HELMS, THE SHAH AND THE CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 81
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 29, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

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V;:,.SH11:G101,1 POST
ChahneApptoffKlbspysRelease 2001/034649:ECIXRDP80-01
STATINTL
Helms, the Shah and the CIA
THERE IS A CERTAIN irony in the
fact that Richard Helms will go to Iran
-as the American ambassador 20 years
after the agency he now heads organ-
ized and directed the overthrow of the
regime then in power in Teheran. The
tale is worth recounting if only be-
cause of the changes in two decades
which have affected the Central Intel-
ligence Agency as well as American
foreign policy.
Helms first went to work at the CIA
in. 1947 and he came up to his present
post as director through what is gener-
ally called the "department of dirty
tricks." However, there is nothing on
the public record to show that he per-
sonally had a hand in the overthrow of
the Communist backed and/or mi-
ented regime of Premier Mohammed
Mossadegh in 1933, an action that re.
turned the Shah to his throne. 'ne can
only guess at the wry smile that must
have come to the Shah's face \ Men he
first heard that President Ni:-on was
proposing to send the CIA's top man
to be the American envoy,
The Iranian affair, and a similar
CIA action in Guatemala the following
year, are looked upon by old hands at
? aea.ae:,
1953: Teheran rioting that over-
threw the government left the Unit-
ed States Point Four office with
gaping holes for windows and doors.
the agency as high points of a sort in
the Cold War years. David Wise and
Thomas 13. Ross have told the Iranian
ilstory in their hook, "The Invisible Gov-
v ernment," and the CIA boss at the
time, Allen Dulles, conceded in public ?
after he left the government that the ODAY Till: IRAN to which Helms
United States had had a hand in -what will ;;a-) after he leaves the CIA is a sta-
occurred. ble, \Veil armed and \cell oil-fill:1/1(TO
re?jrni, under the Shah's command
and the country was thrown into crisis.
Mossadegh "connived," as Wise and
Ross put it, with Turich, Iran's Com-
munist party, to holster his hand. The
British and Americans decided he had
to go and picked Gen. Fazollah Zahedi
to renlace him. The man who stage-
managed the job on the spot was Ker-
mit "Kim" Roosevelt (who also had a
hand in some fancy goings-on in
Egypt), grandson of T.R. and seventh
cousin of P.D.R., and now a Washing-
tonian in private business.
Roosevelt managed to get to Teheran
and set up underground headquarters.
A chief aide was Brig. Gen. H. Norman
Schwarzkopf, who, as head of the New
Jersey state police, had become famous
during the Lindbergh baby kidnaping
case. Schwarzkopf had reorganized the
Shah's police force and he and Roose-
velt joined in the 1953 operation. The
Shah dismissed Mossadegh and named
Zaheldi as Premier but Mossadegh ar-
rested the officer who braught the had
news. The Teheran streets filled with
rioters and a scared Shah fled first to
Baghdad and then to Rome. Dulles
flew to Rome to confer with him. Roo.
sevelt ordered the Shah's backers- into
the streets, the leftists were arrested
by the army and the Shah returned in
triumph. Mossadech went to jail. In
time a new international oil consor-
tium took over Anglo-Iranian which
operates to this day,though the Shah
has squeezed more and more revenue
from the Westerners. - ?
In his 1993 book, ''The Craft of Intel-
ligence," published after he left CIA,
Dulles wrote that, when in both Iran
and Guatemala it -became clear" that
a. Communist state was in the making,
"support from outside was given to
loyal anti-Communist elements." In a
1965 NBC television documentary on
"The Science of Spying" Dulles said:
"The government of Mossadegh, if you
recall history, was overthrown by the
action of the Shah. Now, that we en-
couraged the Shah to take that action
I will not deny." Miles Copeland, an
ex-CIA operative in the Middle East.
wrote in his hook, '"The Caine of
Nations." that the Iranian derring-do
was called "Operation Ajax.'' Ile cred-
ited Roosevelt with 'almost single-
'fixity, there were plenty of ot ter suc-
cessful enterprises that fell short of
changing government regimes. Today
the CIA. humiliated by the 1961 Bay of
Pigs fiasco it planned and ran, has
wi:hdrawn front such large scale af-
fairs as Iran, save for its continuing
major role in the no longer ''secret
\car in Laos." The climate of today
-would not permit the United States to
'repeat the Iranian operation, or so one
a slimes with the reservation that
IdresidentNixon -(who was Vice Presi-
clent at the time of Iran) loves sur-
prises.
The climate of 1953, however, was
very different and must he taken into
account in any judgment. Moscow
then was fishing in a great many
troubled waters and among them was
Iran. It was probably true, as Allen
Dulles said on that 1965 TV show, that
"at no time has the CIA engaged in
any political activity or any intelli-
gence that was not approved at the
highest level." It was all part of a
deadly "game of nations." Richard Bis-
sell, who ran the U-2 program and the "
Bay of Pigs, was asked on that TV
show about the morality of CIA activi-
ties. "I think," he replied, that "the
morality of . . . shall we call it for
short, cold war .. . is So infinitely eas-
ier than the morality of almost any
kind of hot war that I never encoun-
tered this as a serious problem."
PERHAPS the philosophy of the
Cald War years and the CIA role were
best put by Dulles in a letter that he
wrote me in 1961. Excerpts from his
then -forthcoming book had appeared
?i/ri Harper's and I had suggested to him
some further revelations he might in-
clude in the book. He wrote about ad-
ditions he was making: -This includes
more on Iran and Guatemala and the
problems of policy in action when
there begins to be evidence that a
country is slipping and Communist
take-over is threatened. We can't wait
for an engraved invitation to come and
give aid."
There is a story, too, that Winston
Churchill was so pleased by the opera-
tion in Iran that he proferred the
George Cross to Kim Roosevelt. But
the CIA wouldn't let him accept the
decoration. So Churchill commented to
Roosevelt: "I would he proud to have
served under you" in such an opera-
tion. That remark, Roosevelt is said to
vi
STATI NTL
handedly" calling the "pro-Shah fom ces! have replied was better than the deco
-
on to the streets of Teheran" and su- ration.
pervisine "their riots so as to oust" Ifelms doubtless would be the last to
Mossadegle say so out loud but I can imagine Ins STATINTL
reflecting that. if it hadn't been for
what Dulles, Him Roosevelt and the
others did in 1953, he \could not have
the chance to present his credentials
to
in
IRAN IS NEXT DOOR to the Soviet
Union. In - 1951 Mossadeeh, who con-.
fused Westerners with his habits of
%%Telling in public and running govern-
ment business from his bed, national- East-West relations from the Cold War
ized the BritiAl
Aprolvedforileleasea2001103/04q.CIA-RDP80-
Oil Co, and schcipthe Abadan refill- While Iran and Guatemala were the
era'. The West boycotted Iranian oil high pointa of covert GIA Cold War ac-
which has mended its fences Wit Ii AN)F,
Cow With011i hurting its close relation-
ship with Washington. The Shah has
taken full advantaee of the changes in
LAS:it:Kr:ON ?OST
Approved For Release 2S081r431101F:2CIA-RDP80-01601
1
LFTTEFtS
TO LL,Pi
EDITOR.
Rasters of the U-2
In The Post of Nov. 30 there is an ar-
ticle by your Bernard Nossiter, under
an Oslo dateline, about the Russian
submarine excursion into the Norwe-
gian fjord. On page A10, column 7,
there is this paragraph:
"If an exercise had been scheduled
for November in the Sognefjord, the
explanation runs, the Soviet military
would have been insensitive to the po-
litical authorities, In this view, the s(s..
vict military was not trying to sabo-
tage Ifelsinid, any more than the Pen-
tagon masters of the U-2 were out to
undermine the summit 12 years ago.
The Soviet military machine, it is sug-
gested, may have simply been pursu-
ing business as usual."
Mr. Nossiter has his facts wrong.
'Perhaps he should consult your re-
cently retired Chalmers M. Roberts,
who could tell him the Pentagon held
110 "masters of the U-2." In his book,
"The Nuclear Years" (Praeger, 1970)
Mr. Roberts discusses the matter,
starting on page 43. lie makes it clear
the U-2 flights were ordered by Presi-
dent Eisenhower and were directed by
the Central Intelligence Agency. They
also were carried out by a contract?
(Lockheed) who was paid by CIA.
Another authority who might per.
suade Mr. Nossiter is Arthur M. Schle
singer Jr. In "A Thousand Days"
(Houghton Mifflin, 1965). Mr. Schlet
singer writes on page 241 of how Rich.
ard Bissell, CIA's deputy director for
operations, "conceived and fought
through the plan of U-2 flights over
the Soviet Union."
Clearly, Mr. Nossiter's commentls
-
not based on fact. The Defense Deport.;:.
ment used some of the information ob. STATINTL
toined by the U-2 and Defense Seem.
Uzi's, Thomas Gates said so. But to de
clam, as Mr. Nossiter did, that
"Pentagon masters of the U-2" insti.
gated or carried out the flights is in.
correct.
Washington.
CLAUDE WITZE.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4
Approved For Release 2M/cptQfysq,I,MDP80-0160
23 OCT 1972
SECRET FLIGHTS ON THE FRINGE OF SPACE
c r
PSTAT] NTL
Approved For Release 200lip04,:,:0910ADP80-01601R0
1 9 OCT 1972
:menace by putting it to
shame.
Although Eisenhower is
'justly famous for having
said that we must hold onto
Indochina because of its raw
materials, he should be
equally famous for the
much more sophisticated no-
tion, emphatically ascribed
to him in this hook, of want-
ing to assure the freedon of
American corporations to
export capital abroad, to
buy as much of the world as
possible, as a basic exten-
sion of U.S. foreign policy
and cold-war strategy. Frus-
trated by the failure to
'elect Wendell Wilkie to
head the expansion of Amer-
ican corporate enterprise
into the ownership of One
World, the great financiers
and industrialists who sup-
ported Eisenhower (while
middling entrpreneurs and
old-time conservatives de-
nounced him) may have
thought him quite necessary
to safeguard the expansion-
ism which has now flowered,
under three other presi-
dents, into the age of the
multi-national corporation.
This brings up that most -
perplexing of all Eisen-
hower riddles: Eisenhower's
farewell speech in which he
warned against the CXCeSP?CS
of a military-industrial com-
plex which he saw as threat-
ening to become the domi-
nant force in American poli-
ey-making.
Why was the man who ?
was prepared to oust gov-
ernments, dispatch Marines,
talk of massive retaliation,
overfly the U.S.S.R., and an- ?
grily rebut anyone tried to ?
tell him, how to run an
Army?why was such a man
so concerned at the end
about the military he had
faithfully served and the in-
dustry he had painstakingly
supported? Parmet isn't
even curious..
Again the clues, if not the
conclusions, are scattered
throughout this storehouse
collection of facts. One is
the context of the speech. Ei-
senhower spelled out the
menace to be that of a "sci-
entific-technological elite"
and not just the MTC ab-
stractly. To him, real busi-
ness meant the big banks,
the big owners, the vastly
rich folks whom he enjoyed
so much as personal friends.
e
s ?
Book World
The Ike Years
11 Over Again
EISENHOIVER: Aud the .1awrican Crusades.
By Ifei?bert S. Panne:.
6b0 pp. 512.:151
Reviewed by
Llcss
? The reviewer, 15t0 served
briefly on spcclal cisignincnt
at the IVInte House daring
the Eisenhower administra-
tion, is a visiting fellow at
the Institute for Policy Stud-
!
If you -ant to relive the
?. Eisenhower years, this is the
book for you. It has what
seems to be 40 million use-
ful references to Eisenhower
sources, piled up as the
e foundation .for what is al-
? most a daily log of the Gen-
eral-President's years in the
White House, and the sev-
eral immediately before, as
? he backed-and-filled about
;. heeding what eventually he
came to see as his bounden
duty to lead the nation.
__It cites dozens of inter-
views. It obviously is writ-
ten by a man whc, has read
- himself bleary in his subject
?_
.but who, at the end of it all,
-simplY says that to call Ei-
senhower "a great or good
.er even a weak President
--misses the point. He was
. Merely necessary."
Necessary, for what? By
contenting himself with oh-
'serving Eisenhower rather
.Than with trying to under-
stand . him, Ins friends, Ins
: "particular role in the so-
ciety, .Herbert Parmet does
not .provide - even a hint of
answer. But because lie is
a spella veracious reader and
...studious observer, the clues
? .are all there.
First, there is Eisenhower
the anti-Communist. Like
Kennedy-Johnson-Nixon, Ei-
senhower saw the isonfronla-
lion with communism both
? apoplectically and apoca-
lyptically. Eisenhower's New
Look defense policy, diplo-
matical ly extended throueli
? John PoApprovedrFor
manship, n ei in to deter the
Soviets and the Chinese, at
; least, from hie moves in the
of nuclear retaliation. As
Parmet meticulously re-
counts?without seeming to
be impressed?Eisenhower's
rhetoric! about the New
Look was seriously compro-
mised by the old look of
some of his. crucial actions:
when he landed Marines in
Lebanon, for instance.
Also, when Eisenhower
supported the covert U.S.
operation that overthrew
the Guatemalan govern-
ment, he was well into a
world of old-fashioned, even
if newly-equipped, coup and
counter - coup, terror and
covert warfare. That, as a
matter of fact, is just the
. way Eisenhower wanted to
fight the war in Indochina
--secretly and discreetly.
But he did want to fight it.
On that he was as dedicated
a hawk as Kennedy, John-
son or Nixon. (If there was a
difference in style it would
probably be mostly in con-
trast to Johnson. Eisen-
hower was dead set against
a big land involvement. The
Nixon . policy of -ordering
bombing while talking peace
probably would have ap-
pealed to him more, and the
early Kennedy policy of se-
cret raids most o; all?ex-
cept that Eisenhower always
seemed skeptical of how
well such secrets could he
kept. Iris explicit skepticism
about the U-2 overflights
was, of course, brilliantly
justified.)
Beyond his fervent anti-
communism. there is an-
other aspect to Eisen-
bower that might mark a
very special (and necessary)
place for him in our coun-
try's development: his total
visceral and intellectual
commitment to the recti-
tude of American corporate
enterprise?as he under-
stood it from his closest
Raielea
nds, siciaitemai rt. uSe14 tive
that the expansion of capi-
talist enterprise around the
aim, ea-aim on iiastao,
frOubled bythe fantastic
support given, say, the bank-
ing system by federal policy.
But he was troubled by
the thought that the new,
scientifically-based weapons
companies would muscle
their way into policy-influ-
encing positions. Also, he
seems to have been disturbed
by the possibilities of a garri-
son state, totally dominated
by a defense budget. He was
never disturbed by the com-
pany-store domination of the
lives of most ordinary Amer-
icans by the financial elite
which already does own con-
trol of most the capital and
industry, as well as control
of those who make policy.
Maybe that just seemed tra-
ditional to the General-Pres-
ident.
At any rate, deep concern
along these lines may he
merely academic after all..
Thanks to Eisenhower's
foremost bequest to a grate-
ful nation, Richard Nixon, it
looks like we are going to
have both a garrison state
and a company store any-
way.
The eunsliner
cbugDpatiscati401100170001-4
under Kennedy, apparently
appalled him. He was an old-
fashioned remit Mist. Ile
STATIP
. Approved For Release 200/19611:f4cMtiP80-01601R
10 * a
A (1
:I
r-2,)
.ii r
g sj tlia) it 4 \' 4,,,`? r)
Soviet Weapons in Cuba, U.S. Blockade
might kick up a mighty
crisis elsewhere--say in
divided Berlin.
B ii t meanwhile t h e
United States began a
buildup of air power in the
southeast. About T).0n0 ma-
rines put out to sea. About
40 'U.S. warships con-
Brought Globe to Brink of Nuclear War verged on the Caribbean
area, The of.:Icial cover
was that this was part of a
training exercise.
Outwardly, a look of
calm prevailed at upper
levels of the 'White House,
Pentagon and State De-
partment. Routine went
on as usual. Behind
scenes, the tension mount-
ed swiftly.
President Kennuly met
Oct. 18 for two and a half
hours with Andrei A. Oro-
myk o. Th'e Russian
foreign minister assured
\V-II,LIA:tI L. P.YAN
Associaled Press Writer
For seven (lays in Octo- tekivision appearance that
".\londay night. Oct. 22. For
her a frightened world
the President and Ii is ad vi-
contemplated a specter of sers it had been a much
nuclear cataclysm.
The week of high ten-
sion began Monday, Oct.
22, just 10 Years ago, when
the youthful President of
the United States an-
?nounced to a startled na-
tion a direct challenge to
the Soviet Union in a
blockage of Soviet vessels.
? That was the Cuban
'missile crisis. It is likely to
be credited by future his-
torians with having ap-
plied , the severe shock
treatment that jolted the
two superpowers into a
.new era and eventually
produced radically differ-
cot relations between Mos-
tow and .Washington.
Source of Shock
Ten years ago the two
glared at one another
through nuclear gu n-
sights. Today, in the wake
of a visit to Moscow by the
President of the 'United
States, the Russians are
buying huge quantities of
. Amerian grain and eager-
ly inviting U.S. technolog-
ical know-how to help ex-
ploit their resources. The
, Americans seek return
benefits from. these con-
tacts.
And what about the
- source of the shock treat-
ment.? Kiel Castro's Culla
no loner is producing cri-
sis headlines, In fact, it
seems to some students of
Soviet affairs that the
Paissians would be grati-
fied if they could find a.
convenient way of shear-
.g away Fidel's power.
It was a close thing, 10'
blockade
t'ears ago. As President Cuba and chal-
John F. Kennedy himaeif lenge Soviet shires bring-
longer siege.
Calls For Photos
Actually, it bad begun
for the White llou:ze and
official Washington early
h September with U.S. in-
telligence reports of sesni-
clous- looking emplace-
ments in Communist-ruled
Cuba, The President or-
dered photographs of the
entire island and high-
flying U-2 planes carried
out the mission.
What they brought back
was evidence that some
sort of military buildup
was going on. Put not un-
til early October was there
hard evidence of interme-
diate-range missile bases
on a hostile island so Close
to U.S. shores. By Oct. 15,
analysis confirmed Wash-
ington's worst suspicions,
and in an atmosphere of
crisis the President met
with his chief defense, se-
curity and intelligence ad-
visers to discuss what to
do about it.
Should the United States
it back and wait? That
would suggest U.S. weak-
ness and irresolution in
the face of a threat. It.
would strengthen Premier
Nikita S. Khrushchev's
position.
Should the United States
bomb the bases? That
could be bad. too, because
of the world outcry it
could cause on moral
grounds. A. n d Russians
might be killed.
Retaliation Feared
Should the United States
him the only Soviet milita-
ry aid to Cuba was of a de-
fensive nature. The Pres-
ident now knew better.
Two days later, having
agreed with his advisers
that a blockade should be
the response, he ordered
preparations to go for-
ward. He prepared to
make the announcement
at 7 p.m. Monday, Oct. 22.
America's allies around
the world were filled in.
The Organization of Amer-
ican States would be call-
ed into session. A letter
WOlilti be drafted for
Khrushchey.
One hour before Mr.
Kennedy was to go on tele-
vision, Secretary of State
Dean Rusk summoned the
Soviet ambassador, Anato-
ly F. Dobrynin. The am-
bassador was his usual ex-
pansive, smiling self on ar-
rival. When he left the
secretary 25 minutes later
he was pale and shaken.
The President went on
the air. He told Americans
of a "secret, swift and
extraordinary buildup? of
Soviet missiles in Cuba,
called it a deliberate and
unacceptable provocation
and revealed his orders for
a quarantine of all offen-
sive weapons for Castro.?
Soviet ships carrying such
eq ui pm ent would be
Itot it zit one point in the ing in the offensive equip-
turned back. He used the
:\?,,,i3lopingApproveddForRefe. ?
? biocharle, and in inter-
World Stunned
The United St ate.3----and
the woild--were stunned.
So was Moscow. For 13
hours there was no re-
sponse. Then a Kremlin
statement, fuming about
an nniicaed-of violation of
international law, indig-
nantly denied that offen-
sive weilpons had been in-
stalled in Cuba.
it wasneiwous-ound-
sizy..rneht, howe\ er,
betraying shock at having
been caught red-banded,
Thc. blockade took effect
oficially at 10 a.m. Wed-
nesday, Oct. 2.1 At that.
time 25 Soviet merchant
ships were heading to-
le;ird Cuba and that night
they were still on course.
yneeow said Mr. Kenne-
dy's demands were unac-
ceptatile, but larushchey
c:!gerly agreed to a propo-
sal by 1.; Thant, then w-
ing U.N. secretary gener-
al. that. both sides halt all
these activities for two or
three NITC1;3 to permit
a I ii s. Washington was
cold to the propo.ed, it
woold not hack doi,vn from"
its basic demand that
nothing could ha accom-
plished by negotiations
until the Russians agreed
to dismantle and remove
the missiles.
On Thursday came the
Dews that 12 of the 25 So-
viet merchantmen h a d
turned around. It was a
welcome indication that
they would not risk con-
fronting the blockade.
Far From Over
Still, the crisis was far
from ended. In the U.N.
Security Coo ncil, Ambas-
sador Adlai E. Stevenson
challenged the Soviet dele-
gate to answer ''yes or no'
whether Russian missiles
were being placed in Cuba.
Ile would, he said, "wait
'till hell freezes over" if
necessary, for the answer.
Then he produced huge
blown-up photos of the
damning evidence.
U.S. intelligence report-
ed work on the Cuban
bases 11.0W was proceeding
at top speed, suggesting
the Russians were trying
to make them operational.
The tellSi011 rose. The
STATI NTL
20M/p3104 elk FOR
gone "either way." risks. o cook say 804)1)604
R00110017 S
0c1M124
d Up
pre :;sure t me a o-
'For the nation as a whole, what the Soviet reply
Dational law blockade is yiet to board-
1..?) ?.;.1., mm chit he. or whether, in ?,, ?r ?,,?! ing and searching it and.
HOUSTON POST
Approved For Release 2o011034:04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0011
pies in sky keep two
:big powers in balance
By DONALD R. MORRIS
Post News Analyst
,
All that has 'kept the world from sell-
destructing this last quarter. of a century
has been the precarious nuclear balance
between the United Stales and the Soviet
?Union. ?
For a few short years America had an
overwhelming preponderance of power.
We were certain we would never resort to
it, but our mere possession of such night-
marish power drove the Russians to dis-
traction. Then they in their turn achieved
-an edge--and regained a measure of sta.-
bility?and it was our turn to ? taste the
?fear in the phrase "missile gap."
A decade ago the balance was regained
and has since been maintained. The num-
ber of missiles, their megatonnage and
their guidance systems are largely irrele-
vant; what counts is that neither power
can launch a preemptive strike with any
hope of survival, and on this balance
hangs the peace of the world.
'Tiger by the tail
; The balance, however, is far from stat-
ic. Both powers hold a fearsome tiger by
the tail. Research and development must
continue lest one side or the other
achieve a breakthrough in delivery or de-
fense, which might destroy the balance.
The expense of such a break-
through?indeed the expense of maintain-
ing the current balance?is so hideous
that both powers would like to avoid it.
, They are committed to a continuing
arms race not by the need to achieve a
breakthrough but only by the imperative
of not permitting the other to da so.
Both sides recognize the need for a mu-
tual effort to scale down their arsenals.
In the past, negotiations over dis-
armament foundered on a single ele-
ment?trust. The issues at stake were so
overriding that neither the U.S. nor the
-Soviet -Union could afford to accept the
other's word that an agreement would be
adhered to.
? The recent SALT talks, however, have
achieved initial and encouraging suc-
cesses, and the key to the progress can
? be found in an innocuous euphemism the
treaties employ: "National technical
.means of verification". The phrase refers
to a program which supplies an accept-
able substitute for the missing ingredient
of trust, and on that program rests all
STATI NTL
referred to as SAMOS (for "satellit: organization won't:get-apt! past -the fronF
and missile-observation system"); the
Soviet satellites are referred to as
COSMOS, and while neither country will
discuss their .details, they do, as the re- .
sult of a 1962 agreement, report each
launch and its ot?bital characteristic to
the UN.
The programs give both countries a
positive check on the nuclear activities
of the other. Neither nation can test or
deploy a major new weapons system
without timely?and highly detailed?
warning accruing to the other.
The United States launches four or five
"search-and-find" SAMOS missiles an-
nually from Vandenburg Air Force Base
in California. They remain in orbit about
a month, covering the entire surface of
the globe twice a day, once at night
(when infi?a-red photography, sensitive to
heat emissions, gives almost as much in-
formation as daytime passes) and once
during the day.
The photographic results are radioed
back, and despite the loss in resolution,
construction work of any description is at
once apparent when photos taken a few
days apart are superimposed.
Each search-and-find satellite is follow-
ed a month or two later by a "close-look"
satellite, which photographs the specific
areas of interest its predecessor has
spotted. These photographs are not
transmitted electronically. Instead the
satellite ejects the film capsule itself,
which is recovered in mid-air by special-
ly equipped planes based in Hawaii.
- ?
door) a;
The first generation of satellite cam-
eras a decade ago were lucky to pick up
objects six feet across. The third gener-
ation in current use will pick up objects
less than two feet across, and the resolua,
tion may ?some day be measured in
inches. In terms of analysis, this means
that not only can new missile Sites, or
changes in old ones, be recorded, but the
precise technical construction of the mis-
sile can be reconstructed in fair detail as
well. . .
The Soviets launch perhaps four times
as many satellites as America does, par-
tially because theirs do not last as long,
and also because the Soviets are given to
"tactical" missions ? sending a satellite
for a special "look-see" when something
of interest is going on.
The U.S. prefers to wait for its regu-
larly scheduled shots, and has sent only
one tactical satellite aloft ? to check Is-
raeli claims that the Soviets were violat-
ing the truce by installing missile sites
on the banks of the Sues Canal. Soviet
photography is good enough to allay
their fears that the U.S. is installing new
weapons systems, although the resolu-
tion of their cameras is not nearly as
good as ours. .
. High-altitude coverage of the Soviet
Union started in the early 1950s when bal-
loon - mounted cameras were launched.
in Europe to drift across Eurasia before
beim, recovered in the Pacific. .?
? . From such crude beginnings we ad-
vanced to the U-2 aircraft, which worked
like a charm until the Soviets finally de-
veloped a missile that could bring it down
? with disastrous results for American
idiplomacy. President Eisenhower had ap-
proved the U-2 program only after Pre-
mier Nikita Khrushchcv had rejected his
. suggestion of "open skies" inspections.
The gap between the U-2 flights and the
inception of the SAMOS program was for-
tunately a short one.
What photos show
The pictures are analyzed at the Na-
tional Photographic Interpretation Center
(known as "En-pick" to the intelligence
community), a little-known joint project
located in Washington under the aegis of.
the Central Intelligence Agency.
The sophisticated interpretation of
these photographs provides the vast bulk
of what America knows about the Soviet
Union, the Eastern bloc countries and the
People's Republic of China.
The photos reveal not only major con-
struction ? from transportation nets
through shipyard activity to all manner
of missile facilities ? but an astonishing
wealth of technical detail as well.
While the U.S. will not talk about the
SAMOS program any more than the So-
viet Union will discuss the details of
COSMOS.. the general details of both
programs are more or less open secrets.
contilwA.
hope of reversirk.....,the aat,i America's most closely guarded secret
The "nation^HREWW4,179trApleaseN2001i03104rosetiARRDR80-01601R001100170001-4 -
fication" are the photo reconnaissance photographic systems employed by
satellites employed by both America and
SAMOS. aN.P.I.C? in fact, maintains its
nwn tv cv,:irrn and a ?
Approved For Release 2001003/04RKCINIRDP80-01
7 AUG 1972
9 r4k I
?SCOW S mii
By HARRY SCITWARTZ ? ties for baking its own matzos. to pump into Siberia ana. stirs its oil,
MOSCOW--"We don't have to like f r
course. The Soviet press hammers
0 gas and metals flowing whenever Mr.
There is 'another side to the picture,
each away on Vietnam day in and day out. One an only conclude that iglu-
?other to do business and cooper- Nixon rives the signal.
ate. I am for improved Soviet-Amen- and Soviet sources say proudly they c
can relations because I am a Soviet intend to continue helping the North ential Muscovites believe the Vietnam
war will be over in the not-too-distant
'patriot and I know improved relations Vietnamese. The message about es-
would be good for my countr national atmosphere resulting there-
y. T
- chewing barbaric tactics has not yet future and that in the improved niter-
'think the same thing applies to you caused any softening toward s' from both Washington and Moscow
tar
Americans.' Yuri. Arbatov, the Krem-
lin's chief Arnericanologist, was speak-
ing for himself when he made these
remarks,. but there is mounting evi-
dence that similar ideas form the back-
bone of Leonid I. Brezhnev's policy
,toward the -United States. '
Certainly Mr. Brezhnev has made-
settle impressive moves recently to
demonstrate his commitment to better
relations with the United States. He.
reaived President Nixon here last
May despite the political difficulties
? caused him, by the President's earlier
decision to mine North Vietnamese
ports. He accepted. the setback repre-
sented by Egypt's decision to oust
Soviet military ? personnel rather than
'give the Egyptians, the offensive
weapons. they demanded, Diplomats
here believe he faced significant oppo-
sition from a "hard line" Politburo
faction on both issues, a faction that
could become a majority and oust Mr.
