WASHINGTON WHISPERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R001400050001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 12, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

:[ WOliLD iBC
Approved For Release 2001/0110411RC1ORDP80-01
?
-.a...Washington Whispsrs-11....
* * *
Those who sit in on Vietnam policy
discussions have noticed lately that
the Central Intelligence Agency and
Defense Intelligence Agency often
come up with opposite analyses and
recommendations. The decision to
mine North Vietnam's harbors was a
victory for the Defense agency. The
CIA reportedly opposed it?as it has
for years.
STATI NTL
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ti.tiQZ4.1.1`ita.LVA rui
12 MAR 1972
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Jack Anderson ?ks arises; however, 'when' one'.
s loo at the 'total package.'
Kuwaitis appear tc be consid-
Defenso S pyin 0?
helicopters and Hawks."
ering, including 30 F-5's, .11
. Hesaid assessment'
Faelng. Cutback . ts oh toa., ebe ed s ma an efricisti
THE WHITE HOUSE is so
dissatisfied with the Penta-
gon's espionage network that
It is decimating the once-
prestigious Defense Intelli-
gence Agency, the nation's
, number two spying opera-
'tion.
The dramatic cutback of
some 350 high-level espionage
analysts, agents, data experts
and other super-sleuths has
been cloaked in the same
kind of secrecy as MA's spy
work. .
But from espionage ?M-
etals themselves, disgruntled
over the break-up of their
agency, we can report this tu-
mult within the DIA: '
In January, at a hush-hush
meeting in Arlington Hall
outside Washington, the
DIA's chief, Lt. Gen. D. V.
Bennett, sat down with his
top aides.
? --' '? need to strike a proper bal.-
- ._ _,
ance between the desires of.
Arms Deal American companies to - pur-
The United States has be- sue individual sales initia-
come the gun dealer for tives and the desire of the
much of the world, pushing U.S. government to not see.
jet fighters, tanks, flame Kuwait saddled with more
throwers and machine-guns military equipment than it
the way some merchants bus- can effectively use, maintain.
tie "Saturday night specials" and integrate into its armed
on their c!stomers. forces."
When ?, ..:U.S. can turn a , The U.S. government saw
dollar, tii:? government sees the request as an opportunity ?
an opportunity to help our to take a hard look at Ku-
balance of payments deficit,: wait's well oiled military ma-
and turn a tidy profit chinery from the inside. "We
for the firms that have the wonder if this request does
government's approval for not provide a fortuitous op-
their arcane trade. _ portunity for a brief Depart-
Such was the case when ment of Defense survey of
oil-rich Kuwait decided 4.6 overall government of Ku-
wait military ? requirements
load up a few months ago
Bennett confided to them
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
: were ordering a cut of an
extra 10 per cent above the
standard 5 per cent, across-
the-board cut the President
Nixon had ordered through-
out government.
, The general, obviously
moved, detailed the firings,
demotions and transfers of
some of his top aides. The
. Soviet, free world and east-
ern sections of DIA were to
become. disaster areas, with
some, chiefs literally left
without subordinates to do
the work.
? The reductions, to-be sure, live commercial opportunity
would save the taxpayers for Ameriean private compa:'
more than $10 million a year, flies and those companies
but they would remove the under consideration would.
only real backstop to the con- appear capable of performing,
tral Intelligence Agency on necessary training and main-
foreign intelligence. tenance services involved." ?
Bennett, on his own, de- The secretary's eyebrows'
- eided to take the fight for his did not arch a bit as he'
agency to Capitol Hill surveyed Kuwait's shopping.
friends. Nevertheless, the list. "Each type of equini-
Feb. 15 and March 6 dates for ment unde rdiscussion, F-5s,,
the 'first stages of the purge Hercules, Bell helicopers.
,have already taken effect. (and) Hawk missiles, would,
Dozens of old espionag,e appear in itself a reason'
hands have gotten their no- able item for the govern-,
tice.- The agency is in tur- ment of Kuwait to acquire,",*
'moil.Rggers said. "The question:
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and capabilities without coin-
The American ambassador mitment to subsequent sales
was contacted and he intro- of U.S. equipment," Rogers
duced an approved arms said.
dealer. It was a move that 1301-McClure Syndicate
met favor in Washington...
In due course, the ambassa-
dor received a secret com-
mendation from Secretary of.
State William Rogers. "State.
and the Department of De-
fense wish to commend am-
bassador for effective man-
ner in which he has kept U.S.'
private firms, rather than the
U.S. government, in front as
Kuwaitis consider various
possible military equipment
purchases," Rogers cabled.
"We agree that any of these
sales would represent attrac-
STATINtL
1-4
Otamorm.:????.????
S TAT I NTL
Februiri,
pprie4eYKr Releac9INH/bSSWICKW6AU=6T6P1R0014
regular International Security Assistance
funding for FY 1973.
In South Korea, national forces are assum-
ing increased responsibility for their own de-
? fense. The ROK Government must maintain
? large defense forces to meet the threat posed
by well-equipped forces in the North. Conse-
quently; it must support a heavy burden on
its national economy, and simultaneously
? undertake increased production in country of
? defense equipment, aided in part by MAP
1+4, and FMS credit. Thus, South Korea may con-
tinue for some time to be dependent on the
? United States for support of its defense ef-
forts. Nonetheless, greater Korean self-suffi-
ciency in defense is signaled by that govern-
ment's recent agreement to assume respon-
sibility for procurement of operating mate-
rial formerly supplied under MAP as well as
Inauguration of an FMS credit program to
finance development of M-16 rifle and am-
tnimition production facilities in-country.
- A significant feature of the five-year pro-
gram to advance Korean force modernization
Is our plan to provide the new International
Filliter Aircraft, the F-6E. This aircraft has
been developed specifically to meet the need
of allied and friendly air forces for an effec-
tive and flexible, yet relatively simple and in-
expensive new fighter aircraft. Congress had
a strong role in initiating this program.
U.S. security assistance to our NATO allies,
except for Turkey, Greece and Portugal is
limited almost exclusively to military ex-
port cash sales. Credit assistance is no longer
required in most instances, and military sales
to Europe represent an economic gain rather
than a drain to the U.S. However, three allies,
Turkey, Greece and Portugal, continue to re-
quire outside grant and credit security as-
sistance to permit them to improve their
cariabilities for fulfilling their assigned roles
in NATO defense plans. Indeed, their impor-
tance to U.S. and NATO security interests
have increased significantly in recent years
as a result of the Soviet military buildup in
the Mediterranean and the volatile situation
in the Middle East. Both Greece and Turkey
have demonstrated their dedication to NATO
defense by major manpower and resource
commitments to the Alliance. It is in the
U.S. interest, therefore, to assist these wil-
ling allies to make a more effective contribu-
tion to NATO defense by helping them ac-
quire more modern defense equipment and
Improved training. In the case of Greece, eco-
nomic growth now permits U.S. assistance for
the most part, to take the form of FMS credit
ior arms purchases rather than outright
? grants.
2. Supplementary Planning and
Security Assistance
Security assistance can also advance U.S
? security in ways less directly related to spe-
ciftc force trade-offs under total force plan-
ning. As we work cooperatively with the mil-
itary officers who play such an important role
? in many Latin American countries, our mis-
? sions and assistance programs further our
interests while responding positively to those
of the Latin Americans. Latin American na-
Aims are our partners, not our dependents.
We seek only to assist?partly through the
several, less explicitly military aspects of our
? security assistance programs such as training
aids?in preserving the environment within
? which 'social and economic progress can
? occur.
? Among our hemisphere neighbors and else-
? where, selectively, throughout the world the
United States seeks to utilize judiciously its
diplomatic, economic and military resources
to help avert war. We must strike a balance
and take care, for example, that our security
assistance does not contribute to hostility
between neighboring states and forces. We
provide security assistance on a case-by-case
basis to assist friendly countries to combat
insurgency and help defeat externally in-
' spired subversion and maintain the kind of
,military balance which will deter external
attack. In supplying security assistance, and
in the licensing of military exports through
commercial sale, we seek to emphasize re-
gional arrangements that enhance stability.
We must recognize, however, that every na-
tion has the right to be prepared to defend
itself against internal and external threats
and that most nations do not themselves pro-
duce the equipment for their own defense
that they may need. We must also be cogni-
zant of the fact that today, as never before,
foreign countries have alternatives to ac-
quisition of defense equipment from the
U.S.?particularly if some form of purchase
Is involved. Nonetheless, we shall continue
to review most carefully potential sales of
military equipment, even to close allies, and
to refuse them where regional security or
other U.S. interests would be adversely
affected.
c. Security Assistance Legislation: For FY
1972 the President proposed to the Congress
that it enact sweeping new foreign aid legis-
lation authorizing and funding security as-
sistance separately from development and
humanitarian aid. The Congress elected to
defer consideration of this approach and in-
stead to appropriate funds under existing
legislation. Nevertheless, by the end of the
1971 session I believe that the benefits asso-
ciated with combining all elements of secu-
rity assistance into a cohesive program sepa-
rate from development and humanitarian'
programs was appreciated by a majority of
the Congress.
d. Summary: I believe that presentation
of security assistance budget requests in the
context of the overall U.S. national security
program will permit easier understanding of
the linkage between the U.S. force posture
and overseas deployments, on the one hand,
and adequate security assistance to allied
forces, on the other.
It is important that the Congress recognize
and understand the important role that
grant military assistance and other forms
of U.S. security assistance have played over
the past two and a half decades in counter-
ing threats to non-Communist countries. For
while the burdens in blood and dollars which
the American people have borne to help de-
fend others have been great, they would in
ray judgment have been far greater without
security assistance. During the past few years,
I believe that we have made major progress,
through security assistance, in strengthening
the capabilities of Free World nations to de-
fend themselves, thereby helping move
toward a more equitable sharing of the de-
ease burden. -
.
rDEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, we
in this body are daily confronted with
the problems of organization and man-
agement of government at all levels.
Today the Secretary of Defense presented
to the Committee on Armed Services his
statement in support of the fiscal year
1973 defense budget. I was extremely
gratified to read that portion of his state-
ment dealing with the organization and
management of the Department of De-
fense. I believe that Secretary Laird's ap-
proach to these problems has great merit.
It is an approach which will insure more
economical use of the resources of that
Department.
The cornerstones of the Department of
Defense concepts of management are
participatory decisionmaking, selective
decentralization and delegation of au-
thority under specific guidelines.
I would, at this point, strongly endorse
one request of the Secretary of Defense.
He expressect sne nope trias the uongress
would take early and favorable action on
last year's proposal for the establishment
of a second Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Such favorable action would contribute
an immense contribution to the improved
body. gement of the Department.
I recommend Secretary Laird's views
on management to each Member of this
I ask unanimous consent that the or-
ganization and management section of
Secretary Laird's statement be printed
in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows: ,
T. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
. ?
In my Defense Report last year, I discussed
the concepts of management we have been
and are applying in the Department of De-
fense. The concepts of participatory decision-
making, defined and selective decentraliza-
tion, and delegation of authority under
specific guidance remain valid and we are
continuing to build upon them.
Application of these management concepts
places more emphasis on people and less
emphasis on elaborate detailed procedures.
Our approach is to define the task, pick a
good man, provide guidance to him and the
necessary responsibility and authority to do
the job.
Our experience demonstrates that people
perform better if they play an active role
in the decision-making process leading to the
policy decision they are responsible for
executing.
The members of the JCS and the Secre-
taries of the Military Departments remain
my principal advisers on programs for the
Department of Defense. They know that their
views are sought and valued; they play an
active role in both decision-making and in
the management of the Departnient.
Although we emphasize decentralization of
management and have increased the role of
the Military ne pa rtmen Ls and the JCS, there
are functions and decisions which necessarily
must remain the responsibility of the Sec-
retary of Defense. Some of the changes in
organization and management made last year
will assure that, as Secretary of Defense, I
can better meet my responsibilities and in-
sure better management of the resources pro-
vided to the Department.
We should all recognize that new concepts
of management cannot solve all of our prob-
lems. We should also be aware that the bene-
fits of new and improved management con-
cepts do not accrue immediately but only
in time, and that we must continue to carry
the products of earlier management well into
OUT Administration.
A. Specific improvements in organization and
management
In a number of instances, the application
of our new management concepts has necessi-
tated additional changes in organization since
my report last year. Among the more signifi-
cant organizational and management changes
instituted in the past year are:
- Establishment of the Office of the Assist-
ant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence).
Establishment of the Central Security
Service.
Establishment of the Defense Investigative
Service.
Establishment of the Defense Mapping
Agency.
Disestablishment of the Office of the Assist-
ant Secretary of Defense (Administration).
Creation of the Office of the Assistant Sec-
retary of Defense (Telecommunications).
Reorganization of the Defense Atomic Sup-
port Agency.
Reconstituting the Worldwide Military
Command and Control System (WWMCCS).
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IirfzelFeC:vil;a Mary
By
Mjk
Causer
.
_ .
Intelligence Shakeups; the.
authoritative Armed Forces
Journal says reorganizations
that have taken place in' the
. . .
_intelligence .community will
-mean "a better deal, not less
-authority . . . for members of .
the defense intelligence com-
munity."
, An article in the December .
issue of the journal spedulates
. .that Defense Intelligence
Agency will get more super.
grade (GS-16-18) jobs, and that
.better caliber mjlitary person-
nel will be assigned to the
Pentagn unit.
Nevertheless, the Journal
reports, the military spy
agency is now outgunned in
the bureaucratic struggle for
top grade personnel. It says
DIA has only 15 supergraders
.to run an agency of 3,088 civil
-service workers, a ratio of 1
'chief for each 206 Indians,
STATI NTL
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17ASU170;:i S !PP.%
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By Oittit;:
.,Si?r Staff Viritf::
. The creation of a consolidated
mtelligence? progarri budget is
? at the heart of the intelligence
shakeup ordered by President
Nixon, informed sounces say. ,
Preparation of the intelligence
bengaL should be the first time
give the President and ether top
officials a clear picture of how
much is being spent for lotel-
ligenee,' where it is 1.,eing, spent
and what it is buying, these of-.
ficials said. .
Richard Helms, who 1-'0%7 is
ihead of the Cent.-al Intelligence
.Agenc;f7, will he responsirie for
propeT-ation of the . bedgel as
-part Of what the Witt,:e House
srmouneeinent said wotilO be his
."enhaneed :role" in
the intelligence
?
Not `Iiittigo.acc
Informed officials cautioned,
however, that the changes order-
ed by the President ??.-/-oalci not
-snake Helms en "intelligence
? czar" in the sense that he 'Mil
te.,11 the hez2s of other -, 1'?
agencies within the gov-
,ernment bow to run their jobs.
