NIXON WILL ADJUST INTELLIGENCE CORPS TO FIT HIS WORLD PLAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R001300440001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 172
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 3, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

ST. PAUL , MINN.
WANDEh ER.
b.,.f.pr,ro2/94-
WEEM,Y. ? CIRC. N?A
r Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0013
THE scow REPonT
17 0 liii
V N d
U
25X1A
WASHINGTON? The American
intelligence community is
preparing for one of the most
sweeping realignments since the
Central Intellieence Agency (CIA)
was established in the late 194usnt
could also become one of the most
controversial.
In ordering the shake-up,
President Nixon's principal
objectives are to tighten White
House control over the
Government's vast in-
telligence community and to
make it more
changes taking
relations with
Peking.
responsive to
place in U.S.
Moscow and
White House aides say the
President hopes to accomplish
these objectives in several ways.
First, the President plans to
replace Richard Helms as director
of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) with his "own man." This is
expected to be James R.
Schlesinger, presently chairman of
the Atomic Energy Commission
ri Et?
n
ii
Lt L'c.
PAUL SCOTT
forces to successfully oppose it.
With both Helms and Laird now
leaving government, the President
has once again dusted off the
Schlesinger recommendation and
now wants the former Virginia
University economic professor to
see if he can't implement it.
The President would like to
see Schlesinger test out some
of the ideas he put in papers
prepared while Director of
Strategic Studies at the Rand
Corporation, a government.
financed "think tank" at Santa.
Monica, Calif.
These papers dealt exclusively
with how systems analyses could
be used to improve political,
military, and intelligence decision-
making, and cost-cutting in these
fields. While at the Hand Cor-
poration, Schlesinger also
prepared a study on. the cost of
nuclear-weapons proliferation
which caught the President's eye.
NEW INTELLIGENCE
OUTLOOK
r
Li
Fl P
President is convinced that
much of the intelligence now
gathered the hard way and. at
great expense may become
available through mutual
exchange of information.
This proposed intelligence ex-
change is an integral part of the
risky "partnership for peace"
strategy Which Dr. Henry
Kissinger, the President's national
security adviser, has succeeded in
getting President Nixon to adopt.'
Veteran intelligence officers see
the realignment as a move by the.
President and Kissinger to make
the .intelligence community more
responsive to their efforts to use
foreign policy to build a new world
order.
Since intelligence estimates are
used as a key factor in the for-
mation and support of American
foreign policy, a tighter con?trol of
the national intelligence opertitians
by the White House would
increase Kiesinger's a-eady
tremendous -iirduence in riaking
this policy. sde eeier: e in-
telligence (lee-
and a member of the inner White"Kissinger wants ? the in-
In discussing the need for an
house circle, telligence community to
intelligence shakeup with aides,
Second, the President plans to support foreign policy, not to
the President indicated that he was
drastically cut the budgets of Dll help shape it. This could be
rcpl acne' IA I)irector Hchns
intelligence agencies by an disastrous since it would result
because the latter was not
estimated $300 million. ThiS ssoltid in predetermined estimates of
ti;j4,,ressive etiough to in ii the
mean big cutbacks in porsonnel /intentions of governments like
and operational funds for the j Russia and
changes he kilieves zire necessary
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in the intelligence community. China."
the Defense Intelligence Agency, Helms, a camer CIA employee,
the National Security Arency, and was a holdovei from the Johnson
the intelligence functions of the Administration.
State Devil( tment and military
services.
Significartly, the proposed half-
billion-dollar reduction co. the seire
fles-e recommended in a study
made by a panel headed by new relaton,,inps wilich exist
Schlesinger, \Olen he wns hely/cell the UniteJ States and
As,lia "int Director of the Purest] of Russia and the United Stales
The President's view is that
the Government's intelligence
roles and rnissh,ns must he
qr,-;dway charyjeo to rriect She
CO 111 munist
Time ? and events should tell
whether this estimate is correct. ?
INTELLIGENCE
FLASHES
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KtioAftprerdfnfiR.elease 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP
JOURNAL 25X1A
M - 66,978
DEC i 2137a
0
. -747 4,7 Ti/T, 6,34 1 4117'1 (n.'4
('
C)
By Paul Scott
WASHINGTON ? The Ameri-
can intelligence community is
preparing for one of the most
sweeping realignments since the
Central Intelligence Agency was
established in the late 1040s.
It could also become one of
the most controversial.
in ordering the s h a k eu p,
President Nixon 's principal
objectives are to tighten White
House control over the govern-
ment's vast intelligence commu-
e'----
n ii
IL fie
107 A
11%.'ii.5 CIAU?A. 707
Chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission, and a member of
oily and to make it more respon- the inner White House circle.
sive to changes taking place in Second, the President plans to
U.S. relations with Moscow and drastically cut the budgets of all
Peking. intelligence agencies by an esti-
White House a ides say the mated $500 million. This would
President hopes to accomplish mean big cutbacks in personnel
these objectives in several-. and operational funds for the
ways. First, the President plans Central intelligence Agency, the
to replace Richard Helms as -Defense Intelligence ,Agency,
director of the Central Intelli- the National Security Agency,
gence Agency with his "own and the intelligence functions of
man." This is expected to be the State Department and mill-
James R. Schlesinger, presently tary services.
Significantly, the proposed
1 half billion dollar reduction is
? the same figure recommended
in a study made by a panel
headed by Schlesinger, when he
was Assistant Director of the
Bureau of Budget. When the
Schlesinger recommendation
was first circulated by the
White House, CIA Director
Helms and Defense Secretary
Melvin Laird joined forces to
successfully oppose it.
With both Helms and Laird
now leaving government, the
President has once again dusted
off the Schlesinger recommen-
dation and now wants the-for-
mer Virginia University Eco-
nomic Professor to see if he
can't implement it.
The President would like to
see Schlesinger test out some of
the ideas he put in rapers pre-
pared while director of strategic
studies at the Rand Corporation,
a government financed "think
tank" at Santa Monica, Calif.
? 'I hese papers dealt, exclusive-
ly with how systems analyses
could he used to improve polit
cal, military and intelligence de-
Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001300440001-2
cision making, and cost cutting
in these fields. While at the
Rand Corporation, Schlesinger
also prepared a study on the
cost of nuclear weapons prolif-
eration which caught the Presi-
dent's eye.
In discussing the need for an
intelligence shakeup with aides,
the President indicated that he
v was replacing CIA Director
Helms because the latter was
not aggressive enough to make
the changes he believes are nec-
essary in the intelligence com-
munity. Helms, a career CIA
employe, was a holdover from
the Johnson Administration.
The President's view is that
the government's intelligence
roles and missions must be
gradually changed to meet the
new relationships which exist
between the U.S. and Russia
and Communist China.
As contracts and negotiations
produce new agreement with
these communist powers, the
President is convinced that
much of the intelligence now
gathered the hard way and at
great expense may become
aseiilable through mutual ex-
change of information.
This proposed intelligence ex-
change is an integral part of the
risky "partnership for peace"
strategy which Dr. Henry Kis-
singer, the Pi esident's national
security adviser, has succeeded
in getting President Nixon to
ad\nCiti'eran intelligence officers
see the relignment as a move by
the Presid,sni and Kissinger to
make the intelbe-nce cenminni-
ty more resronsiye to their ef-
forts to til-e io.eign policy to
build a new world order.
 Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : commeSOINO1Aj4001300
4 DEC
CPYRGHT .
Si
II rifb?., pi ? m S a.' Lon xed
04,
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ESSEP c
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By OSWAI D JOHNSTON
Star-News Staff Writer
;The impending resignation
; of Richard M. Helms as the
I nation's top intelligence officer
can in large part be traced to
s serious and continuing policy
?disagreement with Henry A.
;Kissinger, according to in-
formed sources in the intelli-
gence community.
e. The disagreement reported--
1y began with Helms' position
In 1959 on a key intelligence
issue? whether the Soviet
Albion, with its giant SS-9
was going for a "first-
-6trike capability,? Helms took .
The less alarmed view.
Helms' departure, which has
been confirmed by authorita-
tive sources in the administra-
:tion, has not been announced
-publicly pending a decision by
-..j.he Central Intelligence Agen-
cy head . to accept another po-
It is understood the new po-
sition will involve the foreign
. policy field and will be pre-
sented, publicly as a promotion
for the 59-year-old Helms, who
,
has been involved in intern-
,gence work ever since World
N'irar IL
? Role'Was Expanded
But insiders already are
e'Voicing skepticism that any
;job outside the intelligence
:?field could be anything but a
comedown for Helms, who is
:believed to have been anxious
to stay on as CIA chief.
A key element in this view is
?the belief within the intelli-
gence community that Helms
:had lost the confidence of the
--White House?Kissinger espe-
cially.
'.?? "Kissinger felt that Helms
wasn't. so much trying to sun-
port ? the administration as
playing politics on his own?
trying to keep his constituency
together in the.intelligence es-.
tablishment," one source ex-
plained.
'? In all outward respects,
;.however, Helms appeared to
Ie have been given President
Nixon's full confidence, ex-
pressed both in public state-
ntents an.d in Helms' assign-
ment just a year ago to a
? to the administration view, ?
ApP.M4411?6FRi4eligs12;6011 /06/09h: CIA4RIDFPROP0160:1R001300440001-2
.'bility in intelligence. intelligence assessmen t,
championed by Laird, was the
M a result of a sweeping
reorganization of the intelli-
gence community in Novem-
ber 1971, Helms' official title,
Director of Central Intelli-
gence, was expanded .to in-
clude new budgetary and orga-
nizational authority over the
whole $5 billion a year U.S.
intelligence effort.
The origin of Kissinger's dis-
satisfaction with Helms is said
to reside in an incident, early
in 1969, in which Helms made
an intelligence assessment in-
volving a fundamental ques-
tion of national security that
was .sharply at odds with the
view advanced by Pentagon
intelligence experts an held
privately in the White House.
The incident was one of
those rare oceurences when
the latent disagreements in
the intelligence community
surfaced publicly, in this case
in the persons of two rival
chieftans, Helms himself and
Melvin R. Laird, secretary of
Defense.
. At issue were the massive
'Soviet SS-9 intercontinental
ballistic missiles, whose exist-
ence as a new weapon in the
Soviet arsenal became known
to intelligence early in the ad-
ministration's first year.
Liard testified before the
Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that the new mis-
siles, which are capable of
carrying a much heavier pay-
load than anything deployed
previously, meant that the So-
viet Union was going for a
"first strike capability."
About the same time, Helms
let it be known that in his
assessment the new missiles
did not indicate a shift from
the traditional emphasis on de-
fense, and that the smaller
Minuteman-style SS-11 would.
remain the backbone of the
Soviet strategic missile arse-
nal.
Judgement Was Key
Later, in June :1969, both
men appeared together before
the committee in executive
session, and their views were
in some part' reconciled.
Helms is said to have deferred
25X1A
one on which to base policy.
The administration has sub-
sequently based some of its
fundamental decisions in the
nuclear strategy and national
securityfields upon that intel-
ligence . judgement: They in-
clude: ABM, whether to go
ahead with rapid development
of multiple missile warheads,
and basic negotiating positions
in the ' strategic arms control
talks with the Soviets.
The Soviet Union has now
clearly shifted to the SS-9 as
its basic strategic weapon, and
in this respect Helms' assess-
ment appears in retrospect to
have been wrong.
According to insiders, there
have been other incidents,
? similar but less spectacular,
likewise involving an assess-
ment of Soviet strategic capa-
bility in which Helms and the
Pentagon were at odds. In
most of these, sources say,
Kissinger has sided with the
Defense Department.
? The leading candidate to re-
place Helms is authoritatively
reported to be James H.
Schlesinger, chairman of the
Atomic Energy Commission,
and a chief architect of a
study that shaped the intelli-
geace reorganization.
NEW YORX DAILY NEWS
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:
115 kifit,e7, "-
rA
trr
13y FRANK VAN RIPER
Washington, NovP28 (NEWS Bureau)?Richard M.? Helms, 5lyear-old
of the Central Intelligence Agency, will leave in January the post he has held
last six years, apparently at President Nixon's .request, informed sources predi
day pendently r!onfirrned to THE Nixon, it is Said, Ii-
While a large body of opinion on Hem
NF,WS today administration con- th TOY now
In official Washington regards gees staff for most of
t Helms as a cern over the growth of the ap-
career gence information. .
"professional," with good White proximately 100,000-member in-
House ties, other sources close telligence community, of which
to the intelligence community CIA is a dominant part. The
maintain that Nixon has grown sources, while hedging on when
?Increasingly unhappy with the , Helms would step down, all con-
American intelligence product ' ceded that the natiens spy sys-
and wants a more vigorous man tern has become bloated and in
as CIA director, one to handle need of a shakeup.
better, perhaps prune, the sprawl- Moreover, at least one govern.... ,
Ing intelligence bureaucracy. meat official with CIA sources
'Helms, a onetime newspaper- maintained that Helms' accessi-,
man before he went into intern- bility to the President has di,
? minishcd considerably . over the
genre, first with the Office of last several months; a possible
l'Strategic Services in World War indication that the agency. head
U and later with the CIA, was is on the. way. .
not available for comment.
While Helms' retirement, pos-
sibly "upstairs" to a post on Nix-
on's Foreign Intelligence Advi-
sory Board or .some other body,
is not definite; there has been
some specplatic,n on his possible
(/
to be 40-year-old Donald G.
successor. One contender is said /
Runisfeld, former Illinois C o n-
gressman and head of the anti-
poverty grogram, who is now
? -
'chairman of Nixon's Cost of Liv-
ing Council.
A man with a reputation in
administration circles, for tough .
management, Rumsfeld has no in-
telligence background. Ile is said
to be under consideration for the
CJA post largely because of the
way he has ridden herd on
, Nixon's Phase II operation.
As chairman of the Cost of
Living council, Ruinsfeld is a co-
ordinator of both the Pay Board
and the Price Commission. Ile .
Is credited with keeping both op- '
1 erations, as well as. his own, from
growing too unwieldly. -
Nearly unrestrained growth,.
- ---- ,.
not only in the CIA, but in the .?
nation's. other intelligen.ce-gath-II.
ering, agencies_ such as the De_ i
fense Intelligence Agency and the ,
National Security Agency, has
prompted the first real criticism
of the nation's spy business in i
recent years.- . .. I
In addition to former empls.ivs :
who have written on alleged ? in-
telligence in fighting and Suplice.-.
Hon of effort, congressional res-
ervations over tile size of the
U.S. intelligence apparatus also
have been surfacing, especially at
budget time. . ?,.
. Several inforrned sources inde-
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?1
.1,4.3 -4 "A ?
27 NO'! 1972.
roved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00130
H[EVVHTEH
PRUNE T
I r'i
1
ii.ze ..../i m...
Now the re-elected President is moving on domestic problems.
Ahead: efforts to overhaul Government, bring the budget under
control, cut down on bureaucracy and avoid tax hikes.
With a new mandate from the voters
?but a Congress still controlled by the
political opposition?President Nixon in-
tends to press for far-reaching reforms
in Government agencies and programs
? during his second term.
The President has said:?
"I honestly believe that Government
in Washington is too big, and it is too
expensive. We can do the job better
with fewer people."
?the outcome of this effort may de-
pend the burden of federal taxes, the
impact of inflation on the cost of living,
the value of the American dollar, and
the availability of money and credit for
business expansion.
Action agenda. In the fortnight im-
mediately following his re-election, Pres-
ident Nixon took these actions:
.? Signaled a firm determination to
'shake up the organization of the exec-
utive branch of Government from the
White House on down.
O Called for resignations of about
2,000 presidential appointees, it
Cabinet officers and White House aides.
Many vill be retained. Some will be
shifted to new jobs. Others will be
dropped.
? Conferred with top advisers includ-
ing Vice President Spiro T. Agnew at
Key Biscayne, Fla., or Camp David,
Md., ? on plans for Administration per-
sonnel, policies and programs in the new
term. Mr. Agnew has been the President's
liaison man with Governors, mayors and
local officials around the country.
-? Recalled Roy L. Ash, president of
Litton industries and former head of
the President's Advisory Council. on Ex-
ecutive Organization, to assist in the
structural planning.
? Consulted John B. Connally, former
Texas Governor who led the Democrats-
for-Nixon drive in the recent campaign.
Mr. Connally was a key member of the.
Ash Council, before serving as Treasury
Secretary in the first Nixon term.
O Set December 15 as -a target date.
for announcing personnel and policy de-
cisions in overhaul of the Govermnent.
Associates say the President will be
guided by recoMmendations of the Ash
Council, which conducted a two-year
study of Government operations in
1969-1970.
The advisory group submitted about
16 separate reports. Many remain con-
fidential memoranda for the President.
Others were published at the time Mr.
Nixon first called for wholesale Govern-
ment reorganization in his 1971 state-
of-the-union message.
"Most Americans fed up." The
President said then that "most Ameri-
cans today are simply fed up with gov-
ernment at all levels."
The Ash Council found that the Gov-
ernment has grown up in a topsy-turvy
fashion, adding people and ? programs
without any consistent pattern, and with
a great deal of overlapping and dupli-
cation among agencies.
As a result, Mr. Nixon told Congress
in January, 1972, "Our Federal Govern-
ment today is too often a sluggish and
unresponsive institution, unable to de-
liver a dollar's worth of service for a
dollar's worth of taxes."
Here are major reforms proposed by
the Ash Council, as revised by the
White House in the last two years:
New super-Departments, A half doz-
en Departments of Cabinet rank and a
score of lesser agencies would be con-
solidated into four new super-Depart-
ments along modern, functional lines.
A White House documentary On the
subject said that "the executive branch
should be organized around major pur-
poses of Government."
The new super-Departments would
deal with domestic problems in these
areas: human resources, ? natural re-
sources, community development and
economic affairs.
Programs dealing- with people?such
as education, :welfare, health, manpow-
er training, social security and unem-
ployment insurance?would tome under
a Human Resources Department.
Other programs?those dealing with
urban renewal, rural development, city
planning, hospital construction, mass-
transit systems and urban highways?
RMENT
?Crockett in "Washington Star-News"
"JUST WORKING ON MY GOVERN-
MENT-REORGANIZATION PLAN."
would be assigned to a Department of
Community Development.
A Natural Resources Department
would guide land use, soil conservation,
energy sources and minerals, vat-er re-
sources and marine technology, public
works, recreation and civilian atomic
energy.
Under an Economic Affairs Depart-
ment would come many existing func-
tions of the Commerce, Labor and
Transportation Departments, along with
the Tariff Commission and Small Busi-
ness Administration.
The Agriculture Department would
be retained as a separate entity, but
would be limited to dealing with farm-
commodity production and marketing -
programs. Its present operations are.
much broader.
These Federal Departments would be
abolished: Interior; Commerce; Labor;
Health, Education and Welfare; Hous-
ing and Urban Development, and Trans-
portation.
Originally, the Ash Council proposed
.to leave intact the existing Departments
of State, Treasury, Defense and Justice.
Recently, President Nixon reportedly
has been focusing on shaking up the
State Department, leading to specula-
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continued
. 25X1A
LOS ANGELES TIMES
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2 8 AUG Nre
Iter. BUreaucra.-
rto.i[oh ri7
.Goa E Nixon 's
f-A ?
e
? r
? 133.' JOHN V. LAWRENCE
lcimes Washington Buroau chisi
DEAcli---It.is
? not a.big vote_ grabber' but
there .is one pet project .
that President Nixon is
'determined to pursue jibe
gets a second term: major
reform in the control of
the bureaucracy.
??:- The President wants to
? 'keep the ? major depart-
' ments of n.overnmen ? r -
closely on .
House policy, ac-
cording to a top adviser. It
.is along-standing concern
? that has been heightened
?Thy 'some frustration over
, ? how the bureaucrats have
--(performed during his first
term. .
? just hf.)w strongly the
? President feels about such
? reform indicated by? ?
:John D. Ehrbehman, his
? chief -adviser for .domestic-
?'? affairs. ?
" Nu:Hellman complained
in an interview that as it is
? now, many ? Cabinet deP?u-
tics ?ire sworn in "and
then the next time you see
them is at the Christmas'
Party. They go off and
marry the natives.."?
In less :colorful terms,
Ehrlichman believes that
.,,.there is a tendency for de-
partment officials, includ-
ling Cabinet officers, to be
"'heavily influenced by the
thinking and the momen-
tum?or lack thereof?of
the existing staff and-oper-
ations of their own depart,
ments..
"There shouldn't be a Int.
of. leeway in following the
President's policies," he
said. "it shot.fld be like
a corporation, where the
executive vice presidents
.(the Cabinet officers) are
tied closely to the chief ex-
ecutive, or to put it. in ex-
treme terms, when he says
Jump, they only ask how
high."
Goal Is Unity
Ehrlichman is not ruling
rut give and take. Rather,
he is looking for a unity
and consistency of -pur-
pose that would enable the
Administration to estab-
lish more precise goals
and have the various de-r
piArtments implement
them more rapidly.
How to bring this about
has not been entirely laid
out.
But Ehrlichman, 'whose --
job at times has been to
call in Cabinet officers and
chief deputies to express
P r C sidential displeasure
with actions seemingly far
afield from presidential
policy, will likely play a
key role. ,
So wil.! Caspar Weinbei?-
ger, who replaced George
P. Shultz as director of the-
Office of Management and
Budget earlier this year.
I[.
C
01
Mr. Nixon last. year pro--
posed a reorgani4alion of
the executive departments
that would create 'tour
new Cabinet-level agen-
cieS to replace seven exist-
ing ones.
The historic depar t-
ments of . State, Defense,
Justice and Treasury
would remain but tile four
new ones?dealing with
national resources,. corn?,
munity development, hu-
.man resources and CM-
? mink affairs?would take
over responsibilities now
Spread through the other
seven departments as vell
as some now allotted tom-
dependent agencies. Con-
gress has Virtually ignored
this idea, however,
Powei"Eragmented
In proposing the plan
the President complained
that- the federal govern-
ment "promises much but.
it does not deliver' what it
promises." Power is "ex-
ceedingly fragmented and
. broadly scattered, through-
out the federal establish-
ment . . .
" "It is extremely difficult
for either the Congress or
the President to see their
intentions carried out
when lines of responsibili-
ty are astangled and am-
higtious as .they are ? in
'Many policy areas," ? he
said.
eyonci nis rerorm plan,
however, Mr. Nixon wants
his appointees as well as ?
nonpolitical civil servants
-to respond with greater
urgency to his policy deci- ?
sions.
Tentatively, 1,Thrlichinan
envisions a coordination ?
system based .on the ap-
pointment, of a key deputy
to ? each department who
would ? have the speeirk:
task of coming to the
White House frequently
for policy sessions.
'Tight after the eleNion
'there' ought to be a meet-
ing of all of the politiCal
appointees at which we
lay out what out goals are,
where we want to be in
four years, he said. "Then
Sonic effort could be made
? to measure progress along
the road in the interven-
ing period."
Some new coordination
already has been built into
the ? system by the two-
year-ord office of Manage-
Ment and Budget. Region-
al offices now pull meth-
? er such things as the di-
saster relief efforts of va-
rious .arms of the govern-
. rn en t. Weinberger h a s
. .
plans for creating a daily
? "domestic situation re-
; port" of the type the CIA
and other groups compile.
on foreign and military
Matters.
:W einh crger believes
fewer persons running in-
dividual programs could
? be more responsive to the
President and thus make
e bureaucracy more
? flexible and able to react
more quickly to meet the
public's needs.
Mr. Nixon's dissatisfac-
tion?with bureaucrats,
reinforced by similar sen-
. ? timents of Henry A.
His--
singer, his national securi-
ty adviser, was reported
long before he became
President. He and the
bureaucrats were at log-
? gerheads almost from the
start of his Washington
career when, as a young
congressman, he pushed
for the conviction of Alger
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cart irrued:
STATINTL
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4 AUG 1972
Nixon appoints Connally
to espionage advisory panel
Washington (Reuter)?Presi-
dent Nixon yesterday ap-
pointed John B. Connally, the
former Secretary of the Treas-
ury, as a member of his For-
eign Intelligence Advisory
Board and indicated he would
soon have other missions for
him.
Mr. Connally was the only
Democrat in the President's
Cabinet when he served as
treasury secretary from Feb-
ruary, 1971, until last June.
Heis now heading a "Demo-
crats for Nixon" drive in sup-
port of the President's re-elec-
tion campaign.
The 11-member hoard, pre-
sided over by Adm. George W.
Anderson (ref.), a former chief
of naval operations and am-
bassador to Portugal, advises
the President on United States
intelligence .operations and how
to increase their effectiveness.
Ronald L. Ziegler, Mr. Nix-
on's press secretary, said the
President has other missions
in mind for Mr. Connally.