? Brezhnev if his policy
There are other,' less cosmic, signs
pointing in the same direction. The
Peterson trade delegation here waa
received with outstanding hospitality
'and friendship even while very hard
'bargaining went on behind the scenes.
A mbjor and prestigious Soviet re-
search institute here is now engaged
In a high-priority. effort to figure out
ways of improving Moscow's image
in the United .States. The ,goal of the
effort was expressed the other ? day
by a Soviet editor, who said, "We don't
'want you Americans to think of ?us
as barbarians." That some lessons have
been learned was evident recently
when a Soviet court gave Gavriel
Shapiro, who married an American
girl in a Jewish religious ceremony,
an astonishingly lenient sentence on a
'charge of draft dodging.
Evert that old bugaboo, the unavail-
ability of matzos to religious Soviet
Jews for Passover, has been taken care
of to some extent. On a recent Satur-
day morning a group of Americans
from the Peterson mission visiting
Kiev asked to see the synagogue in
:that city. They were taken there
promptly and found a congregation of
over 200 elderly Soviet Jews engaged
'in the traditional. Orthodox Sabbath,
service. Before the Americans left they
were shown an album of pictures de-
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STATI NTL
picting the *e: iea ..coneregation's f tcilinew tIclorado with limitless resources
ballet dancer Valery Panov or toward
various Soviet scientists who fell into
disfavor after, they asked permission!
to emigrate to Israel. ?
There is no mystery about the two
chief reasons for the main thrust of the:
Brezhnev line. which is so reminiscent'
of the drive Nikita S. Khrushchey
mounted for a similar rapprochement
during the?Lisenhower Administration
at the end of the nineteen-fifties. So-
viet sources here freely admit that Mr.
Khruslachey made a major blunder by
blowing 'up over .the 1.172 incident in
May, 1990, and they seem rather praud
that Mr. Brezhnev made no similar
error Over the mining of. North Viet-
nam's ports. "We are trying to repair
the thread that was snapped by Gary
Powers," one Soviet editor said.
Very little is said here about the
Chinese, but the fear and worry over
future relations -with , Peking is un-
mistakable. Soviet officials know from
their own life experiences that a large
country can go from weakness to
power in one or, two generations.
But it is economies- that is the main
motive. Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev
are now far richer than they were
'when this correspondent first visited'
them in 1935. Food of all kinds seems
abundant, with the strange exception
of lemons. Most people seem well-
dressed, and mini-skirts and pants
suits are all the rage among the more
elegant women here this summer. ,
There are now traffic jams in Moscow,
a phenomenon that was unthinkable
three ot four years ago.
But Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev
are the main tourist cities. -Except for
them and a few others, living condi-
tions?though better than earlier?are
still hard. One need only look at the
- bedraggled dress of the peasant women
in the street to sense the gulf between
? the urban living standards and the
conditions in the countryside.
It is for massive American economic
' and technical aid, above all; that Mos-
cow now wants to improve relations
with Washington. Despite the emphasis
in the Soviet press on U.S. unem-
ployment and the poverty of Negroes
and,Mexican Americans, even sophisti- ?
cated and well-infortried Soviet sources -
? speak of -America as though it were a
will be able to reduce their arms
budget and end the, futile and ex-
tremely expensive strategic weapons
race. Only on that hypothesis does the
Soviet hope for major American in-
vestment make sense, since the
Russians are realists accustomed to
calculate. Secretary of Commerce
Peterson has said Vietnam was never
mentioned in his economic negotia-
tions here, but it must have been very
much in his own mind and in the
mind of Mr.. Brezhnev when the two
men met. It would seem a reasonable
bet that when' Henry Kissinger flies
to Paris these days to negotiate with
North Vietnam's i.e Due Tho, he has
Mr. Brezhnev's best wishes and per-
haps?but only perhaps?more tan-
gible Kremlin help, behind the scenes.
Harry Schwartz is Cr member of the
editorial board of The Times. -
Approved For Release
AUG 1972
and Damascus. President Johnson brought tremendous
pressure on Israel to halt further troop movements -and
also got On the hot line to warn Premier Kosygin against
S what appeared to be an imminent Soviet airborne'opera-
s-jion against Israel from Bulgarian bases.
C Did this not, in effect, not only prevent further Viet-
nams, but stop the outbreak of World War III? Isn't
,
the tight surveillance that Fellwock insists the NSA
Y is keeping over the Soviet bomber fleet and Soviet nu-
-
clear subs designed to avert war rather than to touch it
off? Isn't the NSA, whose mission is to gather informa-
:tion, but never to act on it, a.weapon for peace rather
; than a weapon of war? The answer is,. of course, that
Fellwock and Ellsberg and the others are first and fore-
'most anti-13.',Stablishment and very possibly anti-Ameri-
can. And they have managed to talk themselves around
. to saying that when they decide unilaterally to abrogate
an oath, steal a Top Secret document, traffic with the
:enenly, which this amounts to, that they are doing it b.2-
cause they are right. Theirs is the higher morality.
? It was a simpler world when the betrayers of national
trust?,. the Phil bys, the Burgesses and MacLeans, the
Martinscs and Mitchells (two earlier NSA defectors),
did their dirty work and, cut and ran. And a better:
,world.
?
None Care If It Is Treason
Ramparts published the article. The New York Time
reported it in full, page one, carry-o'er of four column
:on page three. It was a revelation by a former U.S. cod
analyst that the United States has broken all super
secret Soviet communications codes, (This, incidentally
'say the experts, is not so.) The article tells how man
planes, ships and satellites the United States has moni
loring foreign air waves. Where many of them are; how
they operate; what they have discovered, things calcu-
lated to win friends and influence enemies all over the
world, .and also at home. -
It was written by 'Perry Fellwock, 26, of San Diego,
.California, a war protester. At twenty, he enlisted in the
?;Air Force. While serving,. he was recruited by a United
'States security agent into the National Security Agency,
:which is charged with the collection of security infor-
mation, most of it through advanced technological means
U-2s, spy satellites etc. When Fellwock left the
:Agency three and a half years later, he?like all other
;Intelhgence people?swore an oath never to reveal what
he had done while in .the employ of NSA. But now Fell-
'wock feels that oath no longer "is binding to me." He
:feels that by telling. all Ile will "make sure that there are
no .more Vietnams." He feels that "the American
miii-
tary [is) the most dangerous threat to me, my family
and to world peace itself." He has taken this step "rid.'
.ther for money nor glory, but to bring to the American
people knowledge which they have a 'need to know.' "
. And also, and not so. incidentally, to the enemies of -
the American people knowledge which they have a para-
mount need ?to know. ?
And yet, if Fellwock is so dead set on preserving the.
peace by this attack on NSA, how does he explain away.
one incident he describes in detail in his article. It was
during the Six Day War. According to Felhvock, the U.S.
electronic intelligence ship Liberty (a Pueblo) was sent
along the .Israeli coast to intercept Israeli-baffle orders.
It was attacked by the Israeli air force and 34 Ameri-
cans were killed. But, still according to Fellwock, the
Liberty already had transmitted the fact that General
Dayan intended to order his forces to attack both Cairo
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STATINTL STATINTL
NATION'S BUSINESS
HOWpproved For Release 2001M3/04 411
usmer.3, s
ers OUr
Intellllgenc
Deenees
From building eyes
in the sky to advising
Presidents, businessmen
,are deeply involved in an
essential but hush-hush
'national activity
. .The revo6iution began one ecein- Laboratories, Bell rl e ep -lone
her afternoon. in 1954 when TrevoVtories, RCA and Philco-Ford, Tick
Gardner, a former ? California busi- Corp., Eastman Kodak Co., Perkin-
nessman who was the Air Force's re- Elmer Co., AerojetGeneral
search and development Chief, picked TRW Inc.?as well as thousands of
? up his'Pentagon telephone to make a /smaller suppliers.
?I call at the CIA's'request. The 'man he/ Only when first cousins of clandes-
I called was Clarence (Kelly) -John- tine devices developed for intern-
! son, Lockheed Aircraft Corp.'s chief gence work show up in civilian life--
designer, in Burbank, Calif. Nineteen' in the camera system of the Lunar?
onths later Mr: 'Johnson's ubiqui-v ? Orbiter, for example--can companies
a
ora-
- High over the Eurasian land mass,
? i
two Project 647 .satellites (Made in
'U.S.A.)" patrol unusual "dwelling"
orbits, their delicate "sensors watching
for a missile launching in the Soviet
Union or a nuclear explosion in Chi-
na. - ?
? :A propulsion engineer in a secure,
windowless California office calcu-
lates the range of an Egyptian anti-
shipping missile from data gathered
V
? by the Central Intelligence Agency.
A_ computer analyst in, Boston, his
. advice needed by the code-breaking
, National Security Agency, ' hops a
plane to Washington. And a corpo-
rate . executive answers the Presi-
dent's" personal plea for some annub-
licized counsel on How to reorganize ,
? the Defense Intelligence Agency.
? American industry, a world leader
in advanced technology, is deep into
the Complexities of modem intelli-
gence work?and much quieter about
it than a swinging dames Bond.
. The U.S. intelligence establish-
ment, once comparatively simple, is
now, huge as well as highly sophisti-
cated, costing the government some
$6 billion a year and directly employ-
ing 200,000 men and women.
. One expOt has estimated that 70
. per cent of this money and manpow-
er .is inextricably involved with the
science- and technology that, in less
' than two decades,. have revolution-
ized an essential national activity?
essential despite the thaw in the Cold
War
STATINTL
Approved For Release
tous 13-2---designed, built and teste.d take oblique credit for remarkable
in an atmosphere of extreme secrecy
.7--made its first spy flight for the CIA ?
over the Soviet Union.
Today, the U-2 still flies recon-
naissance missions over Cuba, poten-
tial Latin American trouble spots and
the troubled deserts Of the, Middle
East. Its intelligence "cover" was
blown in 1960 when a Soviet missile I
knocked Francis Gary Powers from
the sky over Sverdlovsk. But its cam-
eras still rank among the world's best,
it can slip over a target, more easily
than a satellite?and. it remains an
undispided symbol of modern, tech-
nological espionage. .
Ironically, Lockheed did almost as
much to push the U-2 into the open?
by creating superior spycraft, and.
therefore reducing the"nced for secre-
cy about it?as the SVerdlovsk.marks- ?
men did. By. 1960, work was well
along on a supersonic successor air-
craft, the Lockheed SR-71, and on in-
creasingly sophisticated spacecraft
that keep an entire planet under ob-
servation.
Under the peculiar rules of the in-
telligence game, Lockheed can admit.
what everyone already knows?that
the U-2 was and is a spy plane. HOw-
ever, it can only concede that the Air
Force SR-71 has "strategic reconnais-
sance" as its mission. And the com-
pany cannot even discuss the fact
that its Agena rockets have carried
almost every American spy satellite
launched in the past dozen years.
technical achievements.
Industrialist John A. McCone, who
ucceeded aging spymaster Allen W.
Dulles as Central Intelligence Agen-
cy director in 1961, and is now back
in industry, is given much of the
credit for harnessing industry and
technology to ? the intelligence com-
munity's needs.
"Dulles had no background for this
kind of thing," a top intelligence ex- j
ecutive recalls. "McCone had headerN
the Atomic Energy. Commission and
been Under Secretary of the Air
Force, and he: fancied himself some-
thing of an engineer.
. "He wasn't afraid of the tech-
nological game."
The simple communication link:
that Mr. Gardner used to order the.
U-? from Mr. Johnson still operates.
"We can pick up the phone to a
West Coast. contractor and say, 'Go
ahead,'" an intelligence .official re-
ports. "Research and development is
different in this field than in the mili-
tary services. We are jtist plain less
.bureaupratic.
"Contractors say it is a pleasure to
deal with us because they can get de-
cisions quickly. The security rules
? are hard to live with, but they are',
more than counterbalanced by the
lack of complications." .
The leading consumer of new in
telligence technology, the CIA, ini-
s-
tiates more than 50 per cent of the .
R&D projects it sponsors but de-
pends - on industry for many new
The rocket's role ideas. Surprisingly, it and the other
While the U-2 clearly marked the intelligence agencies also depend
beginning or the new espionage, the heavily on. companies for analytical
rocket quickly proved a far more dra- help. "We don't contract out 'current
matic instrument of change. business' [the hottest new intelli-
Sputnik I, launched on Oct. 4, gence data] but we might ask some-
. 1957, left no doubt that.rocketry had - one to do a six-month exhaustive
attered man's destiny. . study, say, on the accuracy of an
, ? And the prying eye of the intel- ICBM," one government intelligence
: ligence camera soon peereddown official explains.
from 100 miles in space, rather than
2001) II 'Mt. bfk_RDI:i861p14,
techno ogy i -Kills-tr.-les were qiirtr
cruited?General Electric Co., CBS
1
magtermno???????
MEATUS STATINTL
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AUG 1972
STATINTL
0*
Ctre--1
J
. C
A lk
I
II Ill
BOUT THIRTY.,
MHES NORTHEAST Of CIA head-
'
'''N, quarters in Langley, Virginia, right off the
----v, Baltimore-Washington expressway overlooking
?-?11,- the flat Maryland countryside, stands a large
three story building known informally as the "cookie fac-
tory." It's officially known. as Ft. George G. Meade, head-
quarters of the National Security Agency.
Three fences ? surround the headquarters. The inner
.and outer barriers are topped with barbed wire, the middle
one is a five-strand electrified wire. Four gatehouses span-
ning. the complex at regular intervals house specially-
trained marine guards. Those allowed access all wear irri-
deScent 1. D. badges ? green for "top secret crypto," red
for ."secret cry/1)(o." Even the janitors are cleared for secret
codeword material. Once inside, you enter the world's
longest "corridor"-980 feet long by 560 feet wide. 'And
all along the corridor are more marine guards, protecting
the doors of key NSA offices. At 1400,000 square
feet, it is larger than CIA headquarters, 1,135,000
square feet. Only the State Department and the Pentagon
and the new headquarters planned for the FBI are more
spacious. But the D1RNSA. building (Director, National
Security Agency) can be further distinguished from the
headquarters buildings of these other giant bureaucracies
?it has no windows. Another palace of paranoia? No.
For D1RNSA is the command center for the largest, most
sensitive and far-flung intelligence gathering apparatus in
the world's history. flere, and in the nine-story Opera-
tions Building Annex, upwards of 15,000 employees work
to break the military, diplomatic and commercial. codes
of every nation in the world, analyze the de-aypted mes-
sages, and send on the results to the rest of the U.S. in-
telligence community.
Far less widely known than the CIA, whose Director
STATINTL
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.1.1ib HOUSTON PO3T
/7) Approved For Release 2001/0gW611aDP80-01
warmal
-Ai ET& olc
?
t, 71
03,-0
?
Post News Analyst
?
By Donald R. Morris
The August issue of Ramparts i?-naga-
zinc ? a periodical much. given to at-
tacks on the intelligence community ?
features an article entitled "U.S. Espion-
age: A Memoir," attributed to "Winslow
Peck," i?
The article claims that the N.!ationaI
Security Agency (NSA) has broken ev-
ery Soviet cede, and can pinpoint; the lo-
cation and type of each Soviet jet and
Missile submarine. It also claims the
United States is still making routine
U-2-type surveillance flights over: the So-
viet Union and China.
For lagniappe, the author describes
how in 1957 the NSA monitorqd a live
TV contact between Soviet - Premier
Alexei Kosygin and Cosmonaut Viadi-
mir ?Komarov, who had just ,been in-
formed his braking chutes were mal-
functioning and who was facing certain
death.
"Peck" also claims that the .electronic
surveillance ship Liberty, on: which 74 ?
crewmen died in an Israeli altack dur-
ing the Six-Day War in 1057, overheard
Gen, Moshe Dayan order his troops on
to Cairo and Damascus, as a result of
which then President Lyndon B. Johnson
brought intense pressure on. Isi'ael to
halt further troop movements, and on
Premier Kosygin to call off a :threatened
Soviet airborne operation .agaiust Israel.
"Peck" turns out to be one Perry Fel-
lwock, who enlisted in the Ail. Force in
1966 at the age of 20, was assigned to
NSA for duty, served in NSA. stations in
Turkey and Indochina, an& was dis-
charged in November, 1969 ? age 23,
Ramparts claims ?? he was a "senior
analyst" with NSA.
Fellwock claims he then turned down
a $10,000-a-year job with the. CIA, be-
cause he wanted to "work to end the
Vietnam war." In April, 1.9'12, he was
arrested and fined $50 for disturbing the
peace in San Diego before the
can party headquarters and the nth
Naval District headquarters._
, In an interview with the New York
Times, Feliwock said, "1 know the FBI
knows who I am. I'd like to avoid pub-
licity but I'm willing to go through
and if I haye to, to jail."
Fellwock and the Ramparts editorial
board can sleep quietly. Neither the FBI
nor anyone 'else is. liable tot bother him.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04
NSA's "no comment" to the story does
not conceal official agitation but only
? yawning boredom.
To begin with, while 1\15;k does employ
multitudes of Air Force enlisted men in
a variety of clerical and technical ca-
pacities, it does not use such youthful
detailees ?Vith high school -educations 'as
"analysts," senior or. othemise.
Ramparts could have acquired a far
more detailed, and accurate account of
the structure and activities of NSA from
an overtly published book, David Kahn's
superb "The Codebreakets," than they
got from their ego-tripping source. His
corridor gossip is flattet,'ing, but ludi-
crously inaccurate.
Items: NSA is the seat of the major
cryptanalytic effort of the. U.S. govern-
ment. It regularly reads ti-tat portions of
the traffic Of foreign nations NV11 tC11 is
sent in a wide variety of low-level crypto
systems, designed only to .provide pro-
tection for a short period of time. It
does not, alas, read the key internal
traffic of major powers, which these
days is sent in crypto systems using
computer-generated keys, ?which are im-
pervious to attack.
There have been- no U-2-type *over- '
flights since the early 90s, when the sat
ellite reconnaissance programs were de-
veloped. The unmanned SAMOS capsule
houses equipment so sophisticated that
? the photographic and electronic take -is
infinitely superior to that which a con-
ventional overflight could produce. (The
United States does send planes and ships
along Soviet and Chinese borders to sniff
out electronic- developments and defen-
sive techniques and reaction times, but
these do not deliberately violate foreign
air or sea space. When it happens by
accident, the results can be disastrous.).
And youthful military enlisted men on
detail to NSA simply do not have access
to intelligence slated for the executive.
level ? and they . certainly aren't con-
versant with presidential actions based
on such intelligence..
In. short, Ramparts ? .which has
scored palpable hits in the past is
attacking with .an empty ?waterpistol.
And Fellwock, having ? secured ample
amounts of the publicity he is so ar-
dently avoiding, can sink back into the
obscurity from which he emerged.
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L 2 4 13721
- 12,425
STATINTL
ode Breakiiig
.
A former Air Forte sergeant, who
was discharged from the service in 1969,
? claims that the United States has re-
? fined its electronic intelligence tech-
niques to the point where it can break
`Soviet _codes, listen to and understand
Soviet communications and coding
systems and keep track of virtually
'? ever); Soviet jet or plane or missile-
carrying submarine around the world.
The press quickly discovered the
identity of the analyst, who signed .his
/ article. with .the pseudonym of Winslow
Peck. Peck corroberated many of .his
? revelations, but found .some experts
strongly denying that the United States
-, had broken the sophisticated codes of
the ? Soviet Union or of other foreign
powers,
This whole matter strikes at the
fundamental ? security of the United
States as well as of the Soviet Union.
In the sixties, the U-2 intelligence flights
were known to the Soviet but Premier
Khrushchev used it as an excuse to call
off his summit talks with President
Eisenhower. Government intelligence
experts now say there has been no auth-
orized violation of ,Soviet or Chinese
air space since.
Peck was employed by the little .
known National Security Agency. Head-
quartered at Fort Mead, near Baltimore,
it has about 90,000 employees, mostly
military. Its -annual budget is about. z1.
billion. Primarily, it collects World in---
formation, mostly through advanced
technology, for distribution- through the '
Government, including the Central 1t1,
telligence Agency. Peck claims?Mr.-it
.has elicrEl-e-d'tlie Communist world with
some 2,000 electronic listening posts on,.
land or on naval vessels or aircraft.
It is reassuring to know how wide-
spread our intelligence apparatus is
But, no matter how comforting, it is
not information to broadcast to our fes.
Its value is in its secrecy. Its original
revelation can only be distressing to
American relations..with the Communst
powers with whom we are trying. to
up new relations of co-existence leading
to peace.
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Approved For Release NiNA:f2:61A-R, DP80-01911M11-19
Spy in the Sky?
It was just 'announced that the gov-
erriment is going to send a U-2 plane up
bver Chesapeake Bay in the next few
'days to map the damage caused by trop-
ical storm Agnes.
Without wishing to seem unnecessar-
ily suspicious, we should just like to
point out that, by the freakiest of coinci-
dences, the Soviet Embassy has recently
:purchased a summer residence for its
ambassador and the embassy staff at
,Pioneer Point on the Chesapeake's East-
ern Shore. The embassy, according to
latest reports, is in th.e process of reno-
vating the tennis courts and building a
basketball court on the grounds of the
waterfront estate.
If .you remember, President Eisen-,
hower was first impressed by the poten-
tial of the original U-2 over a decade ago
when the spy masters showed him de-
tailed photographs of his favorite green
at Burning Tree, snapped from 60,000
feet up.
If you also remember, Premier
Khrushchev used the shooting down of
an operational U-2 as the pretext for
scuttling summit talks with Ike in 1960.
We just hope every precaution will be
taken with the flood-mapping spy plane,
so that the new era of sweetness and
light between the United States and the
Soviet Union will not come crashing
down in flames just because somebody at
the CIA wants an aerial eloseup of the
Russians' new basketball court..
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WASETI;C7T0:: POST
Approved For Release 20017Q3/Q4I:g[A-RDP80-01601
.13 .._ .
21(61.1) e e '1' r"
,1,11A. :,..i... r u.. 'LI.,
61,1 -1.!--
.U... ,
ri(0.11 ily ')-1 tl- t; :iYT--N,',, ly-o 1:1 cpPIPee
11
11.c,i.;.L.L. J ? .u..u. ,... :. ? , ..i I ,
,'.1.,1_ - .. ;
,
By George C. Wilson . Union over the last few years i inspector effort has been heav-i
Washinfflon rust Straf Writcr has conducted several sets of illy classified by the Pentagon .
The U.S. Air Force is taking; exercises which many Western !through the years. But the
a. new le?1; at satellites that. space specialists we as (I(-, 'basic idea has not changed
could rocket into, space and in- , signed to perfect satellites , . S.ince former Defense.
i
.sPect foreign spacecraft look. that could in IMI
M spect, and possi-
ing down on the United bly destroy, U.S. satellites. , F.7e.cretary Robert S. Mc-
States.
- The United States is behind Namara told Congress in se-
The arms control agreement
Russia M this field. The A in 1 eret testimony in 1968 that
with the Soviet Union ?
r orce has sponsored a nm
uber "we are exploring the develoP-,
given imPetus i? Pr?P?sals has of studios but. has vet to fly Intent. of a non-nuelear surveil-
such inspector satellites. Presi-Ithe first. inspector satellite, lance or destruction capability
dent Nixon has assured c on.
One argument against doing it ;against hostile satellites . . ." .
gross that the United States has bec--n the fear of looking! - any
.will keep track of the Soviet , i .t , i? ? the i McNamara said one of a
a promise provocative.iii.3?i.;cetonoltliit- e(1'7\s",1( "1" 'Inumber of rockets could carry
.pace.
.missile buildup,
hinged on the ability to keep the satellite inspector into
,
counting missiles with observ-
In the environment?
of the; space- Spartan, Polaris,
'
ation satellites, recent Strategic Arms Limita- ,rhor or minuteman, one way
Right now, both the United tion Treaty (SAL Ii, aerospace for the satellite to home in on
States and the Soviet Union Fompaides see their chances 'another would -hi' by the beat
spy on each other from space improved for .gettim._ beyond :it would give off in space?so-
by satellite.. Neither side has Pr--s studies and individual called infra-red sensors.
,i
. interfered with the other, in pieces of hardware' LTV Aerospace worked with
contrast to Russia's desperate Several of the companies :the Air Force on a sensor for
/ effort to knock down U-2 spy are PrePari.nr_! Proposals for :a satellite inspector under a
planes which used to fly over submission this week to the secret project called 922. The
her territory?an effort that Pentagon in hopes of obtain-!sensor was launched into
was ultimately successful in ing one of two Air Force study space successfully from Cape
downing Francis Gary Pow- contracts for the satellite Kennedy but the doors on the
ers. inspector. sensing unit failed to open,
Nevertheless, the Soviet . ?The off-and-on satellite dooming the test.
4.. ?
yt.
'1
r(r6E-1-1
STATI NTL
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5
Approved For Release 2001/03Ts
.??
ARE BUREAUCRACIES
(, IMPORTANT?
(OR ALLISON
WONDERLAND)
by Stephen D. Krasner
?
kW-180-01601
STATI NTL
article on this subject. With the publication
of his book this approach to foreign ? policy
now receives its definitive statement. The
bureaucratic interpretation of foreign policy
has become the conventional wisdom.
My argument here is that this vision is
misleading, dangerous, and compelling: mis
leading. because it obscures the power of the
'President; dangerous because it undermines
the assumptions of democratic politics by
Who and what shapes foreign policy? In relieving high officials of responsibility; and
recent years, analyses have increasingly em-
compelling because it offers leaders an
? phasized not rational calculations of the excuse for theif failures and scholars an
?national interest or the political goals of opportunity for innumerable reinterpreta-
national leaders but rather bureaucratic pro-
tions and publications.
? cedures and bureaucratic politics. Starting The contention that the Chief Executive
a is trammelled by the permanent government.
with Richard Neustadt's Presidential Power,
judicious study of leadership published in has disturbing implications for any effort to
? 1960, this approach has .come to portray the impute responsibility to public officials. A
? American' President as trapped by a perma- democratic pOlitical philosophy assumes that
nent 'government more enemy than ally, resPonsibility for the acts of governments can
Bureaucratic theorists imply tha,t it is exceed- be attributed to elected officials. The charges
ingly difficult if, not impossible for political of these men are embodied in legal statutes.
leaders 'to control the organizational web The electorate punishes an erring official by
which surrounds them. Important decisions rejecting him at the polls. Punishment is
result from numerous smaller actions taken senseless unless high officials are responsible
r by individuals at different levels in the for the acts of government.. Elections have
bureaucracy who- have partially incompatible some impact- only if government, that most
national, bureaucratic, political, and personal complex of. modern organizations, can be
. objectives. They, ate not necessarily a reflec- controlled. If the bureauctatic machine
tion?of the aims and values' of high officials. escapes manipulation and direction even by
? Presidential Power?was well received?by'John the highest officials, then punishment is
? Kennedy, who read it .with interest, recom- illogical. Elections are a farce not because the
mended it to his associates, and commis- people suffer from false consciousness, but
? sioned Neustadt. to do a private study of the because public officials are impotent, en-?
1962 Skybolt incident. The approach has meshed in a' bureaucracy so large that the
been developed and used by a number of actions of government are not responsive to
? their will. What sense to vote a man out of
scholars?Roger Hilsman, Morton Halperin,
Arthur Schlesinger, Richard Barnet; aU office when his successor, regardless of his
Graham Allison?some of whom heldsub-
values, will be trapped in the same, web of
Cabinet positions during the 1960's. It wa -
only incrementally mutable standard operat-
's
.the subject of a special conference at the RAND log procedures?
Corporation, a main theme of a course at the The Rational Actor Model
Woodrow Wilson School at- Princeton and ?
. the subject of'a faculty seminar at Harvard. Conventional analyses that focus on the
It is the intellectual paradigm which guides values and objectives of foreign policy, what
the new public policy program in the John F. Allison calls the Rational Actor Model, are
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. perfectly coincident with the ethical sas-
Analyses of bureaucratic politics have beenumptions of democratic politics. The state
is
used to explain alliance behaviour during the viewed as a rational unified actor. The
1956 Suez crisis and the Skybolt incident, behaviour of states is the outcome of a
c?, Truman's relations with MacArthur,- Amer-
rational decision-making?process. This proc-
ican policy in. Vietham, and now most ess has three steps. The options for a given
situation are spelled out. The consequences
thoroughly the Cuban missile crisis in ?
