional
The political section of the Foreign Service assignment is
atrocity charges."
huge United States Embassy in often letdown."
programs there?have caused I The magazine article is siane Saigon is especially subject to
many young career diplomats! with the name "John Cray- ,e'riticism on these grounds, the
to face a serious "moral dilem-I more," a pseudonym, the jour-'article asserts.
ma," according to an article in! nal explains, for a former dip- "Almost all foreign service
the December issue of the For-I lomat who served in Vietnam officers who served in the paci-
and whose primary reason for fication programs and most jun.
subsequently resigning from the ior members of the embassy
Foreign Service was "disagree- staff itself give examples of
men,: with United States policy how their reporting was distort-
a
a
eign Service Journal.
The critical question, the ar-
ticle says, is how far they
should go in exposing incidents on Efiutheast Asia." ed and suppressed in Saigon
"which they knew to be. ClAgressional and diplomatic in order that the embassy
soueces have identified the au- might be consistent with the
wrong." thor as John. D. Marks, who ,prevailing 'line' in dispatches
. One Foreign Service officer, served in the pacification pro- to Washington," the writer de-
now back from Vietnam and gram in Vietnam from 1966 to dares.
on his way to another overseas 1968 and later resigned to be- Combat Experience ..,
. assignment, is reported by the come a foreign policy consult- ?Statistics they knew to be
' article to possess a file of ant to Congress. Mr. Marks has
"documented atrocities, includ- confirmed his authorship. !stantly being quoted by the merely worthless were con-
ing photographs." The Foreign Service Journal 1
'd f the United States
"He has written extensive has a circulation of approxi -I as an indication that progress
reports on these apparent war mately 10,000 copies through: was being made in Vietnam,"
crimes he investigated in Viet-
out the executive branch and in it says.
Viet-
nam," the article states. "As . .
Congress. It is published month- Other points made in the
far as he knows, no action has
ever been taken to punish the ,ly by the American Foreign article included these:
CWhile there was no clear
guilty," it says. ?
The article, which is entitled
? "Vietnamization of the Foreign
Service," goes on to say that
the owner of the file will not.combat operations and even
make his information publi0 The article notes that nearly I
;
because he is a "supporter of 3 million Americans have nowcalled in air strikes or artil-
Ilery fire on enemy positions;
the President's Vietnam policy served in Vietnam, including I qThe State Department de-
and fears the effect on that 'career diplomats, or policy of additional war crime'
approxi-
mately 20 per cent of the For-
eign cided during President Lyndon
controversy." Service.
B. Johnson's second term that
He is also "aware of the . Approximately 350 ? the it must contribute 150 diplo-
have on . his career
negative result disclosure would .great majority of them junior mats to the approximately
the earticle states. prospects,",
? .officers?have been assigned to
the pacification program. 1,000 United States personnel
Press Reports Cited known as Civil Operations and7Lmil1tary as well as aid, in-
State Department sources
Revolutionary Development telligence and other civilians?
said that the alleged atrocities'
Support, or CORDS. They have in the CORDS program. Its poi-
were investigated by the de. functioned as advisers to theicy of making duty in the pac-
. South Vietnamese civilian and
partment and were also re ification program mandatory
military administration ? ?try-
ported in the United States for junior officers split the
press on Jan. 12, 1970. They jag, the article says, to make
are said to have concerned the the Government of South Viet- Foreign Service until it was
South Korean "Tiger" Division, nam "a viable force in the scrapped last August. Now as
one of two South Korean infan- countryside." the United States presence In
try divisions serving in Viet- Generation Gap 'Sharpened' Vietnam is reduced, only vol-
unteers who have previously
served in at least one other
diplomatic post are being sent.
CA few Foreign Service offi-
Service Association, a voluntary State Department policy, most
group comprising approximate- Foreign Service officers in the
ly 8,000 active and retired field were expected i
to bear
Foreign Service personnel. arms. Many participated n
nam, and not United States.Service in Vietnam, the ar-
A State Department spokes-
forces. ticle says, is a unique experiman -
*ence. In no other country have
"cl that "implications. perhaps 20 per cent of the cers have resigned as a result
the article that United States
forces were involved or that foreign service officers experi-
mented with soft drugs, but of disagreement with the Viet-
there was a cover-up by the -
State Department are just plain "that is the case in Vietnam," nam war, but "they are def
and misleading."it asserts. it e 'nitelv the exception and in
"And in no other
A Pentagon spokesman said country," each known case they have
that officers in its Southeast
adds, "do foreign service offi-
cers have their own personal
been very junior officers."
Asian section had not been ,
able to obtain ti ert rdains
AD PrOVagdu tri , ti
i0e01:604 R001400130001-5
of the Foreign Service Journal Ott -1-41#11Ww 1/6141Foreign Service per-
andnade-launcher before they go.
thus could not comment.
STATI NTL
W.LSHINGTOLE F0311
Approved For Release 2001i053R4: Ek-Rg12,810411k01R
Murrey. Murder
A Double Setback at State
SECRETARY OF STATE ceives what attention in the the State Department, that's
William P. Rogers at- White House pecking order, his prerogative. Every Presi-
or by whether the Foreign dent has his own ideas
tempted at year's end to lift s ervicehappens to be happy about how he wants to oper-
the crumpled morale of the or glum?. The blunt answer ate; that's his ? choice."
Foreign Service out of a is that in many respects it What is lost in this proc-
matters little or not at all in
ess, others protest, is not
slough of gloom with a burst
national dimensions. What
? only morale but the full
of holiday praise.
m
If effusive words alone does 'atter to the nation is range of expertise and hal-
whether its resources in di- ance that can be brought to
could suffice, the Secretary,
plomacy, as in other fields, bear on a given interna-
who is a professional opti- tional problem, uncolored
are used fully and wisely.
mist, would have accom- by the political-cen tered
plished a small miracle. But FROM their own view. focus of the White House.
to diplomats to specialize in Point,
which is not wholly It is the prerogative of the
soft verbiage to cloak hard impartial, a very large num-
White House to accept or re-
ject this advice, it is argued;
realities, the warm corn. ber of the most experienced what is important is that the
menclation of the Foreign professionals in the Amen- President have access to it.
Service for "outstanding can Foreign Service deplore Dr. Kissinger maintains that
work" carried about as what they regard as the his is precisely what is pro-
much comfort as a diplo- wholly inadezuate use being vided for in his elaborate
matic communique express. made of their talents. National Security Council
Ing "agreement in princi- This past year brought a system. But the realty, in-
siders protest, is that the
plc." ? double blow. The State De- most important policy deci-
This has been "a good partment long had been sions never enter that elabo-
year in terms of foreign af- eclipsed in this administra- rate mechanism.
fairs" said Rogers on Thurs-
tionby the Kissinger opera- With a critical election
on in the White House;' year ahead, the process of
day; brimming with enthusi- policy making is shrinking
suddenly State was n
asm over his listing of "very with increasing secretive-
su bst antial accomplish- empted from another, unex- ness into the confines of the
ments." But for members of
pected direction?the Treas- White House. What is emerg-
the American Foreign Serv-
ury Department, where free- ing is soaring optimism in
. place of realities about the
wheeling Secretary John B.
Ice, it has been indeed been outside world. This, too, is
a poor year. Connally suddenly vaulted not without precedent in an
The main body of profes-
into a dominant position election year. The risk
ional American diplomats
across the economic-foreign conies, as the Johnson ad-
atpolicy horizon. ministration discovered,
State was frozen out of when the optimists let them-
most high strategy-making State found itself not only selves be engulfed by their
In 1971, they ruefully con-
operating on the fringes of own product.
high strategy, but perform-
eede.
Ing what one chagrined dip-
Even Rogers himself re-
lomat called a "sweeper's
ceiVed only the most fleet-
role": sweeping up and
big mention in the White
trying to piece together the
House citations of the year's shards of allies' egos shat-
foreign policy accomplish- tered by the shock of the ad-
rnents, in comparison to the ministration's bold ventures
great pre-eminence accorded in China and in interna-
to -presidential national se- tional monetary and trade
curity adviser Henry A. Kis- policy.
singer. Rogers even ran a A minority inside the
tention on the White House
distant third in personal at-
State Department responds,
accounting to the space and as one expressed it, "So
prominence given to presi- what? What is so bad
dential counsellor Robert If. about being a 'service' or-
Finch's "mission to six na-
ports in Latin America." ganization? If the President
Is the conduct or state of wants to centralize all poli-
AreTle,lryic:rfifeetfef rw9Yer5 Pihrst?kOltigi
tiet0/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001400130001-5
FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL
' Approved For Release 2001/08VO4NMAIMIDP80-01601R0
"CORDS comes home to Washington,
Pacification has just begun,
Still so many hearts and minds to be won."
--from "Songs to Alienate Hearts and Minds By"
EARLY three million Americans
have now served in Vietnam. Of
these, about 600 have been Foreign
Service officers.
Thus, roughly .20 percent of the
Foreign Service has been exposed to
many of the stimuli which have
turned "nice" kids from Middle-
America into peace freaks, hawks,
junkies, and even assassins.
For the FSOs, however, the ex-
perience generally has not had the
radicalizing effect that it has had on
many of the military men. The
FSOs tended to be older and less
malleable than the American sol-
diers in Vietnam, and their personal
thought processes were more subtle
and less striking than those of the
GIs. Some FSOs were essentially
untouched by the whole experience,
reacting no differently than if they
had been in Paris or Rome. But for
most, and especially the young, Viet-
nam meant change. It meant a
violent breaking away from the tra-
ditional diplomatic life and an ex-
posure to the realities of war.
About 350 FSOs have been as-
signed to the Pacification program
(CORDS). They functioned as ad-
visors to the Vietnamese civilian
and military administration in an
effort to makArEttieednireat Rl
Vietnam a viabrerforce in the coun-
tryside. Few, if any, had any back-
STATINTL
_Viistrtamization
the
ftrgn Serviice
JOHN CLAYMORE
John Claymore is the pseudonym
of a former FSO who served in
Vietnam. The primary reason for
his resignation from the State De-
partment was disagreement with
US policy on Southeast Asia. He
is not using his real. name because
of a limitation on publishing in his
current job, but he would be glad ,
to correspond or meet with any-
one interested in discussing his
article.
ground for this assignment; yet most
have acquitted themselves well,
within the context of the programs
they were working in.
Nevertheless, FSOs have been
affected by the same pressures that
have ?been widely reported in rela-
tion to the military.
Many served in proto-combat
roles with command responsibility.
While not participants, they re-
ceived reports of war crimes and
what often seemed like the unneces-
sary loss of human life. Some were
faced with the moral dilemma of
how far they should go in exposing
incidents which they knew to be
wrong.
easiVOYA513/Nre.ViAtikg[S4-. 01
as ington possess s a
documented atrocities including
photographs. He has written exten- -
sive reports on these apparent war
crimes he investigated in Vietnam.
As far as he knows, no action has
ever been taken to punish the
guilty. Because he is a supporter of
the President's Vietnam policy, and
? because he fears the effect on that
policy of additional war crime con-
troversy, he has not chosen to make
his information public. He also is
undoubtedly aware of the negative.
result disclosure would have on his
career prospects.
His example is extreme, but it
points up the fundamental proposi-
tion that serving in Vietnam is not
like serving elsewhere.
With respect to no other country
could it be said that perhaps 20 .
percent of the FSOs had experi-
mented with soft drugs, but that is
the case in Vietnam. And in no
other country do FSOs have their
own personal automatic weapons
and receive training in how to fire a
grenade launcher before they go.
Vietnam is different.
VIETNAM has undoubtedly sharp-
ened the generation gap between
young and old FSOs. In some of the
oworgo I.A)1 swrio6ttioo nva tieelty.
nam. Almost all return with a
Cont
e v
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STATINTL
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lit NOV. 1911
The Foreign
Affair
Fudge
Factor
bornly pursued an irrational
and immoral policy in Viet-
nam; and how they could have
haggled for 10 weeks over the
shape of the Paris negotiating
table?and then have negotiat-
ed on a casual once-a-week ba-
sis for three years while hun-
dreds of Americans and thou-
sands of Vietnamese were dy-
eri McNamara and us en a-
whether such an irreverent ex-
their computers, slide rules
just have) arid coneicler
gon "whiz kids" who, with all I
and super-techniques,. ?miscal pletive might at least have
culatecl the cost of the war by discouraged the muddy mean-
inglessness -
$16-billion in 1985 and 1966. of the following
When decision-makers tolerate
.errors of that enormity, the
budget-making process that
concerns Mr. Campbell shrinks.
Philip Til. Stern is the author to peripheral importance.
Why did the State Depart-
By John FrankUn Campbell. of "The Oppenheimer Case;
292 pp. New York: Security on Trial." ment bureaucracy go along
; Basic Books. $6.95. , ? - . with our immoral war policy?
. .One learns less about that
By PHILIP M. STERN
the next.
ing between one meeting and question from Mr. Campbell's
., Why the self-proclaime'd book than from a Time maga-
Leader of the Free World has zine report of "The Rules of
embraced such repressive au- the Bureaucratic Game," as re-
counted by two ex-Pentagon
tocrats as Franco, Diem,
KY, officials who participated in
Thieu, Chiang, Stroessner and
the Pentagon Papers study:
Papadopolous while self - right-
Morton Halperin, one of the
eously (if not childishly with-
h analysts, and Leslie Gelb, the
holding recognition from Cas-
study's director. Rule One:
governs one-fifth of the world's "You don't resign, you don't
tro and, until recently Mao (wild
population). e carry your case to the public."