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Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001300440001-2
STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
August 1972
SECRETARY
OF THE
TREASURY
DEPARTMENT OF
THE TREASURY
TREASURY
REPRESENTATIVE
ON USIB
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARY
OF
STATE
DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
DEPUTY
TO THE NI
FOR THE
INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY
DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF
INTELLIGENCE
& RESEARCH
THE
PRESIDENT
UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE
BOARD
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
DEPUTY
DIRECTOR
OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
SECRETARY
OF
DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR
NAT'L SECURITY
AGENCY
JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF
DIRECTOR
DEFENSE
INTELL. AGENCY
DEPT. OF DEPT. OF DEPT. OF
ARMY NAVY AM FORCE
CHIEF
OF
DIREOCFTOR I I ASST. I
CHIEF OF
I STAFF INTELL.I I NAVAL INTELL. I I STAFF INTELL.I
--4
ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE
DIRECTOR, FBI
REPRESENTATIVE
ON USIB
CHAIRMAN
ATOMIC ENERGY
COMMISSION
ATOMIC ENERGY
COMMISSION
AEC
REPRESENTATIVE
ON USIB
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HEADS OF
OTHER DEPTS,
AND AGENCIES
OTHER
DEPARTMENTS
AND AGENCIES
FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE
COMPONENTS
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
591740
STATINTL
??
RAMPARTS
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AUG 1972
STATINTL
(71?, 71 1
ILyz) , H
?
1311 ATI)
A kAlelyroliT
L
BOUT THIRTY NI ILES NORTHEAST of CIA head-
quarters. in Langley, Virginia, right off the
---\\ Baltimore-Washington expressway overlooking
? the flat Maryland countryside, stands a large
three story building known informally as the "cookie fac-
tory." It's .officially known as Ft. George G. Meade, head-
quarters of the National Security Agency.
Three fences surround the headquarters. The inner
.and outer barriers are topped with barbed wire, the middle
One is a five-strand electrified wire. Four gatehouses span-
ning the complex at regular intervals house specially-
trained marine guards. Those allowed access all wear irri-
descent 1.D. badges ? green for "top secret crypto," red
for "secret cqpto:" Even the janitors are cleared for secret
codeword material. Once inside, you enter the world's
longest "corridor"-980 feet long by 560 feet wide. And
all along the corridor are more marine guards, protecting
the doors of key NSA offices. At 1,400,000 square
feet, it is larger than CIA
headquarters, 1,135,000
square feet. Only the State Department and the Pentagon
and the new headquarters planned for the FBI aro more
spacious. But the DIRNSA, building (Director, National
Security Agency) can be further distinguished from the
headquarters buildings of these other giant bureaucracies
?it has no windows. Another palace of paranoia? No.
For D1RNSA is the command center for the largest, most
sensitive and far-flung intelligence gathering apparatus in
the world's history. Ilere, and in the nine-story .Opera-
lions Building Annex, upwards of 15,000 employees work
to break the military, diplomatic and cOmmurcial. codes
of every nation in the world, analyze the dc?crypted mes-
sages, and send on the results to the rest of the U.S. in-
telligence community.
Far less .widely known than the CIA, whose Director
STATINTL
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Crentirmorl
WASH:CNC:I:ON STAR .
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ALL NATIONS REPOP,770 MONITORED
SAN FRANCISCO (AP) --
Government officials have de-
clined comment on a Ram-
parts magazine article which
says U.S. intelligence can pin-
point the location of Soviet
military and spacecraft and
can break all the Soviet mili-
tary codes.
? A White House spokesman in
Gan Clemente, Calif., the De-
partment of Defense in Wash-
ington and a spokesman for
? he National Security in?-;eney
at Ft. Meade, Md, would not
respond, to the article, entitled
"U.S. Tspionage: A Memoir."
The article, appearing in
Ramparts' Augnst issue which
went on new?stands today, is
based on an interview with a .
man purported to be a former
NSA analyst.
The ex-analyst, identified by
a spokesman for the magazine
as ''Winslow Peck," pseu-
eonyin ---- is quoted as saying
high-flying jets routinely make
flights over Russian territory
to test Soviet reactions.
? Others Deny Account
While the Defense Depart-
ment refused comment, as is
customary in intelligence mat-
ers, other knowledgeable
sources denied that U.S.
planes fly over Russia gather-
ing intelligence data.
The sources said the United
States has not relied on intelli-
gence flights over Soviet and
Communist Chinese territory
since the earlyy 1960s, because
it has sent aloft reconnaiss-
ance satellites, which transmit
pictures and monitor radio
and other communications
forms.
. Contacted in San Diego at a
telephone number supplied by
Ramparts, a man' who said he
was "Peck," 26, refused to
give his real name but said he
was assigned too NSA for 3'
years after enlisting in the Air
Force in 1936. lie said lie lives
in Washiligton, D.C., but now
is on-vacation in California.
He said he was sergeant
when he quit, because he was
disillusioned in Vietnam.
MonitAring Cited
The Ramparts article said
the United States monitors ev-
ery government in the world,
including its allies, and listens
in on all transatlantic tele-
phone calls to or from this
country, even those by private .
citizens.
The monitoring includes dip-
lomatic communications of al-
lies ? including interception -
of British communications
through monitoring conducted
at U.S. 'oases in England, Peck
said.
"As far as the Soviet Union
is concerned \ cc know the
whereabouts at any given time
of all its aircraft, exclusive of
small private planes, and its
naval forces, including its mis-
?,iiet-firing submarines," the
former analyst said inthe
'The fact is that we're able
to break every code they've
got, understand every type of '
communications equipment
and enci p her in g device
they've got," he added.
The Magazine said NSA, es-
ta'alished in 1952, employes
about 15,00 servicemen and
civilians at its Ft. Meade
headquarters and about 90,000
at?otmd the world. NSA's main
mission is code cracking and
communications intelligence.
In the article the former an-
alyst said that 90 percent of all
"v iable U.S. intelligence"
comes from NSA-monitored
communications.
Some who were. asked to
comment about the story said
Peck seemed to claim far
more knowledge than he could
have gained in an enlisted ca-
pacity.
The New York Times report-
ed that a veteran of 30 years'
service in intelligence said of
Peck:
"Ile's obviously familiar
with the NSA ? its organiza-
tion, operations and many of
its techniques. But no sergeant
in his early 20s would know
how intelligence is handled at
the White House level, what
NSA material is used or dis-
carded by the President or
more than jest the fringes
about CIA oparatimis,"
David Hahn, author of "The
Codebreakers" and a leading
authority cm crypthanalysis,
sai(1. in a telephone interview
that the ramparts article
"represents much new infor-
mation that ? rings true to, me
and seems correct," However,
he challenged some points,
specifically Peek's assertion
that the agency's experts are
able to "break every SOviet
code with remarkable suc-
cess."
Top-grade Soviet foreign
ministry code systems "have
been unbreakable ,since teh
1930s," Kahn said. He added
that it was "highly unlikely
that ? they have switched to
breakable codes.!'
Peck said in Ramparts that
he briefed then-Vice ,President
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Hubert II. Humphrey on no
Soviet taetical air force in 1967
and once listened to a tearful
conversation between Soviet
Premier Alexei Kosygin and a
Russian cosmonaut about to
be killed (luring re-entry, ?
Ramparts, a liberal monthly
journal which features investi-
gative. articles, employs about
CO persons and has its editorial
offices in Berkeley, Calif.
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1 C STATINTL
" 929d
AFITIS Pact Compliance
boramsrawar.mausaiitaiegm.....7rmsrammarm..P..,..a.,arearm...,..
Washington , jar embarrassment to - els
U.S.,
U.S. . intelligence offi-
which had negotiated
cials have established a the truce, and the incident
committee to keep track-
nearly the cease-fire.' led. to the collapse of
of Soviet observance of
the terms of the strategic The new committee, ?Hi-
- a r in s limitation treaty cials said, is to be headed by
signed in Moscow May 26. Lieutenant General Vernon
A. Walters, deputy director
, The-five-man committee is
to begin functioning on July of central intelligence.
Its members are to be
1, the cutoff date agreed
ttpon by the two govern-
Lieutenant General Donald
meats for the construction of V. Bennett, head of the de-
new sites for offensive mis- fense intelligence agency;
, Ales in the United States Ray S. Cline, director of the
and the Soviet Union. State Department's intelli-
Administration officials gence and research agency;
.: said that the committee was A n d r e w Marshall. intelli-
set up to avoid the repetition gence coordinator of the Na-
on a broader scale of the vi- tional Security Council at
olation of the Suez Canal the White House; and a CIA
truce in August 1070, when c!'ricial still to be deanat-
'the Soviet Union and Egypt ed.
moved into position SAM-2 The Moscow ag,reemcnts
and SAM-3 antiaircraft mis- on the limitation of defen-
. sile-s ,after the cease-fire sive and offensive nuclear
: with Israel. ?Yeripons formally come into
At that time, U.S. -intern- 10,?ce on ratification by the
gence. services were unpre- U.S. Senate and the Su:
pared . to monitor through p:eme Soviet. ? .
aerial and satellite olierva- However, both sides have
ton, and other means, So- agreed to abide by the trea-
viet and Egyptian fulfill- ty from the date it was
ment of the truce terms. signed. -
This was a source of ma- _ L.A. Times Service'
_
_ . . ... :
?-? I rl I I Approved
-
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STATINTL
C7I ApproVed For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RD
cop 2 ET:,
171,,
1
F TEE
\- 7
the creation,
control and acceptance
of defense policy by the
RESo
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Approftd For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001300440001-2
Intelligence Oversight
CIA: CONGRESS IN DARK ABOUT ACTIVITIES, SPENDING
Since the Central Intelligence Agency was given
authority in 1949 to operate without normal legislative
oversight, an uneasy tension has existed between an un-
informed Congress and an uninformative CIA.
In the last two decades nearly 200 bills aimed at
making the CIA more accountable to the legislative
branch have been introduced. Two such bills have been
reported from committee. None has been adopted.
Some members of Congress insist they should know
more about the CIA and about what the CIA knows.
Clandestine military operations in Laos which were run
by the CIA provided Congress with an opportunity to
ask questions about the intelligence operation during 1971.
(Congress and Laos, p. 68)
Sen. Stuart Symington (D Mo.), a member of the
Armed Services Intelligence Operations Subcommittee
and chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee
dealing with U.S. commitments abroad, briefed the
Senate June 7, 1971, behind closed doors on CIA involve-
ment in Laos. He based his briefing on a staff report.
He told the Senate in that closed session: "In all my
committees there is no real knowledge of what is going on
in Laos. We do not know the cost of the bombing. We do
not know about the people we maintain there. It is a
secret war."
As a member of two key subcommittees dealing with
the activities of the CIA, Symington should be privy to
more classified information about the agency than most
other members of Congress. But Symington told the Sen-
ate he had to dispatch two committee staff members to
Laos in order to find out what the CIA was doing.
If Symington did not know what the CIA was doing,
then what kind of oversight function could Congress
exercise over the super-secret organization?
A Congressional Quarterly examination of the over-
sight system exercised by the legislative branch, a study
of sanitized secret documents relating to the CIA and
interviews With key staff members and members of Con-
gress indicated that the real power to gain knowledge
about CIA activities and expenditures rests in the hands
of four powerful committee chairmen and several key
members of their committees?Senate and House Armed
Services and Appropriations Committees.
The extent to which these men exercise their power
in ferreting out the details of what the CIA does with its
secret appropriation determines the quality of legislative
oversight on this executive agency that Congress voted
into existence 25 years ago.
The CIA Answers to...
As established by the National Security Act of 19-17
80-233), the Central Intelligence Agency was ac-
countable to the President and the National Security
Council. In the original Act there was no language which
excluded the agency from scrutiny by Congress, but also
no provision which required such examination.
To clear up any confusion as to the legislative intent
of the 1947 law, Congress passed the 1949 Central Intel-
ligence Act (PL 81-110) which exempted the CIA from all
federal laws requiring disclosure of the "functions, names,
official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel" employed
by the agency. The law gave the CIA director power to
spend money "without regard to the provisions of law
and regulations relating to the expenditure of govern-
ment funds." Since the CIA became a functioning organi-
zation in 1949, its budgeted funds have been submerged
into the general accounts of other government agencies,
hidden from the scrutiny of the public and all but a se-
lect group of ranking members of Congress.
THE SENATE
In the Senate, the system by which committees
check on CIA activities and budget requests is straight-
forward. Nine men?on two committees?hold positions
of seniority which allow them to participate in the regular
annual legislative oversight function. Other committees
are briefed by the CIA, but only on topical matters and
not on a regular basis.
Appropriations. William W. Woodruff, counsel
for the Senate Appropriations Committee and the only
staff man for the oversight subcommittee, explained that
when the CIA comes before the five-man subcommittee,
more is- discussed than just the CIA's budget.
"We look to the CIA for the best intelligence on the
Defense Department budget that you can get," Woodruff
said. He said that CIA Director Richard Helms provided
the subcommittee with his estimate of budget needs for
all government intelligence operations.
Woodruff explained that although the oversight
subcommittee was responsible for reviewing the CIA bud-
get, any substantive legislation dealing with the agency
would originate in the Armed Services Committee, not
Appropriations.
No transcripts are kept when the CIA representative
(usually Helms) testifies before the subcom.mittee. Wood-
ruff said the material covered in the hearings was so
highly classified that any transcripts would have to be
kept under armed guard 24 hours a day. Woodruff does
take detailed notes on the sessions, however, which are
held for him by the CIA. "All I have to do is call," he
said, "and they're on my desk in an hour."
Armed Services. "The CIA budget itself does not
legally require any review by Congress," said T. Edward
Braswell, chief counsel for the Senate Armed Services
Committee and the only staff man used by the Intelli-
gence Operations Su hcom mit tee.
17
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The role of the Armed Services Committee is not to
examine the CIA's budget, Braswell said, but rather to
review the programs for which the appropriated funds pay.
Symington told Congressional Quarterly in early
1972 that the Armed Services oversight subcommittee had
not met for 18 months, but that Chairman John C. Sten-
nis (D Miss.) had been taking care of the subcommittee's
business by himself primarily.
"The people who run the CIA budget are the five
senior members of the Appropriations Committee,"
Symington said. That included both Stennis and Mar-
garet Chase Smith (R Maine), ranking minority member
of the Armed Services Committee. (Box p. 19)
"I can find out anything from Mr. Helms (CIA direc-
tor) that I want to find out because we're friends, but
that's not the proper way to do it," Syrhington continued.
"As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee
and the ranking member of the Armed Services Commit-
tee I am denied the details of the money being spent by
the Central Intelligence Agency." Symington would not
deny that he knew details of the CIA budget, only that he
was denied the information when he went through proper
committee channels.
"The budget is gone into more thoroughly than
people (on the committee) would admit," Braswell ex-
plained. "It's just reviewed in a different way than, say,
the State Department's budget is." The committee's
chief counsel said the budget review was conducted by
a "very select group...more select than the five-man
subcommittee."
Foreign Relations. Since the CIA never has been
recognized officially as an agency involved in making
foreign- policy, the operations of the agency have not
regularly been scrutinized by the Foreign Relations Corn-
mittee. The Armed Services Committee reviews the
agency's program annually because threats to the United
States, against which the CIA guards, traditionally have
been military in nature. The Appropriations Committee
checks on the CIA's budget because the committee ex-
amines all money requests of government agencies; the
CIA provides valuable intelligence on Pentagon programs
about which the committee has an interest. In 1967 the
Foreign Relations Committee became a newcomer into
the circle of CIA-knowledgeable committees.
In the spring bf 1967, secret CIA aid for student activ-
ities became the cover story for Ramparts magazine. The
national press picked up the story and soon it became
widely known that the CIA had been contributing money
to the National Student Association (NSA) and other
tax-exempt foundations and was playing more than
casual role in jockeying CIA personnel into leadership
Positions in the various organizations.
The response in Congress to the NSA story was the
introduction of seven bills in one month?all aimed at
allowing Congress a closer look at the CIA. One pro-
posal, sponsored by Sen. Eugene j. McCarthy (I) Minn.
1959-71), would have involved an investigation of the
CIA by a select committee armed with subpoena.
power. A proposal to set up a similar oversight and investi-
gating committee had been killed in 1966 on a procedural
ruling regarding committee jurisdiction. With the new
series of embarrassing CIA revelations, the McCarthy
proposal posed a threat to the long-standing oversight
system.
18
'I Have Not Inquired'
The following exchange was excerpted from the
Nov. 23, 1971, Senate debate over a floor amend-
ment to place a $4-billion annual ceiling on U.S.
intelligence activities.
Allen J. Ellender (D La.). chairman of the
Appropriations Committee and head of its five-man
Intelligence Operations Subcommittee, discussed his
knowledge of CIA-run operations in Laos with J. W.
Fulbright (D Ark.) and Alan Cranston (I) Calif.).
Fulbright: "Would the Senator (Ellender) say
that before the creation of the army in Laos they
(the CIA) came before the committee and the com-
mittee knew of it and approved it?"
Ellender "Probably so."
Fulbright: "Did the Senator approve it?"
Mender: "It was not--I did not know anything
about it."
Fulbright: "So the whole idea of Congress de-
claring war is really circumvented by such a proce-
dure, is it not?"
Ellender: "Well, Mr. President, I wish to Say
that?"
Fulbright: "Is it not?"
Ellender: "No, I do not think so."
Fulbright: "Well, if you can 'create an army and
support it through the CIA, without anyone knowing
about it, I do not know why it is not..."
Ellender: "I wish to say that I do not know. I
never asked, to begin with, whether or not there were
any funds to carry on the war in this sum the CIA
asked for. It never dawned on me to ask about it. I
did see it publicized in the newspaper some time
ago."
Cranston: "...the chairman stated that he never
would have thought of even asking about CIA funds
being used to conduct the war in Laos....I would
like to ask the Senator if, since then, he has inquired
and now knows whether that is being done?"
Ellender: "I have not inquired."
Cranston: "You do not know, in fact?"
Ellender: "No."
Cranston: "As you are one of the five men privy
to this information, in fact you are the number-one
man of the five men who would know, then who would
know what happened to this money? The fact is,
not even the five men know the facts in the situation."
Ellender "Probably not.''
Don Henderson, a Foreign Relations Committee
staff member, said that in an effort to undermine support
for the McCarthy bill, the Foreign Relations Committee
was invited to send three members to all CIA joint
briefings held by the Armed Services and Appropriations
Committees. The original members were J. W. Fulbright
(D Ark.), Mike Mansfield (D Mont.) and Bourke B.
Hickenlooper (R Iowa), who was replaced by George
Aiken (R Vt.) when Hickenlooper retired in 1968.
Woodruff, counsel for the Appropriations Committee,
said that the committee had not met jointly on CIA busi-
ness with the Appropriations Committee for at least one
year. "Maybe it's been two years," he said. "l'in not sure."
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CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL
CIA Director Helms, however, appeared before the
Foreign Relations Committee for special briefings in 1971
and 1972.
"I have known," Fulbright told the Senate during the
June 7 closed session, "and several (other) Senators have
known about this secret army (in Laos)., Mr. Helms testi-
fied about it. He gave the impression of being more can-
did than most of the people we have had before the
committee in this whole operation. I did not know enough
to ask him everything I should have......
THE HOUSE
Two committees in the House acknowledge that
they participate in oversight of the CIA?Armed Services
and Appropriations. The Armed Services Committee has
a five-man subcommittee reviewing the programs of all
intelligence organizations. The Appropriations Committee
refused to say who on the committee reviews the CIA
budget.
Armed Services. A subcommittee formed in July
1971 filled a hole on the committee that was left since
F. Edward Hebert (D La.) reorganized the Armed Ser-
vices Committee and abolished the CIA Oversight
Subcommittee that had been run by the late L. Mendel
Rivers, chairman of the committee until his death Dec.
28, 1970.
I-lebert's plan' was to democratize the committee by
allowing all to hear what the CIA was doing instead of
just a select group of senior members. Freshman commit-
tee member Michael Harrington (D Mass.) said that
Hebert was making an honest attempt to spread the
authority, but the full comthittee CIA briefings were
still superficial. "To say that the committee was per-
forming any real oversight function was a fiction,"
Harrington said.
When Helms came before the full committee, Har-
rington asked what the CIA budget was. Helms said that
George Mahon (D Texas), chairman of the Appropriations
Committee, had instructed him not to reveal any bud-
get figures unless Armed Services Chairman Hebert
requested the information. Hebert said "no'' according to
Harrington and the budget figures were not disclosed.
As in the Senate, the House Armed Services Commit-
tee is responsible more for what the CIA does than how
tnueh it spends, according to the committee's chief
counsel, John R. Blandford. The Armed Services Com-
mittee does not meet jointly for CIA briefings with the
Appropriations Committee or with the Foreign Affairs
Committee, Blandford said.
The new subcommittee, responsible for reviewing
all aspects of intelligence operations, was put under the
leadership of Lucien N. Nedzi (I) Mich.)?a leading
House opponent of the Indochina war and critic of Penta-
gon spending. Hebert said he chose Nedzi "because he's a
good man, even though we're opposed philosophically."
Hebert 's predecessor as committee chairman, Mendel
Rivers, regarded the oversight subcommittee as so im-
portant he named himself as subcommittee chairman.
Nedzi said that Hebert had placed no restrictions on how
the subcommittee should be run or what it should cover.
Appropriations. In interviews with two staff mem-
bers of the House Appropriations Committee, Congressional
Quarterly learned that the. membership of the intelli-
gence oversight subcommittee was confidential. When
Intelligence Oversight - 3
CIA Oversight Subcommittees
Four subcommittees have the official function of
monitoring Central Intelligence Agency programs
and passing judgment on the agency's budget before
the figures are submerged in the general budget.
Senate. Armed Services Committee, Central
Intelligence Subcommittee (reviews CIA programs,
not the budget)?*John C. Stennis (D Miss.), Stuart
Symington (D Mo.), Henry M. Jackslon (D Wash.),
Peter H. Dominick (R Colo.) and Barry Goldwater
(R Ariz.);
Appropriations Committee, Intelligence Opera-
tions Subcommittee comprised of the five ranking
members on the Defense Subcommittee?*Allen J.
Ellender (D La.), John L. McClellan (D Ark.), Sten-
nis, Milton R. Young (R N.D.), Margaret Chase
Smith (R Maine);
Foreign Relations Committee in 1967 was invited
by Stennis and Ellender to send three members to
any joint briefings of the Appropriations and Armed
Services oversight subcommittees. The three mem-
bers were J.W. Fulbright (D Ark.), George D. Aiken
(R Vt.) and Mike Mansfield (D Mont.). There have ?
been no joint meetings in at least the last yedr.
However, CIA Director Richard Helms did appear
once in March before a Foreign Relations subcom-
mittee.
House. Armed Services Committee, Intel-
ligence Operations Subcommittee (created in July)?
*Lucien N. Nedzi (D Mich.),William G. Bray (R Ind.),
Alvin E. O'Konski (R Wis.), 0. C. Fisher (1) Texas),'
Melvin Price (D Ill.), .with ex officio members F.
Edward Hebert (D La.) and Leslie C. Arends (Hill.).
Appropriations Committee, Intelligence Opera-
tions Subcommittee--membership undisclosed.
Believed to be the five ranking members of the
Defense Subcommittee headed by committee chair-
man George Mahon (D Texas). Also would include
Robert L. F. Sikes (D Fla.), Jamie L. Whitten (D
Miss.), William E. Minshall (R Ohio), John J. Rhodes
(R Ariz.). indicates subcommittee chairman
asked why the membership was a secret, Paul Wilson,
staff director, said: "Because that's the way it's always
been.' Ralph Preston, a staff man for the Defense Sub-
committee, said the information was a secret, but ad-
mitted that more members than just Chairman Mahon
were responsible for reviewing the agency's budget.
Rep. Harrington said he has requested the compo-
sition of the subcommittee and has been refused the in-
formation. "I'm just sure the CIA committee consists of'
the five ranking members of Mahon's subcommittee on
defense," Harrington said. (Box this page)
Quality of Congress' Oversight
Because most members of Congress have not been
aware of what the CIA was planning until long after the
agency had already acted, more than one Senator or
House member has made embarrassing statements out of
line with fact.
19
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In?4110* 0@th Figh Rellease 2001/06/09 : OWATINETRI0A6A111?,1113p8i40001-2
Former Sen. Wayne Morse (D Ore. 1945-69), a
member of the Foreign Relations Committee, took the
Senate floor April 20, 1961?five days after the Cuban
Bay of Pigs invasion?and said: "There is not a scintilla
of evidence that the U.S. government has intervened in
the sporadic rebellion which has occurred inside Cuba.
That rebellion has been aided from outside by Cuban
rebel refugees who have sought to overthrow the Castro
regime."
Four days later Morse admitted: "We now know
that there has been a covert program under way to be of
assistance to the Cuban exiles in an invasion of Cuba and
that assistance was given by the United States govern-
ment. We did not know at the legislative level, through
the responsible committees of the Senate, what the pro-
gram and the policies of the CIA really were."
The Morse speech, delivered nine days after the
Bay of Pigs invasion, was the first mention in either the
House or Senate of U.S. involvement in the invasion at-
tempt.
While explaining the details of the Central Intelli-
gence Act of 1949, former Sen. Millard E. Tydings (D Md.
1927-51) said in a May 27, 1949, floor speech: "The bill
relates entirely to matters external to the United States;
it has nothing to do with internal America. It relates to
the gathering of facts and information beyond the borders
of the United States. It has no application to the domestic
scene in any manner, shape or form."
Committee investigations into tax-exempt founda-
tions in 1964 produced an informal report issued by Rep.
Wright Patman (D Texas) labeling the Kaplan Fund as
a conduit for CIA money. The fund described its purposes
in its charter as to "strengthen democracy at home."
Patman later agreed to drop the committee investigation
saying, "No matter of interest to the subcommittee re-
lating to the CIA existed."