His control over the parsestrings
will, however, give inr,e Innen
more control of the over-all in-
telligence 'activities of the gov-
ernment than he has had in the
? past. ?
The changes ordered by Nixon
also give his assistant for
na-
tional security affairs, Henry
Hissinger,. an enhanced role in
'the intelligence field by anahing
him chairman of a !1:1:W. Na-
tional Security Council Intelli-
gence Committee?one off a
.growing number of similar corn-
. mittees he heads.
A Low Net Assessment Group
will be under Hissingcr.. Its job
Is to review and evaluate all Inc
products 'of intelligence work.
STATiNTL
k71'1fl 1T
??. ,
a-nctto make comparative studies 1/said these ? two cnanges ,won't
bf American and Soviet capabil- be much of a problem.
ties.
ities. It will be headed by An-,,/ But they said. the order .to
drew Marshall, a member of the set Up a National Cryptologie
National Security Council staff. Command under . Vice Mm.
Noel Cayler, director of the
National Security Agency, would
"Lake some doing" because the
Do ease Department's code-
breaking activities now arc so.
fragmented.
Similarly, they said, the De-
fense Department faces some
Paiihard Unimpressed . %Attic:L.6,1es in reorganizing its
tactical intelligence?the infor-
mation used by field command-
ers rather than top officials in
Washington.
?
The changes, designed to bring
greater COnteal over the estim-
ated billion a year spent and
2.03,g0 people who work on in-
telligence, have been the subject
of a lengthy dispute within the
administration.
In a press conference Thurs-
day, th.a clay -before the changes
were announced at the ?,.71-iite
House, Deputy Defense Secre-
tary David Packard,. one of they
most outspoken !-.',overnment
indicated he was not en-
tirely pleased by Inc- way the
straggle had worked out.
? "There. have Leen people
thinking if we just had so.;r18::,;:::
over in ti-fe.White House to ris
herd on this over-all intelligence
that things would be jrnpr6rA,"
he said. "I don't really support
that view. After having onperi-
ence with a .lot of people in the
White House the last couple of
years, trying to coordinate ail
kinds of things, I think if any-
tiling we need a little less'coor-
dination. from that point than
more. But that's my own -per-
sonal view,"
'Because the Defense Depart-
ment *ends most of the money
and employs- most ? of the peo-
ple and. machines involved in
intelligence, the . changes-. will
have a major impact there. .
Consolidation Is Hey
The President ordered the
consolidation of all Defense De-?
partrnent security investigations
into a single Office of Defense
investigations and the consoli-
dation of all mapping and chart-
ing activities into a Defense
Map Agency. Defense officials
National Terms
Although the tendency is to
think in terms of national In-
telligence?the lane of informa-
tion on which the President
bases major decisions, for ex-
ample?the, .bulls of the intel-'
ligenee gathered by the various
agencies is ot a tactical nature,
involving such things as the clay-
today movements 6f potentially
hostile ships.
The ?White House said Helms
a career intelligence officer,
would turn over most of his
CJAOperational responsibilities
to his deputy, Marine bt. Gen.
Robert B. Cushman Jr., so be
can devote more time to the
leadership of the 'over-all in-
telligence eormriunity..
Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mieb.,
chairman of a House ?Armed
Services subcor-,-e?ittee that has
been looking into the nation's
intelligence operatioris, .said his
concern is that the changes or-
dered by the President place
an added burden on Helms who,
he said,. already has a. "super-
human job."
`One wonders if any human is
apable of that kind. of respon-
sibility," he
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STATI NTL
ARIeD FORCES JOURNAL
Approved For Release 2001/03/94aCIA9DP80-01601
?
Better 'Deal
for Service Spooks?
WHITE HOUSE SOURCES tell The
JOURNAL that the intelligence reor-
gan!zation announced last month by the
President means a better deal, not less
authority?as the country's press has
been reporting?for members of the
defense intelligence community.
? Among the specifics cited: ?
. 0 More "supergracles" (GS-16 to
GS-18 civilian billets) for Defense Intel-
ligence Agency.
o Assignment of top-caliber military
personnel to DIA (which in past years
has had trouble getting the most quali-
fied Military personnel assigned to it
and proper recognition for their work in
intelligence fields);
o Better promotion opportunities
for intelligence aflalysts (who in the past
have seldom been able to advance to top
;management levels without first break-
ing out into administrative posts that
make little use of their analytical capa-
bilities).
This las? point stems from a major
White House concern with the nation's
intelligence product: "95% of the em-
phasis has been on collection, only 5%
on analysis and production," as one
White House staffer describes it. Yet
good analysfs,.he points out, have faced
major hurdles in getting recognition and
advancement. Moreover, they have been
"overwhelmed" by the amount of raw
data collected by their counterparts in
the more glamorous, more powerful,
and better rewarded collection fields.
The supergrade problem has been of
special concern td the White House. A
high Administration official, who asked
not to be named, told The JOURNAL
that the "White House [has] pledged to
get Civil Service Commission approval"
for a GS-18 billet which had been
urgently requested by DIA Director
LGen Donald V. Bennett. Bennett, he
said, first requested the billet more than
a year ago. Even though DIA has not
Our. Outgunned Spies
A QUICK JOURNAL SURVEY of government-wide supergrade authorizations shows
clearly that the Service side of the intelligence community, and DIA in particular, has
been "low man on the supergrade totem pole" and makes clear why the White 'House
intelligence reorganization is aimed, in part at least, at giving Service "spooks" better
recognition and more attractive career opportunities. Here are typical (in some cases,
ludicrous) comparisons that can be drawn from Part II of the Appendix to the Fiscal
Year 19 72 Budget of the United States, a 1,112-page tome which gives, by federal
agency, a detailed schedule of all permanent Civil Service positions:
O DR has 3,088 Civil Service employees, but only 15 supergrades?roughly one for
every 200 spooks.
o DoD's Office of Civil Defense has 721 Civil Service personnel, but 27 supergrades?
one for every 27 employees, a ratio eight-to-one better than DIA's.
O The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, with only 776 civil servants,
has 36 supergradec?one out of every 22, nine times better than DR. The Peace Corps
also outguns DIA nine to one, with 52 Foreign Service billets in the GS-16 to GS-18
salary brackets for only 1,188 permanent federal positions.
O The National Security Council staff has a 23-to-one advantage, 73 staffers and nine
supergrade (or higher) billets. Even NSC's one-to-nine supergrade-to-staff ratio, however,
pales by comparison with the President's Office of Science and Technology, which has 23
superposts but only 60 people!
Here's how the supergrade-to-people bean count for key federal agencies compares
with DIA's (where authorized, executive level I through V posts are included in
supergrade count):
Defense Intelligence Agency
Office, Secretary of Defense
Library of Congress
Office of Management & Budget
Office of Economic Opportunity
General Accounting Office
Smithso.nian b9
Civil sAmmmesinFo.r. Rele.ase .2001103104::: CIA-RDR80-
Federal Maritime Commission 1- 14
1-206
1- 95
1- 51
I- 78
1- 54
I- 68
had any authorization for a -8, it
took almost 10 months for the papers
needed to justify the single high-level
slot to filter through lower echelon
administrative channels in the Pentagon
before they could be forwarded, with a
"strong endorsement" from Deputy De-
fense Secretary David Packard, to the
Civil Service Commission.
Ironically, just one .day after The
JOURNAL was told of the White
House's determination to help get the
billet approved, it was learned that the
Civil Service Commission had neverthe-
less denied the request. Instead, it of-
fered DIA a choice of having an addi-
tional GS-17 slot or of having a Public,
Law 313 post (which would require that
DIA first recruit an indjviclUal highly
qualified enough to justify the appoint-
ment).
D IA's supergrade structure, neverthe-
less, is going to improve dramatically.
For at least three years, the agency has
been authorized only 15 supergrades,
but will get 24 more under a plan just
endorsed by Dr. Albert C. Hall, DoD's
new Assistant Secretary for Intelligence.
The posts are known to be endorsed
strongly by both Defense Secretary Mel-
vin Laird and Deputy Defense Secretary
David Packard, ? and apparently enjoy
strong backing from the White House as
well.
By going from 15 to a total of 39
supergrade billets, DIA will be able not
only to recruit higher caliber civilian
personnel .but to promote more of its
own qualified analysts into these covet-
ed, higher paying posts.
Pres Misses the Point
Press reports on the intelligence reor-
ganization convey. a much different pic-
ture than the above highlights and White:
House sources suggest. In a 22 Novem-
ber feature, U.S. News & World Report
noted in a lead paragraph that "The
Pentagon appears to be a loser in the
latest reshuffle." Deputy Defense Secre-
tary David Packard is probably the man
most responsible for such interpreta-
tions. In a 4 November meeting with
Pentagon reporters, just one day before
the White House announced that CIA
Director Richard Helms was being given
new, community-wide responsibilities
with authority over all intelligence bud-
gets, Packard said: "There have been
people thinking if we just had someone
over in the White House to ride herd on
this overall intelligence that things
would be improved. I don't really sup-
port that view. ... I think if anything
we need a little less coordination from
that point than more ...."
The White House's determination to
make the .defense intelligence field more
attractive for military (as well as civil-
1601 R001400050001p4taken ear-
lier this year by L.Gen John Norton,
Commanding General of the Army's
STATIN
August JOURNAL interview, Norton c .. sel%C'911etil
Combat DevelAproVed-ftsiriReleare-
said he was trying to get more attention
on intelligence, for example, by making
the S-2 intelligence officer the field
grade officer on Army battalion staffs.
(The S-3, operations officer, is the
senior man under current tables of
.Organization.) Norton said he wanted to
attract into the intelligence field "the
best young commanders in the Army,
the guys who really have a flair for a
military career." CDC is about to
recommend a similar upgrading of intel-
ligence billets at brigade and possibly
even ?division level. This parallels what
,the White House now hopes to accom-
plish by "encouraging" the Services to
fill DIA billets with their most qualified
people.
High Administration offitials con-
firm reports that the White House has
been frustrated by some "glitches" in
the U.S.'s intelligence product and cite
several exaniples to emphasize the need
for better analysis. .
Contrary to many press reports, how-
/
. ver, which suggest that CIA Director
Helms has been given more authority in
? part because of White House displeasure
over military intelligence output, The
.JOURNAL was told forcefully that the
examples run acros the board, with
problems evident in CIA's work as well.
The State Department's Intelligence and
Research Bureau came in for criticism
also. The examples cited:
0 Intelligence reports insisted for
weeks that the buildup of surface-to-air
missiles in in the Middle East cease-fire
zone was not a violation of cease-fire
agreements worked out between Egypt
and Israel (with plenty of help from
Russia and the U.S.), on the basis that
the SAM sites had been there all along,
but had been clandestinely emplaced
before the cease-fire and were just being
uncovered. "There was a lot of pressure
on the intelligence analysts," a presiden-
tial adviser says with oblique reference
to State Department staffers, "to lean in
that direction. Too many people were
hoping we wouldn't have to take a
tough stance: if the missiles were there
before . the cease-fire, technically we
couldn't charge any violation." The
issue was resolved only after a "ludi-
crous" analysis showing that, to have
hidden the SAM missiles before the
cease-fire, the Egyptians and Russians
would have had to secretly dig holes in
.the desert, "big enough to hold several
White Houses."
0 Intelligence projected that the So-
viets would stop SS-9 ICF3M ? construc-
tion at 250 missiles: the most recent
known figure is that 308 missiles have
been emplaced. The 250-missile esti-
mate was inherited by the Nixon Ad-
ministration in NIPP 69 (National Intel-
ligence Projtaii9&?farili.*ug,loub-
kga
Itshed by CrAlfit' MicTHAroY 'I
ptisiegio$M1M-01601R001400050001-4
intelligence estimates were still hedg-
ing" about any higher force levels. "It's
intelligence estimates like this that drive
a lot of decisions on SALT and U.S.
strategic budget planning," The JOUR-
NAL was told. Responsibility for thls
document has been shifted over td
Defense Intelligence Agency, and it is
now called DIPP, Defense Intelligence
Projections for Planning.
" 0 Intelligence reports underesti-
mated "by a factor of six" the amount
of supplies going to the Viet Cong in
South Vietnam through the Cambodian
port of Sihanoukville. The error became
apparent about the time of the May-
June 1970 Cambodian foray when the
U.S. captured intact bills of lading for
the port. As one Nixon aide told The
JOURNAL, "We can tolerate being off
by a factor of two, but six is a little
much." His comment apparently was
directed at CIA, whose estimates, The
JOURNAL was told, differed . by a
factor of almost twp from those sent to
Washington by the Military Assistance
Command in Vietnam.
2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400050001-4
Approved For Releasec29...NRio,R-FRF?,.Rproi 6oi
!S SEP 1-.)71
On CR Vill 2 I.U.5
. , .
. .
-
,
.U.S. .F.>, Secretary of Defense Melvin Baird
?
is reported to be considering a major in-
novation at.the Pentagon, a civilian to be
in charge of intelligence gathering and
evaluating. And high time.
. ? One of the very big lessons which came
out of the "Pentagon Papers" was that
.? Pentagon Iiitelligonce was din-7crent all
/ .
through the Vietnam war -period from in-
telligence. gathered at CIA (Central In-
telligence Agency) and at the State Do-
partme` nt's Bureau of Intelligence and Re-
search (INR): " And there seems to...be
little doubt about which was the more
reliable.
? - The Pentagon's intelligence from its
own, sources was guilty all through of
underestimating the capabilities of the
other side and of overestimating what
'various levels of American forces could
accomplish. The most pertinent 'fact about
it. is that in 1985 Lyndon' Johnson agreed
to the commitment of ',a half a million .
Americans to Vietnam dn the assumption
that it 'would be all over successfully in
ample time for the Ht38 ejection.
Had President Johnson listened to CIA
:and Slate' Department intelligence rather.
than to Pentagon intelligence he would,
not have made that mistake. Their reports
and estimates were consistently' closer to
rnlity. .. ' .
The reason for the difference is 'Plain
enough. CIA and State's INN are both
otaffed by full-time professionals in in--
telligencE,,' work, most of them civilians.
There are a good many former military
men in them services, but they are men
(and woinen) who have gone perma?-.
T 11
nently into intelligence, not just for-? a
short tour of duty. _
Military intelligence is heavily staffed,
and always. so far headed, by officers to
whom it is a, temporary duty between
regular service tours. They are not profcs.-
sionals devo-ting their entire time to in-
telligence. Nor are they civilians rlio can
see such matters from a nonservice-con-
fleeted point of view. It is difficult for an
Army, Navy or Air Force Officer to for-
get his own service when handling intelli-
gence. His inevitable tendency i to hear,
seo, and stress any information or pur-
ported information which will enhance
the... role of his own service, particularly if
he is going on in thA service.