Gelb observes that while
Why the SALT-talk minuet George Ball appear ? to have
has been so maddeninlys- I
ew, "felt very strongly" about the
, dealing, as it does, with an war; he "didn't take the next
arms race that could annihi- step" (of resigning 'publicly)
late us all. , "even though his departure in
itself would have had an enor-
mous impact." (Think of the
reverberations if the doubt?
torn Robert McNamara had re-
signed with .a blast!)
Rule Three says, "Argue tc
convince, not to be candid.''
In pursuance of this rule, Hat-
are tempted to conclude that . perin comments, many of th(
this is an earnest study of mat-
of the State Department: Obi-
ters of the most massive ir-
ously, the Pentagon. the C.I.A.
relevance?irrelevant, at least,
.to the foreign-policy questions and, more important, Congress
and the White House figure
of any real consequence.
significantly in major decision-
Take, for example, the au-
k? a But the State Depart-
'Initially, this book arous-
es, considerable expectations.
Dealing with the State Depart-
ment and its organizational
foibles,, it comes extravagantly
recommended by such foreign-
policy luminaries as George
Kennan, George Ball and John
Kenneth Galbraith. And it be-
gins auspiciously with some
graphic examples of bureau-
cratic foolishness df the kind
that impelled columnist Joseph
Kraft to christen the Depart-
ment a "fudge factory"; exam-
ples of the kind that could Why the Alliance for Prog-
ress. never became more than
only have come from a State
a diffidently supported United
Department insider?as John:
States slogan?and why, in-
Franklin Campbell was for nine
.deed, the United States weighs
years (he is now on leave, and
in so consistently on the side
is managing editor of Foreign
of the elitists .and against the
Policy). One's hopes rise. Tune
populists around the world.
in 272 pages later, and you
It would be unfair to lay all
f the abovesolely at the door
nor's first three areas of sug-
e?
merit rarely inveighed force-
Department
reform: Yes, the State honest policy.
fully (and almost never effec-
Department is an obese bu- But Rule Two is the most
tively) against Such foreign-
reaucracy that would probably nsicuous: "If you disagree
i
policy nonsense and the expla-
i
Improve if drastically thinned; with the bureaucracy's shared
nation does not lie in the De-
yes, the Department should be mages, you must bide it, or
partment's size, location or i
charged with making an over- no one will take you serious-
budget processes. Yet Mr.
all foreign policy budget for ly." That describes the root
Campbell is far more con-
all United States agencies; yes,
it might be better if the high cerned with Organizational problem: institetional incest,
State Department meetings are
lines and boxesnand? manage-
command of a -Streamlined (as the Pentagon
merit techniques than with endless but State Department moved back
official memoranda unveiled is
he Pentagon Papers were not
believed even by those whc
wrote them. Under such ground
rules, even the best-organized
State Department would be
hard-pressed to produce an
-s, Papers suggest) the delibera?
.to its historic offices next to l
ee' ee? -tors almost never question ba
the White House, so as to have ' Greece and the Alliance for sic premises. From my owr While the ? percentage of Ivy
more influence there. That the Progress rate only one-word brief tenure at State, I car Leaguers has declined from
Department's size, Washington mentions; but you'll find ex-. testify to the utter inconeeiv 50- to 25 per cent since the
address and budget powers are tensive discussions ?of the re- ability of anyone ever, evei twenties, three quarters of the
shaking - awake a Departinen; F.S.O.'s still come from the
utterly peripheral . to such cruitmeat and deployment of
questions as: - State Department personnel, meeting with a loud [choose East and West Coasts. (Where
.How a group of supposedly and about the virtues of "pro- your own 'expletive]. If that does that leave the South and ?
.intelligent and moral - men gram budgeting." Mr. Camp- sounds frivolous, just open the Midwest?) And as recently
could have Xevised and stub
. bell casts admiring glances at Pentagon Papers at random (as as 1961, out of 3,700 F.S.0.1s,
,7:6,110a
Department memorandum: "In
general the working group isagreed that our aim should be
to maintain present signal
strength and level of harass-
ment, showing no 'signs of less-
ening of .determination but also
avoiding actions that would
tend to prejudge the basic de-
cision."
But the discussions within
State are comfortably closed;
the policy-makers are spared
any challenge by the sharpest
of _ outside critics. Secrecy
shields them from being held
publicly responsible for th'e
immoral and perhaps illegal
policies they devise under
"Top Seder stamps. But the
question of secrecy and the
outrageous over-classification
of documents rate no mention
in Mr. Campbell's book.
.Indeed, if anything, Mr.
Campbell seems to want for-
eign Policy-making to be more, -
rather than less, of a closed,
circle, inner-club affair:. Every-
one other than State Depart-
ment careerists of long stand-
ing gets a fishy stare. The au-
thor bemoans, for example, the
dilution of the small and ex-
clusive cadre of Foreign Serv- --
ice Officers (F.S.O.'s) by the
infusion, in the fifties, of sev-
eral thousand civil servants
who did not wear the F.S.O.
Old School Tie; he dismisses
? the Peace Corps program and
its young volunteers as satis-
fying more a domestic political
than a foreign policy need. But
'above all, Mr. Campbell wishes
that politically appointed off'-
dais, especially on the White
House staff, would keep their
amateurish -hands out of for-
eign policy-making.
' Another question: How rep-
resentative of the American
public are the career officers
to whom Mr. Campbell would
entrust out _ foreign policy?
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Approv,rdh..3.1, 140
.A.
IT, I GN I) 0 L G Y ?
STATiNTL
? By Giiii4.1es W. Yost
. .
V.7-s1HER.E arc 'many different- ways of conducting a govern-
.],' merit. In the United States the executive authority is both
' More formally centralized in the President and more
sharply separated from the legislature than in most democracies.
This is particularly true of the conduct of foreign, affairs, where
the authority of the President has been seriously challenged
.. only in those rare instances, such as the Versailles Treaty or the
Vietnam war, when he seems to be grossly ignoring or overrid-?
ing the opinions both. of the Congress and of the public.?
In general, he has been free to conduct foi:eign affairs more
or less as he chooses, to use traditional instruments, to set up new
ones or to carry on diplomacy..from his Own hip pocket. There.
.is little use arguinb. whether or not he has the constitutional right
to do SO. AS our government is organized, he, has both. the re-
sponsibility and the power. Critics in or out of the Congress can
make 'things .difficult for him, but they can neither conduct for-
eign affairs themselves nor prevent him from doing so. Of course;
-a wise President will consult the Congress closely, in fact as well .
as in form, on matters of major import, which recent Presidents
? ' have often foolishly failed to do.
Our doncern here, .however, is with the instruments which
Presidents use for the conduct of foreign affairs. Up until the
.19305 the instrument W2.s almost always the traditional one, the
Secretary and Department of State, except in those not infre-
quent cases where a strong President,' such as Theodore Roose-
velt and Woodrow Wilson, Chose to carry on a particular exer-
cise in diplomacy himself, sometimes with the help of a personal
adviser or. emissary. Nevertheless, as late as 1931, President
Hoover,- though . not himself inexperienced, in foreign affairs,
relied. on. Secretary Stimson .to deal, in so far as the United
States was prepared. to deal, with the Manchurian crises.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, however, just at the moment when the
rise to power of ambitious dictators in both Europe and. Asia
made inevitable much deeper AllieriCall involvement in foreign.
affairs, named as Secretary of State, almost entirely for domestic
political reasons, an eminent Senator, Cordell I-Iu1.1,- who had
-unhappily neither the taste nor 'the talent for the conduct of
foreign affairs. Nevertheless, .again for domestic political rea-
-
sons, he remained in office for nearly 12 years, longer than any
previous Secretary of State. This did not seriously disturb
FDR, who was contemptuous of the diplomatic establishment
and overestimated his own capacity-to direct domestic and for-
eign, and later military, affairs personally and, simultaneously.
- *Even Roosevelt, however, while bypassing 'Hull as much as he
'could, at first placed his own men, on whom he did to some ex-
tent rely, inside the State Department itself?Welles and later
Stettinius as Under'. Secretary, Molcy and. Berle as. Assistant
Secretaries, and Bullitt a.nd. KuJie ,..as hq s hs / - -1
APPRAVRCL,WRR.PrINALUAlil !'_y IR11?0)-114 11 JO
71 ... a 0130001-5
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0.11 .
, .From limb to time the. question is ask-cd why
liewspapers -never seem to get anything right and
one answer, of course, is that. we try, but that we
arc only human. Another answer, however?and
better that in the complex and delicate in-
terworkings of the press and the government it
takes at least a little cooperation by the government
ill the public is to get -aversion of events which can
1.1roperly be said to he. right. As a case in point, we
-would like, strictly For Your Information, to walk
you through a brief case history involving a news
story on Page One of The Washington Post, on
Sept. 3, and a subsequent article on this page on
Sept. 8. both of which asserted that the Federal
Pureau of investigation had employed lie detector
(polyk-sraph) tests in an investigation of State De-
parly:-;ent employees. The original story said three or
four officials were interrogated in this fashion as
part of ..a government-wide inquiry into a heal:. of
.classified Mei:illation having to do with the Ameri-
CiM position kin the SALT negotiations, Today, in
the letters space on the opposite page, FBI Director
Hoover states categorically that both stories were
-rtotally and completely untrue" and _that "at 310
time did the- 1'13I use polygraphs, as allegod, in its
investigation." Ile takes us sharply to task for "this
-inept handling of information."
Well, we. have looked into the matter and h. is
clear that. we were wrong about the FBI's use or
hic, detectors. We are pleased to have this -oppor-
tunity to express our regrets to Mr. Hoover and to
set the record straight. But we are not prepared to
leave it at that, if only because the implication of
Mr. Hoover's sweeping denial ("totally and com?
pletely untrue") is that the original story was en-
tirely wrong----that no polygraphs in fact -were used
upon ,.-tt.ate Department employees and this is
clearly not the case. Nor is it quite so certain whose
handling of this information was "inept." The facts
arc, from nfl we can gather, that polygraph jests
were administered to State :Department officials by
employees, and with equipment belonging to an
V outside agency?presumably the Central intelli-
gence Agency which has these instruments avail-
r
(1. o
STATI NTL
able for regular use in security checks of its own
personnel. ?
\ _
In other words, we had the -Wrong agency, which
is an important error and one we would have been
happy to correct immediately, before it had been
compounded in the 'subsequent article on Sept. 8,
if somebody in the 'government had chosen to speak
up. But the FPI was silent until Mr. Hoover's letter
arrived 1.0 days later, and Secretary of State Rogers,.
who was asked about the story at a press conference'
on Sept. 3 in -a half-dozen different ways, adroitly
avoided a yes-br-no answer every time. 'That is to
say, he did not confirm the role of the. Fill', but
neither elid Ile deny it; he simply refused to discuss
meth,ods,-,thile upholding the utility of lie-detector
test S in-establishing, probable innocence, if not prob-
able guilt. And that remains the State Department's
position, even in the face of Mr. Hoover's denial..
No Clarification, no confirmation, no.-comment--
despite the fact that the original story in. The Post
had been chocked with the State Department and
the role of the FBI had been confirmed by an offi-
cial spokesman on those familiar anonymous, not-
for-attribution terms which government officials
resort to when they don't want to take responsibility
publicly for what they say, and which newspaper
reporters yield to when there is no other way to
attribute assertions of far.kt.
The result or this protracted flim.-11;kin was, first.
of all, to leave the Justice Department and the FBI
falsely accused of administering lie detectors to:
officials of another agency, and then, with 1`.1r.
Hoover's denial, to leak.'e the impression that no
polygraphs were used at all, and you have to ask
yourself what public interest is served by having
tins sort of misinformation circulating around, gath-
ering credence. It is not an uncommon practice, of
course, for the government, when it is confronted
in print with an embarrassing and not altogether
accurate news story, to clam up completely rather
than help straighten ;out inaccuracies-- especially
when clarification risks confirmation of that part of
the story which is accurate. hut ii is not a practice
that does much to further public knowledge. And.
still less does it help the newspapers get things
right.
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My attention has been called to an article
entitled "FBI Uses ?Li.e Test3 in Probe of
Lealcs. at State" by Murray Marck,r in the
September 3, 1971, issue of true l'.:?ashington
Post and a column, "Fxtracting the Truth:
Tea Leaves or Polygraph Tests?'? by Alan.
Barth on September 7, 1971. Both' of these
ROMS .eatecorically assert. that the-TPA used
.polygraphs during an Investigation of al:
leged "leaks" of confidential information at
the Departutent or State.
These statements 1%7' Messrs. Marder and
Earth that the FBI used polygrc.pbs .in this
investigation are totally and comp-Wtely un-
true..
For the information of your readers, the,
Dopartmerat of Justice on July 30, 1971, in-
. qructed the FBI to conduct a complete in-
vestigation, which entailed rOfilc: interviews
at the Department 'of State, with regard to
,alleged unauthori-Led disclosure of classified
information as a potential violation of the
espionage laws. We?innuediately instituted
Ofl i51vestition,141 complisnce with thej)c- ?
partment of Justice's instructions, However,?
" at no time did the FBI use polygraphs, as al-
leged, in its investigation.
Surely, it is. in the interest of responsible
journalism that the basic facts be accurately
,and. honestly reported. 'I.'his inept handlin-,!,
of information betrays the sincere desire of
. your readers for a factual knowledge of the
? news of the clay.
?. ? .T. EDGAR noovER,
DIrcc_tor, rbeln-al 3*:,or.utu or Invc7,t;gation.
