SOME QUESTIONS FOR GEN. KY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000900050001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 186
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 22, 1970
• Content Type: NSPR

STATINTL
Approved For Release 20011 4 T J -(RDP80-016
2 2 SEI' iNO
UNLESS he experiences a
:last-minute change of heart,
7 Vice President Nguyen Cao
V Ky of South Vietnam will be
in our midst v,'itlrin the
week, to speak at a far-right
"victory'; rally at the Wash-
ington Monument g rounds.
The rally is sponsored by
the Rev. Car). McIntyre, It
fundamentalist radio pitch-
man who has characterized
the Nixon administration
this year as "soft on com-
munism" and has termed
the President's Victnaniiza-
tiori policy a "sellout." In
Saigon, officials close to
President Thieu are writing
their American friends that
Ky's motives in speaking
here are "to undermine both
.Presidents, Nixon and
Thieu."
If Ky makes himself avail-
able to U.S. journalists, here
is a suggested list of ques-
tions that might. be asked,
all based on material pre-
viously masks public, either,
in the United States or Viet-
namese press:
1. Mr. Vice President,
how do you account for the
$15,000 per week you person-
~l`EIE~' 1 ter 1.~ ?Cs./. (Lh?. Tolle, Y.
' l 'rrJ!`) [ " .1 ~+ ~. ft) ~ l f ''ti t f_ .1..4a 1 '' -
ally receive from the rc-
ceipts of the Saigon race
track? You have told us your
people are fully mobilized
for this war; if that is the
case, just who goes to the
races every day so as to en-
able the track to show a
profit sufficient to pay you?
(In 1957, Ky admitted he was
receiving this money, and
said he used it from time to
time to pay disabled vet-
erans. He had, up to that
time, paid out the total suns
of s(35 for this purpose.)
2. Your protege, Gen. Do
Cao Tri, has been much
praised this year as the
"Tiger of Cambodia" for his
leadership of your, troops
there, What was his final ex-
plan^tion for the package he
sent to Hong Kong earlier
this year which leas unex-
pectedly opened in customs
and found to contain 71 mil-
lion piasters in cash (official
U.S. equivalent: $600;000)?
Why would anyone want to
send that many plasters out
of the country, where they
were practically worthless,
unless to be used illegally-'-
or by the enemy-for pur-
chases back in South Viet-
nam?
3. iltr. Vice President, your
old comrade, Caen. Dang Van
Qilang, is back- in office as
chief of intelligence. When
you and he shared power as
members of the "Military
Revolutionary Council," he
was the commander of IV
Corps until dismissed for
corruption. Did he ever
make restitution for the
money he took from his awn
soldiers?
4. What about your other
colleague from the old days
Of the council, Gen. Cao -%'an
Vien, now the South Viet-
namese chief of staff? Do he
and his wife still leak gov
ernnhen`-owned real estate
to -\n.ericans? Do they still
own boy dello hotels at the
recreation center at Nha-
t rang?
5. Mr. Vice President, why
was your mother-in-law,
Mme. ]loan,., who owns t:
string of "resorts" in Sai-
gon, permitted to be the sole
bidder on a construction
contract at an air base to be
used by the United States?
6. Finally, Mr. Vice Presi-
dent, what about that old
smuggling rap? 'Rack 1;
1901, when the CIA had set
you up as the "conhluander"
of a fictitious airline to fly
South Vietnamese agents
into the North, you were
fired for using the pltsnes to
smuggle opium and gold
from Laos. What ever h;-ip-
pened to the 250 pounds of
gold and the 450 pounds of
opium which were seized?
And your collaborator, Gen.
Loc'-who was fired as is re-
sult of the exposure from
his post as director ene]:att
of customs in Saigon---did
he ever get his old job
back?
These questions may seem
light-hearted, but Gcn. by is
not. 1-Ic has grown rich and
powerful from this war, not
from plundering his own
people--whom he has more
than ? once betrayed--but
ours. He will stand in the
shadow of the monuments
to Lincoln and Washington,
and lecture us on our re-
sponsibilities. Americans, to
our shame,. will applaud
him.
0 1970, Los Angeles Times
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 CHII
SUNCTZ'14pS6I d For Release 2001/03/04: Cl
STATINTL
M -- 541,086
S - 697,966
4 C,
By Morton i:ondt cke
Sun-Times Correspondent
foaled the so-called "amendment to end the Z
' tlrr j H1
11~.:-1 f:
posed a standstill cease-fire as an alternative failed to attract even the 40 votes its spon _ors Assistant Minority Leader Robert Griffin
route to peace in Vietnam, had hoped for as a minimum, (u Micl?