Graham Allisi&VdfAmistMjii 26eftworavot
es eT eiPsion-
e1
ing the Cuban WITsgler risis, Published in 1
OP t
(Little Brown & Company). Allison's Volume makers. The. analyst knows what the state
-1 _ IL - _ ? ? ? n ? I Aid 14iC "1,1.1.,t;? L__
STATI NTL
00170001-4
1-&-S &WORLD. REPORT
Approved For Release 2001/0311f49: bY\-WIliP80-01601R001
HOW
NT
. Thanks to aerial surveillance
and space-borne cameras, the
world. is now virtually an open
book to U. S. They've become
vital tools of American policy.
? President Nixon, directing war moves
in Southeast Asia and peace moves with
.Russia, has at his fingertips a major
weapon brought to a peak of reliability
? during his Administration.
The weapon is this: a constant flow of
.aerial photographs providing, in minute.
.detail, the kind of intelligence informa-
tion that no previous President was able
to 'donut
? ? Over. North Vietnam, reconnaissance
.pilots flying at altitudes of 10 miles. or
more are able to take pictures that can
clistinguish between tank models, . show
the types of trucks. and artillery pieces,
expose troops in camouflaged bunkers?
and even count rifles.
Over Russia, reconnaissance satellites
orbiting at 1.09 miles up?or more than
'SOO miles--can detect the construction
of rocket sites and the firing of missiles.
'From their pictures, aircraft at- landing
Strips . can be identified. The most ef-
fective cameras, from 100 miles, can
.depicf objects two feel in diameter and
show the writing on billboards.
"Silent army." Such surveillance
intelligence?when- properly interpreted
seen as a major key both to the fight-
ing in Vietnam and the possibility of an
arms-control pact with Russia. Behind
the information fed to the President is a
silent army of intelligence specialists
using. new- advances in photography,
aeronautics and space technology.
. In Southeast Asia, these technicians
depend heavily on reconnaissance plahes
and pilotless drones for the pictures they
need. Space satellites are used for back-
up material.
Worldwide, however, the important
business of keeping tabs on the Russian
and Communist Chinese nuclear-missile
build-up rests primarily with the space
satellites. Aircraft give better pictures at
lower cost. But, since the incident in
which a U-2 spy plane was shot down
over Russia, aircraft ? reconnaissance of-
. the Soviet Union has been ruled out.
I1os. they work. Reconnaissance
-planes and drones have been flown rou-
tinely overridesfaithia Place iFise
S Es- EK7 A
HE RED WORLD
ed States first began bombing North
Vietnam in 1965.
The drones have their cameras turned
on to take wide-angle pictures .contin-
uously while in flight. Reconnaissance
pilots, after studying earlier drone pho-
tography, can pinpoint their cameras on
suspected military activity for closer,
more detailed pictures.
The photos are analyzed within min-
utes at U. S. bases in Southeast Asia.
In some cases, the photos are also sent
to Washington?either by air or by radio
beam, depending on whether the priority
is secrecy or speed.
Over the' past decade,' the U. S. has
kept- watch on the Soviet Union and Red
China with a series of "search 'and find"
satellites whose. very names are classi-
fied. They are equipped to pho-
tograph and radio back to
"Sky spy" model is readied for
testing. Satellite cameras can
photograph most of the world.
ground stations prints that can
be put together to depict the
entire country.
Cround stations for receiving
these pictures are located at
Another series of "close look" satel-
lites is used to focus on known or sus-
peeled subjects of military significance.
These photos, of a much higher quality,
are dropped by parachute to be re-
trieved and sent on to the National
Photographic Interpretation Center in
Washington, D. C.
What's ahead. New and improved
reconnaissance satellites, officials say, are
in the offing. One, clubbed the "Big
Bird," is expected to have an orbital
life of several- months and to carry a
quantity ? of film packs that can be re-
turned at frequent intervals.
Success of the sky spies has been
credited with removing an important
hurdle to a U. S.-Russian agreement on
limiting arms. Without the satellites, it
'r'"',"'"Tlrrr':,'',"?.'':'r,'T,7'r"-? ?
Gemini V photo shows African airfield from
100 miles up. Sky spies give much more detail.
New Boston, N. II.; Vandenberg ?Air is argued, no significant agreement could
Force Base in California; Oahu:, Ilawall; be possible because of the Kremlin's
Kodiak Island, Alaska; on Guam; on the steadfast opposition to on-site inspection
Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean, teams to enforce a treaty.
and in Ethiopia. In addition, six ship- Even before arms-control talks started,
board stations, each with a 30-foot an- U. S. officials say the satellites have
tenna, can be deployed around the helped to stabilize relations between the
world to fill blank spoCs in the network. U. S. and Russia?through increased
The photos are radioed from the satel- knowledge?and at the same time have.
lites and wind up at 'Sunnyvale, Calif., significantly reduced U. S. defense spend-
/60\11/01i7an.:ftlAe-kb0810-01601R0011001/006Ven?"' ("DI
? 28 MAY 1972. STATINTL ?
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act Unveiled I ader
. ? . ?
ireumstances
? Nightclub Act
-- ? ? . i
. ? raised dance floor, against
By Murrey Marder a baeIground of champagne
I- Washington Post Staff Writer . buckets. President' Nixon's
r - ?
MOSCOW, May .27?It is a press inexhaustible security ad.
tradition that journalists brace them- viser, Henry A. Kissinger,
' selves doubly against the winds of gave the American version
1
political hyperbole 'at summit confer- of what Mr. Nixon described
ences, where there is abnormal temp- as the "enormously impor-
tation to create. a public impression tam" strategic arms agree-
of extraordinary,' happenings. But even ment signed two hours ear-
'the most imaginative news manager her in the Kremlin.
? . would have been taxed to preplan the On Tuesday, Kissinger
bizarre staging that unveiled the said. the President and
world's first nuclear arms limitation Brezhnev spent the after-
here. . . , noon and evening on four
Nothing approaching the manner in unresolved SALT disagree-
'. :7 which this major international news meitts, resolving all but two
.reached the press has occurred since of them. One group of re-
"rthe aborted 1960 summit conference mining problems con-
tin' Paris, Th9re, former Soviet Pre- ? cerned the terms for inter-
g
. '-mier Nikita S. Khrushchev blew clown changing land missiles with
?the pillars of the temple with .a temper submarines and another oh-
tantrum using unPrintable language.:
stacle was how to deal.with
/because the United States had sent ' older Soviet submarines.
a U-2 spy plane across his country. Kissinger and other Amer-
That.was stagecraft fCir disaster. What lean and Soviet experts
rr happened here last night and in the worked most of the night on
early morning -hours of Saturday was these issues; they were
? Improvised stagecraft to display briefly discussed again, by
suecess. the President and lirezhnev
? ? - ? Nene who experienced it will the next day followed by an-
' "quiekly forget the: climatic act of an 'other prolonged session by
?
improbable ? 'diplomatic presentation experts, who worked into
that had. leaped between the Kremlin the morning hours of Fri-
?.Palace of the czars; ? a well-worn dip- day.
? lomatic 'bargaining room in Helsinki,.
Airborne Negotiations
Airb
Finland; the U.S. embassy here, and ?
:ultimately the night club of Moscow's By noon Friday, the stale-
, Intourist Hotel. No one fully orche- mates were broken, and the
Strated, this production. Russians. were anxious ? to
?In the seductively dim lighted "Sky- announce the result Friday
;light Sky Room," which happens to night to avoid disrupting the
:be on the 'hotel's ground. floor, be- summit schedule. Joint in-
,t1m0 A bandstand and a circular structions were flashed to
? ?- . ? ? ? .
the U.S. and Soviet negotia-
tors in Helsinki, and the
final agreement was. liter-
ally pieced . together by
American Ambassador Ger-
.:a/4 C. Smith and chief So-
viet negotiator V. S. Semy-
enov on an American plane
that brought them to Mos-
cow at 9 p.m. yesterday.
The task of publishing the
agreement and explaining it
to the world was barely be-
ginning at that point, with a
signing ceremony set for 11
.p.m. in the Kremlin.
.
At 10:02 p.m. American
newsmen traveling with the
President were assembled in
. the U.S. embassy for an on,
-the-record briefing by Am-
: ger, both operating under
heavy strain. ?
,Smith called it "the fresh-
est treaty that I have ever
talked about." In fact it was
so fresh that no one in the
room had a copy to show to
newsmen. That produced tu-
mult. The "landmark" treaty
that the President and his
associates hailed was not
available to quote from be-
cause a frantic operation
was under way to produce a
formal version for the
Kremlin signing ceremony.
? Criticism already was
being raised in Congress
about the still-unseen treaty,
especially charges that it
gave lopsided submarine ad-
vantages to the ? Soviet
Union. Smith and Kissinger
firmly denied that, and then ?
?in an unusual sequence?
began revealing, in Moscow,
intelligence information to
sustain the American assur-
ances. ?This session, and the
one afterward in the Intour-
ist Hotel, 'produced on-the-
record. exchanges between
American newsmen and of fi--
dials never before heard in
Moscow. ?
- Ambassador Smith, who
has been negotiating with
the Russians under mutually
agreed stringent security
precautions, in addition to
usual sensitivities on weap-
ons data, reached an iim.
pass(1 with newsmen in the
brief time allotted for ques-
tioning. ?
Then Kissinger stepped -
in.
? 'Not Constrained'
Basic Story
Reporter: "The baSie story
(about the treaty) is going to
go out of this session. I
think . we have to get figures
on submarines and other es-
timates, otherwise the story
will go out in a garbled way
. . . is this figure of 42 Y.
class submarines an accur-
ate one that they will be al-
lowed to complete, and we
with 41?"
Smith: "I don't know
about this figure of 42 sub-
marines. I have seen all
sorts of speculations about
Soviet submarines, but it is
perfectly clear that under
this agreement if the Sovi-
ets want to pay the price of
scrapping a substantial num-
ber of other Important stra-
tegic weapons systems they
can build additional submar.
Ines.
Reporter: ". . I think
you are evading the point
Stith: "I am purposely
evading the ? point because
that is an intelligence esti-
mate that I am not in a posi-
t, Ut horized version
Approved For RelehtWIRIC:P0376144itirA-FtYlitiM1101R0011001060b11-4
Kissinger: "Since I am not
quite as constrained or don't
feel as constrained as Am-
bassador. Smith, lest we
build Up a profound atmos-
phere of mystery about the
submarine issue, I will
straighten it out as best I
can.
.. "The base number of So:
via submarines is in dis-
pute. It has been in-dispute .
in ow- intelligence estimate
exactly how much it is,
though our intelligence esti- .
mates are in the range that
was suggested.
Kissinger: "I am not going
to go beyond what I have
said. It is in that general
range. The Soviet estimate
of their program is slightly '
more exhaustive. They, of
course, have the advantage .
that they know what it is ,
precisely. (Laughter)" ?
This discussion then pro- -
eeeded into complex detail
but with little time for addi-
tional questioning because
of the impending 11 p.m.
signing ceremony. At 10:55
p.m., the briefing was cut
off with a pledge to resume
it across town at the Intour-
ist Hotel that serves as press:
headquarters for the summit
meeting.
There, 'an attempt was
made to hold a joint Ameri-
can-Soviet press briefing,
but that was frustrated be-
cause no one had a copy of
any of the three official doc-
uments that newsmen had
seen being signed on televi-
sion.
At 1 a.m. today, secretar-
les were still, rushing to
copy ? and mimeograph the
texts of the antiballistic mis-
sile treaty, the interim
agreement limiting offen-
sive nuclear weapons and an
accompanying protocol from
ed
? v:AsH:1;;Noli sn?.
Approved For Release 2001/03/042:AVRICala80-01601
MOSCOW MUSINGS
Despite Soviet Rigidity, Life Relaxing
STATINTL
? By a Star Staff Writer
MOSCOW ? All the poetry
of modern Russia seemed to
be summed up in that little
dining room across from the
Kremlin.
There we sat, connoisseurs
of past Nixon travels to Rus-
. sial reminiscing about the 1959
visit of the then vicc president
? which produced so much ver-
bal fireworks with Nikita S.
Khrushchev.
Superficially not much has
changed in the heart of this
metropolis. There in that Vie-
,torian-like dining room were
the same tatty lace curtains,
the same struggle for service,
the same blaring music from a
?combo still living in the 19305.
Outside, despite Ulu intru-
sion of several new glass sky-
scraper hotels, the splendor of
the flood-lighted .spires of the
Kremlin remains supreme'.
But as the evening wore on,
the real changes in Moscow
Shone through. It is 'uasically a
change in mood. It is relaxa-
tion. It is an unashamed
? search for the "good life," as
dfigrmined in best Ameri-
can style ? by more cars,
better, clothes, larger apart-
ments.
This poetry of change pene-
trated the dining room. Sud-
denly, in an interval between
blaring jazz tunes, came the
haunting strains of the Lara
theme from the movie Dr. Zhi-
vago.
The movie ?and the aook by
Boris Pasternak ? have not
been allowed here. This great
among modern Soviet poet-
novelists was ignored to his
death by the guardians of So-
cialist orthodoxy.
Yet 'in came the Zhivago
music, and the fofeign and
Russian patrons around the
room, many of them affluent
Russians still dressed in
clothes of harder times, ate on
with noisy nonchalance.
Later, in the doorway of the
hotel, a group of Swedish lads
?on a school graduating trip
to a Russia which they confid-
ed they didn't like?also per-
sonified the changing Moscow.
They ?. 41n r;rilnk"
little raucous, dressed in the David" were a time of new
hairstyles and ragged clothes hope. Today the same opti-
mis.m is abroad in this capital.
of the young West. Guitar in "Everyone here is expecting
hand, they strolled through the co much, yearning for so
balmy night to the Lenin tomb much," said an intelligent In-
on Red Square, mingling with tourist guide of the President's ;
Russian passersby who visit. "Last evening on the
seemed not the least bit sur- metro home, everyone was
prised by this youthful parade. reading about his arrival and
It all seemed so normal ? talking about what can hap-
therein lay the difference from pen."
1959. Time end relaxation Nixon has said that he does
have worked their way. Thu- not want a new "spirit which
teen years ago, for instance, will later die in disillusion-
the rage of Soviet puritanism meat. The "spirit of Camp Da-
would have been visited on a vie Crashed with the U2
young Russian couple who ' plane incident over Russia in
walked over .the cobble stones May 1960 and Khrushchev's
of Red Square hand-in-hand, later sabotage of the Big Four
sneaking an occasional kiss. summit conference in Paris.
These are only little things. For President Nixon today,
They form the first impres- his summit with Communist
skins of a returning traveler to party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev
Russia. is painted as a' summit of sub-
The bitter Nixon visit here stance. But already a "spirit
in 1959 produced the first real of Moscow" is building in pop-
but brief thaw in Soviet- ular expectations of dramatic
American relations. Those lat- achievement.
er months when Khrushchev Whether the substance the
visited the United States and President wants matches this
lie and President Eisenhower expectation is still an unan-
distilled the "sp -it of ? Camp ? swered question.
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yORIC TX
Approved For Release 2001/03{%;/pRlitsilpP80-01601199111i9lL70001-4
Tass Criticizes4P;esia ;it/
,2 Ships Hit, China Says,
American U-2 spy plane was
? ?-.-
-T No Mention Made of Trig brought down.
By HEDRICK SMITH They noted that the Kremlin
Special to The New York Times
. MOSCOW, May 9?Tass, the
Soviet press agency, today crit-
icized President Nixon's: deci-
sion to mine North Vietnamese
ports as a violation of inter
national law, but gave no indi-
cation whether the move would
force the cancellation of Mr.
Nixon's scheduled trip to Mos-
cow in two weeks.
? The initial Soviet. reaction
tame in the form of a dispatch
from Washington summarizing
Mr. Nixon's speech last night
on new measures against North
Vietnam.
Pravda, the authoritative
Communist party newspaper,
carried the Tass dispatch with-
out-.any other commentary to
signal Moscow's intentions.
American embassy officials
,said late tonight that a 20-man
?White House team, which ar-
rived Sunday evening to begin
final preparations for the Nix-
on visit, was still planning to
hold its first meeting with So-
viet officials .tomorrow morn-
ting?probably the first real test
.of the Kremlin's attitude since
the new measures were an-
nounced.
The Tass report branded thel
port-mining and other measures!
announced by Mr. Nixon as,:
"overt acts- of aggression" inl
violation of "norms of inter-1
national law." it was taken as
preliminary response while;
the Kremlin weighed alterna-
tives.
The President's announce-
ment came as the Soviet Union
and its leadership marked a
two-day holiday celebrating the
27th Anniversary of the Arne%
victory over Nazi Germany. The
holiday perhaps added to the
traditional Soviet reluctance to
respond quickly in public to
major new foreign policy de-
velopments.
. Diplomatic circles were mind-
ful that the first Soviet reac-
tion might not necessarily in-
dicate hOw the Kremlin would
finally deal with Washington's
challenge. They recalled that in
May, 1960, Premier Nikita
Krushchev delayed for nearly
two weekspixtatoiNlile
the
might want to confer with
Hanoi before taking any major
course of action and also might
want to wait until the vote in
Bonn on ratification of non-
aggression treaties with Mos-
cow and Poland.
The Tass dispatch from
Washington, 'presumed to have
been carefully screened at a
high level before its release, re-
ported' Mr. Nixon's speech mat-
ter-of-factly, citing not only the
military measures but also his
statement that "these actionsi,
are not directed against any
other nation?'
It related his offer for a
complete halt to "all 'acts of
iforce throughout Indochina"
:and American withdrawarfrom
Vietnam within four months of
an internationally supervised
?cease-fire and release of Ameri-
can war prisoners. It cited his.
assurances that he wanted to
end the war but said his latest.
actions "point to the contrary,"
an unusually mild .Soviet con-17
?
President Ei e ir Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4
visit to Moscow. after
Approved For Release,2001*SibLPSalA-RDP80-01
10 MAY 1972,
Victim- ?Aorta
Viet ar Puts
rez Tiff on Spot
? STATINTL
THE SOVIET LEADERS . that Mr. Nixon might be ?The Soviet- Union cannot -
have made a great effort in genuinely anxious to secure afford to make trouble on
recent days to help .Presi- a "generation of peace." But the routes to Berlin because..
Marshql Grechko the de- this would damage its
dent Nixon settle the war op c. , ,
tense minister, countered by search for an understanding
terms acceptable to him, but publicly drawing attention with West Germany. But it
Indoing so .they have be- to the "growing aggressive- can send minesv.'eepers to
come vulnerable to the hard- ness of imperialism, and pri- Vietnamese waters, thus
liners in the ? Kremlin. ?2
Madly American imperial- putting the onus of challeng-
. ing them on the U.S. Navy. ?
? Just how far the So vi ism."
.
Soon after Kissinger left
leaders went is evident from SOVIET M I L I T A R Y Moscow, where he had cer-
IVEr Nixon's statement that leaders ob v io u sly were
not mollified by what ,Brezh- tainly warned his hosts of
Mr. Nixon's determination
a .
inC they had lately shown an in- pev to14 them u
'an end on a basis that would meeting held midway
through Henry Kissinger's
terest in bringing the war to
? 'be "just to both sides." For
visit to Moscow last month.
him ' to say this is to ac-
The army paper Red Star,-
?knowledge that the Soviet
commenting on the meeting,
leaders were working for a
pointedly stressed again the
settlement which, in Mr.
threat of an American at-
Nixon's own judgment, was .
. tack on ,the Soviet Union.
"just" and 'therefore favora-
to be tough, a Soviet missile
submarine arrived in Cuba ?
in apparent violation of the
Soviet-American unde r-
standing.
. t
At any other time, there .
would have been bawls of ,
-protest from Washington. So'
far, the administration. has ?
chosen to play it down. But
the' arrival of the submarine
The military leaders have al. shows that those Soviet
. 'ole to the United States.
lies in the Soviet security,
'play it tough are not leaders who also. want to
In spite .of his continuing
with-
anger at the Kremlin for ,police . apparatus, w h o s e out resources.
supplying arms to Hanoi, hec...e,. 1,4 f, -11T s7 i A
?11drOp0V, is the , ..._ 0 1972. ilictOr Zona ,
was admitting, in effect, only Soviet leader: to have,
that Moscow and Washing-
ward a settlement on Viet- about the "illusions" im-
nam. His failure even to plicit in trusting Mr. Nixon ?
"complain about China sug- too far. . .
.gests that Peking was even ,Brezhnev was able ? to
- The Soviet leaders who fa- overcome the objections
'more cooperative.
?vored the summit had 'from both these .quarters
staked their political ca- while the preparations for
reers, as Khruschev once the summit were going well,
did, on the - expectation that
,with the United States was viously been weakened. by ,
were arguing that such an The parallel with the Paris.:
- expectation was an illusion. suinmit of 1960, which
They are ,bound to claim Khrushchev was forced to
'proved them right. . from his own hardliners in
abandon under pressure .
now that Mr. Nixon has
--- The Kremlin hardliners, response to the U-2 over-
' especially the military, were flight is an obvious one.
concerned about the conces-
- ' ?
sions that Mr. Nixon might EVEN IF Brezhnev had.
?
:exact froin their politicians, been tempted by Mr, Nix
-
much as some of the mili- on's renewed offer of
tary and conservatives in "major agreements" on
the United States were con- trade and nuclear arms, he
cerned about' the conces- must' now be in a much
sions that Mr. Nixon might weaker position to persuade
make to the Russians. his opponents in the Krem-
L eo aid Brezhnev, the lin that' the summit ought to
Communist Party secretary, go on. Indeed, he may lvell
as 011sce? # e SAiii be unibr ressure to re-.
pr ,
uttered a public warning
Ion had gone a Ion ?;:', ?.vay to-
but his position has ob-
,a mutually acceptable deal
possible. The, hardliners Mr. 'Nixon's latest actions.
at
eAStei 0 /013/0441 CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4
summit with the argument Nixon himself has acted.
? WASHINGTONIAN
Approved For Release 2001/01161-RDP80-01
STATI NTL- STATINTL
?
STATI NTL
? - The Voice *of
? Joe Alsop Power
Glory
By Twin Kelly
n Joe Alsop's pleasant garden room
I four plump .caged doves are cooing.
Joe says when asked that he does
not like doves?that out of their cages
they are dirty, mean, and hard to man-
age.
?Joe sits under the skylight sipping a
tisane from a huge blue and white china
cup and the doves in two large, elaborate
cages pay him no mind.
? They're in and Joe's out but nobody's
free.
Joe i a blue blooded falcon, a rare
and endangered species. He is a falcon
by inheritance, a member of the estab-
lishment, a natural-born leader, a cousin
of leaders, a classmate of leaders, a for-
mer roommate of leaders, and the chosen
voice of the pedigreed "first-rate men"
for .thirty years.
For generations we've all been run by
the East Coast cousins. The first cousins
went to Grown and the second cousins
to St. Paul's. The Irish Catholic fifth
cousins. were named Kennedy?but that
was later. First they were coachmen and
named Pat and Mike. They went to
Choate.
? It is difficult to tell the cousins without
an alumni bulletin. Cousins are not mea-
sured by blood alone, but establishment
cousins do tend to marry establishment
cousins and produce geneological cousins.
. There are several (de 'facto) Jewish
cousins named Lehmann, Ochs, and Mor-
genthau, but there are no Italian or
Polish or Bulgarian cousins. Black people
.are not ready to be cousins though some
can be classmates. It is customary to
speak well of the late Frederick Doug-
lass.
Some cousins chuckle a lot and Joe's
blood cousin Teddy' Roosevelt grinned
and shouted "Bully" but most were
serious faced and did not laugh out loud.
This was partly because many were from
New ? England but also because they
were born to assume the awful responsi-
? bility of running the world.
?
Running the world. is not easy. Joe
took up the burden in 1932. He was a
Go
loom
oom
ing Connecticut reactionary father and
a mother who was as well connected -:.;
as the Connecticut Light & Power Co.
He was cousined to everyone important
south of Portland and north of Phila-
--"??.?.?I
delphia. He was literally a cousin to all 1 t? - -----
the Roosevelts?Teddy, Franklin, Elea- t, ? ? ?
nor, and Alice Blue down. ""-N
When Joe was ready for the profes-
sional world his grandmother (a cousin
of God's) decided that he was not to be
a businessman, diplomat, banker, Episco-
pal bishop, or president of Harvard. It
was suggested that he get a job on a
newspaper, a startling idea. Cousins and ?
, . ' . ?
-,
1 I
11 i
? :- !
classmates owned newspapers, of course,
but they didn't work on them. Joe had :4-4?6;,,,,
'a few precedents. Alexander Woollcott, ---?itrF;
who if not a cousin. was at least invited' I
..:*t
to cousins' homes, was cutting a choleric
swath through New York culture, and
Bob Benchlev, a blithe spirit but a Har-
vard, boy, was working for magazines.
Ogden Reid hired Joe at Joe's grand-
mother's suggestion and sent him to re-
port to the Herald Tribune's city editor,
a disenchanted man. named Stanley
Walker. City editors are all low-born.
Stanley had difficulty believing his own
? eyes since Joe, though only twenty-two,
was 245 pounds, dressed in well-cut vest
and watch chain, and possessed of an ?
extraordinarily arch accent that sug-
gested simultaneously the Queen Mother,
Cardinal Newman, and the fatigue of a
gentleman who'd just swum the English
Channel backwards.
He also couldn't type.
Still, no one is perfect. Joe was broadly
read and he could write a clear, ominous
sentence. Alex Woollcott decided that
Joe was the only educated youth he'd
met since his own college days. Alex was
given to extraordinary judgments?he
was against sex and he believed Louisa
May Alcott was a great writer.
? N+Actrie.
,
-
?
t.
, -
?
F
z1/4
??
?
, - ?.?.? ??? '014.
vagiMs..
Joe was soon a featured byline writer
at the Herald Tribune and in less time
than it takes to add up the Vietnam elec-
tion. returns he was the co-proprietor
'Of a Washington column?his partner
being a gentleman named Robert Kint-
,? I t
% ?.4', -4 ?
,
-
1
- 2.117 ?
:?..
-
strange youth?fat, an honor graduate ner, a non-cousin, who would in time
3 - ?
of Groton ,and Harvard, .s.on of_a .roar- b.Sg.rgq.ka.ti g NBT C and an advisor to
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continuea
Approved For Releattr 2CINTO31541Z-CIARROP80-01601
25 April 1972
'lough Sf Covert Action
While the Administration has obtained a tern.
porary order against publication of a bpok on
the CIA by a former officer of it, Victor L.
Marchetti, the public has reason to be thankful
to the author. He has already provided outside
of book covers some valuable insights and corn-
Inents on an agency that deliberately hides
from the public and Congress.
Without revealing any really hidden secrets,
the author uses published reporls to note that
the nation's intelligence budget is 6 billion dol-
lars a year, that the Central Intelligence Agency
has 18,000 employes, and that 6000 of these
'are working in clandestine services, as opposed
to intelligence collection.
As it is, .however, the CIA is the President's
baby. ,Congress has proposed various control
measures, such as a limit on the CIA budget,
or requirements for clearer information about
It, or Senator Cooper's present legislation for
the CIA to give intelligence briefings to Con-
gress as well as the White House. Congress,
after all, foots the bill, but it does not know
for what.
?
CIA officials occasionally surface frdm se-
crecy', to complain that critics concentrate on
CIA failures. If so, that is because the public
only hears about the failures, and they have
to be, big ones at that. They always seem to
involve those covert or "paramilitary" opera-
tions, which range from a most qualified suc-
cess in Guatemala to an unmitigated disaster
at Cuba's Bay of Pigs. Mr. Marchetti says, "I
don't think we've had a successful paramilitary
operation yet."
The clandestine operations are worth review-.
There was the U-2 spy plane incident that tor-
pedoed President Eisenhower's efforts to im-
prove relations with the Soviet Union. There
was the CIA's proud armed intervention to
"save" Guatemala from. leftists, leaving the
country to, oppression and terrorism. There was
the financing of Radio Free Europe which, when
disclosed, stripped that station of every vestige
of freedom or credibility. And there was the
Bay of Pigs.
Then there was the CIA militafy operation to
save ?the Dominican Republic from a :rebellion
to return a democratically-elected president.
There was armed support for the overturn of
a government in The Congo. Of course, there
was the CIA's hand in the overthrow of the
Diem dictatorship in South Vietnam, opening
the way for another dictatorship more satisfac-
tory to Washington. And there is presently
war in Laos, which the CIA actively engendered
without any visible success for the American
position in Southeast Asia, much less for peace
and order. '
Aside from the fact that so many of these
clandestine activities were inefficient and in-
effective, even aside from the fact that they
were bound to' be failures for America's long-
? range pi?ospects and 'reputation even if they did
succeed, the ability of the CIA to engage in
paramilitary functions represents a continuing
ability to start hostilities without the knowledge
of the people or Congress, and certainly with-
out any declaration of war.
Author Marchetti is fair enough to say .that,'
so far various presidents have kept a measure
of control over such activities. That is no guar-
antee for the future, however, and it is Con-
gress, not the President, that is supposed to
make decisions on war. Consequently, Mr. Mar-
chetti recommends confining intelligence ac-
tivities to a small and highly professional group,
and eliminating the covert actions entirely.