WaShirigt011,
7.1c: American Polygaph itIoll
takes silong exception to both the tone and
content of the article by Alan Barth on. the
editorhl page of titli.e* Post On September 7.
We are disappointed that a paper Of the
stature of The Post saw fit to dignify with
publication the compendium of half truths,
untruths, and rather sophomoric sarcasm
rePrest'uted by Mr. Barth's -article. We pre
perhaps naive, knowing that alto Post has
never been a believer in the polygraph but
we assert our profound eonvietion that you
should require factual accuracy, even from
Nvriteis on your opinion pages.
Mr. Barth closes with the comment that
polygraph test is so insulting:, so demeaning
and. so limn-Hinting, that anyone who Vmuld!
either administer nr submit to such en ex-
amination is unfit to, represent the United
liospite his assertion that this can be
'taken for granted, the ABA believes that
such strong statements should require some
modicum of proof. Exactly why a person is
humiliated, demeaned, and insulted by lining
given an opportunity to establish 111.; inno-
cence'of serious charges is bayond our corn-
prehension.
Mr. Barth apparently delights in' esoterie.
knowlode of variotu..? forms of ord04,,1 but
conveniently ignores the fact that it was just
because of such in6Ahods of soothsaying that
the polygraph was developed. We of the
ABA would rather stake judgment of our
veracity upon the objective analysis of a set
of polygraph charts than upon the swirl of
tea leaves, even whoh stirred by a person of
17.if e r- ? '
such perception and sensitivity as Mr. Barth,
We find ourselves troubled by vicious at-
tacks such as those by Mr. "P..t.rth, because
noWhere does beset forth a :-iy..;tein to re-
place the. one which he is attacking, lie ap-
patently is establishing a new constitutional
priyilege: The right to lie with impunity.
Mr. Barth and ethers of his ilk would bar
effective investigation, would bar psycbs)10;-:,.
ical testing, would bar polygraph examina-
lions, and would, in general, bar any _means
thus far developed for getting at truth in
matters of controversy.
it is a fact, for example, that even &Arne-
'cors et' polygraph testing concede minimal
accuracy of the technique to be in the 70 per
'cent 'nage. Other scientists of impecable
Icredentiels, which far exceed the:,,, (.2 thr,s,
APA and certainly Mr. Earth, have es-
tablished accuracy of the. techni slue in. the 90
per cent range. With all due modesty the
APA believes that this may oven exceed the
accuracy of journalistic repoi-ting.
The recent statement by the SecqvAary of
State that be believes the poly.su.aph can be
effiective in clearing the innocent but not in
identifying the guilty, though somewhat par-
adoxical, is acceptable to the APA. We have
always belie', adthat the greatest service our
members can perform is that of assisting
persons who are falsely'accused in establish-
ing their innocence.
RAYMOND j. 311.
prezmcnt-v:wt, '
ANcr1c,,,nyc1yi7s1.th Associaticsi.
'Washington.
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0 for hrg-activ s ,?policies and 'depended
6T).071 (7?11 (Thr-'9 inere-isinqlv upon "-t new breed of mil-
, .` ? .
itary strategists and academic social
scientists"; and Lyndon Johnson,
19 whose secretive, idiosyncratic ways,
117411 fondness for contrived diplomatic spec-
taculars, and repeated tinkering with
State's administrative in fur-
ther eroded State's waning influence.
Pu.blicly exhorting, the State DepOrt-
meat to take charge of the foreign p01-
icy-making process, Kennedy and John-
1: son tacitly denied the department the
By William L. Givens backing it needed to do so, allowed
rival agencies to dominate State in the
bureaucratic rough-and-tumble, and
....gradually transferred power to a bur-
geoning National Security Council
staff in the White House.
is a Wistful
11-44--
Widll
"Throughout the careerist ranks
? yearning for good old days that really never
were, a diplomatic Walter Mittyland in ehich
an elite corps of professional 'diplomats, all
looking and acting like George Kennan, have
the President's car . ."
The (1,YthQr_ aPC1.1110-ngrk.-?-6 taff.ejSRACIV:aLpijlar....
F' ALL THE foreign service offi-
cers who have written Master
Plans for reforming the State Depart-
ment were laid end to end they would
reach froin Washington to Harvard
University, where they would find still
more foreign service officers, On leave
or retired, writing still more Master
Plans.
The-latest and by far the best writ-
ten work yet in this bottomless genre
Is "The Foreign Affairs Fudge Fac-
tory" by John Franklin Campbell, a.
? 30-year-old former staff assistant to
under secretaries of state GeorgeTall
? and Nicholas Katzenbach. Camp-
bell is a first-rate journalist and an ar-
ticulate advocate for the clitist----or, as
he puts it, Hamillonlan?approach to
the management of American foreign
policy.- For all its stylistic superiority,
however, "Fudge Factory" turns out to
.be yet another apologia for our career
diplomatic establishment and a plea to
. the President to restore the careerists
to their "rightful" predominance in the
foreign policy process.
? ?It is a familiar refrain. Since World
War II, the rationale goes, the State.
Department has been badly used by 'a
succession of Presidents, most notably
? Franklin Roosevelt, who .distrusted
the:foreign Service ("the profession of
VI
it a- clear charter and the authorl',.y, it
needs to carry out its responsibilities,.
For State, this has been done repeat-
edly; the foreign Service simply has not
ntsaisdke.rable evidence that
;becTnhi. There
to the. _
the real problem is not State's organiz-
tion or lack of authority, but the. diplo-
mats themselves-----that they would be
no more competent to manage the
new, streamlined State Department
they dream of than they have been to
run the old one, and that the authority
they are pleading for would soon, like
Pinocchio's five gold pieces, slip again
from their grasp into the hands of pred-
ators.
C4.9
m ITEM: One of John Kennedy's first
S ' trealini ib
ng Prescribed acts upon taking office in 1961. was to
A S A CONSEQUENCE of all this, issue a.letter to all American ambassa-
the careerists tell us, the State De- dors, authorizing and dirtcting them to
partment has lost control of the for- "oversee and coordinate all the activi-
eign affairs machinerY it is supposed ties of the U.S. government" in their .
to be running. its. ranks swollen by countries. Through Secretary of State
military,. intelligence and economic Dean Rusk. he expressed the "active
specialists, administrators, piopagand- expectation" that State would "in fact
ists, and sundry other nondiplomatic take .charge of .foreign policy." Presi-
, outsiders, the department is far too dent. Johnson in 1960 instituted a top-
big, both in Washington and overseas, level foreign policy-making body called
and its authority fragmented among the Senior Interdepartmental Croup'.
other agencies, most notably the De- (SIG), installed State at the head of it,'
fense Department and the CIA. ' and directed Secretau Rusk to "as-
What must be clone, -Campbell sume responsibility to the full extent
prescribes, is. to streamline the State permitted by law for the over-all diree-
tient; coordination ,and supervision' or
Department by reducing its personnel
by half, reorganizing the remainder oh interdepartmental activities of the U.S.
government ovorseas," in what was .?
leaner 'lines, ahd trimmin-g- o-tit excegsT
pointedly identified as "formal and.'
layers and extraneous functions. Over- specific over-all directive authority.'
seas missions should be drastically
!from the President." .
pared, largely at the expense of the - -
? At the same time there was el-stab:
other executive agencies, and d in the State ambassa- ?
lishe 1--,rtment court...
dorial authority restored over all per- ' ? -?. -
trY, director for each ration, who was ?
sonnel in - each American embassy.
State should be given the authority .1.0 assume the interdepartmental ?
and responsibility to prepare a single, "direction, coordinaftn, and bupervi-
unified foreign affairs budget for the sory" role at the working level and
entire government, and to control gov- serve as a Washington counterpart to
eminent personnel assigned overseas the ambassador in the field, Here,
by all agencies. Horizontal clearances -
? pacKage, was all the authority a Presi-
should be eliminated, and "each mat- ?
dent can convey. But tho diplomats
ter requiring action should be assigned
were ever able to find the handle.
to a single officer -who must hiniself ? r
take responsibility for consulting (but Tougher, Envier bureaucrats from the
other -agencies Slate w.s _supposed to
not obtaining clearances -from) other
interested parties in the decision" to be leading continued riding roughshod
act. Finally, this new, lean State De- over the department's prerogatives
partment should be moved back into - and driving ever deepening inroads
the old .Executive Office Building, into its influence. By mid-1960, the
where it was housed in its pre-World II
,r-oung Turks" of the foreign rervice,
halcyon days, .and where it could be in that year's version of the Master Re-
closer to the President. .
form Plan; were pleading once mono
Well, fine. But if it is all se clear and for tho President to "make clear that
simple, why don't they quit writing he regards American -ambassadors ss-
plans and do it? The careerists appar-. 1.1i,3 (their emphasis) personal repl-e-
entlY feel it is the President's responsi- sentouvos to ox e6rots.,
en his behalf,
Inlay. But, alas, the President can't ad- control over all United States govern-
perfection") and turned for advice to
App rovedyF Release1004/0,.
John Kennedy, who quickly grew frus.
trate(' with -State's lack of enthusiasm
_
other duties, Al that a Presi en ? can- ? ?_
do for any executive agency is to give
_
omtinued
?'US
Approved For Release 29Ct11.03-1it : CIA-RDP80-01601R0
c\r,0
-.material that -was , pub-
( 4%
The. investigation of this
article", however; appears
I-
:I:rt.'. tO , be - the broadest and
deepest of its kind in at
least a decade. The lienne-
0 dy 'and Johnson achninis-
I. c-71 ''' ? re, nations bot h sought the
,",se.U!i? ,t, ...7 Vld A .".:,1
sourceoof news leaks from
(
. BY ROI1E.1;:t?T C, TOTH , . time to true but never in.
? ? as sustai'ned or exhaustive
fashion .as that begun after
; ? \VAST f INGTON---- -FBI. agents have the July 23 story on the
Central Intelli
I some in ence
questioned State and Defense de-
' the ' g- anns,talks. . - - ` ? . -
Use of the polygraph, if
? partment officials?and ? reportedly
true, may be a precedent,
Agency - and White: House. -- in altbeugh there .were? un-
seiirch of lieWE, ?leaks? in recent confinne.do reports of the
? months. .. ? ? detector's usp during- the
At a press briefing i Thursday, F. i S...enhower - administra-
State' D e p a r t m e n t spokesman tion. The four officials
Robert J. McCloskey was asked. ,simjc,:ted" to -the test, the
whether polygraph (lie detector) Ap reported, had all ac-
tests had been used in the investiga- knowledge(' talking to the
lion. . . . writer of the New York
While confirming FBI activity at Times "article, W i I 1 i a in
his and "other agencies," he declined fThecher, but all denied
to say what kind of equipment was :.iiving him the informa-
. used. Phone taps and the taking of Lion and were cleared by
affidavits normally would be used in !ht.,: device. - ? ?
such work. ? "Bceeher's story said U.S.
. . .
The Associated Press reported no.aitia tors had proposed
that four State Department officials a mutual halt in construe-
were given polygraph tests. The de- t ion of land and subma-
-partraent refused to commeut on the riiie-- based missiles " and
report. " ? . . curtailment, of antimissile
deploymentS. The State
None Diseiplincd or Reprimanded
Department termed the
No State DepartMent official had anicle at the time "A?most
-been disciplined or reprimanded, unfortunate breach of se-
mecioskey said. Of her sources said curity and violation of our
-all State Department :personnel who u ?-iderstancl Mg with - the
were . questioned had been cleared. Soviet Union that neither
McCloskey indicated that tho. in- side. ? will discuss - these
vestigetions' began earlier this year talks while they are in
and were still going on but he re- progress." o - . ?
-fusedlo pinpoint the number of sub- subjects Identified
jects- of . stories under scrutiny as
Stat e Department ? offi-
well as the .-number of personnel
ciii.lis-, beyond being hives,-
who came under suspicion,
tigated, also have been re--
i, . It was learned, however, that cently warned to be (Hs-
- while several earlier stories drew erect in talking to repor-
FBI intcres't--7presumably at `t"Vbite ters on particularly sensi-
.House direction----the mo,31, intensive ti ye subjects, , :McCloskey
investigation began six. weeks ago
F,lici. he identified these as
after publication by the New -York the arms talks, President
Times. of an article detailing this NiY011'S forthcoming trip
/com itiry's latest bargaining position to China, and temporarily
-' it the secret strate4i;ic -arms limita- on tlie ...Saigon. (1clibera-
tion talks with the Soviet Union. tions on a one-man pros-
This: particular case may have a idential election, ? : . .
pedestrian and even bizarre explan-
ation. About the time of .the New
York Times article, -a top-secret doc-
ument, on the talks was. distributed,
in.considerable confusion within the
State Department, informants said.
'
Yiriv:s Snit WriIer
afACO'3.A1CCIld"i\
AP'14 71' It'? (ilf(-I't.t":111' :1 s
1/031 n a. r?-k'e inves .igAons
e 64 tAA191D -001601R001400130001-5
should have received none. This urn- this year within the
quitont'l document' crinf-aie'-'cl the cies have all lire.on judged
,No ? written caution has
issued, McCloskey
addcd, "But he said he has
us-cd officials to use
"commo,. sense" in dis-
cussing such topics.
'harmful to the national
interest!' be the depart--
ment and the Administra-?
lion, Mc C 1 o s Is e y said.
They were unrelated to
publication of the Ponta-
Loll Paper s, informants
said.-? ?
McCloskey emphaskal
that no attempt was being
made to restrict the access
of newsmen to officials:
Ile noted that the depart-
ment enjoys the reputa-
tion of being the most
open foreign ministry in
the world to the press and
intends to remain so.
