WHY MUST AN 'INFORMATION' AGENCY RUN THESE WARS?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R001200430001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 9, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

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Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601
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When the Central Intelligence
Agency was established, in the late
1940's, the explanation was that we
needed a specially trained and
equipped organization to gather in-
formation on political, economic, and
military situations all over the
world. We needed an organization
that could give the President reports
on these situations, every day. The
CIA was to be a well-camouflaged if
not'a secret agency--so that it could
go about its data-gathering assign-
ment with a minimum of trouble.
The CIA has, indeed, gathered in-
formation and prepared the con-
fidential evaluations for t h e
presidents. Some of these evalua-
tions, like those that forecast the
problems in Vietnam, turned out to
be good and prescient judgments,
even if they were ignored. The CIA.
would look a lot better today if it had
stayed w i t h information gather-
ing-histead of getting into the
business of designing and executing
adventures like the Ray of Pigs.
It has been rumored for a long
time and now is finally confirmed
that the CIA . has been running the
"secret tvar" in Laos. This is the
operation in which an irregular army.
of more than 30,000 Meo tribesmen,
Thai volunteers, and men from the
Royal Laotian forces has been wab
ing nine years of relatively unavail-
ing war for the Plain of Jars and the.
hamlets of the eastern half of the
country. Our attempt to keep the op-
eration secret has made our motives
look too much like the motives of the
Communists.
To the extent that the United
States must carry on military pro-
grams in South A *s i s- a n d
elsewhere---it would seem in o r e
reasonable and satisfactory to have
them carried on openly and by the
Department of Defense. We may not
accomplish what we set out to do in
every case. Put at least we'll know
what, the United States is doing. That {
isn't -too much to ask of
J
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001200430001-4