Ideally, the Pentagon would take its in-
telligence from 'CIA and :MR. CIA has
no ax to grind but its own, .and then!" is
really almost nothing it can want which
it -doesn't already have? including rela-
tive anonymity and tool freedom from
detailed scrutisny in the* Congress. A
select committee :of Congress ocs over
its budget every year. Much of it:is totally
secret.' There. are never any debates on
the CIA. budget in Congress. The commit-
tee is always generous to CIA. It has no
.special reason to turn out anything but
the most objective intelligence it can man-
age to produce.
The Pentagon won't take its intelli-
gence from the CIA. Human nature
doesn't work like that. But it would help ?
to have a nonservice-connected civilian in
'charge of Pentagon intelligence. It would
reduce the likelihood o.J'? another Vietnam
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400050001-4
STATINTL
17.11SHIRCT011 POST
. Approved For Release 2001/00/PtEplfpRDP80-01601R
?
7'1cz T1 EV/
The new assistant secretary
. ?
t i`j ,uubecorne the ranking Intel?-
- : ligencc official, in the Penta-
- . gon ? and Defense Secretary
" I,aird's? chief intelligence ad-
1.1Vr 1 kUUiJ i; [V I ?
visor. As Defense officials de-
? ? scribe the plan, however, the
?
o cre-q-0, roe
By Michael Ceder .
Washington Post Staff Writer i?t,
?
n The White House is ex?
pectecl to approve soon a Pen-
tagon plan which would in-
for the first time, a civil-
ian as the top-ranking intelli- .
;.gence official in the Defense
;Department, according to in- ???.'
fornied government sources.
, a The move is part of a more
extensive, government-wide ? ? ?
reorganization plan, much of
-which is still unsettled, aimed
at making the gathering of all.
1960 AP Picture
types of military and foreign
intelligence more efficient and
far less expensive. ... may join Pentagon
Estimates of the current, director of the Defense Intelli?
iovcrnment-wide cost,? each gence Agency, Lt. Gen. Don-
year for global intelligence aid V: Bennett, will also retain
? 'gathering, sorting and analyz? direct access to Laird.
.ing run tO about $5 billion and
'involve some 200,000 people.
ALBERT C. HALL
The bulk of the money?an
restimated $3 billion annually,
?and the people--about
. -150,000--are associated with
the Defense Department.
The Pentagon part of the
planned reorganization in-
volves establishment of a new
iAssistant Secretary Qf Defense
Ifor Intelligence whose job
!would be to oversee the entire
, military . network, including
:the separate activities of all
three services pins those of
the Defense Intelligence
Agency, which is headed by a
military man, and the code-? .
cracking .Ntional Security
A.gency. ?
The Pentagon has never had
a civilian in the top intelli-
gence job before, on a full-
time basis. (Last year, after
the department was rocked by
disclosures of military spyingi
on civilians, Laird named hisi
close friend and then Assistant'
Secretary of Defense for Ad-
ministration, Robert F. Free;
hike, to also serve as a special
assistant for intelligence). . ?
Behind the new Move, as
Pentagon officials explain it,
is a need to cut down the
enormous size of the military
intelligence community and to
weed out unnecessary projects
and facilities.
The feeling that the military
intelligence apparatus had
?
" are Several candi- grown too large and costly in
There
dates for the new post. But comparison to the amount of
D useful information it was pro-
ducing was the principal impe-
tus, according to civilian offi-
,
/
he r. Albert C. Hall, currently a man most Pentagon insi-
derS expect to get the job is
dials,- for a White House-or-
Vice-president .of Martin-Mar- dered study of all intelligence
Jetta Corp., the company that
operations earlier this year.
builds the booster rockets for
?
most of the U.S. spy satellites. In addition, some sources .
. H say that President ? Nixon,
Hall has a reputation as a
top-notch engineer and space while impressed in large mea.s-.
leading space planners in the. Ian, run central Intelligence i
euert, having been one of the ure with the work of the civil-
Agency, was unhappy with
Pentagon between 1963-65. He
Is no stranger to the intell.i.- , mi into the abortive Sontay
military intelligence planning
gence field, 'currently heading going
rison raid and the South Vi-
Appef9MlieFpracRems(re 2 4403104uyINAIRDP130-01601R001400050001-4 ?
mitteo. _ . . , , ,, .:. r,
Also, the Preitident report-
edly was annoyed with the lag
in U.S. knowledge of a Societ
cease-fire viohtion involving
construction of SAM missile
.sites near the Suez Canal dur-
ing the summer of 1970.
Demands for more effi-
ciency have also come re-
cently from Son. Allen .T. El-
lender (D.-La.), chairman of
-the p o w cr f u.1 Senate
Appropriations Committee. El-
lender is threatening to cut
$500 million, out of the total
intelligence budge t which
might involve eliminating. STATINTL
some 50,000 jobs.
Some government officials
estimate that actual cuts could
run' to about 20,000 people and'
a savings of a few hundred
million dollars. ,
_While the Pentagon, as the
chief target of the efficiency
experts, is about to get some
help, proposals for reorganiza-
ing the rest of the intelligence
community appear to be -still
involved in bureaucratic in-
fighting.
Plans to create a new stt- /
per-agency with CIA director V
Richard Helms as the chief
have been dropped, though
many officials believe that
Helms will eventually emerge
with strengthened and
broader powers over all intelli-
gence operations and re-
sources.
Plans lo put a new intelli-
gence coordinator in the
White House are Also said to
?
be unsettled, though such.- a
prospect is viewed as likely.
Helms appears to be a cen--,
tral. figure in .the question of;
how far the government will
go to shake-up the entire intel-
ligence community. . While_
Helms is viewed in all quar-
ters as the top professional
the field, some intelligence ex-
perts fear that giving him a'
job with a bigger administra-
tive work load will dilute his*
contribution to the overall
quality of U.S. intelligence,
weaken the tightly knit CIA,
.and focus even more .power in
'the White House. ,?
1,0S.
Approved For Release 2001/v4144111:/&,? Ilk-IRLiFf&COINZ01R0
Official have estimated Another option involved
that - the military spends movement of CIA Director
about $3 billion of the to- :Diehard Helms into the
tal arnount tucked away White House as the top in-
for int elligence each year telligence man . with in-
in a variety of appropria- creased authority over all
.tions bills. . aspects of intelligence.
The uniformed services - Some officials speculate
account for about 150,000 that the Administration
of the l total personnel fig- may choose some form of
tire. i n t e r nal- Consolidation.
L
BY .111ICILIE (i
'ER - Ellender is known to be This probably would in-
, . ;occit,A.,,,, to -r;:. Ituncs front concerned about overlaps volve cutting back on the
? - Mc: Wasttinoton Post
? .. between the work of the military side and possibly
.. WASHINGTON ---- The individual services, t o o adding a high-level Intel-
White House is expeCted. in a n y agents gathering ligence coordinator - to the
to decide within the next data of doubtful signifi- White House staff,'
several weeks whether to cam:0, too many admirals
and Er,enerals doing workact on proposals for rem-- that could be done by low-
ganizing U.S. intelligence er-ranking men, and the
operations ? .partictilarly setting up of a global corn-
those of the military? munication network that
with. the aim of making.' allege d 1 y exceeds the
these vast and far-flung strategic needs of military
jactivities more efficient .. commanders. ?
:pnd less expensive. . _ Government officials say
... Several possible -reorga- that the ? original impetus
nization plans have been f o r reorganization w a s
under' study since early also a widespread, feeling
this -year. Now, however, in the execntive branch
In addition to some inter- that the military Intel-
nal Administration pre,s- Ii g e n c e apparatus ? had
sure to revamp the intel- grown too large and costly
ligence ? apparatus, Con- for the amount of useful
guess is also pressing the intelligence it produced.
White blouse to act. Also, there was said to be
: ? According to informed dissatisfaction because the
congressional s 0 ll r c e s, form in which Sonic. kinds
Sen. Allen 3. Ell'ender (D- of intelligence ? were pre-
La.), ? chai r in a n of the rented to the White House
powerful Senate-Appro- was not readily usable. .
priations Commitee, has There have also been re-
threatened to cut at least ports---denied by high-lev-
$500 mitlion out of the el officials?that the Pres-
rottghly $5 billion that the ident and his top adviserS
government is -estimated were unhappy with the
to spend annually on all military intelligence work
forms of m lilt a r y and that went into the plan-.
foreign Intelligence opera- fling of the Son Tay Prison
Camp raid in North Viet-
nam 'and the South Viet-
h a m e s 0 incursion into
Ellender's action, these i
sources say' weiild have .1..,aos.
. the effect of. cutting about ? .- Cabinet-Level Post
50,000 people out of an es- - Under t h e o r i g i n-a 1
timated 200,000 military White blouse study corn-
Ana civilian personnel en- pleted last spring, a num-
g a g e d in intelligence ber of options were devel-
work.? . . 1 oped. The most far-reach-
- Ellender's chief targets, ing involved creation of a
sources. close to the sena- new ? s ti p c r - intelligence
t6r say, are the separate agency headed by a Cabi-
f n t e 1 ligence operations .net-level officer and corn-
run by each military ser- billing .many of the now
vice and the Pentagon's separate activities of the
I
'defense intelligence- agen- Pentagon, the Central In-
cy. - telligence Agency and the
,-
huge code-cracking opera-
Approved For Release .2004103104e: VADRDP80-01601R001400050001-4
curity Agency.
tions. ?
200,000 in Field
STAT.INTL
_
yis75.3m(),:a
1I JL1G1g71 STATINTL
Approved For Release 20 / ;5/ 4 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001
r: ?Ii - c,
v,
)
jflflflj3 ti
-
The White House is expected
to decide within the nexi sev-
eral weeks whether to act on
propeshls for reorganizing U.S.
intelligence operations par-
lieularly those of the military
'r---with the aim of making these
vast and far-flung activities
more efficient and less expen-
sive.
:Several possible reorganiza-
tien plans have 'under study
since early this year. Now how-
ever in addition to sonic inter-
nitl Nixon administration pres-
sure to revamp the. intelligence
apparat its, Congress is also
pressing the White House to
act.
According to informed con-
gressional sources, Sen. Allen
Ellender (ll-La.), chairman
ti of the powerful ,,_;enate Ap-
propriations Committee, has
threatened lb cut at least .$502
million out of the rote_4h1Y $5
billion that the government
IS estimated to spend- annu.ally;
on. all forms of military and
foreign intelligence operations.
Ellendcr's action, t Ii e s c
sources say, would .have the
effect of cutting about 50,000
people out. of a Corps of mili-
tary and civilian personnel 'en-
gaged in intelligence work
.that now numbers an esti-
mated 200,000 people. .
Ellender's chief target,
sources Close, to the senator
say, is not the highly special-
ized, civilian-run Central In-
telligence. Agency, but . the
separate intelligence opera-
tions run by each of the mill:-
tary services' and the Pentag-
on's . Defense Intelligence
Agency.
Officials have - estimated
that about $3 billion of the
total amount tucked away for
intelligence each -year in a
variety - of approriations bills
is spent by the military. The
uniformed services account
for about 150,000 of the total
personnel figure.
Ellender's concern is known
to involve overlap between the
work of the individual services,
too many agents gather-
log data of doubtful signifi-
cance, too m.E.my admirals and
enerals doing work that could
be done by lower ranking men.
and the setting up of a global
communications network that
allegedly exceeds the strategic
needs of military commanders.
Government officials say
that the original impetus for
reorganization wide-
spread feeling in-the Execu-
tive Branch that' the 'military
intelligence apparatus had
grown too large pad costly in
*comparison to the amount of
useful intelligence produced.
Also, there waS said to be dis-
satisfaction because the form
in which - some: kinds of in-
telligence were presented to
the White House was . not
readily usable.
Under the original White
House study completed last
spring, a number of options
were developed.
The most far-reaching in-
volved creation of a new su-
per-intelligence agency head-
ed by a Cabinet-level officer
and combining nian'y of the
now separate, activities of the
Pentagon. CIA and the huge
cede-cracking operations of
the National Security Agency.
Another involved movement
.of the CIA's highly esteemed
director ?Ilieltard Helms into
the White House as the top
intelligence man with in-
creased authority over all as-
pects of intelligence.
Approved For Release 200i/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001400050001-4
V4SITI1(1'10:1
Approved. For Release 2001/(13104 1921A-RDP80-01601R
' tab Ons 'began training" int . . . .
. .. . ...
tiona.1 Security Action Mein.
! or andum of Jan. 18, , nine felt
wrote that State-
May, 1961," Here were signs
of danger. _ it '?otir training program
Then Lemnitzer
if ho foi_ : d w
ays later "shos that the ., . . -
t
,
,, t Was focusing not :f?1' MINN (Army of the Ile.
.1 lowed the "talking paper P residen public of 'Vietnam) be based
on sening ce
71 prepared for 'him d in combat fors
, was to --a, prirriarily. on the ' concept' ?
quote the President to him- but on cOunterinsur ?g:
enc-'! that the Vietnamese army'
`-? of "a Special. Group (Count. day
start winning ' on the
_ Be ,ordered establishment
self:
"The President on 22 Nov = - day when it has obtained
ember 1961 authorized the unity ,of e
ff
ort and
t"-IalesstIliVe .the Confidence of the Viet- -
er-Insurgency)"
narnese peasants As a. spa
Secretary of State to in- of all 'fivailable 'resources cific example 1 sur,,,e-t II t
- -.
a? ., m
struct the US Ambassador- with maximum effectiveness we immediately seek Viet-
to Vietnam to inform Presi-
in preventing and resisting namese implementation of a
subversive insurgency and policy of promptly giving a
?dent Diem that the U.S. GOV-
related forms of indirect ag-
? small reward in rice,,isalt or
ernment ' was prepared to gression in friendly coun-
money - (commodities in
join the (VN (Government. tries.',', The new group was which the Vietcong al'e in
?GENERAL LEMNITZER
grim chart talk.
_
By ChElmers AT. Roberts
WashIno ton Post Staff Writer
The year 1962 Opened for
President Kennedy with the
.grim word that he had not
'clone - enough to save South
Vietnam.
. According to documents
:from the Pentagon study
available to The Washington
Post, the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff .had were characterized as hay- -L--m, per6 " ?