Intelligence simply cannot work well when
governed by an agency equally interested in
activities ranging from propaganda to military
action; that is a conflict of interest. The nation
does need successful intelligence. It does not
need a publicly-uncontrolled and unanswerable
power tct make War
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STATI NTL
=NINO TON S
Approved For Release 20%ittig01497:2CIA?lioifiT
RICHARD WILSON.
?SCOW Trip L?s ond Present Tens.fons
It's a fair question why and
how plans for President Nix-
on's visit to Moscow can go
forward in the present state of
tension and confrontation be-
tween the United States and
the Soviet Union.
President Eisenhower's pro-
jected trip to Russia was
called off in May, 1960 under
essentially less . provocation
than the direct risk to Soviet
shipping in Haiphong harbor
at the present time.
Although the Russians knew
of reconnaissance overflights
of Soviet territory, its leader-
ship exploded in fury when
Red gunners. succeeded in
shooting down a U2 spy plane
and accused Ike of treachery.
Premier Nikita Krushchev
-withdrew his invitation to Ei-
senhower to visit Russia in
June 1960 and U.S.-Soviet rela-
tions fell back into a deep
freeze.
The difference between then
and now, if Nixon's analysis is
? correct, is profound. We have
done more than fly over Soviet
territory (in fact, American
spy satellites now do so every
day.)
We have damaged Russian
shipping by aerial bombard-
ment. It is surmised we may
have killed Russians at sur-
face-to-air missile sites in
North Vietnam.
It is commonly recognized
that the war in Vietnam, par-
ticularly in its present stage,
is a proxy conflict between So-
viet and American arms, with
the prestige of both countries
at stake.
How, then, can we continue
to talk to the Russians with
great expectations of new
trade arrangements, cultural
exchanges and nuclear arms
agreements?
On Nixon's side, the answer
is to be found in his underlying
concept of his discussions with
the Chinese and Russian lead-
erships.
He sees those discussions as
transcending present conflicts.
He deems them to be of an
historic nature meaning more
to the next generation than
this one..
Small token advances may
be made with both Russia and
China as a result of his visits
to Peking and Moscow. Cer-
tainly the most will be made
of any partial agreement on
nuclear arms.
But this is only the begin-
ning of what must be a con-
tinuing process extending over
many years so that the very
strong China of the future, and
the very strong Russia and
America of now and the fu-
ture, will not plunge the world
into a horrendous conflict
from which it might never re-
cover.
Something of the same atti-
tude must be shared in Peking
and Moscow, it is reasoned, or
Nixon never would have been
invited to Peking, nor have
been received there as he was,
and his projected trip to Rus-
sia would most certainly be
" called off.
Compared to what might
happen in the future involving
Russia, China and the United
States in nuclear ware the
present conflicts between
these powers seem minor and,
in any case, can eventually
be overcome.
One would like to think that
this largeness of mind is as
universal as Nixon evidently
hopes it is. He adverted to this
theme indirectly in China, par-
ticularly at the Great Wall,
and it now appears to be a per-
thanent part of his political
psychology which he likes to
believe originates in the ideal-
ism of Woodrow Wilson.
Therefore, the President,
knowing that only Soviet arms
make the present offensive in
Vietnam possible, is willing to
go ahead with the Moscow
part of his general scheme re-
gardless. And the leaders in
the Kremlin, with who knows
what on their minds, are will-
ing to set to one side the
threats to their shipping? and
confrontation in the Mediter-
ranean, and the conflict over
Israel.
They are willing to suppress"
their suspicions of Nixon's
going to Peking and quit harp-
ing on some unknown secret
deal between Chou En-lai and
a perfidious American Presi-
dent.
, Their receiving American
advance delegations and going
:ahead with Nixon's planned
visit displays a mood quite dif-
ferent from their bristling an-
ger over Eisenhower's rela-
tively innocent venture in 1960.
The United States desires an
Improvement in relationships
in certain areas and so does
the Soviet Union. Those areas
are limited. The outstanding
big differences remain. In the-
ory, at least, those differences
might prove less menacing in
the future if some preliminary
agreements can be reached
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WASIIINCiTOI4 POST
Approved For Release 200,1/0?/84A:P6Ii-V-kDP80-01601
Stanley Karutow
Nwutuino- tne ]Kremlin
; The details of their con- leverage to restrain the'4
1. versation are of course un- North Vietnamese?if not
AMERICAN OFFICIALS .known. Yet it is fair specula- .through advice then by cut-
:.are entreaty stressing that tion that Dobrynin made it ting back their militer
the administration's "contin-
gency plan" to mine Hai-
phong harbor is Only an "op-
tion" that may never be ex-
-.erased. But 'the possibility'
of such a 'move is nettling
plain to Kissinger that min-: shipments to Hanoi.
ing or -blockading- the Hai- Administration spokesmen
phong harbor might lead to '
further hold that the conten;
something like a combine-
tion of the Russians that'tion of . the 1960 15-2 incident their aid to Hanoi is the'.
and the 1962 Cuba confron- equivalent of U.S. aid to Sai- ?
tation in reverse. .gon is specious since, they'
say, the, -South Vietnamese
Besides prompting the
are defending their territory
the .Kremlin, and the risks
, Kremlin to cancel the esi- .against a North Vietnamese ?
are real that some miscalcu- dent's invitation to visit.' invasion.
Aation could jeopardize not , . .
Moscow next month, Dobry- But underlying these ad--?
only Pr?dent Nixon's Mos- nin 1 ministration arguments 0,N,,, presumably said,
' cow trip but also endanger other considerations that:,
threat to Soviet ships might are rightly or wrongly spur- -
U.S.-Soviet relations in
also torpedo the Strategic ring the President's decision '
other ways. ? ? -
? ' Arms Limitation Talks and to challenge the Russians. ?
--
Proposals to mine or One of these, consistent
blockade the .Iiaiplion-g' har- the prospects of increased. with his strategy since 1969,
bor in order to discourage U.S. trade with the Rus- is that he must intensify his
Russian' weapons shipments sians. ? ; employment of air power to
to North Vietnam were re- At worst, the Soviet diplo- cover the reduction of U.S.'
peatedly rejected by former - troop strength in Vietnam.
mat' may havewarned, the _
President Johnson on the the other, particularly im-
pounds that the tactic might destruction or damage of portant at this time, is that
-wreck Soviet-American ties. Russian. ships in the Hai- he must escalate even more
i But on Tuesday, in re- phong area might, even forcefully to placate the
:sponse to questions fromhawks at home if he intends
':Senate Foreign Relations touch off a? more serious
to keep withdrawing Amen-
Committee Chairman J. W. clash between : the United,.. can boys. In addition, he
' Fulbright, DeferiSe Secre-
tary Melvin IL - Laird de- States and the Kremlin. simply refuses to be "bul-
But the Russians have lit-- lied" by Moscow.
1
dined to "rule out" .a deci-
sion to drop high-explosive
:devices into the sea near the
North Vietnamese port.
LAIRD'S REMARK was
/
? 'more than mere talk A mas-
sive U.S. naval buildup has
Neon underway in the Ton-
,k
inn Gulf to provide the yes- their present offensive in
Osels for the prospect of a
South Vietnam, partly be-
'blockade. Moreover, as 'cause their influence, in
Washington Post reporter
Hanoi is limited and partly
;Michael Getler disclosed, a
because they fear being over-
U.S. Navy ammunition ship
taken by 'the Chinese. Nor
? laden with aerial mines has
can they, for the same rea-
1 left its Philippines base to
sons, curb their military
- ' join the American armada
supplies to North Vietnam.
off the Vietnam coast.
In addition, they elver-
' If the ; administration's
statements and deployments ently believe, they have
were designed to worry the every right to provide North
long as the United States
Russians, they had their ef-
Nrietnam with weapons as
feet. Soviet Ambassador to l
Washington Anatoliy Dobry-
tl
continues to arm the Saigon ;
regime and fortify it with in delayed his scheduled
' 4
departure for Moscow this air support.
? : .1
week, reportedly to discuss
JUDGING by both its '
the deteriorating Vietnam rhetoric' and conduct, how-'
situation with Henry Kis.;
ever, the administration is
singer, the President's for- plainly persuaded that the
eign policy adviser. ?
? ? . ? ? '. Russians do indeed have the.
tie to offer in exchange for
their demands that the Pres-
ident refrain from escalat-
ing his actions in North
Vietnam.
They cannot or Will not 'at-
tempt to dissuade the North
Vietnamese ; from pursuing
Whatever the -validity of
this approach, it is carrying
the United , States danger-
,ously close to a collision
',with the Soviet Union. Such
a. collision;' Hit nappenS,
would be one- of Vietnam's,
most costly !..casualties..
-
STATI NTL
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11
STATI NTL
NATION
Approved For Release 2(9=04 ..i..CIA-RDP80-0160
Pint ig'L
?
CEPA,: ?E.1,72.47
(ZEME
vxmon mAnorETTI
Mr. Marchetti was on the director's stall of the CIA when
he resigned from the agency two years ago. Since then, his
novel The Rope-Dancer has been published by Grosset &
Dunlap; he is now working on a book-length critical analysis
of the CIA.
The Central Intelligence Agency's role in U.S. foreign af-
fairs is, like the organization itself, clouded by secrecy
and confused by misconceptions, many of them deliberately
promoted by the CIA with the cooperation of the news
media. Thus to understand the covert mission of this
agency and to estimate its value to the political leadership,
one must brush myths aside and penetrate to the sources
and circumstances from which the agency draws its au-
thority and support. The CIA is no accidental, romantic
aberration; it is exactly what those who govern the country
intend it to be?the clandestine mechanism whereby the
executive branch influences the internal affairs of other
nations.
In conducting such operations, particularly those that
are inherently risky, the CIA acts at the direction and with
the approval of the President or his Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs. Before initiating action in the
field, the agency almost invariably establishes that its oper-
ational plans accord with the aims of the 'administration
and, when possible, the sympathies of Congressional lead-
ers. (Sometimes the endorsement or assistance of influen-
tial individuals and institutions outside government is also
sought.) CIA directors have been remarkably well aware
of the dangers they court, both personally and for the
agency, by not gaining specific official sanction for their
covert operations. They are, accordingly, often more care-
ful than are administrators in other areas of the bureau-
cracy to inform the White House of their activities and to
: seek Presidential blessing. To take the blame publicly
for an occasional operational blunder is a small price to
pay in return for the protection of the Chief Executive and
the men who control the Congress.
The U-2 incident of 1960 was viewed by many as an
outrageous blunder by the CIA, wrecking the Eisenhower-
Khrushchev summit conference in Paris and setting U.S.-
Soviet relations back several years. Within the inner circles
of the administration, however, the shoot-down was
shrugged off as just one of those things that happen in the
chancy business of intelligence. After attempts to deny
responsibility for the action had failed, the President openly
defended and even praised the work of the CIA, although
for obvious political reasons he avoided noting that he had
authorized the disastrous flight. The U-2 program against
the USSR was canceled, but work on its follow-on system,
the A-11 (now the SR-71,) was speeded up. Only the
launching of the reconnaissance satellites put an end to
espionage against the Soviet Union by manned aircraft.
The A-11 development program was completed, neverthe-
less, on the premise that it, as well as the U-2, might be
useful elsewhere.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04
After the Bay of
feel the sting of Pre:
the agency had its
because it failed in
overthrow Castro.
the top of the agenc
committee, which tii
tration, the agency .
tices. Throughout th
tine operations again
the same time, and
agency deeply invoh
ing regimes in Laos
When the Natiorn
the CIA in 1967, s
exposed the agency'
labor and cultural (
funding conduits, ne
tried to restrict the
Senator Fulbright's a
trol over the CIA In
was simply told by P
and get on with its 131
formed to look into
Secretary of State, th
of the CIA. Some (
because they had be
-longer thought worth
continued under improvect cover. A ICW Oi the larger
operations went .on under almost open CIA sponsorship,
Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Air America being
examples. And all the while, the CIA was conducting a
$500 million-a-year private war in Laos and pacification/
assassination programs in Vietnam.
The reorganization of the U.S. intelligence commu-
nity late last year in no way altered the CIA's mission as
the clandestine action arm of American foreign policy.
Most of the few changes are intended to improve the finan-
cial management of the community, especially in the mili-
tary intelligence services where growth and the technical
costs of collecting information are almost out of control.
Other alterations are designed to improve the meshing of
the community's product with national security planning
and to provide the White House with greater control
over operations policy. However, none of that implies a
reduction of the CIA's role in covert foreign policy action.
In fact, the extensive review conducted by the White House
staff in preparation for the reorganization drew heavily on
advice provided by the CIA and that given by former
agency officials through such go-betweens as the influential
Council on Foreign Relations. Earlier in the Nixon Admin-
istration, the Council had responded to a similar request
by recommending that in the future the CIA should con-
centrate its covert pressure tactics on Latin American,
African and Asian targets, using more foreign nationals as
agents and relying more on private U.S. corporations and
other institutions as covers. Nothing was said about reduc-
': CIA-RDP80-01601 R001100170001 -4
z r
sz
3 0 MAR 1972
Approved For Release 2001/03/Q4 : CIA-RDP80-0160
!From Bratsk to NovosibIrsk, U.S. Roc
Is Big, President Isn't
? By HEDRICK SMITH
Special to The New York Times
BRATSK, ,U.S.S.R., March
23 ?Across the vast ex-
panses of Siberia, the pros-
pect of President Nixon's
visit to the Soviet Union this
spring stirs little excitement.
People are more interested in
knowing- about American
cars, books, rock groups and
fashions.
"I'd like to see New York
?what are they wearing
there?" asked a 23-year-old
factory worker and amateur
guitarist, decked out in a
loose - sleeved yellow and
green paisley sportshirt and a
purple vest for a jam session
of the Padun, a local group.
When a visitor suggested
that the young combo from
Bratsk would be pretty much
in vogue in New York and
inquired where they had
found costumes so far from
the usual Soviet garb, a teen-
age flutist with long red hair
replied with a laugh, "From
you ? Americans." He ex-
plained that while the style
was American, the clothes
were home-made or ,custom-
made here.
Questions About Cars
In Irkutsk, a taxi driver
wanted to know whether
it was true that "Americans
all have cars and they are
bigger and better than our."
He was immediately hushed up
by two technicians who in-
sisted, "As you can see, we
have everything here.
At a Russian Orthodox
Church, a grandmotherly yior-
*strollea up to two
American visitors and, amid
. recollections of the suffering
of World War H, suddenly
' asked: "How is life with
; you?" Then looking the visi-
tor 'up and down, she an-
It? swered herself: "I ' can. sec
thatit's good."
In far off Yakutsk, south
'
of the Arctic Circle, an ac-
cordionist in a hotel dance
band stopped at an Ameri-
can's table to ask whether
American accordions had five
rows of buttons or just four.
(Generally, there are six.)
In Novoisibirsk, a college
senior wanted to know about
,the lateskrecv&ved iSi
miap
tha Franklin and the rock
, group Blood, Sweat and Tears.
! The questions and com-
ments of Siberians in random
conversations reveal aston-
ishing pockets of specialized
knowledge about aspects of
American life in the midst of
ignorance about American so-
ciety in general.
Capitalist Social Security
Two industrial workers'
riding the Trans-Siberian
Railroad were at first skepti-
cal then sincerely surprised
to learn that unemployed or
disabled American workers
receive social security bene-
fits and that many Ameri-
can college students receive
scholarships. A 26-year-old
welder was incredulous that
a husband alone could sup-
port a middle-class family of
four. In most Soviet families
the wife must work, too.
A young professional wom-
an in Novosibirsk, said that
some Soviet women were so,
stirred by the Angela Davis ,
case that they were naming
babies after her, then asked
why Miss Davis was being so
persecuted. The woman later
acknowledged that she had
been unaware that Miss
Davis had been charged with
complicity in a murder.
Many Soviet youths listen
to the Voice of America reg-
ularly and are up-to-date on
the lives of movie stars and
rock musicians in America.
In Siberia one encounters
four university graduates
whose favorite tune is the
depression-era tune, "Brother,
Can You Spare a Dime," and
SOVIET "4'4" ?
UNION Yakutsk
Navisibirsk
e)
MONGOLIA
?cuiN/A17/
o ' 1,111-E3 SOO
'
The New York Times/March 30, 1972
in Yakutak a university lec-
turer who knows not only
such Soviet-translated staples
as Dreiser, Jack London and
Hemingway, but also
Faulkner, J. D. Salinger, and
Saul Bellow.
Release 2001/03104:
In Siberia, much , as in
middle America, the tendency
seems to he to regard inter-
national politics as the dis-
tant affair of officials in the
capital. Publications in Mos-
cow may be gradually mel-
lowing in preparation for the
Nixon visit, but thousands of
miles away the people were
either uninterested or wary
about having Mr. Nixon visit.
Some, remembering how
President Eisenhower's
planned trip to the Soviet
Union in 1960 was canceled
at the last minute because of
the downing of the American
U-2 plane piloted by Francis
Gary Powers, are skeptical
that Mr. Nixon will actually
make the trip.
"We built a special guest
house for President Eisen-
hower," a Bratsk executive
.recalled over dinner. "Then
he sent Powers and that fin-
ished it. We still have the
house. Maybe Nixon will use
it. But we'll have to see if
he actually gets here."
A teacher in Novosibirsk
voiced a thought echoed by
many others: "It would have
been better if Kennedy could
have come instead of Nixon."
Memories of Old Days
- Some of the wariness is
attributable to Soviet mem-
ories of Mr. Nixon's vigor-
ously anti-Communist politi-
cal past and some to the
tremor of uneasiness sent
through the Soviet Union
by his recent trip to Peking.
STATI NTL
trouble in the Middle East
and the Vietnam war con-
tinued.
But both, reflecting the
obvious desire of Russians to
be friendly with Americans
and to avoid war at all cost,
. were ready to join in a toast
to "peace with honor."
Again and again, Amer-
ican travelers are urged to
explain why Washington has
suddenly decided to be close
to Peking after two decades
of estrangement.
More than one Soviet cit-
izen suggested that a secret
deal had been struck in
Peking to Moscow's disad-
vantage. "In a year or so it
will come out," said a politi-
cal lecturer in Bratsk,
Two Soviet journalists in
Yakutsk disagreed on wheth-
er the time was ripe for an
American-Soviet agreement
on arms limitations or space
cooperation.
One, reflecting the present
approach in Moscow, fore-
cast a "useful" visit. The
other, more in line with the
old position, suggested that
important agreements were
unlikely so long as there was
CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4
Approved For Release 20eTtiD2P34in-CIXRDP80-01
1 5 MAR 1972
.Mnfst Snit
By Sidney I. Ploss
Mr. Ploss, a research fellow at Harv-
ard University's Russian Research Cen-
ter, wrote this article for Perspective.
The manual used in a special new
course in Soviet universities regrets
that under the late Nikita Khrushchev
Joseph Stalin's version of politics-as-
warlfell into disfavor.
Devoted to the ruling Communist
Party's "strategy and tactics," the new
course brings back the military defini-
tion of politics for which Stalin was
notorious.
Prof. V. S. Aleksandrov, author of the
course manual, examines the history of
the 1.1. S. S. R. in terms of "strategic
stages." At each stage, he writes, party
'leaders confronted "the main enemy"
? and targeted it for "the main blow."
' Invariably this meant a fight to the
finish with "class-hostile forces" inside
the country and abroad.
Main Enemy: U. S. Business
Now, U. S. big business is seen as the
Soviet's "main enemy." American cor-
porate interests are pictured as dispos-
ing of huge power which they use to
Subvert the Eastern bloc of nations and
? to launch armed attacks on it. Aleksan-
STATINTL
S
ezza.a ev
top level is shared and policy disputes 'Soviet propaganda is likely to sharpen
exist there, all of the regime's propa- as a result of Nixon's trip to China.
gardists do not say the same thing. Kremlin hardliners may be expected to
Instead, they tend to voice the diverse stress Peking's anti-Soviet behavior and
opinions of mighty patrons at the seat to offer the Nixon voyage as proof that
of power. . it is America's unchanging policy to
The case of Aleksandrov and his encourage a weakening of Russian in-
friends at the Ministry of Education fluence wherever possible. .
looks like a classic example of Soviet
factionalism.
Wields Less Power
.
A Basic Clue ?Others . will argue that foreign entan-
glements have cost Washington too
A basic clue for solving the riddle .of much in recent years 'and compelled
(sleke.androv's eccentric manual is its Nixon to assess more soberly the situa-
oe moion of policy compromises. Un- tion in the world.
One is thus reminded *of Khrushchev's
like Brezhnev's spokesmen, 'who have advance to the summit meeting with
gone to great lengths to justify such President . Eisenhower in 1960. At that
East-West deals as the Berlin accords, time it was Mao Tse-tung who most
the manual warns that some compro? prominently raged against the Soviet
mises may express "opportunism and chief's search for recognition of the Eu-
betrayal of the workers' interests." ropean status quo. The Paris surnmit
good Communists are urged to "pite conference, abruptly collapsed in the j
lesSly expose" and wage "irreconcilable wake Of the I.1-2 incident and amidst
struggle" against "top leaders" of signs that Khrushchev was not corn-
Communism who strike that kind of Plete master in his own house.
bargain with outsiders. .? In ,1,974.Brezlipev wields less personal
drov instructs that in turn Soviet ener- The super orthodox textbook also re- ? power than Khrushchev. The Ihternal
gies mus e t .b applied toward, isolating stricts the differences between Western critics of his policy of cooperation with
and eliminating this mortal foe. , politicians to starkly economic ones. In the West are more conspicuous. Clearly
'The rivalries between America and contrast, those Soviet writers defending worried about the prestige of the Corn-
its unist philosophy, 'these neo-Stalinists
democratic partners in the world Brezhnev's policy of resolving Soviet- In
community are to be exploited as a American differences insist that "a con-
are strong enough to preach their mill-
"strategic reserve" of Communism. siderable number of capitalist figures" tant gospel in Moscow lecture halls.
And allowance is made for "trials of now oppose a line of military pressure They, may yet cause a major surprise
strength" to promote the cause of glob- and advocate "mutually advantageous in the 'uncertain field of U. S.-Soviet
relations. -
' al revolution. cooperation with Socialist countries."
All this seems inconsistent with the Brezhnev's group includes President
foreign policy stand of today's Politburo Nixon among the Western moderates,
headed by Leonid Brezhnev. His actions to judge from the hopes for improving
would make it appear that Communist U. S.-Soviet relations during his upcom-
China is the Kremlin's "main enemy" ing visit to Moscow that are raised in
on the international scene. Over 30 So- the quoted source; an editorial in the
viet divisions, after all, are massed on party magazine, Kommunist. It takes
The R u s s o -Chinese frontier, where issue with diehards like Aleksandrov,
bloody clashes occured in 1969. Brezh- who are told that long-term trends in
nev soon afterward: gave his belated world politics must never be treated
approval to President Nixon's call for a as "a rigid scheme." Each international
new era of negotiations between Wash- situation is said to be "unique and unre-
ington and Moscow. peatable," requiring "a creative ap-
Why then is an effort being made to proach and solution on every occasion."
induce cold-war moods at Soviet This dynamic attitude is a far cry from
institutes? . the party educator's static teaching
While secret police operatioris are abcut need for ironbound continuity of
more limited, the U. S. S. R. is still a conflict with class enemies, foreign or
totalitarian state. Unusual effort is d
made to coApprovett FortRebeasV
litcp/p4fi;thchkaphoio1601R001100170001-4
it iervice a narrow group of supreme poli ' i
. .. cy that sindicated by disarray in
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDF'80-016
AUS1 IN, TEX.
STATESMAN
r 2
- 31R8
i3Z-ertiVie CrirAinco.
t 11.
One of the most unique
? developments in the history of
? aerial reconnaissance was the
Lockheed II-2 reconnaissance'
airplane. Design work on
the U-2 was initiated in the
summer of 1953 at the request
and with the funding of the
CentEaLatsligeege..,,,Ageewm
By the summer of 1954
construction of the prototype
? airplane had begun and by
1955 this first airplane had
made its first flight. The
? airplane was given a "U"
? category designation to
? maintain its veil of secrecy
? relative to its real purpose (U
being a designation given to
Utility class airplanes).
The C.I.A. had requested
the U-2 for the express
purpose of espionage
,reconnaissance. They wanted
an airplane capable of flying
over forbidden territory at an
?
altitude so high it would be
Immune to conventional
anti-aircraft defenses. This
airplane would, of necessity,
also be capable of carrying a
highly sophisticated
lightweight reconnaissance
package over very long
ranges.
? Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation was chosen as
main contractor in the U-2
program for several reasons.
In the main, they had
Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson
(one of the true greats in the
world of aeronautical
engineering) and his design
team, as head of their
experimental and advanced
projects division, and they
had a super secret facility
known as the "skunk works"
? In which a ? airplane stcig s
the I3-2 ? kg VR ar
without fear of discovery.
AVIArrolt
. by JAY MILLER
Johnson hhd done some
outstanding work during his
years with Lockheed. Some of
his more famous products
included the P-38, the P-80,
and 'ate-F-104. After the U-2,
came the world's fastest
jet-propelled aircraft, the
YF42A and the SR-71. The
U-2 began its design
development program at the
same time as the F-104. As a
result, the two aircraft
mutually influenced each
other, as a comparison of the
two airplanes will bear out.
Several crucial factors
dictated the U-2's many
unique features. First and
foremost in importance was
the airplane's weight which
needed to be kept at a bare
minimum. With very ? few
exceptions every conceivable
short cut was taken to keep
the U-2 within certain weight
restrictions. The landing gear
was compromised down to a
bicycle arrangement of a
single main bogie with a
smaller bogie in the rear.
Outrigger wheels under the
wings, used during taxiing
and take-off, were jettisoned
as ? soon as the airplane
became airborne. The wing
structure consisted of a single
main spar with turned-down
tips serving mainly as skids
during landing and
secondarily as "end plates
which cut down on tip drag.
Over-all, the wings had the
amazing aspect ratio (chord
to span) of 14.3 to 1
(compered to a more
conventional 6 to 1). Full span
flaps filled up some 6 percent
of the trailing edge span and?
wing loading was 25 pounds
Rt htitigdp20 0 1 /03/04 :
? The U-2 was virtually a
powered sailplane. And like a
STATI NTL
, sailplane' it "ims a highly
sophisticated, very efficient,
and aesthetically appealing
flying machine. ?
The U-2, in its initial
production U-2A variant,
.entered service with the
U.S.A.F. during the summer
of 1956. All U-2's were
? hand-made and as a result,
production lots were
relatively small, only 10
airplanes per lot being built.
During its first two years of
service a total of some 20
airplanes became operational.
About 10 of these entered
service with the C.I.A. under
.the cover of N.A.S.A. Initial
releases concerning the
3irplane ? and its duties
ieclared it to be for weather
'ecennaissance only.
Observers in Britain,
6armany, and Japan noted
etherwise.
or two years U-2 !
reconnaissance missions were
? flown over Soviet Russia
beginning in the fall, of 1958.
The missions did not go
unnoticed inside .the Soviet
Union but acknowledgement
? by U.S. authorities that the
flights were being made was
nonexistent. The Soviet
government demanded a halt
to the overflights (this being
kept from the U.S. press) but
the demands were ignored. It
was of utmost importance for
the U.S. security system to
know of Russia's internal
workings.
With very few exceptions,
the 13-2 overflights remained/
one of the best kept secrets of
the U.S. intelligence system.
The U-2 was a seemingly
impregnable reconnaissance
machine and as long as it
remained so; it would be used.
A total of 55 U-2's were built.
in at least three different
models. Five of these were
two-place U-2D's "(for missile
monitoring), approximately 30
etAcRopeovo1601R0
approximately 20 were U-2B's.
The JJ-2A was the intial
production variant powered
by a Pratt and Whiney
J-57-P-37A jet-engine
developing 11,200 pounds
thrust. This version was
capable of maximum altitudes
in the vicinity of 70,000 feet.
When the overflights began in
,the fall of 1958, a newer, more
powerful version of the U-2,
the U-2B, was introduced.
This version was powered by a
Pratt and Whitney J-75-213
jet-engine of 17,000 pounds
thrust. This engine gave the
11-2 a maximum operational
ceiling of 90,000 feet. ?
The engines used in the
various 13-2 mOdels were
special modifications of
standard production engines.
The main difference was in
the compressor section. The
U-2's engines had special
broad chord blades in this
section to make better use of
the low air density at high
altitudes. These engines also
burned special low-volatility
fuel (MIL-F-25524A). This
prevented evaporation losses
at high altitude and added an
additional 5 per cent to
the airplane's maximum range
over standard JP-4.
With the phenomenal 90,000
foot altitude capability of the
U-2B, it was well known that
nothing the Soviet Union could
put into the air could possibly
come close to knocking the
airplane down during an
overflight. This was of course,
barring the possibility of an
engine failure or other
malfunction. The original
U-2A at 70,000 feet was in its
own right, within this realm
of immunity. The 13-23 was,
for all practical purposes, an
impregnable fortress.
