KISSINGER'S KISSINGER ALEXANDER MEIGS HAIG JR.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 125
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 31, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

NEW YORK TIMES
Approved For Release 2a.coompi: CIA-RDP80-01
Kissinger's Kissinger
Alexander Meigs Haig Jr.
, By JAMES M. NAUGHTON
Special to The Now York Times
WASHINGTON, Dec. 30 ?
The most interesting aspect
of the White House advance
party that is on its way to
China to complete the prep-
arations for President Nixon's
journey may be the fact that:
the delegation is led by some-
one ? other than the Presi-
dent's assistant for national
security affairs,
Man Henry A. Kissin-
ger. The man in
charge is the
News next best thing?
"Kissinger's Kis-
singer," as he was described
here today. He is Brig. Gen.
Alexander M. Haig Jr., a but-
ton-down, Ivy League-style
career Army officer who is,
above ,all, loyal to the next
man up in the chain of com-
mand.
General Haig, at age 47, is
the arch type of the military-
political staff man who con-
siders his ability to operate--
and to advance his own
career?to be inversely pro-
portional to the amount of
public notice he attracts. The
general's success can be
measured, in two ways.
A colonel when he entered
the White House, he made
brigadier general within nine
months. After barely two
years he is on the selection'
list for promotion to major
general.
Still Virtually Unknown
? "Selection boards pay at-
tention to commendation let-
ters from the White House,"
a senior Pentagon official ex-
plained. Then too, the official
added, senior military men
eager to advance their views
in policy circles "recognize
who a guy works for, and Al
Haig works for Henry Kis-
singer."
In the Defense Department
there is already talk about
the prospect that General
Haig might one day become
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. .
Even more significant ?
Until Mr. Nixon thrust Gen-
eral Haig into public focus
as head of the advance team
that passion for ano-
nymity. In three years Gen-
eral Haig has risen from be-
ing virtually unknown senior
military adviser to the Na-
tional Security Council to be-
come a virtually unknown
deputy assistant to the Presi-
dent for national securiM? s
ApprovedifcorqRelle
nerg,d as the one member
Associated Press
His loyalty pays off
of Mr. Kissinger's staff of 120
with any -clout of his own.
At least twice the President
has sent General Haig to
Southeast Asia to gather mili-
tary and political information,
and it is believed that he
made several other unan-
nounced trips to South Viet-
nam and Cambodia, catching
even the State Department
unaware.
More often, however, Gen-
eral Haig, slouching slightly,
sits for 14 hours or more
seven days a week at his
desk outside Mr. Kissinger's
office. He was on duty on
the Saturday in November
when the Atomic Energy
Commission detonated a nu-
clear warhead under Amchit-
ka Island in Alaska. It was
he who telephoned the Presi-
dent ? in Florida with Mr.
Kissinger ? to assure ? him
that the test had been suc-
cessful.
Thrives Under Pressure
Mr. Kissinger's demands
on his staff have been such
as to drive a number of them,
feeling tired and unapprecia-
ted, back into private re-
search positions. None have
been under more pressure
than General Haig, who albite
sees what Mr. Kissinger sees
and who must take drafts of
STATI NTL
national security study mem-
orandums, and the sweeping
scope is attested by titles
such as "Laos Peace Initia-
tives," "Uranium Enrichment
Defense Nceds" and "Vietnam
Riot Control."
Some former Kissinger
sides believe General Haig
has thrived under pressure
by "not disagreeing on is-
sues." Joseph A. Califano,
for whom he worked at the
Defense Department under
Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson and who urged Mr.
Kissinger to hire him in
1969, recalls him as the "ul-
timate professional" dedicat-
ed solely to "doing the job
and doing it right."
Even critics acknowledge
General Haig's abilities as
Mr. Kissinger's chief of staff.
"Henry is just a dreadful
administrator," one said.
"He's preoccupied with pol-
icy. But Haig is enormously
effective at keeping the ma-
chinery moving."
? Whatever their reasons,
Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger
have developed sufficient re-
spect for General Haig that,
on occasion, he fills in for
his boss in briefings of the
President.
A West Pointer
Alexander M. Haig Jr.,
who was born in Philadelphia
on Dec. 2, 1924 lost his
father, a lawyer, before he
was 10. He attended Notre.
Dame for a year before
winning a wartime appoint-
ment to West Point, from
which he graduated in 1947.
As a junior aide to Gen. of
the Army Douglas MacArthur
in occupied Japan, he met
and married Patricia Fox,
daughter of a senior Army
officer.
Their three children?Al-
exander, 19 and a sophomore
at Georgetown University;
Brian, 18 and a plebe at West
Point, and Barbara, 15 and in
high school here?do not see
as much of the general as
they used to, Nor does he
get many opportunities, aside
from an occasional tennis or.
handball match, to relax.
Rarely can he count on being
sure of using theater or con-
cert tickets.
option papers and security Nonetheless, his wife, pre-
memoranda, with Mr. Kissin- paring to spend New Year's
ger's criticism scrawled on Eve half a world away from
the margins, back to the au- her husband, had no doubt
thors for improvement, that he was fascinated with
The sheer volume of effort his grueling job.
involved is reflected by the "I don't think an man can
aseh20011/0410141(01tA-RDP89413604R001300400001 -6
ger cf roughly .`?;,,. classifi t ungs, she said.
Approved For Release 261?//tiM4RFM-RbIbtioCt16
2 cp.,. 1971
The CHIl's Ketu Cover
?The Rope Dancer
by Victor Marchetti.
Grosset & Dunlap, 361 pp., $6.95
Richard J. Barnet
In late November the Central Intel-
ligence Agency conducted a series of
"senior seminars" so that some of its
Important bureaucrats could consider
its public image. I was invited to
attend one session and to give my
views on the proper role of the
Agency. I suggested that its legitimate
activities were limited to studying
newspapers and published statistics,
listening to the radio, thinking about
the world, interpreting data of recon-
naissance satellites, and occasionally
? publishing the names of foreign spies. I
had been led by conversations with a
number of CIA officials to believe that
they were thinking along the same
lines. One CIA man after another
eagerly joined the discussion to assure
me that the days of the flamboyant
covert operations were over. The
upper-class amateurs of the OSS who
stayed to mastermind operations in
\tuatemala, Iran, the Congo, and else-
where--Allen Dulles, Kermit Roosevelt,
Richard Bissell, Tracy Barnes, Robert
Amory, Desmond Fitzgerald?had died
or departed.
In their place, I was assured, was a
small army of professionals devoted to
preparing intelligence "estimates" for
the President and collecting informa-
tion the clean, modern way, mostly
with sensors, computers, and sophis-
ticated reconnaissance devices. Even
Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot, would now
be as much a museum piece as Mata
-Hari. (There are about 18,000 em-
ployees in the CIA and 200,000 in the
entire "intelligence community" itself.
The cost of maintaining them is some-
where between $5 billion and 56
billion annually. The employment
figures do not include foreign agents or
mercenaries, such as the CIA's 100,000-
man hired army in Laos.)
A week after my visit to the "senior
seminar" Newsweek ran a long story
n "the new espionage" with a picture
of CIA Director Richard Helms on the
cover. The reporters clearly had spoken
to some of the same people I had. As
Newsweek said,
adventurer has passed in the American
spy business; the bureaucratic age of
Richard C. Helms and his gray spe-
cialists has settled in." I began to have
an uneasy feeling that Newsweek's
article was a cover story in more than
one sense.
Elle
*Ope
the
ingt
kno
fina
ingt
vote
An
ceili
It has always been difficult to faile
analyze organizations that engage in
A
false advertising about themselves. Part of
of the responsibility of the CIA is to lad)
spread confusion about its own work, the
The world of Richard Helms and his
"specialists" does indeed differ .from
that of Allen Dulles. Intelligence organ-
izations, in spite of their predilection
for what English judges used to call
"frolics of their own," are servants of
policy. When policy changes, they
must eventually change too, although
because of the atmosphere of secrecy
and deception in Which they operate,
such changes are exceptionally hard to
control. To understand the "new
espionage" one must see it as ipart of
the Nixon Doctrine which, in. essence, er
is a global strategy for maintaining US Ih
power and influence without overtly reol
involving the nation in another ground Ile,
war. ne
But we cannot comprehend recent lige
developments in the "intelligence corn- uel
munity" without understanding what fur
Mr. Helms and his employees actually Prc
do. In a speech before the National i13
Press Club, the director discouraged/
journalists from making the attempt. d(
"You've just got to trust us. We are
honorable men." The same speech is
made each year to the small but
growing number of senators who want
a closer check on the CIA. In asking,
on November 10, for a "Select Com-
mittee on the Coordination of United
States Activities Abroad to oversee
activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency," Senator Stuart Symington
noted that "the subcommittee having
oversight of the Central Intelligence
Agency has not met once this year."
Symington, a former Secretary of
the Air Force and veteran member of
?
the Armed Services Committee, has t
also said that "there is no federal
agency in our government whose activ-
ities receive less scrutiny and control
than the CIA." Moreover, soon after
Symington spoke, Senator Allen J.
becz
ized
ovei
lige,
Age
Bur
the
cen
ove:
vice
Age
imp
nf
P:
STATINTL
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1
ELSHINGTON FOSZ
Approved For Release 20AEliE4 :1E1A-RDP80-016
Murrey Mctrder
SECRETARY OF STATE
William P. Rogers at-
tempted at year's end to lift
the crumpled morale of the
Foreign Service out of a
slough of gloom with a burst
of holiday praise.
If effusive words alone
could suffice, the Secretary,
who is a professional opti-
mist, would have accom-
plished a small miracle. But
to diplomats to specialize in
soft verbiage to cloak hard
realities, the warm com-
mendation of the Foreign
Service for "outstanding
work" carried about as
much comfort as a diplo-
matic communique express-
ing- "agreement in princi-
ple."
This has been "a good
year In terms of foreign af-
fairs" said Rogers on Thurs-
day; brimming with enthusi-
asm over his listing of "very
substantial accomplish-
ments." But for members of
-the American Foreign Serv-
ice, it has been indeed been
a poor year.
The main body of profes-
sional American diplomats
at State was frozen out of
most high strategy-making
In 1971, they ruefully con-
cede. ,
Even Rogers himself re-
ceived only the most fleet-
ing mention in the White
House citations of the year's
foreign policy accomplish-
ments, in comparison to the
great pre-eminence accorded
to presidential national se-
curity adviser Henry A. Kis-
singer. Rogers even ran a
distant third in personal at-
tention on the White House
accounting to the space and
prominence given to presi-
dential counsellor Robert H.
Finch's "mission to six na-
tions in Latin America."
Is the conduct or state of
STATINFIL
uble Setback at State
ceives what attention in the
White House pecking order,
or by whether the Foreign
Service happens to be happy
or glum?. The blunt answer
is that in many respects it
matters little or not at all in
national dimensions. What
does imatter to the nation is
whether its resources in di-
plomacy, as in other fields,
are used fully and wisely.
FROM their own view-
point, which is not wholly
impartial, a very large num-
ber of the most experienced
professionals in the Ameri-
can Foreign Service deplore
what they regard as the
wholly inadezuate use being
made of ,their talents.
This past year brought a
double blow. The State De-
partment long had been
eclipsed In this administra-
tion by the Kissinger opera-
tion in the White House;:
suddenly State was pre-
empted from another, unex-
pected direction?the Treas-
ury Department, where free-
wheeling Secretary John B.
Connally suddenly vaulted
Into a dominant position
across the economic-foreign
policy horizon.
State found itself not only
operating on the fringes of
high strategy, but perform-
ing what one chagrined dip-
lomat called a "sweeper's
role": sweeping up and
trying to piece together the
shards of allies' egos shat-
tered by the shock of the a&
ministration's bold ventures
in China and in interna-
tional monetary and trade
policy.
A minority inside the
State Department responds,
as one expressed it, "So
what? What is so bad
about being a 'service' or-
ganization? If the President
wants to centralize all poli-
the State Department, that's
his prerogative. Every Presi-
dent has his own ideas
about how he wants to oper-
ate; that's his choice."
What is lost in this proc-
ess, others protest, is not
only morale but the full
range of expertise and bal-
ance that can be brought to
bear on a given interna-
tional problem, uncolored
by the political-centered
focus of the White House.
It is the prerogative of the
White House to accept or re-
ject this advice, it is argued;
what is important is that the
President have access to it.
Dr. Kissinger maintains that
'this is precisely what is pro-
vided for in his elaborate
National Security Council
system. But the realty, in-
siders protest, is that the
most important policy deci-
sions never enter that elabo-
rate mechanism.
With a critical election
year ahead, the process of
policy making is shrinking
with increasing secretive-
ness into the confines of the
White House. What is emerg-
ing is soaring optimism in
place of realities about the
outside world. This, too, is
not without precedent in an
election year. The risk
comes, as the Johnson ad-
ministration discovered,
when the optimists let them-
selves be engulfed by their
own product.
tgicaarflfeca' atireigsrt Voit.3
CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6
J
NEVI YORIC DAILY STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03W:Wk-RDP80-016
Nev's Arotind Mats
vnrk r (777Y 9
-
re,
VZ,7tAl
,
- By GEORGE MAESTAN
The White House will be the subject of two major tele-
vision specials this month, one on CBS dealing with the
Christmas season and the other on NBC covering a day in
dent Agnew; presentation of
diplomatic credentials by ambas-
sadors from Indonesia, Morocco,
Pakistan and Portugal, and a
meeting of the Quadriad, the
President's four major economic
advisers.
Chancellor said that for se-
curity reasons NBC cameras were
excluded from a part of every
Meeting. "Among the unsched-
uled events that oecured during
the day," he said, "was a visit
from Nixon's daughter, Julie Ei-
senhower.
CIS' speCial "Christmas at
the White House," will, be tele-
vised on Christmas Eve, from
10:30 to 11 p.m. It will follow
the First Family through its
various activities preparing for
the Yuletide season. Julie Eisen-
hower will join Charles Kuralt
the life of the President.
NBC's special, titled "Dec. 6,
3971: A Day in the Presidency,"
will be presented next Tuesday,
from 7::10 to 8:30 p.m., with John
Chancellor as host. It will cover
President Nixon through an entire
work day, focusing on every
meeting-, on his schedule, includ-
ing the first part? of a top-level
session of the Washington Special
Action Group of the National
Security Council. ?
This segment will show the
President discussing the Indian-
Pakistani war with Secretary of
John Lucille
Chancellor Ball
State William Rogers, presiden-
tial aid Henry Kissinger, Deputy
Secretary of Defense David Pack-
ard, Gen. William Westmoreland I
and Richard Helms, director of 4
the Central Intelligence Agency.
Reuven Frank' president of
NBC News, said this is the first
time the White House has given
permission to film a program of
this type. "We have been asking
to do a show on the Presidency
since 1948," he said. "We got the
go-ahead in mid-November after
several meetings with John Scali,
a special consultant to the
President."
The President's work day on
the day of filming (Dec. 6) began
at 7:45 a.m., with a breakfast for
congressional leaders, and ended
shortly before 11. p.m., following
-a dinner for Canadian Prime
/viinister Pierre Elliott 'Prudent:.
Other events on Nixon's sched-
ule that will be seen on the tele-
cast included-: a domestic council
Ineeting, chaired by Vice Presi
_
0 n r
iIYc4
and Marya 'McLaughlin for the.
report.
Filming for the telecast began
last weekend.
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001103/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6
NEW 1.'027.-C DAILY
Approved For Release 2001Ipi/r? q1A-RDP80.0
News Arobaci mats
r-,71
?
c.:71
- By GEORGE MAKSIAN .
- The White House will be the subject of two major tele-
vision specials this month, one on CBS dealing with the
Christmas season and the other on .NBC covering a day in
the life of the President.
NBC's special, titled "Dec. 6,
1071: A Day in the Presidency,"
will be presented next Tuesday,
front 7:30 to 8:30 p.m., with John
Chancellor as host. It will cover
President Nixon through an entire
work day, focusing on every
meeting on his schedule, includ-
ing the first part - of a top-level
session of the Washington Special
Action -Group of the National
?
Security Council.
This segment will show the
President discussing the Indian-
Pakistani war with Secretary of
STATI NTL
0'i iir
1.7
John
Chancellor
Lucille
Ball
?
State 'William Rogers, presiden-
tial aid Henry Kissinger, Deputy
Secretary of Defense David Pack-
ard, Gen. William Westmoreland
and Richard Helms, director of
the Central Intelligence Agency.
Reuven Frank, president of
NBC News, said this is the first
time the White House has given
permission to film a program of
this type. "We have been asking '
to do a show on the Presidency
since 1948," he said. "We got the
go-ahead in mid-November after
several meetings with John Scali,
special consultant to the
President."
The President's work day on
the day of filming (Dec. 6) began
at 7:45 a.m., with a breakfast for
congressional leaders, and ended
shortly before 11 p.m., following
a dinner for Canadian Prime
Minister Pierre Elliott Trinket!.
Other events on Nixon's sched-
tile that will be seen on the tele-
Cast included: a domestic council
meeting chaired by Vice Presi-
.
dent Agnew; presentation of
diplomatic credentials by ambas-
sadors from. In dOneSia, Morocco,
Pakistan and Portugal, and a
meeting of the Quadriad, the
President's four major economic
advisers.
Chancellor said that for se-
curity reasons NBC cameras were
excluded from a part of every
meeting. "Among the unsched-
uled events that occ.ured during
the day," he said, "was a visit
from. Nixon's daughter, Julie Ei-
senhower.
CBS' special "Christmas at
the White House," will, be tele-
vised on Christmas Eve, from
10:30 to 11 p.m. It will follow
the First Family through itS
various activities preparing for
the Yuletide season. Julie Eisen-
hower will join Charles Kuralt
it-;.01/10-(7.)
and Marya McLaughlin for the
report.
Filming for the telecast began
last weekend.
?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6
STATI NTL
Approved For?trOgrapEn2001/03/043: 1311A-1OP80-01601R
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. .Dy Jonnne Leccloin ? agency was hard for me to identify at first.
' Staff writer of The Christian Scier.ce Monitor I began -first to criticize the waste. This is
.a_
.. : ridiculous, I thought. We could be doing the
- Bostol i .. job for $2 billion less.
'. ?
In the baSement of his home in Oakton
"The second thing that was Most annoying
. ?,
Va., with dogs and children running have to? me was the military influence. This is
very pervasive. When the Secretary of De-
around him, Victor' Marchetti wrote a spy
?fense controls 85 percent of the assets, he
Dc-
novel last year. Today Mr. Marchetti and
l'ils new book "The Rope Dancer" are stir- [the CIA director] doesn't have the muscle
? ring up 'havoc of another kind just a few to make changes. The military influence in
miles from his borne, at Central Intelligence many ways is the greatest single factor of
Agency ? (CIA) headquarters where Mr. .waste. They want to know more and more
Marchetti was an official just two years ago. and are responsible for C'ollection overkill."
..Toclay Mr. Marchetti is the spy "who To these two criticisms, the former CIA
came in from the cold?into hot waterpn official who worked close to the director
to Mote one of his friends. Now an out-
and who responded for The Christian Science
?spoken critic of the agency, Mr. Marchetti Monitor, partly 'agreed. "There is unfor-
. has been traveling around the country pro-. tunately an awful lot of duplication," he
'
meting his expos?f the spy's world and said, but added,. "What is needed is tighter
crusading-for reform in the CIA. control over the military [not the CIA]. It's
not. a question of the CIA duplicating the
Mr. l'ilarchetti left the CIA after a 14- military but of the military duplicating
year career in protdt over what he asserts t the' CIA does '
is its waste ' and duplicity in intelligence ILation is a strong. The Preside:-,t s aeorga-
' move in the 'rsight' diiec-
gathering, its increasing involvement withtion "
.th'e military, its amorality, and what heAjaother one of Mr. Marchetti 's corn-
.
says now is its subtle shifts to "domestic plaints is that the traditional intelligence
spying." ? -1.7,,ork of gathering and infoaana-
Reform, he says, in the entire intelligence ? assessing - " ?
ti ""
netvRa-k .should be three-pronged: (I) -re-
on has been contaminated with para-
organizing responibilities, (2) reducing size
clered by Preaidezit Nixon. Placing CIA di-
rector Richard Helms as overall coordina-
tor of national intelligence recently was in
.,part aimed at eliminating the waste in the
Cancer-11 noticed
?
"In recent years as domeatic unrest in-
creased, I've noticed the CIA is concerned
about the FBI's apparent inability to handle
subversion in this country. I think there's
an effort to convince the nation that the
CIA should get into domestic intelligence."
"Ridiculous," snapped the former CIA
administrator, and left this charge at that.
,To reform the intelligence network, Mr.
Marchetti says there should be a reorgani-
zation to limit the Defense Department to
the routine intelligence needs Of various de,
p?artments -- Army, Navy, etc.
"Then I'd put the National Security
Agency under the control of the ?Presiden1
and Congress," elaborated Mr. Marchetti
"Congress has very little: knowlc;dge about
what goes on. The Pentagon papers and the
way the Supreme Court 'acted strips away
the shield.intelligence has always had. .We
need to let a little sunshine in; that's the
best safeguard."
Laos example ciled
The former administrator insists, how.
aver, that there are already adequate con.
military activity. - tirols through special -congressional corn.
A prime example is Lao S where the CIVnittees which control appropriations and
recruited and armed thousands of natives' military affairs. "If you had the whole
says Mr. Marchetti, who worked in the CIA -Congress and. Senate debating these issuen
as an intelligence analyst, 'as special assist- in executive session, you might as well ?dc
ant to the chief of plans, programs, and away with it [secret intelligence opera-
budgets, to ? the executive director, and tions]. Inevitably ,there would be leaks."
finally as executive assistant to the agency's "Of course there would be leaks,", admit-
deputy director.- ? ? - . ,ted Mr. Marchetti. "What I'm really saying
"[At the time] perhaps a handful of key is that in the final analysis if we made the
. congressmen and senators might have'President walk through it [his decision to
nation's $3 billion/200,000-man intelligence
.operation which spans a dozen governrnen-
.and funding and (3) exposing the intelli-
gence community to more public control
and scrutiny. .
Silence rnahataltied
- The CIA, in its turn, has remained custo-
marily silent to.the public attack. However,
one former top CIA official, who asked to
-remain anonymous, ? agreed with some of
Mr.- Marehetti's points but disputed his main
.arguments.
Since Mr. Marchetti began speaking out
?. several months ago, a major restructuring
in the intelligence community has been or-
tal agencies. It was also aimed at tailoring
intelligence output More closely to White
-Rouse needs.
This reform ahd. Mr. Ma.rehetti's own criti-
cism come at a time when Congress, too, is
demanding more knowledge -.and -control
over the intelligence networks. For the first
time Congress has ordered public hearings
on the CIA next year, and Mr. Marchetti
Plans to testify. ? ? ? ? ?
. .
linoavn about this ? activity in Laos. ThE
public knew nothing," he declared. ?
According to the former CIA adminis-
trator, however, paramilitary activity is
shifting out of the CIA now and into the
Army. "But. in' any case," .he said, "the
CIA doesn't decide on this activity; they
are directed by the President and the Na-
-tional Security Council." If there, is to be
reform in the use of the CIA, he argues, it
must come from the President's direction.-
While Mr. Marchetti is highly critical of
the CIA's paramilitary and .clandestine in-
terVentions in other countries, he insists that
the real threat of the CIA today is that it
may "unleash" itself on this- country.
uSe covert forces in foreign countries], the
President would see it's all not worth it.
Then if we deny ourselves these alterna-
tives. we'd have to act in a diplomatic
fashion."
. Military ii2PA,Nov.ved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDI380-01601R001300400001-6
In Boston Mr. archetti explained his own
? "defection": "My discontent with the
pAuy.... WP_ELD
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By 'Gus Man
l?
LLJU L1 b\
AFD 601
_0d:2cm:1,50i:rotary, Communist Part/ U.S.A.
? it\ t the last meeting of our National Committee, four
months ago we said: "World capitalism has lost
the source of its momentum. It cannot sustain periods.
of stability. Instability is now the more basic charac-
teristic of world capitalism. It is a social system in
a continuous crisis. Life is giving ever more dramatic
evidence that this is indeed the last stage of capital-
ist development." About the present moment in history,
we said:
. "War U.S. imperialism this is a moment when the
heoldwintls are thre;:teninj.to take over. This is a po?ierl
when the countor-fercos have Locorne anefl'ectivet
counterl:;nlance.. tc; U.S. imperialist policies. Iricrensin:Jy
thcy are cancolino out U.S. influc.,nces...
"Areas of pe.ist cli:iiculties are turning into severe
In world relations, U.S. imperialism is forced :o seek
new tions, because the old cp:ions have p u t the U.S.
on a precarious limbo. .?
"The options that cra open. are either detOin; Or
re:rents and incrensir,* the detours are turning into
- .
"The new element that now more and more forces ?
itself inio cll. U.S. imperialist operations is element of
al a forced retreat."
What we have said is correct. It is a guide to
understanding the nature of the present historic mo-
ment..
But the dramatic events of the past months, and
even days,. force us to probe further and to consider
even more far-raching conclusions. . ? ?
, Needless to say, the contradictions, currents, rela-
tionship of forces giving rise to this 'Moment are ex-
tremely complex. . There are 'currents \and - counter-
currents. The 'capitalist, world is in an extremely un-
settled state. ?
Events unfold with unusual impact and speed.
The moment is complex because the basic post-'
war point or reference for the capitalist world has
crumbled. It is not only the capitalist currencies that
are "floating." Political forces in the capitalist world
,are in a flux, each seeking for neN,v relationships, for
new points of reference. -
What is.. the basic nature' of ,this critical . mo-
ment? What is it that has changed? ? '
In a -nutshell, the economic, political, and military
edifice of the post-war capitalist world is now crum-
bling. It can never be rebuilt on the old basis. The old
relationships of forces cannot be reconstituted along
past patterns.
The capitalist world is trying to find a new
world structure. U.S. imperialism is. trying to do this
on its own terms. The ? task of our people., and the
anti-imperialist forces,oi_the gorlcl, is torevent the
r_egroupintrIZPFPNONcrpctrpOetieast 3/0
?
STATI NTL
? We need to dismantle the institutions of aggression
within the country?the military-industrial complex,
the Pentagon-CIA, the invisible government, the Na-
tional Security Council, and the rest. This is the mo-
ment to demand the dismantling of all U.S. military
bases and alliances of aggression. The 'curbing of the
post-war capitalist system. is of great historic signifi-
cance. .
With this collapse of the post-war economic, politi-
cal and military capitalist edifice, the general crisis
of world capitalism ig entering a new stage. The
strategic U.S.-built imperialist cold war structure is in
shambles. For U.S. imperialism this is the year of the
boomerang. .One ? cold war policy after another is
boomeranging. The "roll back of Communism" policy
is turning into a roll back for imperialism.
? The isolator has become isolated. The initiative in
world affairs is more and more in the hands of the
socialist countries. The trade blockers are at .Work
trying to break through the trade walls they them-
selves have built.
The U.S.-United Nations policy is boomeranging.
Nixon is, pleading, "Vote us down but please do not.
dance and sing'in your victory." With the Chiria vote,
the 25 years of U.S. domination of ?the, UN carne to an
end.
0.
The post-war-world, capitalist economic structure oi
satellites and appendages that are bound to, and dorni-
na?ted by, U.S. imperialism: is floundering fn chaos and
contusion. The Centrifugal force generated by tha inner
contradictions of capitalism has brought to a breaking
point the post-war ties fashioned under U.S. economic,
dominance;
. The post-war. capitalist political structure of poli-
tical and military alliance's under U.S.- control are be-
coming skeletons of past relationships: This is reflected
in the grab bag diplomacy of the Nixon .Administra-
tion. The traditional post-war allies of -U.S. imperial-
ism are often left "holding the bag.",? ? .
? With this new 'stage in the general crisis of 'world
capitalism has come a new shift in, the balance of
world forces. It is more than an .ordinary shift. It is
? a new qualitative shift of great historic significance.
What is the basic cause for this shift .on the world
scene?
Ile processes leading to this shift have been pres-
ent fpr a long time. The contradictions were .born
with the post-war setup. Tile prime source for capital
that has sustained the reconstruction of post-war world.
capitalism has been the accumulated loot, the riches
of U.S. monopoly. capitalism. This ha S lie.en the re-
servoir that has been the source of what stability -there
has been in the capitalist world. The U.S. has been
the main sour& for the working capital for most of.
the capitalist countries. It has also been the instru-
ment of U:S. imperialist domination.
U.S. 'domination of world capitalism gave rise to a
49,rettwDp8die1eettRi0041300400M-6,
voy.2tiln).0
STATINTL !
STATINTL s ARMED FOROTS JOURNAL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04DECIA:43DP80-01601R
r:
- r- r-
iS r.
?
?
Better Deal
for Service Spooks?
WHITE HOUSE SOURCES tell The
JOURNAL that the intelligence rear-
ganjzation announced last month by the
President means a better deaf, not less
authority?as the country's press has
been reporting?for members of the
defense intelligence community.
* Among the specifics cited: ?
. .0 More "supetgrades" (GS-16' to
GS-18 civilian billets) for Defense Intel-
ligence Agency:
O Assignment of top-caliber military
personnel to DIA (v,,hich in past years
has had trouble getting the most quali-
fied inilitary personnel assigned to it
and proper fecognition for their work in
intelligence fields);
O Better promotion opportunities
for intelligence zmialysts (who in the past
have seldom been able to advance to top
'management levels without first break-
ing out into adniinistrative posts that
make little use of their analytical capa-
bilities).
This last point stems from a major
White House concern with the nation's
intelligence product: "95% of the em-
phasis has been on collection, only 5%
on analysis and production," as one
White House staffer describes it. Yet
good analysfs,.he points out, have faced
major hurdles in getting recognition and
advancement. Moreover, they have been
"overwhelmed" by the amount of raw
data collected by their counterparts in
the more glamorous, more powerful,
and better rewarded collection fields.
The supergrade problem, has been of
special concern td the White House. A
high Administration official, who asked
.not to be named, told The JOURNAL
that the "White House [has] pledged to
get Civil Service Commission approval"
for a GS-18 billet which had been
urgently requested by DIA Director
LGen Donald V. Bennett. Bennett, he
said, first requested the billet more than
a year ago. Even though DIA has not
- Our.Outgunt.ied Spies
A QUICK JOURNAL SURVEY of government-wide supergrade authorizations shows
clearly that the Service side of the intelligence community, and DIA in particular, has
been "low man on the supergrade totem pole" and makes clear why the White }louse
intelligence reorganization is aimed, in part at least, at giving Service "spooks" better
recognition and more attractive career opportunities. Here are typical (in some cases,
ludicrous) comparisons that can be drawn from Part 11 of the Appendix to the Fiscal
Year 1972 Budget of the United States, a 1,112-page tome which gives, by federal
agency, a detailed schedule of all permanent Civil Service positions:
O DIA has 3,088 Civil Service employees, but only 15 supergrades?roughly one for
every 200 spooks.
O DoD's Office of Civil Defense has 721 Civil Service personnel, bat 27 supergrades?
one for every 27 employees, a ratio eight-to-one better than DIA's.
O The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, with only 776 civil servants,
? has 36 supergrades'?one out of every 22, nine times better than DIA. The Peace Cops
also outguns DIA nine to one, with 52 Foreign Service billets in the GS-16 to GS-18
salary brackets for only 1,188 permanent federal positions.
O The National Security Council staff has a 23-to-one advantage, 73 staffers and nine
supergrade (or higher) billets. Even NSC's one to-n;ne supergrade-to-staff ratio, however,
pales by comparison with the President's Office of Science and Technology, which has 23
superposts but only 60 people!
Here's how the supergrade-to-people bean count for key federal agencies compares
with DIA's (where authorized, executive level 1 through V posts are included in
supergrade count):
Defense Intelligence Agency 1-206
Office, Secretary of Defense 1- 95
Library of Congress 1- 51
Office of Management & Budget 1- 78 .'
Office of Economic Opportunity 1- 54
General Accounting Office 1- 68
Smithsok'
p roved For Release.2001403104:- CIA-RDF ;Is
Civil Service ommission -113
Federal Maritime Commission 1- 14
had any authorization fo a 8, it
took almost 10 months for the paper
needed to justify the single high-level
slot to filter through lower echelon
administrative channels in the Pentagon
before they could be forwarded, with a
".?stfong endorsement" from Deputy De-
fense Secretary David Packard, to the
Civil Service Commission.
Ironicatly, just one . day after The
JOURNAL was told of the White
House's determination to help get the
billet approved, it was learned that the
Civil Service Commission had neverthe-
less denied the request. Instead, it of-
fered DIA a choice of having an addi-
tional GS-17 slot or of having a Public,
Law 313 post (which would require that
DIA first recruit an indjvidUal highly
qualified enough to justify the appoint-
ment).
DIA's supergrade structure, neverthe-
less, is going to improve dramatically.
For at least three years, the agency has
been authorized only 15 supergracies,
but will get 24 more under a plan just
endorsed by Dr. Albert C. Hall, DoD's
new Assistant Secretary for Intelligence.
The posts are known to be endorsed
strongly by both Defense Secretary Mel-
vin Laird and Deputy Defense Secretary
David Packard, and apparently enjoy
strong backing from the White House. as
well. ??
By going from 15 to a total of_39
supergrade billets, DIA will be able not
only to recruit higher caliber civilian
personnel .but to promote more or its
own qualified analysts into these covet-
ed, higher paying posts.
Pres.Misses the Point
Press reports on the intelligence reor-
ganization convey. a much different pie':
ture than the above highlights and White:
House sources, suggest. In a 22 Novem-
ber feature, U.S. News & World Report
.noted in a lead paragraph'. that "The
' Pentagon appears to be a loser in the.
latest reshuffle." Deputy Defense Secre-
tary David Packard is probably the man
most responsible for such interpreta-
tions. In a 4 November meeting with
Pentagon reporters, just one day before N/
the White House announced that CIA
Director Richard Helms was being given
new, community-wiele responsibilities
with authority over all intelligence bud-
gets, Packard said: "There have been
people thinking if we just had someone
over in the White House to ride herd on
this overall intelligence that things
would be improved. I don't really sup-
port that view. ... I think if anything
we peed a little less coordination from
that point than more ...."
The White House's determination to
make the-defense intelligence field more
goiltcyo fnedittreiriffiva as civil-
ian)* personnerparalThir reps taken ear-
lier this year by LGen John Norton,
Commanding General of the Army's
??
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DAYTON, OHIO
JOURNAL HERALD)
DEC Tap
- 111,867
STATI NTL
le:lance Priormes
. .Congress must monitor C/A operations
President Nixon's irritation at the qual-
ity of information coming to him from the
nation's fragmented intelligence appara-
tus is understandable. However, his ef
forts to streamline operations, while wel-
come, are not without hazard to the
balance of power between the executive
and legislative branches of the federal
" government.
The President has given to Richard
Helms, director of the Cen12414.elligence
'Agency, coordinating responsioillIT and
strilid budgeting authority over the diverse
intelligence community. Coordination and
economy both seem desirable. The various
intelligence agencies employ about 200,000
-persons and spend about $6 billion an-
nually.
? To the extent that the President has
i made the intelligence operation more effe-
? cient and responsive?as indeed it should
be ? he has increased the security of the
? United States. But he will also have
further eroded Congress' role in formulat-
ing national policy if the legislative branch
of government does not balance executive
access to unlimited intelligence data with
more intensive congressional scrutiny of
and control over the nature and scope of
intelligence activities.
special congressional watchdog corn-.
mittee is supposed to review CIA ()Ora-.
tions and funding. Unfortunately, it '6el-
dom meets except to confer congressional
blessings on CIA affairs, This congres-
sional abdication of its. responsibility for
exercising a positive role in the formation
of national policy reduces it to a rubber
stamp for an omniscient executive. This
has virtually been the case in foreign
affairs since the National Security Act of
1947 unified the services and created the
National Security Council and the CIA. .
An efficient intelligence operation is
vital to the interests of the American
'people. ,But the operation does not always
serve the interests of the people when it
strays into political and military activities
such as the formation of coups d'etat,'
direction of clandestine wars and the
practice of political assassination.
President Nixon's changes appear to
offer increased efficiency, and in Helms
the President seems to have a supervisor
who is _pre-eminently concerned with gath-
ering and evaluating intelligence data. But
only a vigilant and responsible Congress
can serve to restrain the executive branch
of government from abusing the vast
power and influence available to it
through these necessarily covert. intelli-,
gence
J
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FOREIGN POLICY
Arti314DTANkEor Release 2001/03/041GIAADP80-01601R0
KIISSINGET{TS
, policy position is preferred by his State
Department; but he side-steps the NSC on
occasion to carry his demurrer, dissent or
? alternate position Co the President. biivatcly.
Atop Washington's complex foreign affairs - --Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird is
bureaucracy sits the National Security Coun, less personally involved in the NSC process,
cil, a 24-year-old body given new status in having apparent indifference to wj-rat he
1969, when President Nixon moved to make ? believes is unnecessary NSC paperwork, which
it a kind of command and control center for
his foreign policy. The new Nixon NSC sys-
tem, run from the White House by Henry A.
Kissinger, has now existed for nearly three
years, producing 133 numbered study memo-
' randa, reaching 127 formal decisions, and
employing a permanent staff of .about 120
? personnel (more than double the pre-Nixon
figure). Though the substance of its opera-
tions are necessarily secret, interviews with
officials .permit tentative evaluation of the
strengths and weaknesses of the Kissinger
NSC. There is broad agreement on the follow-
?
by John P. Leacacos
operates within the Nsc system and also
utilizes it as. a forum to establish whatever
ing seven points:
NSC has served President Nixon
more or less as he desired, that is, in the
ordered style of formal ansWers to detailed
questionnaires. The volume.of this paperwork
has at times been staggering, but it has
sharpened - focus on the search for policy
- choices.
--The answers and alternatives for action.
"coming up through the NSC" have produced
few panaceas, but have contributed greater
coherence of outlook in foreign affairs man-
? agement. 3,:sc recommendations are more
pragmatic than academic, reflecting Kis-
singer's view: "We don't make foreign policy
by logical syllogism."
insistence on the "limited"
-nature of U.S. power and the need for
? greater restraint and cautious deliberation
- about its exercise have been reinforced at the
highest level by Nixon's habit of withdrawing
:to make final decisions in solitude and of
frequently deciding on no-action rather than
'accepting advice to initiate new action.
?By being close to the President and keep-
ing his fingers on all aspects of the NSC
process personally, Kissinger without question
is the prime mover in the NSC system. The
question. arises whether the NSC would func-
tion as effectively without Kissinger, and
whether it can bequeath a heritage of.accom-
he leaves to his .deputy, David Packard.
Laud's main day-to-day operational preoccu-
pation is with the 'exit of U.S. forces from
Vietnam. His International Security Affairs
Bureau in the Pentagon performs poorly b
Washington bureaucratic standards.
--The influence on foreign policy of the
military, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
who are usually represented in the NSC proc-
ess, .is at the lowest point in several years.
This has been attributed to the anticlimactic
winding-down atmosphere of the Vietnam
war, and to the fact that the Chiefs' once die-
hard views and abstract argumentation on
Strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviet
Union have been successfully emulsified into
the Nixon-Kissinger basic principles for SALT
negotiations. with Russia. Kissinger has com-
mented: "In? my experience with the military,
they are more likely to accept decisions they
do not like than any other group." ?
From time .to time, gears have clashed
within the system. The State Department has
complained bitterly of the "Procrustean bed"
fashioned by the Kissinger staff. Meeting
excessive White House deinands, bureaucrats
allege, robs State and Defense of manpower
hours needed for day-to-day operations. After
his first year; Kissinger conceded: "Making
foreign policy is easy; what is difficult is its
coordination and implementation."
White House NSC staffers, on the other
hand, exuberant at their top-dog status, ex-..
press a degree of condescension for the work
of the traditional departments. ? In 1969 Kis-.
singer staffers rated State-chaired studies and
recommendations only "50 to 70 percent
acceptable" and based on mediocre reporting
which failed to sift wheat from chaff in the
political cables constantly .arriving from 117
U.S. embassies. overseas. The Kissinger staff
say that they. have to hammer out the real
choices on the hard- issues, since a cynical and
sometimes bOred bureaucracy offers up too
plishment to be absorbed by the permanent
anx !"straw )tions." State's' planners, for
:machinery ofilt,PWAYea. For Release 20 4_
nuira-LY, TRPRceATO 044R944,30040000 1-6
?Secretary of State William P. Rogers
f).11
STATI NTL
FOREIGN POLICY STATINTL
viinter
Approved For Release 20.01/03/04 : CIA7RDP80-01601 .
The Nixon MC (2) cracy to implement such a strategy once set.
Kissinger found a kindred spirit in a
CAN ONE MAN DO? DO? President whose campaign had denounced the
by I. M. Destle)
t he clandestine journey of Henry Kissinger
to Peking was a tactical coup such as no other
high American foreign 'policy-maker . has
achieved for many years. It also offered a
dramatic illustration of the Nixon-Kissinger
style. The circle of men in on its preparation
was very restricted. And it involved one of
- those large issues of strategic choice which
both the President and his Assistant for
National Security Affairs consider to be
suitable outlets for their talents.
? Together with other summer 1971 develop-
ments--a Berlin agreement, -apparent progress
in the SALT talks?the new China policy has
?brought enhanced prestige to the Nixon
Administration and its foreign policy-making
institutions. Even Dean Acheson, in one of
his. last writings, was moved to temper his
,disappioval of the White House staff role in
? foreign affairs.l Yet despite frequent disms-
sion of Kissinger as an individual, seldom do
outside analysts take a serious look at the
strengths and limitations, of the Nixon foreign
policy-making system More generally. - It has
given us an unusually. effective Presidential
Assistant. But is it enough for a President -
seeking to control the foreign affairs bureau-
cracy to have as his predominant instrument
one talented White House adviser supported
by a'50-man professional staff?
The Shape of the System
When Kissinger came to Washington he
told a number of people of his determination
to concentrate on matters of general strategy
? and leave "operations" to the departments
Some ds missed this as the typical disclaimer
of a new White House staff man. Yet much
it Kissinger's writings suggests that his inten-
tion to devote himself to broad "policy" was
real. He had repeatedly criticized our govern-
ment's tendency to treat problems as "isolated
- cases," and "to identify foreign policy with .
the solution of immediate issues" rather
than developing an interconnected strategy
for coping with the world over a period of
years.' And his emphasis was primarily on
problems of decision-making. He defined the
problem basically in terms ? of how to get the
government .to setyreolvieiit . is V
eTal ce 2004/02404 CIA4RDRION,
Kennedy-Johnson de-emphasis on formai
national security Planning in favor of "catch-
..as-catch-can talkfests." And the system he
4:itit together for Nixon is designed above all
to facilitate and illuminate major Presidential
foreign policy choices. Well over 100 "NSSM'S"
(National Security Study Memoranda) have
? been issued by the White House to the
various foreign affairs government agencies,
calling for analysis of major issues and devcl-.
opment of realistic alternative policy "op-
tions" on them. These studies are cleared
through a network of general interdepart-
mental committees responsible. to Kissinger,
and the most important issues they raise are
argued out before the President in the Na-
tional Security council. Nixon then makes a
decision from among the options, usually
"aft'er further private deliberation."'