' prepared one of those ing 'all the earmarks of Lerrinitzer was responding
'Pentagon flip-chart talks for : gimmicks that cannot and to Lansdales statement that
Mr. Kennedy. Although . will not win the war in Diem was worried about a
there is no direct evidence, ! South Vietnam." The docu- coup against him and that.
? it seems a reasonable as- ? meats do not show that the this had made him reluctant
,surnptio.n that the talk was President had yet commit- to let chis field commanders
delivered. In any case, it is ted himself to "win the war" "implement the task fere
i likely that the dreary word but that was the clear prom- concept that was an impor-
reached the President. ise. The "commitment of US , tant Part of?the_over-all Plan
Can. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, units" - in support of Fresh, of operations against' the
.
of South Vietnam) in a to be _headed by Gin.' Max- - .
short - supply) ' to every per-
..
sharply increased effort to well Taylor. An annex to the son Who gives information
avoid a further dcteriora- memorandum listed . the to the ? army. Similarly, vii-
tion of the situation in SVN. "critical areas" assigned to lages which _show determina-
(South Vietnam)." Next., it as 'Laps, South Vietnam tion to resist ? the Vietcong
: were listed the military' an. Thailand. : _'. a - should receive ?the promp-
steps the President had ap- The same day Gen. Lem- t .st possible support."
. 'proved lelss than two months nitzer sent a memorandum The Joint Chiefs were
-. earlier. to Brig. Gen. Edward Lans- concerned with the larger
? One chart showed "ap- dale, who had been dealing view. - Defense Secretary
proved and funded colistruc? with insurgencies for years,- Robert S. McNamara sent
tion projects" .including im- stating that "now a strong the ? President a mertioran- '
provements at airfields at ease can be made for in- dum ?that illuminated their
Pleiku, Bienhoa and at Tan- creaSed direct participation frame of mind.
sonnhut (Saigon). Here was by US personnel in the plan- 'Entitled "The Strategic
the. commitment .th'u'.; far., ning and supervision of Vi- Importance of the Southeast
But, the "talking paper" in-' etnamese counterinsurgency Asia Mainland," the Jan, 13 ,
(Heated, that. .. was not operWons. Inherent in such paper was signed by Lem,
enough. ? - - ,.? increased direct participa- DIU:cr.- for all the chiefs. It I
c-al-ie. of the projects tion -should be some assur- began this way:
? ?
listed, such as defoliation .
ance of US ? support for "1. The United. States has
then the JCS chan man, was
prepared to discuss China's
problemS (things must be
bad because _wheat had been
(purchased from Canada and
, Australia), the setup of the
16,500-man Vietcong military
establishment and the belief
co D? Diem's Vietcong."
forces in one form or an-
other "should make it ob-
vious to the Vietnamese" and
the rest of the world that
the United States is commit-
ted to preventing Commu-
nist domination of South
Vietnam and Southeast
' that North Vietnam then
-: was running a training can- . .
ter near the city of Vinh Yet "all of the recent ac,
"where prO-Vietcong 'South . tions we . have taken may
.a Vietnamese receive an 18- , still not ,he sufficient to
, month military course inter- stiffen the will, of the ,gov-
spersed with intensive Corn- ernmerit and the people or
\ munist political indoctrina- SVN sufficiently' J.o resist
tion.".? : Communist pressure and
"Two 600-man
. .
battalions win the war without the US
committing combat forces."
trainirg," saiA0-01.0 FeaPktia
u,neritwiticii
___________"talking paper' c , ? t
already have complete
ASO-,
9 meeting with the. Presi- moves Lernnitzer was to put-
dent "and another two bat- to. Mr. Kennedy. But a Na??
.. ? _
On Jan. 26, the 'State De-
partment came .up with
some, Sugg'estionS. Deputy
Under Secretary U. Alexis
Johnson suggested to Dep-
uty Defense Secretary Ros-
well Gilpatrie that if the
Vietnamese armed forces
werd to be increased at the
time "i.ve would envisage
ctrategie plans made in Sai-
gon giving priority to areas
to be eleared? and held and
setting forth general meth-
ods to be used. We believe
these, should be accom-
plished by numerous small
tactical actions planned and
executed by American and
/041ArCiA-Ffpcp8Ct1046
spot to meet e loca situa-
tion at?the moment."
clearly stated and demon-
strated that one of its .unal-
terable objectives is the pre.:
vention of South Vietnam
falling to communist aggres-
' sion and the subsequent loss
of the remainder of the
Southeast Asia ainland.
The military objective,!
therefore, must be to take
expeditiously all actions"
? necessary to defeat commu-
nist aggression in South
Vietnam. The immediate
strategic importance of
Southeast Asia lies in the
political value that can ac- ,
crue to the Free World
through a successful stand
in that area. Of equal im-
portance is the psychologi-
cal impact that a firm posi-
tion by the United States
will have on the countries of
the vorld--both free and
communist. On the negative
side, a United States politi-
cal and/or military with-
drawal from the Southeast
Asian area would have an
adverse psychological im-
gookulowmr
ROntimmA
STATI NTL
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ins to e!VashingtOm
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1f /- 61 .0?.4:.0
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i
Robert S. Allen. ancl John A. Goldsmith
, 4 ? ?
!-- WASIIINGTO N ?In the inaProgressed naler.ihe----Carnera s There is ,in-Short, en argil-
._ .....7 . .
- telligenee ? controversy which eye of the spy satellites. Here meat to be made that the Rus-
grew put of the empty-headed is how the pictures unfolded: - sians are about to install new
-.Son Tay raid, Defense Szere- . Early this Year, after hay- . missiles, perhaps with 5MIRVed
lary Melvin R. Laird lamely jag abandoned work for months warheact.s_Therc is also an
.lamenied the lack of a camera on 1S new silos for their giant argument to be made that the
which could see through roofs. SS- 9missile, . the Russians Russians are simply acting to
and inspect die already raca:.holes for a larger and newly' protect their missile ; silos
ted prison camps, configured miisile silo. Work much as we have acted to pro-
,....Now, . with the . rreinarkable went ahead rapidly at test sites bet ours.
-spy-satellite cameras lock- and on operational . missile
,
Ing down . unobstructed, ? the : fields. . .
secretary is in stile middle of a..* Sen. Henry Eq, Jackson, D-
-new intelligence dispute.. He :?vasb., gave the first warn-
Is accused of exaggerating ? Ing of the ?Minus develop-
even misrepresenting ? the ment in March . Subsequent-
threat posed by a tvw general- ly. Laird and his Pentagon
,
Ion of missile silos within the aides confirmed the existence
Soviet Union.'. of new and larger holes ad
It is one of those vitally mi- said they could well
??k Are the Russians ominously mean
-
.portant arguments which can-
new and 'larger missiles,
not be resolved for the present. Recently, ' however, the:
photographs shown that
. \
' escalating their force of in- th elarg-er holes were dug to.
? : tercontinen altmsilsi es fI(B- accomodate ' reinforcing lin-
? Ms) ? Or ar. e they simply ers to make :the'silos more re-
modernizing the . missile for--; sistant it attacked. Whatever
cc 'to increase its survivabilty? else may be PlanwA, the Rus-
In the intellgence corn- sians are 'hardening" the new
:mutlity tha experts are saying silos, to use the word the Pent-
'?dt- wil hake si xto eight manrIls; non uses. ' . .?
gly-en' the. Present 'pace of acti- Now Lara?d'S critics are say-
vIty at Russian missile sites, lug that, since - the new silos
to have information on which are mostly 5n missile
fields
to base a clear and definitive which harbor the smaller SS-11.
answer. " . . missile, the Soviet activity
:. .Meanwhile Laird 's eritc is just a hardening program
addressed largely to the SS-
are free to claim that the 'sec-
' rotary has added to the Pent- 11 They note that Russan
_agon's credibility gap. his participants -at the SALT talks
have informally described he
.supporters, on the other hand,
work as a modernization , pro-
will keep saying that the Re- -
alms may be opening a gap in gram.
)and '-based missiles. . NO MIND ItUADER S?Both
?")../..prin.coN, ciA _AGREE.a. sides in the controversy get
;Contrary to published reports '
formation. Supporting t h e
sonic support from related : in-
,.which assert that CIA and the
modernization thesis, for ex-
:Pentagon are at odds in the
are removing some of their old
matter, it can be stated that the -
ICBMs from . the operations
intelligence community ts gen- '
' fields.
, erally agreed as to what is he-
. ig done ? at missile sites in On the other hand, there is
that evidence to suggest that the
' Russa, The trouble is
Russians are planning for a
? no oz. knows what -the Rus-
series of missile tesis. So Lai-
-slans INTEND to do.
.... Confusion' also arises .Lon, i'd and his Pentagon experts
are still inclined to think that
:different appraisals, made a t
a new missile, or perhaps a
?``r.- ilif-rPrr.4-4inle:S, :aS the wor14:
. .... . ? .. couple of them, are eventually
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Times's Vietnam Series '
Circulafzcri Pentagon
? __________
sp,eig to The 'Sew York TiD1C3
-WASHINGTON, June
The first three installments
of The New York Times
series on the Defense Depart-
ment's secret study on Viet-
nam have been circulating in
the Pentagon after having
been routinely reproduced in
an internal news publication.
The publication, Current
?
News, is circulated six days
a week to about 2,000 senior
officials of the Defense De-
partment.
An official of Executive
Agency Services, an Air Force.
agency that publishes Cur-
rent News under the jurisdic-
tion of the Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense for public
-affairs, said that he had re-
ceived no orders not to re-
produce the articles.
''We had to leave out a lot
of other stories in order to
get. that stuff in," the official
'said.
Neither the United States
Information Agency nor the
armed forces radio and tele-
vision network reproduced
or broadcast any of the
classified information con-
tained in the news articls,
officials at both Government
agencies said.
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June ,
Mr: Rostenkowski with Mr. DellumS.
Mr. Denholm with Mr. Edwards of Louisi-
ana. ?
Mr. Runnels with Mr. Long of Louisiana.
Mr. BURLESON of Texas changed his
vote from "yea" to "nay."
Mr. RARICK changed his vote from
"yea" to "nay."
Mr. O'KONSKI changed his vote from
"nay" to. "yea."
? The result of the vote was announced
as above recorded.
.A Motion to reconsider was laid on
the table.
.? -CORRECTION OF VOTE
?
Mr. I3LACKBURN. Mr. Speaker, it has
just conic to my attention that the Cox-
. ,ORESSIONAL RECORD of April 22, lists me
aS having voted "yea" on rollcall No. 67.
Mr. Speaker, I did in fact vote "nay," and
I ask unanbnous consent that the per-
manent RECORD DIA Journal be corrected
accordingly.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from Geor-
gia?
There was no objection.
PERSONAL ANNOUNCEMENT
Mr. DULSKI. Mr. Speaker, I have
missed several rollcall votes. Had. I been
present and voting I would have voted
"yea" on rollcall No. 100.
I would have voted "nay" on recorded
teller vote No. 113 and on rollcall vote
No. 114; I would have voted "yea" on
rollcalls Nog. 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121,
122, and 131.
PERMISSION FOR COMMITTEE ON
RULES TO FILE CERTAIN PRIVI-
. LEGED REPORTS
. Mr. YOUNG of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I
ask unanimouls consent that the Corn-
mittce on Rules have until midnight to-
-night to file certain privileged reports.
.The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
. the request of the gentleman
Texas?
.There was no objection.
mo3D-P18444611111111111111111
Reserve of each Reserve component of the
Armed Forces, and for other purposes. After
general debate, which shall be confined to
the bill and shall continue not to exceed four
hours, to be equally divided and controlled
by the chairman and ranking minority -mem-
ber of the Committee on Armed Services, the
bill shall be read for amendment under the
five-minute rule. At the conclusion of the
consideration of the bill for amendment, the
Committee shall rise and report the bill to
the House with such amendments as may
have been adopted, and the previous question
shall be considered as ordered on the bill
and amendments thereto to final passage
without intervening motion except one mo-
tion to recommit. .
The SPEAKER. The gentleman from
Texas is recognized for 1 hour.
Mr. YOUNG of Texas. Mr. Speaker,
I yield 30 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from California (Mr. SMIT1-1) ,
pending which I yield myself such time
as I may require.
(Mr. YOUNG of Texas asked and was
given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
?.
Mr. YOUNG of Texas. Mr. Speaker,
House Resolution 470 provides an open
rule with 4 hours of general debate for
consideration of H.R. 8687, the mili-
tary procurement authorization bill for
? -2 -
fiscal., is
.
.The purpose of H.R. 8687 is to author- amount requested by the administration,
ire appropriations for fiscal year 1972 for ship construction, the report sets
for military procurement, research and forth the continuing rapid growth, both
development, reserve strength, and other in quality and quantity of the Russian
purposes.Navy. To meet this ever growing. threat,
A total of $13,911,900,000 is IS destroyers, attack submarines, and mis-
f or procurement. Of this amount, sile firing nuclear frigates which will pro-
$6,532,500,030 is authorized for aircraft teat our carriers are necessary, and they
for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and are authorized by this bill. ?
the Air Force; $3,645,300,000 is author- The bill authorizes $1,084,000,000 for
ized for missiles for the several branches the Safeguard ABM system. _
of service; $3,328,900,000 is authorized There are some other major decisions
for naval vessels, eq which $14.6 million which this distinguished committee has?
is for advanced procurement for the nu- included: First, a denial of all procure-
clear-powered guided-missile frigate; ment funds for the new Army tank;
$176,400,000 is for tracked combat ve- Second, an authorization of $277,400,
hicles; $193,500,000 is for torpedoes; and 000 to pm?chase F-111 aircraft, $112,-
$35,300,000 is for other weapons. 000,000 more than was requested by the
The legislative committee reduced pro- Department of Defense, to insure that
curement funds for the main battle tank the production line remains open.
from program $59.1 million; increased pro- Third, an authorization of $193,500,000
curemcnt funds for the F-111 aircraft for -the neW MK-43 torpedo, which is
$112 million; reduced the request for the claimed to be the Most effective anti-
. -Minuteman intercontinental ballistic
-submarine weapon available;
RE_ missile $92.5 million; reduced the Navy's Fourth, a denial of procurement funds
MILITARY PRO dUftEMENT,
- SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND authorization for aircraft $24.4 million; for the Cheyenne helicopter pending
- ' . RESERVE STRENGTH AUTHORIZA- completion of a departmental study of -
reduced the Navy's request for torpe-
.. TIONS, 1972 - 'does and related support equipment by
. ? _ - - $12 million; and made several other de- the matter;
Fifth, an authorization of $357,200,000
' - Mr. YOUNG of Texas. Mr. Speaker, by letions and revisions in proposed spend- to _insure continued production of the
. direction of the Committee on Rules and ing authority. ''? . ? - already Ordered 81 C-5A aircraft;
7-on behalf of my distinguished chairman, A total of $7,963,312,000 is authorized Sixth, an authorization of $806,100,000
the' gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. for research, development, test, and for continued development of the Navy's
? COLMER), I call up House Resolution 470 evaluation, as follows; for the Army, new F--14 aircraft;
and ask for its immediate consideration. $1,933,256,000; for the Navy?including Seventh, an authorization of $370,300,-
? ? The Clerk read the resolution as fol- the Marine Corps--$2,460,469,000; for 000 for continued . development of the
low's: - - -- the Air Force, $3,030,144,000; for the B-1 manned bomber prototypes.