Informants said that, in
addition to State and De-
fense department officials,
certain CIA and. White
house employes hat'. been
questioned by FBI agents,
They could not elaborate,
STATI NTL
Approved For Releasel`20090i/04111K2RDP80-01601
13 SEP 197i
STATI NTL
/71 -
14, ,
? . -jt1I.
" ?? ! I
i lL711JJb fIJ/
Ii
By JEFiqt.1,17,-S.r.ANTEVIL
Washington, Sept. 2 (NEWS Bureau)---Justiee De--
partment agents have been questioning State Department
employes about recent leaks of sensitive information to the
newspapers, a State Department spokesman .diselosed
Questioned - by newsmen, the McCloskey also said State De-
spokesman, Robert J. McCloskey, partment officials have been told
would not say how many State to use "discretion and Common
Department employes - were in- sense" in talking with netsmen
volved or .whether lie detectors ahout sensitive topics such as the
were used, But he said no disci_ forthcoming presidential, visit to
plinary action resulted.
The probe; it. was lem?ned, was China.
Department has a deep
-
Conducted by FBIage.nts. concern when information that
could be prejudicial to a national
Series of Probes interest in foreign policy is -pub-.
McCloskey said the....e was no lished or broadcast," especially
single investigation hut a series when it has been disclosed "by
of them c.imed at specific news unauthorized person s," the
stories. , ? spokesman said.
He would not name any of the -IR; added, however, that offi-
articles, but other officials said culls have not been told to limit
t vo recent, incidents involved their contacts with reporters. Be.
;.eparate New York Times' sir,- ac-_!clared that the department of-
-ries votiiiv from a 1. lets greater access to newsmen
than any other foreign, office in
the world.
Approved by Rogers ?
"We have cooperated with
agents of the Department of Jus-
1.1ce who have undertaken inves-
tigations within the Department
of State," McCloskey said. He
would not say who ordered the
agents into the State Department
but he said it was done "with the
full concurrence and approval" of -
Secretary of State William P.
Rogers.
to the White House and setting
out the U.S.-negotiating posiLioii
at the' disarmament talks with
the Soviet Union.
Another leak under investiga-
tion, sources said, was Jack An-
derson's nationally syndicated
column quoting from a secret
government report on the drunk-
en ant3cs of diplomat dur-
ing Vice President Spiro Ag-
riew's recent visit to Kenya in
Africa.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400130001-5
Approved For Release
P hi
Abents Cluestion Personnel
:Us or LiorDetoetors
on Officiaft;ileported
By FRED P. CRTh721A
sznni New York TillICS
WASHINGTON, Sept. 2 ?
State Department personnel are
being questioned by agents of
the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation in an effort to determine
how recent sensitive informa-
tion leaked to the press, the
department's press spokesman
disclosed today.
\ The spokesman, Robert J.
McCloskey, said in response to
reporters' questions at a press
briefing, that the investigation
had been prompted by concern
that "stories 'harmful to the na-
tional interest" were being dis-
closed by unauthorized pu'Ls DTI S.
? Ho repeatedly declined to
'make a denial when asked
about reports that F.B.I. agents
'were giving State Department
!officials lie-detector tests in
'efforts to locate the sources oT
the news leaks,
Mr. McCloskey said the FALL
questioning was ? being done
"with the approval of the See-
'rotary of State," but be de.-
dined to. say who had. ordered
Powell Moore, an official in
the Justice Department's infor-
mation office, said that the in-
iyehstigation had been ordered
by that department's Internal
Security Division.
Mr. Moore: aicl that such
action was taken whenever
there was evidence of viola-
tions of the Federal .security
laws,and that the current
questioning had extended to
other departments, including the
Pentagon. The Federal Bureau
Of Investigation is an agency'
of the Justice Department.
The questioning by -F.B.I.
and the reported use of lie-
detectors has touched sensitive'
nerves in the State Depart-
ment, where, officials say, the
bureau has ,not been active
since it investigated charges
of Communist infiltration
Aiiiirra*elatukob
1..71. YORK TIMES
200VONMIRCIA-RDP80-01601
The State Department has ts
own security force that is sup!
Posed to hives Ligate security
leaks.
In recent weeks newsmen
who report on the State De-
partment have found that peo-
ple there would not see them or
answer their telephone calls.
Today, at his regular noon
briefing, Mr. McCloskey was
asked a series of questions
about the investigation and
other official actions that have
apparently prompted' officials
to close their doors to the
press.
Taboos Conceded
Mr. McCloskey. conceded
that certain subjects had been
temporarily placed off limits
for discussion with the press.
by State Department personnel.
These include President Nixon's,'
coming trip to China and thel
one-man election campaign of
South - Vietnam's President
Nguyen Van Thieu.
But Mr. McCloskey insisted,
have told them that people
need not close doors or refuse.
to return phone calls because
a subject for a period may be
off limits for general distribu-
tion." He said there had been
no efforts to limit "contacts"
between State Department per-
sonnel and the press, but only
? to persuade officials to "use
their common sense in dealing
with the journalists." --
"The State Department has a'
deep concern, and I would ex-
pect the public in general would
understand, that information
that could be prejudicial to the
national interest in foreign pol-
icy is not to he published or
broadcast," Mr. McCloskey
said.
Times Article Mentioned
- He said that F.B.I. agents had
approached State Department
officials "on a number of .oc-
casions," but he would not say
what news articles had been,
involved.
Some individAls who were.
questioned said that the agents
asked about an article by Wil-
liam Beecher in The New York.
Times of july 22, giving details
of United States negotiators'
positions in the arms limita-
tions talks with the Soviet
Union. .
Others were asked about an
earlier article by Tad Szulc in
The New York Times about
arms shpiments to Pakistan.
Mr. McCloskey said, ''To the
best of my knowledge, no dis-
ciplinary action has been taken
against any person ques-
tioned." Asked if a reprimand
or notation placed in a Foreign.
Service officer's re-cord was a
disciplinary action, he said
that such a reprimand would
not necessarily be considered
a disciplinary action.
1200/042464
W
tiCISEMP80-01601 R001400130001 -5
da.vits saying whether they had
talked to certain reporters.
STATINTL
Jill !L)II
WILMINGTON 1osT
Approved For Release 2001/03/' 04 ? CIA-RDP80-01
bid1J/1
(1-.) C.
By Miirrey Marder
Washiwton Post S aU Writer
FBI agents' used lie dace-
. tors to question State Depart-
Anent officials recently in an
inter-agency investigation of
news- "leakage" of security in-
formation, it was established
yesterday.
' State !Department press
17:pokesman Robert J. Mc-
Closkey acknowledged at a
news briefing that Justice
Department agents investi-
gated inside the State Depart-
ment .and "other agencies."
McCloskey said "this has
happened from time to time ...
,when certain : information is
published" froin tibauthorized
? sources that is. judged to be
"harmful to the national inter-
?est."
? This is the first time since
the era of the late Sell. Joseph
It. McCarthy in the early .3.950s
that such a practice in the pose ---- to attempt to find the
State Department has come to "leaker," and to serve as a
. public attention. Many Fltate l warning.to others.
Department officials are them- r lNicCloskey said in answer to
I selves concerned about the in- questions, ``We have cooper-
-. timidating. effect of the procc- ated with agents of the u ins- :secret Pentagon history on
? durc, arid insist it is limited CCL Department who have Vietnam, start,ing in raid-June,
and is no revival of that in- undtak i
en nvestigations with- was not the take-off point for
quisitional period in U.S. his- in the department z,tt the the current investigating pat.
tory.
McCloskey said in response
to .questions that State Depart-
ment officials have been ad-
vised with renewed emphasis
recently "to use their common
sense and discretion" in talk-
ing with newsmen about sensi-
tive security subjects. But he
-denied that any "written in-
structions" have been circu-
lated to restrict press contact
with officials.
ri 1
f 4 .! /- r` 4'7
41.
- -
tion about U.S. bargaining pd
sitions in the strategic arinsi
limitation talks (SALT) withi,/
the Soviet Union, now under
way in Helsinki, Finland.
Sources said that a rela-
tively "small number" of em-
ployees were involved in the'
interrogations by FBI agents.
? This group, it was said, in
turn was narrowed down to a
smaller number, "about three
or four," it was claimed. They
were reportedly asked if they
would submit to tile polygraph
tests, "volunteered" to do so,
and "came up clean," in effect
apparently clearing the State
Department of responsibility
for the "leak" in this
The degree of voluntarism
? acthally involved in such cir-
cumstances is often all open
ir) (Ps, r
1,b!ji 11 r_
to the Russians. !At that time, . ?
State Department officials
State labeled the story "a also know, however, that the
most unfortunatelfreneh ?I Se-? department carries a special
curity." ; burden,. a heritage of the Icy-
A Defense Department ty.secority investigations
spokesman declined to cojn- which decimated its experts.
ment yesterday on investiga- An unusually candid self-ex-
{lens there, or to say whether animation of the department
lie detectors were used at the last year by its own officials
p? said teonit)teigon'ilfiohjta.elitaenti::tat?. practice 15
ism on departmental thinking"
Pentagon. warned that the investigatory
it the
consequences of "McCarthy-
the inTestigation of niajOr only began Co diminish "dur-
news "leaks," Normai?IY, the ing the 19130s" and that even
'State Department uses its own in the 1970s "some of the bitter
security agents for such in- taste lingers on, however, and
I gullies, officials said. still inhibits to some degree '
One administration, source the expression of unorthodox
question, officials privately I said cam-Her this week thatc views!,
concede. Investigations of this ciplinary action has been
kind often have a dual pm-- take" over the news leak
of
proposals in the SALT
I talks, but he declined to speci-
fy the. agency involved,
I 'McCloskey told newsmen
!yesterday that, so far as he
I knows, the disclosure of the
same time that agents also
were doing the same in other tern.
A general tightening of ac-
agencies of the government
with reference to stories in
. cess to security information
which:sensitive information - has been evident in Washing-
was ? disclosed on an unauth-i ton for many months, news-
orized basis. tillesn t on ottileed .uOinfifsitculall smautgebruot ef
"I am not in a position to
, major diplomatic negotiations
get into detail on the anat.- , . - the new,
under way, including.
only of that kind of investiga- -?, s.china relations,
sons involved, he said. SAI...,T talks and negotiatiott
tion" or the numbers of per '
on Berlin, Vietnam and the
'McCloskey said these hives- .,\,.ittue East. Lower-ranking
' tigations have been conducteG ' '
"We arc not trying to . re- with .the "full approval and officials have become doubly
strict access by newsmen," , concurrence" of Secretary of cautious about discussing any-
McCloskey said emphatically. t - - - _, . thino.
1 State William 1'. Roger . .l.c.,:- - ? ..
, Reports and rumors of the or is scheduled today to hold MeClcri:1?-y;i.,7, deputyassistant I
-investigations at . F.;tate have! 'his first full press conferenee Seer et us of state and special I
spiraled behind the scenes, slime June 13. I assistant to Bogus,. is a vet-
however, to the consternation i an professional in the press
According to other sources,' e2--
Of many ranking officials who , relations field. He indicated
the latet investivation at
i are concerned that.the inbibi- yesterday that he had sought
.c.,;tz,ite,, involvina the use Of lie
Con real or exaggerated, will , to forestall a wholesale tight-
, detectors, was touched off by damage morate amid opera- ening of information flow by
; a story on- the nuclear arms
-ions. talks th the New york Times. fficials overreacting th
, McCloskey doclined to dis- ?
I of july 23 by William ns Beecher, tatio on discussing, espe-
[cuss whether lie detectors, (-)1:' he 'fillies ' Penh,t,o . 1 . cially sensitive subjects.
polygraphs as they are techni t
- i; , n i epoi, cif .
In my experience," said
eally called, were used atlI The white Imuse reP?rtedlY McCloskey the policy of this
.. _ . . -.? Oidered a full e investiga -. - I '
department has been exem-
StI"t"' it was c?"firmc'd' "w-II tion which spread' to State.
.which measure human reac- , officials expressed indirf- plary in terms of our (news)
contact. I know of no foreign
ever, that the instruments, ,c0,)'
i nation over what they called a I office in the world where the
!
Tloyed in i --.1;c disclosure of the U.S. position
is- adg n -,r '
tions to questions, were em-,
put?. tReleasle.c,2001/0.3701r1 CFA
. ? ? -RDP80-01601R001400130001-5
degree of access is compara-?
irtt .,
,Verning _CUE,. ?
STATI NTL
?
Approved ForRelease 2001403/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R
CIT3 ZEN JOUR NAI,
Li
*f.'t
?
,
fl
jrp_ . ? ,,,p? . , ' 0., j j? i! ,,;;;,(,-,,,,,i,,,, t
\::::;,. , ?::-C, %.:.,:> 1`,',--, '?.!'..'' 11 a f: t* fl \:::, il L. r
t
i' . .
- )11 0
!If I, -, ' ? " ?
V.-: ' -' ?
(..
1
?By E. Ti. SEACKFORD . that might embarrass the
Sr lir is 'jr :; f:ff Wr it cr White Eouse, McCloskey
WASHINGTON - .-Secre- snapned: "No comment"
lacy of. State William P. The reporter was refer-
Rogers is allowing to
stand, without denial, a re- ring to a column by Row-
port he has ordered state land Evans and Robert No-
Department officials to re vak which said the White
frain from putting any- House was isolating itself
thing in writing that might from the professional ca-
6 in barrass the White Peer officers in the State
House. . ? Department.