On May 1, 1960, Francis
Gary Powers and his U-23
were shot down near
Sverdlovsk well inside the
Soviet Union. Exact details as
to how the airplane was
destroyed remain covered to
01110 017 01301
?ormation
available indicates that for
some reason the airplane was
-tZ
Yknog
Approved For Release 2001/03/04FEeliVRD$W644/61
A iningcr Eanirv..132Me ?
RISE TO GLOBALISM: American For-
eign Policy Since 1938. By Stephen E.
Ambrose. Penguin Books. 352 pp. Paper
$2.45.
.COLD WAR AND COUNTERREVO-
LUTION: The Foreign Policy of John F.
Kennedy. By Richard J. Walton. The Vik-
ring Press. 250 pp. $7.95.
norzALD rulrooSEE
Mr. Radosh is author of American Labor
and United States Foreign Policy (Random
House) anti editor, with Murray N. Roth-
bard, of the forthcoming A New History of
Leviathan (Dutton). lie teaches history at
Queensborough 'Community College of the
City University of New York.
undertook to arm Europe. The program
had to surmount an initial obstacle: the
American populace was not yet ready
for a new holy crusade, and Truman
needed large economic and military lar-
gesse from Congress to meet the sup-
posed threat.
The issue Truman found to get this
funding was Greece, as the United States
prepared to move into the areas from
which Britain was forced to withdraw.
But to mask their real purpose, Truman
had to present his intervention as a step
on behalf of worldwide freedom. Hence
the Truman Doctrine Was devised, and it
"defined American policy for the next
twenty years. Whenever and wherever
an anti-communist government was
--threatened, by indigenous insurgents, for-
eign invasion, or even diplomatic pres-
sure .??. . the United States would supply
political, economic, and most of all mili-
tary aid." For Truman the terms " 'free
peoples' and 'anti-communise were as-
sumed to be :synonymous." , Once the
premise was accepted, the enormous inter-
ventions of future administrations were,
but a step away.
It was Korea, however, that allowed
the Truman administration to finally
achieve the enormous defense budget
called for in the secret and influential
National Security Council resolution 68j
The drafters .of NSC 68 asked for a $35
billion budget. This task Truman consid-
ered hopeless, calculating.that a reluctant
Congress would grant at most $17 billion.
At least, until Korea. The crisis allowed
Truman to put the recommendations oi
NSC 68 into effect. Ambrose is emphatic
on one point: the Korean War, which-
ever side started it, was a boon?political-
fly, economically and socially?to Amer.
ican imperialism.
During the past ten years, it has become
much more widely accepted that the cold
war Was not a Russian invention. Cold-
war "revisionism" has made its impact.
The shock of the Pentagon Papers has
, been eased for many by acquaintance
with the historical analysis of such schol-
ars as William Appleman Williams,
Gabriel. Kolko, David Horowitz and
Walter LaFeber. Yet until now, there has
been no overall synthetic account that
tells what each postwar administration
did and also provides a critical analysis
of its policies.
? This task has been realized by Stephen
E. Ambrose's Rise to Globalism. As the
title suggests, Ambrose is concerned with
the :developing globalist conception of
America's role abroad. He realizes that
this posture developed from the need to
avoid a postwar depression by achieving
new foreign marketsa problem, since
"much of the proposed?market place was
closed." Ambrose sees postwar foreign
policy as formulated particularly to pre-
vent nationalization of American-owned
property abroad, which meant an effort
to create "an open door everywhere."
The globalist shift was not mindless. "Pol-
iticians looked for areas in which Amen-
can influence could dominate; the busi-
nessmen looked for profitable markets
and new sources of raw materials; the
military looked for overseas 'bases," and
/America began a "program of expansion
that had no inherent limits." This basic
stance was developed by the administra-
tion of Harry S. Truman; it is in its
account of these years that Mr. Ambrose's
book makes its most significant contribu-
tion.
By 1947; Truman and his advisers
"saw communist involvement in every at-
tack on the 'status quo anywhere and
convinced- themselves that Kremlin ilk:Olt/Mgr
As for the war itself, Ambrose
corrects major errors in our understand-
ing of it. First, he points out that the
U.S. authorities knew that North Korea
was planning 10 invade across the 38th
Parallel. In fact, the State Department
had prepared a resolution condemning
North Korean aggression days before the
attack. But unlike I. F. Stone, who argued
in his book that Syngman Rhee started
the war with covert American support,
Ambrose writes that the North Korean
action was "too strong, too well coordi-
nated, and too successful to be a counter-
attack." He believes that the North Ko-
reans simply calculated that they could
overrun the peninsula before the United
States could reinforce South Korea. More-
over, American officials had already de-
was at the ppfOlve sQF etleas
conquer the world." To deal with what
was regarded as a worldwide threat, they
may very we ave iou.ted.that America
. would move in.
Second, Ambrose presents a major revi
sion of standard accounts of the Mac
Arthur-Truman dispute. Truman's as-
sumption that American bombers alone
would force the North Koreans back was
quickly shattered. American troops were
then brought in, supposedly only to re-
store the border at the 38th Parallel. But
by August, the policy was to reunify
Korea under the aegis of the South.
Now. the' policy of-crossing the 38th
Parallel and unifying Korea was not Mac-
Arthur's. Rather, it was the new policy
of the Truman administration. The Presi-
dent's advisers argued that China would
not intervene on Korea's behalf. Quoting
from instructions issued by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur, Ambrose
writes that stepping beyond containment
"came after full discussion and considera-
tion in the highest levels of, the American
government. Truman later implied, .and
millions believed, that MacArthur had
gone ahead on his own, that it was the
general in the field, not the government
at home, that had changed the political
.objective of the war in the middle of the
conflict. Such was never the case. Tru-
man, with the full concurrence of the
State and Defense Departments and' the
Joint Chiefs, made the decision to liber-
ate North Korea." Much later, after. Mac-
Arthur's February 1951 offensive, Tru-
pan moved away from the objecti-e'of a
military victory. But that policy :had it-
self arisen from the decision ? to favor
containment, which actually meant war
mobilization, a high defense budget, and
a permanent cold-war footing for the na-
tion. That is the significance of Truman's
flat rejection of Clement Attlee's plea for
peace in Asia.
In contrast to Truman ' and the policy
of permanent intervention, Dwight D.
Eisenhower appears in Ambrose's book
as a President struggling nobly to mini-
mize the effects of the cold war. While
his administration engaged in the rhetorit
of liberation, the reality was more often
a restrained Version of Truman's contain-
ment; Despite John Foster Dulles, Eisen-
hower was more flexible than hi:; prede-
cessor. The Republicans may have rattled
the saber, but "they also shut down the.
Korean War, cut corporate taxes, and
reduced the size of the armed forces.
? Despite intense- pressure and great temp-
tation,. they entered no wars. They were
willing to supply material, on a limited ?
scale, to others . . . but they would not
commit American boys to the struggle."
By 1955, the decision to go to the
summit had undercut the failure of Re-
4 .4i4
ut,..1._Lhe us.
-4RnopEg1601R001100170001-4
6c-in finu 4a:
41)
TIE DENVER POST EMPIRE MAGAZINE
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 WALAIDP80-01601R00
The amazing true story
of the CIA's secret war
- against Red China
By L. FLETCHER PROUTY
[, IGHT HAD obscured the
: mountains when the Air
Force cargo plane finally
11?1
approached the Pikes Peak
country from the west. Wearily,
it seemed, the aircraft crossed
the south shoulder of the peak,
turned left, dropped flaps and
began the long, gradual descent
to .Peterson Field which serves
both as an Air Force base and
' the municipal airport of Colora-
do Springs.
The landing was uneventful.
But from that point some strange
things happened.
The aircraft, a heavy-bodied
.C130 powered by four turbo-
prop engines, taxied to a remote
end of the field rather than to the
regular ramp. A military bus
quickly pulled up alongside.
If any outsider had been there
to witness some 20 men disem-
bark, he would have been told
they, were soldiers from? India
scheduled for training at nearby
Ft. Carson under a military aid
program.
But the troops weren't Indians
and they never got to Ft. Carson.
The loaded bus headed west-
ward out of Colorado Springs,
.up the Ute Pass highway, and
disappeared into the night.
During the months that fol-
lowed, other men like those in
the first ApiiiroztrediRoteRelvits
odically in Colorado Springs in
? The author, L. Fletcher Prouty, is
a retired Air Force colonel who is
now with the Center of Political Re-
search in Washington, D.C.
STATINTL
who connected, vaguely wi
the same mysterious manner Ronald Coleman movie about
and vanished into the mountains. Shangri-la.
The identity of these men and There is nothing mythical;
the nature of their mission about Tibet. It is an ancient
makes a fascinating story ? and, country with an area four times
in some respects, a frightening that of Colorado, separated from
one ? with vast international
implications. Recent develop-
ments in relations between the
United States and Communist
China, which portend so much
for an era of peace, give that
story a special timeliness. The
details of this operation are
reported here for the first time.
To understand what this hush-
hush operation was all about, it
is necessary to set the time,
which was August 1959, and to
recall the ominous twilight zone
? neither peace-nor war ? into
which relations between East
and West had drifted in that
period. With an eye toward the
successful culmination of his
two-term administration, Pres-
ident Eisenhower announced a
series of international events
leading to a super-Summit Con-
ference in Paris during May
1960.
The Korean War had settled
into an uneasy truce six years
earlier, in 1953. The Berlin Wall
was still two years in the future,
India to the. south by the Hima-
layan Range, many of whose
peaks are twice as tall as Colora-
do's highest mountains. The
country's average elevation is
about 15,000 feet. Soon after the
Communist ? government took
over control of China in 1949,
Peking announced its intentions
of "liberating" Tibet. In October
1950 Chinese Communist troops
invaded it.
Tibet's spiritual and temporal
leader, the Dalai Lama, then only
15 years old, urged his people not
to resist. The Chinese in turn left
the Dalai Lama alone. But by
February of 1959 it became evi-
dent the Chinese intended to
seize him to gain undisputed
control over that country.
Forewarned, the Dalai Lama
and about 80 of his followers fled
Lhasa, the capital city on March
17, 1959, heading for the safety of
India. The Chinese were not
aware of the Dalai Lama's
departure for several days. They
had been lulled by the fact that
? 1961. At the moment the point of there were only two good routeg-
eudot orittu4sal of Lhasa, both unrdatevr aCnhilleeasv!
mythical land to most Americans ing for India would have had to
THE LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH MAGAZINE
Approved For Release 24010311m P-CITA-RDP80-01?RIRA01-00170001-4
When Britain pulled out of Rhodesia after the 1965 Unila
--Ile CIA worked , tO ferret out details of the sanction-busi
".-In the popular. traditions of spying, secret documents disa
were used to convey messages in invisible ink. It was a shock
one of the informers was a prominent lawyer.. But it was noi
, the CIA had xpanded.into an a'reti where the British were una
.-actiVe in Egypt, Iran and Syria. E. H. COOKRIDGE ends his
arid looks at the Director, Richard Helms
ANY of the bright young /
men Allen Dulles had -V
recruited to CIA from I Li
law offices and univer- British sanction policy became, British
sities had gained their consular offices and SIS men were
? spurs in London, where they were sent supposed to watch the steady flow of
to glean some of the methods of the
? British Secret Intelligence Service.
Dulles enjoyed making wisecracks
about the Victorian and Indian Army
traditions still surviving in the British
secret service, but he had a healthy
respect for its unrivalled experience
and great professionalism. He knew
that CIA could learn a lot from the
? British about operations in the Middle
'East and Africa, where its stations
were rapidly expanding.
After Archibald Roosevelt, one of
CIA's foremost "Arabists", had re-
stored cordial relations with SIS when
station head in London, a plan of co-
pperation was devised for Africa, where
most of the former British colonies had
gained independence, anti were be-
coming subject to strong Soviet and
Chinese pressure. Roosevelt was still
in London when, in 1965, Rhodesia
made her momentous "Unilateral
. Declaration of Independence" (UDI),
which led to the conflict with the
Britigh Government.
There is no better instance of the
strengthening of CIA-SIS collabora-
tion than the hitherto undisclosed
story of the services CIA rendered
the British authorities in Rhodesia,
particularly since about.1968.
Indeed, in assisting the British SIS
Rhodesian pig-ir.ma, tobacco, and other
products through the Portuguese ports
of Lorenco Marques and Beira in East
Africa to Europe and the Far East
Merchants and shippers there .had
made fortunes out of the traffic which
the Portuguese were bound, by United
Nations resolutions and agreements
with Britain, to regard as illegal.
After the closure of British missions
in Salisbury all ? information about
Rhodesian exports dried up at source.
At this juncture CIA stepped in to
assist the British. It was not merely a
labour of love. American tobacco
syndicates in Virginia, Georgia,
North and South Carolina, Ten-
nessee and Kentucky greatly in-
creased their production and sales to
Europe when Rhodesian tobacco
growers lost most of their trade
through sanctions. Traditionally,
Rhodesian tobacco was used for cigar
and cigarette manufacture in Belgium,
Holland, Germany and Switzerland.
When these supplies dried up, Euro-
pean manufacturers turned to Ameri-
can growers. But by and by Rhodesian
exports began to flow again, by the
use of false certificates of origin and
smuggling through the Portuguese
ports and through Durban in South
Africa, much' to the displeasure of the
in its thankless task of implementing
the policy of economic sanctions Americans.
Thus, obliging the British and help-
against the Smith regime,'CIA put its
relations with the Portuguese in ing American business, CIA ordered
jeopardy. It has an enduring under-
its agents to ferret out the secrets of the
1.
standing with the Portuguese Govern-
sanction-busting schemes devised by
ment and its PIDE secret service
Mr Ian Smith's regime. Soon the CIA
on
many aspects: NATO security, anti-
station in Salisbury was bustling with
communist operations, the use of radio
activity. Since 1962 it had been headed
by Richard La Macchia, a senior CIA
stations in Portugal and her colonies,
jitnehtdireapceitnft official, who had joined it in 1952 from
and of bases
- and Special ForcEslinArigoK.Klozam-eleiaSev2MMWO4n0 GP P80-01601 R001100170001 -4
to Africa in the guise of an o ID
t
bique and Macao. However thin the
the U.S. Development Aid Agency.
Other CI'
were Cal
former A
Francis
who had
cloak-anc
Cuba anc
Wigant,
Congo dt
and sevet
the most
Edward '
Salisbury-
1957 from the State Department;
from 1959 he headed the East and
South African section and, at the tim
of his nev appointment, was Statio
1-lead in Pretoria. Among his variou
exploits he was reputed to hay
initiated the first contacts between th
South African government and D
Banda of Malawi.
The CIA agent's were perpetually
? journeying between Salisbury and the
Mozambique ports, and Murray was
temporarily posted to Lusaka to main-
tain personal contact with British
officials resident in Zambia. Mr Ian
Smith and his cabinet colleague, Mr
J. H. Howman, who looks after foreign
affairs as well as security and the
secret service of the Rhodesian regime,
were not unaware of the unwelcome
operations of the Americans. They
suffered them for the sake of avoiding
an open clash With Washington. Their
patience, however, became frayed
when it was discovered that secret
documents had disappeared from the
headquarters of the ruling Rhodesian
National Front_Party. Subsequently,
STATI NTL
continued
LOS ANGELES TIMES
Approved For Release 2001/6404111:NCIPARDP80-01601R
?
we
? : HARRY TRIMBORN
? , ? ? moSdow
? ?
What constitutes proper behavior
? for an Official representative of the
United States government in visit-
Ing the Soviet Union?
. Does he have the right to engage
In any activity not specifically pro-
hibited by Soviet law, even if he
knows?or should know?that cer-.
tain of such activities are sure to an-
ger his hosts? Or must he follow the
ground rules?explicit or implied?
laid down by his hosts, whether he
likes them or not?
Is it acceptable for him to come to
the Soviet Union ostensibly for one
purpose at? the invitation of the So-
viet. government, then? engage in
side activitieS that the government
'considers "subversive" and "anti-So-
viet"? .
And what would the answers to
these questions be if they were ap-
plied to an official Soviet visitor to
the United States?
? These and similar questions, are
at the root of the controversial activ-
ities of three U.S. Congressmen who
visited the Soviet Union recently as
part of a seven-man House subcom-
mittee .delegation ostensibly for a
two-week look at Soviet educational
facilities
The three congressmen were Reps.
James H. Scheuer (D-N.Y.), Earl F.
Landgrebe (R-Ind.) and Alphonzo
Bell (R-Calif.). Among them they
contacted Jews seeking to emigrate
to Israel as well as a Soviet civil
rights leader, and distributed reli-
gious material to Soviet citizens.
Their activities, however laudable
and well-meaning they might have
been, placed the U.S. Embassy here
In an impossible situation. The em-
bassy, according to reliable sources,
was deeply angered over the behavi-
or of the three visitors. The State
Department even complained to the
congressmen's Washington offices
about it, according to the sources.
While maintaining .an official
stance of "no comment," one top dip-
lomat called the distribution of reli-
gious material here "stupid."
?
Yet at the same time the embassy
was trying desperately to hush up
the activities, ven to the gx,tent
misleading .erapprovea ror K
est of Soviet
Sensitivities
STATI NTL
And it didn't help much when the
congressmen later insisted that they
had done nothing wrong, had not
meant to anger the Soviet govern-
ment or break any laws. ,
Their remarks showed a lack of
knowledge of the Soviet Union and
extreme naivete over what would or
would not be permissible for a vis-
Scheuer sought ,out newsmen to
relate with relish his encounters
with Soviet authorities and also to
tell of his meetings with a number of
other Jews seeking to leave, and
with dissident civil rights leader
Valery Chalidze.
Bell allegedly accompanied
itor, official or otherwise, to the Scheuer to some of the meetings and
country. supposedly was collecting material
The embassy felt the visitors for the World Zionist Congress in Je-
should have done nothing to anger rusalem. Bell went to Israel after
their hosts, whether or not there leaving the Soviet Union.
were any specific regulations cover- ? While readily admitting his con-
ing their actions. tacts with the Russians, Scheuer de-
The embassy's sensitivity to diplo- nied a Soviet allegation that he had
matic disruptions is at a peak now in iistributed anti-Soviet material. The
anticipation of President Nixon's ;:eference apparently was to doe-
scheduled visit to the Soviet Union nnents Scheuer displayed disclos-
in May. U.S. diplomats reportedly ing the formation of a group in the
are concerned over supplying the Jnited States to press for greater
Russians with ammunition for what :migration of Soviet Jews.
one source called the "U-2 gambit." Scheuer was detained on the pre-
This is a reference to the planned text that police were searching for a
1960 summit meeting between Pre- "foreign-looking" criminal in the
mier Khrushchev and President neighborhood and, since the con-
Eisenhower which the Russians an- gressman was a fdeigner, he might
grily called off following the down- just be their man.
ing of the U-2 spy plane over Russia. To some observers, the Scheuer
In the view of some sources, the detention represented a Soviet blun-
Russians appear to be attempting to der. The resultant worldwide publi-
stockpile "anti-Soviet" incidents in- city cbuld only help Scheuer politi-
volving Americans in the event they cally and embarrass the Kremlin.
need an excuse to call off the Nixon Thanks to his own efforts and the
visit. And visiting congressmen and apparent Soviet mistake Scheuer
other Americans should do nothing found himself in a dream position
to help the Russians build their in- for any politician. He had struck a
ventory. blow on behalf of a serious and .
The "U-2 gambit" may have been deeply felt cause that gave him
behind the beating of U.S. Air Force worldwide publicity and went over
attache, Captain Elmer L. Alderfer big with the voters back home.
at the Riga airport Jan. 5, ostensibly Here was a JewiSh congressman
from the heavily Jewish constituen-
cy of the Bronx tangling with the.
Soviet police over the status of So-
viet Jews. As ScheUer himself re-
portedly put it to a U.S. diplomat ,
? The author heads The Times bit- following his detention:
reau in Moscow. I've just insured my reelection.
It's too bad there wasn't a little
blood on my face and an American
photographer around."
The incident, and Scheuer's sub-,
sequent expulsion, along with the
embassy's futile efforts to minimize
the three lawmakers' activities
makes sense if the Russians are in-
deed stockpiling material for possi-
ble future use against the planned
presidential visit
for taking pictures there.
The embassy's efforts to keep a lid
on the three congressmen's activi-
ties were doomed because Scheuer?
taking advantage of a seeming So-
viet blunder?wanted anything but
silence.
Scheuer was detained briefly by
Soviet police Jan. 12 after he had
gone to the. home of a Jew who is
seeking to emigrate to Israel. Two
,days later Scheuer was ordered ex-
pelled from Russia for engaging in
elesene2fre1)e3ib4 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R001100170901-4
? 4071t Ltir.4
WASHINGTON POST,
Approved For Release 2003/08/e4: CIA-RDP80-01601R0011
STATINTL
he Al-P eimin
JACK ANDERSON achiev-
ed a Journalistic coup in pub-
lishing the minutes of the se-
cret White House meetings on
the India-Pakistan crisis. But
liow much of a hero is the
man Who leaked the informa-
tion?
My strong Impression is
that he accomplished very lit-
tle public good, if anY. On the
contrary, his actions are al-
most certain to drive the Nix-
on administration deeper than
ever into secret dealings on a
restricted basis.
On the good side of the
ledger, the leak has now pro-
vided unmistakable informs-,
tion that the President delib-
erately tilted American pol-
icy in favor of Pakistan and
against India. But that much
was known to everybody in
touch with the State Depart-
ment and White House at the
time of the crisis.
Sens. Edmund Muskie, Ed-
ward Kennedy and Frank
Church, among others, said
so. Hundreds of us wrote it.
Indeed, one reason Henry Kis-
singer held his background
briefing of Dec. 'I was to take
the edge off the charges the
White House was biased in
favor of Pakistan.
A second and more Impor-
tant gain from the revelation
has to do with information
about -the way the govern-
ment works. The secret min-
utes provide detailed, irrefu-
table evidence that daY-to-day
foreign policy is made in the
White House as never before.
. They equally show that top
officials allowed themselves
to be treated as mere lackeys
by the White House. Some of
them?including such sup-
posed heavyweights as the
chief of naval operations ?
said, and apparently regularly
say, things silly enough to
issue from the mouth of
Bertie Wooster.
? Then there is the matter of
truth-telling. According to the
minutes in cpk.ty. odcryt
son, Hen gs c
f7
WIMR.
meeting of officials on Dec.
3 that. "he (the President)
wants to tilt in favor of Paki-
stan."
On Dec. 7, in a background
session with reporters subse-
quently released by Sen. Bar-
ry Goldwater, Dr. Kissinger
said: "There have been some
comments that the adminis-
tration is anti-Indian. This is
totally inaccurate."
Seen thus starkly, Dr. Kis-
singer told a flat lie. My im-
pression is that, taken in the
larger context, his remarks
at the secret conference were
not in such flagrant contra-
diction with his remarks at
the background briefing. Still,
he was plainly trying to ma-
nipulate public opinion.
BUT SO WHAT? Does the
new evidence do more than
suspicion that the depart.'
ments and agencies are full
of crypto-Democrats out to get
the administration?is only
going to be intensified. And
that deep suspicion is going
to yield two sets of adverse
reactions. ?
For one thing, security will ?
be tightened. There is apt to
be an end to th,,- kind of min-
utes that were taken at Dr.
Kissinger's meetings. They
will certainly not be spread
through the bureaucracy any-
more.
Seco:1ply, the limited access
which experienced officials
now have to White House de-
cision-making is going to be
even further curbed. The
President and Dr. Kissinger
are going to keep things to
themselves more than ever.,
Important decisions which are
confirm a universal Judg- even now made with too little
ment? After the U-2 and the /consultation. and with
Bay of Pigs and the credibil- small an input from the
ity gap, is there anybody not
Impossibly naive or ill-inform-
ed who doesn't know that the
government lies? Is one more
bit of evidence a noble act?
Or is it just a pebble added
to the Alps?
Set against these gains,
there is the way the adminis-
tration is apt to react. Maybe
the President and Dr. Kissin-
ger are going to say to them-
selves: "Golly, we sure erred
in not telling the truth and
nothing but the truth. Jack
Anderson has taught us that
honesty is the best policy."
But much more likely, they
are going to feel that the min-
utes of- the meeting were le-
gitimately classified internal
working papers, of the govern-
ment. Probably they are going
to feel that the stuff was leak-
ed not for any large purpose,
but out of opposition to the
policy. And almost certainly?
and I say this as an opponent
of the policy?they will be
right in this surmise.
In
these
circumstances, the
they have in the
world is going to be
even more sharply limited.
Re4easei2001M3404gClA-RDP80
have, of the bureaucracy-7-ft4
limited trust
outside
too
out-
side are going to be made by
an even more narrowly cir-
cumscribed group of men.
No doubt And?rson gets
high marks for his acumen
and industry and courage as
a journalist. But his source,
the man who leaked the stuff,
is something else. Whatever
his motives, he has done this"
country a disservice.
-01601R001100170001-4
:WS ANGELES MALI) EXAKENER
Approved For Release 20at/0310.41931A-RDP80-0160
I t
tato?tc
? could fly five miles high at a
? sileed of 50 m.p.h. and had
a range of at least .250
Bares gins, "Both Powers
and I were spies with ?a lot of
cloak-and-dagger stuff, but
there the similarity ends. He
:was probably taking pictures
,..of Red gaided missile bases
hundreds of miles inside Rus-
sia, while we were parachut-
ing secret agents, supplies
- and leaflets ...into satellite
,
c('lwi nicrica4 1.1-2 pilot,.
Frauds GUry Powers toes
,shot dc on 1390 miles inside
Russia ; 7; May I, 1060, .it cau-.
sed a c Isis between the U.S.
and Pusia? and Premier
Khrushellev?caneellM. a surri
-mit mc ;ting with President
Eisenh; wen But CIA-sponsor-
ed orer flights of Iron Curtain
cauntrie: ' had been taking
Vac& fir at least 10 years, cc-
cordinoVo a Southern Califor-
nia rjs'Ident who began his
Career as au airman with the
Polish lir Force in, 1932),.
By DM. SCITRADER
Hormt".-ai?en'inti- ri Wrilcr
? Ten year.. 'bigore Francis
? Gary Pi?wers' VI was blasted
from the skies orer Russia in
/1960, Polish airman Janucz S.
V Baru was making the first of
Ids 00 spy -flights over Com-
munist-held-Albania, Romania
2.td Bulgaria for the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Bares, '52, now a patriotic
American citizen living in San
Pedro, recalls his four-years
? of 1 r antic hedge-hopping
through the Balkans from a
base in Athens, Greece, with
at shudder.
"We flew 0.0 low around and
Up over :those. mountains' and
bills that my heart still But-
lers when I think. of those ex-
citing, but danger-filled mis-
sions. We ?started out An the
old C-47 which had a top
speed of, 140 m.p.h. and later
switched to C-54s with a tap
cruising; Speed of 185," he
Powers,fiew a sophisticated
high.winnd . specially-built
Lockheed Aircraft jet . which
-countles. He made $::0,000
year and I made '?521;0. Oh,
there was one more s'arniarity
?we both carried 'poison kits'
to be used if we were about
to be ? captured. Powers 'ob-
viously never used his end I
was never forced to seriously
consider using mine."
But this Is not to say Bares
Communists openea up with
all the artillery and machine
.t.:us they could muster.. We
tnok scores of hits., and one of
our two engines was knocked
out. It 'was a miracle we got
out alive. My radiri was dead
so I? ,threw . the radio code
books into the Adriatic along
with the stuff we had to drop.
Two Russian Migs circled
above Us as we hugged the
water and made for -Brindisi,
Italy. ?
' "I did a foolish thing which
no spy 'should ever do. I found
the radio was working again
so I se.lt an nncoded message
describing our circumstances.
The iklfr,s crave up the chase
at Briztais'i, but the Italians
put us in jail. Two ham's later
a U.S. IAir Force plane ar-
and his
tour-man crew didn't rived and we were released.
have some close calls. He re- Three ci,a'Yz later we had re-
calls, "An Albania turned [to Athens ? via Rome
n agent wa
.c.11eti 'The Old Man' almost and we never saw the old man
succeeded in doing
again, thank God." - ?
us-in. It
was in 19;33 and we had para-,, The reason Bares and his.
chute d this old man four crow Made ' only 90 over-
times into the wilds of Alban- flights in four years is be-
la and his companions were cause they .flew only when
always picked 'Up and execut- there was a full moon- "You
ed but ul,t,, leiltwtralers Cgot IAbmaa71. -a ?nd- . ?irlei rg"ent? thsty,;:ri IL.1,..1. aglulipntd "werfigI
lt.
said, "there's something fun.j .yto'sli 11::seo.zreallsift4hhet-flinyohcigoagnhdt.
i
ily about this. The old man al-
v. ays comes back, doesn't he? you easy .get to be able to
Another thing, he's the. tam& distinguTh 1. h e mountains
est dressed spy I ever saw. He from lb ir shadows." - - ?
wears expensive Italian silk ? Today ? American satellites
suits, silk shirts, diamond whirl nh above Russia and
rings and - parachute boots. the irrl Curtain 'countries
in
nnd we'reahmeorenz id)lreo.priiilnr)ganTamn dtaaiycisngfolioi,c4t.itygesibrlueit Ii;n7a'rthue
peasants. I think the old man the spyI planes did the job.
is a counter-spy.';
Bares sa.,Ys he never flew over
.:1::it thc. ciA, successor to Russia, rut he did know or'-.