. II. Itss. 470 . Defense agencies, $489,443,000. Also in- Mr. Speaker, the bill was reported by-
- Resolved, That upon the adoption of this eluded is $50 Million for the Department the committee by a vote of 31 to 4. -
resolution it shall be in _order to move that of Defense for use as an emergency fund There have been a number of addi-
the House resolve Itself into the Committee
for research, and so forth. . tional views filed.
of the whole House on the State of the .
? Union for the consideration of the bill (HR. The legislation sets the strength of the I assume there will be a number of
8667) to authorize appropriations during the Reserve , forces and provides that the amendments offered when we get? into
fiscal year 1972 for procurement of aircraft, average strength of any Reserve coin- the 5-minute rule. The one amendment
missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat ye- ponent shall be proportionately reduced which we have all heard about is the
. hicks, torpedoes, and other weapons, and under certain conditions, dependent on so-called Nedzi-Wlialen amendment to
research, development, test, and evaluation
the strength of units on active duty cut off funds for Southeast Asia as .of
for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the - ' '- --", ? - . .. ?
authorized personnel strength of the Selected ' Not to exceed $2.5 billion of the funds January 1, 1972._
e .
t.)
.appropriated are authorized to support
South Vietnam, other free-world forces
in South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.
? Mr. Speaker, I urge the adoption of
House Resolution 470 in order that
8087 may be considered.
(Mr. SMITH of California asked and
was given permission to revise and ex-
tend his remarks.)
Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speak-
er, House Resolution -470 provides an
open rule with 4 hours of debate on
H.R. 607, the military procurement, re-
search, and development authorization
bill for 1977.
The purposes of the bill are, first, to
include the authorization of appropria-
tions for fiscal year 1972 in the areas of
military hardware procurement and also
for military research, development ancl
testing projects for new weapons sys-
tems; second, to authorize personnel.
levels for the Selected Reserves of our
Armed Forces for fiscal 1972; and, third,
to continue existing authority for emer-
gency military assistance to South Viet--
nam, Laos, and Thailand.
The total authorization contained in
the bill is 821,375,212,000, a total which
is $18,555,000 below figures requested by
the Department of Defense.
In authorizing $3,328,900,000, the full
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. . ..
,,Trtv r ,,) ,
. . r.,...,......Voa , vi.,:----r,Leven years C.I.A. -and the Defense Depart-
After that disclosure, the, De- ment could reach such differing
.. ago it was the "missile gap," and fonse Department began retreat-
, before that there Was the "bomb- ? interpretations over the big holes,
ing,. The new holes, it conceded, Even if intelligence opeiations
..el.' i;af.i." Two years ago there could he for "hardening" with
:-.was the "first-strike threat" of Should be further centralized--
concrete liners. Put still, the Pen- perhaps " at the White - House
. .largc Soviet SS-79 missiles. And tagon said, they were big enough, level: a.s is now being considered
' now there is the "big hole" to hold two new types of missiles,: by the ? Nixon Administration ??
threat. -
or perhaps improved models of the problem would not be com-
. . Through all those Swiet the SS-1 I and SS-9. At any rate, pletely solved: The uoderlying
? - -threats?each one of which at the the Defense Department admit- difficulty is that intelligence is
fine was more presumed than ted, the intelligence information not a game of certainties but of
real----runs? a common American Was too inCOJICIIISAVe to draw conjectures. As In the case of
strand,. On the basis of disturb- definitive judgments. That was a the blot, holes, certain conjectinas
? ? lug yet inconclusive intelligence far ern from the impression cre- must -bp drawn on the basis of
information, the Administration ated earlier by the Defense De- limited, cii?cumstanticl facts,' and
P ?and the Defense, Department in partment, that the Soviet Union. inevitably the conclusions tend
particular---drew ominous con- was deploying an unproved ver-. to reflect the philosophical out-
elusions about Soviet strategic sion ef the 55-9 or perhaps even ? look and responsibilities of the
intentions and urged a new a larger new missile aimed at policymaker. .
, round of weapons build-up by a firA-strike capability. ? With a responsibility for pa-
? the United Stales, "We have just witnessed the tional security, the Defense See-
' The latest case in point in- shrillest missile gap in history," retary has a. natural tendency to
surMiscd, could be explained by
? . . the possibility that the 'Soviet rector, for example, has virtually
1
volved the big missile, silo holes .
Prt.tc-la-lined Senator William Prox:ichoose. the most pessimistic
l_l_it,at;,,,,ATF:aaiilt eerece.cO!!ii)lgais.islan.clee 311,1,1,'l of Wisconsin, the pr-,otnotos amcmg the ricrige of conjectures
ss'otl..erileitIL'unticon, sti,fitingt1 last
1-1-.?,.. gua. y. "th a month, without the reached from reed-upon - but
nitt.t.I states lifting a firTer or liznited intelligence facts. That is.
ccmber. As yet, they are just sp' t,ndmg a dime, this missin%, gap :what Mr. Laird ('Cl when he pro-
holes, admittedly larger than was closed-The 'scare-icnii tech- jected two years ag,o that the
fore,those btulT, tShoaldectisd have .du.g b.-- nique boomeranged." ..Union would deploy 500
t stop the Perhaps, as suggested by Sena- SS-9's by 1975, and what he did
Defense Department and its Con- I? p ,, there was just an iw:hciii lie saw the pictures of the
gress-i"ril alrlr's fr?1-11 drawl" cie-m'cin'tLoillf ti)roel'itics in the selective l'iLg holes.
COnClut I's about the missile= the {.-otrt???... of intelligence The difficulty is that this -kiud
self-
Soviet Union intended to put in i3?U?a?-i-i?o--n?a-i.:on-i?th;i.,;;thol,:,s. /i:11,f,e7.3,-, of approach can lead to . a the silos. - ?
Senator Henry M. Jackson of spring, just as roguhl. r]y as the fulfilling form of "worst '
analysis, in w,hich the wor at
sicatisici
i,
cherry blossoms bloom on the
? Washington, who first disclosed is assumed about Soviet inten-
?Ttidal basin, there crop up dire
the detection of the large new : warnings et tions comes true because: of the
. 'holes on a national television pro- ' -V-iponswlt a thP?nbhoigutth?Stoivtils-t- American reaction -- or vice
gram, warned that the "Russians
pairocylcilogw;Linnethwe. gpernoecress. ci.f de- i .gressional consideration of the '1-'e'''; a "nlIssili.' 1-'aji" and t'IntS'
anon, an (ler,?? . rapidly deploying them on land
advanced generation of offensive ????;"? budget. and on sea. The Soviet Union
tisystems." Defense Secretary Mel-' - '''-'1- ;then starts deployiog missiles at
I c problem, however, goes
deeper? than political use of in -
Vin P... Laird, on another tele-: . a'. great rate until. it has more
vision show. followed up h.o.: telligence information, which is laud-based . missiles than ? the
stating that the silo construction'
f prohably inevitable when that United States, which starts talk
information has to be translated
. ? "confirms the fact that the Soviet' - r another miss ?,
Union is going fat-ward with the - into policy and appropriations by those bit, holes o''' spotted.
., r ne gap ? when
construction of a large missile ' -Testlitc,''Ing la'st'I't'-'celtbefor?the
the politicians in the Executive
.. -system." Coupled with these : Branch and 'Congress. In part, s?," Appropriationsstatements were warnings that ' ?
the difficulty, as the Nixon Ad- ..t.'--e,c' pc ,..11/orjerSt,o,,Cilloemno-lrit.: /
ministration is coming to realize,
former Deputy Director for Re-
the strategic balance might be .
? tipping in favor of Moscow. ? lies in ?the disjointed way that search of the C.I.A., said that if
intelligence is gathered and an-
Then last week, through Re- ni?. ,d it now turns out tin,tt the Soviet
publican sources in the Senate, - "'-- - ?
it came out that ie Central In- ? ? In principle, the C.I.A. was set bUlanici.inolis putting
51;-11'S in the
.
at least two-thirds of the ?GO silo . policy-making agency that could. ? 04 '7', 0 ojs op. . 1 400050001-4
?.telligence Agent!. PrOlV eat FtiRelWatle1001103104 ..0p1
versa, Thus, the United States
happens to coincide With CCM-
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ALBANY , 11.Y.
KIIICKETIBOCKER NEVIS
E ? 56,638
MAY
7
Penitagon
- Not many weeks ago, the Defense
Department let out another of its unceas-
ing cries of "Wolf" by saying the Soviet
Union was embarked on. a program of
'constructing launching Silos for a modi-
fied version. of its SS-9 intercontinenthl
missile or possibly an entirely new
missile.
With that cry, Defense Secretary
Laird said the department might have to
a-Sk.for more money for more strategic
weapons.
A few days ago, Senate rtepublicans
said a CIA report indicated the Soviet
construction program was NOT for new
. missiles spoken of by the Defense De-
partment, but was merely an upgrading
of' sites for its relatively modest SS-11. ?
intercontinental missile.
Leapfrog
. Now ,comes Round 3. The Pentagon,
lfl one of those contradictions in which
it is so competent, gays two things. it
says there is no basic disagreeinent be-
tween its assessment of the Soviet Under-
taking and that of the CIA. Then, in its
?second breath it says the construction
program may not be for one new type of
missile but for TWO.
What We have here is the Defense
Department playing leapfrog over the
CIA. It starts with one new Soviet
missile, then leaPfrogs over the CIA
assessment of no new missiles and comes
up with two new missiles.
It is a great game for the Pentagon.
But we can't help but remember that the
..stakes it plays with are our lives and
our money.
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DAYTOl, OHIO
NEWS '?)Y1/1 Y 2 a 1,9:0
E 161,2,64,g
S - 2157
,
r 0
LT! kL-2/
. r6(r.1-7
.Y Ci?L.-/
'1:'110 Defense department and the Cen-
tral Intelligence agency are arguing over
?
the meaning of some holes in the ground,.
like ancients interpreting chicken en-
: trails. The issue is as important as it is
confusing, and congressional action on it
:could either commit billions more to
..nuclear. Weap011rY OF endanger the secu-
rity of us all:
The holes, 60 of them, are in Soviet mis-
sile fields, and they are larger than any
other holes our spy satellites have ever
spotted. This has led the Defense depart-
ment to conclude that the Russians are
preparing sites for a new generation of
,nuclear missiles----perhaps one that car-
ries s ev er a I independently-targeted
'1-17bornbs in its. nose.
? On March 10 Secretary Melvin Laird
Confirmed that ?"the Soviet Union is
in v o 1. e d in a new and apparently
?extensive----ICHM construction program."
lie said the Pentagon might ask Congress
?",*kr. a supplemental appropriation? to coun-
ter the threat. ,
I Now the New York Times reports that
\-) the CL1413as rejected the Laird analysis.
:CIA experilS, says the Times, have con-
' " chided the larger holes are for concrete
liners meant to "harden" missile sites ?
against enemy strikcs?a defensive tactic
STATI NTL
o r
?1-1,17(j)(!7;
. 4,9 21 ?L.."
-z) t O
Ci
? 'I '
the United States has already employed at
its Minuteman sites.
, Evidence for this is that most of the
larger holes have .been dug in existing
SS11 missile fields. SSlis are relatively
small ' missile's, and arms experts say
there is no reaSon -why huge new -
missiles would be placed among them.. s/
Also, the CIA reportedly has pictures of
concrete liners which have already ar-
rived at the sites. The liners are not big
enough. around to accommoUate large
?
. ?
It Comes down to a question of inten-
tion. If the Soviet goal is to acquire a:
first-strike capability that would render.
the United States unable to respond to a :
surprise attack, we have no choice but to
? keep a jump ahead of their nuclear:
technology, and the jumps go by billions or
dollars.
The confusion is still another reason for:
the United States to press the Pu.ssians..
hard in the strategic arms negotiations..
If the Soviet Union is not plotting for a-
first-strike advantage, it has little reason:
to hesitate about limiting offensive
weapons. A treaty would spare Russia
the vast new spending that 'would he
forced on it if Washington mistakes re-a
furbished silos for new missiles and pace;
the arms race?into another lap. .,- ?
?
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THE 11.1\11-CHESTEll C411WDIAN
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'RAPIIAEL, Vizashington, May 2C;
A dispute between the Central In Agency and the Pentagon over the i
interprotaiion of the GO new missile silos in the Soviet. Union has led to a reassess-
mit of linssia's strategic intentions at a crucial stage in the SALT 11.Cg0'liatiOnS.
1
The new silos pinpointed by strike attack posed by the Un ion is going forward with
co
satellite rennaissance were. Minuteman-3 missiles_ with their construction of a large missile
orig?inally described by _ the new MIitV warheads. The size system. We cannot tell at this I
Defence Secretary, Mr Laird, on of the hole is explained by the time whether it is a modified i
March 10, in alarmist terms as need to insert concrete liners version of the S59- ..... or i
possible evidence of a new around the missile to give whether it is an entirely: 'new
generation ?of massive offensive greater protection, missile system." . .
missilessuperseding
It uss?ia n blockbuster rith,.,e A conclusive piece of A niontli later in a speech to
missile. ,S.11 evidence is reported by intelli- the American Newspaper Pub-
The CIA, 11?;,v..ever, 11 13 (1V,'
briefed imic-pendent? arms con-
trol experts that at least twe.
thirds of the large silos arc
designed to give increased pro-
tection to the relatively small
SS11, equivalent to America's
.Minuteman-3 strategic missile,
Questioned about the dis-.
parity today, the Defence
?Department appeared to be
backing from the Penta-
gon's original sessm e:it. The
department's spoke-smart said
inforation gathered within
the ilast month gave some
indication that the Soviet Union'
might be involved in two
separate systems of silo
improvement. " Our best jud,g-
Inent rernain that we would
(11CC in ii to Iiave been hshers' Association, Mr Laird
received early last week when said the US had fresh intellig-
reconnaissance satellite pie. ence " confirming the. sobering
tures showed silo liners 21'ri fact that the Soviet Union is
ing at the missile sites. The involved in a new, and appal::
photographs were also said to ently expensive. ICBM construe-
have indicated that the liners at tion- programme:',
neither type of site were big The net effect or the missile
enough to accommodate larger in.
scare was neatly suille i
st up n
missiles and those at the ,5S9 ?
sites did not ap:-iear. to be evide.nce yesterday to the
intended for ;.'eapons of Senate appropriations commit-.
improved design.
tee by' ?2, former CIA and dis-
h. the CIA's intelligence is armament agency ofiicial. Dr
correct the new Russian missile lierbert Scoville, chairman of
threat posed by tbe Pentagon the strategic weapons commit-
and the hawks in unison is a tee of the Federation -of Amen.
chimera. The threat first can Scientists, said that if as ,
received a- public airing on now 'seemed likely the soviet
March 7 when Senator Henry ,Union was only hardening its
Jackson (Democrat, Washing- missile sites, this would indi-
toll) told a televIsion ? It
eate that it was not seeking
ex.c?ect to see new missiles or viewer, "The Russians are now first ? strike. capability. "We
improvements on existing mis- in the process of deploying a must ask ourselves," he told the
he said.