~h_ .e_ . .
)
he
oin.
re
i
th
a- a
---- - .l
qu
- II
e
1 United States to withdraw all its troops from
Indochina by Dec. 31, 1971. The cease-fire
proposal was designed to get the Paris peace
talks out of stalemate,
Both initiatives were billed by their backers
as attempts to exercise congressional lead-
VI-Ship In. foreign policy. The amendment
I n - an emotional closing argument,' a vote of confidence for President Nixon" and
McGovern said, "In one sense, this chamber his Vietnam policies.
literally reeks of blood" because of its failure A CO-sponsor of the measure, Sen. Charles
to curb "the cruelest, the most barbaric, and E, Goodell (R-N.Y.), said the administration
the most nil-advised war in our national his- should take the vote as "a clear warning''
tory." - _ . that opposition to the President's policies is
Drift toward 1-nr:art rule building.
h
ile e x p r e s sing disappointmen*, h1cGovern
sought that end by force of law. The cease- The measure was designed, said A2cGovei it, YY
to arrest the drift to;~,and one-man rule iii ifica t" that Hatfield
had groan from 12 sett-
to President Nixon, the crucial areas of war and peace." '
Ile chardd "We have the ti;ur ators in early May to 39 at the. final vote.
hotly cp?osed t ? , permitted McGovern also claimed that the amend-
The amendment was hotly opposed by the power to slip out,of our hands until it ne " ment "literally kept the nation from ex-
administration. The cease-fire proposal ap- resides behind closed doors at the State D.~- ,
PlOdi
geared to have been worked out with the. Partment, the CIt1;.,.t e Pentagon and tr ei1erenerggg ies this into summer" by diverting strident
White House although its authors, Senators basement of the f ire House." Y lobbying in the aftermath of
iPresid Nixon's sudden decision to send
Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash
) and Hugh Scott E
uall
i
d
.
q
y ag
tate
Sen John Sti
,.enns (R-Pa.), denied it. (D- U.S. troops into Cambodia.
Mass.) said passage of the amendment would Stop all funds
Sen. Charles H. Percy (R-I11
)
who vote,'
.
,
against the amendment but signed the cease-
fire letter, said the administration might pro-
pose the cease-fire in modified form perhaps
altering the "standstill" aspect to permit re-
grouping of troops.
The action came as the Senate completed
Latest Vietnam troop cutback: 10 000 As voted on, the amendment would have
nien, Page 6. cut off all funds for offensive military oper-
They all voted for peace. An editorial, ations in Vietnam after June 30,. 1971 and for
:Page 35. any U.S. military activity in Vietnam after
Dec. 3], 1971.
Stevenson, peace groups assail Smith, A newly added provision would have
;Percy 'no' vote
M
s on
cGovernHatfieldlld th Pid
- aoweeresent to extend deadlines, by
billion military procurement bill and passed- age 60 days on his own initiative, but required
it to the House, 84 to 5. him to get congressional approval for any
further delays.
Before final passage the Senate defeated, "strip the President of the power to be our After the amendment's defeat, Senate Ma-
.71 to 22, an attempt to bar as~ib"iinent of peacemaker." Jority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.)
draftees to Vietna:n and voted down, 87 to 7, He said that if the measure passed, the U. sought to will approval for a new amendment
'an effort to delay aircra"t shipments to Israel. S. should commence full withdrawal "witlrin',expressing Congress' "support" for "a presi-
Earlier action 30 minutes" because "if you strip the Execu- the end policy" leading to full withdrawal by
In earlier action on the bill, the Senate tive Branch of all its discretion, I haven't got the end of 1971,
voted down efforts to curb the anti-ballistic. the heart to tell the boys that there's anything When administration forces won a parlia-
missile program, stop anti-crop chemical worth fighting for."' mentary dispute over the. right to amend
spraying in Vietnam, institute an all-volun- Seven Republicans voted with 32 Democrats Mansfield's proposal and eliminate the dead-
teer army and slash the defense budget from for the. amendment; 34 Republicans and 21 line, Mansfield withdrew it.