?rdz,, warimo. oss, was smart. mer Pollee Air Force airmen
11.-aL knewzics 1ery, 3.cn,tlatnalihi jashinneersarinpgera. .Bw1h41,:e
casti overa and
Hungary
n dtile t
Baltic a lite
iic
iti.:t.F17:,sob-10 s asafil)1:er Sates. it.c.s:m,, s0 In of
11czte;as:edlInhennefovrisia.
"During my four-year tour
the old man said his right
left band. I 'guess they. be- shot clovvii over Bulgaria with
Za.:31 h7;15 1.1'2:1 111:'1;Ted ailii 11.6 : td1(1:41-..:,)lenis:ti.se:roilka ittil?hlienrecarzirwiir'nae.s-
lieved him because we flew
wtx. hitting the key with' his ear's, '
The Communists
into almost a fatal trap set biaPPorentlY
'him. We were scheduled /to e-r fOr one of our sPY P:arie3-
drop our stuff in a. boxed-in _T.,h??' so-called Bucharest 1 TbI) -6
valley ? and the only way in 1--iicir"3 possibly could
was -ar., a river, , . , - taced to our activities, but
- '",'Illen we were a half mite nobodl, in the CIA confided in
from drop-down, the Albanian 'us aside frora assigning our
? ? missions. ?
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4
aoutinusa
THE ECOIICCIST
Approved For Release ic10317064Th. CIA-RDP80701
A traffic of spies
SPY TI1ADI-.7
By E. H. Cookridoe.
.1-todder end Stoughton. 288 pages.
? ?
CENLEN : SPY OF THE CENTW1Y
By E. H. Cookridgo.
Hodder and Stoughton. 424 pages.
The beauty of spies is in the eye of
the beholder. Mine are fine, Until
they get caught. Yours are black-
guards ; or so, at least, governments
and spy trial judges conventionally
pretend. In the eyes of most of us
spies are ?remote outsiders' though
worth a second glance should you ever
surely recognise one. And Mr Cook-
ridge. observes in the opening chapter
aof " Spy Trade " that it is not only
the richly ornamental spy of'' fiction
who excites pleasurable , curiosity.
How it happens that many a " real
life " spy has been able to turn profit-
-able publicist instead of having to
? languish in jail ? for as long as his
.captors had originally intended he
-should, is amply explained in " Spy
Trade." - The author discusses over a
.score of postwar cases of governments
bartering captive foreign agents
against their own incarcerated men.
For in the end, it seems, no govern-
ment is quite so beastly as to disown
altogether a man who has supplied it
with valuable intelligence; however dis-
reputable he may have been made to
look subsequently.
? A ?delicate matter in'these exchanges
is the comparative worth of the
hostages. available. When equally big
fish are' not at. hand several small fry
have the good luck to be thrown in
to balance the scales. Mr Cookridge
devotes seven of his i chapters to the
intricate circumstances in which
/..Moscow exploited the windfall of Mr
.Gary Powers. and' the U-2 shot down
Over Siberia to effect the ? release in
February, 196; of Colonel Rudolf.
Ivanbvich Abel, the highly competent.
Soviet spy in the United States, who
had been sent to prison for. 30 years.
Among other comparable cases con- .
sidered by
til"111411-
Messrs Grevilregifjrifilnand or on
Getelen (left) in Nazi days
Lonsdale, the Krogers and Mr Gerald
Brooke, and Mr Alfred Frenzel, (a
l'inealtime-minded Bundestag deputy
who had sold defence secrets to the
'Warsaw Pact coUntries) and the com-
paratively insignificant west German
archaeologist, h-au Martina KiSchke.
The book is aptly illustrated with 4o
photographs. ??e? ?
Like the rest Of us, spies tare mostly
weird birds, variously impelled by 'the
exigencies not only of mating, feed-
ing 'and drinking (preferably the hard
stuff) but also by patriotism, religious
or political '? belief, some personal
grievance 'against society, or, above all;
by the desire to be somebody different
and . important. Even- the fabulously
competent and studiedly aloof General
Gehlen displays in his recently pub-
lished autobiography an undignified
itch to play to the gallery, not merely
for the lolly. ?that a knowledgeable
agent (literary) can rake from the
international market but also for
personal vindication in the face of
latter-day disparagement.
Mr Cookridge, perhaps in deference..
to his publishers, calls his other book
Gehlen Spy of the Century.". But
in fact Reinhard Gehlen himself
never crossed a frontier to .spy Out'
the nakedness, of the land' of military
apparel. General Gehlen controlled a
far-reaching network. of agents' and
shrewdly fitted their bits and pieces
of information in to a coherent picture.
co-or c mator o inte igence or tae;
Wehrmacht on the eastern front. (It?
Was not his fault that Hitler dis-
regarded unpleasant news.) In.L'avaria,
after the war, Gchlen put :his exper-
ience and knoWledge at the disposal
of the west, first the United States,
. and then the Federal German
Republic. As head of the Federal
.Intelligence Service he tapped sources
, invaluable information from-
Ple rival east German Democratic
Republic, especially in the days when
it was expanding much of its " People's
Police " into- a " People's Army
tutored by Soviet officers. In March,
1968, Gehlen was the first to .predict,
on the strength of contacts in the
Soviet Union, that Moscow would dis-
place the Dubcek regithe in Prague by
force. Eventually he came hi for heavy
public esiticism for high-handed ways
and undiscriminating choice of staff,
including some former SS officers and
such costly double agents as Heinz
? It s in all a fascinating story and
Mr dookridge tells it well. The text
is adequately documented. But there
are a. few mildly irritating mistakes.
Herr Bran*, for instance, spells his
first name Willy not Willi. And there
cannot have. been a rendezvous at
Milestone toy on the autobahn ; there
are only kilometre posts.
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Near he orgamsei an
.1311.L T Ufa E'L AiICA1T
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?
_ . .
tr'dI
. kki_r. 67,p0-,s2A-.7,43
D.. 11 T 9 (
STATINTL
What did "master spy" Rudolf Abel, who c
last week in Moscow, spy upon during his
years in America? He dretv a whopping y3O-
sentence, twice the penalty imposed, on pa
Greenglasa for betraying (for ',300) the inform
secret of the A-Bomb, the lens-trigger. r. a ?
SBut Abel's harvest was never detailed dur
his trial, except that it had to do with Snopp
around "military secrets." When the FBI mud
n on him he was living in a cheap New York 2
Street hotel with a lot of radio receiving e u
\I meat. It did not seem quite elaborate enough for a
"master s,py." Yet the CIA dhector, Allen Dulles,
said at the time of Abel's conviction, "I wish we .
had three or four like him in Moscow." .
? . The FBI was pretty certain that he was a full
colonel in the KGB, the Soviet Union's secret
police, and that during World War 111th might
have infiltrated circles clOse.to Hitler. Abel was a
, . superior linguist. -- He could even speak
' Brooklyne.se by the time he wascenailed. .
, . .
AT THE TIME of his apprehension and. trial.
the Russians announced that they had never heard
1 ' of the man, But three years after Abel returned to
Moscow ?:--- having been swapped for our airborne
spy, Francis Gary Powers ? he was lauded in '
Pravda by none other than the KGB director. And .
in 1036 the popular Soviet magazine "Young Cora-
munist" had, a big- spread on him. It praised his
''courage, valor and boundless devotion," and
even quoted him on his perilous profession:
- "Intelligence work is not a series of rip
roaring adventures, a string of? tricks or an en
tertaining .trip abroad. It is, above' all, arcittous
painstaking work that calls for an intense effort
. perseverance, stamina, fortitude, will power
. serious knowledge, and great mastery."
- - He may have been building himself up. Spying
against the U. S. is something like spying el
-Times Square. As the last citadel of the free press
.we relieve a spy of most of traditional chores. We
. print or televise or expose in scientific journals
, just about everything any foreign power wants to
know about us. We give it away before a spy can
- teal it, generally. '' ????.. ? ? - - .i - ? -
WIIETIIER ABEL was all that he was cracked
. up to be will never be known nor \vitt he have the
?
lied satisfaction now that he is dead, of reading his
nine -memoirs-and learning ti?bra him just what it was
-ear that he spied on. He personally couldn't have seen
vid mach from -that. frowsy, hotel room, 'though, of
ost course, it might have been the KGB's. hotline- ter-
Inn
lal in this county. :
ing, When we gave him up in 106?2 to get .baek Gary
ing Powers it was said in WaShington that it t,'as a
led bad deal as trading a 20-game winner for. a bat.
8th by. Abel, by, that time, was labeled "master
i -
spy, credentials not quite clear. PoWers?waS, a
plane.jockey, albeit an unusual one. ife worked:far
the CIA. and his job was to get into a U-2 in a
friendly country, fly it very high over the
restricted airspace of the Soviet Union and, work-
ing from a pie-set plan, take pictures, record
military messages, and sniff out radioactive par-
ticles and positions of heat-producing installation,
? such as steel plants. One camera alone cost $.1.
million.
He was shot .down C3,000 feet over Sverdlovsk
by what must have been one of the earlier
versions of the SAM, the air-te-ground missile that
was launched extensively from North Vietnam
bases during the U.S. bombing of the North.
ABEL WAS GIVEN a: medal for whatever it
was he did for his bosses. Powers was given the
boot out of the CIA flying job, returneci to test-fly
for Lockheed, which bailt the high-flying plane, in
a restricted plant known to the employes as the
"Skunk Works," and finally drifted off to write a
. Isola He wouldn't urge that you think of it as your
- life's work. ? .
The actual swap of the "master spy"ei and the
, pathetic pilot ? who had served two years of his
,
10-year sentence by a military tribunal ? was
something right out of ."The Spy Who Came In
From The Colds" Under guard, they walked to the
middle of a bridge linking East Berlin with West
Berlin. It was a fog-shrouded day. Dialogue was
Unnecessary. Curiously, the mechanics of the deal
had been arranged by Abel's' trial lawyer, Jim
Donovan, and he?was present at the exchange. ?
Now Abel is gone, without telling us what he
stole. It must have bemuSed hint, as he died, to
?relize that despite all that talk, you CAN take it
with
?
? . . you. , 7 , .
. .?
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STATI NTL
SHLNTQU P..c.)
3 - Approved For Release 2001iyiK: R D P8 0 -01
?
? .? , ? '
.? ?
? :":" By Jean R. Halley
-:?.i,icrashingeon Post Staff Writer
- ?,
COL. Rudolf Ivanoviel
Abel, at one time the Soviet
Union's master spy in this
'country, reportedly has died
- of lung cancer in Russia. He
was 6'8.
Col. Abel, who posed as a
:struggling artist in a small
? studio in Brooklyn in the
j1950s, was exchanged in 1962
for American U-2 pilot Fran-
Gary Powers, "
The Soviet -spy, who
headed his country's 'espio-
:nage network in the United
..States for nine years before
his arrest in a New York
hotel room in 1957, had been
sentenced to 30 years in
prison.
.Sentencing of the nondes-
cript, bald and slightly built
Russian followed a dramatic
,trial in the Brooklyn Fed-
eral District court house
jUst "across the street from
his cluttered $35-a-month
, photographic and art studio.
? "While he turned out a few
paintings, his time was
'spent mostly in finding out
national defense data of this
country and inicrolihning it.
, The microfilm was then hid-
den in hollowed, out coins;
bolts, pencils and blocks of
Wood. His studio also con-:
tamed short-wave receivers
-capable of picking up radio
messages from Moscow.
, ? 'Col. :Abel, who slipped
. into the United States ille-
, gally from Canada in 1948,
? Used the name of Emil R.
Goldfus during his years in
:this country. He was ex-
posed when an assistant,
Reino Hayhanen, defected
and told. American authori-
ties about hirn after being
ordered back to Moscow.
The principal charges
against Col. Abel included
? conspiracy to transmit at-
comic and military informa-
tion to his country, which he
- gathered through a system
of codes; secret drops and
..couriers.
. But even during his trial,
? few specifies were given on
:the information he was
alleged to have transmitted.
listened without emotion
,to ,the proceedings, some-
-times with akraatiupii1A.
life admittedftpRmvem
?;charge?that he had entered
?this country illegally.
_ ? '
Associated Press
. .
COL. RUDOLF IVANOVICII ABEL
? - - - . ? ' '
?
He was finally convieted.
on the testimony" of Hayha-;
nen and the evidence of the
equipment. found in his stu-
dio.
? Col. Abel had served four
years and eight months of
his 30-year sentence, when-
he was exchanged for Pow-
ers, who had been shot
down in ,the American U-2
spy plane over. the Soviet
Union in 1950. . ."
The secret and heavily'
guarded exchange took
place at " the Glienicke
Bridge between East Ger-
many and West Berlin. Pow-
ers had served 18 months of
the 10-year sentence - ha-
posed on him by the Rus-?
sians. He reportedly now. is
-a traffic, reporter observing
freeway congestion from a
plane in Los Angeles. .
For many years after Col.
:Abel's arrest, the Soviet
t
-
to Russia, he 'was awarded
the Order of Lenin, that
country's highest civilian
award, for his "outstanding
service" as an intelligence
agent for 30 years.
And in 1969, he appeared
In East Berlin for a cere-
mony renaming a street for
Richard Sorge, considered
Russia's most valuable war-
time spy,- who was executed
by the Japanese in 1943
Born in St. Petersburg
-(now Leningrad), Col. Abel
was the son of a factory
worker. His father eventu-
ally was arrested for his rev-
olutionary :activities and ex-
iled to the Far North.
After, serving in the
Army, Col. Abel was dis-
charged in 1925,...When he
was given job offers from a
Union denied any knowl_ radiO research institute and
ForAefleasRi,n0111q3704a1VyR040-00 R0011001700014
four years ,a er is re urn gen T.,,
Of foreign languages and
? had a knowledge of radio
? communications.
"My comrades argued that
I should employ icy knowl-
, "edge of foreign languages to
serve the country," he once
said. "Finally, I made up ray
mind and started working
for the Soviet intelligence
service on May 2, 1927."
"Clean hands, a cool head,
and a- warm heart," was his
description of a good intelli-
gence agent. . ,
Approved Fpr Release 2001/%3M :1g14-RDP8CW.6%
GEN. PHILIP !-) .t.noNp- .
P. G. Strcnig,
709 c Gener-df
In Marines
Retired Marine Corps Brig.
Gen. Philip G. Str,ong; 70, a ca-
reer intelligence:Officer, died
of cancer yesterday at Metro-
politan Hospital after an ill-
ness of several months. .
Gen. Strong served in naval
intelligence during World War
II, and after the war in senior
positions with the Central In-
telligence Agency for almost
15 years.
?? During World War II, he
served for more' than two
.years as chief intelligence offi-
cer to the admiral who com-
manded the battleships of the
U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Following the war, he held
an executive post in intelli-
gence with the State Depart-
ment where he developed an
interest in scientific intel-
ligence, which he later ex-
panded on during his career in
the CIA.
? ?
According to information
provided by his family Gen.
Strong was early involved in.
work that led to development
of the - U-2 reconnaissance. air-
'craft.
On retirement, he was
awarded CIA's intelligence
medal of merit. He afterwards
served as a consultant for the
General Electric Corp.
In 1946, he married the for-
mer Margot Berglind of Goth-
enburg, Sweden. They moved
to Hartland, Vt., following his
retirement in 1957 but her
long illness made it necessary
for them to return here. She
died in 1970.
Gen. Strong is survived by
two daughters, Margot Sem
ler, of Washington, and Har-
riet Barlow, of Chevy Chase; a
brother, Benjamin, former
head of the United States
Trust. Co. in New York; two
sisters, . Katherine Osborne
and Elizabeth Watters, and
five grandchildren..
V !in! UN IL
V
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1/
? STATINTL
WASHINGTON St.i1AR
Approved For Release 2001/0)3?041VCIWRDP80-01601R
'I' erirL, 1 h St?.._)in
h ? -- h
F.-511 -.---, [-----, I TI ,--,,,, 0 ,,,,, il e.,-,
. . I. :-_-0,4,1,:.%,. ..2.: - - n .._.)
p t:;;I `1, l..)!?'?;:4 l ) b y ti V
. - Brig. Gen. Philp G. Strong,
71, U.S. Marine Corps?Reserve,
retired, a career intelligence of-
ficer who Was involved in the
development of U2 reconnais-
sance aircraft, died of cancer
yesterday at Metropolitan Hospi-
tal. He lived at 2500 Q St. NW. ?
Gen. Strong was an intelli-
gence specialist for the State
? Department and the Central In-
telligence Agency.
During World War II, he? was
chief intelligence officer for the
'commander of U.S. battleships
in the Pacific for two years.
. Gen. Strong was commis-
sioned. in 1926, after attending
Princeton University and spent
a year on active duty as a cap-
tainU
During the wi,)r, he returned to
?
active duty, serving in the office
of naval. intelligence. His duties
included supplying intelligence
for the battleships in 10 major
campaigns in the Pacific, 2,7
air-sea actions and two major
fleet battles. ?
. Headed Unit .
Later he was assistant chief of
staff in the intelligence section
at the 'San Diego Marine base. In
1946, Gen. Strong went on inac-
tive duty and became head of
the intelligence acquisition and
distribution division in the office
of _special assistant for intelli-
gence to the Secretary of State.
At the State Department in
1350, Gen. Strong helped to write
a report, "Science and Foreign
Relations,'! which recommended
creation of posts for scientists as
overseas attaches to spur inter-
national scientific inquiry and
exchange of scientific data.
. In 1950, Gen. Strong was trans-
ferred to the CIA, where he held
senior positions until he retired
in 1064. ?
While at the CIA, be was in-
volved in . the innovative con-
cepts of revolutionary
ciao
- recon-
BRIG. GEN., PHILIP STRONG
naissance \vehicles, Which led to
the development of the U2 spy
planes.
Gen. -Strong was married to
the former Margot Berglind of
Sweden, who died a year ago..
In his career Gen-. Strong col-
lected books . and articles on in-
telligence, which he ? gave . to
Princeton University'. Another
collection went to George Wash-
ington University.
Gen. Strong received many'
decorations and awards, includ-
ing the Legion of Merit and the
CIA 'S Intelligence Medal of Mei-
He leaves two daughters, Mrs..
Margot Semler of Washington
and Mrs. Harriet Barlow of
Chevy Chase; a brother, Benja-
min, of New York; two sisters,
Mrs. Katherine Osborne of Sara-
sota, Fla., and Mrs.Elizabeth
Watters of Scottsdale, Atiz., and
five grandchildren.
Services will be held Tuesday
at 1 p.m. at the Ft: Myer Chap-
el, with burial in Arlington Cem-
etery. -? .:?. ? ? .
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CM CAC 0 Tit BWI)11
7 N OV 1971
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- (----,1 0
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4.9 ;.!.. s:,../1,...) .. .. .-....!:, ...
. - Ji.
WASHING-TON, Nov. C?Some of my
be-St fri.ends are spies. ?
I was talking to on the other day
who was complaining that moot Ameri-
cans seem to -fitinl: t,hat we don't 11?..;;CI
any undercover agents, altho it is all
:fight for the other side [sides) to have
plenty el them. . . . .
There is a' little bit of truth in what
itile spy says. Everybody knows that'we
have the Central Intelligence Agency
.becaus.e_ it gots blamed for everything
" that goes wrong in the spy business.
The spy-in-the-shy case in which Gary
. POWCTS got shot down in his high-flying
?. / 1J-2 airplane is perhaps the best known
' case, but the CIA also tool: the rap for
the ill-fated invasion of Cuba which was
to unseat Fidel Castro.
-But the CIA is not really all that big
and RS jab gets compounded heel-also
many, if not most, of the ether govern-
ment. bureaus which do business over-
seas
- like to .tahe individual his at
- spying. This includes _the Federal Elu-
rep or Investigation with agents plant-
ed everywhere?from among revolution-
any groups to Barth Day rallies.
At the last demonstration .against the
;--iif'-2)
- ?
White ITorie policies On Viet Nara, it
rather small affair as .demonstrations
go, it WaS noticed by this reporter that
an awful let of the people mingling with
. the demonstrators didn't really look the
part. Investigation disclosed they were
from the CL1FA)P.:13 Office., Secret Service,
Internal Revenue Service, United States
Marshal's Ofilce, or the Bureau of Far.-
- cotics, to name a few., '
Not too many years ago, we learned
of .t?t diplomatic trip to Russia by an
American [who shall not be named]
who took along a group loaded with
more gadgets to detect radiation than
.they could carry at one time? One of
the gadgets was shaped like a slightly
oversim fountain pen.
, After we gave up the 11-2 flights over
Russia put not China] the Military de-
veloped cameras for space satellites
that today are launched in secrecy
' from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Cal.,
.
to circle far above foreign nations. The
, detail from these pictures is amazing-
- and helpful.
? . - - -
But this sort of thing is never talked
about in more' conventional places of
American government, especially not at
the State Department. There is a cer-
tath disdain shown toward spies and
spying at state, a trait shared by diplo-
rests of many Western nations.
So it was with interest that I listened
when another spy-told me how Villiam
Rogers, secretary of state, had played
a key role .in helping Egypt purge ,its
nation of CommuniF.4 spies.
The story the spy told us ,was that
Rogers had been equipped with a wrist
watch that could detect electronic
eavesdropping equipment. This makes
sense because there are any member of .
minute .electronic devices that could be
detected by a watch of this kind.?
E. is also on public rbcord that East
Europeans had indeed been e.:pellod
front Egypt for planting listening de-
vices in a variety of official meeting
places.
In any event, Rogers' watch was sup-
posed to have sounded a signal during a
private meeting with President Amvar
Sadat that they were under electronic
surveillance. Sadat, of course, heard
the buzzing. I asked Rogers the other -
night if the story was true. ?
.The secretary grinned and said he
had heard the same story.
"But," 'he insisted, "it.: just isn't
true." it's getting so you can't _even
trust spies any more.
STATI NTL
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'BIB BATMAD 0a.:31.-MTER
Approved For Release 20310)3/04 : CIA-RDIRWIIVIZI1
-/-7.1
? ,
,--ln i',Iir-
_..A ...-)1:::::)Uf...?1.
--- --7.-,--::::7:-_--.--. -L-1:::;::--;:,-;:::--:--.7--.,..-:-.?::::?.-_,:::,--7------1:,-'- 1
u
i.
!?] 4%-1
s..%;
cUlates the length of the re-
rileinihg life-span Of foreign
personalities who interest the
, United States. Its doctors saY.
(PIEltitF,-*NOIM,- an internationally known exert on espionage, (escri-? . they do not bother with lead-
beS subversive w:d.- --:-- the ultimate Weai)on ? in his book `IlintoxicatiOn" ing American fiLrures.: that is
(Editions l''ayarcl). It is il do'cUment, a first-hand mo.moire., .. In, it, he, ti ices l'alse on the 'face of it because .
the development of the. great cOntempbrary affiiirs Ana eVokes. little-kr:Orli it is. the latter who determine '
? facets of tile 1939-1945 world conflict and the subversive, revolutioii.ai..y, .eVnybo'dy's future. .
? , kleolog,leal cold. war that his changed the. face of the 'world Since 1945 ... -As for the private lives and .
, Here are passages 1i-in his chapter on the Unita}, State's Central Intellige- financial affairs :of these per-
nee Agency ? C.I.A.). . . . sonalitie.,:., the C.I,A.'s leadim.4
' evaluated. in terms of nurn.bers:; -,- '
IPzal exnerts accaunt.i,lits and
- The .C.I.A.'.s. hcadquar.ters is The results Of these v)aee
onicers often know ino-
. . ?sl-Ap,/,. . . -.....N.V..?R.1.-(116 it 1;e(Lilt.':'lelan their - colleaDies hi
Sheltered horn the curious in a .eYes:. into film and the
translated i . C.I.A.'s
125-acre uark at Langley, ' Vii - tree. recordinr,s, graphs and
. . . -. I the subject's homeland. '
I i,l'ill'arP,4 allr'v- the dirc-'orq Th2. C.I.A. decla.res ?soire)
ginia, twehty 'Minutes by car..s.--- -. --? ''' " ? ? ' -". '.- 2 , . . , ' A very sel&ct company of so-
,./;.., 0.000 permanent employees .
to ci?unt Soviet missiles sto, ,
? froin the White House.. /fifer;
,I.,.?r and sonic Writers have out tli;e, .ciptogists, econo.mists, historia-
ed a_t Sireiallcsk,- or to dc .. -
zintion .has assumed that the anti SUNIC ?NILLCLJ IliPilf IlL.H. LH,' fl, ,geographers, . financiers.'
President of the United .StateS,:n1ir.e' t'lle advanca state of t:19 total at 60,000 -- divided mor'ri political experts and enii;re's
...funs the secret Services. him- next Chinese nuclear; experi- .or less equally between the intcr?Pret ar enoiiricitils. mass Of
'Sel.`, (!) and is is close to the ment, or to hear Moscow's or ?'biocks" \vho oPerate under ?information collected on each
oier user . of it.,... serviz.'es, the.- tlers:to it. sub'Inarines crui.,:ing cover. and the -white's" `?chb- aritag,bnistie, neutral 'or allied
agon hadqUarers
Pent, joint et '
i along Florida's coast, or to cliek in at Lanciley and its state.
Of ;the. American General Staff follow the countdown of- Soyuz.-
branelizs CVery day and cannot' ?
and the US, Department of rocket "Nurilber' X" at Baiko- conceal themselves,
beience, ? . tour in the farthest re ---?
., , . aches of : -"BLACE."" agents get data
The C,I,A ? directer, head . the. Soviet Union .as easily as it its 'source ..overSeaS under i
)f.. American secret war:are, they can cheek the pro,_fress of .cove.r as tourist, journalists,
espionage -activity. and sui3ver, t:-.-.,ii- u.v..1 Apjlo -fityn,?i.-?, v., bus.Inessnien or diplomats.
Ion' in ?foreign . Countries, is at Cape -Kennedy.. All inst:intlA
. These are the real 'secret
,ss,ist.N.1 by t W O. other men: the -
agents. The "WIfIT1'.lS" I:loin'.
' biers of. the Intellfg,ene Divi- I
- '
. i
.. ? A SliCROT . "AR-MIT"
de a tcelinulo$,.1,m3 'clike ,-,.::
I,On .-and .Plans Divigicn, and t s openly reoorted that
researchers, scientist's, , el-ie-
.:cid ? knoWs what .Combinatiop . -
,. -the American secret service is
; mists, roctallurg?ists, T ma the-
.4. .
f 1 -nd ?ec.s orthot,- -
?)1 '1 ? ,? ' ?en an-I.*, o iti i 1.
. maticians, biologists, 'electri-
,. . ,all and robots!
' - SPYING I'.. Lux-uhY ' scinds of me.n. That is plainly .
Ci I' el Cie LT 0 niCS experts,
OF. ? ELEcTrz.,0N.,,Q.. ., : an exageration: but it WOUld .
i
graphers, doctors, fores-
Th
no directors --I sur- be less so if the venal foreigh .11hoto
- ? .
7oundod by luxury and calm, hi agents on the manthly payroll ters, dieteticians and even
lieir Langley office, dressed and freelance spies were coml.. ?
:.And this is no joke... Going'
h.irt-SICCV es .and 'slippers if led' ? ??
I ike their ea..e ? can eX 'WHO CAN. say how many . even fart'ner: The A f: rican8: ,
-alone?; and the Sc.viets morecver hav'e-':;?
they..like their ease can ex- ate Work in Indoe'nina
Ploit the labours of the -Natio- It:Would he well blow . the been .eS:perlincliting in thouglii.::.
?nal .Aeronautics and .Space mark if scientific and indust.-? transn-!issicn, and what has Ill-
Administration and its -satelli- rial workers who conceive ancV hi-cc; through of the first
re
r,ults could shake the most ra-
tes carrying out .patrols'. for build the esoienage machinery':Richard Halmes
tonal. mind...,
Ahem. in the. str'atos'pherer.,' at. were cOuntcd.
the new C.I.A. boss. ? /
40,00.0 nines an hetit:, the Mi.:" Spying and commterrspionage. , . . . t . . . ' _
das II . detecting missiles, 7 the. have become vital industries . HOW ?CI-OS.13 ici DEATH? Being, the most . eXoensivelv
. .