. ? :new generation. anadVance committee, " how many times
The CIA's assessment of the ? generation, of -offensive we are going to allow the
new silo construction is that the systems."
Soviet Union, Ince the US' is v!eaponeers to ce?me before the
Three days later in a televi- Cong,ress and the people shout-
engaged in a programme o/ sion interview. Mr Laird said ing 'missile gap ' when in
hardening silos to protect thein that the silo construction " eon- reality they are only creating
against the threat of1'8' t
7 firmed the fact. :that the Soviet another credibility gap."
---?
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Approved For Release .2000)310tialMRPP80-01601
--2 7 IJAY 1971
I . initially, mtelhvence experts
1
-1211.111.7f(1 rt',...T.,r;t \ 1.1"(;',17.-:1 ? estimated. that 'because- the holes-
' li\t, ..1...i. t'si?::2; It; ..;.i tt it t.-:.)) 1._ t; ..).) were of gretter ditmeter than
i - - . .tiny seen in the past, they were
II P 11 (1, designed for a missile. bigger
..t.
cr:"!---r:',- -; i ..,, than the Russian SS-9----now the
., ,
yv y v.--; iikL,J V---:,0t2-,,) 0 world's largest TCYr.ti----or for a..
Ai 0 version of the SS-9 that might ".
11,71'',,- r,.-,,,-.11,--- r,-,,.--, 1--17:.01.7 carry a multiple warhead.
\
--i fe i't 9"-',.-'-'0.i:';'. "':/ il " '1: 1 Se:n. P(nry Jackson (D-Wtish.),
., 4 '?,' r ic..,.?-. il ,:s) r 11 1, i '
1 d ??..: 'j i- ' '''' ..---' ''' '''' - " d who first reported the new silos
- Washington, may 2z (NrEws. 1?,Tati-t-h, 7, said the Soviets were
0, 0' -:,oymg a Pei. generation, ,- i
COIIStrInt1011.MilISIS'tiliele Soviet 'Union
11/13)liciloT;
Bureau) --:-
advanced generation of offensive
may mean that the Russians axe t'VSten1S."
In an April 59 speech, Defense
working on two new offensive
Secretary Melvin R. Laird re-
missile systems, instead of just
ported fresh evidence "confirm-
onc a Defense Department
ing the sobering. fact that the
spoi:esman said today..,
Soviet Union is involved in a
The spokesman, Deputy As- new ._ and apparently exteanive. _
sistant Secretary Jerry W. Fried-
ICBM construction program." :
beim, said this conclusion was Friedkeiro took a much more '
drawn from analysis of the work cautions approach. ?
being done on about CO new in- c-we said Very early in this
tercontinental ballistic (ICBM) discl;sstori . . . that we were not
silos being built in the Soviet certatin ?vhat the Soviets' iz,tteilt(1
-
Union. The new launch holes are tio?a are," Friedbeim said, ,A m
bigger than any seen before by that remains ur hest assess_
U.S. spy satellites. bent." -
Survive Attack
He said that evidence_ gathered
this month indicates that the So-
viMs "may be. involved in two
separate systems of silo improve-
me?t." These possible "improve-
ments" include either new mis-
siles or the development of "hard-
ened" silos so existing missiles
would be more able to survive an
nttack. i
"Our .best judgment remains
that we would expect to see new
missiles or improvements of ex-
isting missiles," Friedheim said.
"Wet are not certain what the .
-Soviets' intentions are."
? . Discusses CIA Report
.Filedheim was commenting on
roports that. the Central ' Intelli-
gence Agency believed two-thirds
of the new silos were simply
; nwre attack-proof holes for exist- :
ing missiles. Friedheim said the
CIA., and Pentagon have no dif-
ferences in their intelligence
Alssessments. ' .. . ....
W6664001-4
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Approved For Release 2el6ikiditivI: CIALRDP80-01
2? MAY ;971
- .r1 11
("": _)11
?..
By :Michael Geller
wpshin ton Pcst St::? W.titer-
:The Pentagon said yester-
? jaCkson (D-Wash.), and was
.i%daY that th-c missile later confirmed by Defeiise
'silos. being built in the Soviet secretary Melvin 31.
Union' now appear to be de- .
.signed for l'AVe different kinds While toe Pentagon has said
of I011Als, but conceded that .,along that it was not sure
more than half of the new tne holes were for a cern-
holes May be for the relatively
small and less threatening SS-11
ICBM.
Defense offiCials said that
new intelligence gathered
since late last month indicated
that the silo buildin program
touched off scares
here of a new Virlis race?may
11? :,'eant in part to provide
protection for Pussian
111!:e--es, both the SS-lis and
the 111.1ge 55-9s, against U.S. at-
tack. rather than as a big ex-
pansion of the Soviet SS-9
force;
However, Pentagon spokes-
man Jerry W. Priedheim made
it clear that the Pentagon's
"best.. judgment remains that
either. new missiles or modifl-
,cations of existing missiles?
? will go into the "two separate
systems of silo improvement."
Privately, Defense officials
say they believe the most
likely prospect now is that the
Soviets v.,311 combine their silo
hardewing.. effort with installa-
tion of imPi.oved versions of
both missiles, rather than with
any completely new ICBM
even bigger and more ominous
than the existing SS-9.
? . Of some 60 new ICBM silos
that .U.S. spy satellites have
Spotted - since this February,
veil-informed defense officials
say._ that 20 to 25 are under
, o
1?11
V 1) 11?i"?i?
..., . ?
?(;
Disclosure of the new silos.) Washington hopes to hold
was first madc publicly on down'. the number of Soviet
-
March 7 by Sen. Henry AlSS-9s to about 300.
The Soviets jiow. haVe al-
most 283 55-9s on the firing
line and presumably will add
20 to 25 .more in the new silos.
Priedheim denied there had
been disagreement between
pin els new missile Cyr for a
modification of the existing
55.9, the impression was gen-
erally created that whatever it
was, it was very big. It is the
55-9, equipped with multiple
warheads, which th.?_'_ Pentagon
has portrayed as the nlajor
threat to 1,:noel-ing out -U.S.
Minuteman ICRi\l's in a sur-
prise attack.
There was no official, indica-
tion given until yesterday that
the new holes might be for
protecting small ICBMs as
well.-
?
The 55-11. carries a much ,
smaller warhead than the SS-9 '
and is not viewed as a first-
strike weapon.
Friedbeim said that while it
was still unclear what Soviet
intentions were "new infroma-
lion now available to us leads
us to conclude the Soviets
may be involved in two sepa-
rate silo improvement pm-
grams" rather than. just one.
The new evidence, other
sources say, was photos of dif-
ferent size protective concrete
liners for the missile silos
which reduce their inside di-
ameters arid of different base
layouts used for the two mis-
siles.
Priedheim said that in the
past the Russians have in-
stalled SS-l1ICBAls into what
construction in missile fields heretofore have been bases
normally associated with exist- used exclusively for shorter
log .SS-9:b:Ses.-and. 35 to dO at range missile.
SS-11: bases. No misSiles have Privately, Defense officials
actually been installed in any conceded that the latest deVel-
,or the new holes so far, the of- oprnents, if they do not
ficials, say. change, are less provocative'
? Friodheini ?, yesterday. ex- than a big Soviet drive to add
plained .that the _original de- still larger missiles. Splitting
tection_:of the new silos showed the new silos between SS-9s
? "diaineteFs.large enough to en- and 55-11s also seems to fain
? .'compaSs any missile in the So- with U.S. objectives at the
viet inVei'tory":' -'?? ? strategic arms limitation talks:
the CIA and the Pentagon
over assessing: the meaning of
the silo construction program
in recent weeks.
.Nevertheless, Sen. William
PEOXIllire yesterday
called the episode the "the
shortest missile gap in his-
tory."
.Proxmire accused both
Laird and Jackson of whip-
ping up "a series of scare 'e-le
sories" based on the "wholly.
unproved assumption that.
these holes were all designed:
for the huge new 25-megaton
ES-9 missiles." ?
"The lesson is clear," Prox-
vire contended. "The practice
'of selective dizclosure of par-
tially analyzed intelligence
data by the Pentagon and its
allies should stop. Congress
and the American public must
not be swept off their feet by
R!als designed merely to ye.,?o-
ie,c,:andize for a bigger and fat-
ter military buewet."
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001400050001-4
nvi YORK !TIMES
Approved For Release 20Q1L60MAY4T.? CIA-RDP8
z i/1
GIL SAID TO DON'
01T S VIM
-1) MISR' F.1 THTFAT
Senate G.O.P. Sources Sa}!
'Agency Thinks Soviet Silos
Are for Existing Arms
PROTECTIVE STEP SEEN
? 'Moscow IS Be! eved to Be
"Hardening' Installations ,
for Its SS-11's
By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special tl'The New York TirAcs
',WASHINGTON, May 25 ?
:Senate Republican sours re-
ported today that the Central
'Intelligence Agency concluded
that at least two-thirds of the
large new -silo holes recently
detected in the Soviet Union
were intended for the relatively
small 'SS-11 intercontinental
a.rnissile and not for a large new
aweapon as the Defense Depart-
ment has suggested.
This assessment casts a dif-
ferent light on Moscow's stra-
tegic intentions at a crucial
time in the, negotiations with
the Soviet Union to achieve
some .21mitation on defensive
-.and offensive strategic weapons
It now appears to some arms
control' specialists that the So-
et Union, rather than seeking:
achieve a first-strike capa-
ility
against the United States:
,With large new missiles, is fol-
lowingthe American course of
:trying to protect its missiles
against attack with "hardened"
silos.
?, 60 New Silos Detected
Some CO large new Missiles,
silos in the Scarlet Union have
been detected in recent months
by means of reconnaissance
.1/ satellites.. The C.I.A. was said
:to have concluded that at least!
?
to-thirds were intended for:
'the SS-11 intercontinental mis-!
site,. which is comparable to
the Minuteman ICBM of the!
United States
Approvedf
Some -'fionItIciVernmentalI
?sources with access to Central
Intelligence Agency information
said that all but 15 of the new
holes were situated in existing
SS-11 missile fields.
The Senate Republican
sources said thay had been in-
formed of the C.I.A. assessment
?binon-Governmental arms con-
trol experts who earlier had
been briefed by the intelligenc
agency. These sources declined
to be identified by name. ?
The Defense Department de-
clined today to comment on the
reported C.I.A. assessment be-
nausea as a department spokes-
man put it, "We would not
have any comment on a specu-
lative report like that."
But the spokesman said the
department still held to the
interpretation that the Soviet
Union was -deploying a modi-
fied version of :its large SS-
intercontinental missile or an-
. -We cannot tell at this time
whether it is a modified ver-
sion of the SS-9 ... or whether
it is an entirel] new missile
system," he sale,
Secretary Gives Warning
Then, in a speech April 22
before the American Newspa-
per Publishers Association, Mr.
Laard said the United States
had fresh intelligence informa-
tion "confirming the sobering
fact that the Soviet Union is
invoved in a new?and appar-
ently extensive ? ICBM con-
struction program."
He warned that if this Soviet
missile build-up continued, the
Defense Department might find
it necessary to seek a supple-
mentary appropriation for more
strategic weapons.
Last week, Administration of-
.ficials were reported to have
said that the Soviet Union was
pressing ahead with its new
missile program so rapidly that
test firings of an improved
SS-9 or an entirely new and
larger missile were expected
by this &Minion
entirely new missile system. -
Much of the concern and I
gel-ice information, the C.I.A.
On the basis of new. intern- ?
was said today to have con-
cluded that the larger holes
could be explained not by a
Soviet move to a larger missile
but by an engineering step in-
tended to protect the existing
Soviet missile force.
According to the intelligence
agency's analysis, the larger
Union may be deploying as a holes can be explained as an ef-
"first strike" weapon against fort to 'harden the silos, by
the United States's Minuteman ;emplacement of a concrete
force. This in turn gave rise to shell around them, to protect
official speculation that the So- Ithe weapons against the blast
vict Union was planning to de- effects of a nuclear explosion.
ploy an imProved Version of the
SS-9 or perhaps an even larger,
speculation over the intended
,purpose for the new silos has
'sprung from their unusual size.
According to data obtained
by the satellites, the holes were
larger than those that had pre-
viously been dug for the SS-9,
a large intercontinental missile
that Defense Department offi-
cials have suggested the Soviet
The larger hole IS required to
accommodate the concrete
more powerful weapon. liners, according to the C.I.A.
Senator Henry M. Jackson 'analysis.
who first disclosed the detec-1 Old Dflisaile Fields Utilized.
tion or the new silo holes on a!
national television program!
March 7, said at the time that
"the Russians are now in the',
It was said that the first
evidence that the Soviet Union
might be "hardening" its mis-
process of deploying a new; sue sites rather than develop-
generation, an advanced gener- ing a new missile system ap-
ation of offensive systems." peared in the fact that the new
The Washington Democrat, a holes were detected primarily
member of the Senate Armed in existing SS-11 missile fields.