In the spring of 1967, another example of domestic
CIA programming emerged as it became known that the
National Student Association was receiving money from
the CIA and that the agency had been involved in manip-
ulating the leadership of the student organization.
Laos. Another illustration of congressional ignor-
ance of CIA activities was in the series of revelations
which came from the June 7, 1971, closed Senate session
briefing on Laos requested by Symington.
Three times during the two-hour session, Symington,
a member of the Armed Services subcommittee on CIA
oversight, said that although he knew the CIA was con-
ducting operations in Laos, he did not know how exten-
sive the program was.
"Nobody knows," Symington said, "the amounts the
CIA is spending while under orders from the executive
branch to continue to supervise and direct this long and
ravaging war (in Laos)."
Minutes after Symington said that in all of his sub-
committees?which included the Armed Services Intel-
ligence Subcommittee under the chairmanship of John C.
Si enn is ( I) M is. ) --there was no real knowledge about
what is going on in Laos." Stennis took the floor and said:
"The CIA has justified its budget to our subcommittee
and as always they have come with expenditures right
in line with what they were ant horized expressly to
do....They (CIA) have told us from time to time about
their activities in Laos."
20
Intelligence Reorganization
In a move to trim costs and improve the output of
the U.S. global intelligence system, President Nixon
Nov. 5, 1971, disclosed details of a reorganization
plan for the nation's intelligence program. The plan
contained the following changes:
? It gave authority to Richard Helms, Director of
Central Intelligence, to review the budgets of the
CIA, the FBI, units within the Defense and State De-
partments and the Atomic Energy Commission. It was
believed 81-billion could be cut from the 85-billion to
86-billion the U.S. spends yearly to ascertain Soviet
and Chinese Communist military developments.
? It created a new intelligence subcommittee under
the National Security Council to tailor the results
of the nation's vast overseas intelligence network
closer to the needs of the President and his top staff.
. ? It created a "net assessment group" inside the
National Security Council to compare over-all
U.S.S.R. forces and capabilities with those of the U.S.
? It created an Intelligence Resources Advisory
Committee headed by Helms to advise on the pre-
paration of a consolidated program budget. This would
permit Helms to see the Department of Defense in-
telligence budget?estimated to be 80 percent of
everything the U.S. spends for intelligence?and ad-
vise on it before its submission.
"It has been said that we ll know about what the
CIA is doing," Fulbright retorted. "I have been on the
CIA oversight committee and I have never seen any de-
tailed figures (on Laos) whatever."
Stennis said that the secret report on CIA activity
in Laos, compiled by Foreign Relations Committee staff
members, contained some information he was not familiar
with, information he had not been told in his capacity
as chairman of the Armed Services Intelligence Opera-
tions Subcommittee.
"I think we all know," Stennis said, "that if we are
going to have a CIA, and we have to have a CIA, we
cannot run it as a quilting society or something like
that. But their money is in the clear and their forthright-
ness, I think, is in the clear."
Sen. Miller criticized Symington for saying the
Congress was appropriating money blindly: "We should
not leave the impression that the Senate somehow or
other has been helpless in this matter. We are all mature
individuals and we know what we are doing....
"But let us not say the Senate has been hoodwinked
or leave the impression we have been misled and have
not known what is going on. I think ?Ve may have lacked
information on the specifics, and the Senator (Symington)
is pulling out information on specifics, but. the Senators
who voted on these appropriations for the CIA voted for
them with our eyes wide open, knowing what we were
doing. Maybe we should change it. It is something tOr
future debate."
"I would be the last to say he (Miller) had been
hoodwinked," Sym ington com men ted, "or that any
other member of the Senate had been hoodwinked. But
I have been hoodwinked, and I want the Senate to know
this afternoon that that is the case."
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11 FATION
Approved For Release 2001/06/0_1 Apletff80-01601R001300440
IPE
ENIDLITTEV)
wcTon vuotorETTI
Mr. Marchetti was on the director's staff of the CIA when
he resigned front the agency two years ago. Since then, his
novel The Rope-Dancer has been published by Grosset &
.Dunlap; he is now working on a book-length critical analysis
of the CIA.
The Central Intelligence Agency's role in U.S. foreign af-
fairs is, like the organization itself, clouded by secrecy
and confused by misconceptions, many of them deliberately
promoted by the CIA with the cooperation of the news
media. Thus to understand the covert mission of this
agency and to estimate its value to the political leadership,
one must brush myths aside and penetrate to the sources
and circumstances from which the agency draws its au-
thority and support. The CIA is no accidental, romantic
aberration; it is exactly what those who govern the country
intend it to bd?the clandestine mechanism whereby the
executive branch influences the internal affairs of other
nations.
In conducting such operations, particularly those that
are inherently risky, the CIA acts at the direction and with
the approval of the President or his Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs. Before initiating action in the
field, the agency almost invariably establishes that its oper-
ational plans accord with the aims of the 'administration
and, when possible, the sympathies of Congressional lead-
ers. (Sometimes the endorsement or assistance of influen-
tial individuals and institutions outside government is also
so.ught.) CIA directors have been remarkably well aware
of the dangers they court, both personally and for the
agency, by not gaining specific official sanction for their
covert operations. They are, accordingly, often more care-
ful than are administrators in other areas of the bureau-
cracy to inform the White Hous,e of their activities and to
: seek Presidential blessing. To take the blame publicly
for an occasional operational blunder is a small price to
pay in return for the protection of the Chief Executive and
the men who control the Congress.
The U-2 incident of 1960 was viewed by many as an
outrageous blunder by the CIA, wrecking the Eisenhower-
Khrushchev summit conference in Paris and setting U.S.-
Soviet relations back several years. Within the inner circles
of the administration, however, the shoot-down was
shrugged off as just one of those things that happen in the
chancy business of intelligence. After attempts to deny
responsibility for the action had failed, the President openly
defended and even praised the work of the CIA, although
for obvious political reasons he avoided noting that he had
authorized the disastrous flight. The U-2 program against
the USSR was canceled, but work on its follow-on system,
the A-11 (now the SR-71,) was speeded up. Only the
launching of the reconnaissance satellites put an end to
espionage against the Soviet Union by manned aircraft.
The A-11 development program was completed, neverthe-
less, on the premise that it, as well as the U-2, might be
useful elsewhere.
Approved For Release.2001/06/09 : CIA-R
After the Bay of
feel the sting of Pre,
the agency had its
because it failed in
overthrow Castro.
the top of the agenc
committee, which ti(
tration, the agency .
tices. Throughout th
tine operations again
the same time, and l?
agency deeply involy
ing regimes in Laos
When the Nation
the CIA in 1967, s
exposed the agency'
labor and cultural
funding conduits, ne
tried to restrict the
Senator Fulbright's a
trol over the CIA lu
was simply told by P
and get on with its bi
formed to look into
Secretary of State, th
of the CIA. Some (
because they had be
.longer thought worth
continued under improvea cover.
operations went .on under almost
Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty
examples. And all the while, the
$500 million-a-year private war in
assassination programs in Vietnam
A tew ol the larger
open CIA sponsorship,
and Air America being
CIA was conducting a
Laos and pacification/
The reorganization of the U.S. intelligence commu-
nity late last year in no way altered the CIA's mission as
the clandestine action arm of American foreign policy.
Most of the few changes are intended to improve the finan-
cial management of the community, especially in the mili-
tary intelligence services where growth and the technical
costs of collecting information are almost out of control.
Other alterations are designed to improve the meshing of
the community's product with national security planning
and to provide the White House with greater control
over operations policy. However, none of that implies a
reduction of the CIA's role in covert foreign policy action.
In fact, the extensive review conducted by the White House
staff in preparation for the reorganization drew heavily on
advice provided by the CIA and that given by former
agency officials through such go-betweens as the influential
Council on Foreign Relations. Earlier in the Nixon Admin-
istration, the Council had responded to a similar request
by recommending that in the future the CIA should con-
centrate its covert pressure tactics on Latin American,
African and Asian targets, using more foreign nationals as
agents and relying more on private U.S. corporations and
other institutions as covers. Nothing was said about reduc-
DP80-01601R001300440001-2
Approved For Release 281/61negitli318176Tahomoo
The Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency,
at Six Billion Dollars a Year
Edward K. DeLong
United Press International
Washington, D.C.
?
STATNTL
"Whenever you are working on a problem that the military is deeply interested in ?
because It's affecting one of their programs . . . and you're not saying what they want L c
you to say, the browbeating starts . . . the pressure to get the report to read more like
they want it to read." .
(Based on a dispatch distributed by UPI
on October 3, 1971)
Victor Marchetti embarked 16 years ago on a ca-
reer that was all any aspiring young spy could ask.
But two years ago, after reaching the highest levels
of the Central Intelligence Agency, he became dis-
enchanted with what he perceived to be amorality,
overwhelming military influence, waste and duplicity
In he spy buskness. He. quit.
Fearing today that the CIA may already have be-
gun "going against the enemy within" the United
States as they may conceive it -- that is, dissi-
dent student groups and civil rights organizations
-- Marchetti has launched acampaign for More presi-.
dential and congressional control over the entire
U.S. intelligence community.
Moving-Up
' "1 think we need to do this because we're getting
into an awfully dangerous era when we have all this Then he was promoted to the executive staff of
talent (for clandestine operations) in the CIA -- the CIA, moving to an office on. the top floor of
and more being developed in the military, which is the Agency's headquarters across the Potomac River
getting into clandestine "ops" (operations) -- and from Washington.
there just aren't that many places any more to dis-
play that talent," Marchetti says. For three years he worked as special assistant
to the CIA chief of plans, programs and budgeting,
. Running Operations Against Domestic Groups as special assistant to the CIA's executive direc-
tor, and as executive assistant to the Agency's
."The cold war is fading. So is the war inSouth- deputy director, V. Adm. Rufus L. Taylor.
east Asia, except for Laos. At the same time, we're
v
getting a lot of domestic problems. And there are .1 "This put me in a very rare position within the
,people in the CIA who -- if they aren't right now Agency and within the intelligence community in
actually already running domesticoperationsagainst general, in fUt I was in a place where it was be-
student groups, black movements and the like? are ing all pulled together," Marchetti said. .
certainly considering it. .
I Begat? To See Things I Did Not Like
"This is going to get to be very tempting," Mar-
chetti said in a recent interview at his comfortable "I could see how intelligence analysis was done
home in Oakton, (Va.),a Washington suburb where and how it fitted into the scheme of clandestine
many CIA men live. operations. It also gave me an opportunity to get
a good view of the intelligence community, too:
"There'll be a great temptation for these people the National Security Agency, the DIA (Defense In-
to suggest operations and for a President to approve telligence Agency), the national reconnaissance or-
them or to kind of look the other way. You have ganization -- the whole bit. And I started to see
the danger of intelligence turning against the na- the politics within the community and the politics
tion itself, going against the 'the enemy within." between the community and the outside. This change
of perspective during those three years had a pro-
Marchetti speaks of the CIA from an insider's found effect on me, because I began to see things I
point of view. At Pennsylvania State University he didn't like." . .
deliberatellikireparAd,hims.elf for kn Lathiiiaene ?
career, g Mle9arfT5MI,Psded494 Pfrps 5 gIA-RDP80-Q460 1a(}01t3Q044@nittna views about the world
studies and'history. shattered, Marchetti decided to abandon his chosen
,.
Offer of Job in CIA
Through a professor secretly on the CIA payroll,/
as a talent scout, Marchetti netted the prize all
would-be spies dream of -- an immediate job offer
from the CIA. The offer came during a secret meet-
ing in a hotel room, set up by a stranger who tele-
phoned and identified himself only .as "a friend of
your brother."
Marchetti spent one year as a CIA agen/ in the
field and 10 more as an analyst of intelligence re-
lating to the Soviet Union, rising through the ranks
until he was helping prepare the national intelli-
gence estimates for the kl4e House. During this
period, Marchetti says, "I was 'a hawk. I believed
in what we were doing."
4
VASHINGIUN r.0 DJ.
22 JAN 1972
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New _ght n the Cuban Missile Crisis
.By Chalmers M. Roberts
. -
ceases to intrigue those who lived -through it - , . ?
Former Hungarian Diplomat Here
: THE CUBAN missile crisis of 1962 never ? Reveals Some Intriguing Background 45) es si- ece eacta
or had anything to do with it. And so two A
new works that add to the general knowl- , On Oct. 38 Radvanyi attended the first nist diplomats on Oct. 26, this time at the
.edge are well worth reporting. One is a ? of three meetings with Soviet Ambassador Soviet embassy, they discussed Walter
unique look at the crisis by a Communist _
knatolyi F. Dobrynin and the heads of all Lippmann's ?colnien of, the previous day sug-
diplomat then in Washington. The other is the Communist embassies in Washington. gesting dismantling of American missiles in
an analytical study by an associate professor Dobrynin discussed the meeting the previous Turkey along with the Soviet missiles in.
at the Kennedy School of Government at day between President Kennedy and Soviet Cuba.' "The Soviet embassy." writes Rad-
/Harvard. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. After vanyi, "apparently considered the Lippmann
yi Janos Radvanyi was the Hungarian charg?inner at the Czech embassy Dobrynin "as- article a trial balloon, launched by the U.S.
In Washington at the time (there was no am- sured his audience that recent reports of So- administration to seek out a suitable solu-
bassador), an affable fellow with whom I had viet ground-to-ground missiles in Cuba were tion. Dobrynin sought their (Commit-
much contact. On May 17, 1967, he defected, completely without foundation." As to the nist diplomats') Opinion as to whether they
turning up later at Stanford where he wrote Kennedy-Gromyko Meeting, "nothing ex- thought the Lippmann article should be re-
traordinary had happened"; the German sit- garded as. an indirect suggestion on the part
of the White house." Only the Romanian
ambassador indicated he had some reason to
think that it was just that; Lippmann, as far
as I know, has never said whether the idea ?
was simply his own. According to RFK's ac-
count, Adlai Stevenson on the 20th had sug-
gested a swap involving withdrawal of
American missiles .from both Turkey and
Italy and giving up the naval base at Guan-
tanamo Bay in Cuba. The President rejected
TIIE CRISIS became public With the Pres- the proposal.
ident's Oct. 22 speech. Next day Dobrynin
C+.9
called the diplomats together again, explain-
AT the meeting on the 26th Dobrynin said
ing that the purpose was "to collect informa?
tion and to solicit opinions on the Cuban sit-
he still had no information on how Moscow
nation." Dobrynin -"characterized it as seri-
would meet the quarantine. "I told him,"
ous and offered two reasons for his concern.
writes Radvanyi, "that according to my infor-
First of all, he foresaw a possible American mation the American buildup for an inva-
attack on Cuba that would almost surely re-
sion of Cuba was nearly completed and that
sult in the death of some Soviet military
American missile bases had aimed all their
personnel who had been sent to handle the missiles toward targets on the island. Only a
sophisticated new weapons. Thus by implica- go-ahead signal from the President was
tion the Soviet ambassador was admitting needed. The Soviet ambassador concurred
the presence in Cuba of Soviet medium-
with my .analysis, adding that the Soviet
range missiles. Secondly, he feared that
Union found itself in a difficult position in.
when Soviet ships reached the announced Cuba because its supply lines were too long
quarantine line a confrontation was inevita. and the American blockade could be very
ble." Dobrynin "explained that any defensive effective. (Czechoslovak ambassador) Ruzek
weapon could be labeled offensive as well
remarked grimly that if the Americans in-
and dismissed American concern ever a vaded, it would definitely trigger a nuclear
war. At this point I lost self-control and
threat from .Cuba. The Pearl Harbor attack,
any .details and had asked Beck whether he he suggested, might have been responsible asked whether it was not the same to die
knew anything more about the whole affair, for this unwarranted paranoia. EN erybo y from an American missile attack as from a
Beck argued that the story of the deploy- agreed that the situation was serious and Soviet one. Dobrynin attempted to assure
ment of ground-to-ground missiles had been that the possibility of an American invasion me that the situation had not reached such
launched by 'American warmongers' and ob- of Cuba could not be discounted." Asked. Proportions and that a solution would no
served that neither the Soviet ambassador how Moscow intended to deal with the quer- doubt be found..
in Havana nor high-ranking Cuban officials antine, "Dobrynin was forced again to reply "At the close of the meeting, any last re-
had mentioned anything to him about the that he simply had no information ..." maining ray of hope I may have had for a
missile build-up." On Oct. 23 at the Soviet embassy's mill- .Pcaceful solution was abruptly shattered.
This message apparently was sent in late tary attache party Dobrynin told Radvanyi Dobrynin now announced tnat the e;oviet
July or early August. Soviet arms shipments "that the situation was even more confused embassy was this very moment burnine its
Sept. 8. On Aug. 22 CIA Director John Mc- and unstable ..." But, as Radvanyi notes, the archives. Shocked at this news I inquired of
party he had met with Attorney General the families of Soviet diplomatic personnel.
,were arriving at that time, though the, first
vffmedium range missiles did not come until Soviet envoy did not disclose that before the Dobrynin whether he planned to evacuate
Cone voiced to President Kennedy his SUSPi- Robert F. Kennedy? in the third floor of the Dobrynin replied in the negative.
dons that the Soviets were preparing to in- :embassy. It was then that Robert Kennedy "Back once again at the Hungarian lega-
traduce offensive missiles, perhaps on the told Dobrynin the President knew he had tion I rushed off to Budapest a long sum-
basis of information gathered in Cuba that been deceived by-assurances from Dobrynin mary of my latest meeting with Dobrynin'
month by French intelligence agent Philippe and others that no offensive missiles would and informed the foreign ministry that Do-
De Vesjoli. However, on Sept. 19 the United'
be placed in Cuba, as detailed in Robert brynin had confirmed the information that the
States Intelligence Board's estimate was
Kennedy's posthumously published "Thir- Americans were militarily prepared to in-
that the SoviAterytinitdiftoirr616 f ri 1 in Rimligi ebq 1 law vagivogetatiuI 'lleomnplhvearseizefodutnhdatwuitnhlienss
sive missiles ihteS Cu a. Oc o er wou da13E. ''- TtCitla Yfiso9kr-
another story. ?
.COntirfa::::1
J
"Hungary and the Super Powers" to be pub-
lished in May by the Hoover Institution. The
book is largely about Hungarian-American
relations. But one chapter on the missile cri-
sis will have far wider interest. What follows
Is from it-
043
IN SEPTEMBER and October, 1962, Rad-
vanyi reported home that the United States
was overreacting to reports of Soviet activity
In Cuba. He did so .in part because Soviet dip-
lomats here had told him the uproar was
part of the American pre-election campaign.
But one day he received a copy of a cable to
Budapest from Hungarian Ambassador
Janos Beck in Havana. Beck "made it a
point to discount information he had re-
ceived from the Chinese embassy in Havana
as being provocatively anti-Soviet," Radvanyi
writes. But "the Chinese ambassador had ap-
parentlY told him that according to informa-
tion he had received from private sources
the Soviet Union was delivering surface-to-
surface ballistic missiles to Cuba and that
Soviet military advisers had come to Cuba
not as instructors but as members of Soviet
special rocket' force units to operate these
missiles."
Radvanyi goes on: "Ambassador Beck re-
marked that his Chinese friends had com-
plained of Soviet unwillingness to disclose
uation had been discussed at length along
with disarmament. At this point in his ac-
count, Radvanyi states that "it seems highly
unlikely to me" that Gromyko had not been
"privy to the Kremlin discussions" about the
missiles but that "it is altogether possible
that Dobrynire may not have been in-
formed."
043 '
quick
e next
5
Approved For Release 2001/06/04; iiii.1-10.80-016111-K011300
Marines New Chief
Looks Toward Future
[Chicago Tribune Press Service]
WASHINGTON, Jan. 4--Gen.
Robert E. Cushman Jr., newly-
installed commandant of the
Marine Corps and former Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency deputy
director, said today that
United States intelligence can
do its job for less money and
probably will be obliged to.
Cushman, speaking at a Pen-
tagon press conference, said
"the mood of Congress" as he
reads it is that the intelligence
operations cost too much and
fund cutbacks can be expected.
Must Know Stopping Poiut
He said he believed intelli-
gence can do the job for less
money by knowing when to
stop collecting facts. He added
that while those engaged in in-
telligence always feel they
never have enough facts, they
have to stop somewhere.
The big problem, he contin-
ued, is knowing where to stop
and making sure that one
stops there.
He said, however, that good
management will insure call-
ing a halt at the right place I
and, he was sure Richard /
Helms, CIA director who re-V
cently was given expanded re-
sponsibility in the intelligence
field, will make sure that the
agency does not go too far.
Asked the size of the U. S.
intelligence budget, Cushman
said he was not free to say.
Tells Marines Roles
On the subject of the Marine
Corps' role under the Nixon
doctrine in which U. S. allies
will be expected to provide the
men for their own defense
while the U. S. supplies arms
and, perhaps, sea and air pow-
er, Cuchman said he could
foresee no situation in which
Marines would be used for ex-
tended ground combat, such as
Viet Nam.
However, he said, there may
be occasions when Marines
kl have to be sent in tempo-
rarily to seize and hold strate-
gic foreign territory or evacu-
ate Americans from trouble
spots.
[AP Wirephoto3
Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr. meeting newsmen.
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?
FOREIGN
Approved For Release 2001/06/09j liffP80-060-11R0013
THE CIA AND DECISION-MAKING
By Chester L. Cooper
"The most fundamental method of work ... is to determine our working policies a
cording to the actual conditions. When we study the causes of the mistakes we have made,
we find that they all arose because we departed from the actual situation ... and were
subjective in determining our working policies."?"The Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung."
IN bucolic McLean, Virginia, screened by trees and sur-
rounded by a high fence, squats a vast expanse of concrete
and glass known familiarly as the "Pickle Factory," and
more formally as "Headquarters, Central Intelligence Agency."
Chiselled into the marble which is the only relieving feature of
the building's sterile main entrance arc the words, "The Truth
Shall Make You Free." The quotation from St. John was
personally chosen for the new building by Allen W. Dulles over
the objection of several subordinates who felt that the Agency,
then still reeling from the Bay of Pigs debacle, should adopt a
.somewhat less lofty motto. (In those dark days of late 1961, some
suggested that a more appropriate choice would be "Look Before
You Leap.") But Dulles had a deeper sense of history than
most. Although he was a casualty of the By of Pigs and never
? sat in the Director's office with its view over the Potomac, he /
left a permanent mark not only on the Agency which he had
fashioned but on its building which he had planned. .
Allen Dulles was famous among many and notorious among
some for his consummate skill as an intelligence operative
("spook" in current parlance), but one of his greatest contribu-
tions in nurturing the frail arrangements he helped to create to
provide intelligence support to -Washington's top-level foreign-
policy-makers.
Harry Truman, whose Administration gave birth to both the
National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency,
recalls that, "Each time the National Security Council is about
.to consider a certain policy?let us say a policy having to do
with Southeast Asia?it immediately calls upon the CIA to
present an estimate of the effects such a policy is likely to
have. . . .1 President Truman painted a somewhat more cozy
relationship between the NSC and the CIA than probably
existed during, and certainly since, his Administration. None
the less, it is fair to say that the intelligence community, and espe-
cially the CIA, played an important advisory role in high-level
policy deliberations during the I9505 and early 1960s.
To provide the most informed intelligence judgments on the
effects a contemplated policy might have on American na-
tional security interests, a group especially tailored for the task
was organized in 1950 within the CIA. While this step would
probably have been taken sooner or later, the communist victory
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STATINTL
ilOntinnpA
II
NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS
Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA;ROP180-tirlaiR0013
3 0
The CEIrs Zenr Cover
The Rope Dancer
by Victor Marchetti.
Grosset & Dunlap, 361 pp., $6.95
Richard J. Barnet
In late November the Central Intel-
ligence Agency conducted a series of
"senior seminars" so that some of its
important bureaucrats could consider
its public image. I was invited to
attend one session and to give my
views on the proper role of the
Agency. I suggested that its legitimate
activities were limited to studying
newspapers and published statistics,
-listening to the radio, thinking about
? the world, interpreting data of recon-
naissance satellites, and occasionally
_7....._-.=-_ ?____:-_-??=._-_-=--____-_-:-_.=?.-- ______
' publishing the names of foreign spies. I
hid been led by conversations with a
number of CIA officials to believe that
they were thinking along the same
lines. One CIA man after another
eagerly joined the discussion to assure
me that the days of the flamboyant
covert operations -' were over. The
upper-class amateurs of the OSS who
stayed to mastermind operations in
/Guatemala, Iran, the Congo, and else-
where-Allen Dulles, Kermit Roosevelt,
Richard Bissell, Tracy Barnes, Robert
Amory, Desmond Fitzgerald-had died
or departed.
In their place, I was assured, was a
small army of professionals devoted to
preparing intelligence "estimates" for
the President and collecting informa-
tion the clean, modern way, mostly
with sensors, computers, and sophis-
iticated reconnaissance devices. Even
Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot, would now
be as much a museum piece as Mata
'Hari. (There are about 18,000 em-
ployees in the CIA and 200,000 in the
entire "intelligence community" itself.
The cost of maintaining them is some-
where between $5 billion and S6
billion annually. The employment
figures do not include foreign agents or
mercenaries, such as the CIA's 100,000-
man hired army in Laos.)