? No one. pretends that matters end there,
that implementation of the decision follows
automatically. The Nixon system provides
for coordination of actual agency operations
in several ways--in the work of Kissinger's
23-man "Operation Staff"; in crisis coordina-
tion by the Kissinger-chaired Washington
Special Actions Group (wsAo); in the Secre-
tary of State's, formal role of overseeing "the
execution of_ foreign policy"; and in the
operational Coordination work.of the inter-
departmental Under Secretaries Committee
headed by his deputy; Still, the system as dc-
signed and described clearly treats the carry-
ing out of Presidential aims as a secOndary
problem. Wherea.s Kennedy, in McGeorge
Bundy's oft-quoted words, "deliberately
rubbed out the distinction between planning
and operation,?" Nixon has sought to restore
it. Rejecting the Kennedy-Johnson assump-
tion that the problem of Presidential control
over foreign policy is mainly one of interven-
ing in operational issues to. bring clay-today
bureaucratic actions intb line with Presidential
wishes, Nixon has emphasized the priority of:
"policy" over 'operations." As he expressed
it in his first general foreign policy message to
Congress: "In central areas of policy, we have
arranged our procedure of policy-making so
as to address the broader questions of long:-
term objectives first; w.e define our. purposes,'
and then address the sPecific operational
issues."'
The Nixon system is well-designed for forc-
ing consideration of such "broader cities-
priorities and sgy, an ia cen ow to
STATI NTL
?
(116(KR001300400001-6
recognize the difficulty of getting the bureau-
partially emulates, the National Security
STATI NTL
LIBERTY MT-ER
Approved For Release 2001/0344?. t1ARDP80-01601R
?
EDITORIALS There is only one answer to this. It
Its to organize a political counter,force,
THE SUBVERSIVE C.F.R. land we don't mean the Republican or
When President Nixon appointed ,Democratic party. Both of these are part.
Henry Kissinger as his assistant for na7 of the problem and any politician who
;tional sccurity'affairs we pointed out that ,calls himself either is in some degree con-
:he was hardly qualified for his job be- :trolled. If he's honest, he will admit it.
? cause he was a security risk himself. And -.
.we proved it. LIBERTY LOBBY
Many people thought that we were is the answer?a political force which is
crazy, or "extremists," to say such nasty completely independent of all pressure
things about a man appointed to such groups and 'parties.
a high position by an allegedly "conserva- And when we say LIBERTY LOBBY,
tive" Republican. , -we don't mean an imitation, such as
- HENRY KISSINGER "Common Cause" or some other phoney
organization which has been set up by
is the architect of President Nixon's pro- the CFR to lead you down. the road a
Red China policy, which has already little further. The CFR-Zionist cabal is
caused our roost massive foreign policy expert at setting up this sort of thing to
defeat since the recognition of the confuse its opposition. . ?
U.S.S.R. by Roosevelt. He was hand-
) picked for his job by the subversive There is plenty of evidence that
i'Council on Foreign Relations.. Nixon's fiasco in the UN and forced
The CFR . is a private organization busing of kids to integrated schools are
." Which controls our foreign policy. It. is waking up the voters as nothing else ever
itself run for the benefit of the multi- has. Public apathy is giving way to alarm.
billionaire internationalists who profit The people are looking up from their
? from our continuing sellout to conr- boob tubes and wondering what is going
minim. They picked Kissinger for ? , on.
Let's tell them?and let's tell them
Nixon and had Nixon put him in control
Of our foreign policy because they wanted that there is 'only ? one way to fight d-
i fectively?LIBERTY LOBBY,.
to be certain that "American" policy con- ?
tinues td be made for their benefit, rather
than the benefit of America.
. - Kissinger has been So successful in do-
ing a job for his bosses in the CFR that
;on-Nov. 6 Nixon signed an order putting
'him . in charge of all intelligence opera-
tions?the FBI, CIA, Mi'litary Intelli-
!gence, Departments of Treasury, Defense,
and State, and Atomic Energy intelli-
gence. Now, through Kissinner's National
Security Council, the CI-Td can plug in
? to medtings of patriots who may be plan-
ning to overthrow at the polls the inter-
nationalist regime in Washington. Soon,
it will be a "crime" to read an editorial
like this unless the people wake up. But
THE PEOPLE ARE CATCHING ON
to the fact that ihe government is in the
hands of ruthless pressure group bosses
who wish to run our country for their
exclusive benefit. They want to steal all
your wealth "legally," through confisca-
tory taxes (the super-rich very seldom
pa'y any taxes at all), inflation and in
tercst on their Federal Reserve Notes,
which they force us to use as "money."
A poll. reports that in 1964, 62% of
the people believed that the government
was run for the benefit of all.. After John-
son and Nixon that figure is now down
to 37%.
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STATIN.TL
te never came to terms with the new age it was not because
he failed to understand its. seriousness but because he 'dis-
dained it."
?
. .
IT!-1 THESE WORDS, A HARVARD : thesis-writer
named Henry Kissinger introduced Clemens
Metternich, Austria's greatest foreign minister
and a man whose .diplomatic life he has sought
'to relive. As Richard Nixon's most influential advisor. on -
foreign policy, Kissinger has embodied the role of the 10th
century balance-of-power diplomat. He is cunning, elusive, ?
and all-powerful in the sprawling sector of government
which seeks to advise the President on national security
"matters. As Nixon's personal emissary to foreign dignitaries,
to academia, and?as "a high White House official",----to
the press, he is vague and unpredictable?yet he is the
single authoritative carrier of national policy, besides the
President himself.
Like the Austrian minister who became his greatest polit- ??
ical herd,. Kissinger has used his position in government as
a protective cloak to conceal his larger _ambitions .and pur-
poses.. Far from being the detached, objective arbiter of
presidential decision-making, he has become a _crucial
molder and supporter of Nixon's foreign policy. Instead of
merely holding the bureaucracy at comfortable arm's length,
he has entangled it in a web of useless projects and studies,.
cleverly shifting an important locus of advisory power from
the Cabinet departments to his own office. And as a confi-
dential advisor to the President, he never speaks for the
record, cannot be made to testify before Congress, and is
identified with presidential policy only on a semi-public .
level. His activity is even less subject to domestic con-
straints than that of Nixon himself.
Not that any of this is very surprising, however, because s
? Kissinger has emerged from that strain Of-policy thinking
which is fiercely anti-popular and anti-bureaucratic in its
s origins. Like 'the ministers who ruled post-Napoleonic Eur-,
ope from the conference table at Vienna?and the Eastern
,?Establishment figures who preceded him as policy-makers
of a later ag,e--Kissinger believes that legislative bodies,.
bureaucracies, and Jun-of-the-mill citizenries all lack the
training and temperament that are needed in the diplomatic
field. He is only slightly less moved by- the academics who "
parade down to Washington to be with the great man and
peddle their ideas. And when one sets aside popular opinion,
Congress, the ? bureaucracy, and the academic community, -
there remains the President alone. The inescapable conclu-
sion is 'that Henry Kissinger's only meaningful constitu-
?
Arc)
of Henr
t?.1Ss1116ut
"He ,was a Rococo figure, complex, finely carved, all sur-
face, like an intricately cut prism. His face was delicate but
without depth, his conversation brilliant but without ulti-
mate seriousness. Equally at home in the salon and in the
Cabinet, he was the beau-ideal of [an] aristocracy which
justified itself not by its truth but by its existence. And if
ency is a constituency of one.
? At a superficial level, the comparison with Metternich
breaks down. As ?opposed to a finely carved figure, Kis,
singer is only of average height, slightly overweight, excessively plain, and somewhat stooped. Far from beau-ideal,
he isa Jewish refugee, and he speaks with a foreign accent.
Despite the image of the gay divorce', the ruminations
abo'ut his social activity seem to be grounded more in jour-
nalism.than in fact.
? But without being a butterfly, Kissinger is a deeper indi-
vidual than the man he wrote about, and he possesses qual-
ities Which have attracted him a great deal more' popuhrit
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Behind the scenes President Nixon's ? -
confidence in Central Intelligence By HENRY J. TAYLOR
Agency Director Ric:hard M. Helms -* -
has taken a new leap forwarc.I..Mr. Nixon Ports directly to Under Secretary 01
believes (correctly) that our nation's State John N. Irwin II, it is understand-
intelligence setup is a sick elephant. ably jealous of its prerogatives, and
.He has quietly assigned Mr; Helms traditionally it plays its findings very
to correct it. close to its vest. ?
A sick elephant is a formidable danger. Additional intelligence agencies?all
Aricl secrecy keeps our public from growing, all sprawling, all costly?
knowing even the size of this elephant, spread out into the world from the of-
to say nothing of how sick it is. fice of the secreta.ryi?of defense, the
Atomic Enemy Commission, National
Aeronautics and Spabe Ad-ministration
(NASA) and even the Department of
Commerce.
rz.D
'L)
Incre(libly, we spend 'close to $6? ?
: billion I? year for intelligence. Just
the CIA ahr;:]C is larger in scone than
the State Depn:Ime.nt and STY'd.s
pirtre t:Ii;:,: twice as much money. In fact, there are so many additional f
, hush-hush agencies that recently in Wcst [
Legennary Gen. William J. ("Wild and East Berlin alone there were at least
Bill") Donovan's Office of Strategic 40 knoi.vn U.S: intelligence agencies
Services conducted our entire World
and their branches?most of them corn-
War II espionage throughout four year - peting with one another.
and throughout the world for -a total . .
m r. Helms hirnseir dennes inteill-
STATI NTL
self-piotective vagueness and dangerous
rivalries. He has made it clear that he
wants its output brought- closer to the
needs of the ? Presidents so-called 40
Committee (actually six men), which
serves the National Security Council
and the President himself.
In amputating much of the sick ele-
phant, 'Mr. Helms' directive is to cut
down orrthe surprises. And the President
could not have p;cked a more knowing,
no-nonsense man to do it.. .
of $135 million. The budget of the CIA
(secret) is at least S1.5 billion a year.
Next to the Pentanon with its 25 miles
of corridors, the world's largest office
building, the CIA's headquarters in
? suburban Langley, Va., is the largest
.:building in the Washington area. The
CIA has jurisdiction only abroad, .not
in the United Slates. But the CIA main-
tains secret oflices in most major U.S.
cities, totally unknown to the
About 10,000 people work at Langley
and another 5,000 are scattered across
the world, burrowing .cverywhere for
intelligence. These include; many, many
unsung heroes who secretly risk their
lives for our country in the dark and
unknown battles of espionage and treach-
ery. could name many. And as a part
of its veil of secrecy the CIA has its own
clap.clestlnc, communications system
viu Washington and the world, _
The Pentagon spends $3 billion a year.
on intelligence, _twice as much as the
CIA. Like the CIA, its Army, Navy
and Air Force intelligence arms operate
world:vide, of course, and?largely
.unknown?they also have an immense
adjunct called .the National Security
Agency which rivals the _ CIA in size
and cost.
?
?
gence as - b!all the things which should
be knownin advance of initiating a course
of action." The acquisition of intelli-
gence is one thing; the .interpretatiori
of it is another; and the use of it is. a
third. The 1947 statute creating the
CIA limits it to the first two. It ?also
makes the CIA directly responsible
to the President. But it is simply not true
that the CIA-is the over-all responsible
agency, as is so widely believed.
Again and again, no one and everyone
is responsible.
T.lee function of intelligence is to
protect us from surprises. It's not
working tIlf:t way. The sick elephant
is threatenhig our national security
by surprise, surprise,
? Alarmed President Nixon has given
Mr. Helms new. and sweeping in_telli-.
zence reorganization authority on an
over-all basis. He has given him the
first authority ever given anyone to re-
view, and thus affect, all our foreign
intelligenCe agencies' budgets. The Pres-
ident believes Mr. HeInns, this .under-
covet ? world's most experienced pro,
can cut at least Si billion out -of the
? ?
morass. ? ?
Then there exists the? iMportant In-
:elligence Section or the State Depart- The President confided that he is to-
vent, woridwide its aller , tally fed up with the intelligence corn-
pproVOCI-For 1e R001
CIA Diroctor Richard Holms hr acts up
the 15,C00-rnan intelligenco operation-
that is no h e vroanillned.
TITE ECOlaralIST
20-26 Koar 1911
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? Spks get together
There is one secret that 'the intelligence
fraternity in Washington has not been -
able to keep under cover : its own lines ,
;of communication have become badly e,
scrambled. In an attempt to get rid of
the worst, discrepancies and overlaps
President Nixon has announced a
reorganisation of the, multiple branches
of the secret service under the direction
of 'Mr Richard Hehris, the present and
. very -able head of the Central Intelli-
jgence Agency. Mr Helms will now ?
head the new United States Intelligence r
'Board and will co-ordinate the activi-
'ties and the budgets of the various nichord Helms: master-spy
,intelligence networks?the first time
information, on the war .in Vietnam.
that anyone has had power- to. do this.
And now there is a struggle: bri
ewng
?
The board will be directly responsible over the extent of the reported "
to ? the National 'Security Council. At build-up of missiles by the Soviet Union
the same time two new panels will
be set up within the NSC. One, under
the direction of Mr Henry Kissinger,
the chief of the council, will analyse
all. the intelligence, reports. (In the rush
- to collect raw facts their interpretation
has Often been neglected.) The other
will compare ?the strength of the Soviet
forces as a Whole with those .of the
United States. - . ?
The tangles Within the intelligence
World go back beyond- the crisis over
missiles in Cuba. On numerous Occa-
sions the many military spies?the three
'services have their own intelligence net-
works, and then the Department of
Defence has, still another?have Come
. up with assessments that differ from
ithose -of the civilian agencies such as
\I the CIA and the intelligence division
? of the State Department. Although the
CIA has a 'hawkish image in foreign
. eyes, it is generally the military men
who have _over-estimated the resources
available to the other side, partly in
an effort to boost support in Congress
for their own defence budget. Further-
Andre, relations have been strained
recently between. the CIA, which
gathers information from abroad, and
.the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
which manages surveillance at home.-
This year the. confusion has been
more noticeable. than most. The abbr-
tive commando raid a year ago to free
prisoners of war from the deserted
camp at. Son Tay in North Vietnam
caused acute embarrassment. Then the
Pentagon papers revealed that there
had earlier been some serious discrepan-
cies .betwecn -military and civilian
at a time when the negotiations on
the limitation of strategic arms are
reaching a crucial stage. ?
Congress, which has always been
suspicious of the secrecy surrounding
the intelligence world, has .also been
prodding the President. The conserva-
tives in the Senate, led, rather surpris-
ingly, by Senator Ellender, Who used
to be the spies' best friend, want_ to
cut the,. money that goes on military
intelligence ; in the Age of expensive
satellite spies about $5 billion a year
is spent on this out of an annual intel-
ligence budget of around $6 billion.
The liberals, on the other hand, claim
that Congress has too little control over
the intelligence networks ;. in particular
they feel that the CIA has too great an
influence on foreign po.licy. What, they
ask, is the CIA doing in Laos' ? It will
be no consolation to these critics that
Mr Kissinger will now have greater
authority over spying. As a presidential ?
aide he is not responsible to Congress.
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Reshuffling, With More Positions Going.
to Military Men, Worries Key Ltf:vrnakers
--WASIIINGTON (UPI)----
Key senators are.ed n- .-
cerned that CIA .Director ?
Richard Helms might
have been . "kicked up-
stairs" in the reshuffle of :
AMeric, a' s intelligence ?.
community, with more in-
fluence in spy activities
going to military men.
: Helms has assured . in- .
quiring senators that he
had no reason to believe
he had,been shuffled aside
In the nation's intelligence
hierarchy. .
' But there is concern on
Capitol . Hill that Helms
has lost out in the shakeup
of the intelligence net-
work ordered by President
Nixon 'last month:
Sens. Stuart Syrnz.rigton
i:-
.(D-Mo.) and J. William
Fulbright (D - Ark.) are
'concerned that the
shaketip h a s increased
P e nta.gon predominance .
in the intelligence ? field,
-and Sen. John .Stennis (D.:.
,Miss.) is conducting an in-
vestigation to find out
. what happened.
'? What has disturbed
Helms' friends in the Sen-
'ate is that the day-to-day,
control of the CIA ap-
parently has been relin-
quished to a military man,
-Lt. 'Gen. Robert E. Cush-
man Jr., in order to free
Helms for his new duties
as overall director of the
CIA and all other intel-
ligence units. Cushman, a
marine, is deputy director
of the CIA. .- .? .
:. :Also, the Joint .Chiefs of
. Staff and the deputy sec-
retary of defense . have
been given a new voice in
the intelligence command
through membership on .a
? 'committee, which, under
- the direction of presiden-
- tial adviser Henry A. Kis-
singer, will oversee .intel-
ligence.
Helms, in a closed-door
meeting with the Senate
Armed Services Commit-
tee this week, said he did
not think he- was being
shoved out of the way.
Stennis, the committee.
chairman, said Helms "as-
sured me that his domin-
ance over it (the CIA), his
effectiveness, his powers
over it will not be dimin-
ished one bit." , . , ?
But Stennis indicated he
still was ,not satisfied and
we aregOing into it and.
we are going toanalyze it
and study it and have an
investigation ? if one
wants to use that word?if
necessary. We do not take
these things lightly. The
stakes are too high." .
No one in the .Senate
really knows what his
happened at the CIA. Not
.even senafors like Stennis,
w1-1.6 are let in on the
na-
tion's intelligence secrets,
were told in advance,-
nc?
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NATIONAL FaiNIET,./ BULLETIN
NOV. 1971
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ccpri,e01
DCOligliti (-4
?
Dateline
Washington
o "Was Richard. Helms promoted or fired?" was the
'question roost being asked around Washington last week.
The CIA Director's new . post as -coordinator of all U.S.
.intelligence activities was interpreted by some observers ?
as a kick upstairs and by others as a promotion of Helms
to "intelligence czar." In fact, the change represents a
. move to bring. U.S. intelligence activitres more directly
under White House control.
Helms will work under the close supervision of Henry
-.. Kissinger, who is now running the newly created Na-
-Vona! Security Council Intelligence Committee. Like the
White House Office of Telecommunications Policy, the
newIntelligence Committee is designed to eliminate pro-
cedural difficulties and to consolidate information?thus
avoiding interagency conflicts.. Under Kissinger, Helms
will work as a high-level administrator, not so much for-
mulating policy as providing information upon which po-
licy will be based. Implicitly, the new post will put Helms
over FBI head J. -Edgar Hoover, though relations with
Hoover will continue to be handled through Hoover's
titular superior Attorney General John Mitchell. Mitchell
is a member of the Committee because Justice probably
handles more -interagency intelligence questions- than
any other department in the government, including ?De-
.ferise. ? ?
Besides consolidating intelligence .activities under the
White House, the President also is trying to avoid the
.horrendous duplication that.hes ensued from the proli-
feration of intelligence operations. Some of the overlap
.presumably will be trimmed away by Helms, though some
observers believe this' is, for the most part, wishful think-
ing on the President's part. They note that the individual
service- branches, the Treasury Department, the FBI, the
Bureau of NarcOtics, the CIA and even the White House
police force are so jealous of their prerogatives that re-
form would take major surgery?more. than either the
President or Helms is willing to undertake at this time.
?WINSTON
STATI NTL
;.'
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MONROE, LA.
? NEVIS-STAR
V,i3V 24 1371
-- 15,121 ".
, e
PA:01:1
: .
The White Hope is not pleased
at all with "the record posted by
?.the American intelligence commun-
ity. The .displeasure doesn't appar-
ently extend to the .Central Intelli-
'Once -Ageney-4CIA)--beClin-Se'w-ffsw
director, Richard Helms, has been
.placed in charge. of all intelligence
agencieS. Further, the President
added to Henry Kissinger's author-
ity. by giving him the power to
-evaluate intelligence reports.
The public is advised of this turn
of events through the efforts of a
government worker who leaked a
-secret "decision memorandum" to
Newsweek mag,a'zine.
. In. the memorandum, Nixon sin-
gled out five instances in which
American agents were not up to
;- snuff. ..He complained not only of
faultrintelligence, but also run-
away. budgets and a disparity be- ,
tweet' a glut of. facts and a pover-
ty of analysis.
. ?
. -Specifically, he found five areas
of defective snooping, to wit
-- Failure to predict the extent
of North Vietnamese resistance in
the. Laotian campaign early this
year.
--;Misinforination leading to the
, Son Tay .prisoner of war camp
which turned out to be empty.
: Incorrect esthnates of yipt
Cong S.upplies flowing through the
. Cambodian port of Sihanoukville.
? Lateness in detecting Russian
:built surface to air missiles in the
Mideast cease-fire zorie
-- An eighth month delay in the
strategic arms limitation . talks
while the White House checked
111 (1.7A
varying intelligence reports on how
the United States could ? de-
tect possible -Soviet violations of
the arms control agreement.
The magazine article suggested
that some of the gripes might con-
ceal Mistakes more properly laid'
at the Administration's door. How-
ever, it went on to credit Nixon
with efforts to remove all possible
bugs from the intelligence system
as it faces what is 'likely its most
!critical test of recent years: solv-
ing the mystery of the apparent
Soviet -missile build-up..
? ?
The Pentagon Papers showed
rather conchisively that 'Ll,&
mili-
tary - intelligence in yietwara did
not compare very well with its
civilian counterpart. Time:and time
-again. the CIA and the State De-
partment intelligence. arm proved
to be correct in their appraisals of
the enemy situation and optimistic
:forecasts by military agents and
their superiors wrong..
There's 11.6' telling how .man'
tragedies or near - tragedies could
have been avoided had. those
charged with. keeping 'track of the
,North Vietnamese and Vietcong
had had more up-to-date.inforina-
tion. My 'Lai was supposed to be
a hotbed of Vietcong. It had been, of
course, but when Charlie CoMpany
struck, there was no resistance.
The VC had fled.
Within the last 24 hours, those
in charge of Firebase Mary Mn
where 33 GIs lost their lives in a
VC sapper raid have been told
they will be demoted oryeprimand-
ed for a lax defense periineter arid.
lack of troop preparedness. Those
.7.to be punished include a. two-star
general and four other high-yanking
officers.
American intelligence cannot, of 1
course, maintain an umblemishod 1,
record. The Communist enemy,
wherever he is, spends a great deal! i
of time trying to outwit free world!
agents.. He has notched some not
:-
able siiccesses. Credit President
Nixon with trying to :streamline the
U.S. intelligence system . so t h`a t
doomsday won't arrive due to Sec-
ret agents asleep at the switch?...
--..._ _ 1 ..:
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- 1JS & 7/ORD BP0.11\11
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? An urgent need for faster and more accurate in-
formation underlies latest moves by the President.
Upshot: more say for civilians, less for military.
Once again, the vast U. S. intelligence
:establishment is being reshaped by the
White House. As a result:
. 0 Presidential reins on the 5-billion-
.dollar-a-year "intelligence community"
are to be tightened even more. Primary
goal is to avoid repetition of recent dis-
appointments in the quality of Ameri-
can intelligence.
? 0 Fresh effort will be made to reduce
costly duplication, overlapping and com-
petition among the military intelligence
? agencies. The Pentagon appears to be a
sj loser in the latest reshuffle.
The civilian head of the Central
Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms, is
? ? being given broader authority over the
entire U. S. intelligence network?civilian
and military.
. Key Man in the reorganization is 'Mr.
Helms, a veteran of nearly 30 years in
his field, who took over in June, 1900,
the dual job of heading the CIA plus
his role ? as the President's principal ad-
viser on .all intelligence.
Now, under a presidential order of
November 5, Mr. Helms has the biggest
say on how to allocate men, money and
machines in the gathering of foreign in-
telligence for the U. S.
At the same time, the President as-
signed Henry Kissinger, the top White
House -adviser and Director of the Na-
tional Security Council staff, new powers
"which give Mr. Kissinger a larger voice
in determining the direction U. S. Intel-
ligence will take and in assessing the
final results.
'Behind it all. According to Coyern7
ment insiders, a major reason for the
President's action was growing "consum-
er" dissatisfaction with the intelligence
product, particularly with interpretation
of the secret data collected.
. ? Too often, these sources say, the Pres-
ident has been inundated with informa-
tion he does not need, or fails to receive
in sufficient quality or quantity the data
he considers vital for decisiehs.
The most recent example, one White
House aide disclosed, was unhappiness
over the length of time it took to get
reliable intelligence on current develop-
? ,rnents in Red China. The Communist
- Government had been undergOing a lead-
ership crisis just at the time Of delicate
Washington-Peking negotiations on the
,President's forthcoming trip to the Chi-
nese mainland, but weeks went by :be-
fore the U. S. was able to sift through a .
welter of conflicting reports. -
Officials say that - another big reason
behind revamping of the intelligence
command was the daring?but unsuc-
cessful?attempt by. the Army and Air
Force on Nov. 21, 1970, to rescue U. S.
prisoners of war from the North Viet-
namese prison camp at Sontay, 23 miles
west of Hanoi. American commandos
landed at the camp by helicopter in a
well-planned and executed raid. But in-
telligence had lagged, and the camp
was empty. The prisoners had been
moved. . _ .
One official in a position to know ex-
plains that after the White House made
the initial decision to rescue the POW's,
the CIA supplied a model of the camp
and details Of Sontay's daily .operations
as they were known at that time. The
actual rescue assignment was given., to
the Army and Air Force, which had to
select, train and rehearse the, Commando
team. By the time the operation was
launched, intelligence was out of date.
According to this official: "If Helms
had been responsible for the operation?
as- he would be now under the reorga-
.nization?he could have kept current,
probably would have. learned that the
prisoners were moved, and probably
would have scrubbed the operation."
- Government sources say .the President
also was irritated by failure- of his intel-
ligence agencies .to forecast accurately
North Vietnamesn reaction to the South
Vietnamese invasion of Southern Laos
list February and March.
Congress has had harsh words for the
military. The House Appropriations
Committee on November .11 declared
that "the upward trend in total intelli-
gence expenditures must be arrested" and
recommended a 181-million-dollar cut
in the Defense Department's military-
intelligence appropriations. -
The Committee took aim at duplica-
tion of effort. "The same information is
sought and obtained: by various means
and by various organizations," it said.
The President hopes to overcome these
shortcomings by giving Mr. Helms what
Mr. Nixon termed "an enhanced leader
ship role" in planning, co-ordinating and
evaluating all intelligence"operations.
_ The Central Intelligence Director has
had for years, on paper, the responsibil-?
ity of co-ordinating military and civilian
intelligence. But _this has not always
worked in practice.' The reason, accord-
ing, to One U.S. official: bureaucratic ri-
valry among . competing intelligence
agencies.
Mr. Helms also becomes". chairman of
a newly formed committee which will
advise on formulation of a consolidated
foreign-intelligence budget for the en-
tire Government. This committee will
decide which intelligence service has the
people and assets to do a particular job
efficiently and. cheaply.
Reshapinv the network. The Presi-
dent took these actions to strengthen the
American intelligence system:
* Reorganized the U. S. Intelligence
Board, which sets intelligence require-
ments and priorities. The Board, head-
ed by Mr. Helms, includes representa-
tives of the CIA, FBI, Treasury,
Atomic Energy Commission and Defense
and State Department intelligence
agencies.
O Established a National Security
Council Intelligence Committee, with
Mr. Kissinger as chairman. It will in-
clude, besides Mr. Helms, the Attorney
General, the Chairman of the Joint
? Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of
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o
]f GEN. IRA C. EAKER, USAF (Het.) inant in the intelligence community'. are
Richard Helms and Henry Kissinger: The
former wears three hats in the new setup
and the latter two hats plus the all-
important responsibility of personally
determining what the President secs.
No defense leader, civilian or military,
active or retired, so far as I lpicnv, ques-
tions the ability or loyalty of either Helms
or Kissinger, but soand organization should
not be based on persgnalities since they are
always transient and sometimes fallible.
Strangely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who
by law are designated. as the. nrincipal
military advisers to the President, are ohm-
including a director of n
n-
.A release from the White House Nov.
5 announced a drastic reorganization- of ,the
whole U.S. intelligence community.
. The reasons given
for the big shake-up
, were ."to improve the
efficiency and effective-
ness of the U.S. foreign
intelligence c o in m u -
nity."
Ii e reorganization
provides four new
boards or Committees
central intelligence. The Mated, for all practical purposes, from
Cent r al Intelligence /intelligence evaluation. ?
? Agehey?ndirector, Rink./ The whole purpose of foreign in-
Gcn. Eckel ard Helms, takes on this' telligence is -to observe adequately and
job in addition to his assess -accurately the military strength of
duties as CIA director.
other nations and thus evaluate the hazards
- There is a National Security Council
?intelligehbe committee with henry Kis-
singer, the President's principal national
. ? ?
. security adviser, as chairman. There is a
net assessment group within the. National
:Security Council (Kissinger shop) and an
intelligence resources advisory board which
'Mins also heads. ?
The U.S: intelligence board is "re-
constituted," according to the White House
release, and Helms' deputy at CIA is
chairman. ? n
. It is generally believed that the White
.House was unhappy with the sometimes
-:conflicting estimates of enemy Military
strength supplied by the U.S. intelligence ?
community. There were also charges that
:the military deliberately overestimated
enemy strength to get increased defense
'appropriations, and that intelligence was
costing too much, about $5 to $6 billion an-
nually. The intelligence apparatus needed
:therefore to be streamlined, reduced in size
and cost and military influence curtailed,
.
according to this view. ?
: There is no doubt but that the
reorganization does greatly reduce military
influence in the intelligence apparatus. .Of'
the 20-odd members of the four new layers,
boards or committees at the highest levels
to our own security. The U.S.' Defense
Department, including the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the intelligence a.gerneles of the
armed services are best qualified by
education and experience for sound advice
in these areas.
, The -intelligence apbratus has not been
streamlined and reduced in size and cost.
Instead, all the. new layers., boards and.
committees now will have to be manned. A
minimum ,of 500 top-level intelligence peo-
ple eventually will be forind in or serving
these new echelons, considerably increasing
the overall cost of intelligence. These ,new
agencies. .if used. also will create delays
and make intelligence less, responsive to the
decision makers.
Rather than streamlining the ap--
paratus,' the new organization. further frag-
ments the intelligence community by add-
ing the four additional advisory or ad-
ministrative echelorls.,
The new system also increases the
possibility that intelligence estimates and
foreign "assessments can be doctored to
support decisions prOilously made rather
than the other way around.
It would be safer and sounder for
presidents to get, as they did in earlier
times, the daily intelligence summaries
from the ? defense department, the. state
department and the CIA uncensored by any
intermediary. The President's principal
national security adviser might well digest
these estimates and assessments but he
never should delay their presentation
Oiler their ine'aninq. ? '
on the .tete
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are military me .
'The two men who now are clearly dam-
n_
1-b????,'
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NOV 2 0 1971
Reorganizing U.S.
President Nixon has reorganized
the Federal Government's intelligence
operations which, in essence, gives
Cier,frpl?Intel,li5enee,,,.,P.T.n,e7,? Director
Richard Helms a broader mandate to
coordinate all of the various activities
in this field. In the meantime Mr.
Nixon also created a National Security
Council Intelligence Committee to be
chaired by his national security af-
fairs adviser, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.
These steps have drawn immediate
objections from Senators J. William
Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign
Affairs Committee, and Stuart Sy-
mington on the grounds that Congress
was not consulted in advance about
them, and that what Mr. Nixon evi-
dently is trying to accomplish is a
removal of Congressional overseeing
of any intellligence activities by vest-
ing the area almost wholly with.
Executive immunity. But the fact of
the matter is that the President has
dealt solely with the Executive Branch
in taking this action, as he is unques-
tionably authorized to do. What irks
the Senators is that they cannot, un-
der the new setup, bring Doctor
Kissinger before their committee to
be interrogated in this area of Gov-
ernment.
What may have prompted Mr. Nix-
on's action was recent history. That
details how President Kennedy got
\ some bad intelligence from the mili-
tary on the gay of Pigs, and Lyndon
Johnson some even worse intelligence
from his White House people and
some of the military on Vietnam.
The story is that the. CIA was not
responsible for these -bum steers.
Consequently, President -Nixon now
wants the bulk of his intelligence to
come through the hands of a polished
professional, CIA Director Helms ?
Intelligence
a trusted adviser, Doctor Kissinger.
Certainly that is his privilege, how-
ever the Senators may fret.
As Director Helms told the ,edi-
tors: "We (the (IA) not only have
no stake in policy debate, but we can
not and must not take .sides. The
role of intelligence in policy formu-
lation is limited to providing facts ?
the agreed facts ? and the whole
known range of facts ? relevant to
the problem under consideration. Our
iole extends to the estimative func-
tion ? the projection of likely de-
velopments from the facts ? but not
to advocacy, or recommendations for
one course of action or another.
"As the President's principal in-
telligence officer, I am an adviser to
the National Security Council, not a
member, and when there is debate
over alternative policy options, I do
not and must not line up, with either
side.
"If I should take sides and recom-
mend one solution, the other side. is
going to suspect ? it not believe ?
that the intelligence presentation has
been stacked to support my position,
and the credibility of the CIA goes
out the window."
To the journalistic profession,
whose watchword is objectivity, which
equates with a presentation of bal-
anced facts as free from personal emo-
tionalism, bias or bent as it is human-
ly possible to record ,.flies:ez:n_rri, of
Richard Helms are heartenin if.
is in a strong sense, one of us. In-
deed, as he himself put it, "objectiv-
ity puts me on familiar ground as an
old wire service hand, but it is even
more important to an intelligence or-
ganization serving the policymaker."
It is reassuring to realize that a
man of this singular dedication and
rational approach has been empow-
20170SlaM-6
preacentec appearance beiore the the nation's
foremost intethgence oi-
American Society of Newspaper Edi- ficer. Ile has our best wishes in an
THE 11E1 REPT.IBLIC
20 NOV. 1911 STATINT
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sued, this eoncept obviously will change the mission
b 1_,?-py
and emphasis of the various intelligence agencies:
. - ?
Some will wax, other wane. But they'll_ still compete.
'
As recently as .April 14 Richard Helms, director of
Rep: Nedzi, head .of the subcommittee on intelligence ,../
the. Central Intellionce .Agency, assured the world
'
that "the quality of. foreign . intelligence available to oversight for the House Armed Services Committee,
n '
the United. States Government in 1971 is better than it has been lookig up and down the well-shaded streets
'
has ever been before." That's all right, the adminis-
of the Intelligence Community. and finds that, "There
(ration has now said., but it costs too much and the
is indeed real competition among the various agencies."
'
He is not certain Helms' budget authority will do any-
u1overlapping and competition arriong agencies is waste-
f
thing more than. feed interagency suspicions. There and inefficient.. The revelations. of former CIA
/official Victor Marchetti (at one time an aide to the will be the argument that intelligence requires coma
partmentalization at the cost of efficiency, that budget
deputy director of CIA) that the combined intelligence
budget is $6 billion puts it a billion or so higher control will mean a monolithic intelligence voice in-
'than previous . . estimates. Over 200,000 employees are 'stead of healthy if, costly rivalry. Nedzi is concerned
.
involved. Hence the President's new reorganization
but philosophical, gearing up for his duties by going
'order. Mr. Helms is to have "enhanced leadership" to back to the basics .set forth in Compton McKenzie's
'bring all the fiefdoms under control.
spoof on British intelligence, 'Water on the Brain.
. - .
The White House announcement produced wo
In that classic the fictitious Sir William Westmacott,
t
head of the Security of the.Realm, is addressing a neW
telligence budget and (b) a new evaluation group,
principal reorganizational ools: (a) a new joint in-
recruit. "After all, the whole point of the secret serv-
f
, which theoretically will affect the missions in D ice is that it should be secret."efense;
? State, the" National Security 'Agency, and the CIA, 1
to narne the mOst prominent. All intelligence agencies
will. submit their budgets to Helms. instead of to the .
?'Bureau of the Budget, and he is to sort out the wheat
? from the chaff. This. is .not really a new grant of
authority. The National Security Act or 1947 gave
two jobs to the CIA director ? command, of the agency'.
itself, and coordinating responsibility as director of
central Intelligence, chairing the United States In- )
. .telligence Board. He also sits on the National Security
Council. The idea of central supervision, has. been
there from-the start. But the idea has foundered on
the realities, of power; that is to say, the Pentagon.
That outfit is run by the Secretary of a department,.
-while the CIA director is still just the head of .an 'STATINTL
agency. For large overseas operations, as in Vietnam
and Laos, CIA is completely belicilclen to the Pentagon.
. ' Bureaucratically, Helms is also in an Unfavorable
position, although this .may not have been the Presi-
dent's intention. Helms will make his combined budget
recommendations not directly to the National Security
. Council, but to a new National Security Intelligence
Conimittee, headed by Henry Kfssinger. The -reorgani-
zation scheme struck Senators Symington, and Ful-
. i
bright as. an. attempt to wrest from Congress its over-
sight responsibilities in intelligence matters.. Kissinger
is . inaccssible in the White House, protected from
congressional questioning by executive privilege. ,
Kissinger gains more Power through the other presi-
dential innovation, the Net Assessment Group headed
by 'Anthony Marshall in .Kissinger's office. This
-' gronp's. task is to define the situatiou . for the United
States vis-?is the great powers,, or any other Proba
lem it? wants to designate as a crisis. Vigorously pUr-
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BALTIMOI E1S AIERICAIT STATINTL
1 7 NOV 1971
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? ? ." ?
??
? . ?..
?Behind the scenes President Nixon's confidence
In Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard
? M. Helms has ,taken a new leap forward. Mr. Nix-
On believes (correctly) that our nation's in-
telligence setup is a sick elephant. He has quietly
- assigned Mr. Helms to correct it:
..? . .
A sick ,clephnat is a formidable danger. And
secrecy keeps our public from knowing even the
size of this elephant, to say nothing of how sick
itis. .
Inceedibly, we spend close to $6 billion a year.
for intelligence. Just the CIA alone is larger in
scope than the State Department and spends more
than twice as much money. Legendary Gen.
William J. ("Wild. Bill") Donovan's Office of
Strategic Fprvices conducted our entire World
War H espionage throughout four years anil
throughout the world for a total $135 million. The
budget of the CIA (secret) is at least $1.5 billion
? .
NEXT TO THE PENTAGON with its 25 miles
of corridors, the world's largest office building,
? the CIA's headquarters in suburban Langley, Va.,
' is the largest building in the Washington area. The
CIA has jurisdiction only abroad, not in the United
States. l3ut the CIA maintains secret offices in
/
most major U.S. cities, totally unknown to the
public.. - -
. . . . . . . . ..
, ? . .
About 10,000 people ?work at Langley and
another 5,000 are scattered across the world, bur-
rowing everywhere for intelligence. These include
many, many unsung heroes who secretly risk their
lives for our country in the dark and unknown
battles of espionage and treachery. I could name
many. And as a part of its veil of secrecy the CIA
has its .own clandestine communications system
with Washington and the world.
- ? - -
The Pentagon spends $3 billion a year on in-
telligence, twice as much as the CIA. Like the
CIA, its Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence
arms operate worldwide, of COUrS,2, and --
largely unknown ? they also have an immense
adjunct called the National Security Agency which
. rivals the. CIA in size. and cost. . . ,. .
' Then there .exists the Important Intelligence
-
Section of the State Department, likewise world-
wide. Its chief reports directly to Under Secretary
?
?
?;
? ?
. ?
". ?
of State John N. Irwin 2nd; it is unclerstandabl
very close to its vest.
--STATINTL
? - -
ADDITIONAL. intelligence agencies al
growing, all sprawling, all costly spread out Id
to the world from the Office Of the Secretary o
Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, Nationa
Aeronautics & Space .Adminis tratien (NAM) , an.
even the Department of Commerce.
In fact, there are so many additional hush-husl
agencies that recently in West and East Bulb
alone there 'were at least 40 known U.S. in
telligence. agencies and their branches ? most o
them" competing with one another. -
Mr. Helms himself defines intelligence as "al
the things which should be known in advance o
initiating a course of action." The acquisition o
intelligence is one thing; the interpretation of it i
another; and the use of it is a third. The 191
statute creating the CIA limits it to the first two. I
also makes the CIA directly responsible to th
President. But it is simply not true that the Cf
is the over-all responsible agency, as is so widel
. believed. ?
Again and again, no one and everyone
responsible, ' ?' ? ?
. .
THE FUNCTION of intelligence is to protect us
from surprises. It's not working that way. The sick
elephant is threatening our national security by'
surprise, surprise, surprise.
Alarmed President Nixon has given Mr. Helms
new and sweeping intelligence reorganization
authority on an oyer?all'basis. He has given him
the first authority ever given anyone to rewl.
and thus effect, all our foreign intelligence.
agencies' budgets. The President believes Mr.
Helms, this undercover world's most experienced
pro, can cut at least $1. billion out of the morass.
The President confided that he is totally fed uP':
With the intelligence community's duplications;
contradictions, self-protective vagueness and
dangerous rivalries. He has made it clear that he -
-wants its output breu?glit closer to the needs of the..
President's so-called 40 Committee (actually six
Men), which serves the National Security Council.
and the President himself. . ?
In amputating much of the sick elephant, Mr;
Helms' directive is to cut down on the surprises.
And the President could not have picked a more
knowing, no-nonsense man to do it..
?
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Approved For Release 200114?/NY: i9a-RDP80-01601
YRESSU RE-COOKER ATMOSPHERE
'
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. . .
BY ANN BLACKMAN -
:
Alsociale3 Press Writer
- . - First Interviews
? ;WASHINGTON?Status ? -
For most of those inter-
on Henry A. Kissinger's viewed, the sessions were
staff isn't, winging:. out to.. the first time they had au-
an Clemente on a thilita-.. thority to talk to a repor-
. .
-ry jet, or top-secret- securi- ter since joining the Na-
ty clearance, or even ac-
tional Security Council
, cess to the White House staff. All were instructed
? tennis court.? ? . , by Kissinger's d e p u t y,
- ' - ? ' Brig. Gen. Alexander M.
Status for the 48 mem- Hai,* to keep the conver-
hers of the National Secur- '''
sations "non-substantive,"-
ity Council staff is access?mesninz policy and na-
to .Kissinger. ? "The only 1 ti-o'i, a-
I security matters
thing that counts around were not to be discussed.
here is your slot with Hen- "iey weren't. Nor were
ry," said one of them. . the staff members free
, . Interviews ? with 18 Se- NVith. anecdotes about the
. :.curity Council aides offer boss, mindful perhaps of
; a glimpSe into the pres- the time Kissinger roper-
; sure - cooker atmosphere tally opened a staff meet-
that surrounds those ing by asking, "And who
closest to Kissinger, who. here is repreenting the
_,...? heads the council as Pres- New York Times?"
( ident Nixon's special assis- Under the ground rules,
\-..? taut for national security as laid down byHaig, the
. , affairs. ..