Services Committee, described. If the Soviet Union was de-
the development as "ominous ploying a new weapon, it pre-
indeed." I sumably would not situate the
The Defense Department took new missile emplacements
a somewhat more cautious in- among older missiles, according
terpretation, saying that it had to the C.I.A. view, k
detected new ICBM construe:- The conclusive piece of evi-
tion but was not sure what the dence was said to have been
Soviet Union's intentions were. received early last week when'
But in a television appear- reconnaissance satellite plc-
ance on March 10, Melvin R. tures were received showing
Laird, the Secretary of Defense, silo liners arriving at the mis-
said that the silo construction sile holes. The photographs
"confirms the fact that the So- were said to have indicated that
viet Union is going forward the liners at neither the SS-ll
with construction of na large nor the SS-9 sites were big
missile system. enough to accommodate larger
o r'Re lease20GT/03/04RiZIAATDPEC01-41156
sites did not -seem intended for
weapons of altered design.
The United States started
hardening its Minuteman silos
some years ago as it saw the
Soviet Union expanding its
ICBM forces, and then. began
"superhardening" them as the
Soviet Union began deploying
the SS-9 missile.
i Some arms control specists now maintain that the
So-
iviet Union now is turning to
:hardening its SS-11 and SS-9
missiles as it sees the United
States deploying multiple inde-
:pendently targeted re-entry ve-
hicles, or multiple warheads,
known as MIRV's, which po-
tentiaily could acquire the ac-
curacy to strike precisely at
Jay
Soviet missile sites.
This was a point made to
before the Senate Appropria-
er-
of7
the
tions Committee by Dr. H
bert Scoville Jr., a former
-finial of the C.I.A. and .
_
? -
Disarmament and Arms Con-
trol Agency, now chairman of
the Strategic Weapons Com-
mittee of the Federation of /
American Scientists.
A hardening of the Soviet
-missile sites, he observed
"would not contribute to a
first-strike capability and, if
anything, would be an indica-
tion that a first strike was not
a critical Soviet policy olo-
jective."
If it now turns out that the,
Soviet Union is only hardening.
the SS-9 and SS-11 missile
silos,- he said, "We must ask
ourselves how many times
are going to allow the 'wean.-
oneers' to come before the
Congress and the people shout-
ing 'missile gap,' when in real-
ity they are only creating an-
other 'credibility gap.'"
STATI NTL
001400050001-4
3
frntrPOS).
Approved For Release 200R/04IA-RDP80-016
_
-
?The 17,'zIp3'13.143gton Ti7erry.frilo.11milld
!Pentagon reepltoie
Jack 447derson::
The 'N7-i/Ord. has conic down
from the highest Pentagon lev-
els to find the culprits who
haVe been leaking us informa-
tion on some of the military's
mest secret (and most embar-
rassing) adventures.
Investigators have been
busy grilling suspects' behind
the dbors of room 3E993 at the
Pentagon. .
The gumshoes are most con-
cerned about a series of col-
umns we wrote which they be-
lieve were based on secret
communications intended for
the ."eyes only" of such big-
wigs as President Nixon's for-
eign policy sage, Henry Kissin-
iger, and the Joint Chiefs'
chairman,. Adm. Thomas
Moorer. .
. The brass hats are particu-
larly redfaced about our re-
cent report that they have
been intercepting South Viet-
namese President Thieu's pri-
i7ate communications, which
are decoded by the National
Security Agency and passed
on lo-the White House and
ether agencies. The messages
are identified -by code name
-"Gout."
'The U.S. is able to pick
them up because South Viet-
nam uses American-made code
,machines, and U.S. intelli-
gence experts are familiar
with their construction and
!wiring.
'The military brass also are
Upset ever our discovery that.
.Admiral Moorer received a
flash" message after the
abortive Son Tay prisoner res-
cue mission which said the
North Vietnamese prison corn-
-pound had not been occupied
for three months.
The Pentagon would also
, like to ?know how we learned
that Air Force planes had
)ben seeding the clouds over
the, Ho Chi Minh trail network
'to make the monsoon seasons
even rainier. This novel means
of flooding the enemy supply
line is known as operation "In-
termediary-Compatriot."
? ? ?
Lax 'Security
,
, 'Actually, .the Pentagon
shouldn't be .surprised .that
some secrets are getting out.
For some of the highest ofri-
lals_ have become extre_raely_
AppromOyEaritkalleiaise 2001103/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001400050001-4
? \
Althaugh he vigorously de-
nied it, insiders say Paul Hear- ? ,/
ney, assistant to Joint, Chiefs'
Chairman Moorer, has some-
times phoned the Defense In-
telligence Agency communica-
tions center on unsecured
,phone lines and had top-secret
information read to him.
Men on duty in the commu-
-nications center have re-
minded hint that he was using
an unsecured line. But he has
dismissed their warnings, say
insiders, with such comments
as, "We aren't worried about
that."'
Also, admirals and generals
receive telephone calls at
home from the Defense Intel-
ligence Agency when an im-
portant secret message has
come in for them after hours.
Rather than go to the Penta-
gon, the lazy brass frequently
have the sensitive messages
read to them.
Another possible source of
leaks is the haphazard way in
which copies of top-secret mes-
sages are finally taken away
to be burned. They are put in
large, candy-striped bags
which may remain in a com-
munications center for weeks
until they are filled.
1971. Bell-Nictfure Syncpcatc. Inc.
? STATINTL
Approved For Release
t
18a-RD,P80
STATI NTL
STATI NTL
"?Frank,Mankiewicz and Tom Braden
'7
Intelligence Boss Is Neede
[ THE TROUBLE with the
i intelligence service of the
[ United States is that it has
'no commander. This is the
point perceived by Presi-
dent Nixon during a recent
secret White House briefing
at which the President liter- .
ally 'threw up his hands in a
display of impatience at the'
vast, expensive and compli-
cated bureaucracy which
1 had been described.
The President had asked
for the briefing because of
three recent and irritating
intelligence failures.
The first was at Sontay, in
iNorth Vietnam, where the
Army mounted a dangerous
' f operation to recover prison-
ers who weren't there.
t Second was the failure to
'ilearn that the North Viet-
/ namese were using the Port
V. k of Sihanoukville in Cam- '
t
sbodia as a vast supply cen-
!ter?a fact discovered only
1-
After we barged into Cam-
bodia thinking the supply
tenter was somewhere else.
It Third was the failure of
rthe U.S. command in South
Vietnam to forecast the
'speed with which the North
Vietnamese could send rein-
forcements into Laos, and
the Army's failure to esti-
mate how many South Viet-
namese ground troops and
tAmerican airmen would be
needed to do the job.
t
'ALL ,THESE failures ?
'caused the President to ask
for a clear explanation of,;'.',
ow bur. intelligence -system.
47.17:47.7,..t k+4, ,7711. 711o777...,"
works?and why it some- money for intelligence
times doesn't work. What he comes through the Depart.
received was an accurate ac- Ment of Defense, there is a
count of confusion. natural inclination to tell
The first point Mr. Nixon the coordinator how the
learned is that the $2 bil- money should be spent.
lion-a-year intelligence ef- PRESIDENT N I X.0 N
fort is not commanded but /would like to bring Helms
coordinated. Richard Helms,
41 into the White House. That
is usually the first thought of
a careful objective analyst, the boss who wants a clear
commands CIA but not the picture of what he may have
Defense Department's Intel- - to deal With, and one man to
'ligence arm, which iS (whom he can turn to get it.
headed by Lt. Gen. Donald , But if Helms makes this
A move, he will have to give
V. Bennett. General Ben- . up running e en ra In-
nett, in turn, doesn't really telligence Agency, where he
command his own forces be- first made his mark as a
cause he is often dealing master of spy networks and
with intelligence requests into which he has brought
from officers who outrank both order ,and a healthy
him and whose wishes must , ,' sense? of restraint. (It was
be regarded as orders. . ? not Helms' wish to involve
Thus compromise fre- , the CIA in Laos.)
quently substitutes for deci- ' With Helms in the White
sion in determining Defense House, the intelligence ef-
Department intelligence ugi it, ovOlfiamt47 -
priorities. Bennett must try 1
to satisfy an admiral who in- I .
sists that developments in
submarine detection must ;
come first, a general who is.!
more interested in the thickj
ness of Soviet armor, and an .
Air Force man who insists
on priority for new develop-.,
ments in the Soviet SAM. [
Helms must balance all this 1
with the importance of find-)
Ing out what the Russiansj
are putting in their ICBM 1
bases and why. , I
,1
Nobody is boss. Nomi-
nally, Helms is "coordina
tor" of the intelligence ef-1
fot:Lpot*,s}nLejEost?qati
nated by the Defense De-
partment. On the basis of
recent performance, this
would be a disaster. Former /
CIA Director John McCone,
?who was also asked to move.
' to the White House, argued,
that he would become
merely a go-between while;
? the agency he commanded .
withered into an anachro-i
nism, much as the State De-
partment has withered with'
. the advent of resident for-'
ign affairs aides.
One compromise open to
1 the President is to give Lt.',
Gen. Bennett another star,.
? thus putting him on an,
equal footing with those
? who are asking him to make
their priorities his own. But
If this President?or any
Vother?really wants a better
T intelligence system, he will
? eventually have to put sonic/
body in Charge. ? ?
' klt7
.00
Approved For Release 2001/08/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001400050001-4
Igsza-G2 zo_a
Approved For Release 20VONff4filA-RDP80-0160
-.THERE IS A good dee of
talk here about President
? Nixon's plans to reorganize
tour 'foreign intelligence
?
Services, According to one
iaccount, the President was
infuriated by the Defense
Intelligence Agency's mis-
- reading of Hanoi's probable
response to the Laotian in-
cursion. "Hanoi threw 35,000
? men of. four divisions
against the' 17,000 in
iARVN," an intelligence
source told the Times' Ben-
' jantin Welles. - "Th ey
stripped North Vietnam of
troops, gambling that the
United States wouldn't in-
vade the North?and they
were right. Their estimates
',were better than ours."
-.. This allegation, if verified,
'should not only lead to the
reorganization of our intelli-
gence structure, but should
generate the instant dis-
. missal of everyone in the
?,DIA who had a hand in pre-
paring the estimate. The no-
? tion that Hanoi was going to
? hold back its strategic re-
serve to counter a possible
invasion was simply prepos-
terous. It could only have
been made by men without
the slightest understanding
of, or respect for, the intelli-
gence of the enemy. .?
.0.,? Indeed, this has been one
of the curses of the war.
From the outset, military
.strategy was formulated on
an appalling underestima- ,
tion of Hanoi's determina-
tion and capacity. While
:they would, of course,deny
It today, Washington was in
1964-65 full of optimistic
.technocrats who were cer-
tain that Ho Chi ?Minh
would collapse with fright
?the first 'time an F-103 c
?buzzed Hanoi. The strategy/ c
of bombing North Vietnam ?
was thought of as a way of c
-.preventing a war, as a tech- c
-.pique of scaring the North t
t
'off South Vietnam.
- o
' ? WHEN ONE CRITIC op- o
. posed the bombing strategy io
- : in an article In The Wash- n
,.? ington Post in the spring of r
J965, he was informed on a
ohn P. Roche
lies. Intelgence
Failure in Asia
? -
background basis by high
State Department and Pen
tagon figures that his son
her pessimism was unjust
i
fled. He was told that h
? simply didn't appreciate the
? virtues of air power. When
he argued that Ho Chi Minh
? was not the chief of a primi-
tive hill tribe, but a totali-
tarian genius dedicated to
conquering all of former
French Indochina, At what-
ever cost, these briefers ob-
viously wrote him off as an
ideological nut. He was in-
formed that the "intelli-
gence community" (which
? presumably excluded ideo-
logical nuts) was in full
agreement that the North
Vietnamese response to the -
bombing would be "defen-
sive."
In 1971 the same crew
seems to be calling the
shots. Let us look for a min-
ute at the view from Hanoi
of the Laotian incursion.
Hanoi has political experts
who follow American opin-
ion (in fact, one of their best
men holds a Ph.D. in politi-
cal science from a distin-
guished American univer-
sity). Suppose you put the
question to Hanoi's Ameri-
can desk: "How would the ?
Americans? react to an inva-
sion of North Vietnam?"
After the Cambodian con-
vulsion, it would hardly take
a Ph.D. in political science
to answer that one.
SO THEN YOU go down
the hall to the military intel-
ligence division and ask its
members: "Do the Ameri-
cans and South Vietnamese
have the assets for an inva-
sion of North Vietnam?"
Since they can count, they
an make an extremely ac-
urate assessment of our
rder of battle. Taking into
onsideration the rapid de-
rease in American combat
roops, the ARVN opera-
ions in Cambodia, and
ther facts about the state
f combat readiness of var-
us ARVN divisions, it is
ot hard to guess their
eply: "The use of crack.
-troops koi. 'the Laotioan'in;
. eursion has eliminated any
1. possibility of .a diversionary
2 maneuver Into the North."
Of course, in a rather pa-
thetic exercise in psycholog-
ical warfare, President
Thieu in Saigon made noises
about invading the North.
However; far from influenc-
ing Hanoi, all that Thieu did
was to arouse the doves in
the United States. In the
event what Gen.. Giap did
was to strip North Vietnam
of its strategic reserve and
throw the whole force Into
containing ARVN in Laos. It
probably cost him a good
deal in manpower ?he. had
to bunch his forces where
our planes could get. at them
?but in political, terms it
was probably worth it. Laos
got billed as an American
defeat, as a failure of Viet-
namization. In fact, it was
an inexcusable failure in
American intelligence. ?
Q'1971. King Features Syncijcate, Inc.
STATINTL
? J
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? 541;086
..?? 697,9_66
MAY 1 6 1971
'Charles Bartiaa's 'notes
bTOIn cwi bllaCke: CIS011
? WASHINGTON ? President Nixon is mak-
ing it a point to meet the deadline set by the
13 black legislators for an answer to their
demands for more help to the urban poor. On
Monday he will respond, item by item, to the
- 60 proposals advanced by the Black Caucus.
He will not turn them all down, but he can't
promise much because the cost of the blacks'
. program is estimated by budget officials at
" between $57.5 million and $105 million. The
President is, however, eager to convince the
Rockefeller wing of the GOP that he is smypa-
thetic to the problems of the black minority.
Image remakers
THE WHITE HOUSE is still seeking solu-
tions to what it regards as the President's
? Image problem. A new assistant is being
sought to serve as the domestic equivalent
to John Scali, who is advising the President
on how to improve his public relations in the
foreign-policy area. Meanwhile, Charles Col-
son, a high-ranking aide, is collecting ideas
on how to improve Mr. Nixon's projection
on television.
- Fly in ointment
THE PRESIDENT has been cautious in re-
sponding to solicitations from former Presi-
dent Lyndon B. Johnson for official participa-
tion in the Johnson Library dedication on
May 22. Mr. Johnson asked him to fly some
- 500 of his guests down to Austin in Air Force
jets, but the President, apprised that the cost
of each plane would be $8,000 out of his con-
tingency, fund, has so far balked. He is afraid
there will be an adverse public reaction. So
' one group of 100 Johnson associates has char-
tered a Braniff Airlines plane, and others will
, go on regularly scheduled carriers..