!. This coincides with the The column said Rogers
Sect the State Depart- had laid down new rules
merit's views on P. broad on secrecy as a. result of
range of American foreign. ,"Nixon's passion to keep
.policies are being Con- all the important reins in
..veycd to the public these his own and Kissinger's
days ? with two simple t - hands and to smother sec-
words -- "No comment." ,(,.ond-guesshig about deci-
sions already announced."
PART OF this turn of
events may be tiie. outcome
. of the recent publication of
the "Pentagon Papers" .
,with their disclosure of
embarrassing views held
.by White House, State De,
.partmer4, Defense Depart-
ment an cl, CIA officials. .
' But it also is a result of
the exclusion of the State
'Department from partici-
pation in many major de.ci-.
sions. ,
:11.1,1ISTRAI'ED s p o I; e s -
for the State. Depart-
':-Inent, who used to pride ;
:lhemselves on. not -resort-
jng. to "no comment" re-
: si)olises even though they
; didif_t say much, now uSe
that phrase in response to
. questions on almost all im-
portant subjects. ? . .:
Thursday's State Depart-
. ment ? briefing was typical.
. Department spokesmen
Robert j. McCloskey took
,-the "no comment" route
: eight limes.
STATINTL
' ASKED about the report
? that Rogers has informed
? department officials not to
ApprovedlgorReleage 2001,403/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0014001.30001-5
Approved For ReleaSigicidefilo3/64T:Itl-]0DP80-01601
2 7 AUG 197
Ey R. It. SHACK/J(1RD
ScrlEps-Howrird Slcfi Wrilcr
Secretary of. State William Rogers is allow-
ing to stand, without denial, a published report
that he has ordered State Department officials
td refrain from putting anything in writing
that might embarrass the White house.
The coincides with the fact that the State
Department's views on a broad range (4
American foreign policies are being conveyed
to the public these days with two simple words
? "Do comment."
Part of this turn of events may be the out-
come of the recent publication of the "Penta-
gon papers" with their disclosure of embar-
rassing views held by White. House, State De-
partment, Defense Department and CIA offi-
cials.-
. Fut it also is a result of the exclusion of the
itate Departmet from participation in many
--majc.!-7 decisions, such .as those on China, Viet-
nam and dc.valuation of the dollar.
REFUSE, TO COMMENT
Frustrated spokesmen for the Slate Depart-
ment, who used to pride theMselvcs on not
resorting to "no comment" even tho they
didn't say much; 110W systematically use that
phrase in response to questions on almost all
important subjects.
'Yesterday's State Department briefing was
typical. Department spokesmen Robert Mc-
Closkey ten the "no- comment' route eight
different times on as many subjects.
Mr. McCloskey's reputation for keep his cool
in difficult circumstances also was blown at
one point?on the subject of China.
The day after President Nixon announced
his plan to 20 to Peking, the State Department
spokesman told reporters the White House had
forbidden the department to discuss the sub-
ject of China.
?A, reporter asked Mr. McCloskey yesterday
whether there had been any contacts between
Washington and Peking officials since the Pe-
king visit of Nixon's national security adviser
Dr. Henry Kissinger.
"No comment," Mrs. McCloskey replied.
Asked wh-ethcr the "no comment" was be-
STATINTL
cause of the White 'House embargo on discus-
sion of China still stood or because there
might have been some contacts, Mr. Mc-
Closkey said it was primarily because of the '.-
former, .?
"That means the State Department is sill)
not allowed .to talk about China?" a reporter
asked. .
INTERUPTS WITH .SHOUT
After a pause; Mr. McCloskey replied: "Al]
right. lii let it go."
Another reporter replied: "All right. Fil let.
it go." , ?
Another reporter started to ask: "Bob, en
the same subject . ..?"
Interrupting with a shout, Mr. McCloskey
said:. "I'll let it go,"
Asked then about the published report that
Mr. Rogers has informed officials of the de-
partment not to put anything in writing that ?
might embarrass the White House Mr. Mc-
Closkey _snapped: "no comment." -
The reporter was referring to a column by
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak .which said
the White House was isolating itself frOm the
professional career officer in the State Depart-
ment.
The column said Mr. Rogers had laid dotvn
new rules en. secrecy as a result of "Mr. Nix-
on's passion to keep all the important reins in
his own and Kissinge.r's hands and to smother
second-guessing about decision already an-
Incomplete as recieved
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i\UG
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. h E NA N
State's Secrets
The Pentagon, it seems, was not the
only Government department to make.
a top-secret retrospective study of the na-
tion's decisions in Viet Nam. In 1968
Tom Hughes, then director of the State t./
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, ordered another report, far
less voluminous and ambitious but with
considerable potential ithpact.
Composed by two State Department
Asia analysts, the study compared the
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations'
key 'Viet Nam decisions with the bu-
reau's own major judgments during the
same period. In almost every case, the in-
telligence reports called the shots per-
fectly about such matters as the ineffec-
tiveness of the bombing campaign, Viet-
namese political upheavals and North
Vietnamese troop buildups. Daniel Ells-
berg is said to have read the study as a
consultant for Henry Kissinger in 1969
and reacted: "My God, this is astonish-
ing. I thought the CIA stuff was great, but
these papers are even more accurate."
After publication of the Pentagon pa-
pers, the two known copies of the State
Department study have been locked
away, and Ray Cline, the intelligence bu-
reau's current director, has forbidden
subordinates to admit their existence.
. STATINTL
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?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400130001-5
BES'll COP
Available
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Approved For Release 2001/031/04 : ciAgimigithqj6
C),EVIV,0,11), 011TO
PLAIN DELLER
-- 609,41`1')1 ?
II 565,032.
I i
t ./.\ .! (??'
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,? , , : . , , .: ;?. ': i, . L. ..! , ,
. /
..-'..?
,
:nos( frivolitius and. ? iit;H, ". ? ????? :
of th?-.i year Alphabet ,F.:oup
award 'zoos to .Basic Pioaks CatopiKiii ex10-1,-
ines c.if our ler-
for allowing _John . ,
? ? .? ? ? eign in:turs structure v?ith
boll's serious and sigittiticant its
critique of the linitod Stt!'?-e`i gatiic.ations and acronylos
foreign policy. ap-paraius to inelyiling, bit CCrti.j.,21y
C d uner the limited to, .Vi'SA (American
? ante (if Foreign Service Assoei
ci-
fa;; (Or). lion): ACDA (Arms Control
CrimP71'-'11,C to, ? Disarinirnent
J? 1711%.,
11
ii C
Vie(' of,ficer tl:c
-a 11 d 3c)hrif,:0l.; dip) and
tins' it1c 1 tilsilISA (Office cif Internizticinl
analysis of our ever e::paild- se(qt1 it:, Lffairs)ing ,
f?t(4[11-1 1 bit C Ii fen :,c Agency),
cracy, vvhich he describes as 3?.\.4,ii, murf.au of Inteniir:21,.:?.
a machine out of control. The arid, jes (Joint
State Department., sa-lvs,
is stvollcn with civil SerV1CC lice of :tviannt./y,,ificrit, `.11.11,7
a " ov""- Ilud?-,et) NSC
whehried by the iticwe ourity 01-11;ed (Op-
1(11?clre erstions Keduclion), S IL
ii &lJLm&Senior 1311: rdepa utmental
AM, -USIA. Nrj.'di..PAIS 0:.;1-?
Group).
gOVC311111CIL ante , ,
ciamoix or:ivelv
departmeiits. Ogether, ,
. his viin,) i lit ough this me ci
have P"ecmPtf'd cratle thicket to 110ii.V ho
D W
c-iPartment's ,?"end-
rol. as the formulator of our 1- -
tired wcalc, friiiiilened and
foreign polie3??
? impotent.: by Joe illicCarity's
THE att:..teli.E in ihir 'Os and
of-? the' title comes from a by personnel poiiiiics
391i3 l'emzer's of coluillniit dentaled the Ci
Joseph 1,fraft who .used thk, its mast officio a,
? term in cleseribing the de-i has in the htist r ye ac's
sci-
dine of the Slate DeP:irt- re-iv:I:Ted more and more xml
meet. Dut I si.ipposo there its traditional historic
Pre factories which ilia%c functions to the military, the
good fudge and factories intelligence agencies and to
cicnt factories Di,: (ipcia the White
rif.!s, and the whimv of the trot of the esident. This
as inefficient fudge j louse vildcr the direct con-.
that. make had cfri-
titlo demean3 .the de'adly
serious intent of the tent.
SOH, gaSir011,:)111:1
? SiOnS SeClri to be ir.re:-.:istible
in dealing with the State Do-.
imdment. President Ic.crine-
Cy cane 1 it a. bov,-1 of. jelly
and former Undersoccoti:try
of Slate Nicholas Katzen-
. .
? diffusion of pOwer 'incl
sponsibility Itas brought tis,''
to the point where there is no
effeetiVC control of foreign,
policy-. or -of-
pcirsonnel.
thUt
?unless this Puhrauctiatic
monster is brcilit mirier
control end cut to acre
ageable slit?ie, the cold war, .:
wi:ich was the
fintion for tii?e? piling of?
struetuitio upon structure ,
with supc:rstruetinies arid
frcistructures, will drag On'
indefinitely 'while the State----1
D?.pal-tment strugc,iles rift
itS ov,-n 101) envy edifice at
the expense of diplomacy.
? If President Nixon's "ora.:i
of negotiation." is ever to be-
yin, it rilust be preceded by
? burceuci:Oic reform..
This message has been dc-
livered. - before lip meay'
others,- ii7clutilin Henry ???
? l'AcCie:i??,-;(..i ? fluncly,
-George lii, George Kennari.-.
and John Kenneth (lab:.
-braith, but John Ctiimpbc1.1 -;
has perform eia a valuable
service in compiling the
whole chamber of horrors
one book and. by suggesting
how. the demon might be
exorcized. ?? .? ;
?? . ..? f
?
1
bnh co.;,-,pareciA#0$0d For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400130001-5
' cy-mai;ing process ti 0
STATI NTL
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110"111.I.FS, AflIZ.
HERALD
E -- 3,027
R. 7
? .
ports by comiSsions and ta!lr.
/..' m forces, all the way back to lc`,,V1,:-
that have called for -reform ni
1 the State Department, and he
THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS quotes dozens of diplorriats,
. FUDGE FACTORY. By John White House aides and forme'
Franklin Campbell. Basic Bc.loks. bureaucrate on the massive en-
. tanglements of the system.
: ? The author has tackled two Uncierlying his analysis ol
.questiOflS? What's the matter, government operatio.fs 1: ? the
with the Stato..Pepartment and ? I,a that American foreign Pot
the Foreign Service? What can icy no longer is so expansive
it way 25 years ago. ? ' ?'
? be done about. i '.
inn a; and a sharpuing of
elimination of many
0
? ls for reform are.
Basically his argument is that ,eyed to major reductions 1 'Ti. '
rorosa
s .
' .America's foreign affairs, sinceI Ki
\
World War IT, have becom:iPers"nel'
, agencies,
bogged down h a grossly the State Department's author-'
..cd, over-manned bureaucracy
iv backed up by tighter bud-
that is incapable of making de-1 i ? '
- cisions because it has been frae-,.1 getarY control.
me,nted into too many partici- CarrIPb?11 has 11:''d more than
'
paling agencies. eight years experience in the
. He declares that vac, stat,..,, foreign service and now is on
Department has been weak for A leave to hell) start a- ilev`. maga-
ncause it i /Inc on foreign policy.
? many years, partly b :?.?
bas been overshadowed by the
foreign operations of the penta-
gon, .the Central Intelligence.
Agene.y an?d. the White House,'.
Pus about four dozen other,
agencies that extend their oper-
ations into foreign countries;?
and partly because the White
House, for several administra-.
flops distrustful of the profes?
atonal diplomats, has developed,
ittll ?e)zectitive staff to handle'.
oreign problems.
,Campbell cites numerous re-'
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-
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?
tarLte JDep0
?T.n,,
?By Marilyn Berger
, Washintton Pott Staff Writer
....._ ._ ... .- - - - . ...
: The State Department an- and a? hardening .of . the
nounced yesterday the cre- "creative- arteries" through a
Ption of a 'top-level evaluation "crucial" gap in leadership. .
grouP to check into how U.S. The reforms, summed up In'
a progress report by Macorn-
4oreign policy is being carried h s
her, are practical measures
.,out, but with the more basic, intended not to change the
'function of asking the tough structure, which is basically
s
question: Does this policy sound, but to change attitudes
s
and practices to make that
Make sense? - . ? structure work more effec-
. .The establishment of this tively." .
.Mangement - ? Evaluation One goal Is to make room
:Group (MEG) Is part of an for dissent and to encourage
-overall reorganization of the creativity among department
top echelons of the depart-
employees. In addition to es-
'anent announced yesterday. -
'
tablishment of the group to
0 Promotion reform. Career
etnam in the Pentagon papers
By coincidence, the forma-
evaluate U.S. policy, the
fol-
tion o the evaluation group
lowing other change were an-
follows the massive disclo-
flounced yesterday:
sures about U.S. policy in VI.-
foreign Service Officers will
,in which a recurrent theme is be. allowed to remain at the
:sounded: that U.S. policy took same grade without promotion Secretary's ranking deputy for
on a momentum of its
for 20 years. Previously, the the management of the depart-
and the question of own whether ,
so-called selection-out process merit but also that of principal
'
the policy made sense was lost meant that failure to be pro- coordinator in behalf of the
,
In the shuffle.
meted every few years spelled Secretary of the overseas ac-
Ambassador Thomas W. Mc-
,
dismissal from the Foreign tivities of. all U.S. government
: :Elhiney, a senior career For-
Service. agencies."