. . . conversation t e n d e d to
Personal Abilitiescenter on the demands
..- "Youdo things for lien-- Kissinger makeson his
IT you didn't think '
staff, and the, satisfaction
-- - ; you
, Were . capable .of," said. ..the staff gets. from work-
Winston Lord, 34, of New. ing_. fo2.' him. . ... ....
?..na
. York City. "He may know motivation comes
:better than the persons - from working at the cm-
' themselves what they're' 'Lel' of foreign policy," said
. . ., Lord, who came to the Na-
capable of.". ? ? ? . ?
. In oeaanizina- his staff,' Coital Security Council af-
- -o e. ter service in both the De-.
' Kissinger dipped into the'
fenso and State depart-
- .federal bureaucracy, re-
cruiting members .f r o m . ' ments?
i
,partments and the Central special diploinatic m i s-
As a troubleshooter for
. :the State and Defense de-
!Intelligence Agency. But siOns, with emphasis on
he .also went outside the the Far East, Lord sees
. government and hired a the boss more than. most.
half dozen bright young -
He was one of two staffers
people, some of them un-
der 30 and some of them to accompany Kissinger
Democrats, to go t t h e. on the first i 'mission. to
? benefit, of their expertise C o m in u n I s t China. .1'1
in the specific areas. . think of Henry as a .Vince
Among them are - 26- . Lombardi in the ? pursuitof
year-old Mary Brownell of eXcellence," Lord.Said. :
STATI NTL
Sachs, a Berkeley grad- staffers have to be -objec-
uate with master's degrees tive transmitters of any
in economics and urban position on any issu e.'
regional planning .f r o an They sit at the apex of p01-
the University.of Pennsy-1- icy machinery in the
vania, is responsible for government. The only
analyzing military a n d problems, they deal with
economic assistance . pro- are the mast complex. The
grams. He j?o ined the . easier ones are solved
council staff from the Of- down along the line."
. ..
flee of Management and
A senior staff member
the Budget.
Like most of his col- explained th e council's
function this way:
leagues, Sachs works in? .
the Exe t iv e Office "The objective is not to
reach a consensus for its
Building next to the own sake or to develop a
White House. With few.ex- course of action in which'
ceptions, the- council of- the President has only to,
fices are small, utilitarian choose, yes or no, approve
or disapprove; but rather
and:furnished in. "early
. ? . . . it is to give him a clear de-
bureaucrat"
. p s tion of the options he :
:broWn sofas, ? 'cheap lin- really has so he c a n
?
?presisiOnist prints and thin choose, knowing what the
costs and consequences of
rugs the color' of cement
. But if the . staffers' be'." of these options will
fides are not impressive, ue. , Latin Affairs."
their- responsibilities are.
-One of their duties is to Several younger aides
write what they tall "talk- came to the council staff
Straight from academia,
lug points" . for presiden-
with advanced ? degrees
tial neWs c ferenc S,
questions they think re- and 'prestigious f e 11 o w-
porters will ask, aild pre- ships fattening their re-
pare the answers. .sumes.4
"It's great to watch one -The youngest, MiS
'Brownell, is a University ?
of these things and hear
your question me up,"
of North Carolina graduate
co
one staff or ',you with a master's degree in
know exactly what the Latin: - American studies
.
President is going to say from the University of
Texas.- She joined _Kissin-
swer yourself. And. the ibecause you wrote the an-
gees team two years ago, -
m-
arid her work is primarily
? pressive thing is that he
expands on your answer connected with tin
with his own ideas and in-
American affairs.
?
sights:" -Her counterpart in the
Also, the staff is expect-
Mideastern - affairs section
is Miss Neaher, .a Smith
ed consult with .various
government departments College' graduate who has
b
drawing
studied 'Arablc. and taught efore up memos
Asheville, N.C., whose spe- ? ? ? Dennis H. Sachs, 28, of, ? ? ? - -
reports, recommendat-ions school in Kuwait.. She was
? cialty is Latin America; Portland, Ore., 'a greedand options. These go to. recruited two years ago
? 28-year- old Rosemary with Lord that the. job sa-:
Neaher of Garden City? tisfaction stems from be-
N.Y., ? an expert on the ing at the center of power.
Middle East, and 28-year- "There's a psychic income
old Robert D. Hormats of Of being associated at- this
Baltimore, an. economic high level with decision _ _a_aencm _ ro epar
.adviser. Appro.ved Forrae leased 20 01 /63/04's' eigellipcmc4g94011Agunii-6
the President who can from the Middle East In-
then make a decision with statute.
full awareness of agency ? While y o it n g e r staff .
positions and national se-
members occasionally' rep-'
curit *In Ai at* - . resent the Security Coun-
? . ? ?
- ?said Uen.. aig. .1 Liese
bOntiptloa
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STATINTL
In the opinion?of American observers, -no ()the aspect .Of U.S. foreign
-policy with the exception of the Vietnam war has :yoked such vigorous co:' ?
Mienmation and protest as the subversive actions o the ? U.S: ? intelligence
service, its covert and not infrequently overt intererenee in the internal
' affairs of other states, its complicity in all kinds -o reactionary eonspira-
,. cie?,and putsches. The generally known failures ant scandalous -exposures
? of its intelligence service have certainly impaired the prestige of the
- United States. . . ?
A I?IONST-ER TOWERING
OVER CONGRESS
Irnmediatcly after the. Ena of
World War II, seeking a gre:s
ter 'say. h policy-I-nal:in ? the
most powerful spolc:7sinen of
with the CIA).. the matters
of hire and dismissal the CIA
director is not ? bound by any
political CT legal norm.s; pro-
cedures or reccannendation.S,. ob-
. liatory. for government - -
tutiOns; : ?-?
The Central Intelligence ;kg.'
?
cncy, subordinat2d directly to re .to be carried out in such a
- was stress?ed, we, . emu Was authorized to subs.id?--
Ilse the .programmes of colleges.
The Central Intelligence Ng; operations, it
the President, became the first -way that the U.S. go \.,crnment . to institute- and heep up diffe-
PostwaT ine-Penclen't iriteffige,:1- could, if ne.cc?-??-irv, disas':ociate rent foundations,. cultural '.soe:
ce organi7at1on, It was charged itself from them, Thus, in the leties and -publishing - houses.
with collecting, intelligence data o -
?rs + , ye,a.]::. of Jts oxistc.rme., the Moreover, it coulds'pend.inater-
CIA was assi,2ned functillis in! .means ? in disl?cgarOf the .
which no other intelli.:,,ec..s,J.? laws or rules established ;. for
vice has ever had..
. . ..-!.. ' , government institutions. and .
have its aceOunts certified only
formation in. :both secret anti
, In 1949 .Congress adopted,.ari'..
'
by
le g:11 ways, , (2) to ? g.cucvilize, .
I an, addition- to the : N!Itionz.1 its
directer The lattef was
', '
the information collected bY Security. Act, a special lay, on thus In ?i position 16 .?-pend ?any
smn from 'the 31..'as.t ? allocations
monopoly enplial secured re- and ;:t the Same time engin:?2r-
langanization. of the entire go- jag subversion in other states
vernment. rn2,.chin:e:ry of the tasks: ..
Ur.ited States.* In July 1947 the (1) To obtain intcllivnce in-
National Security Act was pro
mulgated,. cnvisagin g. cardinal
?reconstruetion of the milifarY
'depot-la-lents, the .establi,?hm2nt ? ,, b,,, :,.? ,s , .1, ,... the Centr?Ol Intelligence .k,gen--
of .a sin,l,le Depart-mu:It of De ics, evaluate it. ;and 'submit to ? - -
cv-. Eu this ?act the United Sta- i
without any control or explana-
... ...
-Inept for ii first time in man--
Pa'rija. carmarli special stuns to be
Lions The CIA r,vaS anowc&to
. ,
Jence,- a .Joint chiefs of :silo', paii1ielans in a for n, s,.litabio. 1.--;,' goverrrment and
i kmd s history, Openly elevated spent by its persdnnel abroad.
connnittec and a Deportment, for utilitation, (3) to prepare, . .,
,
. It ' .coutcl conclude contracts ...'
of the Air. Force. At the sire in secret, interference in the .
time there w.as e.:^?n----tituted the, affairs of other' m:tions in i.:ase, . c-'P!enage:?nt?ad- till,.)%!?:....,n,k of 5-tate. with U611-goVernment - . ? institu- -
appycved mothetls of a.c?inilo-.ola?io).'...etihonisrrooinect:ste. conduct of i-esear? :
National Security. c3uneii, thp orders came regarding the n-cd PJ.1--`
highest,: after. the ,Pre!-Ident. for such interference, 'Illus. the
%T.:lying interference. in the in-
body called upon to Play an IM siaimal Security !Act cilablel
tern:I affairs of other a int'-ie- However,- publicly promulga-
- portant 'role- in ;,?baring U.S. the CIA to exert its influche. 1 i .1 , c t _-_s ted lax,vs do not give a fullicle.a
foreign polic?,,.:. :.- ,?.. ? on. matterc of state imnortanc:-? zinc' v'cs."Itiun of .ilicir s-G-vcr23" -
1 . -' gntv - of the extent of tbc:.?:poWcrs ,\,vi?
? " -- . - - .-, 1?.....1 . :1th which the CIA is vestc-d?' During .the .re.or,-'inization of something on -.v.-Itieh the advo- . - ? . ? .: ... ,_..
Al-
the military and:. political lc-ad ca?tcs of a "-positions-ef-strength , .1:1:'- ?" of 19c1;9.alreo.'33. 0Pcn- , ong with them there exis.t top--
ership.of the cetIntry the great policy" pressing for the- ii Ii ..ly placed *intelligence abctve i secret' directive.- of the .Nation-
est attention was paid to int C1- tariiation of the-.economy?ana :all Arnecican. legislature: it de i al SeCu,.-it-:..Couneil.. TO. be &bre, -
ligeri' ce.. Drawing ' upcn the ex , social life- of the United States prived the congressional . corn- : Allera Dulls. wrote, --there'- .i.St/
perience Of IlitiTT',. Germany, insisted with particular - vigour,. ? mittees of the right, to inter. the secret -as-pct .of? tile 'Matter,
th U S eriaIist t bout 1 establishing, their own system act gave American intelligence t? ..ana the laf,v authorizes th?e. NSC
e .',. imp so t
According to Allen Indies,' this 'N.-one in :matters' pc?rtaining
thc organizaticn - am' activiti-s r:(i.e..--, aot-L'iony .the ?Prcsident)
of total espionage-- on a ,co , ??_ --- - : --,---- !cf ? the CIA .andf gave' its head
la more hfluential positlim- in _ ? - ? to entrust' the CIA with -=:ome
lossal Fcale as ''befit:s:" the Un- ? unitnnted freedom of action, . - ? id?c,-,' to those !...??-3..
government than ..that held. by ...,.?4:,,, 1,i.,-, .,...7o, ,1,1..?4 dint: ,.?P.c.''''''''Nrs In at. 11.-.11
. te,e, a U.S.. intelligence theore-- . . Lc- in per US. 9:11Z CI L% could , ate .aat -
? ---` -"1-. -ccified in the law7These prwcrs
ited St'ate: of kmerica, Q. Pet
, intellience in any other count ' '?.." '''''..-- -- ..-,
.,. ? given .Piublieity. .What
.
4 ? 1
_ i ry of Inc world.? . -
'Celan, w,rote that to exercise, , ,, , .- - , , ,i; -- -?,f,,,k: ignore fe,.dera.1 la,'.vs and ordin- Is involved .here _is ."special op-
1N. Cl,L1...,ING 1 011E., Ob. C... ,
icadcrship of the world. in".all ances..kvhose obsenvance Could: evoic.r,s7: .,gi:1:.(L. olan.dc,?z.tit-,,e .ac?,
ce.ntinents, of all type of
'''''s A?mericall a uf-h ar'-' -cia.ilTh, involve divulgence of infc,:r.ma- tions deSignce. to int fl (oft;;eir,
.s. sta-'
:
to-, :,od. sooal Evstoms of :111, the per,\?cr of the ?C?fA- and. of . Con aboutits structure, RI:tic-HI-Ire-ugh rnilitTi'ry ec,up....$) reaet-
yaces and religious il any sc,,0 1 its chief has been grc,wix.-g in. tions, names,: official c1,,.:igna-' ionary pro-11,...S, :regimes; enjoy-
301 gmtrical pgs.sicn, In al fini,ncial and political
-
, e,:onelni-c and nolitical eon.: a eorore lions, -ii th
, .e .size of the , 0,g. the
eition, the united states nes 11943 the NSC is.smed a. secret - pur:sonnol (the TreasurY , wras sUpperti-Or. the American ruling
,
cy,,6 Im,.,,,,,,.11, ?,.,,,l, i, et-der authorizing the, CIA to in pot .to report to -Con- circles ar.,f1. the .bictest Mon-opo,
ra.n,1:7?,ii4 inteApproymifoe fRtii6afel2br11/0310srclAr-RDP8041601 R04/1190400001t4
. ly these ?actions
? ien_s on .7.:reign erd,oriz,s.,ile - became as organic part ? Of the
CIA's' practical ?ai-ctiVitie.S. - -
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-
DANVILLE, VA.
BEE Noy 16 1971
E 17,120
I.S..,?,py Network
STATI NTL
.It is amazing that in all the years that the
.United.States has been a super power, there was.;
- not a?.super intelligence agency to determine the
- relative strategic balance between major powers. .
- This. would have enabled- our defense department
to correct any faults that were found, and to meet
all challenges to our security.
. That the Soviet buildup of nuclear arms and
naval power could reach such proportions,. before
we took measures to counter them, is a cause for
national dismay. This development is believed to
have brought about the reorganization of the
Ainerican intelligence community into a network -
that perhaps should have been organized long ago.
Richard Helms, director of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, has been given 30 days-tb- nor-
ganize hs--own office so that he can become the
head of the new network, to coordinate civilian
aicl .military intelligence and bring the military
role under civilian control. Lt. Gen. Robert E.
Cushman, Helms' deputy, will take over operating
reSponsibilities for CIA.
Unofficially, the various intelligence agencies ?
in the government are said to employ an army of
200,000 persons, at hothe and abroad, at a. cost of
'sOine $5 billion a year. It is a huge and very im-
portant Undertaking. Helms will supervise the con-
solidated intelligence network and the budget it
will require. He will be responsible for national
intelligence reauirements and priorities, the se-
curity of intelligence data and the protection of
sOurces and methods used.
The results will be channeled to the National..
Security Council, which will make White .House
?-assessments of the relative strategic balance be- .
riViC011 major powers and evaluate - intelligence
,-quality. If this plan creates the intelligence that
- Can keep the nation at peace through strength,. it
ill be worth the huge outlay of men and money:'
Colleeting it.
_
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Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601
BOSTON, MASS.'.
HERALD TRAVELER
1\)0 16 i42111
? 194,557
ThG Presicienrs Prerociative
? President Nixon has realigned the,: top
echeloia- of the vast military-civilian intelligence
complex in a manner he has deemed best suited
to his oneeds. Predictably, a couple of senatorial
scolds Pave raised a fuss.
Richard Helms, director of the Central Intel-
ligence tlgency (CIA) has been freed from his,day-
; to-day. supervision of the CIA to coordinate that
agency's work with the input of other intelligence-
gathering; departments, including the Defense In-
telligence,. Agency and the National Security,
Agency. 1.
. .
Morewer, the ? President has created a
National Security Council Intelligeve Committee,
which wilD naturally include CIA director Helms
but whichfwill be chaired by Henry A. Kissinger,
the President's special assistant for national
security affairs and executive secretary of the
National Security Council staff.
???? Senators J. William Fulbright and Stuart
Symington, object. They object, they say, because
_Congress vas not consulted in advance and because
-Mr. Kissinger's executive immunity from con-
gressional supervision "further erodes congression-
al control oyer the intelligence community."
The President, of course, does not have to
consult with or obtain the permission of Congress
to create or reshtfffle intelligence (or other) corn-
mittees within the Executive- Branch. Further-
- More, the complaint that Congressional Control
over the intelligence community is being "eroded"
would have some credibility if direct congressional
control were actually exercised or if such agencies
as the CIA Were created to serve Congress in- ?
stead of the PreSident.
The real target of the complaints is
Mr. Kissinger, whom Sen. Fulbright and others
have tried (unsuccessfully) to hale before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee for inter-
rogation. But to complain about Mr. Kissinger's
position as chairman of the National Security
Council Intelligence Committee is to cavil about
titles. The fact is the CIA (and thus Mr. Helms)
serves directly under the National Security
Council and the. Council's staff (and functions) are
already under Mr. Kissinger's direction.
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YEIP;,[4.
Approved For Release 20011M4449611A-RDP80-01601R
INTELLIGENCE:
He at the Helm
For months the talk in Washington was
that- the President was about to reorder
the 'nation's. vast, $6 billion military-civil-
ian intelligence complex. Last week,. in a
two-page low-key announcement, the
White House disclosed that Mr. Nixon/
had given Central Intelligence Agency
Director Richard Helms, 58, a broad
mandate to unsnarl the U.S. intelligence-
gathering agencies. Putting Helms at the
helm, insiders predicted, might prove to
be the most significant power realign-
ment in U.S. intelligence since the CIA
was founded in 1947.
Helms's new job falls well short of
over-all intelligence "czar." Presidential
adviser Henry Kissinger is still virtually
the sole conduit of intelligence informa-
tion to the President. And, significantly,
Kissinger will chair the new National
Security Council Intelligence Committee,
which Mr. Nixon also created, to evalu-
'ate White Hcuse-bound data. But the
President's order frees Helms of many of
his routine CIA duties (which will be
taken over by his deputy, Lt. Gen. Rob-
eli H. Cushman Jr.) so that he can
devote his time to the task of coordinat-
ing and streamlining the nation's far-flung
and disparate intelligence organizations,
which include the CIA, the Defense In-'
telligence Agency and the National Secu-
rity Agency.
STATI NTL
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Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-016
, HOUSTON, TEXAS
H ? -Nov 19-11
POST
M ? 294,677
S 29,710
.? - . ...- .+..,.??-,. -,,,. ? --.-- , ,?
it - -fill c, ?
. -
- _J- ,, 1 ---t i? h Ei 6 ,--, kr 0 1 yi 41 %
la -11-rr-i' - ' 11 'r'''''- . [Irsti'51
A.I.tt a, -1_,-11- i I-LC-T.. 4-lit A ?- -IL L 4..,1, ?r _ 1
i
- ' 0 ? - 1 .
- The Nixon -administration's plan to conSolidate the ,
activities of U.S. intelligence agencies operating abroad.
,-.? is a step toward further efficiency and economy in this . ?
-vital and expensive bulwark of our national security. .,
Under the administration plan, Central Intelligence'
?Agency director Richard Helms will supervise all U.S.
? foreign intelligence gathering operations. The revamp,'
log holds the promise of reducing conflicting and over-
lapping efforts by -r plethora of U.S. intelligence or-
L ? ? ganizations. ,
. -Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield and Re-.,
\ . publican Sen. George D.' Aiken, both members of a :
special -Senate review panel for CIA activities, have
endorsed the reorganization plan.'SP&Iking of the need .
for centralized administration of our intelligence work,
. Sen..Aiken said:
? :
"We've had too many iritelligence. agencies. Every4i
agency of government seems to have one -- the De-
fense bepartment, the Navy, the Army, and God knows
? how many others. If you have more than two agencies
. Of government working on the same thing they always -
try to undercut each other."
,..;?.-? ? The public gets only sketchy indications of the huge i
.. sums spent by government agencies on intelligence ; ?
- - - gathering precisely because Most such activities are ?
'classified. One indication appeared a few months ago
' in a Senate Foreign Relations -Committee ?staff .report
, ... -,. that the CIA spent well over $100 million last year to ,
? ., halt North. Vietnamese advances in Laos. ? ;
. -- It remains to be seen what economics can be effected ! .
? '
in intelligence agency budgets but it is reasonable to , j
.. 'assume that some money can be saved through reduced .
:
duplication of effort arid coordinated planning. The ?
main goal, however, is improved efficiency. This coun- ,
. ? ?
#?? - Ary's economic troubles dictate that we get more mile-4'
age from our intelligence???gathering dollars as from .
-
othey, forms of government spending. , , ? -
, ...
STATINTL
'
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Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0
MeV:ESTER, N.H.
UNION-LEADER
D -. 58,903
N.H. NEWS
S 49,019
NO 'II 4 tan
-
de Who's
Kissinger Now
Walter Trohan (see. column oppo-
site Page) may have something.,in his
'charge that it is Henry Kissinger who
; mesmerized Mr. Nixon into 180-de-
flipflops on Red China and the
.:SoVIcts. Trohan cites earlier writings
of the Iidrvard ?swinger" to show
-::that his own "complete about face"
on Vire Communists has been as fla-
&ant. as the President's and prob-
ably prededed it.
Nixon, be it noted, took to reers-
-J11g his stands on major foreign and
'domestic issues only after he promo-
ed the lady-killer to be his most trust-
- ed aide. Since then the President has
vested increaSing power in his "ad-
viser for National Security Affairs,"
by-passing the the rest of his cabinet, in-
cluding Sec. of State Rogers..
Last week this culminated in the
appointment of Kissinger to head up
a committee which will shake up, and
thereafter supervise; all the intelli-
gence agencies inCluding CIA. CIA's
highly regarded director, 'Richard
Helms, was, booted upstairs to the.
nominal post of overall intelligence
chief, under Kissinger's direct con-
.Angry protests came froin Con-
gress,'. whose members charge a de-
liberate attempt. ,bY Mr. .NixOn to
erode the statutes which give them
at least theoretical control of the in-
telligence community. Congress was
_ ? . ? ? . ?
STATI NTL
furnishea no -details'
shakeup nor the reasons for it. .Mean-
while rumors persist that Mr. Nixon -
is taking steps to get rid of J. Edgar
Hoover. Is Kissinger to take over .
both the CIA and the-FBI?
And what is .it that our double-
back-soniersaulting President and his
fair-haired boy have in mind as new
directions for the intelligence agents?
Will the latter now be hamstrung in-:
their probes of 06mmunist espionage,
already redoubled by the Soviets and.'
certain to be stepped up by Peking's'
appointees to the UN?
?
We find, the emergence: of Kissin-
ger as boss, of intelligence even Mere,
disturbing than. his role as de-facto
Secretary of State. Who is this male
Mata Hari really working for?
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ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE
Approved For Release 2141kilii/OWCIA-kii.V1611-6
recavAtaa IYeafee
Get - iniel[Hpre.)-fritco eon! e
By Andrew Telly
The Mcnaught Syndicate, Inc.'
WASHINGTON. ? Dr. Henry
Kissinger by now is 'known to
most Americans who are inter-
ested in the news as a White
House personality who moon-
lights as a man-about-town with
an eye for a. pretty girl. Since
this is evidence that President
Nixon's asSistant for National
Security Affairs is human, I am
capable of restraining my en-
thusiasm for the role Kissinger
.has been given in Nixon's re-
Organization of the intelligence
community. ?
Indeed, I find myself wonder-
ing whether Kissinger's power
over foreign policy rivals that
of the President, which is not
, good. It is not good because
the doctor would be less than
the human being he has reveal-
ed himself to be if he did not
enjoy power, and use it.
Most reports on the re-order-
,Ing of our 'spy shop have em-
phasized that ? CIA Director
? Richard Helms will be the czar
of all intelligence agencies, in-
? cluding those inside the Penta-
gon. His most powerful weapon,
In a government where one
name for the 'power' game- is
the dollar, will be in his new
assignment to draw up one
budget for the entire espionage
establishment.
That's splendid because Helms
'was not born yesterday and he
Is aware that President Nixon
is annoyed at the high cost of
international snooping ? some
$5 billion a year.. No one has to
tell Helms his No. 1 priority
is to get 'intelligence as whole-
sale as possible.
But it says here that the real
boss of intelligence could very
well be Henry Kissinger, whose
new title is chairman of the
new National Security Council
'Intelligence Committee, charged
with providing "guidance 'and
direction" to Chief Helms. In
effect, Kissinger through his
committee- not only will tell
Helms how to run the show, but
will - decide which intelligence
assessments find their way to
the President's desk. Power in
Washington lies not only in hav-
ing the ear of the President;
it is also in refusing the Presi-
dent's ear to others of a dis-
senting viewpoint.
In his new' role, Kissinger
will have it both ways. His com-
mittee and his personal staff
will initiate intelligence studies,
and then will edit the resulting
opinions and. options before pre-
sentation to the Oval Office.
To be sure, Helm has the
power to submit his own recom-
mendations directly to Nixon,
and so have Secretary of State
William Rogers, Defense Secre-
tary Melvin Laird and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. But since Kis-
singer's -job is to take the task
of reviewing options off the
presidential shoulders, a dis-,
seater already will have two
strikes on him. Nixon does not
_
?
often give a subordinate an as-
signment and then second-guess.
him; he lives by the executive
book.. And you can count the
occasions on the fingers of one,
hand when the President has.
overruled his highly competent
national security aide.. a
Indeed, Nixon's reorganization.
has merely put into fine print
what Kissinger has been doing
for three years. Without any
spelled-out authority, Kissinger's ,
Senior Review Group has always V
been Nixon's personal State De-
partment. Under a Presidential.
directive, the Group invites pol-
icy options from State, Defense,
CIA, then recommends what ac-
tion the President should take.
The difference now is' that
there is a document bearing
Richard Nixon's signature
which says no intelligence as-
sessment or proposed operation
will be approved until it has
gone through Kissinger's shop.
Richard Helms is the czar of a/
all the 'intelligence czars, but
only at Henry Kissinger's pleas-
ure. .
The new system may be the
best possible solution to bring-
ing the sprawling intelligence
community, with its more than
200,500 employes, under Presi-
dential control.?At the same.
time, I don't consider it overly
boorish to point out who's got
the real power in this one. Con-
templating 'Kissinger's new role,
in. some leafy haven across the
Styx, Richelieu must be frantic
with envy, .
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DAILY VORLD
Approved For Release 2ocoivitack:VA-RDFs'?r0i_?&?_?
,
e"..;
fi ? -
hdrire NOUNSO Cara5P"
? k&Jt:,
The concentration of ever greater power in the:
White House and the inner circles of the Nixon Ad-
ministration is continuing to an alarming extent.
' The latest development is the concentration of the
enormous intelligence (in plain words, spying) net-.
work in the hands of a sub-committee of the National
Security Council. This sub-committee is headed by
Henry Kissinger, Nixon's adviser on national security
affairs. It includes Attorney General John Mitchell, an
ultra-Rightist of the Nixon brand, the head of the Joint
? Chiefs o( Staff, the Under Secretary of State and the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Richard Helms, direaor
of.the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), will have an
enhanced "overall supervisory role."
The setup is like a dream of the military-industri-
al .complex come true. It fists into the increasingly.
tighter state-monopoly capitalist framework of the
? United States and the developing fascistic patterns the.
most aggressive, oppressive and racist sections of the
tate-monopoly capitalist setup are imposing. ?
Nixon's action was caustically denounced, by Sen.
Stuart Symington (D-Mo) as "a further erosion of Con--
gressional control Over the 'intelligence community."'
Nixon, has on various occasions invaded the area
assigned to Congress by the Constitution, as in his ex-
pansion of the powers of the Suversive Activities Con-
trol Board, or in the Treasury Department's arbitrary
decision to give corporations a $37 billion tax bonanza
over ten years. .? -
Just as the Nixon economic policy contains the-
"seeds of a fascist economic structure," these moves
are the seeds ?fa fascist political structure.
STATINTL
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Approved For Release 2001/03/04.: CIA-RDP8
'KEOKUK , IOWA
GATE. CITY
NOV 13 9971
? 81 9 3_0.
. (27
? 171-3,1f) . , /7.7/./.7
if" . ?
i-I It is amazing that in all the years that
the 'United States has been a super
power, there was not a super intelli-
gence agency to determine the relative
otrategic balance between major powers.
? This would have enabled our defense de-
; partiniCrit te correct any faults that were
- found, and to meet all challenges to our
??` security. ,
, That' the Soviet buildup of nuclear
arms and naval power could reach such
proportions, before we took measures to
counter them, is a cause for national
dismay, This development is believed to
. have brought about the. reorgmlization
of the American intelligence community
.. into a network that perhaps should have
/been organized long ago.
. Richard Helms, director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, has been given 30
: days to Teorganize its own office so that
. . he can become the head of the new
'network, to coordinate civilian and mill-
= tary intelligence and bring the military
?
?
role under civilian control. Lt. Gem
Robert E. Cushman, Helms' deputy, will
take over operating responsibilities for
CIA. .
''Unofficially, the various intelligence
agencies in. the government are said to
employ an army of 200,000- persons, at
home and abroad, at a cost of some $5
' billion a year. It is a huge and very im-
portant undertaking. Helms )vill super-
visevise the consolidated intelligence
network and the budget it will require.
He will be responsible for national in.
telligence requirements and priorities,
the security of intelligence data and the
protection of sources and methods used.
The results will be channeled to the
INational Security Council, whelli will
make White HOW3 assessments of the
relative strategic balance between major
powers and evaluate intelligence quality.
IC this plan creates the intelligence that
can keep the nation at peace through
strength, it will be worth the huge out-
lay of men and money collecting it.
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Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160
MILWAUKEE, WISC.
JOURNAL.
1 2 1071
359,036
S 37 , 67.5
STATI NTL
?C' loalt and Dagger Hidden From Congress
The US intelligence 'network, a
hydralike structure of vhich the
Central/Intelligence Agency is a
major portion, has always been a
headache for the executiVe and
; Congress. For the White House
there has been the problem of
management a n d co-ordination;
- for Congress the problem of de-
termining accountability.
President Nixon has attempted
to solve his management problem.
Last week he announced a reorga-
nization, that would elevate CIA
Director Richard Helms to a posi-
tion of super-co-ordinator of all
intellig,ence activities. He tied the
, whole apparatus more tightly into
the National Security Coun ell
-through a new National Security
'Council Intelligence Committee
heade (1' by presidential adviser
Mssinger. Presumably the White
IIouse hopes to be better able to
keep its thumb on intelligence op-
erations and budgets, to suppress
the petty jealousies that exist be-
tween such units as the FBI and
! -the CIA and to cut down on the
competitive duplication of work
done by various intelligence orga-
nizations both in and out of the
military. It is a valiant attempt.
Former Defense .Secretary Mc-
Namara tried it within the Penta-
gon structure and achieved only a
? modicum of ,success.
The administration move s,
however, do not solve the needs of
the n'ioney granting body, Con-
gress. In fact; Senators Fulbright
and Symington Thursday ex-
pressed strong fears that tucking
the intelligence community more
firmly into the White house struc-
ture will withdraw it even further
from congressional monitoring.
Their point is well taken. Right
now there are few requirements
for the CIA to tell Congre.s-s what
it is doing. Its budget is secreted
in other agencies. There is every ,
reason to believe that Kissin;:.
ger will refuse to testify before
Congress as he has before, claim-
ing executive privilege. Tradition-
al coneessional checks are miss-
ing. And thatis a dangerous situ-
ation.
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CliriIST1AN SCIENCE
Approved For Release 200/1/01s44 TdiA-RDP80-01601
f.)
11
-?1
i rfir_va
i3 ea \i
" 9 ?
. President Nixon has made an interest-
ing move intended, to correct a condition ?
which got his predecessor, Lyndon John-
son, into a lot of trouble. We can only
. hope, for the sake of the future welfare
of the American republic; that much
comes of it.
/ The move is to give to Richard Helms,
director of the CIA (Central Intelligence
- %Agency), a broader mandate aimed at co-
ordinating intelligence gathering and
weighing in Washington..
The condition that needs correcting has
been documented. in two recent publica-
tions. Lyndon Johnson's nevi book, "The
Vantage Point" does it gently?The chap-
ter on the Tet offensive carries the fol-
lowing statements:
?`. . we did not expect them to attack
as many (population centers) as they
did. . ." S.
"We expected a large force to attack; it
was larger than we estimated."
". . the scale of the 34:tacks and the
size Of the Communist force were. greater
than I had anticipated."
In other words the information about
the capabilities of the enemy in Vietnam.
which got through to the President in the
White House was not very good. If better
information was available, he didn't get it.
" The Pentagon papers provide much
more and broader detail on the same sub-
ject, and also point out where and ,how
it happened. ?
.They show that in the American intelli-
gence community there are many houses,
and two of them almost always got their
assessments right, but that they didn't
succeed in getting through to the Presi-
dent (perhaps in part because it wasn't
. what he wanted to hear). . . .
? It comes out clearly from "the papers"
that Mr. Johnson agreed to the big escala-
tion of the American commitment in Viet-
nam in 1965 on the assumption that a half
million Americans in a relatively small'
Asian ? country would "nail the coon-
skin to the door" in ample. time for the
presidential election of 1963.
But the basis for such a mistaken evalu-
ation did not come from either the CIA
irr m.
11.1.1.tA_Lti1I
. . ?
or froth the State Department's Bureau of
Intelligence and Rese.arch. These two
offices were consistently skeptical about.
what could be done in Vietnam with the
American forces allotted to the task. The
optimism which lay behind the 1965 deci-
sion came from within Mr. Johnson's own
White House and from the separate intel-
ligence Operations of the various armed
forces at the Pentagon.
. And it was from non-CIA and non-State
.
sources that Mr. Johnson got a general
impression of the military situation which
.caused him surprise at the time of Tet.
The logical answer is, of course, to take
the to man from the agency which had
the best track record on intelligence dur-
ing the Vietnam war and put him in
broader charge of all the much uncoordi-
nated intelligence activities of the federal
government. And this, of course, is pre-
cisely what Mr. Nixon is trying to do.
Mr. Helms IS told, in effect, to survey
the whole intelligence scene in Washing-
ton; try to draw it together; try. to make
it more efficient and less expensive; and
get it in shape to produce the kind of in-
telligence analysis which will not mislead
future presidents as Mr. Johnion was mise
It sounds easy. It isn't. A president may
try to do something like this. But there is .
no fury like that of an .armed service
deprived of its own ? special intelligence
branch, for it is on the evaluations of its
own intelligence that its appropriations
for the following year are based.
Army intelligence stresses the might of
the Russian Army. Navy intelligence
stresses the might of the Russian Navy.
Etc., etc. .
Intelligence in Washington can neither
be coordinated nor made less expensive
by avoidance of overlapping work except
after a battle on every frontier. Every de-
partment and branch thereof in Washing-
ton is a stockade of privilege and vested
interest. Mr: Helms is like an Indian
chieftain on the Ainerican frontier who
sets out to overrun every white stockade
from Fort Laramie back to the Mississippi
River. We wish him well.
C-1172LIVIS
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.STATINTL
DAILY WORLD
2 NOV 19.71
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1 /7
(.__
\,.....,
.,...- xiyOza....1.
-
. --31---1 1
??.-..?,,----
)
4 ?,--5()
\I
..?....)
. .
- - Tie
awe- paiillee, tureal
? _
? . . ?- ? ?
The restructuring of - the U.S. intelligence agencies
. ? .
ordered by President Nixon recalls the promotion of Admi-
ral Wilhelm Canaris by. Hitler a generation ago. Canaris
was installed as head of the Nazi intelligence agencies to ?
make them. into a more effective instrument of the fascist-
, regime.- ? -.?.. . ?
The new responsibilities Placed .by the president on
Henry Kissinger and Richard Helms are intended, similar-
to i
11y, concentrate Control of the nation's "seeret police n
!Nixon's hands. - ? ? ?
. Kissinger- will head the National Security Council's
intelligence committee which will also include Helms,
director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Attorney Gen-
eral.John Mitchell; the Under Secretary of State; the Dep
$y Secretary of -Defense and the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. - ? . ' ? _ .7
It will thus embrace the major law-enfercement, civ-
ilian espionage. and military intelligence forces. "
- Secret police operations will be coordinated by the )
Unite.d Stat6s Intelligence Board headed by Helms. The-.
.board will also include the deputy CIA director, the State
-Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and
representatives, of the Treasury Department, the Federal
.Bureau of Investigation, and the Atomic Energy Commis-
' The effect of the President's action is. as Senators
J.W. Fulbright and Stuart Symington have said, to insu-
late the secret police -operations from Congressional in-
quiry or control. That is to .be accomplished by claiming
White House "executive privilege" for them through Kis-
singer. ? - : ? - -
The:Senate itself has abetted Nixon's moves, for the
Senate subcommittee which is supposed to supervise the
CIA -has not met once tin? year." as Symington admitted.
Thosentralization. of control over .the secret. police
for6eS iS."a'Step toward the -Creation of the police-state
which Nixon has in Mind. His, attempt to subvert the Su-
preme Court and his creation of the Pay Board to hand-
cuff the trade union movement are part of the same pro-
gram: --e. - :- ? ? ?-? :7;7
The President's. secret-police move S are a threat to
Constitutional government as it exists in the United States.
They merit the.animosity and opposition of all Americans.
'-STATINTL
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?
T. LOUIS, 1,10.
POST?DISPATCH
E 326,76
S 541,868
NOV 1 2 1971
STATI NTL
More Executive Secrecy?
' . A further indication of the tendency of the
Nixon Administration to keep vital information
from Congress is suggested by the recent White
, House announcement of a reorganization of the
'government's intelligence 6Perations. The re-
- /organization An would, among other things,
V give Richard Helms, director of the Central In-
telligence- Agency, the authority to co-ordinate
? his own budget with those. of intelligence
agencies in the State and Defense departments.
- But more significantly, from the standpoint of
,.
- Congress, if would vest responsfAity for mak-
ing the so-called "net as se ssm en t" of in-
telligence data in a unit working under .Dr.
Henry Kissinger as .head of the National
. Security Council staff. .
.: Senators Symington and Fulbright are prop-
erly concerned that this overhaul may mean
? that Intelligence -operations will be even further
. beyond tile reach of Congress than they already
:
are. Despite repeated attempts in the Senate
- to enact bills requiring the CIA to make reports
-. . to responsible Senate and House committees
?," ? and to compel the CIA at least to reveal its
.- gross budget. Congress has so far not acted.
. With Dr, Kissinger having, final responsibil-
ity for ' making the intelligence -assessment on
which the Pr e aid ant presumably will act,
.. . . .......,
Senator Fulbright for good reason sees "a
further erosion of congressional control over
the intelligence. community." O?n the basis of a
claim of executive privilege, Dr. Kissinger has
avoided testifying before congressional com-
mittees.
? While conceding that the changes could be
constructive, Senator Symington wants to hold
hearings on the reorganization in order to ask
questions about what it means as. to the assign-
ment given by Congress to the CIA. Obviously,
Congress should be kept informed -About in-
telligence activities, not only because Congress
L expected to appropriate money for them but
also because, in legislating in response to
presidential requests, the legislators should
have access to the same data on which the
executive is relying for making its judgments.
-Recent disparate analyses by the CIA and
the .Defense Department as to the nature and
strength of Soviet capabilities lead to the
suspicion that the White House would like to
. produce an iirtelligence estimate over which
? it has firmer control and which Congress would
have to accept. Such a development would
hamper Congress in making. independent legis-
lative-judgments and in serving as a check upon
the excessive power of the executive.
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DAILY. WORLD
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STATINTL
?. White House gins by intelligence shift H ".. ?:-- ?? .
WASHINGTON -- Sens. Stuart Symington (D-Mo) and.J. William
(D-Ark)Fulbright charged Wednesday that President Nixon reshaped
the U.S. intelligence network, placing more control in the hands of Hen-
ry Kissinger. his adviser on national security, to evade Congressional
supervision. ? ? ?
.Symington irade the charge in a Senate speech. ?
-? Fulbright told a reporter that the reorganization of the spy and in-
telligence network was "a further erosion of Congressional 'control over
the intelligence community." He pointed out that Kissihger has steadily.
refused to testify before Congressional cbthmittees. ?-? ":
? The new development began with the announeerrient by, the. White
--HouSe last Fridaithat intelligence. ViaS being' reorganiieci' to "irnprove
? efficiency and effectiveness.' ? *. . ? .
Richard Helms, currently CIA director, was given charge Of all
Intelligence operations, including those of the military services. Kis-
singer was put in charge of a subcommittee of the National Security
Council whose ftindtiOn is. to reviewintelligenee Operaticins. On this new
tuticomtnittee with Kissinger it Attorney General John Mitchell and
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. . ? ' ?? 2: 1:-; ?
: Symington asked whether this 'new White House committee "has
been given authority and/or responsibility which heretofore was the
responsibility of the CIA, and which the Congress, under the National
Security Act, vested in the agency." -. - . ? ?
He also charged that the White House action, "unilaterally de-
creed," did not reveal what caused the shakeup, and in effect was hiding
:information from Congress. ,
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STATI NTL
?
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NEW 01),I_Y.ANg , LA.
. TIMES
- i9635
M
S 303,9,19
P31
Tighteuino Lip -
-
. -Soy System
ileforms in the structure of the
nation's "intelligence community"
:recently _announced by the Prost--
dent are aimed at producing three
needed results: more coherent over-
all direction and budgeting, more
, control over the .inilitary agencies
; by the civilian agency and more
'control over it all by the P.resident.
:C entr a 1._ Intelligence Agency
director Richard Ill:elms is to have:
the government:wide coordinating
role, his authority .backed- up by his
? holding the budgetary of the
military agencies as well as his
own. .
? A new National Security Council
- intelligence committee, headed by
; the presidential adviser on national
2 security affairs, klenry Kissinger,
? will be the. direct conduit to the
President as both giver of. orders
and evaluator of results.
? It is denied but openly suspected
i?
that the 'reforms took this: particu-
lar shape because of top-level dis--!
satisfactiop with the performances
of the military intelligence branch-
-es. ? - ?
It is necessary for an intelligence .
system to :have - several - different
sources and. channels of informa- ?
--ton. It may be More. costly, involve
:'- some dupliCa tion and promote
Lcross-purposes and complexity, but
..the alternative is a : monolithic
? agency whose reports may. not have
the needed balance and cannot easi-
-ly be evaluated ? by the chief user,
? i
the -President.
Placing the. smaller branches un-
;-der . stricter coordination by the ?i
larger, we hope, can keep the best
: features of this situation While
eliminating many: of the worst. ? /
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STATI NTL
STATI NTL
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PHILADELPHIA, PA.
INQUIRER
? 463,503
? 87,81O
QV 1,1
Washing WA Dateline
ma tor a Challenge
ntelligeno Shuffle
Sens. Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) and J. William Ful-
bright (D, Ark.) said Wednesday that President Nixon had v
reshaped the nation's intelligence network to vest more con-
trol in the hands of White House ad-
visor Henry Kissinger without. Con-
gressional,advice.
"Symington, in a Senate speech,
called for a full review by the Sen-
ate Armed Services Committee. He
charged that critical aspeets of in-
telligence analysis had been taken
out of the hands of career profes-
sionals and vested in the military ,
and the White House staff.
Fulbright, asked for comment by ;
a reporter, said the reorganization
? was "a further erosion of Congres-
sional control. over the intelligence
-Sen. Symington ? ?
community" on grounds that Kissin-
ger,. in his position as the President's national security ad-
viser, was insulated from Congressional scrutiny.