A week after my visit to the "senior
se inar" Newsweek ran a long story
n "the new espionage" with a picture
? ',of CIA Director Richard Helms on the than the CIA." Moreover, soon after ,
Elle
? Ope
adventurer has passed in the American the
spy business; the bureaucratic age of ingt
Richard C. Helms and his gray spe- kno
cialists has settled in." I began to have fina
an uneasy feeling that Newsweek's ingt
article was a cover story in more than vote
one sense. An
. ceili
t has always been difficult to faile
analyze organizations that engage in A
false advertising about themselves. Part of
of the responsibility of the CIA is to lad)
spread confusion about its own work. the
beci
The world of Richard Helms and his
"specialists" does indeed differ -from ized
that of Allen Dulles. Intelligence organ- Heli
izations, in spite of their predilection ovei
for what English judges used to call ligel
"frolics of their own," are servants of Age
policy. When policy changes, they Bur
must eventually change too, although the
because of the atmosphere of secrecy cen
and deception in which they operate, ove.
such changes are exceptionally hard to vice
control. To understand the "new Age
espionage" one must s'ee it as ipart of imp
the Nixon Doctrine which, in.essence,
is a global strategy for maintaining US 1.h
power and influence without overtly recn
involving the nation in another ground He)
war. nex
But we cannot comprehend recent lig(
developments in the "intelligence corn- no
munity" without understanding what fur
Mr. Helms and his employees actually Pr(
do. In a speech before the National
Press Club, the director discouraged/w
journalists from making the attempt. ch
"You've just got to trust us. We are n,
honorable men." The same speech is p;
made each year to the small but
growing number of senators who want h
a closer check on the CIA. In asking, tl
on November 10, for a "Select Corn- c,
rnittee on the Coordination of United
States Activities Abroad to oversee
activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency," Senator Stuart Symington
noted that "the subcommittee having
oversight of the Central Intelligence
Agency has not met once this year."
Symington, a former Secretary of c
the Air Force and veteran member of .t
the Armed Services Committee, has t
also said that "there is no federal
agency in our government whose activ-
ities receive less scrutiny and control
The 111190F6Vg9a0i5t110eigeiar*200SVArOn 6104
: JD P80-01601R001300440001-2
_Senator Allen J. ,
cover. en
to some of the same people I na . s
Newsweek said, "The gaudy era of the
'
UW YORK TIMES
pi:Q. 11
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NEW C.I.A. DEPUTY? Maj.
Gen. Vernon A. Walters is
reportedly being consid-
ered for the post of dep-
uty director of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency.
eneral May Get No. 2 Post in C.I.A. sTATii,?
Special to The New York Ttroes
WASHINGTON, Dec. 29 ?
President Nixon is reported to
be considering the appointment
of an Army major general, Ver-
non A. Walters, to be the next
deputy Director of Central In-
telligence.
General Walters, who is now
defense attach?t the Embassy
in Paris, would succeed Lieut.
Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr. of
the Marine Corps, according to
United States and foreign of-
ficials here. General Cushman
has been named by President,
Nixon to be next commandant
of the Marine Corps and is
scheduled to take. command
Friday.
Spokesmen for the White
House, State Department anus
the C.I.A. declined comment on
the report concerning General
Walters. Nonetheless, reliable
informants said that the gen-
eral, who has had extensive ex-
perience as an interpreter with
both President Eisenhower and
with President Nixon, was in
line to be second-ranking of-
ficial at the agency.
President Nixon's reorganiza-
tion of the United States Gov-
ernment agencies involved in
foreign intelligence, announced
Nov. 5, provided an "enhanced
leadership role" for Richard
licims, Director of Central In
Lenience. At the time, intel-
ligence sources said that Mr.
Helms would concentrate eval-
uating foreign intelligence for
the President and on budget
and management problems of
the intelligence "community" as
a whole.
Day-to-Day Control
The 'Deputy Director, they
said, would take over more of
the day-to-day operations of
the C.I.A., including control ofi
clandestine collection of intel-
ligence through secret agents
and such eleetronic techniques
as spy satellites and code-
cracking.
Informants here noted that
General Walters had served as
Mr. Nixon's interpreter during
the recent meeting with Presi-
dent Pompidou of France in the
Azores. General Walters also
served as interpreter for Presi-
dent Nixon early this month
during the visit of President'
Emilio G. M6dici of Brazil.
General Walters, whose nick-
name is Dick, is widely known
for his extraordinary linguistici
gifts. He is fluent in French,
German, Spanish, Italian, Portu-
guese, Dutch and Russian. He
also speaks some Arabic and
Greek. Languages are his
hobby.
He was born in New York
March 3, 1917, and grew up in
Europe, where his father, an
American businessman, lived.
He attended French schools,
and was graduated from Stony-
hurst College in England. He
enlisted in the Army on May 2,
1941.
During World War II he was
commissioned and assigned as
a liaison officer with the
Brazilian forces fighting in the
'rifted States Fifth Army in
Italy under Gen. Mark W.
Clark. His language abilities
brought him to General Clark's
attention and ultimately to the
attention of Gen. Alfred M.
Gruenther, Fifth Army chief of
staff.
As defense attach?n Paris
and previously in Rio .de Jan-
eiro, General Walters is a senior
officer of the Defense Depart-
ment's Intelligence Agency in
both rank and experience. He
also has a 20-year knowledge
of North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
ization problems.
Under the National Security
Act of 1947, which created the
C.I.A. the positions of director
and deputy director cannot be
held simultaneously by military
officers on active duty.
Richard Helms, who was
named Director of Central In-
telligence in 1966, is the first
career civilian intelligence of-
ficer to have risen to the na-
tion's top intelligence position.
The tradition, however, is to
name a military deputy when
the director is a civilian ? and
vice versa.
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1 - President Nixon's reorganization
of the machinery for defense and dip-
! lomatic intelligence is in order.. One
:'of the revelations of the Pentagon
:Papers was that the Central Intelli-
. gence Ageagy (CIA) called the shots
correctly all along. The American
*people may have been sold a bill of
goods about the domino theory, the
marvelous effects of bombing and
other justifications for continuing this
Miserable disaster, but the CIA was
not.
ROMIOKE, VA.
TIMES
DEC 27 1971
- 62,597
S ? 106,111
,
Why Didn't Somebody Listen?
Writing in the January, 1972, is-
Sue of Foreign Affairs, Chester L. /
Cooper pays ? a compliment and asks
a question: "Confronting one of the
most passion-laden, persistent and
dangerous foreign crises the United
States has confronted since World
War II, they (the CIA's estimators
and analysts) consistently seem to
have kept their cool, they remained
impeccably objective, and they have
been right. But if the record was so
goed, why wasn't anyone Up There
listening?"
, Possibilities are that the men Up
There didn't want to hear and began
to neglect the CIA's advice. They
may have been overwhelmed by the
successes of the United States, princi-
pally in Europe, and convinced of
American might and right. President
Johnson, specifically, didn't want to
be the first President to lose a war:
President Nixon's present policy is
open to the criticism of being tuned
to domestic politics and the Novem-
ber election.
? ?
Whatever the possibilities, Mr.
Nixon's plan puts the director of the I
CIA in a position where he can be
heard more easily. The director has
STATINTL
been relieved of day-to-day responsi-
bilities and has been given more au-
thority over all the government's in-
telligence authorities. He can always
be overruled; the CIA does not make
policy. There may be occasions when
he should be overruled. But he can-
not be ignored quite so easily as was
the CIA during the late and continu-
ing tragedy.
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POS2
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Despite Its Being in the Telephone Book
CIA Is an Unlisted Number
' SO FAR as I've found in a lot of traveling,
the United States is the only country in the
world which lists its central intelligence
agency in the telephone book, and enables
anyone to call up and speak to the director's
Office.
- But an extraordinary exchange on the floor
of the Senate recently made clear how little
else the people who put up the money for in-
telligence know about how it's spent. The
debate took place on the day the military ap-
propriations bill was finally pasaed so it at-
tracted little attention, but it was revealing.
It was provoked by Sen. Stuart Symington
(D-Mo,) who offered an amendment provid-
ing that not more than $4 billion in the de-
;fense budget could go for the intelligence
!services, including the CIA, the National Se-
curity Agency and the intelligence branches
,of the various armed services. Symington's
:point was not only to set a limit, but to set a
'precedent.
cross
. CONGRESS does appropriate all the
money that goes to intelligence, but it
doesn't know how much, or even when and
how. That's because it is hidden in the de-
fense budget, with the result that Congress
doesn't really know just what it is appropri-
ating any military money for because it
never knows which items have been selected
for padding to hide extra funds for intelli-
gence.
? Evidently, Symington believes that the ac-
tual amount spent is a little over $4 billion,
tntsead of the $6 billion reported in the
press, because he wasn't trying to cut intern-
( gence funds except for CIA payments to
I Thai soldiers in Laos. He is one of the nine
senators entitled to go to meetings of the
Appropriations Subcommittee on the CIA,
supposedly the confidential watchdog over
the agency. As he pointed out though, there
:hasn't been a full meeting all this year.
What he wanted to do was to establish
that Congress does have some rights to mon-
itor the intelligence empire which it created
by law, and he was driven to the attempt be-
cause of exasperation at President Nixon's
;recent intelligence reorganization. It was an-
By Flora Lewis
en Congress lials
flounced to the public as an upgrading of
CIA Director Richard Helms and a better
method to avoid waste and establish politi-
cal control.
Senator Symington and many other
well-informed CIA watchers in Washington,
are convinced that Helms has been kicked
upstairs. The result, they believe, will be an
Increase in military influence over intelli-
gence?which has been recognized as a dan-
ger throughout the history of intelligence
because it tends to 'become self-serving, the
doctor diagnosing himself according to the
therapy he likes.
There is also a concern that the reorgani-
zation, which makes the President's National
Security Adviser Henry Kissinger top dog
over intelligence, will centralize the system
so much that It will become a tool for White
House aims, not an outside source of techni-
cal expertise.
Responsible political control over the in-
telligence community's actions, as distinct
from its factual and analytical reports, is
necessary and desirable. But despite the
public impression, in the last few years the
CIA has been the most honest source of in-
formation for Congress on sensitive issues
such as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, while
the Pentagon, State and White House have
dealt in obfuscations. Whatever his Depart-
ment of Dirty Tricks might be doing, Helms
has been more straightforward with his se-
cret session testimony on what is really hap-
pening in these unhappy places than the
peoplewho do have to explain and justify
their funding to Congress.
c+4
BUT, as the Senate debate showed, that
Isn't saying very much. Sen. Allen Ellender.
(D-La.), who heads the CIA subcommittees
pointed out that 20 years ago only two sena- ?
tors and two-congressmen were allowed to ?
know what the CIA was spending, and now
there are five on each side of the Capitol,
He implied that they also knew what the
CIA was spending its money for, Sen. Wil-
Ham Fulbright (D-Ark.), had the wit to ask
if that mean Ellender knew, before the CIA v
set up its secret army in Laos, that this was-
the purpose of the appropriation. Ellencler
said, "It was not, I did not know anything
about it . . . it never dawned on me to ask
about it."
Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), had the,
humor to point out that there has been a lot
in the press about the CIA Laotian army in v
the past couple of years, and asked whether
Ellender has now inquired about it. El lender
said, "I have not inquired." Cranston
pointed out that since nobody else in Con-
gress has Ellender's right to check the CIA,
that meant nobody in Congress knows. El-
lender replied, "Probably not."
Symington's amendment was defeated.'
But at least the record is now clear. A re-
cent Newsweek article quoted a former CIA
official as saying, "There is no federal,
agency of our government whose activities
receive closer scrutiny and 'control' than the
CIA."
"The reverse of that statement is true,"
said Symington, "and it is shameful for the
American people to be misled." The record'*
proves him right.
0 1971. by Newsday.
pletrlbnted by Lcis Angeles Times Syndleati.
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YDRK DAILY
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VeVes Aro4/ad tht Dials
?
r:
?z Ili
L::A; Ms" ? z...v b . u
STATINTL
- By GEORGE MAKSTAN -
. The White House will be the subject of two major tele-
vision specials this month, one on CBS dealing with the
Christmas season and the other on NBC covering a day in
the life of the President.
NBC's special, titled "Dec. 6,
1971: A Day in the Presidency,"
will be presented next Tuesday,
front 7:30 to 8:30 p.m., with John
Chancellor as host. It will cover
President Nixon through an entire
work day, focusing on every
meeting on his schedule, includ-
ing the first part of a top-level
session of the Washington Special
Action Group of the National
Security Council.
This segment will show the
President discussing the Indian-
Pakistani war with Secretary of
----'-"'l ;
dent Agnew; presentation of
diplomatic credentials by ambas-
sadors from indone.sia, Morocco,
Pakistan and Portugal, and a
meeting of the QuadriaA the
President's four major economic
advisers.
Chancellor said that for se-
curity reasons NBC cameras were
excluded from a part of every
meeting. "Among the unsched-
uled events that occured during
the day," he said, "was a visit
from. Nixon's daughter, Julie Ei-
senhower.
CBS' special "Christmas at
the White House," will, be tele-
vised on Christmas Eve, from
10:30 to 11 p.m. It will follow
the First Family through its'
various activities preparing for
the Yuletide season. Julie Eisen-
hower will join Charles Kuralt
John Lucille
Chancellor Ball
?
State William Rogers, presiden-
tial aid Henry Kissinger, Deputy
Secretary of Defense David Pack-
ard, Gen. William Westmoreland
and Richard Helms, director of
the Central Intelligence Agency.
Renven Frank, president of
NBC News, said this is the first
time the White House has given
permission to film a program of
this type. "We have been asking '
to do a show on the Presidency
since 1948," he said. "We got the
go-ahead in mid-November after
several meetings with John Scali,
a special consultant to the
President."
The President's work day on
the day of filming (Dec. 6) began
at 7:45 a.m., with a breakfast for
congressional leaders, and ended
shortly before 11 p.m., following
a dinner for Canadian Prime
Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau.
Other events on Nixon's s.ched-
1)1e that will be seen on the tele-
Cast included: a. domestic council
meeting chaired by Vice Presi-
?
?
-
Li
and Marya McLaughlin for the
report.
Filming for the telecast began
last weekend.
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PHOENIX, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC
.DEC 9 1972
- 166,541
S ? 252,975
."-f? ???
?
,npilish'thaii- after--
. 9
.S4 "hisses, amen
By RICHARD SCOTT
Manchester Guardian Service
(S c o t t, who has just
moved from Washington to
Paris, reflects on 8f..; years
.as the Guardian's corre-
spondent in the U.S. capi-
tal.)
Looking back over the past
8/2 years in which I have
lived in the United States, I
find that my strongest
'impressions are largely criti-
cal. This is perhaps some- ?
what surprising since I leave
the country with a good deal
of affection and admiration
for its people. They are cer-
tainly very different from
ourselves. More different than
one assumes on arrival. The
fact that we have a roughly
:common language and have
been taught to regard each
other as cousins induces false
vassumptions of similarities.
, After a few years' resi-
dence in the United States,
? one realizes, if one had not
.done so before, that there is
? for want of a better phrase
? a "European Way of Life,"
'compounded from things both
spiritual and material, which
is 'important to one. This is
, absent in North America, and
exists as much in England as
in France 'or in Italy. An
Englishman might conceiva-
? by be homesick in France,
but he could not languish for
the same reason as he may in
America ? for nostalgia for
? that indefinable quality that
Is Europe.
The question most frequent,
: ly put by Europeans to their
compatriots living in the Unit-
ed States confirms the real
, existence of violence in that
country. How great, really, is
the danger of lAinc, beaten
on the street, PP }45I r
; robbed? The statistics, ,.cff,
coffie, Show that there is in-
deed a far higher incidence of
crime and violence in the
United States than in any Eu-
ropean country. But just how
much is one conscious of this
in one's daily life?
Violence on. streets
'One can speak only for one-
self. A French friend says
that he never knew real fear
before coming to live in New
York, even during the years
fighting in the Maquis. That
was not my own experience
in Washington. Yet Washing-
ton is the only city in which I
have lived where my. own
I riends and acquaintances
were among those who had
been beaten, raped, yes, even
murdered. It would be wrong,
however, to say that I was
daily, or more than occasion-
ally, conscious of the need foi
caution and even more rare
ly of actual fear.
It was not something thqt
preoccupied one. Subc o
sciously, no doubt, the anxie-
ty was there. One learned to
take precautions ? normally
of a- negative character ? al-
most without re alizing it.
There were st r ee t s, even
'areas, where one did not loi-
ter after dark; some where
one would not dream of pass-
ing- through on foot ? scarce-
ly even in daytime ? nor
readily in a car at night. So
one didn't.
It was only When one was
out of the country that one
realized in sudden flashes the
extent to which one's person-
al freedom was curtailed by
the extent of violence in the
United States. I recall Walk-
ing back to my hotel with a
ur col
Agrn SA
Inner ? in London .khis. year,
well after midnight'. It sud-
denly came to me that this
was something I would never
have done in Washington.?
Complex government
In the. area of politics, per-
haps my outstanding impres-
sion is of the infinite com-
plexity of the American sys-
tem. This complexity seems
to arise partly from the vast
size and variety of the coun-
try and its population; partly
because of the checks and
balances established by the
founding fathers in the writ-
ten constitution, and the para-
mountcy which these give to
the executive, the legislature,
and the judiciary, each within
its own sphere.
The federal character of
the Constitution, the fairly
wide powers remaining to the
individual states, the division
of government into thr ee
equal branches, tends to com-
plicate and to weaken the
c en tr al administrAtion in
Washington. This is particu-
larly so when the President's
party does not control Con-
gress, as has been the ease
since Nixon came to the
White House. The American
president's need for caution,
compromise, and consensus is
normally far greater than
that of the British prime min-
ister. His potentie power is
far greater than that of the
British prime minister. His
potential power is far great-
er, but his actual power to
act assertively often may be
less.
Government in the United
States is complicated not only
because of the complete se-
paration of the executive and
the legislative branches with
dures followed by .the latter,
and the massive,- cumber-
some size of the former. Jeal-
ousies between the Congress
and ? the White House, exist
also between the various gov-
ernment departments. This
resfilts hi widespread overlap-
ping and duplication of func-
tions.
In the field of intelligence
and security, for example,
the area of responsibility re-
mains substantially undefined,/
as between thic....GLArisederal
Bureau of investigation, State
Department, Pentagon, and
White House. They each
maintaji their own sources
and lines of communications.
The proliferation of civil ser-
vants is so great that most of
them seem to pend'. most of
their time in-' committee tell-
ing each other what they
have been doing or plan to.
do.
In London, if you wanted to
know what the British govern-
ment's policy is on any given:
subject, you can be fairly:
sure of getting it from the
department concerned ? if:
they will talk at all. In Wash-
ington, almost everyone is
ready to talk ? but you are
apt to receive' several differ-
ent and of ten conflicting
answers to your questions,
but from within the same de-
partment.
Legal system :creaks
The passage of a bilf
through Congress is devious
and slow, and subject to in-
numerable pitfalls. A commit-
tee chairman like Rep. Wil-
bur Mills, D-Ark., has more
real power than have most
members of the Cabinet. And
e' ?I e te there is almost
111
er, out necause of LIC ex- c cope for delaying
traordinarily intricate proce_ tactics by strongwilled minor-
ities.
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
DESERT NEWS
E ? 84,855
DEC B 1971'
Is Pentagon Crying -\\
'Wolf' In Cutbacks?
Government bureaus when faced with a budget cut have
away of raising an alarm by predicting all sorts of dire con- .
sequences.
For example, the Pen tagon warned this week that some .
parts of the world may be left uncovered by its military in
telligence apparatus ? spies, if you will ? because of a
projected cut of 5,000 jobs.
That sounds ominous, until one realizes the Pentagon now
has 139,000 persons working for it in its intelligence organiza-
tions alone. .
One place the Pentagon could safely cut back is in its sur-
veillance of civilians. Americans were properly shocked not
' long ago at disclosures that the military was actually spying
: on civilians ? a- practice generally reserved for totalitarian
countries.
So it's hard to accept at face value Assistant Secretary of
Defense Robert Froehlke's prediction that "we are going to
have to accept the risk of nct having complete information
- on some parts of the world."
Senator John Stennis, chairman of the Armed Forces :
Committee, raised a strenucus objection when he declared: "At .
the present time, it is almost as though the dropping of a leaf
in the far Pacific elicits a report." Stennis says he doubts that .
the Pentagon can make effective use of all the intelligence it I
now receives. ? ,,I
No one disputes the fact that the U.S. needs a large
enough intelligence apparatus to keep it informed of potential .,
. i
dangers. Anything less would be unthinkable.
How much the Pentagon's activities duplicate those of .
the Central Intelligence Agency is difficult to know, since
both operations are top-secret. But certainly Congress should ,
probe overlapping activities and cut out useless duplication.
i
At the same time the Pentagon cannot escape the
\
responsibility of using its forces efficiently. And bigness, par-
icularly in a bureaucracy, has seldom been known for its
eIft iciencv.
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STATINTL
USILINGT.0.1i
Approved For Release 2001/06/0V :M-r00080-01601R
1T1eaelt;11. ITtary
By
Mike
Causey
Intelligence Shakeups; the
authoritative Armed Forces
Journal says reorganizations
I that have taken place in" the-
' :intelligence .community will
-mean "a better deal, not less
-authority . ? . for members of
?the defense. intelligence com-
munity."
?, An article in the December
Issue of the Journal speculates
.that Defense. Intelligence
Agency will get more super-
-grade (GS 16-18) jobs, and that
.better caliber military person-
nel will be assigned to the
Pentagon unit.
Nevertheless, the Journal
reports, the military spy
agency is now outgunned in
the bureaucratic struggle for
top grade personnel, It says
DIA has only 15 supergraders
.to run an agency of 3,088 civil
'service- workers, a ratio of 1
'chief for each 206 Indians.
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ffp-rrtr iTii
? STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA3201M-011601R001300440
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agency was hard for me to identify at first. r, ? STATINTL
_
4-cc'
? Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor I began "first to criticize the waste. This is `4--.0.1celn 110: .,--
, - - - ? - : - ridiculous, I thought. We could be doing the "In recent years as doineatic unrest in-
.
. rostea ' job for $2 billion less. . . - ? - . creased, I've noticed the CIA is concerned
, ?
..,, ? .
': ? "The second thing that was Most annoying, about the FBI's apparent inability to handle
. In the basement 'of his home in Oakton,
. - . - -
to' me was the military influence. This is . subversion in this country. I think there's
? Va , with dogs and children running havoc
very pervasive. When the Secretary of De- . an effort to convince the nation that the-
aro.und him, Victor' Marchetti wrote a spy _ 1 85 ,
'fense controls percent of the assets, he CIA should get into domestic intelligence."
' 'novel last year. Today Mr. Marchetti and
are stir- [the CIA director) doesn't have the muscle
- :his new book "The Rope Dancer" "Ridiculous," snapped the former CIA
-
ring up 'havoc of another kind just a few to make changes. The military influence in
a administrator, and left this charge at that.
miles from his home, at Central Intelligence many ways is the greatest single factor ol To reform, the intelligence network, Mr.
Agency ? (CIA) headquarters where Mr. .waste. They want to know more and more Marchetti says there should be a reorgani-
. Marchetti was an official just two years ago. and are responsible for 011ection overkill." zation to limit the Defense Department to
aToday Mr. Marchetti is the spy "who To these two criticisms, the former CIA the routine intelligence needs of various de.
came in from the cold?into hot water?, official who worked close to the director partments -- Army, Navy, etc.
-
to quote one of his friends. Now an out- and who responded for TheC Christian Science
"Then I'd put the National Security
.spoken. critic "of the agency, Mr. Marchetti Monitor, partly 'agreed. "There is unfor-
Agency under the control of the President
?.has .been trav.eling around the country pro- ? tunately an ,a.,.,vfu,l. lot o. f duplication,? he
tighter and Congress," elaborated Mr. Marchetti
' mating his expose of the spy's wdrld and said, but added,. ' What is needed is .
"Congress has very little knowledge about
? crusading for reform in the CIA. CIA]. It's
what goes on. The Pentagon papers and the
control over the military [not the
net a queStion of the CIA duplicating the
. Mr. 'Marchetti left the CIA after a 14- way the Supreme Court 'acted strips away
military, but of. the military duplicating Y . .
. year career in protest over what he asserts what the CIA does.. The President's reorga- the shield intelligence has always had,. We
is its waste - and duplicity in intelligence nization is a strong move in the right direc- need to let a little sunshine in; that's thc
gathering, its increasing; involvement. with tion." ? ? . best safeguard."
file military, its amorality, and what he: Another one of Mr. Marchetti's corn- r
says now is its subtle shifts to "domestic plaints is. that the traditional intelligence ""s eXamk cited
ai
spying." - -work of gathering and assessing infermaa The former administrator insists, how.
Reform, he says, in the entire intelligence tion has been "contaminated" with para- ever, that there are already adequate con.
network .should be three-pronged: (1) 're- military activity. - ' t ols through special congressional corn,
. organizing responibilities, (2) reducing size A prime example is Lao S where the CL aittees which control appropriations . and
' dered by Preaiderit Nixon. Placing CIA di- recruited and armed thousands of natives, military affairs. "If you had the whole
rector Richard Helms as overall coordina- says Mr. Marchetti, who worked in the CIA ?Congress. anti. Senate debating these issue:
tor of national intelligence recently was in as an intelligence analyst, as special assist- in executive session, you might as well "cla-
-,part aimed at eliminating the waste in the ant to the chief of plans, programs, and away with it [secret intelligence . opera?
nation's $3 billion/200,000-man intelligence budgets, to - the executive director, and Cons]. Inevitably .there would be leaks."