Pign Service Officer, has been
The selection-out ? process 0 Deputy Under Secretary.
named to head the group, was blamed, in part, for the for Economic Affairs to be
which is under the office o suicide of a former Foreign raised to Under Secretary for
f
the Inspector General. Accord- Service Officer, Charles W. Economic Affairs;
ing to a departmental press re-
-
Thomas, 48, who was forced to 0 Deputy Under Secretary
'lase, the MEG "will be the de-
l
retire without a pension be- for Administration to be desig-
partment's instrument for in-
cause he was not recom- nated Deputy Under Secretary
for Management. ?
. ?
ment of senior executives.
These initial changes are de-
signed to reduce these pres-
sures during mid-career." -
0 Policy Analysis and Re-
source Allocation. This is de-
scribed as "a systematic proc-
ess for better identifying is-
sues, interests and priorities
for all U.S. government activi-
ties abroad, matching re-
sources and policies and peri-
odically reviewing real and po-
tential issues."
The reorganization also calls
for a number of changes in ti-
tles .of: some principal depart-
ment officers that will require
congxesgional approval:
? The Under Secretary (now
John N. Irwin II) to be named
Deputy Secretary "to reflect
not only his position, as the
tlependent, institutionalized
,evaluation of the activities of
.the department and missions
.abroad." It will also carry on
the original functions of the
insuring that he will receive a
Inspector General's office. to
evaluate personnel abroad. pension when he retires.. For
? The reorganization grows
out of a year-long self-exami-
nation, by members of the
State Department itself. It cul-
minated in a 610-page report
entitled "Diplomacy for the-
10s." Since the report was re?
leased six months ago a task
force under Deputy Under
ti7 Secretary for Administration
William B. Macomber Jr. has
been at work to institute man-
agement reforms to meet the
? ,shortcomings exposed in that
mended for promotion. The
new system will guarantee
that any officer who reaches a
certain grade (Calss 5) will be
givn tenure for 20 years, thus
those who enter the Foreign
Service at the lowest grade
(Class 8), it takes an average
of seven and a half, years to
reach (class 5).
Title change, according to
the management reform bulls..
.tin announcing the new provi-
sions, "Is the initial response
to the conclusion ... that the
highly competitive promotion
.system tends to make caution
a virtue, inhibits such gunn-
ies as initiative, persistence
report. and creativity, and discour-
? It said the State Depart- ages officers from accepting
? ment had for two decades suf- training, assignment to other
- fered ?,"intellectual atrophy" agencies, or other types of un-
usual 'boradening' assigns_
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STATI NTL
%Sig Sitri'O.RDAV inivren
19:
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THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS FUDGE
FACTORY
?
by John Franklin Campbell
Basic Books, 292 pp., $6.95
State began to decline in President
Franklin D. Roosevelt's time throngi
his use. of personal and, to a large ex
tent, mili tau diplomacy. The MeCarth
era subdued State's-personnel into cau
? tious conformists, relegating .some o
its ablest officers to oblivion. Moral
and performance suffered further from
.arbitrary reforms from the outside, in-
cluding efficiency-expert methods that
could not possibly assess the quality
of professional knowledge, negotiating
skill, or political judgment.
Moreover, State's budget and ex-
pense account continued to be small
compared with many other agencies
in the field, as well as the diplomatic
services of other big countries. (Not so
long ago, the American ambassador in
Bonn had at his disposal for personal
expenses and entertainment one-third
of what the West German ambas-
sador spent in Washington.) State, for
instance, must rely on another govern-
- ment agency for financing its communi-
cations abroad. And State, in common
with other dePartments, is caught up
in the habit of multiplying and com-
plicating its structure with inter-this
? and inter-that committee, meetings,
clearances, and the rest.
- John Franklin Campbell would whit-
tle down the sizeand structure of the
department, and he ivould eliminate its
duplicative agencies. The bureaucratic
:layers inside State and among all the
_
Reviewed by Nicholas King
Li What's wrong with the State Depart-
ment? This question has rung like an
echoing gong down the decades. It has
been asked by Presidents, by the pub-
lic, and by almost everyone in the State
Department itself. John Campbell's
book provides a full and reasoned an-
swer, forthrightly written and con-
vincingly documented. Despite the title,
the problem is handled in The Foreign
-Affairs Fudge Factory with sympathy
and insight.
The basic malady is the growth of a
monstrous foreign affairs apparatus
that has overwhelmed the State De-
partment and its control of?and voice
in?foreign policy decisions. The De-
fense Department and the Agency for
International Development, for exam-
ple, have more men in their overseas
missions than State, according to the
latest available figures. The Central
Intelligence. Agency's strength .abroad
is not known, but anyone acquainted
- ?'foreign affairs foreigaffairs pie-sharers in Washing-
\ Le--:--/2'54'0.7:_n'S-2es ? ton have created an absurd procedural
system, often with the experts at the
with our embassies is aware that CIA bottom (as in the Bay of Pigs and
Vietnam) while the ideologues and
officials, under diplomatic cover, are
prestige hunters flourish at the top. Mr-
numerous. They have their own (often
overlapping) sources of information, Campbell knows that, although bureau-
cratic methods are necessary to the
their personal communications, and
government's functioning, the fragmen-
handsome. budgets. Also, based uponoutdated ideological or Cold War pre-
mises, they usually have their own
foreign policy. So do the Labor, Com-
merce, Agriculture, and Treasury de-
partments, which send officials to em-
bassies to represent their domestic
interests; all of them are backed up by
hordes of weighers, sifters, newspaper
readers, and decision-makers back
home in Washington. Added to this is
the President's foreign policy staff in
? the White. House, a separate bureau-
cracy instead of, as the author recom-
mends, a small and flexible staff of ad-
visers who. could supply the President,
the ultimate policy-maker, with what
he needs to know.
Yet Presidents desire a strong State
Department. A tough Secretary of
State could be one of the truly com-
manding figures in the government, an
influence in all projects and expencli-
Approftfr FitSFR61414ec
?t irougn his am assacgitti.Cs it*Ph4
does what out of which embassy.
For several reasons this is not SO.
tation of authority tying up foreign
policy formulation is a fundamental
cause of today's confusion and ineffi-
ciency. Foreign officifils never cease
wondering what precise government in
Washington such-and-such a duly man-
dated emissary is speaking for, or on
whose exact behalf there he is spending
money. -
The author of this well-grounded,
perceptive study realizes that what is
wrong cannot be put right at one
stroke, or even by one President. But,
basing his thesis on past criticism as
well as on his own experience in the
Foreign Service, he calls for a num-
ber of specific, workable reforms that
could gradually bring order, intelli-
gence (in the ordinary sense) and .flow
to the making of modern American
foreign policy.
STATI NTL
Nicholas King was press attache for
:ieliVRI3P811101604RIY019400130001-5-
or to that he was an editorial writer
for the New 3ork Herald Tribune.
FOREIGN AliVARIS
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THE. ECLIPSE OF THE
STATE DEPARTMENT
By Dean Zcheson
?
TiOR over a decade it has been received as accepted truth in
the highly charged political atmosphere of Washington that
" the role, power and prestige of the Secretary and Depart-
ment of State in the conduct of foreign affairs have steadily de-
clined. Accompanying this decline, and accused of causing it, is
said to have been an increasing part played by the President
himself in this alluring, fashionable and important activity,
accentuated, perhaps, by the appearance in the White House of
a court favorite--a modern Leicester, Essex or Buckingham--
served by over a hundred attendants and constantly advising the
monarch on these matters in the antechamber. The New York
Times, in a series of articles published in January 1971, dates.
'these developments from FDR's time, though adding that the
trend was arrested "during the Truman and Eisenhower years
[until] the death of John Foster Dulles in 1959."
Opinions have differed widely whether the eclipse noted is
total or partial, radical and sinister, or within constitutional
limits and historical precedents in relations between presidents
and the first state secretary and dep'artment created by the first
Congress. A great deal of the resulting debate has been based on
wholly erroneous ideas of the nature and source of the national
power to conduct foreign affairs, so we might do well ?to get this
, straight before going further.
II
The Supreme Court has left no doubt that the federal power
over external affairs--unlike the power over internal affairs?
is not the creature of the Constitution. The Union, it has pointed
out, existed before the Constitution, and, with independence from
Britain, the power to act "in the vast external realm" passed from
the British Crown to the corporate unity, the United States of
America. The Constitution strictly limited participation in the
exercise of this power. "The President alone has the power to
speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties
?with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone nego-
tiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and
Congress itself is powerless to invade it." The Court quotes the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations as reporting to the
Senate on March 7, 1800: " . . the President is the constitu-
tional representative of the United States with regard to foreign
nations. He manages our concerns with foreign nations and must
necessarily be most competent to determine when, how, and upon
what subjects negotiation may be urged with the greatest pros-
pect of success. For his conduct he is responsible to the Constitu-
tion. The committee consider this responsibility the surest pledge
4.0 VOldi fOlajtik* 0:0-?09iA 1400130001-5
ena c tne irec -ton o ore4,5-n nego tati s c,
coutinnod
SiiiGiOfl POST
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-Itt,oult0
-(trt Mo
?? On ? a Lic
113' 11 vi-IL 7 -tiff -)ve,
rt: 0
By . Marilyn Berger - closures would not affect foreign 'governments involved
Washington Post Staff Writer security interests. . in the Pentagon .documents
-
The S tate Deartment, it was not expected that would not .be approached.
P
such a council would signiti- The British government,
prodded. into action by the
cantly cut down on the sclec- meanwhile 'said yesterday
massive leak of secret infor- tive relea i
se of classified in- '
that ? t ? was informing the
.mation in the Pentagon pa- formation by those officials United States of its "concern"
perS, has ' speeded up moves who do "leak" classified infor- about revelations of diploma-
to form a committee to au- maiien, and sometimes because they sometimes on orders tic ' discussions through pub-
? ?
thorize disclosure , of classi- hcation of the . Pentagon
'
believe the disclosure would
documents. dpapers. .. . -
a -
be useful for any one of ?
' ?It was learned yesterday
number of purposes. The 'Foreign .. Office an-
that plans are being discussed The council could pass on flounced that Lord Cromer,
to create a review council, release of information re. the British ambassador in
staffed by top departmental quested by anyone and could Washington, "has been in-
officials to review methods of also consider suggestions from U.S.tructed to express to the
declassification and to author- forei '
gn service officers who government the British,
ize foreign service officers to government's concern at the.
wish .to . disclose the contents
give out information they con- of classified documents in the threat ' to the 'confidentiality
skier to he in, the public in- belief that the advantages of of diplomatic exchanges in
terest.. ?
? such disclosure outweigh the the light of the ? publication
-The council is expected to disadvantages. i of the papers." ? - .
be headed by an official .at Besides this council the The announcement added,
the level of assistant secre- State Department is also look- "We are concerned at the
tary or deputy under secre- ing into ways of speeding up status of exchanges of an in-
Jary. . declassification of historical tergovernmental nature. The
Leisurely Consideration was documents. A State Depart- point we have made is that
'given to the creation of such meat official also said mem. there is a general problem
a council after. the Jan. 15 bers are .still to be aPpoin.ted which we would like the U.S.?
order by President Nixon to to the interdepartmental task government to bear in mind."
review: government procedures force dealing with the Ponta- Paul C. 'Warlike, former
for, classifying documents. The gon documents that have been assistant Secretary of De-
idea has been under more distributed to a number of cense 'for International Secur-
'active review this .week. ? It newspapers. ity Affairs, 1-Vedpesday said
was suggested that such a A State Department official the portions of the Pentagon
council could clear current in- said yesterday that in de- Papers dealing with diplonA,-
formation for release to news- classifying documents foreign tic exchanges were of a suf-
men, congressmen or .the pub. governments are not normally ficiently sensitive nature to'
lie if its members decided that contacted, even when they are warrant p r i 0 r restraint
disclosure would not be con- involved as a subject of the against publication.
frau to national security and papers. If it is a joint agree- The Chinese ambassador
would not affect foreign ment that is being declassi- to Washington; James C. H.
governments or intelligence Lied, the official said, the gov? Shen, said yesterday" that
sources. . ? ernment will be contacted. But publication of the documents
At best, such an institution- if the paper is a telegram from hampered diplomatic ? conduct,
alized procedure could help a U.S. embassy abroad that "As a government official,"
erode the ingrained reluctance contains information?provided Shen said, "I would feel very
on. the part of State Depart- by another government, .that happy knowing that what I
meat officials to provide in- government would not be ap- say today in negotiations with
formation about current dip- proached for clearance. ?American officials would not
lomacy,. eyen. when such .dis- .
This official said ? that be published."
.. . .... ......? _ . , .? ....?.......... ..
STATI NTL.
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Approved For Release 200WailYPbRADP80-01601R
1 8 JUN 1971
STATINTL
-'2-DAY SEARCHIi -
S
?MEI- on
c r2 Dr),
foy
By GEORGE SHERMAN Top officials of the depart:
? Star Staff Writer ment?and even not-so-top offi-
cials?often leave personal files.
behind containing classified in-
formation. They get the same
security treatment as State De-
partment files: But he officials
concerned have a right to return
to these personal files for any
memoirs or articles they may be
writing.
So it is today with William
Bundy. He has been 'given use
of a corner in room 5310 of the
State Department.
Something like two of the 10
filing cabinets in the room are
his, 'that is open to him and
his secretary, Blanche Moore,
whom he has kept on at .his
own expense.