The White House announced last Friday that intelligence
? activities were being-restructed to improve their- "efficiency
:and effectiveiress'A,CIAlisector Richard Helms was given
control over all intelligence activities while Kissinger was
placed in charge of a subcommittee of the National Security
Council to review intelligence operations: ,
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CS
ST. LOUIS, MO. ?
GLOBE-Dm:SO:Wed For
. MORNING - 292,789
WEEKEND - 306,889
,
?
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elease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R
0
all q II C tfi E1 II g
?
STATI NTL
?
; ? By EDWARD '1,V.? O'BRIEN
? 4?? I
t Chief of the Glohe-Danocrat 0 0
? tit
Washington Bureau P 're'm 4'
, WASHINGTON ? Sen. Stuart
? Syrnington (Dern.), Missouri,
. said Wednesday the "integrity"
; of U.S. intelligence analyses
? may be threatened by a recent
: White House move which he
-charged gives more power to
presidential adviser Henry A.
r.Kissinger.,
In a Senate speech Syming-
ton challenged the intelligence
reorganization announced last
Friday for the White House as
designed to shift responsibility
for "the most critical aspects"
.of intelligence interpretation
and vest it. instead in "a com-
bination of military profession-
?als and the White House staff.?
. Symington asked the Senate
Armed Services Committee to
hold hearings on the reorgani-
zation and obtain "answers"
. Which have not been disclosed
by the White House.
' THE ..COMMITTEE chairman,
Sen. John C. Stennis (Dem.),
Mississippi, made no immedi-
ate reply. "
In his speech Symington noted
acidly that the Senate central
;intelligence subcommittee, a
? unit of the armed services
.group, "has not met once this
:year."
The subcommittee is sup-
posedly one of the key agencies
which Congress uses to assure
'itself of proper supervision of
'highly secret intelligence opera-
tions around the world.
,? ? Though Symington mentioned
Kissinger only by job title and
;:not by name, his speech
.amounted to a renewed criti-
? cism that Kissinger, as Presi-
dent Nixon's top security as- .
sistant, has been giVen tre-
. mendous powers and yet is be-
yond the reach of congressional
?. committees which want to ques-
? tion him. ? I
IN A. PREVIOUS headline- .
making speech, Symington
charged that Kissinger is wide-
ly regarded around town as the
real secretary of state. .
In his latest speech, Syming-
ton suggested that the same
downgrading may be happen-.
ing to Richard Helms, the high-
ly regarded chief of theS,IA.
Symington's wori7?7', fie int-'
plied, is that ,such critical
analyses as comparisons of tile.
United States and the Soviet .
in strategic military weaponry
may be influenced or manipu-
lated to make them fit presiden-
tial and Pentagon policies.
The White .house announce-
ment Friday asserted. that
Helms will enjoy "an unhanced
leadership role" in the new
setup. ?
BUT SYMINGTON SAID:
'How is the leadership role.
of the CIA director "enhanced'
by the creation of a new and ,
obviously more powerful super-
visory committee chaired by
the adviser to the President for
national security affairs (Kis-
singer), on which new board
sits not only the attorney gen-
eral but also the ?Wrman of
the Pentagon pint chiefs of
'44 -
staff?"
The effect of the reorganiza-
tion, Symington said, will be to
"bring the most iMportant as-
pects of intelligence production.
and coordination directly under.'
the White House."
Congress already is "severely
restricted" in obtaining intelli-
'gence analyses, he said, and
' may find itself in worse shape
through increased application
by the President of the doctrine
? ??
of "executive privilege" in re-
fusing to' sharesecret informa-
tirin with Congress.
In an intervievi, .Sen. j. W.
Fulbright ,(Dem:), Arkansas,'
agreed with Symington that the,
?eorganization ? -means fur.-
ther erosion of congressional
controls" over intelligence oper.-
ations.
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E ? 326,576
S ? 511c868
NOV 1 1 10.1=t_
e.u.nrc,311. "[tab J.?encialrit L,
-?)
-Jur re uan
/3y LAWRENCE E. TAYLOR
A Washington Correspondent
?? of the Post-Dispatch ? - i
i: ? WASHINGTON, Nov. 11 - ? :
,-- Senator Stuart Symington
- ( e .),issouri, calledyeAer-
ay for ? congressional hearings
,...
on . the Nixon Administration's
t reorganization of American in-
telligence operations.
?Symington said in S t ?
'speech that although many
? questions about the restructur-
ing, were unanswered, one thing
:was clear: The White House ?
"does not consider either the
organization or theoperations. -
. _..
?,.of the intelligence community .
? .to be matters of concern to the
?Congress."
. ' The changes ordered last Fri-
:.day by President Richard M.
Nikon brought American intelli-
gence and spying operations un-
der closer control of the White
?1 House. - There were reports,
however, that the move had
1
- been made, in part, because of
what Symington termed "gen-
? era!- unhappiness about various
' specifie intelligence estimates."
"Unfortunately, however, it
has been impossible for the?
public, or even concerned mem-
bers of Congress, to obtain
'enough information on this sub-
ject for informed judgment,"
.he. said. .
. ;Symington said he had asked
? for hearings by the Senate For-
.eign Relations Committee or by
Jits subcommittee on the ggptrals,
s intemgensce sAac.pcy. He is
? member of each. -
? 'The intelligence shake-up last
week provided a stronger role
..?Ifor Richard Helms, director of
the Central Intelligence Agency,
.. and created several new groups
, to assess and direct intelligence
. :. operations. . ?
. .
? . Among them was the cstab-
? ' lishment of a ?"net assessment
7 group" within the National Se-
curity Connell. There were in-
dications that one of the group's
_ chief concerns would be. an
evaluation _ of the balance be-
tween the United States and
. :Russia in terms of weapons,
: economies and politics. ?
In recent months Government
? experts have. disagreed on the
balance of power between the
two nations. Department of De-
fense analysts, including Secre-
tary Melvin R. Laird, have con-
tended that the USSR was gain-
ing- strength rapidly. The CIA
hand,on the other hccl
.peared more skeptical about
Russian power and capabilities.
Nixon said that the reor-
ganization was ordered after.
full study by the National Se-
curity Council and the Office of
Management and Budget.
Senator J. William Fulbright
(Dem.), Arkansas, chairman of
the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, said the reorganization was
"a further erosion of congress-
ional control over the intelli-
gence community."
He pointed out that Henry A.
Kissinger, placed in charge .of
the review group, was insulated
from congressional scrutiny in
his position as the President's
national security adviser.
Symington, in his address,
said that the changes could be
constructive, but, he said, Con-
gress should not be eliminated
from the picture.
He said that he Would not
accept the proposition "tha.t our
only current and continuing re-
sponsibility is to appropriate
whatever number of billions of
dollars the executive branch
requests to handle this work."
Instead, Congress 'needs an-
swers to such questions as what
were the deficiencies in the U.S.
intelligence operation, in what
way should it be .made more
responsive and what is implied
by the White House reference
to "strengthened leadership" in
intelligence?
Symington questioned h o w
Helms's leadership .role would
be "enhanced," as the. White
House contended, "by the crea-
tion of a new and ,obviously
more powerful supervisory com-
mittee chaired by the adviser
to' the President for national
security affairs (Kissinger), on
which new board .not only sits
the Attorney General but also
the. chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff."
"Has this neW White House
committee been given authority
r/and responsibility which
eretofore was the responsibility
of the CIA; and which the Con-
gress, under the National Secur-
ity Act, vested in the agency?"
Symington asked.
"How can the integrity Of the
intelligence product be assured
when responsibility for the most
critical aspects of intelligence
analysis is taken out of the
? hands of career professionals
.and vested in a combination of
'military professionals and the
White House staff?"
STATINTL
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TEE SAN DIEGO UNION
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EFFICIENCY NOT SOLE TEST
n? ?
t, n ci e e rwves Secun
k-
e
y.
To most Americans the intelligence Therefore, the proposed adminis
trative action which narrows the
sources of information that the gov-
ernment uses to develop foreign poli-
cy decisions does raise some genuine
qualms.
Is it, for example, wise to have the
same person who has something close
to final authority. on which inter-
national infol?mation should be passed
on to the President also serve as the
chief foreign policy adviser to the
chief executive?
gathering activities abroad by the
United Stales of America ? spying in
least charitable terms ? is a mys-
terious matter. Their closest brush
with it is usually a glamorized but
'distorted James Bond movie.
Thus the action of President Nixon
to integrate the far-flung activities of
.1 the Central Intelligence Agency, and
many other similar groups, is unlike-
ly to arouse the average citizen for
long, although it should. It is his own
survival, as well as his tax dollar,
that are at stake.
By the same token, the Complexity
and cryptic qualities of these
agencies make the average citizen
unqualified to discuss the specifics of
the subject with any authority. He is
obliged to speak Of the problems of
national intelligence in terms of goals
and principles.
As a first principle, the average
citizen would agree that we must
always undertake whatever level of
intelligence-gathering that is essential
tO our security. In carrying out this
principle we, should not be surprised
if on occasion the pursuit of informa-
tion is not savory, for this is a game
without rules. We should not be sur-
prised at -the cost, because intelli-
gence ranges from the observations
of a lookotit posted on a hill in Cam-
bodia to information acquired by the
most sophisticated and expensive
electronic masterpieces.
As a second principle we should en-
sure that there always is a diversity
of sources reporting to the President,
and that there are adequate checks
and balances as to the validity of the
information provided.
Over the years Congress has au-
thorized a number of intelligence
agencies that range froni those in the
exceptive branch of government to
those in the military services. On oc-
casion the information that they have
given the President has been conflict-
ing, but by and large the combined
STATI NTL
Further, does the consolidation
have the effect of making the in-
telligence operations even more dis-
tant and cryptic by removing them
farther from the Congress and the ex-
ecutive branch?
Finally, Meriting some in-
trospection, is the thought that it is
better for the United States to have a
degree of redundancy and even waste
in its intelligence system than to
have it become so -efficient that it
may become a security problem on
its own.
'Able' To Leap Tall Buildings...
effort has bqk
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1
1:LO;-;? STAT INTL
Approved 'For Release 2Rigy31194 : CIA-RDP8
Y;ibEiP
)') ri ?e - 11.1 Ci
, ? .11"; ) ?Zi
i ? I ? F I e \Li ,n
-11-11 (I I; 471 1:1) i
(L.)
;? THE REORGANi ZAT10:g
:of the intelligence commu-
Itity announced last week
:looks at first glance like a
mere administrative tighten-
ing. The producers of
-the raw intelligence are sim-
'plY:. being made. more re-
- sPonsivc to the needs of the
.Consumers' in the White
-House. -
But the Nixon administra-
_lion is no more free than
'most 'others of the itch to
'onforce conformity. 'Unless
very-. carefully lynched, the
new set-up could be one
more device for destroying
independent. cent or s of
analysis and information in-
Side government.
The reorganization has
...two main components. For
one :thing, Richard Helms,
the directIr of the Central
intelligence Agency, h a s
,becn given authority to co-
Ordinate his own budget
.with. those of the intelli-
gence units within the De-
fense and State Depart-
ments.
? : Since Helms as CIA direc-
tor is a member of most of
the, ? high-level policy com-
niittees in government, he is
alert to the intelligence
.needs of the President and
big closest advisors. Presum-
ably he will be ablc----per-
Imps with considerable say-
frig of money?to make the
work of such intelligence
outfits as the National Secu-
illy' Agency and the Defense
Intelligence Agency more
relevant to White House
needs. his part of the reorg-
anization seems relatively
? . - .
? Under the Ellenhower ad- '.tached analysis, ?still less to
minis-traion the net a.sscss- ? hear news out of -keeping
wont was. handled by a se- with prejudices and commit-
cret subcommittee of the . manta.
National Security Council A nice ease in point is the.
headed by a geilr.T:il officer defense program reviewi
and V,',Orkillg out of the ?pc.n7 committee set up under
tagon. In the Kennedy and Kissinger hackgroup
Purpose
of r90-31101.)
?to cast a cold, analytic eve
johnson 'Ad wan ts,ra
the net assessments were es-
sentially. .rnade. under the on the defense budget, and
some of, the best analysts in,
and out of government
signed on to do the staff'
But the President has
backed the big ? spending
program of Defe;re Secre-
tary La:rd. The revi,:w emu-
?n?iltce has been allowed to
wither on the vine:.
dwelt of the analysts
nected with it have 1-6'
. -
signed, and the. senior offi-
cial presently concerned, Dr.
K .Wayne Smith, is rumored..v/
to be leaving soon.
'?No 'serious high level cri-
ique of the defense budget
is now being made any-
where in government. That
is one of the reasons the.
Congress, and those of us in,
the press, are floundering so
when it comes to defense ex-.
penditures. .
What - all this means is
that the new intelligence;
National Security Council. set-uP should be watched
staff, Dr. Henry Kissingerdwith great care. It looks like
The official itinnediately
a sensible arrangement. But
- re-
it could easily become one,
.sponsible for the net assess-
more instrument for ? ments will be Andrew re-
shall,Mar-
who nowi leaves the strieting information and
criticism to the disadvan-
Rand corporation where. he
has been serving as an ana.. tage of all of those on the
f,
lyst to take a place on the outside o government.
.
NSC staff. .
Mr: Marshall is by all ac-
s-traightforward. .counts an extremely . good
THE SECOND PART .of man?cxperienced, reliable
and discriminating in judg-
the reorganization involves'
.ment. Pre.sumably he can do
What is called "net assess--
serious jet) of pulling Ment." That is a fancy term
to-
orf the -ana\.-;,er to the clues- .gelher the vast range of
complicated data required;
lion: How does the strategic
direction ief Secretary Rob-
ert McNamara in the Sys-
tems Analysis Division of
the Department of Defense.
Under the Nixon adminis-
tration there has been no
central responsibility for net
assessment. The result has
been a chaotic battle featur-
ing many protagonists. In
general, Secretary Of De-
fense Melvin Laird, with the
.backing of his director of re-
search John Foster and to
the delight of congressional
hawks, has tended to rate
the Soviet threat very
highly. The CIA, to the de-
light of congressional doves;
has been more ? skeptical
about the Communist men7
ace.
Under the new reorganiza-
tion, responsibility for mak-
ing the net assessment will
be vested in a group.work-
ing under the head of the
balance stand between Ens- for making ,the nett
'S ssass-
in and the United States? me making
That question,. with deep BUT IT IS a serials clues;
ramifications in politics and tion whether that offic,0
economics as well as foreign should be performed in such.
policy, is to the various pri- close range to the White;
Nate and public interests House. For the atmosphere
,that come to a heal in gov- in the White House is Irony-.
ernment what a pio.ce of red fly political. There is no
meat is to a pack of starving. ?..eat disno,Atioji to \vard de;
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5.-qm /atm illaima)
Approved For Release 20011/0M47CIA-RDP80-01601R
-11
. .
o -
ti
1__,.
? C.)
? .
. . . ,
HONOLULU -7-- . (AP) ? 1 %
. -i ? . , .yli-,) : 7.,r? ,, .s, -i'l,)
1 % 1 1"--?) T?
Secretary of Defense Melvin
-_,_
-Laird said Saturday that tiv..% A -7L-1----). -----1-' (---.:',...: .1----i
-Pentagon is 'ready to carry
Out quickly President Nixon's genus_ arms.
new order S to consolidate . Recalling streamlining pro:,
federal intelligence-gathering posals by his own blue-rib-
operations.
.. . ? bon defense panel, Laird said
..
? "we have paid particular at-
"I bae.ve the Department tendon to intelligence,
of Defense Defense will be able ulti- eluding the need to maintain.
rnately to reduce costs be- the intelligence capabilities
cause of these actions," Laird of the four armed services."
said in Honolulu for a stop- Even before the White
over while he was flying House acted, Laird had creat-
from Saigon to Washington ed a new assistant secretary ?
after surveying the Vietnam of defense slot which he said
situation for Ni:-:on.. "will increase .civilian super- .
. - ? ? vision of intelligence matters
, DI-i,TENSE officials said in my office."
the consolidations should ? The new post is held by
save millions of dollars Dr. Albert C. Hall, until re-
through elimination of dupli- cently a vice president of an
cations and reductions in
aerospace company.
staff but they said it is .too
. ? -
early to estimate accurately . BUT LAIRD never has fol
how much costs will .be cut. lowed through on ? a re.com-,
The full extent c,i defense mendation by th.e blue-ribbon
intelligence operations in - panel that would have stri.p-
their.various forms never has Ped command of fo,reign in-
been disclosed publicly, but a ?telligence from tne J a i n t ?
hint of their magnitude can Chiefs of Sta,i.
be gleaned from an estimate Pentagon authorities said
that they involve about 150,- that Lt. Gen..Donald V. Ben-
000 people and about $3 mil- nett, head of the Defense In-
lion a year: ' , ' .- . ? ? : telligence Agency; and Hall
. ?
rank as co-equals. ? -
Laird's - statement- came a The Defense chief said that
? day after the White House establishment of a National
announced a reorganization Cryptologic Command, to
of the wide-ranging intelli- handle all code-cracking and
gence apparatus of the goy... communications intelligence,
Iernment, -giving Central In- "wil' proceed in an orderly
te,Iligence Age a c y Director ?-
Richard Helms "an enhanced manner." Arid he said his
...-
'leadership role" and coordi-. staff is working on estaohs
natin authority. meat of of a . Defense Map
g
Agency and an Office of De-
IN urn statement, Laird fense Investigati;n: .
: appeared to be backing up
'. the generals' and admirals'
view that each armed force
- must have its own intelli-
. , .
STATINTL
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)11.:Ins
Approved For Release 2001/6361! :bA-RDP80-01601
STATINTL
r-1,- TFrii MI -1'- rri101-1-1::-.1 T. T. .? -
-I , t ,,,, r ' ' * ' ?./ -, . 1\zi. Lams s outies here. vzill he ?
1'041,0 J. 0,U z.,? i . -assumed, by his ,dert:,.7, L.rit::;.1.1.,(4'. lio'nfl:;:ecaPi:el3;1::(Fil:11,neLseePloleiLgi3iedlltasecceiS,3if-sia)t-iiii,
, - --,'.1----- f-i?iL fi C :1.1. RObi'rt E.. Cusot,i.:tn.,t,. . I
I 09;4 i' if -;!, .;tii. i_,! ,,,? ,,,.....? -,'. It creates .a ne-, ,naell,.1.-,
,.. its au Rit. , ._
ilUM1U?i- 11-L'i?"''I'-L6 f;ence subconrnittee unot.,: 4,,,.. (111-2Tsh(Vrcise.Et0 per. cent of cv--
. i National Security Council with erything the United States
the aim of tailoring' the daily spends for intelligence," he-
NiXOtt -Order Alf113 ai: Liot.';/A? "ITO Chid." garnered -hy the na- said. `i lie President hasn't giv-
.
?Intelligonce Cancring lion's vast overseas hdelligence en Helms control Of the D.O.D.'s
netAvorl; closer to the needs of intelligence budget, but at least
? . .._....____??, .. . 'the "consumers". President
lie can now see it and advise
I:.?,y LIENjAI-all IVELI,Ei:.; - Presumably, intelligence sour-
on it:before its prescnted P.S a
. . ? Nixon and his top staff.
WASHINGTON, Nov. 6 ? \yin be merged in to the coml. fait accompli."
_?.....
SiAcial to M.?. Nu.; York 7-1il! . cos say, the Forty Committee
President Nixon has given ell's new subcommittee since
Richard Helms, his 3).iroctor of the membership of each is iden-
Central Intelligence, new or-. Cent:
'dors-- and new authority?to:
/'-,lot 1.:Z .
trim costs and improveAhvays esponsiv the out-1 .
- _put of the nation's global in- --Til? I'veslils-i- d31, Henry
telligence system. ? . - [Kissinger] 'ha\ e felt that the
intJligence we were coiled:in-
In a E':...ateille.Ilt i5;SiIP.0 y?sr-e-.
day by the White Lt,?11,._,0 ..,_ wasn't always respOtisiVS- to,
under circiunstances strong1ty
their needs," said one source
sugrsting, it was designed ''They suspected that one yea-
to
attract as little public. notice as son was because the intelli-
possible----Mr. Nixon disclosed gence community had no way
details of a far-reachin .of knov,-IN; day to day what
OE, rc-
rganization. the - President and Kissinger
\ - I
Intelligence expert, bare b,,:,.i needed. This . is a new lin: be-
?,1 -hove that Mr.' Dehns, P.I.Tr:C4 twe.:31-)rci(luccrs `..-nd consumers
We'll have to ,wait and see if
with Ids 710A7 Pre.sidentlai hacit-!
ing, may be able in the comin:,,,?
, it works."
Mr. Kissinger Nvill mid the
months. to cut $I--billion from
chairmanship of the new sub-
the S5-billion to S6-billion that
committee to several others he
the United States spends year-
ly to ascertain, with shy satel- ? PireadY li?1("s* .
.E.tes, electronic eavesdropping, Another development in the
Alecret agents and other soLtr- president's reorganization is the /
ces, Soviet and Chinese Corn- cit soon cf a "net assessment 1.
7, ip" hiside Mr. Kissinger's
munist i niliia ry developm ents . ?E"c-'
National Security Council stall.
The reorganiaation plan, which
has been under study at the It will be headed by -Andrew
Office of Management ? and
hr. Marshall, a con.sultent with
Iludget for at least a year;
-_ the Land Corporation of Los
?
makes three main changes, in- Angeles. ,
torments say: "Net assessment means corn- ?
I, It gives Mr. Helms, who Is paring oyer-all U.S.S.R. forces!
?
ti3 years old, the fir:t authority and capabilities wi.th those of
ever given an intelligence chief the U.S.," said a;1 American
to revic.,:w----and thus affect-- 5nteligence expert. "It's as coin-
'the _budgets of all the nation's. -placated a calculus as exists.
1 foreign intelligence agencies as
We in the inteligence world of-
well as the Central Intelligence' 'ten know more about Soviet
Agency, which he will continue forces and capabilities than we
to head. The other agencies in- -do about our own------and this
dude units within the 3.)efonse DOW group is intended to pull it
,and State Departments, the al together in one place for thei'A.to7-nie Energy Commission and President," - . --'-
? the Federal Bureau of Investi- .
.? ? Resources Committee
-galion.? .
: 2. It will free Mr. rlehrts Under the new plan Mr.
,
ibility for espionage, counter-
from much day-lo-d,sy respon- Plelms ? wil also head an Intel- /
ligence Resources - Advisory
espionage and such 'covert ope- Committee" on which will be
xations as the White House represented the state and De-
pot-lb:Really orders through its tense Departments, the office
secret 'Folly Committee." of Management and Pudget and
- This committee, named for a the C.I.A. ?
Mlnlbered rileMoraLduni - in- The white house announce-
dudes Henry A. Kissinger, tht. meat said that the committee
J
V White Muse national sectifiv' Nyill."advise tlx D.C.I. on the
assistant, Attorney General preparation of a consolidated
.. john N. Mitchell, tit,dter Secre- program budget." Ti-ds, in the
tary of State John N. Irwin 2d, view of experts, is Mr. Holm's
Deputy Defense Secfetery Da- new authority to supervise and,
vid .Pachard, Adm. Thomas H. at least partly, - control tr,.:
Moot or, 'chairman of the joint volved .
in collecting inteligence.
Chiefs of Staff, and Mr. Helms.1 ? ? -
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STATINTL .?
WASIIINGTON STICt?,
Approved For Release 2001/04/Q4W MAi-RDP80-0160
I 11 111 Ili 0
1"--'. ! i- r
wic:'''''' il ii !
t,.. :::.:d IA ii i?
11
ji tik, ti
\\ A /1," ._
0 if;
I ,_?-,
cr:z "7.7-4 ri, , , /7.:.:) ra c ?,\.., , I t, f.i
.1 ?..'::. ii t..) t;..;") it b ii ,' ? : V..-a-J L r.3 .,.
By GEORGE SHERMAN
- Star Staff Writer
Y'resident Nixon's drastic reordering of the intelligence com-
munity brings still more power to that White house adviseir-
extra.ordinaire----Ilenry A. Kissinger.
',. People rnwt intimately involved see the erstwhile proles-
,/ sor's passion for order and efficiency triumphing.
Or) one level CIA Director Richard Belms was given a man-?
date to become director of all 1
s
American intelligence. in fact, 1 Options Discussed
as well as in mune,
- . The . options also are dis-
' -
'- But on the White House level, , cussed by the National Security
Kissinger was put at lno
, oe r the_ I Council--whose chairman is the
1 i-,, ? ,
resident, and wnose members
new "National Security Council Include the secretaries of State
intelligence Committee' provid- and Defense. Furthermore' the
int.; "guidance and direction" to. State Department, through Rog-
Helms.
i ers, has the power to submit its
own recommendations directly
In other words, under the re-. to the President on any given
shaping'orclered Friday, helms option.
has the job of coordinating the, But in nearly three years,
?
; 1 i
work of the often-warring ?011-e--.KiAnger's driving energy and
ligence agencies, inside and OtH devotion to detailed staff work
-side the Pentagon. For the first!: ' a,u - ? , i
per- i---plus his rsputco ntellec-
time, with en expanded
..tual power?h m ave given hi the
so 1l staff, he will be in charge
of drawing up one intelligence upper hand. Be and his staff
budget-- now unofficially reck-
oned at $5 billion yearly.
Kissinger at Helm
But the direction in which his
machine goes will be deter-
c;)
initiate government-wide policy
studies, and precious little na-
tional security policy is decided
by the President against Kissin-
ger's advice.
mined by Kissinger's commit- In the intelligence shake-up
tee. This group, of which Helms, the Kissinger apparatus will
Attorney General John N. Mitch- . also get powers at the lower
oil, undersecretaries from the levels. The mechanism is a new
State and Defense Departments, iNet Assessment GrQup (NAG)
.and the chairman of the Joint ,headed by Anthony Marshall, a
Chiefs of Staff also are merit-senior member of Kissinger's
hers, will determine the intel-; White House staff.
ligence assessments which get "The functions of NAG- will
to President Nixon. be just what the rIST110. sug-
gests," said one insider ? "to
nag the intelligence commit-
: That means the group is to be
'responsible for suggestiers to
Helms & Co. that they should
assess what results might flow
abroad from :any policy under
consideration in the White'
House. Naturally, Kissinger,
chairman of the Sensor Review
Group, will be in a position to
know, what those possible pol-
icies are. So the Kissinger shop
becomes practically the coordi-
nator between policy and intel-
ligence.
The job of NAG- also will be
to produce comparative assess-
ments of the relative strength
of various world powers. It -will
do this by pulling together in-
telligence estimates from all
1/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6
. ? The new committee is simply
the latest addition to that na-
?tional security council system
"Kissinger has systematically set
:up in almost three years in the
:White House. It is roughly akin
/ to the Senior Review Group,
which Kissinger also heads, re-
- sponsible for filtering the for-
eign policy options which reach
.the, President.
According to most insiders,
this Review Group has been the
vehicle for Kissinger's virtually
'taking control of foreign policy
;away from more passive Score-
tory of State William P. Rogers.
,Interdepartme;ntal groups from
the state, defense and other in-
?terested departments feed pol-
icy options into the Kissinger
:shop,. which reviews them for
ApprEfitd11.2bOfee 20
over the government?political,
military and ccenomic. Por in-
stance, .NAG v,,ould assess tlic
strategic balance between the
U.S. .and Soviet Union, or be-
tween the Arab world ,e.nd
All of which adds up to a ma-
jor new 'responsibility for Kis-
singer. It also marks a major
step in Nixon's drive to put cen-
tralized control. over every vital
government function in the
White House.
STATINTIL ?
STATI.I\ITL
Approved For Release 2001l3l104 itiA-RDP8
STATIN
ay ALNOLD it, ISAACS
Washington Eureau of The Sun
Washington?Fresident Nixon
moved yesterday to improve co-.
ordination among. the govern-
ment agencies involved in for-
eign intelligence activities.
Part of the plan would tie the
intelligence effort more ? closely
into, the National Security Coun-
cil apparatus headed by Ms.
Nixon's most influential foreign-
policy adviser, Henry A. Kissin-,
gar. . ? - ?
The reorganization also will
mean that Mel-lard Ilelms, the
-director of centrallintelligence,-
Will turn over many of his agen-
cy's day-to-day operations to his
deputy and spend more time as
the government'. general
gence overseer. i ?
The CIA chief theorotieelk;
has been the head of the v.lioio
"intelligence community" clue,
'1
1
lI i
1 1
1
v
1 1
I
the l-ilennedy administration, ? ItKliftAti.11 it li-j.,i.NIS DENRY I.OSSINMilia. . . . t ?
, Prealdtrig Over the United States the world. The unit will be holid- It . Proposals to revamp the Intel- .across the border when North ,
tj. ]McIllgence Donal. But the Jim- ed bY Andrew Marshall, tile.] ligence structure have been Vietnamese forces in the Iron-
its of his authority novel: 1111Ve. I; and Corporation's former floating through the adminislra- tier .:,:one proved to be?fac strong-
beLII defined very precisely. director of strategic stud;as, - . lion for Many nlonths. tfhtil plan a than had ken anticiil.??tcd. 1
The White- Home, announcing The clA director 1,,,;11 he ?iven announced yesterday was. draft- .. ?, ..._,?.?.
the new structures -yesterday, ,,, ?, ., .,_, ?, ,,, ,,,,, . c., ? ed primarily by the National Se-
SE11(1 thi...y ere designed "to irn. rin ebnencco ..paia:t.Aup Imo', ? . entity Council staff and the Of
scrving as chairman of a_ rc?2-On? lice of Manar,crnent and Midget.
prove the. efficiency and effec- , ,-?
tiVeness? of the intelligence- stiii---,11.(1 ll 1-e,'S' in nc
telligee bi.-)ard , - -- 2 fon6s--cited
in , . n?
agencies, V, -Nell together employ all? also ha h' a new 11"
MI estimated 200,000 persons-- gelice Besourcea AdvisqlY Com-./ Questions about the present
three-fol.niths of them military, ,mitfcci which Will dr"\'''_,U,4) 1,)r: SYStelll' effeCtiveness seemed
set vicenlell ? an .1 spend about posals for a consolidaleo onager to collier mainly on the Defense
billion a year. . -for allthe MtelligenCe agellAS, 71ALel " 11.lgth'. ? '
.11A e
? Mr. Nixon also ordered the . -. . Two notable intelligence fail-
Li ,
Marine in charge
\/ e.alion of a hew National Peru - - , - ? -- Pres inlndoehina have Lem cit- i
-cid as causing-. the failure Of an
rity Co;.tnell hilell-genc cont'.. Officials said this means that
initro.i.., v.h,H, 1,),?? Eif.,,inger win - the CIA's deputy director, Lt.' / if 11 .I. 1
U.S.. troops in No
II ou,se i yil direction Marine Corp
-I
ti,,,?:L The comp:1;11(.0,- the white Gen. Robert E. Cwritisihillakno oof\tielic.y
.vene.; 1.1i i c):;, 1)4, to rescue Anieri- 1
sad, " \i p;ivc s,
IUI,ahance on 1.,;;Jionai intern., - m,ut.;11 Of. the responsibility fOr I can prisoners of war from the .;
n.!ii .poi2ds,, and ninvile fo,. a the CIA's own operations. . 1 S011fay P11 00 ca m p in North
Vietwitin . and as having Ii on
contit.uin,:i ( volual'a of. intelli-? - . Government agencies repre- ;
?
ttenef pro:hick," .
Seated on the intelligence beard I pared the South 'Vietnamese
'. '
.Tinis si.:tfined to ad-ate, that include, beside the CIA, the; campaign in Laos last February
?
STATINTL.
-the council will have greatly -ex- State DeParImeot's burn? of
Inth e ne
ellt'e and Research ; the
panded authority over the. differ- '
efense, -Department's National
nit oLfencies. DSecurity Agency, WilliC11 Special-
tile:: council's . lees in code-cracking; the Pe-
i a new "net, assassement group," tense Intelligence Agency, which
also will ba created; The group has sea: ate Army, Navy and
,svill evaluate intelligence data
and make studies 'on the relative
balances
ApOrovedeForim
and March.
. In 1110 Sontay attempt, the
Army -and Air Force raiders
lamied only to discover that all
the P.O.W.'s lind? been moved
out. ,
Air Force components working; In the. Laos eampaig,n, the
cm military intelligence; the; South Vietnamese Army suft,
400 il04/04,,,Y?1101A4kbP8044604R001300400001-6
-units? were sent reeling back. f
m?ission.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601
HARRISBURG , PA .
PATRIOT'
PATRIOT ?NEWS
S ? 1591880
f4r.:1! 6
?v:?1,1 "
STATI NTL
. ?An intelligence -committee
/1-F. - . will be set up within the Na-
Tr At\ . rill- ' 4, 02 --fl,, i 1---tt.p cm, f-;-.1 t: tional Security Council which
1,..ftiL.4,.../.?._ . , .
j ''''' t I 1 --11--"-il ',; -U- It:4-1C:- 4:-''').'. ' will be headed by Jr. Henry A.
. Kissinger, presidential adviser
- on national security affairs.
,
The committee will include the
CIA director, the attorney gem
\\7fr'' Tiof II
N _
} I, -II -Pi 0
1
T.11...,.....u..,L: defense and the chairman of
T 1' '1 9 '
, the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
C .'.
,
From The Patriot Wire SeMees But Nedzi questioned the ad- ?A "net assessment group"
WASHINGTON -- CIA Direc- be 9 ; will . established within the
ditional duties given Hehns.
tor Richard A. Helms has been WNT a t i o a a I Security Council
ci
c
t th
b
doubts about e apal yv
given broad overall supervision have ;Nvhich will be responsible for
in an overhaul of the United of any. one person to be able to; reviewing and evaluating all
States' intelligence gathering oversee the entire inielligencentelligence,
Operations, the White House operation .and at the same time
announced yesterday. - ' administer the CIA," the con-
Officials said Helms would gressman said.
be freed from some operational The reorganization also re-
responsibility at the Central In- vived the old U,S. Intelligence
telligence Agency to assume Board whose membership will
"communitywide responsi- include Helms, FBI Director J.
bilities of the several scattered Edgar Hoover, the chief of the
intelligence operations." Defense intelligence agency
Chairman .George H. Mahon and representatives of. other
of the House Appropriations agencies with a stake in in-
Committee, which has ? been telligenee operations.
among congressional critics of
Time. magazine -reported in
U.S. intelligence operations,
its October 25 issue that Hen-
said after a: White House brief-
ver recently had "effectively
lug on the reoranization that
cut off the international from
it was a step in the right direc- ?
the national intelligence effort":
tion, but it was too early to pre-
by limiting contacts between
..dict results. , FBI and CIA men. But officials
"I believe we can save per-
flatly denied the report.? .
'sonnel- and money and get
eral, the under .secretary of
state, the deputy secretary of
j
more intelligence," Mahon told Time n the same article said
a reporter, but he quickly Hoover also had abolished a
-
added that intelligence oper. seven-man FBI section that
ations had been repeatedly maintained. eanta.ct with other
U.S. intelligence units, in-:
, reorganized with but limited
' . ' eluding the- defense inie. lligence
. success.
agency.
Rep. Lucien Nedzi,
chairman of a -House armed
,seryices subcommittee with su-
pervisory responsibility for the
CIA and Pentagon intelligence
operations, said he did not find
the new shakeup particularly
_ . _
The-White Hons.?, announce,
e n t listed these specific
steps:
--helms will assume 1"en-
hanced leadership" in plan-
ning, reviewing, coordinating
and evaluating ll intelligence
,programs and activities. .
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6
LOS .1-1-1:10ELES TIiSLf
Approved For Release 200(1/63V040CIATREDINKLO
CIA's 1--hAm; Sn Po Cur, hicncy
Do,eograckd zind S 1R :cive ilcv( Povms
.1rSi DA'017) ERAST.,01,?V
r?ww.0 Chid
AVA.SHINGTON .-- The White
Ifouse announced Friday a shakeup
of. the government's massive Intel-
ligence 'bureaucracy that could have.
major import in enabling the Pres-
Merit to assess mo-re accurately any
Societ -threat to the United States.
Richard Helms, director of the
Central I n Le-1). igence Agency,
emerges from the long-planned reor-
ganization as an even stronger fig-
ure. with responsibility for coordi-
nating all intelligence activities.
Some sources said Helms' role could
develop into that, of an intelligence
czar.
Henry A. Kissinger, President,
Nixon's assi'stant for rational securi-
ty. affairs, and the National Security
Council' staff also are given signifi-
cant new powers in the shakeup.
Pniclg?:4-Clearing i'rocethlre ?
The Pentagon's hugh Defense In-
telligence Agency is downgraded
and will be required, along with oth-
er intelligence .arms of the govern-
/Anent, to clear its budget through a
/ new Intelligenc..e Resources Advi-:_,0.
ry Committee chaired by Helms.
Informed sources said the shakeup
reflected the President's unhappi-
ness with the quality of information
supplied :him on occasion and his be-
lief that the splintered intellige.nee
activities can be coordinated better..
:The President also is. convinced, it
was said, that the government's in..
telligence reliably estimated
at about $5 billion .a year now?is
mmccessazily high. Administration
OfZicials -hope to achieve a saving of
at least. several. hundred million dol-
lars along with greater efficiency.
For years Many in Congress mid in
the executive branch have thought
that . the govern-Merit's intelligcmce
: effort, because of grov?,th of at a f f and.
... fragmentation among va-rious agen.
cies, was becoming unmanageable
1,r,:id that the cost; was getting cut of
hand. . .
The. studies that led to Friday':;
an ricu nee rcicr, v,,ere Iat inched. se_:
cretly by the National ? Sceurity
Council more than a year ago.'?
A major change, which for the
first time will give the White House
the expert .capability. to make its
own intelligence evaluation of such
'strategic problems as the Soviet mis-
Helnas' 'strengthened po-
sition vihi derive in large
measure from his new au-
h or it y over what the
White House described as?
a "consolidated i ii t
ligence program budget."
Never before has there
been. a single intelligence
budget. Under the present
system each agency en-
sile threat, is the establishment of gaged in intellig,ence
the Net Assessmant Group withinisubmits its on budget
the National Security Council; staff. quest to the lite House.
The group will be headed by a se- Under the reorganize-
nior staff member. A 1,yhite: House ;Jon the budget requests
source said that job o.vould go to An will go to the committee
drew W. llOW director ofj chaired
by Helms and STATI NTL
strategic studies at. the Rand Corp. ..'?hose membership wilt
Iii Santa :\lonica. . 'include representatives of
The different interpretations that the state and Defense
do-
tile Pentagon and the CIA have giv- z..nd Office
en to the construction of about. COv '1"
of Management and Budg-
missile silos in the Soviet Union is
expected to be one .of the first, strate-
gic policy problems to be
put 'before the NAG.
. The. SiZO. Of tire defense
budget and the strategic
arms linliThtiOn talks with
the Russians could be af-
fected by whatever cle.cl-
sion the President finally
3nakes regardin's the pur-
pose of thqse still-empty
silos.
Pentagon analysts have
tended to a more alarmist
reading of the silo con-
struction, suggesting the
'Russians may be develop-
ing a new weapons system
for offensive purposes. ?
:While not ruling, out
that possibility, the CIA, it
is understood, tends to the
view that the silos are de-
signed primarily to afford
greater protection for mis-
siles already in being and
are therefore defensive.
Thus, where differences
arise in the intelligence
community on strategic
questions, the NAG would
be expected to reduce such
disputes ? to manageable
proportions for the Pres-
et.
Also among the 'major
management improv e-
ments" announced by the
White House were:
?"An enhanced lead-
ership role" for the direc-
tor of central intelligence
(Helms) in "planning, re-
vie-Wing, coordinating and
evaluating all intelligence
programs and activities,
and in the production of
national intelligence." .
--Establishment of a
National Security Council
I n t elligence Committee,
-.chaired ?by the President's
nationel security assistant
(Kissinger), whose mem-
bership "will include the
attorney ? general, the di-
rector ? of central ir4el-
ligence, the undersecreta-
ry of state, the deputy sec-
reedy of defense and the
chairman .of . the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. -
" That "committee is to
"give direction and guid-
ance on national intel-
li?e.nee needs and provide
for a continuing evalua-
tion of Intelligence prod-
ucts from the viewpoint
of. the intelligence user."
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Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-016
PHIL.ADELP HI A , P A .
QUIRER
M - 463,503
SS67,S10
NOV 6 197)L:.
IA\ D-q..-Trorzi-kr!-4-117,"
. v? kLp
.1:(Lp /veilLuli,
/
. 1
::??? ?
WASHINPTON (UPI).
The White House announced
on Friday president Nixon
has ordered an ovprhall of the ,
government's intelligence op-
&aliens", assigning Richard
? Helms, director of the Central
? Intelligence Agency, a broad-
;er overall supervisory role.
jAdministration officials said'
that Helms would be freed'
from some -operational re-
sponsibilities at the CIA and
assume "community-wide re-
sponsibilities" in the U. S.
foreign intelligence gathering
? operations;
The White House announce-
?
o
L ;OI
A -;n Tr
v./ ,1_,/
STATINTL
0 ;11 1 trZy1-1! GO-gra p
A 1.1J
?
RICHARD HELMS
wider restionsibility
meat listed these specific
steps:
?HELMS WILL assume
" 1 ed leadership" in
en ianc ? ________. _
planning, reviewing, coordina-
ting and evaluating all intelli-
.
gence programs and activit-
ies.
--AN INTELLIGENCE
committee will be set up with-
in the National Security Coun-
cil which will be. headed by
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Pres:
?idential adviser en national
security affairs. The commit-
tee will include the CIA direc--
tor, -the attorney general, the
under secretary of state; the
deputy secretary of defense
and the chairman of the
joint chiefs of staff.
?A ? "NET ASSESSMENT
7 - 0
]
. p I?
? .
1;1)(9 0 rdis
?
group" will be established .
. within .the .national security
council which will be respell-
? sible for reviewing and evalu-
ating all intelligence.
" ?AN "INTELLIGENCE-,
- resources advisory commit-
- tee," headed by Helms, will
advise on the preparation of a ,
consolidated intelligencepro-
. .
gram budget.'
: The White House said that a
national cryptologic com-
mand, a code-breaking organ-
ization, would be set up under
the National Security Agency
to consolidate work now being
'carried out in differenl agen-
cies. . _
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Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01
PHILADELPHIA, PA.
VULLETIN
-1\10\1 6 w)7)
E 634,371
S - 701,743
I I '1,7
? r)
,
- Mr. 'Nixon also ordered re-
construction of the United
States Intelligence Board to
be headed by Helms .and to
include representativeso f the
CIA, the Federal Bureau of
1 ? ,.: 11 . Investigation, . the Treasury iv,inr111,,r[, Department, Atomic. Energy
ii d U'C7 6 t???11.' Commission and the National
Security Agency.
g'-'' r '' ri.