Samos se.ries. and othi-r .sys- and electronic values. are the : But it is c.C.rtainly the Medi- paid .r:- t' ? odd 11' -n - -
I i tie N , .ley 'tip,a
..,- .
t,ms la'kincr photographs.' To 'workhorss of Wail Street, thel cal servic'e which is the Agen- ' - ?
- qualified enough to Coh_hich.
mar roW, the orhitting :spae6 New. York Stock EXchange.. 1 cys 'tint garde . Amon o- its -
'_ 'Here is What this counti.v ?,vi."0.
. ..._ ?? .
stations will 1)Alarkrit.ved For Rel'eatie2061t01/02th'f'..ear-Ruvuu--01buTROD1100110001b4circiirosta;ices".
' 'only catecmry wnicn can . be!
, 1
? Approved For Release
This is f1 manwho EJE? 1 ? 1.
leaked the Pentagon
5ers that tell The
2001/0 -/85-i
? Top ;Secret history of deei- ? 171 r
sion-Making in -the Vietnam \ 1
war Di7 Daniel Ellsberg
? ? - -
veteran .of Vietnain and Pentagon combat, is.
'lean, intense, athletic, attractiveto woMen
'and brilliant. Why did this 4O-year-old?nar-
tvard:-Cambridge-MIT intellectual, thusias-
tic Marine. Corps _officer, Rand Corp. an?_ly st
an.d Defense Department planner expose these
When you turned yourself in, you said you had inade the
,Pentagon papers public di' a responsible American cititien.
'Really, the'essential question we wa,nt .abola
rl.at is the moral responsibility of the citi;:xn who thias
he sees his government doing evil?
? '1 was in a dual position. Eike every American, I
had a feeling of obligation to the Constitution and
' to my fellow citizens. At the same time, 1 was a re-
k'archor through most of this periq,. doing consult-
. . Ing for the Government, and someone whose reflexes
in terms of loyalcy.had been set by 12 to 15 years of
service to the Executive branch-15 yeats would
- include the three years with the Marine Corps.
: ? I question the identification of the state or the
Government with the.Executive Branch or with the
President. All the members of the Executive Branch
? ? are the creatures of one elected representative of the
- ' people, the President: When you look at the entire
Executive- Bianch, you confront this enormous
structure of somewhat conflicting institutions in
which .only one man has been elected by the peo-
ple. The effects of this are very-great.
In the early sixties, before I ever got on the
. subject ofYietnarn, I was granted interagency access
at a very high level to study the decision.-making
process in crises like the Cuban missile crisis, Suez,
Skybolt; U-2 and so forth. In fact, the arrangements
for,. that study were sec up by Walt Rostow, who was
than head of the Policy Planning- C9uncil of the
State Department,
I was at Rand and Was brought to Washington
? as the sole researcher for .what was to be a year's
study. That 'study exposed to me the importance of
time Ptesident in every one of these crises, the pecu-
liar, Very 'powerful influence of the President's per-
sonal judgment and personal preconceptions. -
This Conflicts with another view of the decision
process in Government ,which says that the president,
although he may look powerful, is given surprising)),
little leeway by the bureaucratic agencies under him,
in which to influence policy, that he has to fight for
influence, to connive, to maneuver, in order to have
any impact whatever.. ' . . ?
STATINTL
-RDP80-01601
c assi.aec ciocuments.
? .!1 -??? /' to the world? Since
he did, their pUblica- ?
tion has becoine the most sea-.
?
sational story of the year. The
Nixon Administration tried to
,halt publication, starting a battle in which
the Supi:einc Court refused to stop the nation's
press from making the papers public. In this
so] f-revcalin t interview with LOOK'S l'oreip
'Editor J. Robert Moskin, Dr. 1.7,11sberg. explains )
. why he risked prison to try to end the war.
? - Its a position that's very plausible from within
the system. The bureaucrat gets a sense that presi-
dential policy reflects the success of one or 'another
agency in tying his hands. He doesn't have a sense of
presidential initiative and power.
The most startling thing to me Was to discover
,how critical timePresident's role had been, that if his
hands were tied at all, it. was because he chose to
cooperate in having his position forced by one pses-
Sure or another. ?
Was this the expiTienee of just one President, say, Kennedy?
Oh., no. This related very. Much to Eisenhower
and others. Remember the clear-cut lies by the
Executive relating to the shooting down of the U-2
Eight over Russia in 1969? Remember that first they
described the pine as haying been a weather plane
off course. Then Khrushchev revealed that thy not
only had parts of the plane but they had the pilot
alive. After which the President himself took respon-
sibility for the U-2 plane and admitted that It had
been a spy reconnaissance flight. Ile was very much
criticized for having, admitted this, which demolished
the. summit conference scheduled right afterward.
? Most Americans assumed! that Eisenhower had
.not known of the flight, certainly in detail. I think
most people believed this on two grounds: that
there's, a lot that goes on that no President knows
about In detail and that Eisenhower knew even less
.than most President:s because he was always on the
golf course. ?
? In the Course of doing this.study, I looked into
the U-2 crisis. quite closely and finally went to the
.man who was. in charge of the U-2 progm.m. from.
beginning to end, who had left the CIA at that point.
He said that President Eisenhower went over the
flight plan. of every U-2 flight over Russia in the
greatest detail, which usually occupied no less than
four or five hours. lie said that for every. flighi of the
. ? 11-2 over Russia, he brought the detailed flight plans
. ? wite the full schedule to the White House for Prcsi-.
.clent Eisenhower, and in no.ciise did Eisenhower .fail
to make some modifications in the flight plan.
? He said the questions that President Eisenhower.
Approved For Release 2001/0 014ft)CIALFTP8fp&ItW1R9011b0V0001-4
jective assignee to tne It an to weigh it co,.:71-t '1'iiOErCi
?.
STATINTL
'KM rA,9,Y.i..r.(rOr-f.- 1.-L11;\:..1;.3 11.11ICK1
Approved For .Release 2001/03/04 PCIA-RDP80-01601
9. 110
0 6 " %ch ?
i i :1-F ri[1rTO...
.1
t (U
UL
ONE OF TILE 01,1MST 'PRACTICES
world is the exchange of rich gifts when one head
of state visits another. Right now, somebody in the
State Department's p'otocol .division -- probably
Bus Mosbacher himself -- is shopping for just .the
right baubles for President Nixon to press upon
Chou ri\lao Tse-tung and Lin Pine when' he
visits.them in Peking. The Foreign (devil) Office
of the Peoples Republic of. China is engaged in the
same pursuit.
? _ ?
?
? There has been an understanding sincq about
the time Cleopatra called on Julius Caesar and
presented him with, among other gifts, a son, that
the loot belongs to the individuals concerned, not
their respective states. In our times, tins has
enabled oup former . presidents ? to fill
-,their museums and libraries with treasures of.
? great value. The gifts President Nixon receives in
Peking vil( be viewed -- perhaps with wonder -- -
by future gene:,ations of sightseers -trudging
through his museum.
sometimes wonder whatever became .of .the
fibre-glass lake -boat which thc., State Department
bought for President Eisenhowsr. to present to
Nikita Nimuschev in the spring of 1.'?30. It was. to;
be Used in the pl.casanl stretch of water near
Nikita argeyevich's dacha about f.?) miles out of.
Moscow. But something happened on May .1,
. . something called a 13-2 spy plane piloted by
CIA pliot Francis Gary Powers. A Soviet ground-
to-air missile winged it at c3,CCO feet over
Sverdlovsk_ laruselte).? canceled his invitation to
Ike to visit him, The Slate Department- was left.,
holding the bag. Or, rather, the boat.. .
In view of. subsequent events, maybe -it's a -
ferry on the Styx.
When Vice President Nixon visited Klauschev
in 7959 he presented filmt with an expensive inter-
continental radio. Khruschev gave Nixon a
-shotgun, for Unexplained reasons.
11o
r- I :11 ra ?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4
STATI NTL
? STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04;: CIAIRDP80-01601
_2 1 SEP 1971
If
'47'4 P r!,.
d
. . .
?
%I:20A .
fi r! ? v
r
if
ZO-') lb] i! ? '"1.1
Hti p ?
ivwcd
Plans of Mizsirirr,,,
and Sanclio,:led S?-qt
'-? NEW YORK (UPI).?
. ?
President Dwight D.
Eisenhower personally re-
viewed the flight plan of
all U-2 spy missions over .
the Soviet Union and it
was -he. v.ho decided ;-the
ill-fated flight of Francis
Gary Powers was "worth
the risk," Daniel Elkberg
said Monday. ?
Elkberg, the former De-
fense Department analyst
:who leaked the Pentagon
papers ? on he -Vietnam
war to 1.7?-le press, said in an
interview in Look maga-
zine that he learned of
Gen. Eisenho?,,,?er'-s person-
al involvement in the U-2
? flights when preparing an
early study. of the deci-
sion --making process in
crises,
? The shooting down of -
.Powers' U -2 reconnais-
sance plane by the Pus-
sinus in ION shortly he.
fore a planned. summit
conference. between Can.
'Eisenhower and then So-
viet Premier Nikita S.
Xhrushchev strained. U.S.-
Soviet, relations apd.
prompted Mr. -.Khrushchcv
to cancel the conference.
? "M o t Americans
is-
? that Eisenhower
had not known of the
flight, certainly in detail,"
? Ellsberg said.
But, Ellsberg said, in the
course of hiz--; study )10
learned differently from
"the man \r,dio Was in
charge of the II-2 program
? from. beginning to end,
who had left the CIA at
that point."
"Ile said that President
Eisenhower went over the
flight :plan of every U-2
flight over Pussia in the
greatest detail, which
usually _occupied_ no 1cs3
than four or five hours.
"He said the question?
that President. J...isenhow-
cc asked forced 'him to jus-
tify every reconnaissancc
objectie assigned to the
flight and to weigh it
against: the precise mar-.
ginal risks on each leg of
the flight.? ?
"In fact, he said that on
the specific flight where
Powers was shot down,
? they were weld, aware that
there were. SAMs (surface-
to-air missiles). in that
area that were becoming.
opera.tional.
"There was already a
risk, and. they had to ba-
lance hat leg of the flight
against, the desirability of
covet?ing those objectives,"
Ellsbei:g said. "President
Eisenhower made. the de-
cision that it was worth
the
Approved For Release-2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001100176001-4
Approved For Release 2uu-TRAI114 C1AL-RDP8
- 9 SEP 1971
? STATIN L
11'11
Y1,-03
kicb 0
.a..
. o
. . A .
fi-75-il fi , -.,,r, 71, yq . 0,..3 1, \ f I.] t I
.- --,04,-.----A ? -IA
U)4-PJ. Jj..A11. \..?]..0., .;, CU LI.L.....1).,i.J, Lt.
? .
NEW YORK, Sept. 8 [Rene
tersl-a-The remarkable per-
formance of spy'-in-the-sky sat-
ellites and a "tacit understand-
ing" by the governments of the
-United States . and the Soviet
Union not to interfere with
them could be a major factor
in preserving- the peace, an ex-
pert on the subject has report-
ed.
There even were two occa-
sions in a one-year. span when
the information from recon-
naissance satellites saved the
peace, according to Philip J.
Klass, an avionics editor of
the magazine Aviation Week
and Space Technology.
Product of Think Tank
Klass gives the first detailed
study of the .history and ability
of reconnaissance satellites in
the book,. "Secret Sentries in
Space" [Random House, ?
p.0.33.?
According to Klas the first
concept of .spy-in-the-sky satel-
lites stems from a report by
the Rand Corp., ?the Air
Force's think-tank?in 1046. The
technology to actually build
the satellites was created when
Bell Labs invented the transis-
tor in 1048.
All that was needed were
rockets big enough to launch
the satellites and the will to do
so. During , the Eisenhower
years many government offi-
cials . believed Space was' a
"frivolous" diversion and gave
little- credence to the possibili-
ty it could have military im-
portance.'' ? _ ? : Foreign Minister Andrei Gro-
p delicate balance the satellite
.13alloons Landed in Russia myko during a .- Washington have given ave given the two big powers.
The first attempt at aerial meeting. This, he believes,
ie
may have .contriuted to' the Ones He fact the Russians
surveillance during the post- Russian backdown on Berlin. probably have killer satellites
war period came in the late the that can knock dos American
'40s when the 'LT. 8. launched Later that - year dining
satellites. That NVOUld end tue.
h i g h -altitude bEtE0011S Nvith Cuban crisis the Russians may
"understanding." :
have again backed down, be- -
Klass also thinks it's possible
cameras attached to them cause of satellites, in this case
near the s
soviet border.
The their own. They may have had to someday make laser beams
cameras did not ?work verypowerful they could. be
pictures :that showed the U. S. iso
well and
balloons lav,r,,i `111,'n1Ths'siYc,,, " n 1" ",'mg
2 04103/1A
61 R0b1100170001-4
? i could create "death rays"--a
prompting complaints from the Cuba and was capable of using '
t' i Buck Rogers concept he. be-
Russians. . .it. . 1 iir,vps -ig lin lonlrfo.r romnIolp .
?
In the late '50s, NV11-011 the. Klass writes there are proba-
Soviets appeared to have taken, lay two kinds of satellites.
the lead in intercontinental They are those that drop pack-
[ICBM] and intermediate ages of film Irons orbit for .air-
range ballistics missiles craft pickup, and that use tele-
[IRBM] [the so-called "missile vision to scan the pictures and
gap"), tI-2 high altitude air- transmit them' to earth later.
craft .gave the U. S. the first Newer satellites are hooked
"hard" look at what the Rus- into communications satellite
beamS to speed up delivery of
sians were up to. So diq R13-47 the television pictures.
jets flying around the' Russian
borders.. New One Launched'
Klass says tlie U. S. is now
But when the Russians shot' reducing .the fourth genera-
down U-2 and an RB-47 the
U. S. was left with no way to
find out exactly what the Rus-
sians had developed; Klass
writes.
By this time work on spy
.satellites waS beginning to
bear fruit.
Then, in 1061., .during the
height of the Berlin crisis, the
t i on satellite, called- "Big
Bird." It weights 12 tons- and
will remain in orbit several
months. One was launched re-
cently. .
? Ho says cameras aboard the.
newer satellites may.be able to -
!pick out objects several inches
wide, use infrared for taking
pictures at night, use zoom ?
first hint the U. S. was using
the satellites came in a column 'rises' and have special radar
c a in eras for shooting thru
by. Joseph ? Alsop?probably
Pentagon "leak," Klass writes lclouds.
--that stated that the U. S. A fifth generation satellite I
now thought the number of now planned could give "real
(CiT,Is the Russians had were time" information, meaning.
only a quarter of previous esti-
television pictures of exactly
what the satellite sees as the
.?
mates.
satellite sees it.
I Learned They Had 11
Elder Satellites,?Feared. ,
Klass says the U. S. found There are also early warning
out some time later exactly satellites parked in ? orbit--
how many the Russians ? bad probably over the Indian
[141. . Ocean?watching for missile
He speculates Prsident'John launches from the two Russian
launch sites at Plesetsle or
F. Kennedy may have let the
Russians know about the satel- TYuratam.
lite by actually showing pie- Klass sees two clouds on the
tures taken by the satellites to horizon that could- change the
? Approved For Release 20111,1113104rt 01AIRDP80-01
? no. 19 1971
? tTATI NT
"...AIth31.I;It IhIs elttire f.erin or eis- rivalries .,to be: stire, 61 once. the deci-
. .. ._ . . .. .._ ...
cnsslom vins "C the. the, r.eco?.1", c2c sio.hs arc.rcaehed at the top they are
slthject of
Si -for thIs pnrik..)-- carried out with the monolithic tone or
lar meeting. %vas especiany 'senst1ye
'rid tubject to the preriotls!y zn- - state power. ? .
rotms-ed resty;ctieTs." The..intellitence cbmmunity-now
?C. Do.egIe.s D:lIon ''. plays an expended and critical role in
By The ilf'Zi.n GYelvi.) creating and administering the real;
. ?
stuff of American foreign policy. CIA
, The Central. Intelligence Agency is . Director Richard Helms presides over a,
*one .of the few governmental agencies U.S. Intelligence Board which links the
%whose public image has actually im- secret services of all government agen-:
/proved as a result of the publication of cies, including the FBI. In the White
j the Pentagon japers. Despite diselo- House, Henry Kissinger presides over
sums. of "The Agency's" role in assassi- an expanded National Security Council
'nations, sabotage, and coup d'etat's structUre which "further centralizes
consciously intended to subvert i'Mehta- covert foreign policy planning. It is here
tional law, A meric.a's secret agentry that the contingency plans are cooked.
has actually emerged in some quarters up and the "options" 'so carefully
:with the veneration due prophets, or at 'worked out. It is in these closed chant-
leas.t the:respect. du'e its s?o.agcsted effi- .bers, and strangelovian "situation
ciency and accuracy. . ? rooms" that plans affecting the lives of
Virtually every newspaper editor, not millions are formulated for subsequent
to mention Daniel Ellsberg, himself,. h,as execution by a myt;iad of U.S. con-
heaped praise on the CIA for the aceu- trolled agencies and agents.
'racy. of its estimates detailing the U.S. . Jncreasinnly, these schemes rely' on
defeat in Vietnarn..Time and agltin, the covert tactics whose full raianii'ig is se-
Agency's "level headed professional- .dom perceived by the people affected -:---
ism" has been contrasted 'with the esca-? be they Americans or people of foreign
lation-ovei-kill orientation of the Penta- countries. The old empires, with, their
t,
'ocin or the President's advisors. The colonial. administrators- and civilizing _
. -.
. 4 ?editor of the Christian Science Monitor mission have given way to the more ' CIA manip- ulations. ? /
- even called upon policy makers to.con- subtle craftsman Ol intervention. Their Richard Bissell, the man who led the ?s/
:suit the CIA more, calling it a "re- manipulations take place- in' the front Council discussion that night, Was well
markably accurate source or informa- rooms of neo-colonial institutions and egelpped to talk no the CIA. A or
'tion." But such backhanded praise for the parlors of dependent third world. time Yale professor and currently an
Conspirator's confuses public under- elites. In this world of r6alpolitik,--ap-
executive of the United Aircraf Corpo-
,Standing of the important and closely Dearances are Often purposely deceptive t . .
' ration, Bissell served as the CIA's Dep-
integrated role which Inc CIA plays in ancl politIcal stances inc-en Director un
tionally mis-
ladvancing the Pax Americana on a leading. The U.S. agnT,ression in Viet- uty- til he ?"resigned in the
''
;global scale.. - nam, lest'anyone forget, began as-a wake 1961 invasion of
' of the abortive
.. Cuba. The blue-ribbon group to
For atiy, tie Pentagon Papers -covert invOlvement largely engineered. .which
m
provided a- first peek into the inner by the CIA. Similar covert interven- enee exoerts including Robert Amory,.
he- spoke included-a number of inte'llig-
'sanctum of foreirm policy making. As - tions now underwayelscwh Jr another forme Deputy Director
ere in the
the government's attempt to suppress world may be fueling' tomorrow's Viet-, arid-the ,,,
.,:. r ,
the study illustrttes, the people are not n ioams. . collr,:tidte erC:;dI A ehiet hc,,rf:t, ,niesc?srblock.in It c,
n )latInl is) r
. , .. _
.suppos,-d. to have access .to the 'real . It is for: this reason that the Africa'Arae lcn.
plans of their novernment. On close nese :Arch Group, an indepe ndent rad i--? ---wans.irnei-paor.tte:sriP i0t?e1:01Zh i
a TheI ol c. Zsrl c:n
osf cocr
inspection, what emerges is not an "inv- cal research collective, is now tnaking
international banker Douglas Dillon to
-isible government" but an indivisible 'public Major excerpts from a document
system in which each agency offers its which offers an informed insider's view
own specialized input, and is delegated of the 'secretworkings of the American . _
its own slice of responsibility. Coordi- intelligance apparatus abroad. Never *1 he complete text of the document will
nated inter-departmental agencies work .. intended for publication, it was made be available fOr SI in late-
October from
out the division of imperial labor. There ? available to the Group which will pub_ Africa 3
ca Research Group, P.O. Box. 21,
are disagrApproved ForaR4leilsei20.01/93/04>:tOIAADR80-4116ocilkbbitcifiThkdi.4
-sym,L6,17.00
!cm
Approved For Release 2001/Oa/Vs. p167-RDP8VM0A
r
of U.S. aircraft in Florida and the Amer-
ican task . force assembled in the Ca-
ribbean.- "What role, if any, Russian sat-
ellite pictures played in , convincing
Kremlin leaders that the U.S. was pre-
pared to go the limit," Klass writes,
"probably is known only to a few Rus-
sian leaders."
The ..author concludes that "the au-
tomatonS-in-orbit, adolescent as their
performance was at that stage, had kept
the to . giant thermonuclear powers
from bombing into World War III at
least once, perhaps twice." , Another
round of reconnaissance dueling came
last year over the Middle East, when
U.S. satellite pictures confirmed that
U.S. MR FORCE
SATELLITE LAUNCHING
ESPIONAGE
The Spies Above
/ If a U-2 overflight could once pro-
yoke crisis, as the Francis Gary Powers
incident did in 1960, the elaborately pre-
cise spy satellite systems of the U.S.
and Soviet 'Union a decade later have
created and enforced a de facto "open
skies" policy between the two super-
powers. Today such satellites slide
through space like disembodied eyes re-
cording an astonishing variety of in-
formation. Just over a month ago, for
example, the Pentagon revealed that the
latest Soviet SS-9 ICI3M ground tubes
-are exactly 20 ft. in diameter.
Neither country, naturally, is very
talkative about its espionage system. But
in a new book, Secret Sentries in Space
r (Random House; $7.95), Philip J. Klass,
senior avionics editor of Aviation Week
& Space Technology, offers a first, fas-
cinating look at the space hardware that
has, so far, contributed to global stabil-
ity. By allowing the two major nuclear
powers to examine one another's military
installations in exact detail, the satellites
have considerably diminished the danger
of war throughmiscalculation.
Florida Force. During the 1961 Ber-
lin crisis, the "first generation" of Dis-
coverer satellites was aloft, and John
Kennedy was able to show Soviet For-
eign Minister Andrei Gromyko pho-
tographs indicating exactly how few
ICBMs the Soviets really had. "I be-
lieve," says Klass, "that after Gromyko
saw those pictures he persuaded Khru-
shchev to back down." ,
Similarly, Klass writes, "the President
entered the Cuban missile crisis with a
very precise inventory of Soviet stra-
tegic missile ail o 111
to U.S. satelli, xrogovkibikiMe
s. r sc
time, the Soviets undoubtedly used their
Cosmos satellites to watch the buildup
RECOVERING CAPSULE
Also for poppy fields.
the Soviets and Egyptians had moved
missiles into the cease-fire zone, in vi-
olation of the cease-fire agreement,
Klass submitted proofs of his book
to the CIA and the Pentagon; they ob-
jected tO its publication but made no
ILOVC to stop it. No one else has writ-i
ten in comparable detail about spy sat-
ellites. Klass describes; for example, the
nation's latest SAM05,(satellite and mis-
sile. observation system); "the Big Bird,"
launched just two months ago. A giant,
twelve-ton spacecraft capable of working
aloft for at least several months, the
Big Bird combines the capabilities of sev-
eral earlier satellites, It can transmit
high-quality pictures by radio, and eject
capsules of exposed film which then
drop by parachute. The Big Bird also in-
. _
tration
Klass reports, is behind the Urals in Cen-
tral Asia and in Siberia.
Narcotics Film. Besides sniffing out
weaponry, spy satellites provide a va-
riety of data for civilian use?in geo-
logical studies, for example, or even
narcotics control. Color firm pictures of
the poppy fields of Southeast Asia and
elsewhere, taken from satellites, have
been projected at the White House.
When President Nixon referred recently
to international control of narcotics, he
had in mind the U.S. capability to
point out the exact locations of the
world's poppy fields.
In the past 18 months, the Soviets
have moved one step ahead of the U.S.
They have devised a killer satellite that
can track, inspect and blow up another
satellite aloft. The situation is not un-
like that in the James Bond epic You
Only Live Twice. The U.S. is still de-
veloping such a destroyer, and the pos-
sibilities are ominous. Should one side
decide to knock out the other's spies,
Klass concludes, "it will turn space into
a battleground, precipitate a still more
costly arms race and return the world
to the perilous days of the .late 1950s."
STATI NTL
i0eAritO ?0, tigg4.7emp, -o 601R001100170001-4
an
ice and snow to locate Soviet under-
ground weapons, The heaviest concen-
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.,.?o
REPORT FROM 'CUBA 3 . By JAMES HIGGINS ?
'. -- HAVANA-- "From April 19,
?! 1961,, up to the present," said the
,. .young man from Cuba's Ministry of
e Foreign Relations, "we have publicly
i? announced 87 separate aggressions
against our cottntry by the CIA." He
emphasized the "publicly."
He said that Cubans had been
,I very . interested in .the information
, which the Pentagon Papers had pro-
vided to the people of the US.
.' "Partly," he added, -'because we
e are sure that the people in your coun-
try do not yet know that for 10 years,
. ever since the Day of Pigs invasion,
Whicb We defeated, there has been
:.consistent espionage, sabotage, infil,-
' tration. and -raids conducted by the
' CIA against Cuba!! . .
I .asked if he were certain that all
Were the work of the CIA. .I reminded
;him that there were Several thousand
, Cuban exiles in the US and that a
. number of them, especially those of
the Alpha 66 organization insisted
.t.h.ey were operating on their own in
) their efforts to penetrate Cuba.
....."Well," he said, "if there were
several hundred thousand North
Americans in Cuba,- and if some of
: these were not only openly declaring
their intent to invade but also, from
tittle. -to time, sneaking ashore with
: guns, . aminunition and explosive
i 'equipment, you would assume that
all this.could not happen without the
.cooperation?of agencies of the Cuban
government," ?
e ? And, he went on, if, in addition,
official' Cuban government planes,
. : such as US ?U-2s .and SR.71s were
, flying along tire US coast and photo-
graphing US territory, it would be
- hard not to conclude that the nation
" which did this had had intentiOns
STAT I NTL
- .
lritevan [C@ g lin grd:
upon your territory and sovereignty.
"Leto me give," he said, "a few
specifics from a document we pub-
lished about a year ago." HQ quoted:-
"1?On June 13, 1961, a CIA craft
based in the US attacked and sank a
Cuban ship to the north of Isabela de
Saglia"
"2?In May of 1965 members of
a network of CIA agents who: were
sending secret information to the US
through the Guantanamo Naval Base
were captured in Camaguey
"3?On Dec. 29, 1967, a light plane
proceeding from Homestead, Fla.,
was. shot .down here. The pilot, US
ditizen Everett D. Jackson, was'
captured. He had air-dropped arms
and espionage equipment in the
northern part of. Las Villas Prov-
ince:"
"4--On Sept.. 12, 1969, counter-
revolutionary agent Jose Antonio
Quesada Fernandez landed in Oriente
Province.' He was, captured with War
material and espionage equipment
found on him. He was tried by a rev-
olutionary court, convicted and exe-
cuted:"
?-"5--On April 17, 1970, a group of
mercenaries proceeding from the US
and armed with the latest weapons
used by the US Army landed near
Baracoa in Oriente Province: The
group was .put out of action. Some
were captured, others killed."
He said that two years ago a CIA
spy had been detected- here in the
Mexican Embassy where, in the guise
of a diplomatic officer, he attempted.
to cover his efforts to gain informa-
tion from highly placed Cubans and
to comMunicate reports by radio to'
the CIA as well as sendingwritten
Messages and photographs. "Every-
thing the spy Humberto Carillo?Colon '
did. was intercepted by our counter-
intelligence authorities," he said,
"and most of the documentation was
published, including the instructions
he had received to pretend he was
writing a book about `The Men
Around Castro," one of the stated ob-
jectives being to try and find out Who'.
might lead a faction against Fidel."
Perhaps in time ;to come, he said,
from CIA or other US government
files, it will become clear that a long;
caniyaign of secret aggression ? se-
.ret from the US people but not from
us ? has been waged against Cuba.
He said. that he thought it was even ,
possible the US p'eciple did not know
of their ?government's interference
with Cuban trade, using such meth-
-ods as Pressure upon other govern- ,
ments and private companies to pre- :
vent Cuba from selling nickel, for ex- ,
ample, or from haying machinery,
tools and spare parts. ? ? A
"We regard the haven and sup-
Tort the US government gives to Cu-']
bans with have left their cOuntry," he
added, "as, similar. to the. policy the
uS govefnment has followed up to
lately ? toward the-Chiang Kai-shek
elements. on Taiwan, a US ? Protector- :
ate for more than 20 years. These ele-
ments have, it is now admitted, been
iaiding and penetrating the Chinese
mainland, just as, Cuban -e)dle ele-
ments have been doing- here. The
only difference is that now the US-
sponsored activities against the 'Pee-
ples Republic of China are becoming
public knowledge. Presumably this ,
means they will stop, Of. course that
is a guess. We don't know?" -
NEXT: If .a student is bad, he goes
to the head of the line..