.operation which spans a dolen governrnen- finally as executive assistant to the agency's "Of course there would be leaks," admit.
and funding, ancl (3) exposing the intelli- deputy' director. - - ,ted Mr. Marchetti.. "What I'm really saying
gence community to more public control "[At the time] perhaps a handful of key is that in the final analysis if we macle 'the
. and scrutiny.. .? a - . ,- congressmen and senators might have' President walk through it [his decision tc
. 'kown about this ? activity in Laos. The use covert forces in foreign countries], the
Silence antia:aanarneal : n
President would see it's all not worth it.
-
- The CIA, in its turn, has remained custo- public knew nothing,",he declared. Then if we deny ourselves these alterna?
"marily silent to the public attack. However, According to the former CIA adnainis- tives. we'd have to act in a ? diplomatic
.-one, former top CIA official, who asked to trator, however, paramilitary activity is fashion."
?remain anonymous, . agreed 'with some of shifting out of' the CIA now and into the
Mr.- Marehetti's points but disputed his main Army. "But. in any case," he said, "the
.arguments.
. Since Mr. Marchetti began speaking out
several months ago, a major restructuring
in the intelligence community has. been or-
tal agencies. It was also aimed at tailoring
-intelligence output More closely to White
House needs.
. This reform and Mr. Marchetti's own criti-
cism come at a time when Congress, too, is
demanding more knowledge .-and control
? over the intelligence networks. For the first
, time Congress has ordered public hearings -
on the CIA next year, and Mr. Marchetti
plans to testify.
. .?
? Military inlippixved or Release 2001/06/09 : cIA-RDP80-01601R001300440001-2
In l'aaston Mr. Marchetti explained his own
? "defection": "My discontent with the
CIA doesn't decide on this activity; they
are directed by the President and the Na-
tional Security Council." If there, is to be
reform in the use of the CIA, he argues, it
must come from the President's direction..
;While Mr. Marchetti is highly critical of
the CIA's paramilitary and .clandestine in-
terventions in other countries, he insists that
the real, threat of the CIA today is that it
may "unleash" itself on this country.
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etrr.rethetet Cr.!7!T rrr'rr
VL:6.1. WW1,/
3 DEC 1972
By Thomas B. Ross
Sun-Times Bureau
WASHINGTON ? President Nixon plans to
name Atomic Energy Commission Chairman
James R. Schlesinger as the director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, reliable sources .
reported Saturday. ?
Schlesinger, a 43-'y ear-old management and
budget expert, is scheduled to replace career
CIA operative Richard M. Helms early in
Mr. Nixon's second term, which begins Jan.
20. -
Like several of the President's recent high-
level appointees. Schlesinger reportedly has
indirfated ?a desire to remain in his present
White House announces retention of several
top aides; RumsfeId due for new post. Story
on Page 5. ?
job, from which he cannot be legally removed
until June 30, 1070. Nonetheless, Mr. Nixon's
wishoatire again expected to prevail.
Helans' departure represents another bu-
reaucratic triumph for Henry A. Kissinger
ho has been critical of the CIA's work and
who now stands to strengthen his control over
the intelligence community.
Hissinae.r reinforced his dominant role in
foreign policy last week when Kenneth Rush,
a close collaborator, was named under-
secretary of state and the President retained
William P. Rogers rather than choosing a
more assertive secretary of state.
Kissinger's influence may similarly be ex-
tended at the Pentagon where Helmut G. Son- .
nenfeldt, a long-time associate and current
member of .his White House staff, is under
consideration as assistant Defense secretary.
for international security affairs.
At the CIA, Schlesinger could be expected?
at least initially to concentrate on managing
the huge budget and bureaucracy with Kis-
singer overseeing the flow of. intelligence. The
,CIA.director has charge not only of the CIA
but also of all the civilian and military, in-.
telligence branches, which employ more than
250,000 persons and spend approximately $.5
billion a year.
Kissinger reportedly has directed a series
of complaints against the CIA. In particular.
he is said to ?have accused Helms and the
agency of falling to give adequate advance
warning of the massive North Vietnamese of-
fensive last spring.
CIA officials insist that their reports were
complete and accurate. and that Kissinger
should have drawn the proper warning from
the reports. Other officials who followed the
reports agree but Kissinger's assessment
evidently was persuasive to the President.
CIA sources said they were unaware of any
presidential displeasure with Helms. They
ApprovettfOrRehtiated2001106/091PCIN-R
iated to his age and fineneial problems than
his performance on the jch. They said Helms,
n nrnfonen1 inmilluonce efficer for 30
years with the OSS and the CIA. has inspired
a high level of morale among the career offi-
cials at the top of the agency.
But they reported Helms has set a rule that
leading CIA officials should retire at 60 and
he will reach that age next March. In addi-
tion, friends said a divorce settlement and
remarriage four years ago left him in diffi-
cult financial straits.
A motive in leaving the CIA, they stig--
gested, was to get a job in Private business
drawing a salary higher than. his current
-$42,500 a year.
Schlesinger'S departure from the AEC is
sure to be well received by the oil industry
which has. been wary of his plans to move
forcefully into the energy crisis with atomic
_power plants. It is also likely to be pleasing .to. '
environmental groups which have opposed
him on licensing standards.
Schlesinger came into office- in July, 1971;
? with a declaration that the AEC would no .
longer serve as a defender and promoter of
nuclear power but rather as a prctector of
public safety and the. environment.
He has subsequently pushed atomic devel-
opment, however, arguing that environmental
opponents failed to prove their case.
Officials at the AEC and the White House
give him high marks for efficiency, in-
telligence. public relations and political
'awareness. Those are qualities which could
serve him well at the CIA which, in addition
'iti,47asaegaaryiy,aa cQi,lcisma has come
1-41DYN.Yri l'hYlVtitkAPPYfflguAlitieoversial op-
erations in foreign countries.
Prior to 'his appointment to the AEC,
JAMES R. SCHLESINGER
, Schlesinger served as assistant director of the
Office of Management and Budget under
Geoli?ge Shultz, who was reappointed Friday
as secretary of the Treasury and given the
expanded job of chief economic manager for
the President. Schlesinger's ?close relations
with Shultz should give him leverage in the
Inner circles of the White House.
Schlesinger is a native of New York City
and a summa cum ',nude graduate of Harvard
where he also took his PhD. He is married
and has eight children.
STATINTL
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ST.PETERSBURG, FLA.
TIMES DEC 21971
M - 154,532
- 169,68E1
Nixon's Finesse
Faced with Senate concern that CIA
control was slipping to a military .ntill!
and with the need for a new Marine
Corps commandant, President Nixon
solved both problems with one move.
His nomination of Lt. Gen. Robert E?
Cushman, deputy CIA chief, to become
Marine commandant gives him a quali-
fied replacement for retiring Gen. Leon-:
ard Chapman and simultaneously re4
moves any threat to Director Richard
Helms' leadership of the intelligence
agency.
It was a neat way to finesse a contro
versy.
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ARMED FOIi0T:r3 JOURNAL
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_
Better Deal
for Service Spooks?
WHITE HOUSE SOURCES tell The
JOURNAL that the intelligence rear-
ganjzation announced last month by the
President means a better deal, not less
authority--as the country's press has
been reporting?for members of the
defense intelligence Community.
? Among the specifics cited: ?
?o More "supergrades" (GS-16 to
GS-18 civilian billets) for Defense Intel-
ligence Agency.
o Assignment of top-caliber military
personnel to DIA (which in past years
has had trouble getting the most quali-
fied Military personnel assigned to it
and proper recognition for their work in
? intelligence fields);
ci Better promotion opportunities
for intelligence?zcialysts (who in the past
.have seldom been able to advance to top
management levels without first break-
.- ing out into administrative posts that
make little use of their analytical capa-
bilities).
This lase point sterns from a major
White House concern with the nation's
intelligence product: "95% of the em-
phasis has been on collection', only 55
on analysis and production," as one
White House staffer describes it. Yet
good analyst?s,.he points out, have faced
major hurdles in getting recognition and
advancement. Moreover, they have been
"overwhelmed" by the amount of raw
data collected by their counterparts in
the more glamorous, more powerful,
and better rewarded collection fields.
The supergrade probl9m has been of
special concern tc; the White House. A
high Administration official, who asked
not to be named, told The JOURNAL
that the "White House [has] pledged to
get Civil Service Commission approval"
fe,r a GS-18 billet which had been
urgently requested by DIA Director
LGen Donald V. Bennett. Bennett, he
said, first requested the billet more than
a year ago. Even though DIA has not,
Our. Outgunned Spies
'A QUICK JOURNAL SURVEY of government-wide supergrade authorizations shows
clearly that the Service side of the intelligence community, and DIA in particular, has
been "low man on the supergrade totem pole" and makes clear why the White 'House
Intelligence reorganization is aimed, in part at least, at giving Service "spooks" better
recognition and more attractive career opportunities. Here are typical (in some cases,
ludicrous) comparisons that can be drawn from Part II of the Appendix to the Fiscal
Year 19 72 Budget of the United States, a 1,112-page tome which gives, by federal
agency, a detailed schedule of all permanent Civil Service positions:
O DIA has 3,088 Civil Service employees, but only 15 supergrades?roughly one for
every 200 spooks.
O 12oD's Office of Civil Defense has 721 Civil Service personnel, but 27 supergrades?
one for every 27 employees, a ratio eight-to-one better than DIA's.
O The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, with only 776 civil servants,
has 36 supergradcs'---one out of every 22, nine times better than DIA. The Peace Corps
also outguns DIA nine to one, with 52 Foreign Service billets in the GS-16 to GS-18
salary brackets for only 1,188 permanent federal positions.
O The National Security Council staff has a 23-to-one advantage, 73 staffers and nine
supergrade (or higher) billets. Even NSC's one-to-nine supergrade-to-staff ratio, however,
pales by comparison with the President's Office of Science and Technology, which has 23
superposts but only 60 people!
Here's how the supergrade-to-people bean count for key federal agencies compares
with D IA's (where authorized, executive level I through V posts are included in
supergrade count):
Defense Intelligence Agency
1-206 ,
Office, Secretary of Defense
1-
95
Library of Congress
1-
51
Office of Management & Budget
1-
78.
Office of Economic Opportunity
.1-
54
General Accounting Office "
1-
68
SmithsofikpprOVed For .Release .2001/06/09- :..CIA-RDP80-01-6DTRO
Civil Service Commission '17103.
Federal Maritime Commission 1- 14
had any authorization fora'8, it
took almost 10 months for the papers
needed to justify the single high-level
slot to filter through lower echelon
administrative channels in the Pentagon
before they could be forwarded, with a
"sti'ong endorsement" from Deputy De-
fense Secretary David Packard, to the
Civil Service Commission.
Ironicat.ly, just one .day after The
JOURNAL was told of the White
House's determination to help get the
billet approved, it was learned that the
Civil Service Commission had neverthe-
less denied the request. Instead, it of-
fered DIA a choice of having an addi-
tional GS-17 slot or of having a Public.
Law 313 post (which would require that
DIA first recruit an incljvidtial highly
qualified enough to justify the appoint-
ment).
DIA's supergrade structure, neverthe-
less, is going to improve dramatically.
For at least three years, the agency has
been authorized only 15 supergrades,
but will get 24 more under a. plan just
endorsed by Dr. Albert C. Hall, DoD's
new Assistant Secretary for intelligenc.e.
The posts are known to be endorsed
strongly by both Defense Secretary Mel-
vin Laird and Deputy Defense Secretary
David Packard, ?and apparently enjoy
strong backing from the White House. as.
well. ?
By going from 15 to a total
?supergrade billets, DIA will be able not
only to recruit higher caliber civilian
personnel .but to promote more of its
own qualified analysts into these covet-
ed, higher paying posts.
Pres Mies the Point
Pres.s reporis on the intelligence reor-
ganization convey a much different pic-
ture than the above highlights and White
House sources suggest. In a 22 Novern,
ber feature, U.S. News & World Report
noted in a lead paragraph that "The
? Pentagon appears to be a loser in the
latest reshuffle." Deputy Defense Secre-
tary David Packard is probably the man
most responsible for such interpreta-
tions. In a 4 November meeting with
Pentagon reporters, just one day before
the White House announced that CIA
Director Richard Helms was being given
new, community-wide responsibilities
with authority over all intelligence bud-
gets, Packard said: "There have been
people thinking if we just had someone
over in the White House to ride herd on
this overall intelligence , that things
would be improved. I don't really sup-
port that view. ... I think if anything
we .need a little less coordination from
that point than more ...."
The White House's determination to
make the.defense intelligence field more
130644,6001_c2 military (as well as civil-
ian) personnel Parallels steps taken ear-
lier this year by l_Gen John Norton,
Commanding General of the Army's _
cjn
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1 DEC 1971
? .,? . , _
.`tiN,"
? - - co 11 ?
? ?1 'rr Cl
ij,) IL
Telligence activities, and -specti-'
lation had been that Mr. Nixon
-would retain him in that major:
post, traditionally occupied by a
Military man.
(At the White House, Ronald
:L. Ziegler,- the presideTitial press.
secretary, said he did nOt. know
- .who Mr. Nixon would name to
Succeed General Cushman.).
GEN. ROBERT. CUSHMAN Also, Observers noted, General
- ?
new top Marine - Cushman graduated from the
CILAIII.ES W. CORDDR)?
?
yaslangion; Bureau of Ths SUIL
WaShington?Lt. Gen. Robert!
,-,Everton Cushman, Jr., a World- ?
? ;War.II herb and commander in: ?"`cc.
f of the largest Thus, a whole generation of
'
? forces 'ever to serve under
a top Marine officers is being
Marine officer, was tagged by passed over, those generally of.
:President NiXon in a surprise the 193.9 class. The next coin-
'move yesterday to become ccira- mandant almost certainly will
mandant of the Marine ? Corps be chosen four years from now`
January 1. ? ? from the ranks of today's briga-
? ;. --General .Cushman, a longtime
? r .
?oi very major gener-
?
Naval Academy in 1935, in the
same class as the retiring com-
mandant, General Chapman,
and will be 57 when he takes_
friend and aide oi r. ixon,
( has been 'deputy director of the'
? 'Central Intelligence Agency
since March, 1H9.
'He served .as Mr. Nixon's as-
.sistant for national security af-
fairs for four years when Mr.
Nixon was Vice President.
If General Cushman's nomina-
tion is approved by the Senate,
:he will become the Corps' 25th
:Comfbandant; succeeding Gen.:
- Lech-mai F. Chapman for a four-
year term.
Though his record in eQmbat
? command and staff work is long
and distinguished, General Cush-
man's appointment' was a sur-
Prise to many Marine officers
and military observers on sev-
eral counts.
_ He will, have been away from
the Corps for almost three years
in the deputy's job at CIA, where
? he Is responsible for day-to-day
operations.
The importance of his CIA job
was enhanced under the recent
. reorganization .of government in- ,
? - als, the 19-12-1E3 classes.
VO)01.11.v fi tr
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??
0 -0
Irr 11)
? t.
STATINTL
'CHICAGO TRIDT:TY,
Approved For Release 2001/06/09 :R001300440
, I
.. BY FRED FARRAR
? IChicaua Tabun. Pis Svelte] - ? . .
. WASHINGTON, Nov. 30-
- ;President Nixon announced to-
1/4/2,fday that he will nominate U.
Robert E. Cushman Jr:::
deputy director of the' Central
'Intelligence Agency, to become
the next ccmmandant of the
Marine Corps.
Cushman, 54, will replace
Gen. Leonard F. Chapman Jr.
who is- retiring Dec. 31 after
completing the four-year term
in the commandant post.
Cushman's selection came as
a surprise to some observers
hem who had speculated that
geNT,0 rj111 -cc 4--
0 1 RIO )
c.L
of :the *Marine, Corps, or U.
Gen. John Chaisson, chief of
staff, to be selected as com-
mandant.
Cushman, a native of St.
Paul and a U. S. Naval Acade-
my graduate, was the Marine
commander in Viet Nam for 13
months prior to his appoint-
ment to the CIA in April, 1069.
Before his assignment to
Viet Nara, he was commander
of the 3d Marine Division.
From 1957 to 1931, he was spe-
cial assistant for national secu-
rity affairs to then Vice Presi-
dent Niori.
As a battalion commander in -
World War H, Cushman won -a
Navy Cross during the battle'
for Guam and a Legion of,
Merit during the Iwo Jirria
campaign.
M. Can. Cushman
the . President would want
Cushman to continue in the
No. 2 job in the CIA---particu-
? /3.riy in view -of the recent re-
organization of the United
? States intelligence apparatus
. which gave broader responsi-
bilities to the deputy director
of, the _agency. ?
Once Served in China ?
.Cushman served in China be-
fore World War II and was
conunander of the Marine
Corps complement aboard the
battleship Pennsylvania when ,
the Japanese attacked it and
other ships of the American
fleet at Pearl Harbor.
Cushman will take over a'
Marine Corps which is down to
a total of 204,000 mon from the
318,000 it had at the height of
the war in Viet Nam. At that
time, the Marine. Corps had
86,000 men in Viet Nain. Now,
500 Marines are stationed ,
there. . .
Ronald Ziegler, White ?house
press secretary, said he did
not know who would be Cush-
man's replacement at the CIA,
. whether the job would be
?Commander in Viet Nam filled by A civilian or a mill-
/
These observers had expect- tary off r. Traditionally, a
od either. Can. Raymond G. military man has been deputy
Dav:11, assistant commandant CIA directf3J,
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STATINTL
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DAYTON, OHIO
JOURNAL HERALD,
DEC i1371
- 111,667
?
integigence1?UofltBS
...Congress must monitor CIA operations
mittee is supposed to review CIA op6ra-
tions and . funding. Unfortunately, it lsel-
dom meets except to confer congressional
blessings on CIA affairs, This congres-
sional abdication of its. responsibility for
exercising a positive role in the formation
of national policy reduces it to a rubber
stamp for an omniscient executive. This
has virtually been the case in foreign
affairs since the National Security Act of
1947 unified the services and created the
National Security Council and the CIA.
An efficient intelligence operation is
vital to the interests of the American
people. ,But the operation does not always
serve the interests of the people when it
strays into political and military activities.
such as the formation of coups d'etat,.
direction of clandestine wars and the
practice of political assassination.
President Nixon's changes appear to
offer increased efficiency, and in Helms
the President seems to have a supervisor'
who is.pre-eminently concerned with gath-
ering and evaluating intelligence data. But
only a vigilant and responsible Congress
can serve to restrain the executive branch
of government from abusing the vast
power and influence available to it
through these necessarily covert intelli-,
gence activities.?
President Nixon's irritation at the qual-
ity of information coming to him from the
nation's fragmented intelligence appara-
tus is understandable. However, his ef-
forts to streamline operations, while wel-
come, are not without hazard to the
balance of power between the executive
and legislative branches of the federal
government.
? The President has given to Richard
Helms, director of the Ceq1. Intelligence
"Agency, coordinating respon-sTOFTand
ssurn budgeting authority over the diverse
intelligence community. Coordination and
economy both seem desirable. The various
intelligence agencies employ about 200,000
persons and spend about $6 billion an-
nually.
" To the extent that the President- has
;made the intelligence operation more effe-
eient and responsive?as indeed it should
be ? he has increased the security of the
-United States. But he will also have
further eroded Congress' role in formulat-
ing national policy if the legislative branch
of government does not balance executive
? access to unlimited intelligence data with
more intensive congressional scrutiny of
and control over the nature and scope of
'intelligence activities.
A special congressional watchdog corn:.
Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001300440001-2
LT.LERTY LETTER
Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIIMD14010160194IL3004
? EDITORIALS ?
THE SUBVERSIVE C.F.R.
When President Nixon appointed
!Henry Kissinger as his assistant for naT
.tional security'affairs we pointed out that
.he was hardly qualified for his job be-
!cause be was a security risk himself. And
.we proved it.
Many people thought that we were
crazy, or "extremists," to say such nasty
.things about a man appointed to such
a high position by an allegedly "conserva-
tive" Republican.
. ..!HENRY KISSINGER
is the architect of President Nixon's pro-
Red China policy, which has already
. caused our most massive foreign policy
!defeat since the recognition of the
! U.S.S.R. by Roosevelt. He was hand-
) picked for his job by the subversive
. 'Council on Foreign Relations..
. The CFR - is - a private 'organization
' which controls our foreign policy. It is
'itself run for the benefit of the multi-
billionaire ! internationalists who profit
from our continuing sellout to con?-
munism. They picked Kissinger for
-.Nixon and had Nixon put him in control
of our foreign policy because they wanted
to be certain that "American" policy con-
tinues td be made for their benefit, rather
than the benefit of America.
: Kissinger has been So successful in do-
. .ing a job for his bosses in the CFR that
;on Nov. 6 Nixon signed an order putting
!him in charge of all intelligence opera-
tions----the FBI, CIA, Military Intern- .!"
!gence, Departments of Treasury, Defense,
. and State, and Atomic Energy intelli-
gence. Now, through Kissino?er's National
!Security Council, the CFR can plug in
to meetings of patriots who may be plan-
ning to overthrow at the polls the inter-
nationalist regime in Washington. Soon,
! it will ? be a "crime" to read an editorial
! like this unless the people wake up. But
? . THE.. PEOPLE ARE CATCHING ON
-
f!There is only 'One answer to this.
is to organize a political counter-fore
and we don't mean the Reptiblican . or
Democratic party. Both of these are part.
I
of the problem and any politician who
calls himself either is in some degree con-
trolled. If he's honest, he will admit it.
LIBERTY LOBBY
is the answer----a political force which is
completely independent of all pressure
groups and 'parties.
And when we say LIBERTY LOBBY,
we don't mean an imitation, such as
"Common Cause" or some other phoney
Organization which has been set up by
the CFR to lead you down. the road a
little further. The CFR-Zionist cabal is
expert at setting up this sort or thing to
confuse its opposition. .
There is' plenty of evidence that
Nixon's fiasco in the UN and forced
busing of kids to integrated schools arc -
waking up the voters as nothing else ever
has. Public apathy is giving way to.alarm.
The people are looking up from their
boob tubes and wondering what is going
on.
Let's tell them?and let's tell them
that there is .only one way to fight ef-
fectively?LMERTY
?
to the fact that ihe government is in the
hands of ruthless pressure group bosses
who wish to run our country for their
exclusive benefit. They want to steal all
your wealth "legally," through confisca-
tory taxes (the super-rich very seldom
pay any taxes at all), inflation and in,
terest on their Federal Reserve Notes,
which they force us to use as "money."
A poll. reports that in 1964, 62% of
the people believed that the government
was run for the benefit of all. After John-
son and Nixon that figure is now down
to 37%.VIgl)traipt,vd toliakii0sia2101/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001300440001-2
fool all of thellid&pple- alt of the time.
STATINTL
MI/NI HERALD
Approved For Release 2001/06/09 :t1WRID146161601ROG1
tVig n
01J (-71
7-1
Ora
WASHINGTON -- (UPI) ? President Nixon Tuesday
named Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., a personal friend and
the No. 2 man at the CIA, to be the new Marine Corps com-
mandant. Cushman vowed to 'keep the Leathernecks "lean
and mean:"
' .A native of St. Paul, Minn.,
the 56-year-old Cushman will strict discipline ? or "lean
get a fourth Star' and assuine and mean" in Cushman's
command of the Corps on words.,
Jan. 1, succeeding Gen. Leon-. "Itis my opinion that the
ard F. Chapman Jr:, who is present course charted. for
ci. ur Corps is a correct one,"
retiring. Cushman's pay will
Cushman said in a statement
rise from $31,400 to $36,000
released on the announce- ?
a.year.. '?. ,ment of his appointment. "I
look forward with enthusi-
His selection came without
asm to taking over the task
the rancor .of the ferocious .of maintaining our highly
:arapaigning that had sur- professional standards." .
rounded onie selection of l?
Cushman won the Navy
Chapman four . years ago. Cross ? the second highest
Cushman was considered the award- for . valor after. the
front-runner among the three Medal of Honor ? -during
World War-II as a lieutenant
candidates for the job. The
others were Lt. Gen. John R.
colonel who led a battalion in
the recapture of Guam.
? Chaisson, Marine chief of
staff,. and Gen. Raymond
Davis, assistant comman-
dant.
become even more distffict as
the other, larger services
have gone "mod" to attract
higher enlistments. The 200,-
000-man Corps has stood.by
its tradition of toughness and
THERE had been specula-
tion that Nixon might want
to keep Cushman, in the more
important, if less prestigious,
post at the Central. Intelli-
gence Agency.
This speculation increased
_after Nixon reorganized the
U.S.- intelligence-gathering
apparatus a few weeks ago,
making CIA Director Richard
A. Helms overseer of all such
operations and increasing
Cushman's responsibilities in
'day-to-day CIA activities.
? Cushman, who worked for
Nixori as his assistant for na-
tional security affairs
throughout Nixon's second
term as vice president, was
named deputy director of the
CIA just two months after
Nixon entered the White
? Approved For Rerelgee 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001300440001-2 .