I . i
i '?.'.1 i4 IA ," ?I V ':
t! til4 df._-1,
V' ' t,li , Rep: Lucian Ne .(D-')/
Mich),chairman of a House
Armed Services subcommittee
CI
0 with supervisory responsi-
bility for the CIA and Penta-
gon intelligence operations,
saidh eh ad doubts "about the
capacity of any one person to
.,? be able to oversee the entire
intelligence operation and at
the same time tinea dminis-
ter h CIeA." . .
it. Gen. Robert E. Cush-
man, deputy director of the
CIA, was expected to take
over many helms' operating
responsibilities.
Other provisions .. include
creation of a "net assessment
j group" within the National
Security Council to evaluate..
all intelligence; and estab-
lishment of a "intelligencer ?e-
sources advisory committee,"
headed by Helms and which
will advise on the preparation
of a consolidated intelligence
program budget.
? ?
? Nixon Desionotos
Direcipr
Aupncie's
Washington --- (UPI) --
President Nixon has ordered
the nation's scattered military
andcivilian intelligence gath-
ecringo perations to be consoli-
dated under the leadership of
Cia Director Richard M.
Helms.
"---The White House said
?Helms wads bed some of his
duties as director of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency to
spy and . counter-spy agenciqs
tral Intelligence Agency to
cbordinate the work of U.S.
spy and counter-spy agencies
as the result of al engthy ex-
ecutive branch study of dupli-
cation of efforts in their oper-
ations.
? - Congress?onaI committec's
:have long been critical of al-
leged overlapping of intelli-
gence activities and the ,new
plan won ;tentative -approvale
of one keY. lawinaker, Rep.
George H. Mahon -(D-Tex)
chairman. of the House .appro-
priaticms Committee.
? Helms will work with a new
National Security Council in-
telligence committee headed
by presidential aide Henry
.Eissinger and consisting. of
the attorney general, the
.chairman Of the Joint Chiefs
.of Staff and .representatives of ;
the Statedild Defense Depar.t-
m.ts ?
?
STATI NTL
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Approved For Release Ot
?,0
? 1t,11011A11?171 RELMS
. . . intelligence chief
t11/71
Ii I c); 0
c ,
.11-
GEN. 111-01111RT CUSI1MAN
... new CIA duties
_
I
401
he may assume his neV,,. gbv- Tim White House announce??
ernment-w?ide responsibili Les, merit zilso said that P1 \1 i
officials said. has -ordered three -consolida-I
He will turn over many of , ePtitagon's intcl
i
.-i
? his operating responsibilitiesirons in the -
ligence organization:
: for the Central Intelligence .
0 A natimial cryptologicl
: A.gency to his deputy director,
Marine Lt. Gcn., Robert F. command to consolidate all!
Cushman -Jr. .
- . communications intelligence I
I' Cushman served folic xcars
activities tinder the clii?ector of
as the -national security aide
the National Security Agency,1
of then-Vice President Nixon
?the monitoring and cot-10'0'1.0a.-
-from 1957 to 1950, and is con-
ing agency with headquarters
sidered close to Mr. Nixon.
at Fort Meade, Md.
? Helms ?will become chair-
0 An office of Defense In-
man Of a reconstituted U.S. inv
vestigations, to consolidate all
telligence board to considei? personnel security investiga-
national intelligence require-. tions in the Defense Depart.-
. ments and priorities, the semi- ment.idly ?
0 A Defense m-ap agency to
Of intelligence data and
the protection of intelligence "Inhirm the now separate
? mapping, charting and geo-
sources and methods. detic.organizations of the mill-
Other members of the board tiny services. ?
Officials said the reorganiza:
?vill be Cushman, chiefs of ?
the major intelligence agen- tion is "not a plan to save
? cies Of the Defense and State.
Departments and representa-
tives. of the Treasury Depart-
77 ? 3nellt, Federal Bureau of In-
0, Deputy Defense Secoe-../Viashillorit-o?il-
ttiry David Packard,. ono of they National Terms
moat outspoken government of-
ficials, indicated he was lint ell-
1)1e,:so,,f; by the way the
struggile had worhed out.
? ? '".1.'hore have. keen prone
thinking if we just had someone
over in the. White House to ride
herd on this over-all intelligence
that things would be improved,"
he said. "I don't really support
that view. After having experi-
ence with a .lot of people- in the
White house the last couple. of
years, trying to coordinate all
kinds of things, I think if any-
thing we need a little less-.C.301.-
dinationofrom that point than
-Because the Defense Depart-
ment spends most of the. money
and employs, most of the peo-
ple and. machines involved in
the changes.. will
have a major impact there.
Consolidation Is Hey
The President ordered the
consolidation of all Defense De-
partment security investigations
into a s,:ngle Office, of.))eferise
Investigations and the consoli-
dation of all mapping and chart-
ing activities into a Defense
Map Agency. Defense officials
Although the tendency is to
think in terms of national 'in-
telligence?the kind of informa-
tion on v.rhich the President
bases major decisions, for ex-
-bulk of the intel-
ligence gathered by the various
agencies is ol a tactical nature,
involving such things as the day-
to-day movements of potentially
hostile ships.
The -White House said Helms
a career intelligence officer,
would tura over most of his
CIA operational responsibilities
to his deputy, Marine Lt. Gtm.
Robert E. Cushman Jr., So' he
can devote more time to the
leadership of the -over-all in-
telligence community. .
Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi,
D-Mictn, 0?
chairman of a House ?Armed
Services subcop?,ittee that has
;been looking into the nation's
intelligence operations, said his
concern is that the changes or-
dered by the President place /
an added burden on Helms who,
he said, already has a. "super-
j
? human ob." ? .
'One wonders if any human is-
apable of that kind. of respon-
sibility,' he
STATINTL
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I J ,N
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HICTITAT if) HELMS
IIENTri: ISSJisCFfl
C
04&./
c.\ji (7 :11 if If- !!'
0
? r ii , ' - I/ , 13 ri ?
I +
1. ri i..n cl i.r.11i 'ij:".i 11 li ij
i ii c-,2) i 11 11 :1 \:-..-':::., t! LI !i :-.-T`l \.:::,::? il IA ,,,-.1
?
By GARNETT D. 110nNER
-Star Staff Writer
The White House announced a series of steps today aimed Among other changes .ordered
at improving U.S. foreign intellk;ence. . by the President the White.
. - The new setup in effect makes Central Intellic,"cnce Agency House said, a National Crypto-
Director Richard Helms a sort of super boss of all government logic Command will be set up
intelligence operations, inlcuding Fentaon activities in this field, under the director o'f. the Nation-
As the White House put it, Helms will have "an enhanc'ed al Seclirity Agenc,y to consoli-
leadership role" in planning, re- lec-7-17311Je1 intethgence pro. date code-brealdnq
,, activities
viewing, and evaluating, all incl - grarn budet.." now carried out .by sepearate
ligence progriuns and activities. In this 'role, the offichds said_ agencies. -?
. 'Officials said the CIA director the CIA director v,ould have a To rir.! C.onsolidatea
will delegate moat of his CIA key voice in the allocation. of Another change involves con-
operational responsibilities to available rescul'ces b c t vi 0 0 n solida tion of ml Defense Depart- .
the deputy director, now Marine so-called "tactical intelligence" inent personnel security investi-.
Lt. Oen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., of the military service intelli- gations into a single Office of
in order to give more - time to gence arms and broader-scale Defense Inve.stigations. I
leadership of the intelligence 'activities. - The President also directed
community as a whole.l The CIA director also is made that a Defense Map Agency be
1
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, pres..i_Ichairman of a reconstituted U.S. created by combining the now-
dent NixOn's assistant for na- intelligence board, which in separate ma ping charting and
tional security arfa-i,c; .0;,.,., ,, dudes di.rectors of the State De- eodetic organizations of the
given a key role in -16,,,,, erlill.it.u_.?',..partment s Bureau of ? Int0M military services in order to
gence field as chairman oefaja genc! arld Research, the N ationr.achieve maximum efficiency
National Security Council Intelli- ' Security Agency, the director , and economy.
of the Defense Intellicience i The White House said the
gence Committee. ,.,
Agency, and representatives of President's cl?jectives in order-
- The WhiLe House said this the Treasury Department, the inn the changes in the intelli-
committee "will give direction FBI and the Atomic Energy igence field n0 to ITSUre continu-
and guidance on notional MI:011i- oornihissi011. . I mi,c review of the responsiveness,
gence needs ,and provide for a This board, the White Rouse of intelligence effort to national
commumg evaluation of nitelli- said, will "advise and assist"
1 i needs; streng,thend leadership
gence products from
Lle v-7-'w- the CIA director "with respect for the community as a whole;
? point of the intelligence user." to the production of rational in-.
more efficient use of rcsourcs
The CIA director will be a mom- telligence, the establishment of in the collection of intelligence
ber of this committee. national intelligence reginre- information; elimination of less
Much of the CIA director's ments and priorities, the super- efficient or out-moded activities,
new power wilt come from his vision of the dissemmation and .and "improvement in the quail-
role as chairman of a new Intel- security of intelligence material, ty, scope and timeliness of intel-
ligence H e s o u r c e s Advisory and the protection of intelligence ligence information,"
Committee, which will actykx; sources and inethods." .
-.him "on the Preparation of a
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?
STATINTL
?
WASIIIIIGT011 POG9
Approved For Release 2
.'e1?-',.,
j
',..... 0 - \ 0 1-
0
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.. ?.
t ?
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,..,, ?.,
i/MOCICIA-RDP80-01601
STATI NTL
14114 v -tv Fi1 s I I, y
Li!ltek,k Cited in
By Sttntley Karnow. _ , There et-c'e these, particu- 'won either NVfty, F311Ce PC-
' . 1- 1 1.1 d Anthony Astrachan .. .
laylv inside the official U.S. ling had a:..:,Teed to the pies_
foreit?tn Po-lie. aPParatus, ,ident's visit ss Ii te. t the
. wasbalatoa P.xA St p.f f Writer.-; .
. Wl10 - See it latigely as a mc- outcome at the U.N."
Q. Mr. SeerefulT, wil11 00 rhanical failure sustained by in terms of energey ex.
poll think We lost?
the bureaucracy. They con- Tended for results attained,
?
,
A. We . didn't /one the: . tend that the day could have- they , 41e. real American
aa
Votes, (Laughter) been saved had the united loser at the U.N. seems to
1.
. Q. Seriously, 1 mewl ? : ? . States had more time to sell have been the State Depart-
Secretary of State William its position and, anl?rIg ment. Its setback appears to
riori,iersi4News confcrencc, Oct. other things, had certain reinforce the prevailing
26, him A m e r 5 e a n ambassadors Washington view that its
. Last MonclaV ni,lit the abroadi,?erformed better. role in foreign affairs is neg.
_United States' rnet.%"-stitit- M th
any of ese officials ligible compared b..," the
. . also argue that the adminis- power wielded by the Presi-
. ning diplomatic defeat as a , tration's "dual 1? r1 dc?if, and Kla5iinf,fer.
majority of the -General As. lion" proposal was biller- Preparatiofts for the Gen-
sembly voted to expel Na, ently contradicted, by 11 that
.,.., --le eral Assembly vote at oc-
,tionalist China from the Presenee of IlenrY 1\-Issin- curred on Monday night
United Nations and seat the per, President Nixon's na-
. reach back to the U.N. de.
'Chinese Communist 'regime ti?nal security athlsen, in bate on China that took
its the intermitional 01 'III roking just as Yaso,Ingtou pittee llearlY?a Year ago.
zation, :. .waS urging nations to sup-
. The U.S. setback appeared port a U.N. position viru-
, then, the United Stittes Ii For two decades before
to he devastating because so ,,, . ,,"1)().st'cl . , bY the systematically rejected the
Jenny
ijrnany American officials in ? idea of bringing the Chinese
kaninese uommunisis.
On tile other side, several -
a na \ s s 111 ?111( 011 - 0 the U0111MUniStS in.to pointer-
-Washington, New York and ... 1 .,..i ? . i t - f ti
government e x p r e s s the national organization in any
'around the World had ".
worked so hard to Prevent- opinion that the entire U N shape 2r forrOal. But on Nov.
that outcome. exercise Was actually a Clla.
? ? 12, 1910, there *Was a hint
that the old U.S. line was
- Early this month, for ex- rade staged by the adminis- .
.
--ample, Secretary of State tration for two essential mo- shifting'.
Christopher
Rogers talked with a tot es-
al of tiv- -to fend off the Presi- Ambassador ,
If. Phillips, the deputy chief
92 foreign ministers and dent's conservative critic's
- at home and to assure of the American mission to
. America's conservative al- the U.N., asserted in a
other foreign delegates in
an . effort to persuade them ,. ? speech that day that the
failed of adoption, however,
because the United Stales
had won its motion to Make
the issue an "important
question" requiring a two-
thirds margin.
. The narrowness of that
victory made it plain to the
White house that the
United States urgently
needed a new policy lest it
suffer a defeat in the next
round on-China. On Nov. 19,
1970, consequently, Kissin- ?
ger sent a National Security-
Memorandum to Secretary
Rogers requesting the crea-
tion of a special committee
to review the Chinese repre-
sentation issue and. to Yee-
ommend fresh strategy.
Headed by Assistant Sec-
retary of State Samuel de
Palma, chief of. the Bureau
of International Organiza-
tion Affairs, the committee
comprised ? about 35 State
Department and Central In ? V
i LS tisk- ? Cr (IL zt.lt"
paper to be sent to the Na-
tional Security Council,
which inturn would advise
which in turn would advise
As it held its delibera-
tions, the committee grad-
ually became pOlarized be
abroad that the United
to' support the U S. position
4- United. et`,1e31 110 K i to See
. to eon members who favored
-, states does not betray its
which favored the entry of friends. , - . Communist China "play
a '
Pc!li.ing without ousting partisa?s of this lb constructive role aniong the all-out support for Peking s
Chiang Kaiisheh's National- consider it significant that family of nations." . admission to the U.N. and
ists. George Bush; the chief the President carefully re- ? Phillips implied in the advocates of both Com-
s
. American. representative at frained from -dep c- lorin the same speech that the United
m u n i t and Nationalist
repyesentzttion in the inter-
Texas Politician to swing' instead de o dr It des ' .
the U.N., lobbied lit a ztclyerse U.N. vote itseff but S.:0?1-tis t\i'.1.e?111.1_(-1Lxii.iv.?ckieltrAate tleo ii 1101 body. Nobody .be
-
votes behind the "dual rep- who cheered the final seore. -block the ouster of National- lieved, ? in short, that the
neuncega
resentation" proposal.informants with aCOSS to 1st China. The article stipu. Communists could be kept.
c
' Meanwhile, U.S. envoys in Kissinger also now rceall lates that a member nation out. ?
that he treatea the U.N. can only be expelled by a in February, Waal' examin-
places as familiar DS LOnclon
"as if it didn't nuttier."
and as exotic aF, the' Trucial jssue tWo-thirds vole.- 111'1 a wide assortment Of Straddling these divergent Although it was not en- ,b
Coast were striving to sway the consmittee Sb--
kingpre-
s, dictators, Presidents, explanations, so3ne sources tirely clear at the time, the
sent ed the White House
ttons,
premiers and lesser foreign point out that the choice Phillips statement signalled ??
prineipal Options
dignitaries into baching the facing the administration that the United States was wl":?1 two
American stance, was never as cicarcut as it e'dging towards the 'dual arnal'a'31e4,. li
What went wrong?.01. was ceemed to be--and that, in rePresenUltion" Position it `'ne o' ?lase' 1 av?red TV
a-is these who wanted to S2C
the result of the U?N? void so lits Cu White Nouse .would later ' put forth. in
now ,i,),.)roaoh was prompted .only the Communists in the
really a failure for 11-10 preferred to shroucl ils strat- ' 'I' U.N., became lenot?vn ill
egy in atnbiguity. by the 1970 vote on China.
s.11oo State Department. jargon as
Nixon administration? . .
In the post mortems that For the first time 1
"se "
follow uc
sh historic . epi? "From the President's the U.N. strutgOe the inl with the ship
. over
.
so les versions of 'What, how perspectit.re, there were risks Chinese! representation had geunbit It recommended?
that the administration con,
and as the event unfolclud and gains in eithe r r begun esult bn,
, the s1 ii Al ?
Unite to back the Natioirl-
inevitably differ etecording
and he wfts ivepared to ae- ? ,
banian appeal etilling for Pe. ? : ' - ? ' `?
ist.? ex, lusit eV-- huts ith a
, ept ocuo says one of these s - s ' - a - : i ' full awai eness that they
nd the ?exoul
to the ViCAVpoint of the l'iar- --- ?
. Ariiltitliwa. 141?C.:1. 1411111's c ? ? (!) a? :,? clan Qf the Nationahqs?car- ' - . "---
tr. .., ?OtWA t.? win 1 v.' eas q)2rwl-11 3 , 1 . wolil,?Ao,,e,and thus open
WMM?dit-Nocking's entry.
,int,r.. tior0/014ctiltlicic lAiIROPc80,1316111R001,3004
.broad categories
? 0 CP.t 5.33.1.0(1.
TIATTOITAIJ oumaual
Approved For Release 200f/034O411A-RDP80-
By Robert Barkan
Pacific News Set vice
.. Washington
"1984" may arrive ahead of schedule.
While Army intelligence agents have
been quietly amassing extensive files on
dissidents, scientists have even more quiet-
rj.
fl
??
111, f; k;s
. .
?..S.:..) Q..'
STATI NTL
A.concfltion for bai!
7file transponders proposed by Meyer
would be attached to the "subscribers" as a
condition of bail or parole. Each subscriber
Would be identified by a code transmitted.
several times a minute to a. computer via a
network of transceivers deployed around
ly been developing the technology that will town like police call-boxes. The computer
enable a computer. to control "criminal" would record the "subscriber's" location
actions and emotions. ' and compare it with his "normal sche-
"1984" is still fiction, but no longer ' club," checking for any "territorial or cur-
science fiction.. The technology of the po-
lice state is ready. All that remains is for
. the governmen CU). implement it. ' ?
? The first 'covert slop in that direction
may have already been taken. In the Janu-
-ry issue of Transactions on Aerospace and
Electronic Systems, engineer Joseph Meyer
proposed attaching miniature electronic
tracking devices to 20 million Americans.
These "transponders" would be linked by
radio to a computer which would monitor
the wearers' locations and implement cur--
few and territorial restrictions.
Pentac;on silant ?
. .
.Meyer, a computer specialist, has spent
his last 17 years working for the Defense
Department. Yet the Pentagon has made'
no public statement concerning his propos-
al. Interestingly, Moyer neglected in his ar-
ticle to name the particular Defense De-
partment agency he works for and he gave
his home rather than his business address,
an uncommon practice in. technical jour-
nals.- Reached by phone in their suburban
home, Meyer's wife nervously refused to
divulge Mcye:r's telephone number at work,
insisting that he could be reached only at
'homer early in the?moffiing. The next day,
Meyer laconically refused to name which
agency of the Defense Department he
works for, but a check with the switch-
board operator at the National Security
Agency (NSA). found an extension for him
there: ? ?
Meyer's reticence in naming the Nation-
al Security Agency is understandable. The
NSA is the most secretive of the dbzen of
. _
so agencies that make up the U.S. intern-
gence community. Established in 1952 by
:a still-classified presidential directive, the
agency has remained shrouded in secrecy.
'The NSA has more personnel and larger fa-
cilities than the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy and twice its budget, yet while volumes
have been written about the operations of
?the CIA, very little has been discovered or
few restrictions." If the subscriber was out
of lino, the computer would instruct the
.transponder to "warn" the subscriber of
.his violation.
The transponders would be "attached"
to "subscribers" in such a way that they
couldn't be removed without the computer
knowing it. Tampering with or discarding
transponders would be a felony and a sub-
scriber who .did so, would be forced into
hiding "everywhere he goes," sought by
the FBI. Meyer wants the transponders as-
signed "on a fairly long-term basis," so that
the "subscriber" "will acquire long exper-
ience in not committing crimes."
The scheme's purpose, says Meyer, is to
"constrain criminals and arrestees into be-
having like law-abiding citizens," but in
practice the computer?and its human pro-
grammer?would control the everyday acti-
vities of the people plugged into it."Stib-
scribers" would be identified by a code
transmitted several times a minute to a
computer via a network of transceivers will
"stay close to home; to avoid being impli-
cated in crimes." At work a "human sur-
veillance system" will keep them under
control.
Estimating that the number of trans-
ceivers needed for surveillance in a large
city would be about the same as the num-
ber of policemen, Meyer has all the details
worked out. In New York City's black
community of Harlem, for example, the
transceivers would be strung at one block,
intervals "along 110th Street, 114th,
118th, etc., from 8th Avenue to tiu. river."
North-south strings' of transceivers would surveillance .system," he fears, "tunnels
be installed "on 8th Avenue and several could _be. dug under the streets or move-
n-lain streets to the east." Only about 250 ment through the sewer system. could be
. transceivers would be "capable of monia tried." Worse yet, there might be "massive
toring the whole region on a street- destruction" of transponders in "mutinies
by-street basis." . .? ? ; and large-scale. confrontations."
Like every good engineer, Meyer covers ; "An outright revolt by 25 million arrest-
all the "system parameters" in his propos- ees and criminals," Meyer warns, "would
al?including its social implications. If laws, be troublesome." ,
police, prosecutors, courts, prisons, news
feet, he says, then his scheme could be
proved on the .basis of its "efficiency." But
he admits that criminal acts are frequently
a response to "the social and economic
system." Most people arrested are poor,
members of minoritygroups, or "products
of deplorable circumstances."
Coat a pro hdm,
The Pentagon engineer nonetheless
comes out predictably on the side of law
. and order. The basic problem in preventing
the pc.). and the black from committing
the "criminal acts". with which they re-
spond to the system and their deplorable
circumstances is to ."persuade or conch--
tion" them to "play by the rather arbitrary
rules of 'the social. system." This .can. be
done, says Meyer, "by providing costs for
misbehavior and payoffs .for compliance."
But the' costs - are much clearer than? the
payoffs--"attaching transponders to arrest-
ees and criminals will put. them into an
electronic surveillance system that will
make it very difficult for them to commit
crimes, or even to violate territorial or cur-
few restrictions, without immediate ap-
prehension." Joseph Meyer recognizes that
his transponder, surveillance system could
lead to a "police state," but "the same
could be said about police, jails, courts,
Jaws, taxes and so on." . .
Transponders, he thinks; will help the
.government protect itself from the people.
For example, they might be used as "puni-
tive devices" against political "criminals,"
that- is, "for arrests following riots or con-
frontations." If the system is successful,
Meyer 'proposes_ that plans be made for
"monitoring aliens and political sub-
groups." Later, when the U.S. again .me.d-
dies- in the internal affairs of another coun-
try, transponders might be used for "de-
fense purposes, to monitor guerrilla or dis-
sident activities in foreign areas."
Rent a transponde-
Meanwhile' Meyer worries that his sys-
tem will not ,work. "To evade the street-
disclosed about he NSA. ? meduaaa ".sccarety..a'? p -
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II" .11 11
JILi 1/5 k)
By Chalmers M. Roberts
Additions and omissions
mark former President
Johnson's account of the
1964-65 escalation of the
Vietnam war, it is evident
from the excerpts from his
book published today.
Probably the single most
.disPuted issue in Mr. John-
son's conduct of the war was
the alleged Aug. 4, 1904, at-
tack in the Tonkin Gulf by
North Vietnamese boats on
? two American destroyers,
the Maddox and Turner Joy.
Mr. Johnson declared then,
and reaffirms in his book,
that the evidence of the at-
:tack was conclusive. As a re-
sult he sought and got the
Tonkin Gulf Resolution
from Congress. ,
But his critios contend the
attack either never took
place or even if something
did occur Mr. Johnson blew
it up out of all proportion
because he already was de-
termined to strike North
Vietnam from the air. At
least three books have now
been written about the af-
fair and the thrust of each
has been on the critical side.
American intercepts of
North Vietnamese messages
were heavily relied upon at
the time to prove that the
.
f!711(2 1., 114'
?
attack took place. Their
texts, however, have never
been made public though
Defense Secretary Robert S.
-McNamara in 1958 did sum-
marize them for the Senate
Foreign Relations Commit-
tee and show the texts to
the senators in private. Now
the former President quotes
from two of the messages
and concludes that "clearly
the North Vietnamese knew
they were attacking' us."
,The quotes will not satisfy
the doubters.. Why did not
Mr. Johnson reveal the com-
plete texts, they will ask?
And why not, indeed. Cryp-
tographic protection is the
usual answer but it is not
convincing, given the nature
of current procedures at the
time. Mr. Johnson thus
would seem only to have re-
opened the argument.
In this installment of his
memoirs the former Presi-
dent discusses four of the
first five major Vietnam de-
cisions. The Tonkin retalia-
tion was one of them; the
Johns Hopkins speech an-
other; the policy of reprisal
by air another. The fifth
"and by far the hardest"
was sending ground troops
to Vietnam to join the bat-
tle.
As the former :President
Co Ce
)ri
(1_1-vq 11"(
Jzi / td .
describes all these decisions,
each was reached with great
soul searching. Yet, read as
a whole in hindsight, there
was an inevitable progres-
sion from one to the other,
especially from Rolling
Thunder, the air campaign
against the North,- to the
shipment of massive num-
bers of troops to the South, ?
As he so often did while
in office, Mr. ,Iohnsen saw
his actions as steps logically
following the policies of his
two predecessors, Presidents
Eisenhower and Kennedy.
Omitted from today's ex-
cerpts arc descriptions of
Gen. Eisenhower's personal
encouragement to his. John-
son.)
The air war simply was
not enough; only ground
forces could save South
Vietnam. In March, 1955,
Gen., William Westmore-
land's request for the first
two Marine battalions was
granted. Then on April I
came the bill decision to beef
up the manpower though
the Army forces still were
described as "logistic and
support." It would be only a
matter of time, however,
until combat forces would
have to go as such. ?
Mr. Johnson's account of
the April 1 decision lists
three steps as "among the
.).r,L1P)
!.
1.-/ ? Q.)
1.1 (
specific military actions I
approved." But the Penta-
gon papers made public
something the former Presi-
dent totally skips: his in-
structions to avoid telling
the American public about
the major steps he was tak-
ing. This was contained in
the National Security Action
Memorandum 328, over the.
signature of McGeorge
Bundy, to the Secretaries of
?
State and Defense and the
head of the CIA detailing
Mr. Johnson's "decisions."
It was this memorandum
which contained the state-
ment that "the President de-
sires" that "premature pub-
licity be avoided by all pos-
sible precaution" on the
key new military steps. "The
President's desire," the.
memo concluded, "is that
'these movements and
changes should be under-
stood as being. gradual and .
wholly consistent with exist-
ing policy."
If this decision then was
to be painted as "wholly
consistent with existing pol-
icy" how can it now be "by
far the hardest" of five, deci-
sions Mr. Johnson had then
taken E,Lbout the war? lierein
lies part of the credibility
gap that plagued him in of-
fice and which today's in-
stallment fails to dispel.
STATI NTL
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WASHINGTON FQ.SY,
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 266)1_.0 :ICIA-RDP80-01601R00
1f7
71
OfiSgreQ95 ./ e10)
30111VE/IZ
C.) ?
11110II 0iTIL11.Th1 filitte-ltac, Obi!,
This is the fourth of 15 'excerpts
from former President Johnson's
book, "The Vantage Point," an cm-
count of his presidency, to be pub-
lished shortly. .
"CIIAT,LENCE AND RESPONSE
' ,VIETNAM 1961-1065"
In August 1904 an unexpected crisis
developed, one that threatened for a
time to change the nature of the war
In 'Vietnam. During the early hours.of.
.Suuday morning, August 2, a high-
priority message came in reporting
that North Vietnamese torpedo boats
had attacked the destroyer USS Mad-
dox in the Gulf of Tonkin.
The Maddox was on what we called
the De Soto patrol. One purpose was
to spot evidence of Hanoi's continuing
infiltration of men and war supplies
into South Vietnam by sea. Another
.was to gather electronic intelligence.
Another form of naval activity, not
connected' with our patrol, was going
17 on in the area. During 1954 the South)
Vietnamese navy made small-scale
strikes against installations along the
North Vietnamese coast. The purpose
was to interfere with Hanoi's continu-
ing program of sending men and sup-
plies into the South by sea. Senators
- and Representatives designated to
oversee our intelligence op'erations
were fully briefed on these South Viet-
namese activities, and on our support-
ing role, in January 1964, again in May,
twice in June, and again in e.arly Au-
- se- ??,
va31110,a61.1cJe
- 4
k kti) 1.112,11,
. During the afternoon additional in
' reports flowed in. We inter
'cepted a message from one of the a
:tacking North Vietnamese boats Ic
which it boasted of ha.ving fired at tw
"enemy airplanes" and claimed to hay
damaged one. The North Vietnamest
skipper reported that his unit had
"sacrificed two comrades." Our experts-STATINTL
said this meant either two enemy boats
or two in the attack group. An--
other message to North Vietnamese PT
boat headquarters boasted: "Enemy
vessel perhaps wounded." Clearly the
North Vietnamese knew they were at-
tacking us..
Action ?reports continued to arrive
from our destroyers, and from the Pa-
cific Command. A few were ambigu-
ous. One from the destroyer Maddox
questioned whether the many reports
of enemy torpedo firings were all
valid.
I instructed McNamara to investi- ?
gate these reports and obtain clarifica-
tion. lie immediately got in touch with
Admiral U. S. G. Sharp jr., the Com-
mander in Chief, Pacific, and the Ad-
miral in turn made contact with the
De Soto patrol. McNamara and his ci-
vilian and military specialist went over
all the evidence in specific detail. We
wanted to be absolutely certain that
our ships had .actually been attacked
before we 'retaliated.
Admiral Sharp called McNamara to
The
. message that 'strongly Indicated the
North Vietnamese Were preparing an- - , - ?
other attack on our ships in the Ton-
from the destroyer ly.Tadclox that its tailed studies made after the incident
kin Gulf. Soon we roceived messages reached the same firm conclusion. De-
radar and that of the USS C. ".Curnen?
to be hostile. The enemy ships ap-
peared to be preparing an ambush, and our plans for a sharp but limited
Joy had spotted vessels they believed
The Maddox and C. Turner ;Toy had
changed course to avoid contact, but
they then sent word that the enemy
vessels, were closing in at high speed. sional resolution of support for our en-
Within an hour the destroyers advised
that they were being attacked by tor-
pedoes and were firing on the enemy
PT boats. As messages flowed in from
Namara passed along the key facts to
Pacific Command Headquarters, Mc- with me."
me.
cuss the situation in Cyprus, and say-
that session. ? .
the National Security Council to dis, fairs or in the domestic field.
oral key Advisers had assembled for
We had scheduled a noon meeting of ion that
'I
.k . _.--- _
report that after checking all the re-
ports and evidence he had no doubt
whatsoever that an attack had taken
place. McNamara and his associates
confirmed this judgment.
p.m. to discuss in detail the incident.
response. About seven o'clock I met
Council for another meeting at 6:15
with the congressional leadership in
the White House for the same purpose.
further action, and that I did not
I told them that I believed a emigres-
tire position in Southeast Asia was
hand. I said that vie might be forced to
necessary and would strengthen our
became President, to seek the fullest
"want to go in unless Congress goes in
.itpport of Congress for any major Re-
told Secretaries -Rusk and McNamara
that I never wanted to receive any rec-
ommendation for action we might have
I summoned the National Security
I was determined, from the time 1
Concerning Vietnam, I repeatedly
'I took, whether in foreign af-
. . .
attacks would occur. ..
? I closed the NSC meeting and asked o take unless it was accompanied by a
Two days later the North Vietnam- Rusk, McNamara, Vance, T,IcConc, and proposal for assuring the backing of
? .: cso struck again at our destroyers, this _Bundy to join me for lunch. The unani- Congress.
? '
Because of tins
time at night (midmorning \Ir a s iii n g to n mous view of those advisers was that
f suggestions
ons all contingency plans to include
, It became routine
. .
time) on August 4. A few minutes after we could not ignore this second provo- ? ? for ? inform ?
.ing Congress
nine o'clock I had a call from Mc- cation and that the attack required re-' and winning its support. As we consul-
Namara. -Ha in ?ormed me that our in- tallatione I agreed. We decided on air ered the possibility of having to ex-
telligenco pc PPraQVildrRYgReicta$0403101014viGAIRDR8 TO NA ?fmtowittoonit,00,voIrs,
.boats and their bases plus a strike on became part of the normal contingency'
. fe.:emet i'r,t) ca
gust. Secretary McNamara?cle-scribed
the operations, codonamed 34-A, in a,
closed session with members of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee -
on August 3, 1901. ?
One 34-A attack occurred on July 30.
At the time, the destroyer Maddox had
not started its patrol and was 1.20 miles
away. A second South Vietnamese at-
tack took place the night of August 3
when the Do Soto patrol was at least
'10 iniloc away. It was later alleged that
our destroyers were supporting the,
South Vietnamese naval action. The
fact is our De Soto commanders did
:not- even know where or when the 34-A
Approved For Release 2o9rattf: wil;-R? DP80-01
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.. , . ? ? - - ? - - .... -... .?
By mew Deci,yriall agencies. Diplomatic cables
_ go first to Kissinger is occasionally called, and
. .- . . . _? -_
Mr. Eteoliiman
7 the Department of State, intelligence A IcAlanus receives several calls a
is a member, ?of Tile
ibu c s Washington atn eon ? reports are routed to the Central Intellk,/ week on the White Ifou hone se p next to
Trn.' . . e is.
gence Agency, and military up-dates his bed.
&signed to the ,White. House. d .
' are moved to the Pentagon. . Ile and James Fazio, 33, deputy di-
' WASIIINGTON--Mom than.1,POO intel- However, intelligence- outposts, when- rector of the Situation Room, take turns
...,. cc they are radar stations in the frozen being "on call " 'Whoever is on call
Pence reports a day poCC into a plainly
- Arctic keeping an eye on flight patterns never goes to !?-? 1 without telephoning
decorated suite of rooms nestled into 'a
corner of the White House basement'.
Many are routine but the knowledge
of Soviet bombers. over the North Pole, the, duty officer for an update on re-
or intelligence vessels tailing a Soviet ports and, when not in bed, is never
that reports of any attack on the United
States by a hostile power would reach
submarine off the North Carolina coast, without a "page boy," an electronic
first creates a re?cooker
1 aye the ca,pability to flash information device the size of a tiny transistor radio
directly to the White House.: - Nvhose buzz can be adivated in the Situ-?
here. pressu at- .
naosphere for the young staff that mans: ation Room, signalling its carrier to
the facility 24 hours a day, seven days Dozen- Teletype illechines immediately telephone his office.
a week. . ?
The overthrow of a head of state, The two young intelligence analysts
There are no holidays in the, 'White unusual bomber deployments by a po- ' '
. i.a.,Iso tal,-.?, turns comino- inta the (nee
c'
. , . oril- af!er d'orn to put the finishing'
lious.e Situation Room, the strategically .
imp-ortant focal point Upell Whin the 0. . . . ,
tentially hostile power or the sigiAing ,, , / '- ?:'
i missiles heading toward the United
gence briefing..
0-Lum..as on the President's daily !LIME-.
President of the. United States must
sates W01114 be flamed directly to the - The three. or four page report., carry:
rely for instant information, Modern
White House Situation Robm. ing 10 to 12 single or double paragraph
communications, Well-orzanized (lissom- Inc reports move into the White items, represents the highlights of re
-
illation procedures and a dedicated
House on one of a dozen teletype ma-
.
ports received durii-zg the previous 24
staff are intertwined with a world-w'ide
chines in the 'bomb shelter under the hours. Kissinger wants it by 8 a. in.
intelligence network and aimed at a
East Wirw and are dispatched immedi-
and sometimes asks that items be ' re
-
goal of inforining. the President of atei to ti.:1', a. .
;51tuation Room, in the West
events anyv.,hCie in the world within ., . Y . ' , 1 wordad to more accurately reflect his
Wing, via a pneumatic tube, arrivirri
'-). .feeling on a subject. ?
:Minutes after they occur. .
there 34 seconds later. . i
Dependent on Other Agencies 4 "It's our daily newspaper," said Mo-
onOne of the two or three duty . officers
Manus, "but we don't try to be.compre-
? duty receives the report and has the hensive." An effort is made, however,.
David ..-.1e:\-lanus, 34, the quietly confi- authority to instantly and personally to foeus On what CLUTently is under dis-
dent director of the Situation Room is contact :the President, regardless of the . cussion in the National Security Coon-
quick to -emphasize that the success of time of day or night, if he believes the
.
Ills operation is dependent, in a large report is of such importance. The ea- cil. The daily briefing, which Kissinger
m ne
easure, to similar intelligereceiv- pability for instant Presidential contact
ing facilities in the Departments of is maintained by the Army Signal Carries in to the President, is not intend-
w? p,
State and Defense, and in the Central Corps and is there whether theed to serve as a orking aper but is
Presi-
,.
Intelligence Agency., dent is sleeping in the White House res-
designed to present, in capsule form for
' - "We ?live off the fruits of other agen- idence, working in his Oval Office, On the chief executive, the latest develop-
cies," he said during an interview in board Air Force I over.. the Pacific, or milts thruout the .world.
the paneled conference room, where the riding in a motorcade thru downtown Daily status reports on the action in
South Viet Now are included. Several
Indirect lighting, the cork wall designed Belgrade. weeks ago, Nixon learned the results of
?
for easy stamping of world maps, and "if the missiles' are coming - our way,
a bombing raid he had ordered to wipe
the President has to know it," ?Mc-
out a fuel clump nea'r the demilitarized.
the impressive-looking rectangular con-
ference table leave a visitor with the Manus explained. ? . ? zone in North Viet Nam, when he read
feeling that the room could be usect as Those same duty officers also have,.
the report from the Situation Room.
a - movie - prop for a Mita House war the authority to immediately contact Nixon has spent _little time in the
room. . . . Henry Kissinger, Nixon's assistant for
guration, in marked
room since his inau
? national security affairs, or McMinus,
contrast to his predecessor. .
Il_cl,\Ianus, in an obvious. effort to
if a report arrives that requires some "President Johnson was here a lot,"
EtifIc,, interagency rivalries that once
eMaii rampant in the United States in- quick attention. ,
. ? recalled McManus, who served as Eat-
telligence community, estimated that 07 T-r? ? - ., Occasionally Called .
0gei
per cent -of 11,11L,.atrarts.icsi'63;;Ii-:t
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. ,
-(3 ? - - - -.- :ii- 11 ,
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rOmlaCIT KITAIRS
October 1.971
Apprc?lePI-.6t9t; .1.Riga.IM9PI49WS WIRJ.9?13
FOREIGN. POLICY ?
? By G4erles T. Yost
177'-',IIIER.E are many diffefent ways of conducting a govern-
,'
: ment. In the United States the executive authority is both
-- more formally centralized in the President and. more
sharply separated. from the legislature than in most democracies.
This is particularly true of the conduct of foreign. affairs, where
the authority of the President has been seriously challenged
. only in those rare instances, such as the Versailles Treaty or the
Vietnam war, when he seems to be grossly ignoring or overriding the opinions bath of the Congress and of the public.'
In general, he has been free to conduct fol'eign affairs more
or less as he chooses, to use traditional instruments, to set up new
ones or to carry on diplomacy from his own hip pocket. There
is little use arguing whether or not he has the constitutional right
to do so. As our government is organized., he has both the re-
sponsibility and the power. Critics in or out of the Congress can
makefthings.difficult for him, but they can neither conduct for-
eign affairs themselves nor prevent him from doing so. Of course,
?11 wise President will consult the Congress closely, in fact as well
as in form, on matters of major import, which reeent presidents
have often foolishly failed to do. .
Our donce'rn 'here, _however, is with the instruments which
Presidents UN for the conduct, of foreign affairs. Up until the
.19305 the instrument wa.s almost always the traditional one, the
Secretary and Department of State, except in those not infre-
quent cases where a strong President, such as Theodore Roose-
velt and Woodrow Wilson, chose to ,carry on a particular exer-
cise in diplomacy himself, sometimes with the help of a personal
adviser or emissary. Nevertheless,, as late as 1931, President
Hoover, though . not himself inexperienced. in foreign affairs,
relied on Secretary Stimsoa .to deal, in. so far as the United_
States was prCTar.ed to deal, with the Manchurian crises.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, however, just at the moment when the
rise to power of ambitious dictators in both Europe and Asia
made inevitable much deeper American involvement in foreign
affairs, named as Secretary of State, almost entirely for domestic
political reasons, an eminent Senator, Cordell Hull, who had
'unhappily neither the 'taste nor the talent for the conduct of
foreign affairs. -Nevertheless, again for domestic political .rea-
sons, he remained in office for nearly 12 years, longer than any
previous Secretary of State. This did not seriously disturb
FDR, who was contemptuous of the diplomatic establishment
and overestimated his ov,rn capacity to direct domestic and for-
eign, and later military, affairs personally and.simultaneously.
? Even Roosevelt, however,- while bypassing Hull as much as he
'could, at first placed his own men, On whom he did to some ex-
tent rely, inside the State Department itself?Y./dies and. later
Stettinius as Undel.'? Secretary, Moley and Berle as. Assistant
Secretaries and Bullitt an 1, K-crne a aS''',f11.01s a tile
API:K.91110E*.130q.#1,-Z9,Plipt (94,A, ti$t- i(47351.R01$141V0400001-6ont .
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STATI-NTL
ly
1
Approved For Release ttt40,51.,:rcIA-RDP80-01
:For some time I have been disturbed by the way the CIA has been
diverted from its original 'assignment. It has become an operational and.
at times policy-making arm of the government. I never thought when I
set up the rin that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-
dagger operations. ?ox-President Harry S. Truman.
OTI I ING .has happened since that prOnouncement by
the agency's creator in December 1963 to remove or
reduce the cause for concern over the CIA's develop-
ment. As currently organized, supervised, structured and
led, it may be that the CIA has outlived its usefulness.
Conceivably, its very existence causes the President and the
J National Security Council to rely too much on clandestine
operations. Possibly its reputation,- regardless of the facts, is
now so bad that as a foreign policy instrument the agency
has become counter-productive. Unfortunately the issue of
its efficiency, as measured by its performance in preventing
past intelligence failures and consequent foreign policy
fiascos, is always avoided on grounds of "secrecy". So
American taxpayers provide upwards 'of 57.50,000,000 a
year for the CIA without knowing how the money is spent or
to what extent the CIA. fulfils or exceeds its authorized
intelligence functions.
? The gathering of intelligence is a necessary and legitimate
activity in time of peace as well as in war. But it does, raise
a very real problem of the proper place and control of
agents who are required, or authorized on their own
_ recognizance., to commit acts of espionage. In a democracy
it also poses the dilemma of secret activities and the values
of a free society. Secrecy is obviously essential for espionage
but it can be ? and has been ? perverted to hide intelligence
activities even . from those with the constitutional re-
sponsibility to sanction them. A common rationalization is,
the phrase "If the Ambassador/Secretary/President doesn't
know he won't have to lie to cover up." The prolonged birth
of the CIA was marked by a reluctance on the part of.
politicians and others to face these difficulties, and the
agency as it came to exist still bears the marks of this
indecision. ?