Bundy is writing a book about
the same subject as the Penta-
gon subject?the history of the
policy-making process on . Viet-
nam.
N at ur all y, these archives
would be of great use to him.
Bundy, who is now visiting Lon-
don and works out of the Center
of International Studies of MIT
in Boston, is reported to make.
frequent use of his files here.
Sometimes he comes to room
5310 three times a week.
When the book is completed,
Bundy?lihe all other former de-
partment officials?will have to
have it cleared by the Historical
Office of the State Department.
There its pages will be gone
over to make certain no classi-
fied material in the .personal
files is going into print.
Security people in the State
Department are still musing
over how two copies of the mam-
moth Pentagon archives on Viet-
nam policy could have been in
the State Department without
anyone in authority knowing it.
It took Secretary of State Wil-
liam P. Roger's staff about 48
hours to find the copies of the
47-volume studies.
The reason ? they had gone
directly into the "personal files"
of former Undersecretary of
State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
and William Bundy, key depart-
/ mcnt aide on Vietnam under
President Johnson. Two copies
? from the 15 made ? were
sent by the Pentagon by person-
al courier, outside official ellen-
nels, to both men toward the end
of the past administration in
1988.
?The volumes were not regis-
tered with the central filing of-
flee of the department. They
were not gone through by the
security office to cheek whether
any documents needed to be du-
plicated for the department's
own files. They were put under
lock and key in the filing cabi-
nets of Katzenbach and Bundy,
tiiho ? in the haste of the transi-
tion -- neglected to tell their
successors of their existence.
?.Officials say they see nothing
peculiar in their procedure. Se-
curity was Dever violated, they
say,?in fact, the volumes were
so secure almost no one knew
,about them. , ?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400130001-5,
Approved For ReleaseA2A1 #47 i? jETTAI-WDP80-01601
*JOURNAL MEMO
STATI NTL
CIA STUDY some time back developed
likely "scenarios" for thaw in Red
China's belligerent stand against U.S.
One initial Chinese opening predicted:
Reds would invite U.S. ping 'pong team
to tour People's Republic of China.
State Department, in written comments,
ridiculed the suggestion, JOURNAL has
learned from impeccable sources outside
of the intelligence community.
?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400130001-5
Approved For Release iiiitifigi:042,:6A-RDP80-01601
1AlmO'," t9),T, CiT1 Avolop
DOD3
)i tifi,fipy-,1
iiL olAuiad.
243,i a; Names in Computer
--A1Dplicatio1isrs'3croenoci
%.1 I Fl I 1 1 `I I
Miss Knight said she had ageney w w
ith a.fugitive arrant,
been ill for the last three weeks for oCa'ill-ple ? that ,. Person
and away- from her desk-. Un- hste.d In the file had applied
til She summoned aides to Lac for a Pa-ssPort.
ction" a
office thia afternoon, site said, . Whether "adverse.
she was unaware that Senator woulkl. enS11) was n On of her
Ervin had made official inquir.? interest, hid, and she would
les about the file or that it was not notify the. subject of ? his
a matter of controversy, 'Ille listing in the file.
Miss Knight said she would
State Department's reply to *Mr.
Ervin's vestionnaire Was dated not necessarily notify anyone
-- ' l3y 3-.11!:1'-.1; A. F.P.AN!',"LIN Jam.' 4. - ? n . that he was included in the file
= spiclalto T:',..e 1:-:v? Yol-k mres yeadlts- Start Veb:23 ? -"' even 11 the "adverS3 EiCti0. II"
? A
- . were talten in her own office.,
.WASI TINCT01.-I, Feb. 10_, .....72,1a,t,ovr, Eorrviiit`f.,',3c, sc111,7,ci.uc?d through ' the denial. of a pa'ss-
flee acknowledged today - that before - his snhbommitiee star;;. I, ? `'.!
i'l ,-,..-, '"' -'-' -)Or'
The United States Pa. ssport of- li"
it keeps a secret, coniputerind log Feb. 23 on what 11:,..; has
- file_ of 243,135 Americans called the growth. of "police
?whose applications for pass-stat"
.,. surveillance and dossier-
' ports may he of interest to it keeping on perhaps 50 million'
or to Government law enforce- Americans, most of them ? ac-
merit agencies. Persons listed oused of breaking no laws.
in the file may never be awarz, The North Carolina
:Demo
of it. crat'afor%rjlceoris
The existence of the fib was state's Supreme Court, said lastdisclosed by Senator Sam J. night that while there might, be
'Ervin Jr., the chairman 'of the legitimate reasons for maintain-
Senate Subcommittee on Con- log portions of the Passport or-
stitutional Rights, who is a per- fice file, many of the justinca-
sistcnt critic of what be con- tions for it given to his sub-
? skiers Government surveillance . committee by the State DePart-
and file-keeping abuses, moot were "beyond any reason
. In a speech last night before. whatsoever." ?
a symposium at Dickinson Col- He said a State Department STATI NTL
? lege in Carlisle, Pa., ?Senator reply to a subcommittee:ques-
Elvin said he had discovered tionnaire listed those cl'.::.e.
? the Passport Office file through ZolThs:
a reply to his subcommittee's q"individual's actions do not
questionnaires. He called it reflect to the credit o. th,2, U.., S.
more proof that uncontrolled. abroad (1,0-10 persons)."
and undercover Governmentl -.Defectors, expatriates and
surveillance was a serious' repatriates whose baekgronad
threat to the er:ereisc of the demands fmther inquiQ?'. prior
'First Amendment rights of free to issuance of a pa.ssnort.
speech and freedom to asso-1 cPersons v',-anted by a hvy
date. . 1 enforcement agency for crimi-
. ? File Is Defended nal activity.
- In an interviev,? today Miss clindividuals involved In a
Frances Knight, the Passport child custody or desertion case.
Office director since I055, said, (Delinquents or sn6pected
"A passport is a United States delinquents in milita,-y service.
document addressed to foreign c.1"Known or suspected Com-
Governments in which we are munists or subversives."
saying, 'This person is an ? . - 'Orange Cf CC? - -
American citizen.'"Senator Ervin said other cal.e.;
said that vast majori- gorics included simply "Oran?
ty"----perhaps 90 per cent---of card" and "miscellaneous."
those listed in the file were "I don't know what 'orange
"persons of "questionable citi- card' means, and I don't think
zenship" about whom it was they know either," he told the
her obligation to be curious and Dich-inson College gathering.
icautious in is an official Asi-..ed if hc thought the Cen-
document. tral Intelligence Agency had in-
A spokesirian for. Senator Er- sorted names in the file, Mr.
Vin, however, said today that ?Ervin said, "1 c,n't prove 'it lint
the State Department had re-I suspect the CIA, gas just
.. ported to him in writing that about anything it wants." V
? the largest p,roup of nmnes on He said the State Department
the list WaS in 1,112, "known or had acknowledged maintaining
SUS pected Comnumists or sub. a 1;2?cra surveillance file of,
? versives" category and tliat the passport applicantS in NInch
number of names under "dou'ot- "tlic individual Is not told that
ful citizenship" ranke.d second. 'he 13 in the file" until and un-
c .number in each of these less "a.dvers.. action is t....en..
, categories was not immediately It was not clear today?how this:
available. Would operate in actual prae-i
"We are guarding the integ- i tice.
rity of the passport by verify-. Miss Knight saki her. office?
inc' United States citizenship," would_ merely report .citliely to
Kniat said. Put she ex- atile intdrested t.he
APprOyepeharRalieaStet .0=11044 CIAIIRDP10,?"0101 R001400130001-5
number of names on the ist. or a -tate law en
. . .
?
?
YeRC' STATINTL
, ri
Approved For Release 200/0049VCIA-RDP80-016
. . -
t ' ...'-' , ? . 0 ,' ..... ..0.,/ Cuba, last' September.
t....,011 cy -.1 ..,pf s n 1 1 -?. r; c suspicions, based on the, an
Lf4c.:J4' L 't ' ' ' of a mother ship, plus twc
, conspicuous barges of a I
v i .-.? i . . ?
I - . ? ----, .,:t. rt.. 4- A:4 4. ~,"--L used only for storing a :
VOIAIIII of 1 C tiCC, Ni ? /I, I) './
- f, lear submarine's raclioac
'" ' '
? ? - - ? ? .... .
- ' ?? ?-? - ? ? House. That led to int(
Following 1.3 the f if ill in a .series of or e4loring the behind-the-scenes. ?,neg re-
otia
_
. _ . - ,
. Nixon. Admini.stration's .? and the President's style in foreign policy: - -
. _.? - ? - .-- . -,: . .- warning, to MoSeOw not
' - - ? ' ? By BENJAMIN WELLES ? . ? . .serViae ? nuclear armed -s.
...
"in or from Cuban bases.
? ? - ? -. ?.,- -- - :... SpecIal to Tile New Yotk '1?-tne; . :. - _ :
. WASHINGTON,. Jan. 21 ?.per cent of the total, or about - Career officials .in the ii
President . Nixon has become 84-billion, about 82.5-billion of ligence community . resist t
dissatisfied with'the size, cosit on the strategic ?intclii?oence ing With reporters; -- -but -ir
views over mot
and loose codrdination of the t on tactical It con- v
tand the res. . . . .. _ , several .
mutes -at least 150,000 mem- with l'ecleral officials
Government's worldwide in-_ bars of the intelligence staffs, matters, with men ret
m
deal daily . with intelli ?
telligence operations. which are estimated at 200,000'
According .. to ornembers of people. ?
his staff, he believes that the Overseeing all the activities
intelligence provided to help is the United States Intelli-
gence Board, set up by secret
him formulate foreign policy, orderb ? ?
y President Dwight D.
while occasionally excellent, i Eisenhower in 1956 to coordi-
is not good enough, day afterinate intelligence exchanges,
day, to justify its share of , decide collection priorities, as-
the budget.- - -; " ? ? - sign collection tasks and help
. .-Mr. -Nixon, -it is said, has .1;e. prepare. what are known as na.-
. tonal intellioence estimates.
gun to decide foe himself N?vhat'. The chairman of the board?
. the intelligence priorities ?ri.nistll,vho is the President's repro- si.les, nuclear submarines
!
P /s be and where the money should.sentative, is the Director of power' for the talk with
russian.s
be spent, instead of ieavin? idCentral Intelligence, at on the limitatior
presei t
- ,
'-' IRicharcl. Helms. The other mem-
st.rategic arins.
largel y to the intellig, corn--hers ence co-,
. . hers are Lieut. Gen. Donald V. "We couldn't get off
ground
munity. He has instructed -his Bennett, head of the Defense -at the talks witi
.
staff to survey the situation Intelligence Agency; Ray s. this extremely sophisticate(
and report back within a year ,!Cline, director of intelligence formation base," . an ' off
it is iope.d--with recommen
and research at the State De- commented. "We don't gi
dationsl-
' Adm Noel
for budget cuts of as 'partment; Vice , Gayier, head of the. N. ational our negotiators round figures
,
much .as seVeral hundred mit- Security Agency; ? Howard C. ?about 300 of this weapon.
. 1
lion dollars. - - . . , . .1Brown Jr., an assistant general. We get it down to the '284
, Not many years age the manager at the Atomic Energy here,here and ? here.' When
, ,? ? dWilliam?- c. our people sit down to nego-
o- Central Intellig,ence Agency ?",-,,*"- -?`- 'tiate with the Rbssiairs' they
.. Sullivan a deputy director of
.and the ' other intelligence -the Federl Bureau of Inv esti_ know all about the Russian
a
b.i.ireaus we ' portrayed as an gation. ? 1 strategic threat to the U.S.?
' rinvisible empire" controilhig? Intelligence men are aware that's the way to negotiate."
foreign policy. behind a veil of the President's disquiet, Too much intelligence has
its drawbacks, some sources
of socrccy. Now the pendu. but they say that until now
say, for it whets the -Admin-
1
.? . \ i,y throughh'. term um has swung.he has never seriously , istration's appetite. Speaking
.?
. The President and his aides sought to comprehend the of Henry A. KiSsinger, the
are said to suspect wide- vast, - sprawling'. conglomera- President's adviser on nation-
spread overlapping, duplica.- tion of agencies. ? Nor, they al-security affairs, a Cabinet
- tion and considerable vb000. s has ay, he decided libv., best official observed: "Henry's hn-
doggling" in the secrecy- to use :their teblinital re- patient for facts." . .-
sourcs and personnel---much I Estimates in New Form
shrouded ?intelligence "corn- of it ta1ented-4n' formulating .
In the last year Mr. Nixon
munn.y. .? .-.4 , ' - 1 policy. and Mr. Kissinger have or-
In addition- .to' the C.I.A., Two Cases in Point- dered a revision in the national
!they include the intelligence Administration use ? albeit, intelligence estimates, 'which
. arms of the Defense, State tardy use--of vast -resources in are prepared by the C.T.A. after
rand Just.ice De,partrnen'ts ?ar,d sOy satellites and re connais- ! consultation wit'n the other in
the Atomic Energy Commi..- sance planes to help police .the telligence agencies. ' Some on
Arab-Israeli cease-fire of last future Soviet strategy have
August is considered a case in been ordered radically revised
point. Another was poor intellt- by Mr- Kissinger.
gence coordination before the I "Our knowledge of present
a.boi?tive Sontay prisoner-of- Soviet- capabilities . allows
war raid of No. 21,-at which Ienry- and' others to criticize
time the C.I.A. was virtuall us for seine. sponginess about
.
shut out ofPentagon planning. predicting i future Soviet pol-
By contrast, the specialists icy," an informed source con-
point out, timely intelligence ceded. "It's pretty -hard to look
helps in decision-making,. ? down the road with the same
It was Mr. Cline who spot-- ertainty."