? HE TAKES over as the top ?
marine at a time when the
ViASHIIAGTON PO,s5:
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11
Ly Michael Getler
Fcrit Staff Writer
? ?
Lt. ? Gen. Robert E. Cushman
deputy director of the
Central ..Intelligence Agency
? . Who was, military aide. to Pres-
'Mont Nixon, when he was Vice
? PreSident, was -nominated yes-
terday to become commandant
? of the Marine Corps,. -
Cushman will become the
. . , .
commandant in the
Marine's 196-year history, and
will' suecced Gen. Leonard F.
Chapman ...whose - .four-year
team as commandant expires
Dec. 31.
?'Yesterday' announcement of
the ? nomination by the Presi-
dent provided a surprise end-
ing two months of speculation
within..the - Defense Depart-
ment ? and ?- the . military serv-
ices... ? .
Though Cushman was one
of three senior Marine gener-
als .knoWn to have been under
White House consideraion,
number of. high-ranking._ offi-
cers' expected the job to go the
? Lt, _Gen. John H. Chaisson .or
to Gen.' -Raymond G. Davis,
Chaisson was the roost fre-
quently mentioned candidate.
Davis, a Medal .of Honor
winner in Korea, is currently
the assistant commandant and,
:aside from Chapman, the only
other four-star 'general in the
corps, ,
? Chaisson, a Harvard-eclu-
-cated officer with a reputation
as a top combat commander
and a "defense intellectual," is
Currently the - Marine Corps
-chief .of staff. .? ? -
? Speculation that Cushman
might :be out of the tuning in--
creased - last month. when the
White House announced a
shake-un of. the entire intelli-
gence. apparatus.. In that ac-.
tion; .?CIA Director , .Richard
Helms ..was given broader pow-
ers all government intcl?
ligence_ operation, and Cush-
' man was. -designated to - take
on even, more of. the CIA load
as second' in.. command to
Helms. ? ?-?
In making' .the announcement on Cushman :yesterday,
presidential press secretary
- Ronald L. Zeigler Said. he did
not .know .,who .4fould..repl ace
Cushman at CIA or whether
the No. 2 ? intelligence job..
-would go. to a civilian or an-
; other military officer, CusLom-
arily, the depet9IFRYftgi
filled from the military....
1 1i
0 60::
ci
.. \1?,,, ,I,-,,,,Trori?. fry '
- cd.U.J..L.t.L V?..i. q..d.?
. ,-,..- .---. -.-,- ? ---- -
cushm-an, 56, won the Navy
Cress .in -1944 . for his . role: in
the recapture of Guam' and
was commanding the Third
Marine Amphibious Force on
Vietnam in March, 1969, when
he was nominated for the CIA
, ___..... .
post shortly after the Nixon
administration took office.
The general, according to
his associates,' is it close per-
sonal friend of the President,
a? relationship stemming from
the four years in the late 1930s
in which Cushman served as a
special assistant for 'national
security affairs to. then Vice
President Nixon.
Cushman, who - joined the.
Marines in 1935, IS the senior
three-star general in the corps.
With his new post, once ap-
tul Fal.r..}111.121.(11.cc).1:1
...,.-, :31'Airif
- v, , 6-11 T';'3 11 IY7', 11.2c:
i
(t7.1.,A.J.1... ' .. V .1...L at.;.1_ .d..0..i.1. '-&,./ B., -
STATINTL -
proved by the Senate, will .go
a four-star rank and a spot
along with the heads of the
other three services on the
Joint Chiefs of Staff---the na-
tion's top military council that
argues the military's case on
budgetary and operational
matters before the White
House.
While the White House took
longer to name its choice for
the new commandant than
many high-ranking Marines
expected, these officers say
that the selection process this
time was carried out with
none of the campaigning that
marred that process four
years , ago. Chapman, who claims.
'stayed out of that jockeying ? Nominated to become a
four years ago, emerged with .member of the Federal born-
the prestigious commandant's munications Commission was
job.. .?? Richard E. Wiley, currently
Cushinan, a native of St. the commis'sion's general
counsel.
Corps at a critical time in the
Paul, takes over the Marine
,
SerViee's history.
The Marines have emerged
.from Vietnam in .compara:
itively better shape than some
I of . the other services, with its
I leaders anxious to get back to
? the ? smaller, more elite- force
that it was prior to Vietnam,
But ?tivith? the' administration
t..
t.
jrj GEN. R. E. CUSHMAN
. named. to 1-star post.
. .
hoping to end the draft by
Mid-1973, the Marines , are
faced. with attracting men vol-
untarily into a tough, combat-
ready military environment at
a time when the other services
are seeking to '.make service
life less rigid.
Thus far,. the Marines are
j-aptimistic.. about. the ,. allure
,that the corps' spartan ways
still holds for a number of
!young people. _
In other announcements.'
yesterday, the president nomi-
nated assistant attorney gen-
eral Shiro Kashiwa of Hono-
lulu to become an associate
judge of the U.S. court of .
?
elease 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-0,1601R001300440001-2
Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001030044000
? SALT LAKE CITY, UTAI-t
RJ:Y3L1 E 193/j
W.1
103;27 0
? 188,699
Frii-? 0
: 111.71v
.0 in
The .American intelligence comrinini-
ty sinc'e long before World War II has
L been, and remains to a .large degree,
a many splintered. thing. Every agency
needing fresh, accurate and secret infor-
mation on. which to formulate its plans
and actions has developed its own set of
spies. This. lack of coordination and. -co-
. hesiveness has .become apparent with
:..sortle disasters, most. notably the Pearl
. ? Harbor attack of Dec, 7, 1941, and a lot
of embarassments such as the Bay of
Pigs debacle and more recently the abor-
tive commando raid .on the des-erted
prs-
oner of war camp on Sontay, 23 mik,S
, west of Hanoi, on Nov. 21, 1970.
In 1947 the Central. Intelligence Agen-
? cy was established with the aim of coordi-
? hating all this nation's intelligence ef-
forts. Besides the CIA, the U.S.
intelli-
gence ncwork tod'ay-nielii[cie?s-the Defense,
Intelligene&, Agency, the National Sc..,cur;?,
' ity Agency, the State Department's Du-:
reau of Intelligence and Research and nu-
clear intelligence operations of the Atomic
Energy Commission. '3.1he counter-intel-
ligence activities of the Federal Bu-
'? reau of Investigation must also be includ-
ed.
President Nixon, following what has
almost become a presidential tradition
after public disclosure of an intelligence
? . failure, has shaken' up the top levels of
the American spy network. In an appar-
ent hope of overcoming the shortcomings
? of the present system, Mr. Nixon has
_ given Richard Helms, the CIA director,
"an enhanced leadership role in planning, -
coordinating and evaluating all
gence operations." Theoretically this is
the authority that director of intelligence ;
has had for years. But according to one
official because of bureaucratic rivalry'z
among competing intelligence agencies?
*this has not always worked out.
Sens. Stuart Symington, fl-Mo., and
William J. Fulbrif,;ht, D-Ark., have seen .;
Mr. Helms' new job more of a "demotion
upstairs" than any enhanced leadership
role. Their suspicions are understandable,
considering the Sonta.y raid failure and ,
the imbiay of the intelligence community
to forecast the reaction of North Vietnam ,
to the inwsion. of South Laos last Febru-
ary and March.
Bolstering the sc,,nator's suspicions
must be the lack Of concrete knowledge
about the apparent leadership crisis in
mainland China. This development comes
at a time of delicate negotiations preced-
ing.Mr. Nixon's planned trip to Peking. It
would be foolish for Mr;Nixon to make
the. journey without accurate knowledge
of the power structure in Peking.
However, the concern of Seos. Sym- -
in[2;ton and Fulbright that Mr. Helms has I
been "kicked upstairs" sounds more like ?
the political reactions Of two men who
have Consistently disagreed with the Pros-
Mont, than the genuine concern of persons
fearful the nation might be losing :the ,
needed talents of a highly competent hi-
telligence administrator.
Instead the senators should be ap-
plauding the President for his 'efforts
to bring greater coordination and col-:e7
siveness to, an ihtelligence effort that has
become famous for Pearl Harbor, the Bay ;
of Pigs and Sontay.
?. .
Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001300440001-2
Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001300
DALLAS, TEX.
NEWS TONI 2 8 19141.
E - 242,928
- 284,097
Leath:tem ircaosa
11 eb Grows in French
By MARGOT LYON
PARIS ? "It's like a Shakespeare
play," said a leading Frenchman this
week. "It's an infernal cauldron where
ambitions, grudges, big money and
blackmail are all simmering ? an ex-
plosive mixture that will probably
spare nobody when it boils over, as it
must."
: He was talking of the latest revela-
tions in the scandal that links French
counter-espionage services with the $12
million sale of heroin in the United
States.
" The story began last April when
French agriculturist and one-time spy
Roger Delouette was arrested in New
Jersey as he went to claim a Volkswag-
en minibus in which 96 pounds of hero-
in were hidden. He told American au-
thorities that the man behind the smug-
gling attempt was a Colonel Fournier ?
later said to be Paul Ferrer ? a high-
ranking officer of the Service de Docu-
mentation Exterleure et Contre-Espio-
nage or SDECE, roughly the French
equivalent of the CIA.
Action Urged
New Jersey attorney Herbert Stern
has been demanding that Fournier-Fer-
rer come and defend himself against
the charges, but since last April nothing
has moved, except for a visit to Paris
from Mr. Stern himself earlier this
month, when he saw the director of
the cabinet of the Interior Minister,
Raymond Marcellin, in the presence
of U.S. Ambassador Watson and
.tither officials. The ambassador
seemingly tried to smooth the rough
'edges of a somewhat stormy meeting,
but as one of the participants said later,
-"Dr. Watson did not manage to soothe
1Sherlock Holmes."
Last February Minister Marcellin
signed a cooperation pact on dope-hunt-
ing with Attorney General John Mitch-
ell and it looks as if Washington does
not wish to sacrifice the restored coop-
eration between the two for the skin of -
a crook. But Attorney Stern is seen to
be in a hurry to build his own political
career, and is impatient with the slow -
and exceedingly formalistic style of
French justice.
In turn the French criticize him for
keeping their official from contact with
Delouette. Mr. Stern says that De-
louette's lawyer will only allow him to
meet with them after Delouette himself
has been granted immunity ? along
long way from French traditions of ju-
dicial procedure.
With little understanding of each oth-
er's methods; legally what is going on
is a dialogue of the deaf.
BUT THE FRENCH public sat up
and paid attention last weekend when
Colonel Roger Barberot, a gaullist for-
mer ambassador, a well known busi-
nessman, and very probably an ex-spy
himself, revealed in a radio interview
that the entire affair had probably less
to do with international drug traffic
than with East-West spying.
Before De Gaulle returned to power,
he said, the French intelligence service
had virtually become a subsidiary of
the CIA. But after 1958 De Gaulle re-
stored its independence. Later in his
term of office he oriented it toward
counter-espionage against the United
States.
Two years ago when President Porn
pidou took over, he ordered the service
changed back to its former task of
spying on Communist activities. By that
time it contained so many anti-Ameri-
can agents that according to Colonel
Barberot, when new broom Alexandre
de Marenches began his clean-up, he
found he had to fire all the top brass.
' Since then SDECE (pronounced
Zdek ) agents have used their inside
knowledee to settle scores with..new-
.
OUS
rug- Tangle
comers, old-timers and any other fac-
tion they disliked. The former head of
the Research Service of the Zdek, said
Barberot, was himself fired on suspi-
cion of _working closely with Com-
munist agents.
EARLY THIS WEEK the man in '
question, a Colonel Beaumont alias Ber-
trand, while admitting the whole serv-
ice was infested with factional rivalries,
sued Barberot for one million francs for ,
slander. Said Barberot: "I didn't make .
my statement lightly." However, both I
colonels take the line that no serious
link exists between the Zdek and drugs,
but that rivals clumsily placed the hero-
in in the minibus knowing that De-
louette would implicate anybody to get
himself off the hook.
However, the staunchest defenders
of France have been pushing the line
that a link Indeed exists between spy- ,
ing and drugs?only it concerns the /
CIA and not French intelligence.
Everybody knows, say' these hard-
liners, that the, cJA, manipulates the :v/I
selling of Laotian opidn because it is
more than a source of profit, it is a
tactical necessity. So the CIA has used
the existing networks to wipe out politi-
cal adversaries ? which in that part of
the world were French, France having
retained a good deal of her influence
since Laos and the rest formed part of
the French Empire.
A Hidden War
Since General de Gaulle's anti-
American speech at Phnom Penh in
1966, a hidden but merciless war has
gone on ? and the Delouette case is
only one aspect of a French-American '
settlement. Nobody would know who ,
emerged the winner, say the gaullists,
If President Nixon had not recently de- ,
' manded a reorganization of the CIA for /
misleading him ? especially on Laotian
and Cambodian affairs.
Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001300440001-2
27 NOV 1971
Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-0160A-R001
? 1.48(-k.:1 r
.71,3 Psn,
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?
By 1-1ENRY J. TAYLOR
Behind the scenes President Nixon's
confidence in Central Intelligence
Agency Director Richard M. Helms
has taken a new leap forward. Mr. Nixon
believes (correctly) that our nation's
-intelligence setup is a sick elephant.
.He has quietly assigned .Mr. Helms
,to correct it.
A sick elephant is a formidable danger.
And. secrecy keeps our public from
knowing even the size of this elephant,
to say nothing of how sick it is.
Inere..:lib!y, we spend .eiose to 56
billion a year for ieteni:gence. Just
the CIA alenc is larer in Eri": 0 than
flie State De72:trf.ent and spends
more tv/n t.W.Iee.as muc!! money.
Legendary Geri. William J. ("Wild
.BM") Donovan's, Office of Strategic
,Services conducted our entire World
.War II espionage throughout four years.
and throughout the world for ?a total
of $135 million. The budget of the CIA
(secret) is at least SI.5 billion a year.
Next to the Pentagon with its 25 miles
of corridors, the world's largest office
building, the CIA's headquarters in
suburban Langley, Va., is the largest
:building in the Washington area. The
CIA has jurisdiction only abroad, not
in the United Slates. But the CIA radii-
tains secret offices in most major U.S.
cities, totally unknown to the public.
About 10,030 people work at Langley
and another 5,000 are scattered across
the world, burrowing .everywhere for
intelligence. These include many, many
unsung heroes who secretly risk their
lives for our country in the dark and
unknown battles of espionage and treach-
ery. I. could name many. And as a part
of its veil of secrecy the CIA has its own
elan(l,est'Ine communIcations system
with?vaslaington and the world, ?
The Pentagon spends $3 billion a year.
on intelligence, twice as much as the
CIA. Like the CIA, its Army, Navy
and Air Force intelligence arms operate
worldwide, of course, and--largely
.unknown?they also have an immense
adjunct called the National Security
Agency which iivals the _CIA in size
and cost.
?
?
. Then there exists the- important tn-
. :elligence Section of the 'State Depart- ,The President confided that
he is to-
mtit, likewise worldwide. chief re- t"-Y fed up with the intelligence corn-
- APproved i-or Release-20114106/019 : CiAliRDP80,-0t604R1104300440001-2
Ports directly to Under SeCretary ot
State John N. Irwin II, it is understand-
ably jealous of its prerogatives, and
traditionally it plays its findings very
close to its vest.
Additional intelligence agencies?all
growing, all sprawling, all costly--
spread out into the world from the of-
fice of the secretary/of defense, the
Atomic Energ.v Commission, National
Aeronautics and Spate Administration
(NASA) and even the Department of
Com in erce.
In fact, there are so many additional
hush-hush agencies that recently in West
and East Berlin alone there were at least
40 known U.S. intelligence agencies
and their branches--most of them com-
peting, with one another.. ? .
mr. helms Eirriseif dennes intelli-
gence as -`!2.11 the things which should
be known in advance of initiating a course
of action.". The acquisition of intelli-
gence is one thing; the interpretation
of it is another; and the use of it is a i
third. The 1947 statute creating the,/
CIA limits it to the first- two. It. also
makes the CIA directly responsible
to the President. But it is simply not true
that the IA -is the over-all responsibk
agency, as is so widely believed.
Again and again, no one and everyone
is responsible.
The function of intelligence is to.
protect us from surprises. It's. not
working that way. The sick elephant
is threatening out: national security
by surprise, surprise, surprise.
Alarmed President Nixon has giVen
Mr. Helms new and sweeping
zence reorganization authority on an
over-all basis. He has given him the
first authority ever given anyone- to re-
and thus affect, all our foreign
intelligenee agencies' budgets. The Pre-s-
ident believes Mr. fleir.n, this under-
cover - world's most experienced pro,
can cut at least SI billion out -of the
morass.
STATINTL
self-protective vagueness and dangerous
rivalries. He has made it clear that he
wants its output brought- closer to the
needs of the- President-s so-called 40
Committee (actually six men), which
serves the . National Security Council
and the President himself. .
In amputating much of the sick ele-
phant, 'Mr. Helms' directive is to cut
down on the surprises. And the President
could not have picked a more knowing,
no-nonsense man to do it. .
,
?
-- ?? ?
. -
CIA Diroctor Richerci Helms haEcts up
the 15,C00-nton intolligenc,2 cperoilen
that is now boinj strean) fined.
NATION
Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDMT60901.W130044
. .
CelD 39 nci agency and to assure us that it is static y Ica C
C R.SeF: a tlizo i. .
.-.-- . A , friends of the democratic ideal. Now he is up to the same
-a--.President Nixon has issued an executive order which antics again. This week he is the "cover boy" on News-
invests Richard Helms, director of the CIA, with author- week, with the predictable feature telling of gallant CIA
ity *to oversee all the intelligence agencies (the National capers of a kind that could have been made known only
Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency; etc.)-
by the agency that is so super-secret it feels compelled to
and to Cut "bureaucratic fat" and professional overlapping conceal its activities from the Congress.
_wherever possible. There may be merit in this new order. Congress should not take any more of this guff from
but there is incontestable merit in Se the agency or its director. It has authority to insist that
Seri. Stuart Symington's
reaction to it. The Senator notes that the CIA was its authority be respected and it has a clear responsibility
.brought into existence in 1947 by an act of Congress. Its
to act in that spirit. In an editorial last August 2, we re-
uowers . and duties are defined by legislation adopted by marked on a measure, intraoduced by Sen. John Sherman
Cooper, which would reuire the CIA to make its Intel-
ject to confirmation by the Senate. Last year the Congress the Congress. The director and deputy direcZor are sub- Cooper,
reports available. to the .chairman of the germane
appropriated between $5 billion and $6 billion 'for the committees of the .Congress (Armed Services and For-
intelligence establishment; no one knows the exact
eign Relations) and also require the agency to prepare
.
reports at the request of the Congress. There is precedent
antount, since. part of the CIA's budget .is artfully con-
f
cealed. Yet the Senate was not consulted about .the pro-
dr such legislation in the instructions given the AEC.
After all,
reorganization. Senator Symington serves on thefter all, the CIA often gives to foreign governments
CIA subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Corn-
information' and reports which it will not make available
,mittee. To his knowledge, the subcommittee was not to the Senate or. the House. This is selective secrecy
. consulted about, nor did it approve; the reorganization carried to a grotesque extreme.
Hearings will be held on Senator Cooper's bill (S. 2224)
ordered by the President. As a matter of fact the sub-
during the first week of February. It is a wise and sensible
committee has mit met once during the current year. This
is. an amazing state of affairs. Surely the Congress has a proposal. We hope it is adopted. We hope too that the
right to be consulted about the reorganization of an agency CIA subcommittee will come alive and begin to exercise
which owes its existence to an Act . of Congress and is a real degree of oversight over the agency. Better still,
sustained by annual appropriations voted by the Congress.
the Senate should adopt the resolution offered by Sena-
tor Symington (S. 192, November 13) to create a. select
: The fact is that the CIA enjoys an autonomy almost as
- '
complete as that enjoyed by the FBI. Whatever the orig-
committee which would oversee the CIA. But there is
inal intention of the Congress, the CIA functions. today as, really only one way to deal with the problem of the CIA
and that is to make it direetly responsible to the Congress.
? an adjunct of the White House. The intelligence it gathers
If it is engaged in activities of such a character that they
is available to the President; it is not available to the Con-
cannot be reported to the Congrss, then it should be
gress. Under the proposed reorganization, it will be even
- .
more directly responsible to the President, and by its over- told to abandon those activities. There is no place for a
secret agency of the CIA type within the framework of a
sight control over the other agencies will be supplying him
with a unified appraisal. An agency that gathers informa-
constitutional democracy, which is how Justice Stanley.
tion for the President may be tempted to provide him with Reed once characterized our form of government. As
long as the CIA can plead secrecy; Congress will be un-
the estimates it thinks he wants (as the Pentagon Papers
able to exercise effective . oversight. The time has come
have shown, intelligence reports that do not coincide with
to make both the FBI and the CIA subject to close and House opinion are apt to be ignored), and as Joseph
e
Kraft pointed out in a recent colinnn, there is much to continuing CongressionFWrvision and control.
be said for diverging, even conflicting, _ reports in the
highly subjective area of intelligence evaluation. .. ?
.Tire CIA is closed off from scrutiny by the press, public
And the Congress; like the FBI, it functions in splendid
bureaucratic isolation. Mr. Helms is such a gray eminence
that a private elevator takes him to and from his office in t_Z
the .CIA structure in Langley, Va. Like Mr. Hoover, he
is usually not "available," except at budget time. Re-
cently, however, he has been trying to give the agency a
new, or at least a brighter image, since he is well aware
Of a growing restiveness in the ,Congress and of the need
to slash budgets. A Nation, editorial of May 3 called at-.
tention to the way in which Mr. Helms was "breaking
cover", to talk about the brilliant achievements .of the
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TITE ECOMI.T.ST
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,/
toles get toinoi
--,--
. There is one secret that the intelligence
fraternity in Washingtori has not been
able to keep under cover : its own lines
;of communication have become badly
scrambled. In an attempt to get rid of
the worst discrepancies and overlaps
President Nixon has announced . a
reorganisation of the, multiple branches
of the secret service under the direction
of Mr Richard Helms, the present and
. very -able head of the Central Intelli-
fgence Agency. Mr Helms will now
head the new United States Intelligence
'Board and will co-ordinate the activi-
ties and the budgets of the .various
intelligence networks--the first time
'that anyone has had power- to do this.
The board will be directly responsible
to ? the :National Security Council. At
the same time two new panels will
be set up within the NSC. One, under
?the direction of Mr Henry Kissinger,
the chief of the council, will analyse
all the intelligence reports. (In the rush
to collect raw facts their interpretation
has often been neglected.) The other
will compare the strength of the Soviet
forces as a Whole with those of th,7
United States.
The ? tangle's Within the intelligence
World go back beyond the crisis over
missiles in Cuba. On numerous Occa-
sions the many military spies--thc three
serviees have their own intelligence net-
works and then the Department of
Defence has still another?have Come
UI) with assessments that differ- from
those -of the civilian agenciefs such as
the CIA and the intelligence division
? of the State Department. Although the
CIA has a hawkish image in foreign
. eyes it is generally the military men
who have _over-estimated the resources
available to the other side, partly in . authority over spying. As a presidential
an effort to boost support in Congress aide he is not responsible to Congress.
for their own defence budget. Further-
'Inre, relations have been strained
? recently between. the CIA, which
gathers information from abroad, and
4he Federal Bureau of Investigation,
which manages surveillance at home,.
This year the. confusion has been
more notiteable. than most. The abbr-
tive commando raid a year ago to free
prisoners of war from the deserted
camp at Son Tay in North Vietnam
caused acute embarrassment. Then the
Pentagon papers revealed that there
had earlier been some serious discrepan:
ties 'be.tween -military and civilian
STATINTL
information on the war .in Vietnam.
And now there is a struggle breWing
over the extent of, the reported '
build-up of missiles by the Soviet Union
at a time when the' negotiations on
the limitation of strategic arms are
reaching a crutial stage. .
Congress, which has always been
suspicious of the secrecy surrounding
the intelligence world, has also been
prodding the President. The conserva-
tives in the Senate, led, rather surpris-
ingly, by Senator Ellender, Who used
to be the spies' best friend, want_ to
cut the ? money that goes on military
intelligence ; in the age of expensive
satellite spies about $5 billion a year
is spent on this out of an annual intel-
ligence budget of around S6. billion.
The liberals, on the other hand, claim
that Congress has too little 'control over
the intelligence networks ; in particular
they feel that the CIA has too great an
influence on foreign policy. What they
ask, is the CIA doing in Laos ? It will
be no consolation to these critics that
Mr Kissinger will now have greater
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L_QS ta; atzES f.t'. In S
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:
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Reshuffling, With More Pojitiorls Going.
to Military.tv'ten, Worries Key Lawmakers
WASHINGTON
Key senators are ed n-
cerned that CIA .Director
Richard Helms might
have been "kicked up-
stairS". in the reshuffle of
A ni e r i Qa' s intelligence
community, with more in-
fluence in spy activities
going to military men. -...
,Helms has assured in-
quiring senators that he
had no reason to believe
he had been shuffled aside
in the nation's intelligence
hierarchy.