Wiiat we need to do is to examine how the .U.S. gathers
its intelligence and consider how effective its instruments
are and what room there is for improvement. Every govern-
ment agen4y?pproomedcFornReEeasei2001t03104.tht lkiiltikV41-601R001300400001,6 -
ho
CIA's Director, acknowledged before the American Society
of Newspaper F
be supervised i
Intelligence Agi
The time is lo
supervisory rolc
Central Intellig
War. Under thi.
CIA administra
of inquiry by i
and specificall\
requiring disci'
titles, salaries
CIA; (ii) expo
tions on expel
the Director's
without adver
Government
the Governmc
for staff abroai
their families
1949 Central I
Director a lice
With so mi.
is seen by rnE
stine. Coups,
in Guatemala
Mossadegh i
the ? Cuban
failure). The
President Kw
28, 1961, \A
heralded -- y
Because the
agency's ?"m..._
? representative of the unending gar-not-try alit.)
life human aspect of espionage? and secret operations. At this
'eye! the stakes are lower and the "struggle" frequently takes
bizarre and even ludicrous twists. For, as Alexander Foote
noted in his Ilandbbok for Spies, the average agent's real
difficulties are concerned with the practice of his trade. The
setting up of his transmitters, the obtaining of funds, and
the arrangement of his rendezvous. The irritating administra-
tive details occupy a disproportionate portion of his waking
life."
As an example of the administrative hazards, one day in
1960 a technical administrative employee of the CIA
stationed at its quasi-secret headquarters in Japan flew to
Singapore to conduct a reliability test of a local recruit. On
arrivl he checked into one of Singapore's older hotels to
receive the would-be spy and his CIA recruiter. Contact was
made. The recruit was instructed in what a lie detector test
does and was wired up, and the technician, plugged ? tile
machine into the room's electrical outlet. Thereupon it
blew out all the hotel's lights.. The ensuing confusion and
darkness did not cover, a getaway .by the trio. They were
discovered, arrested, and jailed as American spies. ?
By itself the incident sounds like a sequence from an old
Peters Sellers movie, however, its consequences were not
nearly so funny. In performing this routine mission the
CIA set off a two-stage international incident between
England.. and the United States, caused the Secretary of
State to write a letter of apology to a foreign chief of state,
made the U.S. Ambassador to Singapore look like the
proverbial cuckold, the final outcome being a situation
wherein the United States Government lied in public
STATINTL
V
STAT I NTL
Approved For Release 294:11,49017: gi,kRppso-
roe 19
5,40 ,e e ?
e
"...Although this entire !;e7;CS or eis- rivalries .to be sure, but once thc deci-
ettstions was "off the r,ecorci", the Si o.hs are reoefied at the top they arc
p.1:*:?et or Ciscussior. for . this riet:c11- carried out with the monolithic tone or
1?.r ineeting v;as especisily ? S517C
state power. ? .
-flud Subleet. to the previously nu- -
riouqed restrictiore." Tho,intelligence community now
---C. Di.-Aig!pis Dillon '. plays an expanded ? and critical role in
Dy ini'y.',? Ac;.-22.2 1.--1.e..e'.;arch Croup creating and administering the rea l_
stuff of American foreign policy. CIA
. The Central. Intelligence Agency is ' Director Richard Helms presides over a
?one .of the few goverrmental agencies U.S. Intelligence Beard which links the
.whose public image has actually im- secret services of all government agen-.
proved as a result of the publication of cies, including the FBI. In the White
Ithe Pentagon l''apers. Despite disclo- House, Henry Kissinger presides over
sures .of "The Agency's" role in assassi- an expanded National Security Cotincil
?nations, sabotage, and coup d'etat s structure which 'Further centralizes
consciously intended to subvert rritei?no- covert foreign policy planning. It is here
tional law, America's secret agentry that the contingency plans are cooked
has actually emerged in some quarters up and the "options" 'se carefully
:with the.yeneration?due prophets, or at ' worked out. It is in these closed chain-
least the respect. due its suggested effi- ?be_rs, and strangelevian "situation
ciency- and accuracy. . rooms" that plans affecting the, lives of
Virtually every newspaper edito,r, n,c,it millions are formulated for subsequent
1.6 _mention Daniel Ellsberg himself,. has executiori by a 11:y1:lad of U.S. con-
heaped praise on the CIA for the accu- trolled ageneies.and agents. -
racy of its estimates detailing the U.S. . ,Increasingly, these schCrnes rely on
defeat in VietnameTirne and aahin, the covert tactics whose full rheanir'ig is se-
Agency's "level headed professional- dom perceived by. the people affected --:-
ism" has been contrasted -with the esca-- be they Americans or people of foreign
lotion-overkill orientation of the Penta- cOuntries. The old empires, with. their
-gen or the-President's advisers. The colonial_ administrators ? and civilizing
.1 -editor of the Christian Science Monitor mission have given way to the more.
.even called upon policy makers teson- subtle craftsman Of intervention. Their
'stilt .the CIA more, calling it a "re- manipulations take placc in the. front
markably accurate source of infdrma- rooms of neo-colonial institutions and
'tion." But such backhanded praise for the parlors of dependent third world.
-Conspirators confuses public under- elites. In this world of realpolitik,--ap-
?tanding of the important and closely pearances are often purposely deceptive
-Integrated role which the CIA plays in and political - stances intentionally 1T:is-
:advancing the Pax Americana on a leading. The U.S. aggression in Viet-
? ;global scale.: ? ... - ? nam, lest anyone forget, began as-a
. For -many, the Pentagon Papers covert involvement largely engineered'
provided a? first peck into the inner by the CIA. Similar covert interven-
; sanctum of foreign policy making. As tioris now underway elseWhere in the
the government's attempt to suppress world may' be fueling tomorrow's Viet-
the study illustrates, the people are-not narns. ' . .-.
supposed to have access to the real It. is for. this reason that the Africa
plans of their government. On close Research Group, an independent radi-.'
inspection, what einerges is not an "inv- .cal res;etrch collective, is .now making
-isible government" but an indivisible public Major excerpts from a document
system in which each agency offers its Nvhich offers an informed insider's vievl..
own specialized input, and is delegated of the-secret workings of the American
its own slice of responsibility. Coordi- intelligance apparatus abroad. Never he complete. text of the document will
noted inter-departMental agencies work ..intended for publication, it was made be avail:111)1e for Si in late?Octobr from
th 1:5WirroYIR-6110r.aser20041031'04G.rerk-IFthPil Afric.a Research Group, P.O. Box 213,
out e diviA . .
FleY1 6CUROATt30041001101,6 '
are disagreetnentS an areaueratic lish theentiretext in October, I
CIA manipulations.
Richard Bissell, the man who led the 1
Cottncil discussion that riight, was well
equipped to talk about the CIA. A one-
time Yale professor and currently an
executive of the United Aircraft Corpo-
ration, Bissell served as the CIA's Dep-
uty Director until he "resigned" in the
wake of the abortive 1961 invasion of
Cuba. The blue-ribbon g,roup to which
he spoke included-a number of intAig-
ence experts including Robert Amory,
another former Deputy Director,
and-the late CIA chief, AllanDulles,
;long. considered the grand bidman of
American' espionage. Their presence
was important enough an occasion for
international banker Douglas Dillon to
?
Q01.45.rtty.,00.
i:oriIWS KdER:CC.tlif
Approved For Release 2001M3/D4T:CIARDP80-016
IT) 774-7 ,7,21Y.;77'r!li)2 P7
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?
,.._ ., ...-
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6,
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jolnie'lie is en a 11ple.t vacation, but he will con-
tilltci Wr:te 1,111 promiirier.t
lit (CI
figures contrit).1.1r.,?; e.,)1,,1I10,3, TO
centriholor is Sen. Ilchert P. Eltunpbrey,
1`41on., mr,v a
Perneeratie I're,;identiat hopcM.
We have witnessed in receat years a gradual and
potentially dangerous isolation and insulation of
power within Inc iiiIsecutive branch of government.,
an particularly sensitive to this sit.u;_tt On,havin.;
served in the linite.c1 States Senate for 15 years z.nd as
vice president for tom%
?
No\vhere is the tendency toward isolation more
apparent than in the field of national :,ecurity. I
believe it is, at Ice st in part responsihie for some of
the divisiveness and the search for scan,ezoats
generated by the recent publication of the "Pentagon ?
.Papers."
NOT the PI2C1,.:sin for
adequate consultation bet,,een Congress and the
Pa-
? ccutive branch in the formulation of national security
policy
The President and key government officials meet
? ocea:,,lonally with the leaders of Cenpresa On an in-
? formal basis. There 'are several congressional com-
mittees that deal v,,ith some aspects of national.
security. 'Flot decision-nta%ing is frazinented.
I? have proposed that. we end that fragmentation
and provide for. closer consultation by cstalili,711ing
permanent joint cen:ressional Committee on Nat j1
Security.
? r-Z) ; ?
i;
N
. A
T:11,771 TO)
7
... 11, !:
12, .?7 1 C
The committee would have these main functions:
First, to ?study and malte recommendittions en
concerning national.- security. This v???ould
include review of the President's report en the stale
C f ti'' ?,vorid, the defense bud.f.,:et . and foreign
assistance programs as ? they relate. to national
security goals, and U.S. disarmament 7..;3_1(7*.i0S as a
part of our defense Considerations.
0 Second, to review, study and evaluate the /
"Pentagon il'au?-c.,rs," and other do?-_!unneitts, whePfcr.
published lli..retofore or not, covering U.S, involve- ?
me:It 5n 'N'iettram. ? ?
0 .Third, to study mtd make recontmend:ations on
government practices of classification and
?
declasslfication of clecttments.
0 Fourth, to cenduct a continuing :review of the
opet'ations- of the Central Intelligence Agency, the
departments of Defense and State, and other agencies
intimately invc,,ived With Cr.T foreign policy..
73a; UNItraliI,', 1,'IlLATU;l.l'i3 of the committee would
be the composition of its membership. It would have
representation irone these individual and. cennuittec
jurisdictions that have primary responsibility in
military, foreign...relations and congre?ssional
leadership.
It would include the President Pro Tenni:ore of the
..Senate; the Speaker et the Douse; .the majority znid
minority leaders of both houses, and the chairmen
and ranking minority members of the committees on
tippropriations, foreign relations and armed services
and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
It would not usurp the le.gistalive or investigative
functions of any present committees, hut supplement
and cordinate?their efforts in a more comprehensive
framework. .
Nor is it designed to usurp the President's historic
Tole as Commancler-In-Chief, nor to pot the Congress
in an adversary relationship with the. Executive.
branch,.
. IT :ES, rATITER, A Na,i 7MDY, to be COthpOSCC1 Of
members of both parties and both houses of Congress,
that will male possible closer consultation and
cooperation bet;veon the President and the Congress.
'Inc concentration of power within the Exe.cutive
branch is quite understandahle considering our CN-
pairince in World War II and afterward. Put limes
change,and secant our Institutions ard respons.
? I cannot brIg but believe that if tile Con-gels had
shared mere fully in momentous decisions, like those
? ? in Vietnam, we would he less divided as a nation by
Approved For Release 21301103/04,:,-VARDP8Ou01601.R091300400001ntLiona-
-6
A :ley.' frarneworlt for the formulation o,
sect.trity policy, I believe, can bring us closer to Inc
ideal ,,v0 all silar for la.;tin.?.:
STATI NTL
STATI NTL
DE,Trurirr I ram
nEv.fs Approv%ThlikkIftlelease
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AUG 8
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By GEORGE KEI \ITER A ?
News w;:stanotem ttureau
NASHINGTONI---Since it opened in the late 1950's, the head-
' quarters of the super-scicret Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) in nearby Virginia has been sereenc:d from public view
j ] by ii border of woodland. ? i
? ? X,hat screen is soon to be lost. The land is to be developed by ,
'the National Park Service , ? ?
.- "for 'camping, hiking and pie-
is?:?':'s::':::: ?'?''' -----: ? -..?-?,.,-;::'':?:?:?:::::?:'::::':E-s??::--:
niaing. And even as CIA t::::::::ss]s: : ? ? - ir,- -s,?,:::::;::::?:::,..:E:?:,i?-?
..ikeadquarters itself becomes -: ':'?.::'::::',,.."::;-:-t?!
?? more visible, an effort_ is be- ? .:::.:::?':'.'.4:. t
ginning in Congress to open
; ..
,a -winckiw on the CIA activi-
ties \vithin the building.
::?T'hiese developments on
'Capitol Hill point up the ef-
fort:: ?
' p.. ',Ile troubled reaction of
?
some Senate members to the
JcliscloLgire last week that the
CIA., a:,cl the United States
were more deeply involved
in a clandestine military
actio a in Laos than ii as
hes?oofore publicly known or
li:-_:(:_-.T veil. .
' r:, the appointment of an
in.ii-war Michigan con-_-,,ress-
1,s, Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi,
:tetroit Democrat, the chair-
nails:hip of Et special House subcommittee on intelligence, and to
Lis-hopc of staging open hearings on the CIA. .
.Action in Cong,ress, already halfway through the legislative R
proce;:js, In put a halt to secret CIA financing of Radio Free tr
.I.M?up,e and Radio Liberty, which beam news behind the Iron in
Curtain. ' ' '
? , . L
0 .
."
.;
I:- 111
3
? ? . - - -?
'However, SOMe Members of Congress do not feel, despite
the informed briefings, that procedures exist that make the .
CIA at least partially accountable to Congress:
NEDZI SAID THE OTHER DAY, "My feeling is that the old.
subcommitlee (the informal group) served more as a vehicle
for the Chief Executive, to enable him to say he had consulted
and advised Congress. But I'm not aware that there has been
any congressional oversight of the. CIA . . . I think ii impor-
ant that the window be opened a hit.'
He said later, "Everybody .apiveciates that elements of re-
traint are involved. The difficulty is in drawing that line'be-
ween the national security and:public disclosure.", ?
The effort to focus more attention on the CIA is of a
rend in recent years, toward More public disclosure by the
ongress.
This trend has seen public repelling of congressmen's net
:.?orth and ineeme, liberalized rules in Bouse and Senate, the.
tdoption of recorded teller votes in the House, reform of cam--
aig n spending and reporting of that. spending, and a move
sward more open hearings of congressional committees. -
Publication of a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff
eport on laos last week indicated that CIA-supervised troops
umbering more than 30,000 were actually bearing the brunt
the combat against the enemy in Laos.
, -7?? i, 1 .1/4\ ... i f i n j \ i 9 ci-.3
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I d '', ' _L ? 4 \,\,,$) \ 1 V ..,/
Following are texts of key documents from the Pentagon's
'tistory of the Vietnam war, covering events of August, 1964,.
!o February, 1965, the 'period in which the bombing of North
Vietnam was planned. Except where excerpting is specified, t1ie.
locuments are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typo-:
jraphical errors correted.
Rusk Cable to lmnbassy in Laos
cacch and
n rIAC igh t
. - ? _ ' ? !
. .
- : ...
, ? - , ? .
Cablegram from Secretary of State Dean Rush to the United States
Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, Aug. 26,-1964, 4 copy of this message, was. sent
to the Commander in Chief, Pacific. . ?
- We agree with your assessment of
Importance SAR operations that Air
America pilots can play critically im-
portant role, and SAR efforts should not
- discriminate between rescuing Ameri-
anS, Thais and Lao. You are also here-
= D7 granted as requested discretionary
-authority to use A.A pilots in T-28's
,for SAR operations. when you consider
this indispensable rpt indispensable to
success of operation and with under-
standing that you will seek advance
_Washington authorization wherever sit-
nation permits.
? At same time, we believe time has
? come to review - scope and control ar-
rangements for, T-28 operations extend-
inginto future. Such a review is especi-
ally indicated view fact that these op..
-erations more or less automatically im-
pose demands for use of US personnel
in SAR operations. Moreover, increased
-AA capability clearly means possibilities
of .loss somewhat increased, and each
loss with accompanying SAR operations
involves chance of escalation from one
action to another in ways that may not
? ? ?
? ? ? ? ?
- -
be desirable in wider picture. On other
side, v.,ci naturally recognize T-28 opera-
tions are vital both for their military
and psychological effects in Laos and as
negotiating card - in support of
Souvanna's position. Request your view
whether balance of above factors would
call for some reduction in scale of op
orations and-or dropping of some of
better-defended targets. (Possible exten-
sion T-28 operations to Panhandle would
be separate issue and will be covered
by septa) ?
On central problem our understand-
ing is that Thai pilots fly missions
strictly controlled by your Air Com-
Mand Center with [word illegible] in
effective control, but that this not -true
of Lao pilots. We have impression latter
not really under any kind of firm con-
trol.
Request your -evaluation and recom-
mendations as to future scope T-28 op-
erations and your comments as
to whether our impressions present con-
trol structure correct and whether steps
could be taken to tighten this.
, ..
. .
Rusk 0etV
_. ,,.. - ? ...-
0 i
to vlentane Embass. 3.7.
- ?
. .. . . , v. ,- -- ?
On Desirability of Laos Cease-Fire
..
. ? . .
. . .
? ? ..
. , '
? -
.. ? .
- . ? - .
, .
Cablegram from Secretary of State Rush to the United States Embassy
in Laos, Aug. 7, 1964. Copies were also sent, with a request for comment, to
the American missions in London, Paris, Saigon, Bangkok, Ottawa, New Delhi,
Moscow, Pnompenh and hong Kong, and to the Pacific command and the.
mission at the United Nations. . . ?
?
. . '
,
. .? . .
... .
. ? . . -
. . ,
? ?
- . . ? .
.? . ???.
I. As pointed out in your 219, our 0-at recent RI-G-s-neceSse.s and reported'
objective in Laos is to stabilize the situa- low PL morale may lead to some escala-
tion again, if possible tv?ithin framework tion from Communist side, which we do
of the 1992 Geneva settlement. Essen_ ! not now wish to have to deal with.
Cal to stabilization w uld be estalAis,14- I 2. Until now, Souvatma's and our po- .
1A?p
;ant of milita ay equi promeutrisoftpReateen2ptipt04,,HCIALR
and that si.0
precondition
ference. Que
m
ritorial ga;
!vided they c
practice bra
equilibrium
no longer m
Lao withdra
Lion to 14-n
fact though
cured to So
is alai touc
to Butler (:
Souvanna.a&
PDJ with
evitably ins
gains, -and
arrange.men
present fa
division.. I
were to be
'best be don
it might be usea oy ouvanria as mu-gum-
?ing counter in obtaining satisfaction on
his other condition that he attend con-
;fcrence as head of Laotian Government.
Remaining condition would be cease-
fire: While under present conditions
cease-fire might not be of net advantage
to Souvanna--we are thinking primarily
of T-28 operations---Pathet Lao would
no doubt insist on it. If so, Souvanna
could press for effective ICC policing of
cease-fire. Latter could be of. importance
in upcoming period.
?? 3. Above is written- with thought in
..mind that Polish proposals [one word il-
legible] effectively collapsed. and that:
pressures continue for Geneva [word il-
legible] conference and will no doubt
? be intensified by current crisis brought
on by DRV naval attacks. Conference on
Laos might be uaeful safety valve for
these. generalized. pressures while at
same time providing some deterrent to
escalation of hostilities on that -part of
.the "front." We would insist that con-;
*ference be limited to Laos and believe
that it could in fact be se limited, if -
necessary by bur withdrawing from the
'conference room if any other subject
brought up as we did in 1961-62. Side
;discussions on other topics could not be
avoided but we see no 'great difficulty
with this; venue for informal coreidor
discussion with Ph, DRV, and Chicoms
? could be valuable at this juncture.
4. In considering'thia course of action,
. key initial question is of course whether
? Souvanna himself is prepared to drop
his withdra wal precOnditicn and wheth-
er, if he did, he could maintain himself
in power in Vientiane. We gather that
answer to first question is probably yes
but we are much more dubious about
DP80-016-01R001300400001-6
t.t Wo".... have some concern 3.vou,c1 require at. -ao witIldrawal
? ; from areas seized in PDJ since May 15
STATINTL ;
.1721;7112..tik.I.L.VjA
1 4 JUN t971 STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-016
'11, was charged by then Sen.
. .
Tp;TI, - -.)1 -i-,r), r.,
1 "ti (./ ' WV.,11:1 Morse (D-Ore.) that the
1 3 r,---)1,1c.:,-,--tro,T,,-1,,:)..,,,,,-,? r-,,,r2,-,,,,-,,,,,,,,,,,y, rTin'ri,,Ti,,,,,.i,k-c.-?-,,,,,,,., . ,o,..,,,, ,7i"--q.liarfteLe attacks c.43
1
k . ',I ? 11 i' ' ,1.... P. '1 i i 11 \I i '1 ,.1' 1 ' j ; ??.I.,./ t;.. '-', P 11 %.1 1 ' 1 ?4,....V.[1. 11 .112,,,,,?,a1,1-. Jr., North Vietnamese 'Drees an
Ithe Gulf of Tonkin caused the
*\_\ ..r 7. Tr-i 0 -il (-111 North Vietnamese to fire upon
iiilri..\Tiz.(.5..n...," in..1.114, ..i ,,,,,,\,,, (ft, iy,,-.i i.. iil ,1,, tol --ti it ,f-t.rn 1.-:::?... '..!..-,,, ?..--t.N.,?? (.7. 1II.S. destroyers MarldoN and C.
KJ).1-1.C.,J!,.-s'i.. \LI, Ji a . . N ?4. P .11. 0,i1....ile) .i-t. JJ...lt ',.L...ii.I.1 -,....i.' ' Turner joy. 311 eNarn at a, in
. . ? ?
? .
By Murrey Marder ? 1: N a ti o n at Security Action'
. ? ? -
' 'Memorandum of March 17
' and Chalinc.srs M. Roberts
Wastithz:ton i ost -Act t I te,S li)36, pre.sumobly tie' result of 1
-? a presidential clecision, set out
The Johnson administration both the administration's po-
planned for major American hum aims and the basis for
military action against North its military planning. A cable,
.Vietnam nearly five months he; sent three days later by the
?f ?re the 1964 Tonkin Gulf in- ri.esident to Henry Cabot
"11 to secret goy-- Lodge, I then the. AI112311Call a111-
j1,968, told thr.s. ;.-lenate corrinalt-
-- however, that it was
action" then was "prematnre." I tee'
Mr. Jo1"3?11 offered ,;:.''s .?1,1e1 the United Slates "induced
"monstrous" to insinuate that
reason ' that statemeni th4ithe iuevierc 1,-
t as an "exeusa"
"re expect a showdown be- to take retallatm:y action. Tine
tween the Chinese and Soviet. r.etaliatory action was the
Communist parties and action 'opening rounds. of U.S. bomb-
against the North will be more ing attacks upon North vet.,
pradicable after than before a.' Rain. .
showdown." According to the information
The President also told disclosed by the limes, tie
-
cident, accm. t ug,. .
ernment documents made pub- bassador in Saigon, illurni-1 Lo?dge that pert of his job Plan 34-A operations against
lie yesterday by The Net'.' York yiates his haentLein. . ? then was " ink, ._..0 ag l wl the
Times. 1 The memorandum says that idea of neutralization" of Viet-
These plans V:ere. made, the "we seek an independent non- Lam, in idea advanced by
document5. show, at a ? time Communist. South Vietnam" then French President Charles
when the United ...States al- ibut "do not require that it deGaun 0, "wherever it rears
ready was directing clandes- I serve as a Western base Or as its ugly bead and on this point
tine sabotage operations in the I a member of a Western alli- I think that nothing is more
North.
Two months before the at- free, however, to accept out-
1 mace. South Vietnam must be
itack on, two American. clestro" side assistance al, required to
' -' *- e ssity"
Repeating, language from a planning is shown in seretca salon control of Gen. Paul D.
documents. Put other de,ett- II Harkins, then chief of the Ins.
McNamara memorandum of 1
(language in part drawn Ili., as Dec. 21, 1963, a memoran- with joint planning by the
assistance command,
, ments also show that as early? military
March 16 to the President .
iMeN"mara. on Rim 22 from 1 Sonth Vietnamese who carried
turn from a naernorandmil to. dun from McNamara to presin
(the ' chairman of the joint "plans for covert out the operations themselves:
I
dent Johnson IeferreCi i(31
:Chiefs of Staff, Gen, "i\taxwc,?11 action into or with "hired personnel."
l\Zorth Vietnam" that "present . Nven before thc:,,c covert cp.;
, n ,
D. Taylor) the National Se- / ? ? -
1 a wine variety co. sabotage and
re- ? - li ,-'4" -that orations began, however, the'.
- 7 , ? ?
the North during M-ol. ranged
from U-2 spy plane ;lights to
parachnting sabotage and psy-
chological warfare teams into
the Nonth Vietnamese ciGar 1.,
seadamiehed commando raids
on rail and high\vay bridges
important than to stop neutral- and bombardment of. coastal
1st talk wherever we can by ,instanati.ons in? boats.
whatever means we Can." These attacks were da-
l' in on - ? ? ? The resulting contingency scribed as being under the
em in the Cul o on
Aug. 2, and 4, 1964,. the admin.-
istration sent a Canadian dip-
lomat, J. Blair Seaborn, on a
secret .Mission to Hanoi where
he is quoted as telling Pre-
mier Plain Von Dong that "in
the (Went of escalation (of the
war) the greatest devastation
would result for the D.R.V.
STATINTii
(North Yietnam) itself.," cu-city Council document. . psychologicalo a-va o
fleets the prevailing belief in - " U.S.Joint Chiefs of Staff were
should "provide maximum
pressure with ronureurn reported recommending "un
creasingly bolder actions in-
cluding "aerial bombing of
key North Vietnamese tar-
gets" and use of "United
States forces as necessary in
direct actions against North
Vietnam."
After the August, 1901, Gulf
of Tonkin breakthrough to
more open U.S. involvement
in the fighting, the published
documentation shows ree.om-
mendations for considerably
expanded covert operations
against the North.
A memorandum prepared
for Assistant Secretary of
State William P. Bundy shows
that part of the clandestine
operations against the North
were suspended immediately
"after the first Tonkin Gulf in-
cident" on Aug. 2, 1064, but
that "successful maritime and
airborne operations" were car-
ried out in October.
The documents discuss
clan-
fivstiiie operations carried out
not only from South Vietnam
but from Laos, against North
Vietnamotas of I e 1.1
Taos. On (10c-
4a0w010'' against enemy-
'''
it \vas the ionkm inmeni.
_e?lied totally unprovoked by what President Eisenhower
the administratio-n?---which led had called the "domino effect"
of the loss of Sou
Congress on Aug. 7, 190-1, to South Vietnam,
pass a resolution declaring Unless the objective is
as achieved in South Vietnam, it
that the United States w
sa?Ys, "almost all of Southeast
"prepared, as the President cli-
'sects, ;.40 .tal,e. all. necessary Asia will probably fall uner
steps; including the use ? of Communist dominance" or n-
amed force," to .assist ,itauth commodatc to Communism.
- The Philippines, it was
Vietnam. It was on this resolu- judged, "would become shaky"
tion that President Johnson and "the threat to India ..on
subsequently leaned heavily to the west, Australia and New
'i ?
widen the war. , ? , Zealand to the South, and Tel-
- ! 1-he documents are Part of a wan, Korea, and Japan to the
'initlii-volumed, . collection of north would be greatly in-
records and -comments aSSenl- creased:,
. The policy decision, ,...then,
then Secretary
bled under the direction of i
I ?-- of Defense was to "prepare iminetnately,
1?Iiert. S. MeNalmra? The' to be iso a position on 72 hours
bulk of the documents . dis-
closed thus far by the Times
are of military origin but in-
clude some White House and
Stale Department papers that
reached the Pentagon. Other
documents Were only &haled
notice to .initiate toe full
range of Laotian and Cambo-
dian 'border control actions' "
as well as "the 'retaliatory ac-
tions' against North ViC:illaal
and to ba in a position on 30
days' notice to initiate the pro-
to or quoted fronnin the news- gram of 'graduated overt mill
-
paper's story. tory pressure' against North
. ' Vietnam . . ."
- The President's cable to
Lodge says that "our planning
North is
Approved Fck.Oirenagea'aiclOb, Aig31
gronds that ."overtomilitaty
This clandestine program
became "Operation Plan 31-
A," launched on Feb. I, 1904.
It was described in a Nationed
Security memorandum .the
next month as "a modest 'cov-
ert" program operated by
South Vietn.amese (and a few
Chinese Nationalist)---a pro-
gram so limited that it IN un-
likely to have any significant
effect ..."
One source yesterday said,
In retrospect, that these covert'
operations were in fact "very
modest--and highly unsuccess-
ful." But they came to have
profound significance in the
Tonkin Gulf incident. Mc-
Namara, even in noa testi-
mony reexamining the 1964
Tonkin affair, professed to
know little about the plan :14-
A operations. Le told Senate
Foreign Relations Committee
Chairman J. W. Fulbrig,lat (D-
Ark.) that they were carried
out by South Vietnamese
against the North, "utilising to
some degree U.S. equipment.".
"I can't describe the exact
or illiNitprribiAr-Orpietat-461,
PuinriL;ht,""MiltlfETY %11-M1-
happy to try to obtain the in-
formation for you."
I L.,
'S
T.1.1111,
7/ I 4 JUN 971
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160
THE
NATION
Insecure Council
fit the shrouded pyramid of ascending
levels of governmental- secrecy, the Na-
tional Security Council stands at the
apex. Yet when it meets and turns out
the lights for a briefing, an outsider
can walk right in. So, at least, claims for-
mer Presidential Press Secretary Pierre
Salinger, who reveals that such a bi-
zarre incident in his first novel, On In- 7
structions of My Government, was based v
on an actual happening in 1961.
As Salinger tells it, Seattle Television
Executive Elroy McCaw (who died in
1969) arrived in Washington to attend
a Pentagon meeting of a volunteer cit-
izens' advisory group of which he was
a member. The meeting was canceled be-
cause the Berlin crisis was hot and the
top military chiefs were attending an
NSC meeting at the White House. Un-
aware of this, McCaw called Air Force
General Curtis LeMay's office and was
directed by a confused secretary to the
meeting at the White House. According
to Salinger, Brigadier General Chester
("Ted") Clifton, President Kennedy's
military aide, escorted McCaw to a dark-
cued room where slides of Soviet troop
concentrations wei.e being shown. When
the lights were turned on, McCaw was
astonished to find the President there
?and the generals were even more
shocked to see McCaw. To ensure se-
curity, they considered recalling him to
active Air Force ,duty, but finally ac-
cepted his pledge of total secrecy.
1/AIINIL ?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6
(- 4
)I CPC tIi1S STATINTL
?3 '84 1'6 ?
Approved For Release 200 ./03/ : A-RDP80-016
,.__... .
,
1
\i/ t
(("
.
i ) ? ?
" f /h/ rc, V-. ? )
`Iric7-A ,
,
cey c
.1. 11 v .4'5\ . , il 0 LO,Jci.- are the teX63 ,Of
....
..-?,4?,9_ the Pentagon's stvdy- of .the Vietnr.
December, 1963, through .the Ton?ii 12,
1964,- and its aftermath. Except.tviter
the doelm'ents are printa verbatim;
:typorri.yphi.c.(.1,167TOr8 corrected.
_..._ .
- 1 4,1 41,1, .10 ? .3
t, ALS t ? -
j 1.1
? -
.1A
the ;:?:,,i.i.,L`c`-.1L.I.011
Memorandum, '.`Viatnoin Situation," from Secretary of Defens:? Robert S.
? 'McNamara to President Lyndon B. Johnson, Dec. 21, 1933.
In accordance with your request this (and also by John McCone), and T do not This-
morning, this is a summary of Iny con- think he is consciously rejecting our Ire'LlitlY
elusions after my visit to Vietnam on advice; he has just operated as a loner (V.IPit-!-1 <
December 19-20. - all his life and cannot readily changecsta(-7,131ais:
1.Stunralry. The situation is very 11?17.
disturbing. Current trends, unless re- Lodge's newly-designated deputy, Stti''-1101
.versed in the next 2-3 mont113, will lead David Nes, was With us and seems a ?IT'S 13
to neutralization at hest and more likely highly COIllpEtc;nt team player.? I have I-16v scerl
to n Conimunist-controllecl state. , stated the situation franlEly to him and tkihly in recent months. General Hark-
he has sEdd he would do all h3 could to 105 still hopes these areas may be' made
2. The netv Lovernmeat is the greatest'
?.source. of colleen). It is i.ndecisive. and :constitute N',11?.t Would in effect be an tte.relt3yrir!':,1 tecurc Lttcr half
nh
executive committee op. a?, helot,/ the
Ithough Mi stEctes that 11a
level of the. Ambassador. ? iA gtoorny foutiinfl nicture, an
rather than the Committee of Generals, ?
is making decisions, it is r,ct clear that As to the grave rc,p-olling weakness,J .8):C.,ptIon to tn.. LI' r:nd oZ Viet Cong
both Defense and ClA must take major cess may be provided Ly 1:113 possible
this is actually co. 11 any event, neither
he
no tilt' Com , steps to .improve this. John McCono and arlherence to the government of the r mittee are experioneen
nave ctscussed. it and axe. a.cting yosor-
in political a.drainisfration a.nd so far
ously in our respective spheres. - ??
. they show little talent for it. There is no
;clear conept on how to re-shape or Viet Cong progress has been great
conduct the strategic hamlet program; during the period since the coup, with
the Province Chiefs, most oe whom are my best guess being that the situation
new and.. inexperienced, are ? receiving .has in fact been deteriorating in the
or ?10 direction because the gen.: .countryside since July to a far greater
ends are so preoccupied with ossenti3.11y extent than we realized because of 'our
Political .affairs, A specific example a undue .depondence, on distorted Viet-
the . present situation is that General names?. reporting. The Viet Cong now
lama illegible] is spending little or no control very high proportions of the
tune commanding In Corps, which is in People la certain key provinces, par-
tite vital zone around Saigon and needs ticularly those directly south and west
.full-time direction. I made these points of Saigon. -1113 Strategic narilletP1:03ram
as strongly as possible to Minh, Don, was seriously over-extended in those
if,irn, ? and Tho. _. .? .. , prottinces, cud the Viet Cong has been
: 3. l'ho'Conntry Teem is the second able' to (le''''::roy many hamlets; while
otlie:s hav3 been abandoned or in some
major weakness. It lacks leadership, has
? been poorly luformed, and is not work- cases 1,3tr.iyed or pillaged by th,3 gOVC111-
ment's own Self Def ii Corp.. in these
. irks.; to a common plan. A rt,?cent exempi7 e
of confusion. has been conflicting USOM key provinces, the Viet Cong have de-;
t ';,zinci rAilit.niy recommeadation3 bOth .to ,stroyed abIlOSt all major roads, and are
''... tlite Government of Vietnam and to collecting taxes at tvill.
As remedial measures', we must get
. '
\'f 'din on no size of the mi littuy '
' .inttlget. Above all, Lodge has virtually the governnicnt 1 o.re-allocate its militaiy
' ?no official contact v,-ith Itsrkius. Lod7;e, forces so eiltIt RS Off0CtiVe Sire;t13th in
s
ends iri reports with major military tiles? provinces is essentially drodil'ed,
po7:-.1...nt in n: "
read and he eCt`3il't try to 5i -s
Vic;!zinzton 1-17,-.:s.
.. ? flirting for conversai.ion, nat cid
Henry Icissin,7,:er, are said to re.g-Ird Princcton routine that s-ernn of
the con7ounity as a mirrz-::,1 blessing: th3 colu:-...nists arou.-.c1
intrinsic:11y 1..a.-,;,orte.lit Co the United Soma of his cri,.:los complain that
Stntres but far too bis- and too prono he is tei close to the pres ?oven
to ele,Soure cliffeiencas of pinioli? though Llo:.,t a3-ree. CC:71t 1:2 US-73 it,
or, sometimes, no c,1i1ion--1:aiiinl a with rare finesse, fo: .his
scraenof-woz?d5. his agency's cr:C.s. Sarr,e d3 t
Consiclere6' a colci-1,1c04:eri neces- frequent m5nUon of Ilielms ant" his
city in tI, Cold v7.-,r days, t eIecy 11,.11.1CiSC:111,17:7.3 In C1-2 ,?,:f03:7Ip columns ?
troy; seems to many steat3, li"ceral P-ag33 Of t::13 nition's
intellectuals and Collg.ressiren, to be capital.-
rinderno.eyatic, cons2iratcri,11, sinister. Yet, if he Eives t.":a apis,arance of
Tine revelat1on:3.in recent years fha.t inaeucianc--...,---hre is witty, gregarious,
have naf'..-e the af,ecysaspect thee,
itsa.ctivitia...'s 15 oullle 1st A131a, the a hish-vsltaga el 'just'
?Coivje, G-.1:Ite..(1.ala, the Lay of Pigs; be...-leath the sucfac. Yelans is
the U-1 fl::::;ilts; its seciet 1-unding of apf-arent
through 'front" fou7,-.7:2a.tions of the so"f-discip1i.-2eA a-.:-.1.1outwasdlyrela.:red,
National Stuclent Association plus 3abcd1 in the essential yet fasoi-,
private and law- na.t.2..1 by the A former foreign
yors' gC013, and, Lally, tvo -:/-zears o"eseryes nuahand
ST AT I NTL
eie
azo, the GrIt-ea Z 0
eretuLia.L.. 00 viti*Rtypo-01601R0013004000ui-b
53-ytIPPFCIVITTM 11:947,-,13 41,.? 11 .11 LA
this, better than most. As the first C.:7.- pl.aCe---Wilat gova each uromarn wore
_roar intelliger.ee officer to treach the to a dinr.;.--;r c".7d SVnC1C should,er strap.
_
)`
f' 1"*"1
_ K_ARprove,s1 J\_ y .o.r,Rel5aseld_ J
, ?i
By Luther lit
Newspaper editors must our attention, it must burst to
achieve a more serious, more the surface in some disruptive,
sophisticated perspective on exceptional (and hence news-
their jobs. Revise their basic worthy) event. Even when we
concept of news and quit being know what is happening under
"suckers" for either side of the the surface, we are forever
proponents of change, Newbold waiting for a traditional news
Noyes, president of The Amen- peg to hang the story on. What
can Society of Newspaper Edi- are we thinking of, sticking to
tors, told several hundeed edi- such old-fashioned concepts in
tors at the opening session of a time of revolutionary ? move-
the society's annual convention went? If we have so little faith
in Washington April 1.1. in the intelligence of our read-
"The newspapers," said Noyes, ers, how can we expert them
who is editor of the Wci:sb fog- to have faith in us? No wonder
(D.C.) Star, "are not exact- the readers constantly feel that
ly writing a glorious chapter" events are ?very:helloing them,
in the history of the profession unawares." Newsmen, Noyes
'
and have "a good deal to an- said, are not "merely spectate
swer for at the bar of public on the unfolding scene."
opinion."
are the. people who cee-??J,
whether we like it or not, ds-
If the reader confidence in the
new,,piper pr.?, is at cid e what is worthy of r.,:s17:
attention ,anil who must iieted?
it is beCause "we are lazy and
mine the way it is to be
porting" and fail to give read-
p:
? superficial in much of our re-
seated. The. dielculty ot
task has made it conven'ent
ers the information acid under-
fon us to hide behind simplistic,
standing that \yin "permit them
even childish formulas as to
to sort out the forces at work
what is news, the slinnIest and
in society and to decide where
most childish being chat this,
their true interesfs lie."
after all, is what pe,:?plo no
Noyes "heynotesspeech", ally weint to read."
the society adopted a report of
New techniques must be de-
its freedom of inforroatioit co LW
that will permit news-
mittee which recommended en-
papers to convey to renders the
actment of a National Shield
Law to protect newsmen from truest possible picture of what
He
disclosing confidential infoema- 'ransPires' Neyes asset ted.
acknowleelged that he did not
tion or the sources of such in -
know what these te?shiliqueS aee
foemation: agreed to let Con know
told the editors that "we
grass know that it cernosed ef-
m
fortis of the Staggers subcom-
ust grow up, must change, be-
cause our readers are changing
mittee to subpoena Columbia
Broadcasting Systems and tran-
scripts of its documentary on
"The Selling of the Pentagon";
voted against a proposal to es-
tablish ?national press councils
but authorized formation of an
ad hoe committee to select some
specific ethical violation by a
newspaper and conduct a "dry
run" trial to see how the press
council idea might work.
Noyes criticized the press for
maintaining steno-typed stand-
ards of news coverage. "Not
only do we devote SO per cent
of our time and space to stere-
typed happenings, but we alSo
insist these happenings are
newsworthy only if they meet
certain stereotyped standards".
Noyes said, "there is no story
and growing up. They are de-
manding more of us now, and ate, those of the Federal Bureau
they are entitled to more from of Investigation and the Atomic
us than what they are getting." Energy Commission." All of
t.P.a2.41rt
,1
L
doubt the Pent
makes
makes suckers of
but no more eas
New Left does. W
to me, tnagically.
velop foe our reach
ingfol perepective?
ties of such smeir
In the first publ
has made as dirt
Central Intern ger
Richard Helms tomi
can Seciety of
tors that the work
criticized CIA - is
"Permit this county
in a fearsome wor1
its way into a bed
peaceful one."
"We are, after
this democracy, an
in it," Helms, a fiet
and advertising sr
"We would not ?
our work distort
and its principles.
to adapt intelligeree.
icon society, not vice versa."
Helms said that the quality of
foreign intelligence available to
the United States government
in 1071 is better than it has
ever been before. He said that
the "intelligence cceomunity?
a name for all of the intern-
gr.:11,.!C assets at the disposal of
the United States, comprised
the CIA, the Defense inselli-
genre Agency, the intelligence
components of the various
rifled services, the National
Secovity Agency, the intelli-
gence elements of Department
of State and?when appropri-
, these agencies are represented
'
"Change we must have '
on the United States Intern-
Noyes went on, "but the trick gi:nce T3oard, cheised by the
is to give our readers a basis, director of Central Intelligence,
factual and intellectual, for as- not as head of the CIA, but as
sessing the paths of change into the principal intelligence ad-
which they are bc.,.ing pushed, visor to the presidnt and the
form rational choices while the National Security Council."
choice is still theirs. "By necessity" Helms said,
"I think the worst of our "intelligence organiaaticins do
lazy and superficial perform- not. publish the extent of their
once today is that we of the knowledge and they do not
press- are allowing ourselves to challoin;e criticism of their op-
be manipulated by various in- editions. We answen to those
terests?some for change and we serve in govermoent."
some against it?smile power- The CIA, he said, is the only
fully in support of the system, one of the organizations named
some destructively seeking to
in a speech AA ? ? f _ Fieg it doo---c-akiiiimar tz
once or whae fe.,per,, 10..s ease - I
it involves conflict or surprise. nesses, our laziness, our super-
i!efore a situation isworthy of ficiality, our gullibility. No
STATI NTL
many to Will I
kind of report for a very few."
Helms gave a detailed report-
of the C part in the Cuban
missile crisis of 1062. He cited
the agencies success in disprov-
ing various reports, such as
that light bombers were being
stored in a particular cave and
that what was reported as a
rounded dome covering missiles
was actually a relatively now
movie theatre in Havana.