Bees' needs
.?. -
NATURE NOTES: The House juSt passed,
without dissent, an administration proposal
that beekeepers be awarded $3.5 million in
indemnity payments for damage done to
their honey and bees by insecticides .
White House gardeners, who developed a
colorful array of flowering plants for table
decorations in the Johnson era, are re-
strained now by Mrs. Nixon's taste. Size has
a strong preference for using only red
flowers.
-
? .Pollution stanclE.ircis abroad
U.S. officials are working hard to impose "
U.S. pollution and safety standards on foreign
countries so that U.S. manufacturers will not
face a competitive disadvantage in foreign
trade. A total of 11 U.S. ecology specialists
flew to Prague last week for a conference on
European pollution problems. Identical air-
monitoring systems have been set up in St.
Louis, Ankara and Frankfurt as part of a
health study. The Japanese public's sudden
concern with pollution promises that manu-
facturers there will not escape the added
costs.
Bigger role for Helms?
? Mr. Nixon has not decided how much of a
reorganization he wants in the intelligence
community, but it seems likely that he will v
give Richard Helms, Central ?Intelligence ?
Agency director, some co-ordinating author-
ity over budgets that pay for intelligence
_cictivities in the Defense Department. The
President's agreement to have Helms ad-
dress the editors convention here in 4,711 is
taken as a sign that he means to move Helms
Into a more prominent rote. ?
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STATI NTL
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. ?
JOURtNpty A
i 4 19-ni
II- 66,673
8 ? 209,501 _ .
- -----?
17---"---. O. - '--- ' : ' - ? *-/ ' -- ?
1
:A Song e Agency '..?
11 A major reorganization of the nation's overseas,
intelligence services is under consideration at the ,
: White House, and the sooner the job is done, the
'better for the country. The precise outlines of the
overhaul are mit yet clear, but it is obvious that Mr.
Ir. Nixon is determined to improve intelligence .serv-
i
L., ices while cutting high operational costs. r ?
;.------ 1 The Central Intelligence Agency is the most
-, prominent of the federal agencies which collect and i
1
E4 -
I analyze foreign intelligence. But there are five
1
1- other agencies involved, in similar work. The total..i
t: annual bill for all six agencies runs to about five
t_billion dollars; about 200,000 persons are involved,..
I mostly in the armed services. ' ? i
,A study made for the President includes a rec-
ommendation for the creation of a Cabinet-level '
1
f% intelligence department;' it also includes provisions
%-?for tightening CIA's oversight of intelligence work
', ? _
; done for the?ar.naezLatrzices in the Defense Depart-
ment. It is plain that any reorganization will run '
_.
} -squarely into operation of long-established vested
i interests.
f 7' 'There is a superficial attraction to the idea of
!.'creating a Secretary of Intelligence, but does the
',:.? task of correlating overseas intelligence work rate
..
=-1 'a Cabinet post? It would seem that such a service i
:,-.- is intended to provide information to all major ,
? agencies of government and, as such, might more
4 properly be made a White House staff function.
Assigning the CIA Primacy among the intelli-
gence agencies is certain, to run into opposition;
'- particularly from military service agencies. But
t somehow, the goal of cooperation must be fixed and '
t
4 -enforced in place of what must often be almost
1 _. cutthroat competition among the. six agencies for
G.money, staff, and authority. .:
;Congressional opposition or suspicion of a presi-
dential effort to centralize the overseas intelligence
1.- services might be blunted if Mr. Nixon accompanied
i-;- his executive order with a 'proposal for appointment
.. .1' ? of a joint congressional committee, such as the
t? Atomic Energy Committee, to oversee the intelli- .
gence gathering services for the legislative branch. '
C- ? ? Mr. Nixon will not have an easy time in the
.1.
,
,--. proposed reorganization, no matter what may be
rthe precise nature of administrative reforms. But
:
t. reforms are needed; in fact, they have long been
, ...oirerdue. A single agency, coordinating all intelli-
f..gence work overseas 'effectively for the President
' -and his Cabinet, is _essential to the national security.
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SALEM, ORE.
STATUMAN
--
35,5 72
t7P1
.1.L t ,
ii 0
woc:
. C)
t:
(J.,. ? p
" The U.S. government spends an esti-
mated $5 billion annually gathering in-
telligence all .over the world.
President Nixon has serious. doubts
.about whether we are getting our mon-
ey's worth, reports The New York
.Times: He is considering various ideas
to reorganize our various global infor-
mation collection efforts.
The Central. I.ntelligence Agency, a
civilian orgailiz-ation, is our prime
means of gathering strategic informa-
tion throughout the world. But much of
the intelligence effort is carried out
through the Defense intelligence Agency
and 150,000 men assigned to intelligence
branches of the various armed services.
The $5 billion cost figure is only a
very rough estimate. The government
never reveals intelligence spending pub-
licly, in order to deny this information'
to potential enemies. As a result, only a
handful of our congressmen and hardly
any ordinary citizens know much about
our- intelligence activities.
The President reportedly is con-
cerned about the quality of our intellig-
-once effort' as ? \veil as its cost. The
`nines says he wasn't happy about two
recent intelligence failures, which prob-
ably is an understatement. One was theL..
STATI NTL
7;
I;
.?,fr:er); ft
0
,rry,
Linid-
work that preceded that abortive prison-
er camp raid deep into North Vietnam
Inst. November, when the raiders discov-
ered the prisoners hadn't been in the
camp for some time. The other was the
great underestimate of North Vietnam's .
ability to counter that South Vietnamese
move- into Laos.
Good foreign intelligence is of e,x-
treme importance to the U.S. It can
mean the difference between preventing
and blundering into a war. It can pre-
vent serious mistakes our government
Otherwise might make on a long list of
subjects -- everything up to and includ-
ing the question of what new weapons
systems we should be developing to
protect our country from which poten-
tial threats. It's a prerequisite to mean-
ingful arms control, for example, which
if achieved might save us several times
the cost of all intelligene.e.work.
So if it takes $5 billion per year to
keep our government well informed
about scads of actions taking place all
over the globe, we'll not complain. .s
But both the size of the price tag ancii,
some of the recent fumbles make US'
suspect that the President's critical re-
view is very much in order.
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?
SCRANTON, PA.
TRIBUNE
- 34,458
SCRANTONIAN
? S 47,518
MI 1 219111
Intelligence Agencies
ur In
? Presidents have been misled at
?-?iie time or another by faulty intelligence
t reports. President Nixon has been irritated
in recent months by two examples of
ehoddy intelligence work.
Last November, inferior intelligence
-
'resulted in the abortive prison camp raid
- at Sontay, North Vietnam. The staging of
,the raid was an example of fine planning,
but the raiders -found no American prison-
ers to rescue. The prisoners had been
.shifted elsewhere and our intelligence
'sources failed to report the move.
The incursion into Laos earlier this
year by, the South Vietnamese Army met
:massive resistance, all because our intel-
ligence sources failed to pick up Hanoi's
'moves to implement forces in the field in
?Laos. ' ?
?': President Nixon is now said to be con-
sidering a major reorganization of the na-
-tion's foreign intelligence activities to im-
rove output and cut costs. There are sev-
eral options the President can follow. One
'creation of a Cabinet-level department
of intelligence. Another is strengthening
the authority of the director of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency oyer the global
operations of the Pentagon and other in-
telligence- agencies.
The United States has a far-flung in-
telligence network that costs taxpayers
about $5 billion annually to Maintain.
Many Presidents have bemoaned the fact
that intelligence reporting has been rather_
,
erratic despite the money pumped into the
program.
The Central fritelligence Agency is the
largest of the agencies speciaTiiing in in-;
telligence activities. But. there are other,
bureaus performing similar services, five
of them with overseas ties. At least 200,00'
are employed in the intelligence agencier
Many observers feel the President me
take action through art executive order dc.
.fining the authority of Richard Helms; d'
rector of the CIA. The authority of Helrr
is rather imprecise at this point. The mon
could strengthen the CIA director's av
thority .over such intelligence-gather jr
agencies as the Pentagon, State Depart
Ment and Federal Bureau of Investigatio^.
Whether such a solution is a viable one
would remain to be seen.
\.)
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STATINTL
The TYV,571-11.:1:1;;.t. Din -11121'27pm
IYIDDT(BT Aido
By Jack Anderson the DIA regularly gets a copy.
It is smuggled to them by
International espionage is Adm. Thomas Moorer, the
seldom as efficient as the in- joint chiefs' chairman, who
ter-departmental spying that has sufficient standing to get
on the distribution list.
goes on in Washington. To make unauthorized cop-
The rivalry between some ies of this sensitive presideet-
government departments is so tial digest is akin to counter-
intense that they spy on one felting holy writ. Yet our spies
have spotted a Moorer aide,
another like suspicious who is entrusted with the ad-
spouses. The armed forces, for mirars eyes-only messages,
Instance, watch each other furtively running off copies on
Jealously. The Central Intelli. a DIA copying machine.
Another
gence Agency never makes a supersecret docu-
ment is the State Depart.
move without the Defense In. ment's intelligence round-up
telligence Agency keeping from embassies around the
close surveillance. And when a world. The department guards
State Department employee
this so jealously that it is
stamped, "ODI," which
enters the Pentagon he takes means it isn't supposed to be
the same precautions as if he distributed outside State's
were entering enemy tern- own elite.
tory.
What .they don't know, how-
No ?
dally document is more
ever, is that a Pentagon .pi-
sensitive that "The President's geon in their midst runs off
Daily Intelligence Briefing:, unauthorized copies and
sneaks them in a plain brown
which the CIA prepares for manila envelope to the joint.
President Nixon. It is loaded s
with SI (Special Intelligence) chief chairman and the DIA.
dect
item ir or.
s, country by country, on Thus do government agen-
Jong sheets tucked into a
cie-s, in the best cloak-and-
white folder with blue letter-
dagger tradition, snoop upon
one another.
To possess a copy of th,--
President's private intelli-
gence digest is the ultimates,
status symbol. Those who see'
. it are men of consequence, in-
deed. tiut for the DIA, which
is eager to know what the CIA
knows, access to this exclusive
document is a matter of ut-
most priority..
Our own spies tell us that
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STATINTL ?
.31a' ihikkolle9c1 o r Releas12
The proposed legislation would per-
mit the ,court to make cliacaetionary al-
lowonces not to exceed $150 for a re-
?ceivor and $230 for a trustee in those
cases, where the distribution is too small
to provide an aderntate basis for com-
puting a reasonable allowance for the
necessary services rendered
Under this proposed legislation, the
maximum allowances which are at pres-
ent permitted for a trustee will be appli-
cable to receivers. This will represent an
Increase in the percentage rates for re-
ceivers and also have the effect of in-
creasing, for receivers, the range of the
application of the higher rate to the
medium and larger distributions
The maximur allowances for trustees
have. been,incrTased, with this proposal,
by increasing the range in which :the
rates :for a trustee are applicable
The proposed increase in the custodial
rate would make it unnecessary for the
referee to enlarge the duties of the re-
ceiver in order to fairly compensate him
for his services
The proposed increases would apply
only in banlarriptcy caeca' initiated subse-
quent to the enactment of the proposed
legida tion
The above bill was approved by th
Judicial Conference of the United States
at its October 1070 session
?
?
By Mr. BURDICK:
? S. 1356. A bill to amend section 35 of
the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. 63) and
sections 631 and 624 of title 23, United
States Code, to permit full-time n.ferccs
In bankruptcy to perform the duties of
a U.S. magistrate. Referred to the Com-
mittee on the JudiCiary.
Mr. BURDICK. :arr. President, I intro-
duce for appropriate reference, S. 1306,
, to emend the Bankruptcy Act to oermit
? .fulltime referees in bankruptcy to per-
form the duties of a U.S. maaistrate.
The Federal Maaistrates Act, approved
October 17, 1966, 82 Stat. 1107, paovides
that with the approval of the Judicial
Conference of the United States "a part-
time referee in b2nkruptcy--niay be ap-
pointed to serve as a part-time magis-
trate," and authoriaes the Confersnce to
"fix the aggregate amount of connsensa-
than to be received for performing the
? duties of part-time magistrate and part-
time referee in bankruptcy" 23 U.S.C.
634. The act, however, does not authorize
a full-time referee in bankruptcy to per-
form the duties of a part-time J.S. mag-
istrate. In addition, section 35 of the
Bankruptcy Act, pertaining to qnalifica-
tions for referees in bankruptcy, provides
in part that an individual shall not be
eligible for appointment as a referee
unless he is "not holding any of:ce of
profit or emolument under the laws of
the United States or of any Slate or sub-
division thereof -other than conciliation
coMmissioner or special maater under
?
this Exceptions to thi.s previaion
are made only in the case of a part-time
referee in bankruptcy.
In the design and.orgonization of the
new system of U.S. magistrates two dif-
ficulties have arisen which v,-cat'sd be
ameliorated in part if a full-time referee
In bankruptcy were authorized in) per-
form the duties of a U.S. magistrate.
in(
0641631041s:TOALROP80-0
First, there is the problem of a 'back-
rip'' for a magistrate who is ill, or tem-
porarily away from his atation on bust-
ness or :vacation. Some courts have re-
qunstcd authority to appoint a second
part-time magistrate at son se locations
at a nonsinal salary to arraign defend-
ants and set bail in the absence of the
regular magistrate--aa function which a
. referee in bankruptcy might
well perform. Second, certain language
in the Magistrates Act and in the Bank-
ruptcy Act seems to prohibit a court from
combining a position of part-time ref-
eree in :bankruptcy with a position of
part-time magistrate, in order that it
may have one full-U:1*-x officer rather
than two part-thou officers. It is the view
of the Judicial Conference of the United
States and its Committees on Bank-
ruptcy Administration and tire Imple-
mentation of the Federal Magistrates
Act that it would he in the interest of
good judicial administration to permit
full-time jai:fere:es in bankruptcy to per-
form magistrate duties and to authorize
-a full-time combination position of ref-
eree in bankruptcy.
en.
By Mr. CHURCII:
S. 1397. A bill t.o amend the U.S. In-
formation and Edueational Exchange
Act of 10.16 to impose restrictions on in-
formaticn activities outside the United
States of Government agencks. Re-
ferred to the Committee on Foreign Re-
lations.
F.E0a.IILIT /NG TIIE UNIT):13 STATES FROM ENI3AG-
, ING IN kr.OPAGANDA A