But there is concern on
CapitoLHill. that Helms
has lost out in the shakeup
of the intelligence net-
work ordered by President
.Nixon -last month:
JSens. Stuart Sylpton
(D-Mo.) and J. William
'Fulbright (D - Ark.) are
concerned that the
shakeup h a s increased
P e ntagon predominance
in the intelligence- field,
and Sen. John .Stennis (D-
Miss.) is conducting an in-
t'
.vestiriation to find out
what happened.
What has disturbed
Helms' friends in the Sen-
ate is that the day-to-day
control of the CIA ap-
parently has been relin-
quished to a military man,
Lt. *Gen. Robert E. Cush-
man Jr., in 'order to free
Helms for his new duties
as overall director of the
CIA and all other intel-
ligence units. Cushman, a
marine, is deputy director.
of the CIA. ?'
. .Also, the Joint Chiefs of
;Staff and the deputy sec-
retary of defense have
been given a new voice in
the intelligence command
through membership on .a
'committee, which, under
- the direction of presiden-
tial actviser Henry A. Kis-
singer, will oversee intel-
ligence;
hi?a closed-door
meeting with the Senate/
Armed Services Commit-
tee this week, said he did
not think he was being
shoved out of the way.?
Stennis, the committee.
chairman, said Helms. "'as-
sured me that his domin-
ance over it (the CIA), his
effectiveness, his powers
over it will not be dimin-
ished one bit." ? .
But Stennis indicated he
still was not satisfied and
.".wc are going into it and.
we are going to analyze it
and study it and have an
investigation ? if one
wants to use that word?if
necessary.. We do not take
these things lightly. The
stakes are too high."
No one in the Senate
really knows what his
happened at the CIA. Not
,even senators like Stennis,
who are let In on the na-
tion's intelligence secrets,
were told in advance:
?
?
STATINTL
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NATION1 REVIEW BULLETIN
Approved For Release 2001/026/0r .VdIAWP80-01-601,R0013
ri,
jab (-1-3 }
Dateline
Washington
o "Was Richard ? Helms promoted or fired?" was the
?question most being asked around Washington lust week..
The CIA Director's new post as coordinator of all U.S.
intelligence activities was interpreted by some observers
as a kick upstairs and by others as a pro- mption of Helms
to "intelligence czar." In fact, the change represents a
move to bring U.S. intelligence activitres more directly
under White House control. ?
Helms 'will work under the close supervision of Henry
Kissinger, who is now .running the newly created Na-
tional Security Council Intelligence Committee. Like the
White House Office of Telecommunications Policy, the.
new Intelligence Committee is designed to eliminate pro-
cedural difficulties and to consolidate information?thus
avoiding interagency conflicts... Under Kissinger, Helms
will work as a high-level administrator, not so much for-
mulating policy as providing information upon which po-
licy will be based. Implicitly, the new post will put Helms
over FBI head J. -Edgar Hoover, though relations with
Hoover will continue to be handled through Hoover's
titular superior Attorney General John Mitchell. Mitchell
is a member of the Committee because Justice probably
handles more interagency intelligence questions than
any other department in the government, including De-
ferise.
Besides consolidating intelligence .activities under the
White House, the President also is trying to avoid the
.horrendous duplication that has ensued from the:- proli-
feration of intelligence operations. Some of the overlap
.presumably will be trimmed away by Helms, though some
observers believe this'.is, for the most part, wishful think-
ing on the President's part. They note that the individual
service branches, the Treasury Department, the FBI, the
- Bureau of Norco. tics, the CIA and even the White House
police force are so jealous of their prerogatives that re-
form would take major surgery--more. than either the
President or Helms is willing to undertake at this time.
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ST. LOUWth
.dd For IRlease 20
POT_DISPACk
E ..
326,376
S 541?-1368 ?
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01/-1111,11L
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?
By TAYLOR PENSONEAU
A Staff Correspondent Of the Peat-Dispatch
- _
WASHINGTON, Nov. 26.
.THE BELEAGUERED CONGRESSIONAL minority that has ,
fought to pry loose the Government's 'secret figures on intelligence:
expenditures. mounted a challenge this week, that though unstiecessful,
1!.may make the objective more attainable. ?
Althcr.if.,,h an attempt by Senator Stuart . and undercover endeavors by the armed
Vmington (Dern.), Missouri, to limit in- forces. .;
telligence outlays was rebuffed by the Many observers regard Symington"s'
c: ?
Senate as expected, an increasing num-
move as the roost determined attempt
bar of members?including some of yet to force Congress to account at least ?
mington's opponents?predicted that the somewhat for. the activities of these
- day would come when Congress was no agencies. -
longer in the dark on the country's un- ?
STATINTL
*If
Tc7.7. 7.r0 (1-1
, "One of Ere things that wars:.
ries me most of all is that I do
I
not see amy reason why we
f should pass appropriations for
the CIA to organize an army,
pay the tioeps 'and conduct a
full-scale war in Laos," Ful-
bright said.
"Yet people of this country
think we have a democracy in
which a war, if one is to be
fought, has to be declared by
Congreas. Yet Congress did not
know about the war in Laos
until'it was well under way."
When prodded by fellow Sen-
ators, Elleader conceded that
he 'did not know in advance
about CIA financing of any army
in Laos.. lie said further that
he had "rieT er asked, to begin
with, whether or not there were
any funds to carry on the war
in this sum the CIA ha S asked
for."
"It never dawned on me, to
ask about it," Mender said. "I
did see it publicized in the
newspapers some time ago."
. Fulbright and his allies point-
ed to Ellerider's statement as a
prime exari%ple of the necessity
fo: greater congressional .aware-
ness of undercover activities.
Ellender became a prime tar-
get of the Symington side, be-
cause of an occurrence last
week that the Missourian re-
lated to the Senate Tuesday)
Symington, when asking staff
members of the Appropriations
Committee about intelligence
figures, war told that they could
discuss the matter only 1,vith
Ellender aml four other senior
members of the panel.
91-U3 wizr.u.is. that these bit-
lions of dollars of the taxpay-
ers,' money arb
eeing authorized'
3nd appropriated by the Senate
w:ti) the knowledge and approv-
of just five ar its members,"
otenington tante:lied. 'Inc other
roar are Senators Jahn L. Mc-
-C:alland (Dent), ? Arkansas;
John C. StenniS- (Dern.), Missis-
sippi; Miltea R. Young (Rep),
North Dakotaa and Margaret
Chase Smith: (Rep.), Maine.
Symingtorde. mention of this
mattee constituted an attack on
the sye cu'.'sas? y'. thee-afore, pos-
tidy ? his ails-- oast ;ab of the
ay. Aa rmeat ensued,
one of the e'e.e.i rear Sym-
Although waste and duplication in many '
;.- dereover acti'vities.
' of the intelligence operations were given
Possibly 'most significant, the debate, as the most obvious reasons for the
- on Symingtoh's proposal brought out .
j
jamendment, the greater intent 1.tias to
' that the seemingly broad war being
or- !pr'ovide Congress, and the American pub-
,
' Central Intelligence Agency may finally 1.1.1es..c ganized and financed in Laos by the with more insight into both the do-
ti and foreign activities of these
.
persuade soirm wet-teat:at, hesitant mem- , anenci. . ?
. bers of Congress to assert themselves ' ?
Moro in this ticklish field. -- - I ineton contended that he had been unable
' ,
USING HIMSELF as an example, Sym-
-
- THE MOST StWelis'i" appraisal of to determine the appropriations this year
Symington's effort came from one of . for intelligence, even though he is a roam-
the opponents, Senator Charles Mathias
, her of the Foreign Relations Committee
; Jr. ? -(Rep.), . Maryland, who remarked and the Armed Services Committee as
moments before the vote ?that the Mis- .
?sourian had focused "our attention on.. :Well as ail exsorilcio rnenwer of
.? water that is not only muddy, but ac- - the ApPropriations Committee.
. Wally Murky." -? Senator J. William Fulbright ,
: (Dem.), Arkansas, asserted in
I "Many- members may be reluctant to ,
I stir, this water for fear of. what they the debate Tuesday that the
-74.issourian should not feel in-
may find," Mathias said. "I think we ;
cannot delay much longer in turning our asulte'd 11..-1 dja
beastusa To,%-sr'y. ;-
i
covered where ti intelligence
intelligence
l attention in this direction .for fear that
( what is there . may evade our examina-
tion and our concern."
" This feeling may be 'realizedsooner
:Allan expected because a number of
? Senators, in the wake of the Symington
, matter, said they _would Tush for an
executive session by the Senate to con-
sider the Intelligence question. It could
mean a major breakthrough for those
of Symington's persuasion?especially if
a censored transcript was made public
later. . .. , - . ,
. I
SYP,IINGTON sought to amend the De-
. partrnent of Defense appropriations bill
for fiscal 1572 to place a 4-billion-dollar
ceiling on intelligence outlays. Most esti-
mates put this yearly expenditure cur-
rently at more. than 5 billion dollars. .
f - The proposed limit, which the Spate
rejected Tuesday 513 to 31, would have
-applied to the CIA, the National Security
;Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency
.. . .... .. .. .._ .... .. . . .
funds were in the defense ap-
propriations measure.
"When they read a line item
and find that there is so much
;for aircraft, or for a carrier,-
thcse may or ma Y not be the
real amounts," Fulbright said.
REPLYING Senator' Allen J.
,Ellender (Dein), Louisiana,
chairman of the Appropriations
'Committee and a main opooneni
of Symington's amendment to.id ?
'that there was no specific ap
propriations for intelligens a. ac-
tivities. "They are funded from
many different eopropriations
included in the bill,' he said.
Much of the argumenf? ff1:7
-week centered on the CIA,
which came under conare
scrutiny earlier this yet ? fo:
clandestine role in ths
tiens of Radio Free Eur..
Radio Libert.,. In his seaersi .
Approved For Release 2001(86E09in0AiRDP80-0160
Inight was particularly ceicie.70
f he: CI's
f q9e1ACTAIPEciVritc"'''
"You're to be trusted," Sym-
nut wiry
aren't the rest of us to be.
trusted, too?"
. Ellender was not hushed in'
his rebuttal as he told the Sen-
ate that "this method of appro-
priating funds for these intelli-
gence ? activities has, been in
_
eifect for at least 20 years that
I know of, since' I have been
on the committee." ?
Only a few persons consider
these funding requests because
Of the sensitivity of the subject,
Ellender said. In addition, he
expressed 'an opinion of many
of Symington's opponents in say-
ing that the intelligence field was
too much of a L'hot pot.e.tb to
"discuss in the open."
THIS APPROACH was adopt-
ed by Young al-o, who asserted .
that proper defense- of -the CIA
in the debate would require
documentation of activities that
could not be done.
"Spying is a dirty business;?
but it is a business every nation .
in the world engages in," Young
said. 'Russia does a bigger
job of it than we do. You can
not disclose secret information.",
In an action earlier this yea.i
against the use of intelligence .
funds, the Senate passed a bill
that would provide $35,000,500 ,
in fiscal 1972 for financing the ?
operations of Radio Free Eu- ?
rope and Radio Liberty through
the Secretary of State.
The measure, sponsored by
Senator Clifford P. Case ffeep.)ate
- -
New Jersey, is intended to di-
vorce the CLAI from the funding
of the stations. Radio Free Eu-
rope, beamed to eastern Eu-
rope, and Radio Libert y, ?
beamed ,to the Soviet' Union, -
operate in West Germany, 03- ,
tensibly on private contribu-
tions.
However, Case said in Jnriu-
ary that funds had been ex-
pended from secret CIA budg-
ets to pay almost totally for'
the costs of the stations..
The House has approved a
bill providing for a. cominiasion
to conduct a two-year study of
The stations. Continued funding
of them would be channeled
through the commission. A corn-
promise between the two bilis
will; have to be worked out in
a conference between the* two
?,-
iifiQJ All
2 1 110V
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? : A G 1:i
,-;,-.!
, \- u IIti ith
-.: I - 7 ? :74 -::,1
11 -i\
Leirtiet,
EL/
Unitet1 I Tess I nternE l iunal .
' ,Sorne key senators fear that
the military has gained execs
-
sive influence in the U.S. intelli-
gence network even though a
civilian has been named its top
/- director. .
They are concerned about the
V possibility that Richard Helms,
popular director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, might have
given up considerable influence
to his military assistants when
he was named over-all czar of
the CIA and other U.S. intelli-
gence agencies.
- With 'his added ? duties, they
fear, Helms will have to turn
j over many of his CIA responsi-
, bilities to Lt Gen. Robert H.
.. -Cushman Jr., a Marine.
-, Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the deputy secretary
of Defense have been given a
?new voice in the intelligence
coram::4 I through membership
on a committee under the direc-
tion of Henry ? A. Kissenger,
President Nixon's advisor on na-
tional security, to oversee U.S.
intelligence activity. .
,
?
Sens. Stuart Symingto
D-Mo., an-d J. William Fulbrigl
D-Ark., fear this reorganizati
means that the Pentagon is tak-
ing an increasingly larger role
in intelligence activity.
:Helms this week told a closed
session of the Senate Armed
Services Committee that this
was not so, but chairman John
C. Stennis is conducting an in-
vestigation to find cut just what
the situation.is.
Stennis said Helms "assured
me that his dominance over-it
are CIA), his effectiveness, his
power over it will not be dimin-
ished one bit." -
No one in the Senate actually
knows if there has been any less-
ening of Helms' influence -within
(the CIA), his effectiveness, his
access to CIA secrets.
Only five members of the Sen-
ate and five from the House
even are given information on
the intelligence budget and de-
tailed briefings on the operations
of the various other intelligence
services.
STATINTL
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.STATINTL
MONROE, LA.
?-NE:WS?SiAR
1\10\1 2 4: 1971
? E ?15,121 '
0
; ?:./fr kc...11.
on Vj t r31 fl
? - ? -
The White Horuse is not pleased
.at: all with the record posted by
.the hmericanintelligence commun-
ity.The-.displeasure doesn't appal--
,
ently extend to the ?Central
?gence'Agency
director, Richard Helms, has been
-placed in. charge -of all intelligence
?
agencies. Further, the President
? added to Henry Kissinger's author-
, ity. by giving him the. power to
? ?evaltiate intelligence reports.
? .
The ptiblic Is advised of this turn
of events through the efTorts of a
government worker who leaked a
.secret "decision memorandum" to
? Newsweek maga'zine. .
?
In the memorandum, Nixon sin-
gled 'put five instances in which
' American agents were not up to
inuff..He complained not only of
faulty:intelligence, 'but also run-
? away, budgets and a disparity be.,
tween a'glut of facts and a pover- '
.1,y of analysis, ? ? . .
he found five areas ?
. .
of ;defective snooping, to4it:
-- Failure to predict the extent
of North Vietnamese resistance in
the. Laotian campaign early this
year. . ?
. --;Misinforthation leading to the
. Son Tay: prisoner of war camp
which turned out to be empty.
--:,Incorrect estimates of Viet
Cong supplies flowing through the ,
Cambodian port of Sihanoukville;
Lateness in detecting Russian
'built surface to air missiles in the
Mideast cease-fire zone. ?
,-- An eighth month delay in the
strategic arms limitation _talks
while the White House checked'
urn
-
? to be punished include a- two-star
general and four other high-ranking
officers.
?
- varying intelligence reports on how
, 1,Vell the United States could de-
tect possible -Soviet violations of
the arms control .agreement.
The magazine article suggested
that. some of the gripes might con-
ceal. Mistakes more properly laid
at the Administration's dopr. How-
. ever, it went on to credit' Nixon
with efforts to remove all. possible
_bugs ?from the intelligence system
as it faces what is likely -its most
I critical test of recent years: solv-
ing the mystery of the apparent
Soviet: missile build-up.
The Pentagon Papers showed
rat-er conclusively that U,S. mili-
tary intelligence in. Vietnam did
not compare. very -well with its
civilian counterpart. 'Time and time
?again. the CIA and the State De-
partment intelligence arm 'proved
to he correct in their appraisals of.
the enemy situation and optimistic
forecasts by military agents and
their superiors wrong.
- There's ri6 telling how .many
tragedies or near - tragedies could
have been avoided hail. those
charged with keeping 'track of the
.North Vietnamese and Vietcong
had had more up-to-date.inforina-
Aion. My 'Lai was supposed to be
a hotbed of Vietcong. It had been, of.
course, but when Charlie Conapany
struck, there was no resistance.
The VC had fled.
Within the last 24. hours, those
in charge Of Firebase.. Mary Ann
where 33 GIs lost their lives in?
VC sapper raid have ?been told
they will be demoted or.ri-Trimand-
ed for a lax defense periineter
lack of troop preparedness. Those
American intelligence cannot, of
course, maintain an umblemished
? record. The Communist enemy;
- wherever he is, spends a great deal.
of time trying to outwit free world!
agents. .He has notched some notf
able sticcesses. Credit President
Nixon with trying to :streamline the
U.S. intelligence system So- t10 t
.
:doomsday won't arrive due to .see-
ret agents asleep at the switch'. .
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ST. LOUIS rof-357 DisfAr.cail
Approved For Release 2001/06M9IICIA1-0P80-01601R001300440
7L1 17.-8
Jim Lig ce t/ut 7/7)
- - )-- frb
-
By a Washington 'Correspondent
of the Post-Dispatch
- WASHINGTON, Nov.. .23--
Senator. St oar t Symington
(Dem.), -Missouri, in a major
attack on Secrecy in govern-
Inent, proposed today that Con-
tress cut: intelligence expendi-
tures from more than. 5 billion
dollars to a mandatory ceiling
,of 4 billions.
lie, charged, in a speech pre-
pared for delivery, that present
intelligence operations were
wasteful, overlapping and in-
adequately supervised by Con-
gress. ,
' In. a. reference to the Indo-
china war, he said that he be-
lieved "at least one war" could
have been avoided if it had note
been for "pressures, combined
:with unwarranted secrecy," on
the part of ? the intelligence
,lagencies.
o Symington's proposed ceiling
would apply to the Central In-
telligence Agency, the National
Security- Agency, the Defense
'Intelligence. Agency and all
other intelligence units, includ-
ing those -within the branches
of the armed services.
He said that he had not been
able to determine how much
:was being appropriated this
year for intelligence operations,
-although he is a member of the
Foreign Relations Committee
and the Armed Services Com-
mittee and an exofficio mem-
?ber of the Appropriations Com-
mittee.'
When 'the- final draft of the
:military appropriations bill was
_before the, ?defense appropria-
?tions subcommittee fast week,
he said no, mention was made
,of the multibillion-dollar appro-
priation ,requests that it cos-
tamed for much of the 15 in-
Jelligence operating or advisory
,operations.,
r-? After the meeting, he said,
..he asked the ,committee staff
a
771
krikJJ.?
-"in general about intelligence
appropriations." He said he was
?told that the staff had been in-
structed to talk- about those ap-
propriations only with five
'senior Members Of the commit-
tee?chairtnan Allen J. Mender
(Dern.), Louisiana, -and Sena-
tors John L. McClellan (Dem.),
Arkansas; ? 'John C. Stennis
(Dem.), Mississippi; Milton H.
Young (Rep.), North_ Dakota,
and Margaret' Chase Smith
(Rep.), Maine.
Symington said he had the
greatest respect for the five
members, "but I lo not believe
that they, and they alone,
should render final, decision on
both said authorizations and ap-
propriations without the knoo
edge, ?let alone the 'approval, of
any other Senators, ? including
-those on the Armed Services
Committee who are not on this
five-member subcommittee or
appropriations, and - all Mem-
bers of the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee."
Symington quoted press esti-
mates that put intelligence ex-
penditures at 5 to. 6 billion 'dol-
lars a year. He said that de-
spite his committee assign-
ments he had been unable to
say ?whether , these , estimates
were accurate, , Another San-
at e source termed them fairly
accurate... .
...The Senator renewed his criti-
cism of. a reorganization of tho
intelligence machinery an-
nounced earlier this month by
President Richard ? M. Nixon.:
. He said it could mean turning
intelligence operations over to
the military, thus leading to
billions of dollars in additional
and often unnecessary defense
expenditures, because military..
-estimates of enemy plans, pro-
grams and production tend to
be higher than civilian esti-
'mates. ?
. . . ? .
He objected also that the re-
organization put policy control
'of intelligence in a new com-
mittee in the White II ouse
"i77)
'
? C)
headed by Henry A. Kissinger,
presidential assistant for na-
tional security affairs,
"Thrs 'gives executive privi-
lege to the, final policymakers
an therefore, except for the
power of the purse, enables the
policymakers to, in effect, take
the entire question of interne'
gence out of the hands of Con-
gress," he said.
Symington had charged earli-
er this year that KisSinger,
rather than Secretary of State
William p: Rogers, had become'
the President chief adviser On.
foreign policy and, unlike
Rogers, was not available for.
questioning_ by Senate commit-
tees.
Ile complained recently that
the change in intelligence. ar-
rangements had not been dis-
cussed with anyone in the' Sen-
ate. He said today that Kissin-
ger, had called him and said
that Symington was correct and
that the change should have
been discussed with the proper
committees of Congress. .
Symington said it was non--
sense for anyone to think that
a high. degree of secrecy -was'
necessary for intelligence oper-
ations.
.11e pointed out that congres-
sional and public discussions
constantly referred to the costs
of such neW weapons as the
nuclear., aircraft carrier; the
C-5A transport -plane or the
main battle tank. These discus-
sions ski not go into how these
weapons' wciuld be used in a
war, he. said.
. "By the same token, knowl-:
'edge of the over-all Cost of in-
telligence does not in any way
entail the release of knowledge.
about how the various intelli-
gence groups function or plan
to function," he said.
"Why should there be greater
danger to the national security
in making public over-all intel-
ligence costs than in making
public other over-all security
costs?" .
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C ap it oi -113 nish a
. "
? _
. 131. S
Oh PI
g 0
ati n
By Art Buchwald
The news that the FBI has been investigating CBS
;correspondent Daniel Schorr caused some trepidation.
among Washington journalists early last week.
? But then the White House explained it all. Mr. Schorr ?
iwas being -investigated, a spokesman said, because he
twas being considered for a high government job, and
the White House Wanted to run a check on him before.
:,they offered him the position.
.?
Well, all of us relaxed when we heard the explana-
itIon, not only because it made sense, but also because
.?it showed .that the administration harbored no ill ful-
l'ings. Mr. .Schorr.. has been a consistent critic of ad-
.. i.ministration policies and if he was being _considered
lior a high government job, that meant any of us could
? !:be. tapped for public service.
- A group of correspondents were sitthne? in the White
tilouse. press room the other day, chuckling over the
latest ?White House press release, when Clyde Moth.
ballcr- of the "Kinzu Telegram Ledger" was called to
fthe phone.
. ?
-came - back whiteface(' and said: "That was my
;-
inother. The FBI was -just at her house and. wanted to
'iknow what librarTbeeks I borrowed when I was a kid."
"Congratulations, Mothballer," the AP Man said, "that
./.ne..a.ns you're up for an important government job."
9 don't know," Clyde said. -"The. administration get
awfully mad at me about my articles on .the Supreme
--Court appointments. As. a matter .of fact someone from.
:.the White House called my editor and suggested I be
sept to Moscow where I 'understood the government
letter."
:.--"Don't be 'silly, Mothballer," the Boston Globe man
Said, "the adrninistration doesn't .hold grudges. I
wouldn't be surprised if they made you Secretary of
.the Treasury." ? .- . .
"You would think they would ask me if I wanted a
job first," Mothballer said.
-"They wanted to surprise you," *The .Washington Post
--correspondent assured him. "To think, one of our boys
will be in the. Cabinet!"
"The ? FBI man didn't say anything to my mother
about a -Cabinet apPointment But he did want to know
if I ever played with Daniel Ellsberg .as a. kid," Moth-
bailer said.
?
"It's just a smokescreen, Clyde," the Los Angeles
Times man said. "They 'always ask :that when they're
considering semebody for Secretary of Defense."
mother said they also went around to the neigh:
.burs and asked'them if I had, ever had any strong feel-
Ings about Cuba." .
: ?
7,`That 'Means you're being put uP-. for 'head .of the
a' UPI photographer said. "With Dick Helms;
being moved upstairs, they're probably looking for a'.
new chief of operations."
"It's possible," Mothballer said, "but my mother said
she caught two of the FBI ilaQ11 going through her trash
basket last night".
= "That means you're up for an environment job," the
NBC man shouted.
-- "I wish I could be as Optimistic as you guys," Moth-.
bailer said. "Suppose the FBI was asking questions to
intimidate me?" .
The Chicago Sun-Times man was shocked. 'Bite your
tongue, Methballer,". he cried. "The Nixon adminis-
tration would never stoop to a trick like that, even if
they disagreed with every word you wrote."
"He's correct, Clyde," .the Newsweek correspondent
said. "Attorney General Mitchell would resign before
he'd allow the White House to intimidate a news-
paperman." - -
"J. Edgar Hoover wouldn't stand for it," the New
York Post man put in.
"I guess you're right," Mothballer nodded. "I'd better
call my mother back and reassure her. She just doesn't.
understand how Nixon's people operate."
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Approved For Release 2001/04404W80-01601R00
119,57{407)0,Th 4???,4 r?I tit
.44 IZ,;?,_;J
200 000 rilenSochen arheiten in dren
Gehreim- und Spionageeliensten der
USA, aber sic arbeiten oft nicht zur
Zufric?denheit des Prasiclonten. Des-
halb seuriten die Dionste jntzt Nixons
Chefberater Kissinger unterstellt.