"Our intelligence tiles in
Washington, however ? thanks
to U-2 photography of the So-
viet Union and to a number of
well-placed and courageous Rus-
sians who helped?included a
wealth of information on Soviet
missile systems. We had descrip-
tions or photographs of the mis-
slice, their transporters and
Other associated equipment and
characteristic sites in the Soviet
Union. We knew what to look
for.
"Guided by this background,
the interrogators were able to
sort out from the flood, of
reports the ones which estab-
lished the arrival of MTIT3M and
IPTIM equipment in Cuba. We-
weee then aide to locate the
sites ender construction and tell
President 'Kennedy the exact
scope of the threat."
The CIA's eiforts to obtain
foreign intelligence in this
counLr, said, "?
gcn-
A-RDP80-01601R001 4000016
300
of the most viru-
lent ceiticism of the aoency.
They have led to charges that
STATI NTL
2001/013104 1.0A-RDP80
HE NEW STATE=STATIN
. Cooper gives a most human, and often
?.The .Long Side ,- ? humorous, account of the Geneva Confer-
GEOFFREN/ McDERMOTT
The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam by
`. CHESTER COOPER MacGibbon & Kee 13.75
"The Military Art of People's War: Selected
writings of General Vo Nguyen Giap
edited by RUSSELL STETLER Monthly
Review Press .0.90
We in the West can take hope from both of
these utterly contrasting books about Viet-
nam: in utterly contrasting ways, of course.
Chester Cooper was the leading expert on
Vietnam in the Central Intelligence Agency
,for much of the 1950s and 1960s. His excel-
lent book is a study in frustration, both per-
sonal and national. He is a living proof that,
contrary to what many people believe, there
are members of that powerful agency who
take infinite pains to judge critical internat-
ional problems objectively, and to suggest
doveish rather than hawkish policies as far
as possible. Unfortunately, the hawks both
in the CIA and the US government have too
often had the last word, so far. If there is
something missing from Cooper's account,
which is both comprehensive and subtle, it
is perhaps an analysis of the conflicting in-
fluences inside the National .Security Coun-
cil, including the CIA; but this is easily com-
prehensible, even in the absence of an Offic-
ial Secrets Act in the US.
? Cooper's style shows that great diplomatic
affairs can be effectively described con brio
and without dryness or pomposity; which is
seldom the case in books written by British
diplomats. While never in favour of action
for action's sake, he conies across as an
activist amongst diplomats; so he was, and
this characteristic gave mc much pleasure in
my close collaboration with him. His atti-
tude to Britain, where he has Many, friends,
is always objective; he has no time for illu-
s'ions about 'the special relationship'. He lays
bare the enormity of the part played through-
:out by France, right up to De Gaulle's
fatuous suggestion that all South-East Asia
should be neutralised. This suggestion is be-
ing revived, equally inanely, in some British
government circles today.
The whole dreadful story of escalation is
related with both objectivity and passion.
,from the foundation of the Viet Minh in
.1941 up to 1970. Ho Chi Minh ? 'He who
Enlightens,' formerly named 'He Who Will
be Victorious' and 'The Patriot' ? is of
course central to developments right up to
his death in September 1969. Cooper reminds
.us that Gap in 1945 paid tribute to 'the par-
ticularly intimate relations with thina and
thspnited States, which it is a pleasant duty
to dwell upon'. In Giap's book the pleasure
has turned hit? rage and vituperation where
the US is concerned?
ence of 1954, which he calls 'blueprint for
a house of cards'. For the first time Com-
munist Chinese and Indochinese attend a
conference in the West. Eden irreparably
offends Dulles. Dien Bien Phu falls in the
middle of the conference, without the atomic
intervention by the US which had been pre-
dicted. 'What filially emerged was not very
attractive . . such pious platitudes as "ob-
serving. the principles of Geneva" are good
political slogans but bad policy.' I agree.
Successive British governments were too
often to ignore this fact. It would not be
too cynical to say that the Geneva 'agree-
ments' were signed ? by other participants
but not by the US government ? because
the word 'democratic', freely used in their
texts, meant diametrically opposed things to
the two sides. From Geneva Cooper rushed
off to Manila to help Dulles set up Seat?, the
most effective achievement of which was to
provide the US with a justification, on paper,
for intervening in Vietnam. The Dulles
dominoes theory followed logically enough.
The serious escalation of US forces in
Vietnam began under President Kennedy
and his whiez-kid Secretary of Defence Mc-
Namara. With a weak Secretary of State in
Dean Rusk, the military-industrial complex
headed by NIcNatuara increasingly took
over. Where there had been sonic 700 `milit-
nry advisers' in Vietnam when Kennedy be-
came President, the troop level had reached
,16,500 by his death in 1963. Cooper was now
an adviser in the White House, but he was
unable to stem the flow. NfcNatuara's atti-
tude of 'what is good for Ford is good for
the US and the world', and his extraordin-
arily dehumanised approach to the problem
throughout his baneful reign of seven years,
emerge very clearly from his own disagree-
able little book, The Essence of Security.
Under President Johnson, McNamara and
the near-Strangelove type General West-
moreland were completely let loose on their
policy of 'more is better'. Forces and mod-
ern armaments were poured into the war, be-
cause the human computer McNamara' cal-
culated that sheer weight was bound to wint.
and what general, even if brighter than West-
moreland, has ever declined to have more
forces under his command? Moreover, at
about six-monthly intervals, top US poli-
tical authorities ? as often as not septuagen-
arians ? would rush about all over Asia and
elsewhere, and report that the situation was
vastly improved and would shortly be under
control completely. President Johnson was
not sensitive to the widening of the credi-
bility gap, or the ever mounting protests
against the war, in the US and far beyond.
Cooper was a first-class official; but try
as he might he could not restrain the boys
in the big league. He quit the White House
but kept in the closest touch with Vietnam-
ese problems as assistant to Averell Harri-
abortive, ane sometimes tarcicat.
Brown-Kosygin peace discussions in 1966-7,
which I described in the NS of 18 December
1970. For some of the time he was, pecul-
iarly, used by Wilson as a sort of Perman-
ent Under-Secretary of the British Foreign
Office. All rather frantic, and unavailing.
And in 1969 the new President Nixon in-
herited a legacy of 541,000 US troops stuck
in the theatre, not to mention some tens of
thousands of naval and air force personnel.
Not a single Russian or Chinese was fight-
ing there. ?
'Where, then, is the hope in all this that
I mentioned? In Cooper's last chapters, and
in President Nixon's policy. In `No More
Vietnams' and 'Crusades, Commitments, and
Constraints' Cooper deals with the besetting
sin of US foreign policy in the past, mis-
directed moral fervour, and pleads for a
more realistic approach to the major prob-
lems. in the nuclear sphere and that of
relations with the Soviet Union in general,
togetner with those of a gravely disunited
society at home in the US. He chides Presi-
dent Nixon for his Cambodian adventure,
and would no doubt say as much about Laos.
But the facts now are that the US forces
are being reduced, the South Vietnamese are
stronger, and a relatively stable government
rules in Saigon.
Giap depicts the other side of the coin.
He too covers the history of Indochina
since the 1940s. He defines his curious title
at length on pages 175-6, emphasising
the revolutionary, class, and Party character
of our nalitary art. Its characteristic is to
? defeat material force with moral force, de-
feat what is strong with what is weak, de-
feat what is modem with what is primitive
In the context of Vietnam he never considers
it necessary to mention nuclear weapons;
and the communists simply do without air
power. 'The strategic orientation is to pro-
mote a war by the entire people, a total and
protracted war? He repeatedly praises 'rev-
olutionary violence'. He echoes Cooper's
metaphor of the US seeing itself as a knight
on a crusade. On a point of fact, it is inter-
esting that he dates the first US bombing
of Hanoi, in June 1966, eight days earlier
than Cooper.
It is indeed possible to admire the milit-
ary achievements of the various commun-
ist forces in Indochina, both in opposition
to the French and to the Americans and
their allies. They have, up to a point, put
into practice the principles enunciated by
Giap; and no doubt his style of writing and
rigid Marxist-Leninism are a heady brew
for the faithful. It strikes a non-communist,
however, quite differently,, for a variety of
reasons. Giap carries de-humanisation a
whole stage further than McNamara. The
word is never once used; nor are any
individual names save Uncle Ho ? always
revered ? and, scattered about, those of
half a dozen men who performed particu-
Approved For Releage2C100i3ffilicii.tiAllthiVoi-VitOMANSWA, Even Giap can-
a t of his account
STATINTL
.
Approved For Release 2001-41/04:1A?RDP80-01
5 A?::,
-.1Z0-.?? P LS From ? Cee !elmsto
taThm
WASHINGTON, April 14?
Following are excerpts from.
an address by Richard Helms,
Director - of Central Intellia ?
gence, before the Atneriegn
Society of Newspaper Editors:
I welcome this oppcg?tunity
to speak to you today about
the place of an intelligence
service in a democratic gov-
ernment.
In doing so, I recognize
that there is a paradox which'
I hope can be dispelled:
On the one hand, I can as-
sure you that the quality of
foreign intelligence available
to the United States Govern-
ment in 1971 is better than it
has ever been before.
On the other hand, at a
time when it seems to me to
be self-evident that our Gov-
ernment must be kept fully
informed on- foreign develop-
ments, there is a persistent
and growing body of criti-
cism which questions the need
and the propriety for a demo-
cratic society to have a Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency.
I am referring to the as-
sertions that the Central In-
telligence Agency is an "in-
? visible government," a law
unto itself, engaged in pro
vocative covert activit;es re-
pugnant to a democratic so-
ciety and subject to no con-
trols.
This is art outgrowth, "[sup-
pose, of an inherent Ameri-
can distaste for the peace-
time gathering of intelli-
gence. Our mission, in the
eyes of many thoughtful
AtnericanS, may appear to be
in conflict with some the
traditions and ideals of our
free society.
_
May emphasize at this
point that the statute [Na-
tional Security Act of 1947]
? specifically forbids the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency to
have any police, subpoena or
law-enforcement powers, or
any domestic security func-
tions. I can 'assure you that
except for the normal re-
sponsibilities for protecting
the physical security of our
own personnel, our facilities,
and our classified informa-
tion, we do not have an'-
such powers' and functions;
we have never souaht any:
we do not exercise any. ".fundamen;:al question or rec-
short, we do not target on onciling the security needs
American citizens, of an intelligence service
In matters directly affect- with the basic principles of
,ing the security of the United our democratic society. At
Stales, the President and his the root of the problem is
.National
want wise
14?011:faQ.7). r EUcriebva. labectl Qalaia
. 'tional" intelligence--evalua- service ? whatever type of
tions which reflect the con- government it serves?must
aast wrnn it:-;c?if in as much se-
of all Of the intelligem;Se Com-
ponents of the United States
Governme4.t,. The production
and dissemination o f this
national intelligence is the
responsibility. and the pri-
mary'function of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
We not only have no stake
in policy debates, but we can
not and must not take sides.
The role of intelligence in
policy formulation is limited
to providing facts-the agreed
facts?and the whole known
-range of facts?relevant to the
problem under consideration.
Our role extends to the es-
timate function?the projec-
tion of likely developments
from the facts?but not to
advocacy.
Ironically, our efforts to?
obtain foreign intelligence in
this country have generated.
'some of the more virulentcri-
ticism of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.
It is a feel that we have,
as I said, no domestic secur-
ity role, but if 'there is a
chance that a private Amer-
ican citizen traveling abroad
has acquired foreign infotiaa-
tion that can be useful to the
American policy-makes, we
are certainly going to try to
interview him.
If there is a competent
young graduate student who
is interested in worktog for
the United States Govern-
merit, we may well try to
hire him.
The trouble is that to
those who insist on seciag
us as a pernicious and per-
vasive secret government,
our words "interview" and
"hire" translate into suborn,
subvert and seduce, or some-
thing worse.
We use no compulsion If
a possible source of infor-
mation does not want to talk
to us, we go away quietly.
If some student groups ob-
ject to our recruitinub on
campus, we ?-fall back to the
nearest Federal office build-
ing.
gSimilarily, we welcome
the opportunity to place re-
search contracts with the
universities, but again,, these
are strictly voluntary.
And so I come to the
-of
.
C3.,' 17,7
crecy as possible in order to
operate effectively.
If we disclose how much
we know, the opposition is
handed on a platter highly
damaging indication's of how
and where we obtained the
information, in what way his
security is vulnerable, and
who may have helped us.
can seal off the breach in
his defenses, roll up Vie
agents, and shut off the flow
of information.
I cannot give you art. easy
answer to the oblectkaas
raised by those who consider
intelligence work incomps.t-
i'ole with democratic princi-
ples. The- nation must to. a
degree take it on faith that
we too are honorable nen
devoted to her service. I an
assure you that we are, lilt
I am precluded from dem-
onstrating it to the public.
I can assure you that ssllmt
I have .asked you to take on
faith, the elected efficialsof
the United States Go-sem-
meat watch over extensively,
intensively and continuously.
Starting with the eaecttiv
branch, the Central Intdli
gence Agency operates an-
der the constant supers-is:in
and direction of the Natioral
Security Council. No sigrM-
cant foreign program of nay
kind is undertaken withfut
the prior approval of an
N.S.C. subcommittee with
includes representatives of
. the President, the Secretary
of State and the Secretary of
Defense.
In addition,' we report pe-
riodically and in detail on
? the whole -range. of foreign
intelligence activities to the
President's Foreign Intalli-
gence Advisory Board,, a
group of men who have dis-
The same objectivity
which makes Us useful to
our Government and our
country leaves us uncomfort-
ably aware of our ambiguous
place in it. We. may chafe
under the criticism we do
not answer, but we under-
stand as well as anyone the
difficulties and Coe contradic-
tions of concluctiog foreign
-
intelligence operations on be-
half of a-free society.
We are, after all, a part
of this democracy, and we .
believe in it. We would not
want to see our work distort.-
its values and its principles.
We propose to adapt intel-
ligence to American society, ,
not vice versa,
We believe, and I say this
solemnly, that our work is
necessary to permit this
country to grow on in a fear-
some world and to find its
way into a better and more
peaceful one.
STATI NTL
tinguished 'themselves in Grr- ?
eminent, industry, educaiion
and the professions.
Our budget is gene liver
line for line by the Oce
of Management and BAet
and by the appropriate cosn7
mittees of the Congress as
well.
There are elements of the
Appropriations and Arned
Services Committees in lath
the Senate and the Raise
which?lilra the Presidmt's
-board?are told more aiout
our activities and our opra-
tions than is known to latest
of the personnel in our-Ngh-
ly compartmented agar:eye
But how, in the end, we are
9)4-pgrA024.0.1' GM-Rom 300400001-6
In short, the Central In-
telligence Agency is not and
? ApprovSPOTOPAlease 2001/0/047:-:01A-MP80-01
15 AP,;
?ler 3.12 do) C. 7..A.
Associated Prass
Richard Helms addresses
editors in Washington.
_
Rare Speech Discloses
Some Russians Aided
U.S. in Criioarz Crisis
Excerpts from linns acidness
will be found on Page 30,
By RICHARD HALLORAN
SNclat to Tile New To:k nros
WASHINGTON, April 14 ?
The Director of Central Intelli-
gence, Richard Helms, vigorous-
ly defended his agency today.
as necessary to the survival
of a democratic society and
asked the nation to "take it ortl
faith that we too are honorable
men devoted to her service."
Mr. Helms asserted, in his
first public address since be-
coming head of the Central In-
telligence Agency in 1966, that
"we propose to adapt intelli-
gence work to American so-
ciety, not vice versa."
He spoke with the specific
approval of President Nixon
before a luncheon meeting of
the American Society of News-
paper Editors.
In a footnote to history, Mr.
Helms revealed that American
intelligence in the 1962 Cuban
missile crisis was aided by "a
number Of well:placed and
courageous Russians."
He told reporters later that
he was alluding not only to Col.
Oleg V. Penkovsky, who was
identified previously, but also
to .-others who provided -in-
'formation on Soviet missile sys-
tems. When asked for their
names, Mr. Helms laughed.
? Colonel Penkovsky was a So-
viet intelligence officer secretly
Working for the Americans in
1961 and 1962. He was detect-
ed in October, 1962, and ex-
ecuted in May, 1963. The pub-
lication of his alleged memoirs
in the West in 1965 aroused.
considerable controversy over
.th.eir authenticity.
Mr. Helms asserted today'
that United States intelligence
would have "a major and vital another matter when soese of
Approved foCke egsga
rrt any into 6a6Lifitit aa a re's' o ri ' - Ici n_g deet,a f
ato4 : tdiARktai480,41-61A
Noting that the Soviet Union engaged in intellizer.ce. say
things, that are either vicious
Fad rejected proposals for in-
. or just plain silly."
Mr. Helms Said tee United
States could undertake an
agreement to limit such arms
".only if it has adequate in-
telligence to assure itself thatl
the Soviets are living up toi
their part."
' China Held Police State
At a time when the visit of
an American table tennis team
to mainland China has aae.ner-
".ated official hopes for . better
relations with Peking, Mr.
Helms told his audiende that
"some. of our most important
intelligence targets lie in totali-
tarian countries where collec-
tion is impeded by Ch:. security
defenses of a police state?for
example, Communist China."
Mr. Helms's rare psdelic ap-
pearance today was initiated by
Newbold Noyes, editor of The
Washington Star and president
of the society of editors. When
Mr. Helms said he could speak
only with the approval of the
White House, Mr. Noyes wrote
to Herbert G. Klein. the Presi-
dent's director of communica-
tions.
Mr. Klein said today. _that
President Nixon had readily ap-
proved Mr. Helms's appearance.
He said the Administration
thought it a good time for the
American public to have Mr.
Helms explain the role of the
C.I.A., since the agency was
not under the kind of fire that
had been directed toward it in
the past.
Mr. Helms noted in his ad-
dress that in Britain and other
European democracies. "it
would be unheard of for the
head of intelligence services to
talk to a nongovernmental'
group as I am talking to you
today."
Dulles Talks Recalled
A spokesman for the C.I.A.,
rti response to an inquiry, said
later that Allen Dulles. the Di-
rector of Central Inte.iligence
from 1933 to 1961, spoke- pub-
licly about twice a year. But
he could not recall an instance
, in which Mr. Dulles's succes-
sors, John A. McCone and Adm.
William -SR. Reborn, delivered
public addresses. Thus. Mr.
Helms's speech was probably
the first from an intelligence
director in 10 years.
Mr. Helms, who has a rep-
utation as a skilled adardnis-
trator, said, "There is a per-
sistent and growing body of
criticism which questions the
need and the propriety for a
democratic society to have a
Central Intelligence Agency.
"It is difficult for me to
agree with this view." he said,
"but I respect it. It is quite
. _
No Domestic Functions
Mr. Helms emphasized thati -
the agency had no domestic
curitv functions and had never:
sought any.
"In short," he said, "we do
.not target on American citi-
zensh.e"
T
agency was discovered
in 1967 to have financed sev-
eral international activities. ofl
the National Student Associa-1
tion and to have given subsid-!
ie.s to unions, foundations and.
publications.
More recently, the agency
was implicated in the Govern-
ment's surveillance of political
dissidents in the- United States
by -the testimony of former mil-
itary intelligence agents giv-
en before a Senate subcommit-
tee.
Mr. Helms asserted that the,
enency had no stake in .policy'
debates.
'Must Not Take Sides'
"We can not and must not
take sides." he said. "When
there is debate over alternative
policy options in the National
Security Council. to which he
is an adviser, "I do not andi
must not line up with eitheri
If e recommended .one solu-
tion to a problem, those. recom-
mending another would suspect
"that the intelligence presenta-
tion has been stacked to sue-
port my position, and the credi-!
bilitv of C.I.A. goes. out the,
window," he said.
Mr. Helms. after asking; that!
the nation believe that the azqn!
cy's onerations were compatible'
with democratic principles, said:
"I can assure you that what II
have asked yoti to take on faith,i
the elected officials of the Un-
ited States Government watchl
over extensively, intensively, r
and continuously."
He said the National Security
Council, the President's Foreign
rIntelligence Advisory Board the--
Office of Management and Bud-1
get and four committees of
Congress regularly reviewed the .
agency's operations, plans and.
organization.
STATI NTL
01300400001-6
OK
Approved Fg-rraVae 2001/Citietiq66-RDP8
3
- , ;\k, been .lookg into tnis probtenl, still
-By J.V,IES RESTON
WASHINGTON, April 1?The recent
? disclosetres? abou: extensive Govern-
i,ment spying onprivate citizens raises
a practical questicim Why not a domes-
' tic intelligen, advisory -board to help
the: President maintain a balance be-
tween the security of the nation and
the rights of its citizens? In short, a
cpunterpa. k in the domestic intellie
gerice field to the excellent committee
of distinguished citizens now serving
as President Nixon's Foreign. Intelli-
gence Advisory Board?
The foreign intelligency board was
;originally proposed by the Hoover
Commission and established by Presi-
dent Eisenhower on a-limited basis in
1956, 'when it was discovered that
--Separate intelligence operations were
..,preacling from the State and Defense,
_Departments into other agencies of the
Government without effective coordi-
nation and often without the knov,d-
,
edge of the President himself.
When President Kennedy stumbled
into the Bay of Pigs disaster in Cuba
n 1961, he revived this board and
gave it wider powers to supervise the
operations of all foreign intelligence
gathering agencies. No such protection
has been provided for the President
and the people in the domestic intelli-
gence field, however, despite the fact
that the F.B.I., the armed services, and
:other' arms of the Government, aided
.by all the new technological means of
'gathering, storing and retrieving infor-
mation, have been increasing their
surveillance over private citizens.
? Much ..has been written about both
the dang,ers of subversion and crime
on the one hand, and the dangers of
unregulated_ Government snooping on
the other, but the question now is
what can be done about it? The Gov-
ernment clearly has a duty to preserve
"domestic tranquility" and needs to
gather accurate information to prevent
or detect serious crimes or threats of
rebellion, but this dilemma cannot be
resolved either by relying on what the
Justice Department calls the "self-
discipline" of the intelligence com-
munity, or by abolishing. secrecy.
Intelligence operations, as a distill=
-guished and experienced lawyer here
has 'pointed out, are not the same as
the usual methods of public .scrutiny.
Glying'the Congress or the publii as-
cess.to the security flieF, could in many
.'ways-do -greeter harm to the riehts of
individuals than the present policy at
.rigid secrecy.
At the same time, the regent..dis:-
closures about the F.B.I.'s u-se of in-
? WASHINGTON
or go to the Srivict. Union for a 1-e.v
days clearly- indicate that relying on
the self-discipline of J. Edgar Hoover
is scarcely the answer to the problem..
Paid informers have the perspectives
and prejudices of the,: trade. They are
trained to gather and use information,
not to weigh its ?alue or ,.v.or:y too
much about the civil liberties of the
people. Also, officials at the tep of the
Government' who use this kind of
formation don't always have time to
police the methods used by tile snoop-
ers cr the means to check the accuracy
of the information or limit its distrihu-
. tion. .
Even if the Congress takes the
armed services out of the business of
Spying on private citizens and poli-
ticians at home, there will still be a
need for some kind of organization to
supervise the projects and methods
used by the various intelligence agen-
cies, and here the instructions to the
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
suggest a useful guide.
It was instructed to advise the
President concerning the objectives,
conduct, management and coordina,.
tion of the various activities making
UD the national intelligence effort; to
conduct a continuin.-_,, review and as-
sessment of intelligence and related
activities; and to report to the Presi-
dent on its findings, appraisals and
recommendations. '
More important, in his Executive
order establishing the board, President
Kennedy instructed the heads of all
foreign intelligence agencies "to make
available to the boara any information
with respect to fereign intelligence
matters which the board may require,"
and provided the board with an ade-
quate independent staff to help meet
? its responsibilitieS.
The evidence is that this system
worked well, first under Dr. James R.
Killian Jr. of later under Clark
_Clifford before he became Secretary of
Defense, and now under Admiral
George W. Anderson (retired).
Much depends, however, oft the id-
dependence, integrity arid knowledge
of the members of-the board, and par-
ticularly on the confidence and coop-
eration of the President. In President
Kennedy's case, he regarded the board
not only as a protection' to the nation,
but as a means or knowing what was
going on, and therefore as a protection,
for himself and his Administration.
He did not; however, have a similar,
formers, teivi onera.tar.: aru
?
t,al employ ? pyggtr9A, keasef2001103/04 retlIA-RDE110-01601 R001300400001 -6
intelligence field, nor does President
ais who attend antiwar demonstrations
and the close surveillance of individu-
Nixon today. In fact, even Senator ?
S.1711 Frvin \rnr-t1-1 r/rnI7n-1 1TrTI, 11,c
does got know who was supervising
the Army's domestic spying operations.
"1 ;doubt," said Jerome B. Wiesner,
the new head of M.I.T., "that anyone
is aware of the full extent of the sur-
veillance and information collection -
activities that go on in this nation,"
and nobody yet has come forward to.
remove his doubts.
The President, however, .has the.
power to create an advisory committee,
without delay and is new cOnsidering,
.doing so. All he has to do is sign the
appropriate Executive order, and this
.would have the,' support of almost
everybody in the capital, with the pos-
sible exception of J. Edgar Hoover. .
, s-Amcited For Release .(00iitfi?/C141:1CIA-RDP8
The. Nixon \A/atch,
?
c
After saying, at a press conference on Match 4 that
Secretary of State William P. Rogers is "the fore,ign
policy adviser for the. President" and "the chief foreign
policy spokesman for' the President," 'Mr. Nixon con-
tinned: "Now, the role of Dr. Kissinger is a different
one., He is the White I louse adviser tb the President.
'? He ,covers nOt only foreign policy but national security
policy; the coordination of those policies.' - There was
a sufficient, and convincing answer to the question to
which the President was addressing himself.-The ques-
tion, -as he stated it a moment later, was "whether
either Secretary Rogers or Dr. Kissinger is the top
adviser:: and the answer implicit in what Mr:Nixon
had said was that Henry A. Kissinger is "the top
adviser." But the President didn't leave it' at that. He
felt` that he had- to repeat him-self and say that the
answer to the 'question as he had phrased it "is very
, simply that the Secretary of State is always the chief
? foreign ?policy 'adviser and chief foreign policy
spc;kcsmati of the Administration."
? It. was a .sensitive question for the President, one
.that had been 'rubbing him raw since early February:
His reaction then to a casual and generally overlooked
'statement by George D. Aiken, the Republican dean
'? of the Senate, showed when it became known that
Mr. Nixon- was beginning to realize tliat his prized
System 'of foreign and national security policy develop-
ment?had seriously impaired the position and effective-
ness of Secretary Rogers. A brief news item quoted
Aiken's remark that Rogers did not seem to be in-
volved in major foreign policy' decisions. Mr. Nixon
immediately ?yroteta letter to the senator, assuring him
that Rogers was involved in *all major foreign policy
decisions. Aiken said nothing about the letter until
March 2, when a Nixon assistant startled him by asking
him not only to release it but to publicize it at. a press
conference. Senator Aiken declined to call a press con-
ference, ? but he agreed to answer any questions' that
he might he asked aboul the letter and to have it
printed in the CoHgcssionfil Record. ?
The request lo Aiken was one of 'several White
House responses, capped by -the .Prcident's remarks
on March 4, to the.-complaints. 01 twa other senators
that Henry Kissinger had damagingly overshadowed
Rogers and, what \vas. worse, had done it in a fashion
that denied CongresS as a whole and the Senate ,For-
eign Relations Committee- in particular their proper
roles in the evolution arid execution of foreign policy.
The.comrnittee chairman, Senator' Fulbright, and one
of its members, Stuart Symington, .raised the?old and
tattered issue of. "executive privilege." They said that
Kissi tiger, bikt3Of&krEf6)?1
mm 141-60Ft(20tii 3Y.64
coittee qutti
aaothng, had rrustratet t -tem anc tneir
?._
colleagues in their right and efforts to get at the- real
? origins and intent of Nixon policy.' Symington, graph-
ically detailing .the structure of departmental commit-
tees, groups and staff processes that Kissinger devised
and directs, said that the President's assistant forSTATINT
national security affairs is "the most powerful Man in
the Nixon Administration next to the. .President him-
self" and asserted that his immunity from committee
interrogation "nullifies the basic concept of advice and
consent." Eulbright drafted a bill that woltId require
Kissinger and 'other Presidential assistants to. appear
upon command before the -Foreign Relations and other
committees; if only to say that they had been .specifi-
cally directed in writing by the President to refune. to
testify. It was- a 'feeble 'threat, likely to die ?Ful-
bright's commiitee, and the President would probably
have ridden Out the furor in silence if Kissinger's
ascendancy had not been related to what ? Symington
called "a resultant obvious decline in tile prestige and
position or the Secretary or State and his department."
. Symington also said in a Senate speech, "Wherever
one goes in We afternoon or evening around this town,
one hears our very able Secretary of State laitglrtod at.
People say he is Secretary of State in title only." That
did it. A White blouse assistant forthwith g9t in touch.
with Senator' Aiken, as noted. Mr. Nixon ordered his
press secretary; Ronald Ziegler,. to tell reporters that
"President Nixon has the utmost confaence in the
f:re'cretary of State" -artd.that "those whb may have ,?the
impression tlult the Secretary of State is not the Presi-
dent's chief adviser on foreign affairs are misleading
theniselv'es and others." The' staff of Monday,. a,
-weekly propaganda sheet put out by the. Republican
National Committee, polled tWo Washington society
columnists and four "pronainent?Washing,ton hostesses"
and reported their "Unanimous" testimony that "they
11c1 never heard the Secretary of State laughed at.",
Mr. Nixon made the difficulty for himself and for
his Secretary' of State when he fulfilled, his campaign
pledge "to restore tht Nationitl Security Council to its
preeminent role in national security planning." Henry
Kissinger's preeminence, his ,own skills apart, is -a
prodhct of that promised and, accomplished preemi-
nence. Symington recognized this when he maintained,
on the Senate 'floor and personally to Rogers, that he
was aiming at neither Rogers 'nor Kissinger but .at "the
concentration of foreign policy decision-making power
in the White Hotrie" and at the isolation of that power
cent'ettfrom Congress. Senator Jacob Javits, agreeing
with Symington. that "excessive use of executive privi-
lege" had impeded congressional oversight of foreign
- policy, ?vent to the core of the matter when he asked,
"Why' should we not hold the President himself, re-
spor4ble rather than Dr. Kissinger for the effect -upon
congress .of the or.ganization of his Presidency respect-
ing international security affairs?" Mr. Nixon, re..act-
'4100fditoGiii Dij Q14 in the
aoinet, tn0 .i
e ecretary o- Jtate, ac mowteugthe re.-
J_ ,ri 1961
Approved For Release 2001103/04: IA-RDP80-01601
STATINTL
THE 'VICTORY' WESTMORELAND LOST
A confidential Pentagon paper details the plan
the military.had three years ago to end the Viet-
nam war. Gen. William Westmoreland, then top
man in Saigon, and Gen. Earle Wheeler, then
'chairman of the Joint Chiefs, worked it out clur-
ing height of Hanoi's. Tot offensive in 1968.
Westmoreland read Tet as a shift to all-out war
by Hanoi and wanted to match it. He also viewed,
It as a last gasp that would leave North Viet-
'lards army badly mauled. His plan called fdr
206,000 more men (a total of 731,000) and Moves
-on. all fronts?stopping anticipated assaults from
the north, seizing sanctuaries in Laos and Cam-
bodia, blocking the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex
in those countries, invading North Vietnam and
bombing the 'port of IIaiphong.
.? On Feb. 12, the proposals were discussed at
a White House meeting involving LBJ, Dean
Rusk, Robert McNamara, CIA chief Richard
-Helms; Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Clark Clifford, Walt
Rostow and Wheeler. On Feb. 23, Wheeler met
Westmoreland in Saigon and after three days
brought details of the plan back to Washington.
Shortly afterward, the 206,000-man request was
revealed in a Pentagon "leak"?a move, West-
moreland says, designed to "prejudice the Presi-
dent's* appraisal." On March 24, Wheeler met
Westmoreland privately in Manila. The word:
no new bombing, no invasions, no 731,000 men.
The only thing Wheeler could not tell his field
..commander was something he did not know him-
self?that on March 31, LBJ was bowing out of
the way and out of the White House.
RUSSIA ORBITS ANOTHER RIDDLE
The Soviet Union seems about to write a new.
cliapter in manned Spaceflight?but no one knows
?v1v.it it will reveal. In November and December
and again last month, the -U.S.S.R. fired off three
shots that all looked like tests of a new manned
vehicle. The first two satellites evidently carried
recorded voices; they executed maneuvers that
outdid any by previous manned satellites. U.S.
experts say they don't quite fit a program for a
manned space station (which the Russians are
working on) nor a moon shot. Beyond that, the
experts are baffled.
TROUBLE ON THE WELCOME MAT
Chile's new Marxist government faces a delicate
problem in its efforts to forge new, friendly links
to Red China. After President Salvador Allende
granted Peking diplomatic recognition, the Na-
tionalist Chinese envoy left but gave the Chinese
Embassy ( bought by China before World War II)
to Chile's League Against Cancer for use as a
hospital. Peking's athbassador wants it back, and
Allende's opponent's in the .Chilean Congress
have vowed to block the move.
MOSCOW DROPS A HINT
For the first time in memory, a Soviet radio
. broadcast this week listed all Russian vessels
mOving to and from North Vietnam. (Except for a
tanker, all carried non-military cargo.) The rea-
son, U.S.- analysts think, is that Moscow, fearing
that the U.S. may resume full-scale bombing M
North Vietnam, Is -hinting at immunity for its
ships from American aircraft.
?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6
ST&TINTL - '
Approved For Kelease 200-1103/04 ? CIA-RDP80-0
- g
-
eV(1'-d
-611: oh.
? EX CIMONS
? .Yirftl?WI ?76!tr
Lonneit syste'm anc: trom ?is to keep the 2?a.c.1tnel-y
'the l'resident. the Cabin::: F
deoartmcnts: st-id ? a:.iencies, iu hr., j, vor azre
_
the 'Me 1.1..U;.C: stair, , 0?- ,1-)f that, 1L ac ncrv lIrn
gcess, foreign goverrirrie-nt. failed. .
and the . She dcscrilKs.i.
z 'We get about SOO pieces
of paper a month,' she
said. "Our system -is de-
signcd to control it and
keep track of every ooc-
ument. We ii \C a doe-..?
urrient control organiza-
tion that, as each piece
Comes in, assigns it a num-
ber, a security classifica-
tion, and keeps a record or
who sent it and where it's
going." ? ? ? ?
? ?
Extreme precautions are
taken to protect the secur-
ity of the system.
"We' have safes and'
vaults Where the classified
Material is stored," she
.said. 'This building, is se-?
-
CUIC,! and everyone who
c,on-tcs in must be cleared.
"Every eineument is
hanr.learried. We have a
se.curity officer who
V.,-ati-lies for -unintentional
breiches. And. of .couuc,
everyone involved in this
operation has had a thou-
Quell security edema nee."
c, Mrs: Davis had to un-
dergo a similar clearance'
v.-hen she moved over
from- the State Depart-
ment, an elaborate elc?a-
r.ance involving in te r-
views with neighbors, era-
ploy9rs and friends.
.3,-Thoroult. Check
'They check every ad-
dress: every place you've
ever- worked," she said.
They examine your loyal-
ty?asking such things as
she ever said any-
thing against this Colin-
try?', 'Has she belonged to
any subversive organiza-
tion s? 'W h a t are her
&inking habits?' "
`.; T d
he probe idn't bother.
her.
"If I \\TH. on the outside
'and someone else had this
job, I would want to know
that they v-ere completely
trustwort0y," she said. "I
--,:vould want the govern-
ment to be aware of their
per?sonal habits and weak?
nesses."
She is close to her hoss
.Kissinger but says that,
because she is not a policy--
? ? : WASHINGTON ---- When-
ever-Jeanne.' WilS0)1 Davis
goes to parties, she usually
keeps quiet when :the cock-
tail conversation g6ts around
to foreign policy. 'I'm sure
everyone must think I'm ter-
ribly stupid,' she said.
But there's a 'very gooii
?.reason for her silence.
? ; "51 I were to comment on ,
foreign affairs," she said, 'I ?
couldn't alv,-ays he sure whe-
ther I ?was saying something
rd read in a. newspaper that
morning-7-or in a top-secret
document." ??
'?-? :11-e w a s exaggerating
somewhat, of course, but
Mrs. Davis still must exer-
cise- great' caution. As staff
? secretanTto the- National So-
'curity Council and head of.
.its secretariat, she has access
tO every piece of classified
foreign policy information
that passe.s among members
. of the highest levels of the
U.S. government.
-? nigh Security
, .
"We're all, very coriscio513
.of our responsibility," she
said. "We're always aware of
the extremely high see ui ity
classification. I guess be-
?CatiSe of this, you learn to
live with it always in the
back of your mind. It's alrea-
dy a part -of my life.?
Mrs. Davis, a tall, slim,
gray-haired wornan of 50
who V.-3 :3 born in Long Beach,
came to the National Securi-
ty Council and.? its chief, De.
Henry A. Kissingec, in
March, 1000, on-loan" from
the State Departnpent.,,vhe-ret
she .had held a similar jOb,'
'? She describes hcrself?as
"sott of a traffic manager,"
, who prepares briefing books
for Kissinger and the Pres-
- ident, coordinates staff work
as a man ci "failtz,,,tie en-
ergy. and. ?.enteiect-si:d
pnity" vs-ry
:long hea.its.
- "He's here before S a.m.
?
and often doesn't leave un-
til after 11. p.m.;" Eike said.
"lle's very demanding of
his staff, but ?doem't de-
mand anything he won't
do himself.
"Ile has a knack ffor ask-
ing the (-1U:est:ions vigt hope
he ask- -tics hard
ones. He has a marvelous
wit. And I must say, I
-think his social imag s has
been grossly exag,g-tratecl."
Government-riede
' Mrs. Davis, a resent re-
cipient of the FcrIclial Wo-
m a n' s- Award kr her
career ac.complislments,
feels that women lave an
important p:iace. Ha high
government pesitiki-s.
"I've. never ? thcerght of
my sex as a handicap," she
said. !Tye been my for-
tunate'. I've ; alwzys had.
;basses - who hi--tve judgcal
me as an iudiviclutd, and I
'had a very undmitandiug
bvsband." -
Her" husband, ;a former
attorney with Alk State-
Dapartment, cli ccif our
years ago. Her 16-Y-ear-old
daughter attends iehool in
Cennecticut ?
always. mid men
working for me," she said.
"Marly - people Juice asked
me if I've had prinibleres. I
figure if a man le troubled.
bi2cause hek Worling for zt."
woman?he has nc prob-
lem, not me., '
Her day begins at 7:30
a.m.- when she kayos her
?)t)-acrie farm Ito Broad
Run, Va., for th-c
drive to Washingtion. It's a
long commute'(a't Inst- an
%out. each way) but fills
loves it -- espeelidly the
drive home. ?"Aaer the
tension of the da, it's lilac
a decompression c h a M.
her," she said.
STATINTL
anda'gtr-V
?_
,ri1e416r;401 -110144
-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6
?
ar1borv4. the?Natior:: ,
:i he I.; \ Tv job
I 1:IE
STATI NTL.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP8
8 MAR 91
The Predominance of Kisinger
?? I
its orderly march of ideas, its thoroughness and its con-
ceptual Veadth, President Nixon's wide-ranging foreign
policy report -demonstrates again the predominant. influence
of Henry Kissinger, his articulate National Security As-
, sistant. The. former Harvard professor's strength is his ab-
horrence of sloganeering in world .affairs and his knack for
breaking complex problems down totheir more specific and
manageable components. At one ?and the same time, claims
one White House observer, he is -"Richard Nixon's Ri-
chelieu, and his Metternich."
? Kissinger bega.n to solicit suggestions for the report last Oc-
tober from the Department of State, the Defense De-
partment and the. CiA. On the day after Christmas he took
five of his 49 aides to San Clemente to begin drafting the doc-
ument. He discussed its outlines in detail with Nixon in Jan-
uary. A rough draft was then circulated to the key 'agencies
for their comments, and the National Security Council re-
viewed both the draft and the comments. The final policy de-
cisions were ' Made last Month by Nixon, Kissinger and
Secretary of State William Rogers at Key Biscayne.
As the drafting and the final polishing continued, Kis- ?
singer drove his staff with all the harshness of a. plantation
overseer. It- was easy to detect which members of his staff
had worked on the, final drafts;Kissing,er says. "They had ma-
niacal -expressions on their faces." As the deadline for the
final draft approached, Kissinger kept telephoning his men
with last-minute thoughts. Exasperated, they finally stopped
taking his calls so that they could' complete their work,
Tyrannical taskmaster that he is, Kissinger has already
run through three administrative aides, who decided to es-
cape the pressure. But the irrepressible Kissinger can read-
ily joke about his reputation, as a ruthless boss. Says he of
his overworked staff: -"The circles under the eyes don't both-
er me. It's only when I see the flecks of foam at the, cor-
ners of the mouth that I worry."
Approved For Release.2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6
Cl..aClACO,
y ?
Approved For Release 20,01/03/04 : CRLRDP80.701
By Thomas B. Ross-
? Sifti-Tirns Eluroz-iu
\VASIL ? This provincial capital of the non.-Commu-
nist world was struck dumb last week when a former pillar of
the establishment stood up and said the emperor's minister .
has no clothes.
It has long been part of the insider's wisdom here that Sec.
Of Stale William P. Rogers plays a secondary role to White
-Hence adviser Henry A. Kissinger in the formulation of Presi-
dent Nixon's foreign policy.
High ranhing officials have been saying as rimch privately
for Mere than a year and newspapers have been speculating
about it even longer. But it was considered bad form in OIL;
protocol-conscious town for any titled member of the goeern-
.
snout to say sb publicly..
s Then, last Tuesday, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo), race a
proper Member of th-2'.. Cold War Club, rose on the Ssmate floor
to declare to the outside world that Rogers is "laughed at" en
-Washington's cocktail- circuit beca.use Kissinger is considered
"secretary of state in everything but title."
SVI)IINGTON, a former secretary of the Air Force and
hawk turned dove on Vietnam,. asserted that Kissinger is "the
actual architect of our foreign policy."
'The senator's point: was that either Rogers' poser should be
testored or he should be replaced by Kissinger- as. the Presi-
dent's spokesman in testiniony before Congress.
? Mr. Nixon promptly called a press conference to defend
."nay oldest and closest friend in the Cabinet." But his re-
marks did little to change any minds and, in fact,, implicitly
conceded Symington's case, ?
.For tile President, while describing, Rogers as "the chief
for'eign policy spokesman or the administration," indicated.
that Kissinger has a broader role ? "not only foreign Policy
but national secitrity policy -- the co-ordination of thine pol-
icies."
In other words, Kissinger stands at the focal point not only
of the State Depattment's recommendations but also those of
the Defense Department and thost_c.0.10::.:111genc.3 Agency,
which command much more money and probably have more
influence over U.S. operations abroad.