, NT ftql49g0101.1QA7- 41ssaar6 Ah ii:iiif '
...
, , 4,7
marine buildup at. Cienfuegos, put and organization of the
. ..
effluent, alerted the WI
from intelligence careers
with some on active duty
dicate that .President N
and his chief advisers ap
date the need for high-gi
intelligence and "consu_me-
,eagerly. , ?
The community, for instE
has been providing the P.
dent with exact statistics
numbers, deployment
characteristics of Soviet
? sion. Together .they spend 83.5-
. billion a year on strategic into!-
. ligcnce about the Soviet Union,
Communist China -and 'other
. countries that might harm the
nation's security.
When tactical intelligence
in Vietnam and Germany arid
reconnaissance by overseas
commands is included' the an-
- . nual figure exceeds 85-billion,
experts say. ThAbtorm
partment spends m'aiie -than 8
Helms Said to Pate High
"Sources close to the White
House. say ? that Mr. Nixon
and his foreign-policy advisers-
--Mr.. Kissinger and Secretary
of State William' P. RogerS
and Secretary of Defense
Melvin R. Laird?respect the
professional competence- of.?
Mr. Helms,' who is 57: and is
the first career head 91 the
Central Intelligence. Agency.
, Appointed by President
'Lyndon. B. Johnson in June,
1066,.. Mr. Helms Ilas been
essentially apolitical. He is
said to have brought profe.5-
sional ability to bear ? in
"lowering the profile" of the
agency, tightening discipline
and divesting it Of . many
fringe activities that have
aroused criticism in Congress
and among the public.. His
standing with Congress and
among the -professionals is
high.
According to White Howie
soui:ces, PreSident Nixon,
backed by the Congressional
leadership, recently offered
Mt. Helms added authority to
coordinate the activities of
the other - boz..rd meMbers. He
-
is reported to have declined. ?
- A major problem, according
to those who know the situa-
tion, is that while Mr: Helms
is the-- President's representa-
i7? on 11,Q Intellioence Board,
01343.00011.15 abo
10- per cent--$500-million to
kkgk:A.i7.a:Vol
?
1?F7
Approved For Release 200f1/0338;r41.:ip/A-16Q.1\-1131-60
? ? ? I himself satisfied that all was in
1 c-t ,:7' ,:??????-: "r'?'
., 2,-7' "..-A ?.,--,2
?---
, ....... Despite the transfer of many
c.,.0. k V (..i.t
foreign-policy functions to the
? ? : 2, .,,--IT - r--1 J. I _ ?? - - 4 , White House, the State Depart-
- i t I ?_*- ??.;?-?.(.....t L-
6 z.,, ..c.,..,..,
.,,,--, c
. ....,,:... t, .,.".1. li. 1.. bulk of day-to-day business
* * e ?
.7-.".4. (-74 1-',. 1 ment still conducts the groat
. with the rest of the world. In
.,
. second that-it is often unable to, such afeaS EtS Africa and I,,atin
*..?? After two y0,-?ra in offic0, clei?-t.th of John 1,,,,,ter Dunes in assert 13adearship over other de-, America, indeed, - the dcpart-
, in?q ) ,-,,,,? -, ? .., ,,
PITS id:3121; NiX01.1. hC{3 faSill011Cti - c'-- ' , I r,.._id...nts lk.N... do Ii partments, even on se,cond.cy meat rnakes policy simply be.-
c'.use the. White Ho ase is too
los own s!`yle in forci3n f:;01i.c..,. wItcd. the foreign-p,olicy sc-ne, - matters. The influence of sLeh
./
- ? - i. ! aeencies as the Defense Dena:t- sorbed with otnar matters.
cinc,.. in Me tese of his sf-aff. The centralization h , A departmental proposal to
''..3 1?)'-cni flint and tly, Central :In'tei''
Corrc.3po./6"2iltS of The Is i-nost striking under President.. prim A,7;:,ne.).., has ris0n, 1,,1?,,,r'l strive . for -closer communica-
Yoth Tbncs 111.11e explored Jigs:Yr....on, who regarls for,sign af-! while, until it has appr.f..acl-,e-a t.'? with 501110 or the icit'It'cen-
. foreign polic machincry, .the' fairs as his field of c.pecial co ll.*. that' of tho State D.',-?pirtment. in g governments cir 11.?r th
- - , , ? , ! .,..., ?, ? , ,i .
Africa recently became -policy
?rolvcr of 1-11,-..- Pr(%-iic,eilt s 0,-.V,Le?Ice- -ills cv--'-i-mr2ct P?.1-rso?il'7"1 l'ecrz Ccord;ination 1 e Hams-3 had.
rVISCrS 0, .-1. the iitTaCt ,of Wa;4i- involvcmcnt has often been at, That wouldpose no pro'-ali-an been too busy with thc,* Middle
. ? ilk?iv.on's itiC,%01 it/StitliOt2S 0:1,i11( C:::1)C11,7; 0:7 CH? State Dopart-{ if the V.ihite House ?was able lc East .crisis to review it
Jot eign policy ecNisioil.3. Th,:imont. 71The 1370 ir,ssage on the' orchestrate all aspects of f.....- The. dePariTh'-'-iit is 0.1-'''-1111'd
-rola, of i;2s: State D2parl,:incinL is ;st.i...e.of tile world ?,-;as a case,l'olleY? Laroe sitt.,3 ? into foe geographic 1-jurea,as,
explored today in the first of ?feint has become --- Mr. hissim.ar each headed by an assistant sec-
a ,sert,as of cuticles! u ..ii-,3 id,E,,,. for a 3-1,:,,jor 3,car.end has 110 people ---- it cannot f.1.0
1 ret and composed of "coun-
t try .directors" who are sup-
sof- ar,:i in the secondary E:ICIS
Yy T.I.,NC,,E; S:',Ilf 1.7. Isom:in-tau of . the Administra? where it counts on the sta.-ta. j-,-,...,..?, posed to cool?dinate all the coin-
?-.s.,:,,,,I*11,..., Ta.:, x*-.,- Yo:k ..i,-.-7,-:parlm.ent v., ro
to follo thugh co- , munications and issues bet:v.:eon
- WASHINGTON, Jan, 1.7?Thcitio-a's view. Of the world situa- ,-, the United States end a
ordination is often poor given becars
lion originated, with' some -, ? -,-- ? ,_ * .
-Department of State, once the oha *?,,encies ha\ e cleveloi....!d country. It is a? focal job, and a
prompting froni the . Snate- the habit of taking their case strong country director, if he,
proud and tridisput;1.,d. steward i
of ? foreign pcJiicy, has finalh, , b - ?
Foreion ? INations Committee- ; directly to the White House. s left alone, can have a major
impact on policy -in the coursa
.., at tile State DzTartment. Socrell On more than one occasion,
. aclo-M,,vledged w:P.21.; ot.h2rs have tary of State \\ ill 11, --1--logrrs, as a cons,>quanee, the Achnin7-s- of routine business, .-Stlell RS
? . -long Itocii sa:;fin.c:,: that ii: 33 210 planned to deliver it Iiiinself! ti Oil has spoken with un- recommending aid. levels and
longer in clia-%e of the United at th,e end of 196'9. 1 flictinz, voices. Even the, Uni',ed
b
initiating exchange progrants.
States', foreign affairs ailil that Each gec,caphic bureau .w,,,s, States . Information Agency, * The system reaks down in-ai , , _
tene,...,ca:sy. of countrio,s such as
it Ca 01reasonably expect tc.1 called upon to zsul.,:esit rc,aterial.1.?f"'I'c'jt- ?f .ill':' S.'':atc-i 1--W--:?/". ann_y.,...ia, and Jordan, where
be SOaa1.1-.1. -. . Ii-v- prokct. genE.,[p.=2,:l considc,r..! mcilt, has begun P.Iticulating an -
? ? . the Winte House has a strong
able enthusiasm because it pre-I indePerlecrle line.
s over
lly its own admission as welt smt.,-,f, ono of th0,-,,,-.I It acloptcd a far firmer stand interest and tnnd to tahe
.as the. t2siiniony.cr; its critics, tunities for people at Che v,,ork-iathan the department, for ?ex- during a crisis. The , country
- the clepartinont has been.kts-i,--1,-, ing level to play a direc:L rob, inj-ainfi-e, ? ,. ,?..11.....,.... 0,1 .c:,., duced in places like Etarea and.
director's influence, Is also rc.-
I in its broadcast. ce,n-
- 11- ally. f- r 2"u ' p' hl'-'' n''''''rlr''' las'
ground in the bureauery foi: a P '.': 6 "3 ? 1.`" a S a 1-k. ' ' --- ? ' ? "-'' ' . ''' . ' .' . ' ' ' ?
pOqlt,on . i'viet "duplicity" in the Mid:ale --ial,vall, 'allele the United
generation. In the opinion of - '. ' . States mo.intains large military
I East --- just at a time when the,
' ' ?
, ga? ecd.tiV 1 ... ,.5 ,,,,..111,
? ' '
department was relying on c11.17et missions and the impact Of the
Before, the conmilation was; diplomacy to persuadeDefense Department is corres.
the Ras-
finisbed the White. House staff, sian; to rectify violations of the P0.":1111Z,IY grEiat
learned of the prc.1ect, sa-,v thel Suez Canal cease-fire, A major change in the
possibilities in it LT Mr. Nixon Reminded in an .extraordinary amount of aid provided under
and prc-empted toe idea, The! Ille.in0 from Secretary Rc,t;,N..s the military-assistance program,
dery,rtment's draf was th._,/11 that u,s,LA,'s con-gresiiic,a:A, for instance' greatly effects re-
turned over to the n2-tion;?.?1-se- charter requires it to . clear lations with the United States.
curity staff, which wrote an policy with the State Dei.y..-:ri.- And it is the mililary who de-:
expanded 40,000-w,-,rd version msnt, Frank Shake::peare, its termino the rate of assist.ance.. .
for release, under the President's director, replied that he . re.- : The diminished role of .tlie'
name.ported directly to the Whlte State Department is not a ?new
,
When Mr. Nixo.1 signed the House. -- . _ phenomenon, but it has reached
document in a White Hou.lei A conflict ar0s3 recently Geer a point where its officials
ceremou last February, Ftenryi the -Achninistr,
?.tion's attitude acknowledge it in public.
A. Kissinger, his spacial assis- toward the West German G:-,--/- "Diplomacy for- the 70's,1' a 61 0-
tant for national-security of- croment's controversial polcy paga critique of its shortcom-
fairs, stood at his side, flanked 'of improving relations v.-P.:ft ings -published last month,
by others on the, White House !Eastern Europe.. The official speak's of the "intellectual at.-
staff. No State Deo,.rtment rep- United States Vi Z.17, as outlined ropliy" that besets the depart-
rcsentative vies present; Sccre- repeatedly in public by Mr. moot and adds:
Rogers, is unqualified endorse- .
, "With the exceptions of an
plant. But Mr. ? his singer ?Enct active period at the -end of the
other members of the , White ninctecn-forties, the departmcrit
House stag recently undercut EX, ti -Foreign Service have Ian-
that by disclosing personal rc.s- guiclicd as Creative 0?,..:,.ans,
crvato B se
i, to veral visiting dip- buily imd Cl ?1 happily Chelv..
lomats and to newsmen, ing on the cud of-daily routine
Furor' in West Germany ,
while other - departments, IX:-
fense, -C.I.A., the White House
Bonn. The West German Gov-
The. result was a furor in staff have made important, in-
e
ernm novativ contributions to for-
la
at dispe Lei' a high-levcrl eifm policy." . . .
en-Liss:11y to Washington to find A, ? .
? e'ements
? 1 4:adf3tititbt is -
cItCMCAR:17,49MOTR60 31
--siomtion are th!:: folkrAng:
?
Significantly, the envoy went ?
to the White House. for his -
many people, in the department
and outside, the erosion has ac-
celerated. sharply during the
? first two y3ars of the Nixon Ad-
:ministration.
As president Nixon pledgedduring his campaigni he has
gathered more and more of the
business of foreign affairs in the
White 1101120,' He has taken a
personal hand in both the broad.
scope and mechanical details of.
foreign policy, from proclaiming
the Niam. Doctrine on the
American stance abroad to com-
posIng the Covernmcni.,-.7.
?condolences to France on. ?thet
. The centralization ? of u
death of 03 Gaulle.. tary Rogers and his aides were
formulation of foreign policy ini
? the White House has been a,
I
characteristic of the nue. lca r
age, asilen Cio issues have be7
? tome so coniplex end the con-
. sequences of cr,r01' SO grat,C. It
.' has, -in fact, been the pattern
'since the days of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Particularly Iiron" Se?c14,-
. taries of StattPIR4s9Yr?Me
trend during the Truman and
F,isenhowor.years, but since the
in the Ghanaian ca,.;ita.1., Accra,
at the time --- all-Dot as far out
in left field as they could be.
!`The whole illeidEnt.raiikkA,"
an assistant to the Secretary re-J
called later. "We all felt cheated
on that one."
Increasing White House con-
trol 61 foreign affairs is one of1
rane,,* of factors that hovel
caused the 1,000-man State De-1
par-Latent to slip from its ofice-'
00114pitfiSt.t? 20 0449310
m
aong -qua. s m foreign al airs.
As it is now, it not only
stands second but such a weak
? ? "