Jeclen Morgen, kurz nach Anbruch
. der Dammerung, bringt eine schwar-
ze Limousine brisa.nte Fracht ins WeiBe
Hairs. Es 1st eine tvlappe mit den ge-
heirnsten Geheimberichten der letzten
24 Stunden. Titel: .,The President's Dai-
ly Brief" ? Tagliches Kompendium ffir
den Prasid.enten..
Zuniichst studiert Nixons auBen- und
sicherheitspolitischer Chefherater Hen-
ry 'Kissinger das Papier. Von ihrn laBt
sich der amerikanische Prasident dann
die Top-Nachrichten referieren. Er
selbst liest das Von der Zentraten Ge7
heimdienstbehorde (CIA) zubereitete
Dokurnent allenfalls abends ? und
eher lustlos.
Denn Polit-Routinier Nixon, so ere
kannte ?Newsweek", ?ist an Geheim-
nissen urn ihrer selbst willen nicht inter-
.essiert". Er wtinscht weniger 'Daten, da-
ffir aber griindliche Analysen, die ihm
als Grundlage f?r politische Entschei-
dungen dienen konnen.
Bisher lieferten die Geheimdienste --
neben der CIA vor allem die ?Intelli-
gence"-Stabe bei Heer, Marine, Luft-
waffe zu wenige Analysen nach Ni-
xons Geschmack. Die Folge: Unzufrie-
denheit im WeiBen Haus.
Falsche Informationen durch Ameri-
kas Militarspaher und die kletternden
Kosten des aufgeblahten Spionage-Ap-
parates verstarkten den Unmut der Re-
gierung noch, von der harschen Kritik
liberater Volksvertreter an den Gehei-
men Zli schweigen.
s
Law-and-Order-Prasident Nixon re-
organisierte daher jetzt die Nachrich-
tendienste. Zwar bleiben alle bestehen-
den, weitverzweigten BehOrden am Le-
ben. Doch praktisch sollen num-nein-
alle Geheimdienstfaclen bei zwei Man-
flan zusammenlaufen:
> CIA-Direktor Richard Helms Ober-
wacht und koordiniert samtliche
Programme. Obendrein leitet er
einen neugeschaffenen Spar-Aus-
? schull, der die Budgets trirnmen soil.
Prasidentenberater Henry Kissinger
dirigiert das neue ?Intelligence
Committee" mi Rahmen des Natio-
nalen Sicherheitsrates. Dieses Komi-
. tee erteilt Spionage-Auftrage und
siebt die Resultate filr Richard Nixons
Gebrauch.
Sogar dem CIA-Chef Helms soil Ex-
Harva rd-ProhpprdrviettEturReleituse 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001300440001-2
hoctisten Wunsch ktinftig ?Fiihrung
Geheimdienst-Chef Helms
Interview mit Hitler
und Richtung" geben. Washingtoner.
Beamte werten die neue Informations-
Schleuse unter Ftihrung Kissingers als
wichtiges ?Binclegliect zwischen Produ-
zenten und Konsumenten".
.Kissingers MaChtzuwachs hat im
Kongrel3 sogleich Widerspruch he-rvor-
gerufen. Senator William Fulbright
sieht die erweiterten Befugnisse als
neuen Beweis daftir, daI3 die Regierung
dem Kongre13 die Kontrolle fiber die
Nachrichtendienste entziehen wolle.
DaB bei den Geheimdiensten gespart
werden soli, 1st freilich auch den Parla-
menta.riern nun recht. Insgesamt yen-
schlingen die Nachrichten- und Spiona-
gebehorden mit ihren 200 000 Beschaf-
tigten etwa sechs Milliarden Dollar pro
Jahr. Alicia (tint Milliarden gehen auf
, das Konto der drei militarischen Ge-
heirndienste, wobei der grate Amen
auf die Luftwaffe entrant: Ihr gehoren
jene teuren Flugzeuge und Satelliten
wic der zetin Tonnen schwere ?Big
Bird", die militarische Anlagen in China
oder der Sowjet-Union ausspionieren.
Profi Helms, 58, ditrfte darum wohl
von allem versuchen, bei den militari-
schen Geheimdiensten Kosten zu kap-
pen. Er gilt als ttichtiger Verwalter, als
em n Btirokrat von Uhler Kornpetenz.
Der CIA-Boll (Hobby: Umwelt-
schutz) ist em n Nachfahre deutscher US-
Einwanderer. Er verbrachte einige
Schuljahre in Freiburg sowie in der
Schweiz ? seit damals spricht er Fran-
zosisch und Deutsch.
Jagd auf Nachrichten machte der
spatere ?Intelligence"-Fachmann erst-
mats als UP-Korrespondent ? 1937 in-
terviewte er Hitler. Bei Kriegsende ar-
beitete Helms in der US-Absvehr. Uncl
seit 1947, dem Grtindungsjahr der CIA,
diente er sich im Geheimdienst hoch.
Beriihmt, aber mehr noch bertichtigt
wurde die CIA durch Beteiligung. an
Polit-Greueln und Coups in vielen Lan-
dern ?den Mitten Welt. CIA-Agenten
leiteten die MordereChe Guevaras an;
CIA-Manner trugen 1970 zum Sturz des
Kambodscha-Premiers Sihanouk bei.
Falsche CIA-Inforrnationen fiihrten
1961 zum Fiasko der Invasion in der.
kubanischen Schweinebucht. Und die
CIA 1st es, die in Laos eine 30 000 Mann
starke Armee von Stammeskrie,gern un-
terhalt ? zum Kampf gegen die Kom-
munisten. Insider des Geheimdienstes
betonen freilich,. die CIA ziehe sich aus
dem Coup-Geschaft zurOck.
So viel.1st richtig: Die CIA hat sich
von einem kleinen Trunn patriotiseher
DER PRASIDENT '' '
? DER VEREINIGTEN STAMEN 1
Richard M Nixon
i TiiiiIONITER SICHERIFITSRAT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ? 1? ? :?? , ..?
Leiter:Henry A. Kissincer AUSSCHUSS FUR
Haupt-Enlscheidungsgremium; Plummy ! GEHEihmeisi...
und Ausiiihrung geheimer OTrationcm' _ i F1NANZEN
1:1*-- 7 7"7---'-- i I INTELLIGENCE
i
KOMITEE DER GEHEIMDIENSTOIEFS i ! RESOURCES ADYISORY
U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD rii COMMITTEE
I YoNitz: Richlrd lidms g 1 Leiter:Richord Helms
rii?.....?......-,.........
--------- - ?:---9 r----. - ---------------ff:7-..-:a? ',-..1
LITTRALE DEFIMDIE0111E1i6RDE * ?I EDI
teller: J. Edgor nom
Genenspionage.
im Inland (m:ben
Kripo-Aufgaben)
IF/ERTEIDIGTIO-SMIHISTERIUM
77:7-21
?.
NATIONALE Sit:HERA
NEITSBEHORDE s
NATtONAL SECURITY t
AGENCY
EIENDRDE FUR
GENEIMDIENSTE
GER YERTEIDIGUNG
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCEI
((ode-Exp,N7en) AGENCY
_
11-5EllEIHrilENSTE DCA TEILSTREITI to hold formal
? - , . - --? a - hearings on Americ.an?intelligence bperations, and
. FRIDAY NI:MI is to take a closer look at DIA he wants to open at least some of them to thr:: .
And in coming Weeks he has scheduled official, :public for the first time. Former and present for-'l
though informal, quiz sessions "at the super-secret eign and .defense policy officials- and intelligence
National Security Agency (NSA), the FBI and the . officers will b.:: invited toltestify. .
intellinence.of Nees of the Atomic Energy Commis- ..' Nedzi, who has a reputation as a dove, was tip-.
'sion, the Army, Navy and Air Force. tr;ointed subcommittee chairman by Rep. F. Ed-
The subcommittee. . . was organized years go to - ward Hebert, of Louisiana, Democrat, a hawk, he, ?
'.a
-keep wafch over American intelligence activities. , cause Nedzi has a careful style and because, even
But s with its Senate counterpart which has not .the military's heSt friends were disturbed that the
even met this year, the House subcommittee gen- :ntelligence community got us where we are h..
florally has allowed intelligence agencies to roam
rather freely . into the internal affairs of other
Countries-7-as well as of this one.
Nedzi's inquiries are aimed-at putting seine
its on the things our spent--.s can do. And although
his
visits are a ,modest beginning, they indicate
the changes that may be coming. The four other
subcommittee members, all of Nihom servei1 on
it for years u,111 Nedzi took it over, had not
visited the agencies until their new chairman took
them.
?
.Soon after Nedzi. Was-given the a:I:committee
:last July, he imMersed himself in what has been
written about American intellience. Ile talked
'privately N;tith former top-ranking intelligence
anch-Pentagon officials. And he set himself the
?chare of learning more about intelligence oper-
ations than any member of Congress, the better
to return ? some control over such activities to
Congress. .
- In short, N.Indzi has become tim only member of
Congress to devote most of his time to gathering
intelligence on American intelligence..
?
? HE HAS FOUND the agencies bristling \vith per- '
?
sonality problems, empire-building and jealousies.
;They keep secrets from each Other.
At the moment Nedzi said, military and the
State Department intelligence types are angry
over 'a White House reorganization, of intelligence
operations because it puts CIA Director Richard
. Helms in position to oversee every other agen-
cy's budget. Opponents or the plan charge that
Helms will favor his own agency. ? .
Nedzi is more concerned that the reorganization
will put the entire intelligence community too
close to the White House, where intelligence could'
be perverted for pouitical use or be forced' to
conform with White House policy.
? 'Because of the nature of the business, ??-:erlzi
? has found' ApiiiroveitFOrRt4eastitz200V06/09 : CIA-RDP80-0.1601R001300440001-2
Vietnam.
' But Hebert made- certain to put four conserva-
tives on the subcominittee?Democrats Melvin
Price of Illinois and 0. C. Fisher of Texas,' anc:
Republicans William Bray .of Indiana -and Alvin -
0'1 P
Though Mr. NIXON needs no justi-
fication for seeking new ways to
achieve more at less cost, the public
is not reassured that the quality of
US. intelligence work is as good as
it is cracked up to be. In. recent years,
in fact, intelligence has become ' a
dirty word in most. liberal and some
moderate circles. But in those days.
of global suspicion and strife,
gence is essential; good intelligence'
is of inestimable value.
The PRESIDENT is to be commended
for the effort. He is the first to un-
dertake the drudgery and, complex
probing required to learn -the depth
and scope of espionage and domestic
security vigilance.
To be sure, what he may find will
scarcely be information to be made
public. But for the first time, some-
body in super-authorjty in Washing-
ton will know what is going on,
whether it is strictly honest in in-
tent, and how much it is costing.
PrOm there, the 'PRESIDENT can sat-
isfy his own need, or make recom-
mendations that Congress can act
upon. Too little is known of 'U.S. in-
telligence activities that rightfully
belongs in the public sector.
Fr
. ,
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Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0013004400
PROVIDENCE, R.I.
JOURNAL
M ? 66,673'
S ? 209,501
JA1Z 2 8 1971
:Ur-tintaikence
Overlapping and duplication of the work of in-
telligence agencies in the United States government
? .have become -so pronounced that it is no wonder.
President Nixon. is dissatisfied. It seems almost in-
credible that these agencies should be spending an
estimated five billion dollars a year and employing
ethe services, of 200,000 persons.
. What makes the situation more, deplorable is the
mutiplicity of agencies ? not only the CIA? which ,
- has the over-all reaponsibility for foreign intelli-
gence, but intelligence agencies in each of the three
major military services, the State Department, the
National Security Agency, the Atomic Energy Corn-
mission, and the FBI. Many citiiens will wonder
why a single agency couldn't do the bulk of the work, ,
with the others perhaps doing specialized tasks for ,
- their own agencies ? but no mere. ?
. The rising cost of these activities, like that of
all government expenditures, is enough to warrant a
1, thorough investigation of the extent and efficacy of
all the intelligence and spy agencies. Informed offi-
cials insist that the number of persons and the amount
of money involved in, real spying are relatively small..
The large expenses are incurred in rontine gathering
of so-called "open" information and also in inter-
cepting and trying to decipher coded messages ,on
world-wide radio transmissions or operation of planes ?
and satellites on surveillance missions.
- One trouble with the intelligence organizations,
like ail bureaucracies, is that they tend to proliferate.
;Occasionally, they grow. almost uncontrollably as did
the Army missionof spying on civilians in connec-
tion with possible military employment in controlling
domestic riots. That is perhaps the greatest danger.
All these agencies operate under a- cloak of secrecy, .
with only a handful of civilian officials, legislative
, and executive; aware of what they are doing. It may
be questioned how much any cengressman or senator I,
really knows about them.
Another trouble is that any investigation or t
evaluation must be done with a maximum of secrecy.
eIt certainly can't be handled the way an investigation
of welfare expenditures is coneincted, with legislators
sounding off in all directions. No responsible_ par-
ties want to hamper the intelligence-gathering proc-
ess. But no one can be happy, not even the Presi-
dent, with the present situation,
. _
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STAIINTL
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26 JV 1971
Alt For Intelligence
President Nixon is said to have difficulty
*aseertaining what all the federal intelligence
agencies do, and with how much money and
manpower. And if the President cannot figure
out what all the espionage is about, how can
Congress, or the public?
Thus- Mr. Nixon should have thorough sup-
port if he undertakes any real reorganizati3n'
of the various intelligence .arms-T-the Central ,
Intelligence Agency, along with agencies of the
Defense, Justice and State Departments and, at
'times, the FBI. Mr. Nixon has asked his staff
to survey this abundance of intelligence effort
and to report back with ideas about 'cutting spy
expenses.
Mr. Nixon is the first President really to at-
tempt to make fiscal or any other kind of sense
out of the intelligence apparatus, though had
he lived John Kennedy might have tried, con-
sidering the CIA blunder in the Bay of Pigs
'fiasco. One of the worst features of so-called
intelligence is that it is not entirely that; it has
too Often been involved in paramilitary yen:
tures far beyond data gathering.
Most citizens probably thought the CIA was
supposed to bring all this together, .and then
President Eisonhower no doubt thought he was_
' co-ordinating something when he set up the
U.S. Intelligence Board, but the various agen-
:cies still go their own ways with an estimated
-200,000 personnel and a similarly estimated
expenditure of 3.5 billion dollars a year.
Aside from saving money, reorganization
could result in more. competent intelligence.
But in this mysterious field governmental re-
.Organization may be more difficult than any-
wh_ere else.
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e. STATINTL
ApOoved For Release 2001/066 :%CiA-Ektolno-oi601R00130
5,
ign..?? off
ver k tJJigcic cm.?,
I.
-
. . _ .
, .. : ? ? House. That led to inti
. .
?
? , - Following is the fifth in a series of articles exiploring the behind-the-scenes e negotia
.. .
Cuba, last. September.
suspicions, based on the an
of a mother ship, plus twc
conspicuous barges of a
used only for storing a :
leal? submarine's radioac
effluent, alerted the WI
Nixon Administration's style in foreign policy: and -the President's re.
= ? warning- to MoSeow 'not
? By BENJAMIN WELLE,5
:...speciat to Tile New York Thar::
WASHINGTON,- ?Jan. 21 ?e're?-n? cent cit the total, or about Career officials .in the li
e t
President , Nixon has become $4-billion, about $2.5-billion of ligenc community resist
dissatisfied writh the size, cost it on the strategic intelligence ing With reportersn but ? ir
ancl loose, codrdination of the . '''
and. the re-i- on tactical. It con. views over several moi
000 mom. with Eederal officials '
tributes .at least 150,
Goverament's worldwide in-_ bars of the intelligence staffs
telligence operations. .which are estimated at 200,006 deal daily with intellirn
matters, with men ret
from intelligence careers
According .. to;:nnembers .onf peoPle: ?
'
his staff, he believes that the Overseein.g all the activities with some on active duty
i
intelligenc.e providecl to help is the United Stales Intelli- (1cata that .President N
an
. gence Board, set up by secret d his chief advisers op
bun formulate foreigndate the need for high-gi
policy, order by President Dwight D.
while occasionally excellent,i Eisenhower in 1056 to coordi- intelligence and "consume
IS not. good enough, day afterinate intelligence exchanges, 'eagerly- ? ? .
The community, for insts
day; to justify its siiere ? of I decide collection priorities, as-
has been providing the P:
dent with exact statistics
numbers, deployment
characteristics of Soviet
tiles, nuclear submarines
the.iriteilieonce priorities n.::ustWho is the President's repro-
prcser*/ ussians on the limitatioi .
.service nuclear armed_ s
"in or from" Cuban bases.
the budget.. ". - ? sign collection tas.c.s and help
Mr.-Nixon, ' ? prepare what are known as na-
it is said, hes .t.)tional intelligence estiinates.
gun to decide for himself ?vhat The chairmen of the board,
Tpower for the talks with
I,be and \vhere the money should' sentative, is the Director of
? -0 "Richard Helms 111,N inern- ar"ls?
larg,ely to the intellieence com-"bers' are 1,ieut; Gen. DoLnialci'V. "We' couldn't vet off
be spent, instead leavior, it!Central Intelligen oft
ce, at
, ground at the talks wig
triunity. ?he has instructe-d .hislBennett, head of the Defens
Ray .s.. this extremely_ sophisticate(
staff to survey the 'situation!Intellieence Agency;
and report back within a yt-ar !Cline, director of intelligence, formation base," . an off
t is loped?with re.commen.:. and rese n
arch at the State De- commented. 'We do it give
partment; Vice " Adm. Noel
l our negotiators round -figures
nations for budget cuts of as
I Gayler, head or the National
much as seVelal. hundred mil-, v en - A I' ---about 200 or this weapon.
, oeCULI,_3 gency; ioward C.
lion dollars. ? , . . l DrOW31 Jr., an assistant general N,Ve got it drr.va to the '234
gy nere, here and - here.' When
manager at the Atomic Eller
No'?. initTly years ago the
our people sit down to nego-
:Central Intelligence kencv Commission, and William C.
the Federal Bureau of Investi-! know
hate with the Russisuts- they
all about the Russian
,and? 'Lae owe/. intellieence
Sulli\nin, a deputy director of
.1 ? n ? ?
.tis were portrayed as an gation. ?
onpire"...coritrolliir,' Intelligence men are disaware/ that's the way to negotiate."
strategic threat to the U.S.?
burea
foreien policy ?behind a veil of the President's quiet, Too much intelligence has
?
its drawbacks, some sources
of secrecy. Now the peridu., lotit: they say that until now
h'e term sav, for it whets the Admin-
lum. has swung.
. The President and his aides
are said to suspect wide-
spread overlapping, duplica-
tion and considerable. 'loon-
dogglinn" in the secrecy-
shrouded intelligence "com-
munity. . ?
In addition to the, C.I.A.,
----hail-Way tnrougri istration's appetite. Speaking
has never seriously
sought to comprehend thel of Henry A-. Kissinger, the
vast, sprawling' conglornora-';President's adviser on nation-
tion -of agencies, Nor, they al-security ,affairs, a Cabinet
says has he decided how inl,s1; official observed: "Henry's im-
to use .their technical re- patient for facts." -
sourc-.3 and personnel---much Estimates in New Form
of it - talented-----in. formulating, -
policy. In the last year Mr. Nixon
? and Mr. Kissinger have or-
Two Cases in Point- dered a revision in the national
they include the intelligence Administration use ___ albeit, intelligence estimates, 'which
: arms of the Defense,- State tardy uso---of vast .resources in are prepared by the C.I.A. after
-? and Ju tic Departmen.f.,s .and spy satellites and reconnais-lconsultation with the other in-
saline planes to ;help police _the 'telligence agencies. ? Some on
. the 'Atomic Energy Commis- .
,- ? n 7
- sion. Together.they spend $3.5-
. billion a year on strategic intel-
ligence about the Soviet Union,
Communist China and other abortive Sontay prisoner-0i-
' countries that might harm the yl a r raid of No. 21,' at which
e.? nation's security. time the C.I.A. was virtuallt
i i When tactical intelligence shut out of Pentagon planning.
..,., in Vietnam and Germany and By contrast, the specialists
reconnaissance by overseas point out, timely intelligence
?
commands is included, the an- helps in decision-making.
nual figure exceeds $5-billion, ? It was Mr. Clint,. \?,.-'no spot-- ertainty.." is the. President's representa-
experts say. TIAppribmedffOrtOelePpS000/61940113
Arab-Israeli cease-fire of. la st ? Uwe 0?1,- by .
August is considered a case in been ordered radically revised
point. Another was poor by Mr. Kissinger.
gence coordination before. the "Our knowledge of present
Soviet- capabilities . allows
Ienry - and others to. criticize
us for .some- sponginess about
predicting future Soviet pol-
icy'," an informed source con-
ceded. "It's pretty hard to look
down the road with the same
,
. Helms Said to Rate High ,
'Sources close to the White
House, say' that Mr. Nixon
and his foreign-policy advisers
----Mr., Kissinger and Secretary
of State William P. Rogers
and Secretary of Defense
.Melvin R. Laird?respect the
professional competence. - of:
'Mr. lichns,- who is 57, and is
'the first career head .of the
Central Intelligence- Agency.
, Appointed by ? President
'Lyndon: B. Johnson in June,
3966, Mr. Helms has been
essentially apolitical. He is
-said to have brought profes-
sional ability_ to bear ? in
"lowering the profile" of the
agency, tightening discipline
and divesting it of . mainY
fringe activities that have
aroused criticism in Congress
and 'among the public.. His
standing with Congress and
among the professionals is
high.
According to White Home
sourCeS, President Nixon,
backed by the Congressional
leadership, recently offe?ned
M. Helms added authority to
coordinate the activities of
the other ? board marchers. Ile
is reported to have declined.
A major problem, according
to those who know One situa-
tion is that while Mr. Helms,.
rt 4-4,14416nistrattoifs tive on the Intelligence Poard,
partm ds ent spen more than SO ? sign o. a noviet ? s - Of1300440ataency spend only aboot
s
marine buildup at. Cienfuegos, put and organization of the 10 per cent-n.$500-r-Milion to
. _
. - .
Approved For Release 2001/00/09 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001300440
STATINTL
PROVIDFNCE, R.I.
JOURNAL
M ? 66,673
S ? 209,501
JAN 21 ign
----e-see - -
0 ...see_ e, a successful peacemaker. CerteinlY,' 'ha. tried ,to
Shipwrcfrtck of Stielle, .
.. play that role in the Middle East?sand ?not Without
. some Success. But if he is not the essence cif aggres.;
siveness, ?that undoubtedly ie because ?Preasident
Nixon did not want ,a high-pressure man heading
the State Department. That Mr. Rogers is an old
and trusted friend?one of Mr. Nixon's oldest and
most confidential advisers ? has not prevented his
department from being pushed- into -secondary
position. Other departments with interests arid-, per.;
sonnel abroad have been quick to ignore, or shake
off the direction and control that the State Depaets
ment, through its ambassadors, is. supposed to 'exs
efelse in all oversea.s situations.
POSsibly a different combination of president and
secretary of state could put the department hack
-a position of command. But a reversal apparently
will not be easy. The attempt., ought to be made,
?for the State Department does represent civilian
control over foreign policy, a- control less and less
representedby the activities of the huge DefenSe
Department and the mostly undercover .CIA.
? ? ?
There was a time . in the affairs of the United ,
States. when the State' Department made foreign
, policy. That time is quite a way in the past More
and more, as a survey by The New York Times has
shown, the formulation of foreign policy has been
,moved to ,the White House. The. State Departments .
-instead ,of directing other agencies in their dealings
with foreign goverments, finds itself competing with
those agencies for White House attention. Moreover,
It frequently finds itself running a poor. secon.c1
? . ? ?
them. - ? .
Probably this development should not be ens.-
' prising. For the past decade, the nation has been
: conducting or directing a war. In an age of -super-
- powers and superweapons, the military budget of
the. country has swollen to between 70 and sp
-dollars. Whoever controls the ? spending of, that
:amount of money, and the activities of all the people -
involved in the expenditure; is going to have ?a.
potent influence on policy, if not indeed to the point
?
of making the pblicy.
But personalities are the imponderable in politi-
? cal affairs. A succession of relatively weak secretaries
of state has done nothing to offset the trend toward
' centralization of authority in the White House. It
? is not simply that Presidents Kennedy, Johnson: and
Nixon have insisted on paying day-to-day attention
? to foreign policy; they have . gradually built .up
' a White House foreign policy staff that. rivals the
;State Department. This build-up has not been acci-
dental, of course. The catapulting of the 'United
?States-into the position of the most powerful nation.
' has thrust new, and magnified -responsibilities upon
the President. ? ? ? ? -?
Still, Harry Truman deferred to Dean Acheson
and Dwight EisenhoWer. deferred to .John. Foster
= Dulles. Perhaps a weaker president seeks a more,
aggressive secretary to formufete. the policies and
decisions that have to be made?although neither
Truman nor Eisenhower, was exactly. aeweak man.
Perhaps if Dean Rusk had had a streak of greater
' decisiveness in him, he could have stemmed the tide.
Secretary of State Rogers has impressed no one as.
'-a strong.personality. He comes across, in press and
- television, as a likable and kindly person,- a man
who ?n the lash' t
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