$73 billion to $66 billion. - Democrats opposed it. Sen. Ralph. T. Smith The 1,JcGovern-Hatfield forces failed to will
The "end of war" amendment, sponsored (R-111,) voted with the opposition.,
pposition. the support of such Republican moderates as
by Senators George S. McGovern (D-S.D.) Nixon defended George Aiken (Vt.), John Sherman Cooper
and Mark 0. Hatfield (It-Ore.), has been the Minority Leader Scott said President Nixon (Ky.), William Saxbe (Ohio) and Percy who
focus of a half-million-dollar advertising cam- was "de-escalating the war according to plan have participated in previous efforts to exert
paign and extraordinary lobbying by students 'and promise, His credibility is good. The congressional authority in foreign policy,
and various professional groups for foul, American people clearly feel, this is being Percy and Cooper expressed doubt that the
months. done as well as it can be done o o '- amendment would contribute to a negotiated
In the en e ? 2061103/8 i
LCrFbri Ieas3v risQ~IQo,R~IL~ s d~jV R? M?~ dig the w as the most de-
people Ix. ackin t e ga'cries, the amendment who inherited it and who is trying to liquidate
suable means of ending the war.
war" by a 55-to-39 vote, then 14 senators pro-
 STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0
NEWSWEEK
31 Aug 1970
Army court-martial (in Pentagon simulation) : Branding is out but bread-and-water is still a sentence
.~. EP~1~~3f"~&8Y J9l~79C~ ~
idn't you whisper to Yossarian that
fished for, in effect, trying too hard-by
constitutional rights and, above all, al-
D we couldn't punish you?" demands
gunning down civilians in a village long
lowing commanding officers to exert im-
the bloated colonel with the fat mustache
sympathetic to the Viet Cong? Should
proper influence over the proceedings.
in Joseph Heller's "Catch-22."
these fundamental questions even be re-
Many critics, liberals and conservatives
t`Oh, no, sir," replies Air Cadet Clev-
solved in the dusty, parochial confines of
alike, would probably agree with crusad-
' inger. "I whispered to him that you
the court-]partial chamber?
ing attorney Charles Morgan Jr. of the
couldn't find me guilty-"
The search for answers to such ques-
American Civil Liberties Union who says:
"I may be stupid," interrupts the colo-
tions has thrust justice military style un-
"The Uniform Code of Military Justice
nel, "but the distinction escapes me."
der more rigorous scrutiny today than at
is uniform, is a code and is military--and
The distinction-along with the unfor-
a.ny time since World War II. And the
therefore has nothing to do wjth justiice."
tunate Clevinger's quiet contempt for the
new preoccupation with the quality of
Out of. Step: The military argues that
justice meted out by the military-may
military justice has raised the most basic
its system of justice does guarantee the
have eluded the colonel in the Mad Hat-
questions of all. Can an authoritarian in-
essential rights of the accused, and that
ter's world of "Catch-22." But in the soul-
stitution like the armed forces, with its
military tribunals around the globe are
searching climate of 1970, the frailties
martial mission, ever render justice com-
paying ever more attention to the rights
and excesses of military justice have be-
parable to that administered by the ci-
of defendants and the protection of the
come a high-priority concern. Out of Amer-
vilian society? And should civilian Amer-
innocent. Still, the swelling ranks of critics
ica's involvement in a uniquely unpopular
ica expect it to?
contend that the. military is out of step
war has come a series of headlined cases
Grind: Such issues are hardly academ-
with the times, that its traditional pre-
testing the limits of dissent among men-
ic. Today, there are 3.8 million Ameri-
occupation with discipline is depriving
at-arms and, more dramatically, reopen-
cans under arms-the vast majority of
Americans of the due process that is con-
ing the old questions of whether enlisted
them conscripts. Last year alone, the mil-
stitutionally their birthright.
men and officers should be liable to such
it:al?y conducted some 110,000 courts-
The heart of the problem, as critics
civilian charges as murder in dealing
martial under the Uniform Code of Mili-
see it, was defined by no less a military
with "the enemy."
tary Justice. Only a handful of the cases
authority than Dwight David Eisenhow-
The cases have produced an improb-
made headlines; most were prosaic af-
er, who said in I948: "[The Army] was
able set of heroes for both radicals and
fairs (page 21) of consequence only to
never set up to insure justice ... It is set
conservatives. To those on the left, the
the defendants. Still, these proceedings
up as your servant, a servant of the civil-
doctor who refused to train the Green
c.an mean freedom, long incarceration or
ian population of this country to do a
Berets, the draftees who sat down in
death to the men in the clock, and the
particular job ... and that function .. .
the Presidio stockade in a show of defi-
mills of military justice grind exceedingly
demands ... almost a violation of the
ance and the GI's who have picketed
fine: prosecutors regularly run up an eye-
very concepts upon which our govern-
against their Commander in Chief are
catching 94 per cent conviction rate
ment is established." That appraisal is as
symbols of moral courage, spiritual kin to
(compared to 81 per cent in the Federal
true today as it was 22 years ago. A citi-
the Germans who worked to subvert Hit-
courts for civilians).
zen-soldier who takes his constitutional
le]'s Reich. To some on the right, the
That 94 per cent figure only fuels the
rights at face value can get into serious
officers and men accused of a massacre of
suspicions of civil-libertarians and others
trouble in the service of his country-un-
civilians at Song My are figures of com-
who have long been building their case
less he understands that he has beeo:mc,
parable stature, heroic Americans being
against military justice. Across the politi-
for the period of his service, a noncitizen
martyred by gutless higher-ups. cal spectrum, critics accuse the military soldier.