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1971
Pao
Into Chhuz.
Said Halted
,
By Michael Getler
washing;top. Post Staff Writer
The Nixon administrati on.
has -ordered a -halt to the cis-
patching of special CIA-sup-.1
Etiorted teams of .Laotian:'
tribesmen into China on re-.
eonnaissance patrols' from.
bases in northern Laos, ac-
cording to well informed dip-
lomatic sources.
These patrols-L-which some.:
times range 200 'miles inside
China's Yunnan Province on.
road-watching, telephone-tap-
ping missions----have been
going on for a number of?
years, and their existence wasi
known to the Peking regime. I
Nevertheless, in a recent ac-
tion designed to avoid any pos-
sible incident which could!
sour
U.S. relations with Pe-
king before President Nixon's:
forthcoming trip to the
Chinese mainland. the forays
have been halted, according to .
official sources here. .
,Some sources also suggest:
that the intelligence value of
these- operations may also
have decreased somewhat.
Although no Americans go
on these patrols, the Laotian
bill tribesmen who carry them
out are recruited, trained and
equipped by the CIA, and the
staging area for the patrols is
a CIA outpost in northern
Laos.
The Laotians are native to
the border region, and the in-
telligence-gathering operation
.took advantage of the -normal
movements back and forth of
those bill people. ?
While the White House, CIA
and the U.S. embassy in Vien-i
Cane have never commented:
on or confirmed these activi-I
'tics?which reportedly (late
back to the Johnson adminis-i
tliation?the patrols have been: ?
mentioned in numerous press
reports by C.S. correspondents.
In Laos.. i
STATI NTL
Inlate 1970 'and early this.:
year, articles by Michael Mor-
? row of Dispatch News Service}
InIernational described the re-1
connaissance operations in
considerable detail. ?
As recently as June 27, Ar-
nold Abrams of The Philadel-
phia Bulletin reported that
the raids were still being car-
ried out despite the onset Of
Ping Pong Diplomacy.
The order to 'stop these pa-
trols, according to informed
sources, came 1,?ery recently.
Presidential aide Henry Kis-
nger's secret trip to Peking
was made July 9 to II.
In another move relating to
the forthcoming Nixon visit, a
press report last week, citing
administrative sources, said
the United States had sus-
pended- flights over Commu-
nist China by high-flying SR-
71 spy planes and unmanned
reconnaissance drones. This.
concession was also depicted
as a move designed to avoid
any incident which could in-
terfere with the President's
journey,
. However, well placed de-
fense and intelligence, , offi-
cials, asked about the reported
suspension, said privately that
to the best of their knowledge
there had never been any SR-
71 flights Over the Chinese
mainland.
Officials say there was a
suspension of the unmanned
drone flights some months
ago, partly for diplomatic rea-
sons and partly because of
technical problems and the
vulnerability of these drones
4to Communist gunners. At
least two of the drones were
shot down since late in 1969,
one over the mainland and
one over Hainan Island.
There have been flights of
the older-vintage 13-2 spy
plane over mainland China
carried out by the Nationalist
Chinese, but officials hint that
these flights, too, have not
been scheduled for about a
year.
The United States for some
time has relied On satellites
for photographic coverage of
goings-on inside China. The
SR-71s based in Asia, sources
say, are' used primarily for
flights over North E.orea. .
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. ?
.651616
For the time being, we're going to stop sending
3pi'-in-the-sky planes OVerPlC Peoples Republic of
china, formerly Red China. We don't want to risk
The chance of having one of our latter-day Fra?eis
Cary Powers shot down over Peking while Presi-
lent Nixon is on his any to tea with Chou Eu-lot.
Whether we'll request or 9 demand that fhb
Nationalist Chinese follow suit has not yet been
leaked, Rut the chances are that we'll lake care of
that, too. We gave Chiang Nai-Shek's forces their
U-2 spy planes, taught his pilots how to use them,
and asked only that they keep a peeled- eye on
Mainland China.
?
It would be relatively simple to knock that off
until further notice, just as --- in massive mor-
tification ?.President Eisenhower cancelled out
U-2 flights over the Soviet Union in lice wake of thq
shoot:do,,vn of POWCF.,7, Ehruslichev's angry pro-
teSs, and the State Department's clumsy at-
tempt 'to fob oft a hoax to the . effect that
? Powers' U-2 Miff, a wnther plane that had been
blown off course.
"4/13! ji
SI'VING ON CliN13, will not be suspended
completely during the period of' the new rapport.
Our inquisitive satellites will continue to criss-
cross the .tvorld's 31,10A 1 ,,Dpill01.1S a, lion night and
day, taking pictures, sniffing out nuclear tests and
producflen, keeping tabs on steel production,
counling missile installations and bombers parked
; on rautva:;s, and watching for unusual Dloveinents
of huge armed forces. '
, Russia's :pony satellites will be attending to the
;same flabbergasting chores at the same time. In
:addition, they will also ? be checking over every
part of the U.S., and ours vill be zipping over the
groat land mass of rli:! Soviet Union.
But the adirAlstration has decided wisely that
It wouldn't be cricket to continue our spying from
within the Eat th's atmosphere. Spying from space
is different, as. any UN diplomat can explain at
-great length. It is silfreuent principally because
ribbody yet has coma up with a- sure-fire way to
knock down the other fellow's orbiting robot spies.
The Russians amply proved when they knocked
down Powers front U.Ci(l0 feet over Sverdlovsk,
even the best of spy planes operating in the at-
mosPhere with a guy at the wheel can be knocked
out.
11..E1,:3:: LEEN 1,11iC.i.V with our spying on
? China from manned planes. II-2 pilots who. have
been shot down have been Nationalist Chinese. So
have the .unmanned .planes the mainland gun bat-
teries have claimed --- remote. control drones that
zip across the Straits of Formosa, cross over into
China, take a few pictures, and try to zip home,
We've been using a super version of the old
UAWN the SRAUQN which has a top speed. three
times that of -sound. This is the plane that will now
be grounded voluntarily to avoid a foul-up in the
Peking talks.
We'll probably put it to work elsewhere, but not
over the Soviet Union. We still give Cuba a regular
'Iookasee from on high, just. to make certain Castro
isn't stashing any missiles or moving his guns too
close to the wire fence at Guantanamo.
7111: 1/AVOC RAISF,D Py the shecting down of
Francis Gary Powers is still unnerving, even after
a Japanese of It years. The incident gave. Nikita
Ehrushchev the sledgehammer he necded to break
up a summit conference in Paris attended by
himself, President Eisenhower, ChEtrles De Gaulle
and Harold Mac:million.
Khrushchev's dressing down of Eisenhower at
the Elysee Palace was the most humiliating mo-
ment ill the President's life. The Soviet Premier's
news cenference. the following-. day in Paris
sounded for a time like a declaration of war.
The scheduled Eisenhower trip to the Soviet -
-Union -- returning Khrushchev's U.S. visit to the:
year before -- was 3:evoked. It had promised to be
the high point of his life as Chief Executive. It was
planned for him to make half a dozen major
speeches to the Soviet people. They had been
written for him and, in the opinion of one of the.
" writers, Dr. Kevin McCann, could have brought
about:a fine relationship between the world's two
great powers. Dr. McCann is also sure that the
speeches, which had to be junked, would have
eliminated all chance of the subsequent eyeball-to-
eyeball confrontation and threat of thermonuclear
war during the Cuban missilie crisis of 1992.
So, this time well play it cozier. President
Nixon does not want a fly (or a flier) in his oolong.
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Frucient insu_ranee
President Nixon has much better liaison with the
? military and the Central Intelligence Agency, or more
alert advisers than-his-pi'edecessor President Dwight
? D. Eisenhower. As a. result, he has ordered a suspen-
sion . of SR71 and drone reconnaissance flights over
mainland China. - ?
This is prudent insurance against' an incident which
? E might disrupt' the President's plan to visit Peking
sornelime before next May. The Chinese resent the
;? intrusion of reconnaissance planes into their air space,
just as we would if we were in their place. Most impor-
tant intelligence information can be gained from recon-
naissance satellites anyway.
Perhaps we can never know the true impact on
Russian-U.S. relations of the U2. flight over .Soviet
Russia on May 1, 1960. This reconnaissance plane pilot-
eel by Francis Cary Powers was shot down approxi-
mately 1,200 miles within the Soviet Union. Premier
Nikita. S. Khruslichev refused to participate in the Paris
sumrnit conference scheduled for May 16 unless Presi-
dent Eisenhower apologized for the U2 flight. Eisenhow-
er refused and the summit conference failed;
We assume that the 112 incident contributed to The
downfall of Khrushchev two years later, although Ins
. ?
STATI NTL
performance in the Cuban missile crisis in21962 proba-
bly played a dominant role.
We cannot know what will come from the visit of
Nixon to Peking. But we do know that we should not
invite any incidents that might abort that mission. ?
?
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STATI NTL
?
? M. MI N.11.1ES
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STATINTL
GElOROl. W,' PAL
It has been evident forseme. time
that our Government was seeking tci
detach itself from a China policy con-
gealed in aspic for. the last twenty
years. What no one expected was the:
spectacular means chosen to bring it
about. Presumably the President might
have explored, and with luck devel-
oped; an improved understanding with
Peking by traditional diplomatic
'means. But, hi announcing arrange?,
inents for a personal 'Visit, he quite'
deliberately adopted: what Might be
called ,symbolic diplomacy-Ha form of
international maneuver in which the
chosen method .of diplomatic inter-
change is itself a political act produc-
ing .major consequences regardless of
any .substantive agreement that may
emerge.
.? Though I accept the President's se-
lection of .diplomatic tools as a shrewd
and useful ploy, it may still be profit-
able to speculate as to its far-reaching
Implications. The classical objection to
summit' meetings e is that they raise
expectations which, if: unfulfilled, can
lead to disillusion and even greater
tensions, but, in the Present special
circumstances, the mere announcement
of the projected meeting has already
produced irreversible effects. At the
heart of the President's- calculations
is the hope that those effects.will, on
balance, be- more useful than other-
. ? ' ? '
Wise. ?
? ,By?.his. unexpected actioh he has set
in motion forces that can 'free us from
the, fictions and rigidities' of the past.
On. the 'home front, the irrevocable
effect of the .arinOuncement---ethe fact
that;. ncoinatter what: happens, it has
already 'eroded. our. Unrealistic China
policy?!S instinctively Understood. It
has compelled Americans to' adjust
ovelmight to a new -set -.of. ideas they
Might sttibbornly have resisted if pre-
sea-ted Progressively and - inuiramatical-
ly; To -a publid ;cliseburaE,red by our
?
manifest impotence. ?iii - Indochina, a
demonstration of colorful and incisive
action is a long-;overdne stimulant.
aTTfl ?1 (
Yet if the clement of fatt accompli
Is tonic to the home front, its effect for, given the fact that Japan's Gross
National Product is two and a half
In operationalterms is to limit both
sides' freedom of action. Since Wash- times mainland China's, it would be
no bargain to trade a functioning and Peking have each acquired
their own peculiar vested interests in friendship with a functioning super-
the making of the visit as well as in Power for the chance of a fragile ar-
ena rangement with a potential one.
at least its outward ' success,.
........ _ .
capital roust?in shaping its policies
between now and the meeting--,-factor
in the forces of cOnstraint on the
other side.
During this' Period President Nixon,
will be under pressure. -to Pursue
courses Of action, at the United Na-
tions and elSewhere, calculated not to
provoke Chou En-lai to renounce his
China visit as ,Ign-ushchev used the
U-2 incident in ,1960 to torpedo the
conference with President Eisenhower.
'And,- on its side, Peking, oblivious to
domestic opinion yet sensitive to reac-
tions throughout the world Communist
party structure, long as .it
finds it useful- to keep Moscow off
balanc:e-----tendatp. avoid outrages that
might force Washington to cancel the
visit. ? - ?
-For Our Western friend's and- allies
the announcement has come at a good
time. it is a welcome reassurance of
America's resilience and good sense.
For the Soviet Union it is a blow and,
a worry---which may not be a bad
thing. In India there is anger that Mr.
Kissinger's visit was connived with
Pakistan, while ae shell-shocked Talpei
is apparently scrambling toward great-
er flexibility _and. jmaneuver in an ef-
fort to face up to its alarming pre-
dicament. Since five out of six Japa-
4iese shipping lines have abruptly can-
celed their service to Taiwan, and
American and other foreign companies
are sharply curtailing their direct in-
vestment plans, it requires no special
Oriental insight to read the message
in the entrails and tea leaves.
Ohly in one major capital is therd.
urgent need for diplomatic repair work'
and .that is Tokvo,_ Unable, because'
of the requirements of secrecy, to' in-'
form him in. advance, President Nixon's
announcement left Premier Sato and
his colleagues in a had spot,. Having
pressed Japanese governments for two
decades not to get too close to Peking
but give political and -economic sup-
port to Taiwan, we have suddenly cut
the ground from under .our most loyal
friends. in Japan, just at a time when
our commercial differences are prov-
ing dangerously abrasive.
Unless we act quickly this could
well produce a crisis we cannot afford;
(1'..-ST1
e.,
/ undo, g et
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STATINTL
Tn.)'71T ? -0 ? ?
-
- ?
'
,)
.L...J'
.C) ?
by Milan Mikovsky, one of
the *Justice Department
aides of Attorney General
Robert, F. Kennedy. They
were under orders to get the
Cuban invaders back to the
United States by Christmas
Eve.
Donovan negotiated an
agreement under which the
United States would give
Castro food and medicine
worth $53 million in ex-
change for the prisoners. In
addition, Castro insisted on
getting $2.9 million in cash
which had previously been
offered by Cuban refugee
organizations as payment
for sick and wounded brig-
ade members already re-
leased.
It was during a conversa-
tion that lasted until 1 a.in.
in early April, 1953, that
Castro announced he womd
take Nolan and Donovan to
the Day of Pigs. They left
from Castro's beach home at
Verdadera, on the north side
ot--the island nation, at 5 the
same morning and drove to
the bay on the south shore.
- -
. . .
By Murray Seeger .
,... . Los Antelcr, Timn -
'1 'WALT:MAX, Mass., Aug. 1.
. -
---Two 'years after the Amer-
,
- lean-sponsored inVasion_ of
Cuba, Fidel Castro took .two- .
-.A:inc,?rican lawyers to the
' Day ,of Pigs site and ,dem-
onstrated why it had failed
So disas-tronsly. . . .. ?
. It was April 1963, just
days short of the second an-
-niverstary of the- invasion
which John .F. Kennedy yinEr, , cASTP.0
later acknowledged was one ,- ... explained debacle
of the great mistakes of his ? . .
presidency, and 'Castro was. dinal Cushing, the interview
laying host to -James B. supplies details not pre-
!
jonovan and John F. Nolan-- viously known of the-. ne-
Jr., as, he had several tillICS gotiations with Castro.
in the previous five months.
Wouldn't Square
'
"He'd get out of the car .
Speaking of the mercurial
and ,describe diferent as- .
Cuban leader, Nolan said,
peels Of the battle; where
"M
he was when he got such any of the impressions
and such a message from that we had, and I think
that my impresaions were
the troops-and what he did,
and so on," Nolan recalled about the same as Jim's
a recorded interview (Donovan), would not square
made for the John F. Ken- with the commonly accept-
nedy- Library located in ed image of Castro in the Sampled Swamp .
temporary qu arters in this United States..
?"At one point, there's an.
Boston suburb. "During the tune that we area there which is marshy
This interviee,,, recorded were with him, Castro was land, swamps and - there's
. .. --
pril by
never irrational, n ever only one road that runs.
' in A 1937 Nolan in-
drunk, never dirty," Nolan across it to solid ground,"
Washington, is just one r e cal 1 ed. In his personal Nohm recalled. Castro "got
of the many. revealing new relationships with u-1--; and out, walked off the road and
in connection with the ne- into the marsh to see how
. .
-pieces of history now avail? .
able to researchersat the gotiations, he was always swampy it was.
. --
-: . ? ,., ? reasonable, always easy to "You really ? had a sense
library.' ; ...,... :- deal with. He was a talker of history listening to some-
Effective Monday, .a eiy r the of v ?'' significant
prc)por- one like Castro -describe
..... .
Kennedy Library is-Making; tions. I mean, - he would 'something like the Day of
,c_f {.11( come over at midnight or 1
available 95 -per cent Pigs. And then the feeling
o'clock. in the morning and
"3.3 million documents it has- that in walking out into the
stay all night talking. but:
'relating to the Ke.nnedy ad,. marsh, which was consider-
ministration. A small, ini- , he wasn't a conversationall ed impassable by him and
-tial portion of the docun hog. He;'d ask questions, Es-.
the brigade, if he
?merits ?was opened to.- thei,, ten for viewpoints. He was also by.
easy to talk to, good con- or something
. stepped in the wrong spot
__. . .. , versationalist, hardsell guy; , that he might
:public in October, 1969.
The . Milan intervew is
constantly plugging bis pro.- just disappear beneath the
especially interesting for its
gs, his: government. " ooze and that would be the
ram
idescriptim4 of Castro with end of the whole problem.
whom he and Donovan ne- - Donovan, a New York at "And he sank down and
gotiated for the release of torney NV110 had previously it was up to his boots, but
- the 1,100 survivors of the negotiated the exchange of he got back."
disastrous invasion and 23Castro and Donovan de-
Soviet spy Col. Rudolf Abel
tl. ? American prisoners. for the American U-2 pilot veloped a warm. relationship
Added to 'other recorded held by Russia,?Francis Gary that enabled the hard-drink-
mpaenmtsd ri.nie stheA pi Pst vnr ck, -'_0 c?,t 10sQ W?. ielcf i'n 1, 20111/ -'- 1, 0- .?
11th 01
'retired Gen. Lucius D. Clay view at the library, that his associates could
.and the late, Richard CRY: Nolan was enlisted to help not, Nolan related. . .
Just - before Christmas,
1962, when Castro came to
Havana airport where the
prisoners were waiting for
the ransom goods to arrive,
a flight .of Cuban Mig fight-
ers swooped so low over the
field that the men on the
field had to crouch down.
"Donovan was standing
next to Castro, elbowed him
and said, in his loud voice
that was clearly audible to
me and .other peo ple
around, 'It's the invasion,'
"It seemed to me to be a
very jocular remark to
make. Castro laughed at. it.
And then it seemed to me
that the other people
around, who initially didn't
think it was funny at all,
looked at Castro and saw
his reaction, and they
laughed, too.?
in the April meetings,
held to clean up details of
freeing the 2$ Americans,
including three CIA agents,
Donovan and Castro talked
about improving ?relations
between the United States
anti Cuba.?
"I think Jim (Donovan)
always had his Cyc on this
as a possibility," Nolan said.
"He felt that his maximum
usefulness lay in the direc-
tion of providing that kind
of alternative to American
policy. And I think that
Castro had a similar inter-
est in Donovan _... ."
Nolan gave another ex-
ample of Donovan's manner
with the Cubans, describing
a tense scene when the.
Americans were desperately
trying to get $2.9 million
into a Havana bank before
3 p.m. Christmas eve, 1962.
"Look, Mr. Minister, if
you want to be helpful in
this regard, there's one thing
you can do," Donovan told
the cabinet official who was
driving Nolan to the airport.
"When you get- out there
and that big plane is waiting
to take off for Miami, don't
defect."
In his intervi ew,.-Gen.
Clay recalled ,that he was
summoned to Robert Icon-
most before I knew, I signed
a _note for the $2.9 inMon
STATINTL
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Approved For Release 20000340412c1A-RDP80-01601R0
STATI NTL
\iril r(Til
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One week after the announcement of President
Nixon's trip to the People's Republic of China, the PeMng:
government issued a "serious warning" about the 41,\lth'
military aerial intrusion.
. Now the White IIonse has announced that there will be.
no rrwe flights over China by the SR-71 spy plans. It
seeks to avoid an unpleasant incident.
? However, U.S. reeionnaisance satellites will continue
to conduct military operations over China, as will "pri-
vate'' SR-71s on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency,
and American U-2s flown by Chiang 12:al-Shell airmen.
? The ceremonial pause. in U.S. SR-71 spy flights over
China do not prove Nil.,:bn's peaceful intentions.
- The flights prove that China is an "enemy" target,
that U.S. imperialiS.in is an enemy of People's China, event.
as it is an enemy of the entire socialist world and the
national liberation ? movements. The Chinese leaders'
hostility to the Soviet Union is not enmity to "revision-
ism,". as they assert, but enmity to-the wofld's first social?
ist state.
Security of be People's 1-Z6public of China lies in. the
unity of the socialist world in the first place.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R001100170001-4
Approved For Release 2001
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Missions Suspended to Bar
Interference With Nixon
.. 'nip, Officials Assert
. .
U-2 1.) OWN IN (i? .R E V, LLED
II (I QTY.?. 111)34:(
Reconnaissance Satellites,
Termed Not Provocative,
Ito Continue Surveillance
--.^,
By WILLIAM BEECHER
Sp.edal n Thes.v York VLIes
WASHINGTON, July
Administration officials said to-
day that the United States had
suspended flights over Commu-
nist China by manned SR-7l.
spy 'planes and unmanned le-
connaissance drones to avoid
any incident that might inter-
fere with President Nixon's
:forthcoming visit to Peking.
But,' it was reported, Ameri-
can reconnaissance satellites
:will continue missions over Chi-
na. Such missions are consid-
ered relatively unprovocalive
since they are well above the
.airspace of China,
In 1930, it was recalled, a
planned conference between
.presicint Dwight D. Eisen-
hower and Premier Nikita S.
Kruschev was called, off by the
Soviet Union after an Ameri-
can U-2 spy plane had been.
shot down over Soviet: ter-
ritory.
U-2 planes are flown oyer
the Chinese mainland by Chi-
nese Nationalists from Taiwan,
an official informant said "the
mainland Chinese have good
enough radar to distinguish be-
tween art overflight by the kind
of aircraft we possess and. the
kind flown by the Chinese Na-
tionalists"
t
416
tat: ta-RDP80-01601R
,as much more compelling than
continued intelligence from an
occasional SR-71 or drone mis-
sion. Some sources also noted
that the, suspension conceivably
might be lifted after President
Nixon's visit to China, although
a similar suspension of flights
-over the Soviet 111111011,
tUted after the 1960 U-2 .in-
Cident, remains in effect.
..,,White House officials, in re-
porting July, 16 on Henry 'A.
Kissinger's- conversations in
Peking with Premier Chou En-
lai the Nixon visit, ex-
pressed confidence that neither
nation, "will knowingly do
something that would under-
mine the prospects of something
that it took so long to prepare
and that it took such painful
decisions to reach,"
Satellites Play Key R013
?Although officials were. re-
luctant 'to discuss the specifics
of American intelligence-gather-
ing activities in relation to
China, the following details
have been pieced together from
well-infprmed .sourees:
The bulk of photographic re-
connaissance is done by spy
satellites operating at altitudes
of about 100 miles. Photos
taken from that altitude would
;allow aaalysts to determine,
(say, the type of aircraft sitting
on a- field- but not to read its
wing markings or discern de-
tails or armament.
If a new type of aircraft was?
spotted by a satellite, intel-
ligence- officials could call
an SR-71 mission to get clearer,:
more detailed pictures, Cameras
carried by the Sit-71, which,
flies at an altitude, of about
50,000 feet, reportedly can cap-
ture small details. -
According to time imformants,
a handful of SR-71, operated by
the Air Force, normally fly from
Okinawa. There are additional
SR-7)'s in the Far East, they
say, flown by civilian' pilots
under contract to the Central
-Intelligence Agency.
Because of its 'high altitude
and 'great speed?more than
2,000 miles an hour?the SR-71
is ? not believed vulnerable
either to Chinese surface-to-air
missiles or interceptor aircraft.
,It can provide photographic
coverage of about 611,000 square
miles in an hour.
The U-2, by contrast, has a
. Political Reasons override .maximum altitude of roughly
'/0,000 feet and a top speed of
:Informants said the political about 000 .miles an hour, .
-reasons for the decision to halt
American flights were regarded
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The drone, the Ryan Firebee,
is also used for some recon-
naissance missions. Typically a
C-I 30 "mother -ship" carries
two drones to a point outside
the defenses of mainland China,
where It launches -them. They
fly a predetermined course and
return to a safe point over
water where they are parachut-
ed down and recovered..
Peking has publicly protested
nearly 500 incursions of its air
space by United States aircraft.
The United States also uses
SR-71's and drones over North
Vietnam and North Korea. Be-
sides cameras, the SR-71's also
carry equipment to monitor
and record radar and% radio
transmissions.
?' ?
?
?
1
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MIDDLE: EAST
Flybys and Superspies
Israel celebrated the 23rd birthday of
its potent air force last ..yveek with flow-
ery words and impressive flybys. The
words came from the ?air force com-
mander, General Mordechai Hod: "We
breathe the air of the summit of Mt. Her-
moo, our wings trace the tranquil waters
of Mirfatz Worn? [Sharm el Sheikh]
and the reaches of Sinai, and our jets em-
brace the skies of Jerusalem, which has
become a united whole." Then at Hod's
order came phalanxes of Phantoms, Sky-
hawks, Mirages, Mysteres and Ouragans,
of Sikorsky helicopters and Noratlas,
Dakota and Stratoeruiser transports, and
even of gnatlike Cessnas.
The only disappointing aspect of the
display for Israelis was that it did not in-
clude more of the swift, dangerous U.S.-
die East power balance differently. from
the Israelis, partly. because it considers
the Phantoms a useful lever for mov-
ing Israel into 'a Suez Canal agreement.
The Phantom decision is still, so to
speak, up in the air, but Jerusalem
hopes for some progress when Assistant
Secretary of State Joseph J Sisco makes
a scheduled visit this week. "We don't ex-
pect Sisco to come flying over in a flo-
tilla of Phantoms," says a government
official. "But we do hope that he will
come ?vith words. of encouragement."
Arab Buildup. On the eve of Sisco's
trip, pro-israel politicians in the U.S.
have been spreading alarmist reports
about a significant buildup Of Arab air-
powe,r. The Egyptians, according to
Washington estimates, have received 100
lvtlGs since last September, in addition
to 80 MI-8 troop-carrying helicopters.
Syria has got 30 HiGs, five Sukhoi-7
fighter-bombers and 22 helicopters. All
built Phantoms, the backbone of the together, there are no ,N nearly 600 So-
. air force. Israel has so far received ap-
proximately 85 Phantoms and lost nine
?in sorties over Sinai or in accidents.
Last year it requested another 4.0 or so
to keep its military power on a par
with that of the Arabs.
The Administration has postponed a
decision, partly because it secs the Mid-
poin s discussed when Helms conferred
with officials of Ha'Mossad, or "the In-
stitution," the Israeli equivalent of the
CIA:
Is Soviet-flown MIC-23s, which can fly
at 80,000 ft., an altitude that Phantoms
cannot reach, are conducting intelligence
missions out of Egyptian bases.
Tv,,o electronics-crammed Russian
"listening ships" have been stationed
about 80 miles off the Israeli coast.
I- Soviet radar installed on the ground
in Egypt can monitor air routes over
Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Jordan.
I. Hundreds of Soviet intelligence ex-
perts are at work in Middle East eval-
uation centers in Cairo and Alexandria.
Soviet agents are visiting Israel in in-
creased numbers in the guise of tour-
ists, journalists, European businessmen
and even immigrating Jews.
The Russians are gathering informa-
tion more openly than they once did;
they are ready to risk more in order to
GRAYSMITH-SAli FRANCISCO CHRONICLE
"A fine job of camouflage, comrade ..."
viet-built planes in .the area, some flown learn more. Helms and his hosts ap-
by Soviet pilots.parently came to no firm conclusions
The Administration argues that So- about the objectives of the current So-
viet plane figures look more formidable viet operation. But they did reach some
? than they are. U.S. officials point out decisions, including an Israeli agreement
that while the Arabs have about a 6-to-1 to provide facilities for U-2s and
advantage over Israel in planes, the Is- SR-71_ U.S. spy planes.
raclis have the edge in qualified pilots It will be no surprise if Sisco, fresh
and able ground crews. Egypt lost so from conferences with the National Se-
many pilots in the war of attrition that . curity Council, makes less headway on
after Russian resupply it had four times the diplomatic front. His object is to
as many jets as men to fly them. The Is- probe for possible areas in which U.S.-
raclis fret nonetheless about the grow- sponsored discussions on reopening the
ing, number of aircraft in Arab coun- Suez Canal can be continued.
tries, and there are signs that they will In Cairo last week, State Department
not discuss a Suez agreement until there Middle East Specialists Donald C. Ber-
is some redressing of thebalance. gus and Michael Sterner received assur-
'' Sovief Activity. If the weapons build- ances from President Anwar Sadat that
up is worrisome to Israel, the U.S. has Egypt still wants the canal reopened
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\re
shown concern over a marked buildup of -14iut on its t own teiindts. Sisco ise it iill