KISSINGE.R'S POWER grows out or los position as director
of the .Natiorial Security Council which, under Mr. Nixon, has
been restored to its original pre-eminence.
The NSC was created in 1947 to enable President Truman to
conduct the cold War with the same type of strong, central
' control that Franklin D. Roosevelt exercised in World War it.
By statute, it includes the President, the vice president, and
.the secretaries of State and Defense. .
Under Mr. Truman and President Eisenhower, it was domi-
nated by two- forceful secretaries or state,- Dealt Ache-sea and
;John Foster Dukes, and developed an elaborate staff that
'represented a mini-State Department-Pentagon-CIA.
? Gem Eisenhower ran it much like a military staff with the
Jdirector presiding as thief of staff dyer a wide range of cora-
miti:ces 405X/Ofriqillreii4 226ofi01764'1.
_foreign o ? icss tss
The members of the NSC then debated, revised and ap-
rorover,1 tte papers and .director was charged with seeing
STATI NTL
that they were put into effect. President Kennedy decided, even,
before he, took office, that the NSC routine had degenerated
into bureaucratic formalism. In one of his first official acts,
in the words of his adviser ArtlAtIr Schlesinger, Mr: Kennedy
"slaughtered committees right and left."
The stated object was to restr4e the President's personal
control over foreign pelicy and also to re-assert the pre-
rogatives of the secretary of State, which had begun to wane
under Dulles' successor, Christian Herter.
Ilov.,ever, Dean Rusk failed to assert himself to Mr. Kenne:.
?dy's satisfaction and, again according to Schlesinger, he was{
soon complaining: "damrait, (McGeorge) Bundy and J get
? more done in ono day in the Vhite. House than they do in six
r?riontits at the State Department.'' ? .
Bundy, Mr. Kennedy's special assistant for national security
- affairs, was seen exeteisingrthe powers of the NSC without the
old encumbrances of the committee structure and, the format
debates ainong the members. ? ?
Meanwhile, Defense See. Robert S. McNamara was cutting
into the State Department's domain by issuing an annual
"posture statement," A precursor to the state of the, world,
Message now prepared by Kissinger fon Mr. Nixon, it was full
of sweeping foreign policy pronouncements.
D.ES.PITE-lcileNAINLVRA.'S COMPETITION, Bundy wielded "
- considerably more prr,v-er than any previous director of the
NSC. And his-successor, Walt W. Rostov', sustained the status
. of the job under President Johnson despite a resurgence in
Rusk's influence.
When Mr. Nixon took office, be restored the Eisenhower-
type staff structure to the NSC but, at the same time, retained
the Bundy-type dominance of the director. Thus, Kissinger ?
inherited the best of both worlds, a large, loyal staff and a
tradition of equality with the Cabinet officers.
Defense Sec. Melvin It.. .Laird has not achieved the influence
of McNamara under Mr. Kennedy. And Rogers, who lacked
his predecessor's diplomatic ,t.tel,:ground, has net achheved!
Rush's influence under Mr. Johnson,
Kissinger, a brilliant scholar of foreign affairs and a stir- .
prisingly aggressive administrator, has filled the vacuum to
become, in the opinion of Kactically all experts here, the
dofninant administration figure in international affairs.
As such, Symington', Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) and
other critic 7 of the war have sought to hold him accountable..
particularly on Vietnam.
, .
KISSINGER HAS AGREED to a number of informal meet.:
jugs, including at least. one visit to Fulbright's home. But the
senators want hint 'on more formal terms, possibly under tile
hot lights for a televised hearing. -
Mr. Nixon has refused, invoking "executive privilege", the
theory that.the President has the right under the constitutional.
separation of powers to decide, who should and who should not.
. testify before Congress. -
The senators have counterattacked with the argument titat
the Constitution directs the President to seek the Senate's'
- "advice and consent" on foreign policy.,
P 16-.e2trrf0.01414-13011,-40000eltireClitteabt.rie
torATTnu i.4t.
"- Soviet Union, ;ranee coordination before .the "Our kneaaledge of prbsent
Communist China and 'other abortive Sontay prisoner-of- Soviet' capabilities . allows
countries that might harm the war raid of No. 21," at which Ienry and others to criticize
nation's security. time the C.I.A. was virtuall$\ us for serne? sponginess about
When tactical Intelligance shut out of Pentagon planning. predicting future Soviet pol-
' ? ' '
, in V ieLnam and Germany and By contrast, the specialists icy," an informed source con-
reeonnaissance by overseas point out, timely intelligence. ceded. "It's pretty hard to look
commands is included, the en- helps in decision-making, down the road with the same
rural figure exceeds 85-billion , It was Mr. Cline who spot- ertainty."-
experts say. ThAy . PAC Re-1'001101 - 44s:sZI D R80 -04 604
Pad o" *he AdministratieM's
partment spends o e than 8 ,
' - - marine buildup. at. Cienfuegos, put and organization of ..tne
clogglhas;" in the secrecy.
shrouded _intelligence "com-
munity."
sourcas and personnel?much
of it talented--in formulating
policy.
In addition to the C.I.A., Two Cases in Point.
. --Helms Said to Rate High
-Sodreles close to the White
House, say' that Mr. Nixon
and his foreign-policy advisers
--Mr.. Kissinger and Secretary
or State William P., Rogers
and Secretary of Defense
Melvin R. Laird?respect the
professional competence. of
-Mr. Helms, who is 57. and is
:the first career head of the
Central Intelligence. Agency.
; Appointed by - President
'Lyndon. B. Johnson in June,
1966, Helm has been
essentially apolitical. He is
said to have brought profes-
sional ability-. -to bear ? in
"lowering the profile" of the
agency, tightening .discipline
and divesting it of.. manY
fringe activities that have
aroused criticism in Congress
and. among the public.. His
standing with Congress and
among the - professionals is
high.
According to White House
soufces, President Nixon,
backed by the Congressional
leadership, recently offered
Mt. Helms added authority to
'coordinate the activities of
the other ? board meanbers. ? He
is reported to have declined.
A' major problem, according
to those who know the situa-
tion, is that while Mr. Helms
is the. President's representa-
tive on the Intelligence Board,
ROO ?130040009111
.10 per .cent--Sa ion - to
? ?
$TAT1NTL rioi; YORK -S
Approved For Release 200103,404 iMA-RDP80-
at......
, - ? ili--), 1 ' - - l'";i ' ./. ' '.'' - ' An astessment of the ;policy! added billions, he Won. the 1
11, I '-- -11 .1 $ ..11._ ' A CA. e,' - position and influence of inili-
't--0 --"'C'' i 0 ''''i - '-'-- 0 ' C ''''.7 ? ? 0 1C " 0 17
a
- . - Cet,' ''. regard of the brass because]
tary and civilian Defense Dc- they felt like full paitners
- rx ''. - - 5
'I. . ()NUL - ' r .t,l-ff
1,..,.%..?. ..,,....iA . ....., ? . , e...,...,_ ? 0 ....- t. %..., , 4
IP ---) ..--,,
----, A fa -,-.-^ 0 ? --,-:, p, q / IS par.tment leaders in the foreign-
- -a - poluty arena makes it clear that shrinking budgets.
the hard choices required' byl
the stereotypes of hawks in the One reason forthe relati'on?
,- , . _ . ? Pentagon and doves elsewhere ship is the mutual respect -and
Following, is the fourth in a series of at exploring no longer prevail. Nowadelys a
. .. .
, .. .... ...,. ,
warmth between the Defense
the Nixon Administration s style in foreign
variety of shifting allia.nees in i;Secretary and the Joint Chiefs
_', policy:
the Administration sometimes that was obviously tacking 'oil
. 'By WILLIAM Bnt'CIllitil ? , pair the Joint Chiefs and the both sides during ttho McNa-
.? _
Special to The 'sea To Times .. . State Department against the. imara era,
??-:-:- WASHINGTON, Jan. 20?' -- Pentagon's civilian leaders; at _
Nonetheless, ;Mr., Latird"nas,
That happened in the spring -other Thmes civilians are ar- .. ?
;Though the Defense Department ' retained a principal planning
raved aat hist t'ne milita- ? then r a ? ' ? " - 0
innovation of Mr. McNamara.'s:
of 1969, following the shooting
:remain? the largest, richest and down of an unarmed spy plan'e ag)-.-i'n,'?'''''' ''''' ' '''Y'
Icy ?White House ',staff dividinr, the budget among
.most f in
mi Governent off the coast of North Ko tea, men may be pushing: for bold the mca'jor military mitsions.
lien the mill ta ry strssed the
? "agency, it, like other agencies, ,, w - = ? ., , racoJes, against opposition from that must be fulfilled, not
- I ?ioatteity of forces available in the th, di Aomats and the nhilitar '
has lost to the Nixon White iv' - - , . , . ; . 1 . , 1 .. . . ? among the armed . services as'
arouse some of its influence on:.
- face of Iva. Nixon s India in- leaders. -
such l'he first decision' on 'sey '
clination to bomb some North To gain sornr. insight into the strat.egie misSiles is li'cr:v i.na.?i?ri.
:.foi?aign policy. , ? Korean airfields. As the, mill,- conside- ble I i" f P^ r- ? - ? - a ? - - ??
t. . , .?, are needed and of what kind,
t'? Senior military men have the tary slowly moved air and sea infitt-tence in fornian olic , one
. ..P_. 3a-.. . .and only then is it determined
-satisfaction- of sitting as equals reinforcements toward Korea, ..
must Juin to .the beginning of how much money will go to
his anger cool-d and he cle.
,the various missile programs.
'
on all major policy boards with
cide.d against retaliatoloy ?Hs, ithe nni2Leen sixties, when Rob-
civilian leaders of the ' Ponta- During the recent Jordanian Ica S? .i.leNarntira was John F. ? There is no doubt that civil-
/
gon, the. State, Department and. 'crisis, after hundreds of Syrian !Yenriet/s SecrotarY of De- tan control continues at the
.the Central 'Intelligence tanks hacl gone into Jordan to f fense. che Pentagon of Seere-? Pentagon. SecretarY Laird end
Agency. They' get their views support the Palestinian guer- t?a'
Mtivin H. Laird is Vastly DaTuty Secretary David Pack
l -
t, , s,
rillas against the troops of different, in style and sub-
aid make the final decisions
direct y o the President un-
King Hussein the Joint Chief
stance, from the establishinent on such questions 'as whether
filtered by civilians. But thoselsupported .by officials of the molded over a seven-yeart to develop and build a Navy
fighter or an Army tank and
yicavs are rejectecl by ;the Pre s1-1 State and Def.a.rise Departments, _spt,C.,;i2dd biyhrao,ILil?g. h?aleilsn,Taa.:;ntari;f. Nii:Ifiro
on the nutnber of combat divi-
dent as often as they aro ac.!tirgcd caution lest a misstep . .
'copied_. ; trigger a confrontation with' 351ihson's Presidency, ;sions and aircraft car riers that
.. ?.._ . ,
? i-
; -- - e the Soviet 'Un i?vill be maintained as the nili
Li-ton Brilliant But Abaaaive
. While President Lyndon. B. On the other hand, on issues I 'tary 'establishment shrinks.
Johnson was jealous of the pre- in which the White House, for Mr? McNamara, a . brilliatq Under Mr. McNamara and his
but. abrasive manager, or successor, Clark M. Clifford it
rogatives of Presidential power, strategic reasons, was receptive
,y c ,a tains
h ' too', ? , ? . ? on, to toe
. e an options offered by the Samzed a team of bright- Young. %YRS CiVilian analysts wrho for-
.. tactical,ci.villan analys.Ls who helped ntulated the options, with the
fratary support for, his tough mreialsitoag _f_ or essentially
as in the case cyfrhim take decision-making from military coming . in later on
decisions, whether on Vietnam. tee rebuttal; now the military iii
force
invasion and!the armed services .. and .
;,lie Joint Chiers . and central- i-
force levels or on the khid of the heavy bo abatrikcs on air- ti ate specitic- proposals on? how
antimissile missile he Wanted defense sites 'and sup:A-5, ize it in his office, In the prb- the defense pie wilt be cut,
?
to build. President Nixon in dumps. in North Vietnam _ cess the views of militaty mei, ?with civilian analysts making
, '
, , - , supportehard-lfne . military policy
was V:ere consistently brushed 'their comments before ultimate
contrast, seldom seems to feel . d. ? . . _ aside, or so the military felt.
With the not-Me excePtion :, During the long team of
- tdecision. ? -
the -peed for a public military' .
endorsement of his actions. . An linpression lingtpported of .Vietnam strategy, Mr. Mc-. Mr. McNamara and the brief"r
Even when the Defense. De- Mr. Nixon's stand has some-,Namaia succeened in gaining one of Mr. Clifford, the Office.
artment
times given rise to the impre.s-'virtual autonorn.y over policy of Internationt'd Searity Affairs
p can present a united sion that military men arc, in,cleci.sions, even tnos.e. with 1,arge --roughly 300 speeialists w1o.
front of civilian and militarY the ascenclancy. Early las.t;foreign - policy . implications. advise the Secretary of Defense
planners pushing a project, the month, after two intensive air.And in a world in which the on. foreign policy.-- . included
White House has shown no re_ strikes on North. Vietnam an. d?Urated States has commitments isome of the brightest and most
luctance to _ impose its own a commando-type raid on a pm is to raore than 40 countries, there, 'assertive' officials in Washing-
_ oner-of-war camp near -Hanoi, is little the Pentagon does or iton. . ? -- .
-solution.. Mr. -Nixon overruled Senator J. W., Fulbright as- contemplates that lacks rami-t i .
the Joint Chiefs of- Staff when serted that the Pentagon was fications abroad. _ , I Urged Pullout
'.
they araaied against the uni- "taking over the. primary role It wa.s Secretary 1,,leNamara Nov according to 'people in
lateral elimination of- stodts in our foreign policy." rather than the President oi- other agencies who rietai with
Ci biological w-eapons. Since those bard-line actions the Secretary of Stale who each them, the caeca staff,?with a
seemed to break a patterni
of January published a "posture few . notable exceptions, i.s
-- He overruled them again more than a year's duration n 'statement" otalinint= worldwide; weaker. A senior State Deont-
when they urged that the Rus- which the Administration ap- problems and how the United merit official commented: "In
-slams . be offered a package naared to be fulfilling its States intended to: deal. with the McNamara era State
proposal on nuclear-arms n- - coeledge of negotiation rather them, dealt with I.S.A. because that's
trol that . would - not Prevent than confrontation, the Ar- Into that setting stepped Mr. ,where the strong men Were at
construction of a full 12-site kansas Democrat's allegation Laird, a smooth, political-t Defense. Now we tend more
Safeguard antimissilesystem; may have struck a responsive ly shrewd, Congressman from,. and more to deal with the
the offer, instead, was eitlIcr chord around the -nation. . -Wisconsin .t.ilio had gained his; Joint Start and the services.
for . no missile defen w
se or for Hoc as it prompted_ a knowledge of defense matters On the large stage of policy,-
-one limited to protectina only ranking Administration official during more than a decade on, Mr. Laird- has chosen a limited'
a . the capitals of the Sevier 'Union to .say that he had missed:the the House Military Appropria? number of key positions aad
( and the? United Stales. ? . point on the g01,11d that it is tions Subcominittee. ? lobied- hard for their accept- -
Moreover, on ? at ? least two not that the Pentagon has "in- He de-emphasized the impor- ance, bdth- in the Administra-
. occasions when . the military ordinate 'influence on . our for- lance or civilian analysts and tion :id in Congress.
. chiefs prevailed on a major eip policy but rather that the returned to the military a sub-I One was his insistence that,
policy matter at the V/htte .Administration is itself . more stantial role in the makinvt' of' in addition to the stress by the
i - -
-- House, it was in
straint on a Pr, , itf
atiaokai....inclinact to a. p hard,Itne bias in defenate ra-4:i I' lthougl 11;,ctutry-816.-iiwat..s, 1.2eparia ciTtorReleasen2001/03/ 41110C1 Et '(? OttaiblUi m,
0 . .
. . toward hold action. ' et, to which_Mr...fpNamara had, gon andumirco114;blne..'t
YrY." .
? STATINTL .
- e) , r, 10-:ii
Approved For Release_2001Y03/04i:ICIA-RDP80-01 .
-, a ,, 1 , 6 ' in ,?"--, '4 how
0 r
1 1 ,., how soon and how effectively
er'el C *,lr-'ii I*3 r''''' ' -' ' ? 11.2.k.'h(-, .-". .r"."0 C.,'4 i e'rn IMr. Nixon's new council can
b.t.iks to politicac6.6.6.1.;.6i_aEruirocavi-tigil gain control over the rival in
- i
. .. mg --- with only occasional
terests that have been opera.t-
1
i victirri of interagency
Rhe United States relatively jso-
i,
Following is arc third in a that the White House often lia.c1 toted.
series of artinis cieproi.iiig.-thelto resolve on an improvised
Crucial Issue in hPan guidance and frequently impro-
Nixon Adminisirittion's styre in!libasi5. i A ia*.ilure to settle trade' ..-I 'Yised White House. decisions.-- :
!i 'The ? establishment of the l' investment questions rii,u ? ..,,,
foreign policy:. ? -v,iithAri: nine Government depart-
.
, . inew machinery was not .a sim- Japan--a 'much more acute po- Ments and at least a dozen
Ili y TAD :-.il'a..1I,C . lpie ? bm-eauccatic. Tilove out a liticaLproblem. in Tokyo _than agencies.
- Spzclnl tb Tir.-nr?.? 1::-:% T;Ines .. major effort to cope.-../ith the has *been generally acknoWl- '- ? -In addition to the State Dc-
WASHING1ION, Jan. 19--De- rapidly, changing interilatii,i?n,i; edged l. in Washington?could, partment, which is charged with
spite deteriorating economic economic situatiOn, ..airr..,...,,,,. in Tile ..opinion of American -of- negotiating most of the econom-
R?1 "'idols, weaken the pro-Ameri- le agreements but whose role
relations betwepn the United posing grave foreigii?-Pcille.Y. can . Government and induce is. gradually diminishing, the
States and the two otbc.r gre['it problems for the Unitad StateS More* active -econOnalc if not Defense, Treasury, Commerce,
trading powers - --- til,e EuroPeall Traditional questions. 0-iirse .. diplomatic relations between Justice Transportation, .Lahor
Common Market and Jcpall--- curny and diplomacy :are tc., . Japcn . and .(ioimiiiiiiist cluna. Agriculture and . Inten.lor Do-
?Nixon Arirohlistration ilaS ginriing to bi-. overshacloWe' h- Iint.il noi,v such poliiiical lin- partments participate in mal
the
. . . L1 . .). plications have often been lost ing foreign economic policy.
been - ?unalilci in the last. two l'isieZ . Protectionism hero ancfrom sig.lit in the Nixon Ad- That is not all. The Central
years to develop a Comprehen. abroad, by fears of trade :%,,,4s ministration's conduct of for- Intelligence Agency, the Atom-
sive foreign cconoritiC Policy. I and by de.i?pcining : .C.olmn '
,.., . . _ true
eign economic policy. A high ic Energy Commission, the
Th.?,t; stair.; e,f affairs, piivalcly idisplites with the - European- .., .1,. 1 - ?-.1ti, . ?j- . fc .cir
St' t . De Y rtr----it offickd re- United.. States . Tariff, Commis-
i . mat,,t.:i ?i,ce.? y. "I ? ii n siorithe -GC'neral S.6r vices Ad-
described by high Achiiinislra- 'Economic Gcimmtinity? and at- econoMic policy we are - in a ministration; tile Maritime Com-
lion officials as a long -.ici-10cl pan-the two other great. traa. state of drift. One hand often mission, the National Advisory
of drift marked by polic.y cell- in powers--as well as by dif does not know what the other Council,- 0.1e . _E,xport-Imp.ort
,traclicticins and failures, has forences..,dith the. un.clerde,,?,,31., hand is doing." . :- ?.? . - .: Balnk, the:1'.Civil.:- ?ACrOnautics
Mcausing concern. in Wasii- opal nations 'a ?nd by. the' prob. Divisions have occurred ' in Board, the Federal Aviation
bee
official ranks and in the .busi- Agency, the Federal Comm-
ington, in foreign capitols and lems of economic and military miss community. Industry and meations Commission and other
lin the' American business, labor a.ssistance...- : '.T - ? :i... farm groups are- divPled bi- . agencies also have a voice.' '1 -? .
lanbl? farm Coirirnunities. FreeTrade* I.illd6r'Fire tween. protectionism and 'free! - Even before IVir. Nixon estab-
? The foreign view has been trade. Organized. labor is thin- I lish th
ed "e-:.couricii; it. was the
. .,,
' . The economic- problems have ing, toward protectionism.: " iWhite 'Houk that had Ito* step
that only the exercise of United 'Western Euro ,ie and Ja.pari, . Government departments in.: 'into *recent em.ergencies to co
fr --
States aclersiiip Call rrcst a th-reataai ..
-i American markets ereasillz1::1Y 'act as spokesmen. ordina.te Policy %Olen agencies
. .i
growing trend 10 rd .worldab,,md fin-ci ,_, \,,,,,,?,,,, ,. (.10,. for the econoinie.intcrestS. clos-. directly ;responsible for , 'oce-.
. ? mes tic mark et, has brought Depa?ri. meta, its voic, -,,,?eal,,c4,..11 fatter.
' - ' est - to them while the -,..ita...e.,nt.,inio.- ::'affairs appeared to
econeici conflict, l'j " Mt, i
ma' for coordinating divergent in-, attempts to kee traditional Last p traditional! Last " -Saturday be dispatched'
It wa.s in recogmtion of the pressure to change the United
States' traditional free-trade: foreign-policy objectives:. fore-YUrvier: Secretary of State John
:doviestic ail d overSeaS lilti,T- philo,ophy. . . -lrWin 2c1 to Teheran and
esls at. a time of deepaning ' most, ? - - - ,.
. ? ? '' :- ' ?-. ? -- ' ' 'several Arab capitals as,a long-
As . Americans have lost to .. ''' CongresS bIay Intehvene
: .
the six Members of the Elito-* Official -:...: ?brc,wing and lar?,gely. ignbred,
ly,-the*Achninistration 'crisis ."7r0SC involving deroands'
crisis 5n the international trade,. .
monetary and mu stn fields pean Common - Market tl.,,e:ir remains.. committed, to free .by producing co 'nines for a
that President Nixon today place as the principal tradel-S trade. Thus far the President greater share of the 'profits
istabtished a .Cabinet -level ancl as the domestic rece.s sion
- has tended to decide tariff Om. earned by American oil com.-,
,Council op international Eco- . troversics in favor of the free panieS. The White House also;
non-dc Policy... ' * eign competition, has added to concern the Acimird cit.& for.
s-. flo.w of imports,. but Congress directed the Justice' Departmentl
' *
maY inv014e severe 1.12:Sisl'i'ltive to lift antimonopoly.. could
ies .strictures
mounting protectionist p:.es. restrictions this year. ? ' * '. so that the compan
. ,.
Mr. Nixon, the chairman of tration has found itself under
the new body, named Peter 3. The chief task. of the :new unite in dealing -with the, pro-
Pcterson of Chicago, chairmanure Ja pan s gi.ow in- econs:d nic u White House ccnc.II, inn -em diming countries. .,. ?..:. --..? - ?. ,, ..
S. '
of the board of Bell L o 5e1
eeffect, is tO pull tog-el:11er under the Simitarly, ..the- White.: House
potential has had a similar
_ .- - - president's control ,the over-all virtually overruled the State
The conoinie probleins have direction of foreign economic Department -last week to obtain.
Coil1Prmy, to be executive direc- .
tor. . , political implications that ma v policy. That has already been thei:,caticellation of a riegotiat
The council's task is to pullsignific.antly alter . i oreL,on done with diplomatic and s' inn' in session with the European
-.. .....
po 1,..3.. .. curity affairs, which ..are CO.l- Cominon Market countries mid
together military t1.11.C1 econonlic A trade war with Western
. .
!Europe, ....af ter the curily Council in which henry for mined at contilluing all
orclinated by the National :Se.-
, t, - - ? ?
Japan, set for- Jan.?24 .in.Frank-
aid, intoinational .tracie and particadarly
monetary, financial, investment ? Common .. Market is expancled A, Kissinger, Mr. Nixon's *SPE.i7. ancelnent hit hung steel a'
and commodities matters into , ports to the United. States,-
Britain' and others, could result cial assistant for national-secur-
with the anticipated - entry of
a. cohesive body of. policy, tak-
in a European shift. tovford the it' affairs, plays the key role..
Foreign economic .policy- had 1 cancellation to influence the
i The White Earn forced _the
ing into account the -require- Communist countries, on the been the missing link in _the domestic steel industry to cur-
merits of foreign policy. Model of West Ciermany's l'Ost- centralization. The new cpuncil, tail price:. increases,. using the
Until the establishment of the politick." ? . . -. - which ineludimg Secretary :-'Cif threat of import's as a ' weapon
c6tincil, recommended by .an .. That, policy, inaugurated by State Will,iam P. Rogers as vice, in the battle against inflation,
advisory committee on Govc;rn- chairman, as well as ? Mr. Kis-
Legislation Was DelaYel .
- ? -
Chancellor \Villy Brandt wand
designed .to achieve rapproach- singer and Paul V. Mc:Cracker", . .
meat organization, the author- rant betwee a \Vest Gerinany chairinan of the council -of With foreign economic policy
ity and capacity to mana,g6 all and the. Soviet bloc, has already Eccinoinic Advlsers; - provides au orphan ..as , Mr. Nixon and
the international economic ?Yes- caused * some nervousness in the bridge between foreign af- In-. Kissinger have -Concen teat-
irons have been scattered Washington. Many officials fairs ancl the domestic policy ,ed- their attentionelsci,vei-e,
througla the GDVernmezit. For groups, v.thich -are in the do- the Adininistration delayed the,
here. ' believe that closer, eco-
eign ?economic policy ?.? no n& ties betiNeen We-stern rnain coordinated ..by John D. submission. -of,the measures
Was- "le and Eastern Europe may lead Erliehman, another. assistant to signed '-to -re:Organize. the' for-.
? -anis. Al,
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. - - or tryinc, c Z',Z1+7 away
? ?
ii
a k tr!, ? f ? t p ? 'r the
/ 4 (14 " ( i" the Vietnam war arid prevcr.,1--
Yeritd -down
Jt
? .,--. ? - ? , ,
c".." e , ?
'
Followingi. the ''second in a
:sail:35 of ortiate.f; exploring. the
1Nixon Administration's style in
'foreign policy and the Presi-
dent's relationship with his
staff earl with Government
-
TIEDRICKStJlfli
volt
WASHINGTON, Jan. 187--A
IIaava al professor namc?i.l. r.enry
A. Kissingei!. Cursed. his luck
wilen. Richard M. ? Nixon de-
feated Nelson A. Rockefeller for
the Piesidential nomination at
the ltl:38 Republican convention
in Miami.
Friends recall that Mr: Kis-
singer, then Governor Rocke-
feller's chief expert on foreign
policy, spoke with a tart, par-
tisan bitterness ? about Mr,
Nixon. Ile 1.';'es sharply critical
of what he felt were the nomi-
nee's vague and elusive policy
prononneemeths and was. ?vor-
Tied that Mr:- Nixon would be
unable to lead the nalion out of
Vietnam.
Yet: Mr. Kissinger has b
the hilstrument by which Prasi-
- !dent Nixon has centrali?zed the.
?
?, ....t.? ??,..,...... .".
Nonetheless, the system has
..???? g,iven Mr. Nixon Et
sufflcR_ it
on policy so that he has
d in m
??? not been forceto ajor de-
cisions by sheer bureaucratic
M
momentu or. high pressure
from any quarter. There has
been no repetition of President!
john F. 'Kennedy's Bay of Pigsi
disaster. '
Imitable Atom-Age. Shift !
in the nuclear age it was
virtually inevitable that power
would drift from the State. De-
partment to the White house.
Any President wants. to assert
ultimate command in moments
of crisis and on key issues. To
reconcile the positions of 40-.
odd agencies -dealing in foreignt
affairs, he needs his own for-
eign-policy staff. The patterfl.
had already emerged in,pre-vi-
oils Administrations; the Nixon
Ailmnis
itration has brought
about significant change.
? In the architecture of govern-
me.nt, the pillars of the new
centralism. are a rejtrvenated
National Security Council but-
t?? ?
:
tressed. by ?, network of inter-
agency committees designed--
and all headed?by Mr. Kis-
singer. They inject the White
House deep into the develop-
of policy on defense and
. ?
? '"` intelligence. 3riatters as well as
fai.cll.JPc,13.
On (111)10111a cy.
? Tic'TirY?1" Kissinger withPres1(1'?'"t Nixon, for wIlein 11.'' . In the more Intangible cur-
management of foreign policy
has become the Inost- a3.-leulate si,o1,.esmant on p,olley. rency of incluencn in this
in the White House as never capital, the change is demon-
. .
beforc---much -as S?cr,:!tary of recommended co ire of aotion, ! strated by Mr. Kissinger's rep-
" Active I-Innd in Diplomacy
Defense .1tobert S. Tyl-c.Nainara ? ? ' " ? 1 'ence vtatior --- in the Government,
once centralized Control over
of the .Pentagon. . In the 1063 campa.ign he de- portant foreign visitors, meet- ,Secretary of State William P.
In the process the Presi- dared his intention to purge the jog with the most prestigious Rogers or Secretary of Defense
dent's brilliant and generally State Department and recast it ambassadors and troubled Melvin R. Laird. None of his
- ? - !and on rare predecessors enjoyed such cm,
herd line speokil assistant for more to his ov,,n lilting. Once 'olc'casions, 1.11.,,nn,.;,, sensitive reputation. . I
national -security affairs 1-"ts elected, he ,chose instead. t? negotiations. lio gets actively ? Ii:i the personal trappin::;? cir,
eim.ri:;ad not only as li!,3 rilWI: lUtVe. the department in a sec- engarA, cheeks with the Presi- status, the- syrabOls- inch-de. his'
o-iefre; p-)sit;on and to build dent and reports bac', to bun
basement office to bright,
emergence from a White House
swank, Hilton-style quarters oh.
the ground floor near the
President's Oval OffiCe. There .
he. directs his growing staff,
winch is considerably bigger
than those of his preJacessors.
In protocol, a secretary said
jokingly, Mr. Kissinger comes
"just below God"---a jibe at his
ego as well as his power.. ,
? Nixon Style and Personality
leaving him TiO choice but ap- Despite is in
proval or disapproval. He ?Mr. Kissinger takes an inereas- Congress, the press and among
.?.
? ingly active hand in diplomacy, the embassies?as a? more
the -competing bureaucrams.wanted more "options." - seeing select a vyverful fieure than either
influential foi?eign-policy ad-
viser but also as a natural ally
in cutloolt and strategy. It is
a far ci7y from -
up the foreign-policy machin-
ery of the White House. ? departments, jealous of
The results - are, now dear. what they consider their pre
tiVeS often complain
The President, who holds the The Administration's tactics' about White. House ' usurplaq,
final deterrninationF. cp.-Oen-elan may continue to evolve, butl but White House' official?s
? that this is the way th
decided to concentrate respon-i set --- it is a Nixon-Kissingerea. the system
warl-Its
hue-inc-es sist e
policy Molly in his own bands, pattern of doingisibilit at the .White House. , . los; net eiccet
then gave Mr. Kissinger au- Mr. Kissinger Is the pivotalf lelon on some
Ii s been top rovide more order-
pattern.
thority to operate virtually so welt ,sely...,olod is Le: issucs_highly
y policy oimu at ,
a super-Cabinet officer inan-1 in international allfair. that posals -for the negotations
indicate pro-
af fairs community major issues centers on him arms, for example. Conversely,
aging the sprawling, {02-caw) conceptual planning on roost with the Russians- on strategic
. , ?I geopolitics makes President nor 1:, adviser c ,
in area$ where neither the
.. end his staff of 110. His under-
,--a ..;termine.d to h?-? ' ha,
.., Mr. Ni.:.:on P.SSINIM, f,,,110., t..,.-Isanding _ ,, ._ _,_ , ,,.. , , 1 . '
. , , 1 , r- -, -In
take charge of !oll'ihirn the most articulate, and shown great personal ,intercst,
ieian policy and not 10 lease itinost frequently used, -,r:(..:1,-te.F,- such as foreign eeneMic. P-011Y,
i there is serious disarray.
The Vinite House. has not
ito the diplomats. Ile skunned!man f0.1' policy, albeit thn.,.uah
the anonymous pronouncements
' ithe Eisenhower pattern or ITIv:
.. ifor,,,e grand compromises and,
pre:sent ? him with. r si-roe I
1. ,,,,,,,.. baen spent reachin7,
rouch time and. energy have
.to crises
ting the cApproveciFo Re*igd IOVI03/04 -:eqrA;4100
itythpian-
Why has he become so cen-
tral to the Administration's pat-
tern of operation? Primarily be-
cause of the style and person-
ality of President Nixon, most
important his determination In
take the policy lead himself;
and his feeling that foreign af-1
fairs is his strong suit.
0120040001 -a foreign.
Policy," be said during the 10 :%S
campaign, "I have strong con-i
C! OTT:CE P.10.1if T07?
T, ? .,,,Ft
'" 9 8 JAN 1971: ?
..... rovecLhorixelease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-
? '71 7 ?. ?
?
T1,Ie 7q1) (rT1 . )
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1.1
STATI NTL
By, Courtney R. Sheldon
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Are they as strongly opposed on a broad advocate. My position has to be that of help-; }
? " Washington range of fundamental foreign-policy ques- ing the President make his decisions."
.. . ? - tions as has _been portrayed in reports in ' i
.
' White House. aides .in any administration this newspaper and in other periodicals? And at another point, Mr Kissinger corn-
can learn with guillotine swiftness that they Valued staff assistants are ind mented:-
ependent- ' -, ?. ?
must accommodate themselves to a Pres- i-nincled and from varied backgrounds. They ."The first thing to understand is that no-
dent's style of decisionmakinEf,. . ' .. ;sometimes see the actions .of their bosses body gets to be president who suffers from I
Those President Nixon has summoned to through tinted lenses. Some .are conserva- a weak will. And, ther'efore, no president is!
the White House apparently have done, so Live, others liberal. They know much but likely to take only one person's advice. No
7:resident can afford to take only one.per-!
in good grace. They may find it enormously not all. They calmot be expectgd to know' 1
draining, but also often personally pleasant what goes on when Mr. Rogers, Dr. KiSsin- son's ad Vice." ,. ' - - ? '. - I
and certainly viable. - . . . ger, and President /\.ixon consult in piiva e. , "If my view differs from that .of one of
. ?ithe ?Cabinet members "then the President '
In these last hectic' days of preparation
yould hear the Cabinet member. 1-31.it the '
of budget, economic, and State of the Union 14-1Pelr'a'al-3;ces 13.011ed ,. ? ? - .. e ? .
messages,? aid and comfort from White Despite the above reports, the available way the ?Pitsident makes decisions, in any :
"rouge advisers is vital to the presidency. facts today. seem to indicate ?that at the :event, isn't that he calls in a series of peo- .
In one sense they are middlemen --be- hour of crisis in foreign affalits, there has pie individually. VThat he generally does is 1
tween the- Cabinet" members and the Presi- been a better Working arrangement at the to call all the interested parties together. '
dentleesifters of opinion and bureaucratic very top levels of. government than is gen-in my field that is inevitably the Secretary
? . ? l
regulators who supply the. President with erally.assumed. - !of State, the Secretary of Defense; almo
. .., ,i .
the relevant facts' for decisionmaking. This applies to such sensitive judgments: always the d latch- director of the Central Inte-
? as how to respond to the Soviet missile, gClICC Agency and the chairman of the Joint
Close :.,.I Land. ? . ? ' -? ' crisis- id the L?liddle. East - and how to im- Chiefs of Staff."
. .
"-
13ut the elite .of the ?White House h-iner prove relations with Communist China, for Then he asks me, on the basis of pre-
, ? - liminary work that has been done in sub-
'cir'cle are also closer 'at hand than the Cabi- examPle? . ..
w is,,
net, and the President asks their advice, tco. And, further, it is difficult to put Dr.. Kis-.'ordinate bodies, to explain hat the ite
Everyone invblved r ognizes Ulat the Pr sinrer in the role of a direct. competitor of is, lie almost inevitably calls on the Sc
the State Department, for. his job entails retary of State first to state -his recom- "!
rustling around in military and intelligence memlations; Then everybody else has an-
areas as well as diplomatic. He is called opportunity to state his views." ?
upon to look upon issues from a somewhat
broader perspective than is the State De-
partment. ? . -? - e . ..? ?
?
I
?
dent must take the ultimate praise or blame.
Any aide who is overall:dons to have the
public know of his personal good works ob-
viously destroys his value to the .presidency.
" The press listens for the slightest hints on
who originated what opinion, and the Presi-
clent and his.aides read the media s specu,a- met od
tion sometimes grimly, 'sometimes apProv-.. .
ingly, sometimes laughingly. i Are there personality differences between
How can diverse personalities, such inde- Dr. Kissinger, an acknowledged ' expert in
pendent, intellectual powerhouses as a Kis- foreign and military affairs, and Mr. Rogers,
singer, a Moynihan, and a Shultz find. the a longtime confidant of Mr. Nixon and an cd-
magical formula for serving the presidency viser on a broad range of subjects, beyond
:without impairing their own integrities and those that men of goodwill mutually tolerate,
futures? .. . . . recognizing that those of differing back-.
- One 1:vay is to play neither the role of an grounds can make a contribution to the Pres-
antagonist, at least not early in the deCision- ident's knowledge? .. ? . .. ? ? '
. making process, nor to give substance to This question is almost beside the noint
any suspicion of supplanting, duplicating' or
when one takes into account President
undermining the role of Cabinet members.
.. - . Nixon's mode of -decisionmal;ing as ex-
Kissii-P-'er rok 1-3ole'd ' ? . plained by Dr. Kissinger.
. ?
0 - .?.
As one would expect there is speculation The role of Dr. Kissinger, in particular, is
on the growth of influence of -the staff of easily misunderstood. lie described it.on TV
Dr, Henry. A. Kissinger, Assistant to the recently: "The Secretaries of State and De-
President for National Security Affairs, fense haye a. responsibility tq make specific
vis-a-vis the State Department and Score- recommendations . to the President? I have
tary of State William P. Rogers. . ? ?two responsibilities. One is to make Sure that
With no assistance from either Dr. Kissin the PresideiAt gets as many choices put be-
ger or Mr. Rogers in making this kind of fore him as possible ---- as many realistic
comparison, one source of information has choices put .before him as possible.
.been the informal views of. sorrie of the ,. "The second is to see to it that when issues
assistants of le two men ious denartments that each de-
And. this i!i? e.rovedLEg;reReletatecpti6M4/04/14bA4RDP8omeotRool300400001-6
rf?cy as it jF objectilaShl- to, Dr.icissinern .
case to the. President. ?
"My basic position cannot be' that .of an
admitted, eon be. as vulnerable to inaccu-
-
t.
?r
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-
AMICAN OP IT. ION
JEM. 1911
[7.77.11 7
ed Look At The
. Frank A. Capell is a professiodal intelli-
gence specialist of almost thirty years'
I
standing. He is Editor and Publisher of
\
the fortnightly newsletter, The Herald Of
Freedom, has contributed to such impor-
tant national magazines as The Review Of ?
.The News, anci is author of Robert E.
Kennedy --. A Political Biography, The
Untouchables, and other books of inter-
est to Conservatives. Mr. Cap ell appears
frequently on radio and television, lectures
widely, and never :I-ears controversy.. He
lives in New Jersey, is an active Cath-
olic layman, and . father of seven thus.
.?. \ i (r 1
1
\1_2?1 171. j \ \.:23 _C., .7_
"Well, in addition to all the informatio
which OSS was getting on Latin America
he had access to the cables which the OS
was getting in from its agents abroad
worldwide information of various sorts
and al.so the OSS had an agreement wit!
the State Department whereby he als
could see State Department cables oi
vital issues.".. Halperin was Chief of 111
O.S.S. Latin American Division at - th(
time when, as Miss Bentley hs sworn, hi
was one of her . contacts in a Sovie
espionage ring.
Carl Aldo Marzani was Chief of th
Editorial Section of the O.S.S. Marzat
has been several times identified ? undf
oath as a member of the Cormnuni
Party. Using the most highly classific
information, he supervised the making
charts on technical reports for higher ech
Ions of' the Army, the Navy, the Joi
Chiefs of Staff, and the 0.S.S. Comra .
Ma.rzani made policy decisions and wa:
liaison officer between the Deputy Chie
of Staff of the Army and the Office
the Undersecretary of War.
When questioned before a Congre
sional'Committee, Irving Fajans of 0.S.
took the Fifth Amendment rather tha
admit to his Communist Party memb
ship and long history of activities
behalf of the Soviets. Comrade Faj
was a key O.S.S. operative despite t
fact that he was known to have bee
member of the Communist Party and
have served in the Communists' Abrah
Lincoln Brigade in Spain during the ye
1937-1938. .
Robert Talbott Miller III was anot
contact of Soviet courier Elizabeth Be
Icy. An O.S.S. employee assigned.to
State Department, he was Assistant Ch
in the Division of Research. On a trip
Moscow, Comrade Miller married a me
ber of the staff of the Moscow News.
Leonard E. Mins, a writer who h
worked for the International .Union
Revolutionary Writers .in Moscow a
written for New Masses, was also on
staff of the 'top secret 0.S.S.. Coinr
1,,lins took the Fifth Amendment ratl
0120011/03/04,11t $31APROP80411601 R001300400001-6
ship in the Communist Party. ile refu:
to deny that he was.a Soviet agent ever
r.3 THE. Central Intelligence .Agency was
established in 1947 after its wartiine
predecessor, the 'Office. of Strategic Serv-
ices (0.S.S.), was expo'Sed as thoroughly
infiltrated by the Communists. .Let us
examine some of that O.S.S. personnel.
In 1948, former Communist spy Eliza-
both Bentley appeared as a witness before
the Douse Committee on. Un-American
Activities. On Page 529 of the formal
report of those Hearings is the record of
Miss Bentley's testimony about intelli-
gence she received from Comrades inside
?O.S.S.. while she was operating as a Soviet
courier:
?
All types of infonnation Ivere
?given,
highly secret information on
what the OSS was, doing, such as,
for example, that they were trying
to make secret negotiations with
governments in the Balkan bloc in
case the war ended, that they were
parachuting people into Hungary, '
that they were sending OSS people
? into Turkey,. to operate in the
? Balkans, and so on. The fact that
General Donovan [head of 0.S.S.]
was interested in having, an ex-
chimge between the NKVD [the
Soviet .secret. police] and. the OSS.
That's right, O.S.S. and the N.K.V.D.
were working very close indeed.
When asked what kind of information
Communist Apiyi,oVe , todariYir Ei61
Halperin gave r to be rwarued to The
'Soviet -Union, Miss Bentley testified:
STATINTL