But can a nation~aatt war],t~olerate{rrebel- of sta~c/k/i~ng/its Juries, muzzzzlin defense a at/-~ p/~P[ubblliic a/warre/ne~sss~of /tthe weakness of
lion and S lr~yl/C~C1 `~~~i Rlloalle 211?11103 101 /"~RI~p ~l~ e~/1 Qp11eY~VM./~S/~,x, Aug. 24).
prohibitions against se]f-incrimination, his Army career to New York Sen. By far the single most important flaw
double jeopardy and cruel and unusual Charles Goodell). Or, nowadays, a de- -"the cancer of the system" according in
punishment. (Commanding officers can Tense counsel may suddenly discover Ilenry Rothblatt-is the inevitable, uues-
still put a man on bread and water for that he has orclcrs for Vietnam. (Capt. capable presence of command iuflucnce.
three days-more a drastic diet than Brendan Sullivan, the defense attorney The opportunities for a commanding
cruel punishment.) Pretrial investigatory in the Presidio "bfutiny" case, for irr- officer to influence courts-mania] are im-
proceedings (the military's equivalent of stance, was: ordered to Vietnam soon posing. The commanding officer decides
the civilian grand jmy) are, in the words after the case ended. The Army, un- whether to bring a roan to trial, and on
of Green Berets' attorney Rothblatt, "a der strong public pressure, rescinded what char;;e,. I-Ie controls the pretrial in-
lawyer's dream." The defeuclant yr his the order-but it had made its point.) vestigation of the charge, usually de-
attorney can demand that the prosecu_ Says Bailey: "The only time you can tides whether to jail the accused prior to
tion produce every piece of evidence count on a military defense lawyer to trial and selects the officers and err-
and every witness against the accused. whale the hell out of the military-and listed men who will serve on the jury.
On top of this, counsel is available to that's a defense l:?twyer's job-is when In the great majority of cases he picks
most military defendants; most state and the lawyer is getting out of the service F~eoplc who are ~rnder his command and
Federal courts require free counsel for very soon and he doesn't give a damn dependent on him for day-to-day job
indigent defendants only when the pox- what his superior officers put in his fit- assignments, lea~ae and career advance-
sible punishment exceeds six months. Hess report." went. Generally the defense counsel
"It's become very popular to be critical a Vagueness: The Supreme Court has and ilre pr?osectrtor are appointed by
of anything military, whether it's, military Held that no one eau be convicted of vio- the CO., When the trial is over, the
music,. military strategy or military jus- lating a law if the stahrte is so vague that same CO gets first. crack at revie~eing the
tice," )tilaj. Gen. Kenneth J. Hodson, the reputable authorities disagree whether trial record and the sentence. "The conr-
Army's Judge Advocate General, told it has even been broken. Yet Article 133 manding officer never says `I want to get
Nr:ws~er;Ex's Robert Shogau. Hodson, who of die Uniform Code of Military Justice this son of a bitch'," explains attorney
is in charge of the 1,900 military lawyers forbids "conduct unbecoming an officer Emile Zola, Berm::rn. "But he doesn't have
servicing the Army's courts-martial sys- and agentleman"-a stricture so broad to say it. 'I'lre members of the court un-
tem, added: "Military justice is as good that it obviously means just about what derstand that they are there to convict."
or better than the justice in 48 of the 50 any particular commanding officer wants Adds Rothblatt: "If the CO is out to get
states. ~t%e have a very good system that i to mean. Article 89 forbids "disrespect you, God help you."
I'm very proud of. 'v~%hat we have is the toward a superior officer"-which varies Since the introduction of the 1950
appearance of evil. And as Marshall N1c- from officer- to officer depending on his code, commanding officers have become
-Cuban would say, that's what we have insult threshold. (Being right doesn't more subtle about exerting iufluence-
to deal with." help much either; iu 1925, Brig. Gen. but ilrey are still doing it. "You c?an walk
For all that, the semblance of inequity SVilliam (Bally) Mitchell was court-mar- onto any military post in ilre c?ountry,"
in the military system of justice is perva- tialed and suspended from the Army for says one Army lawyer, "and ask: `What's
sive. Some of the more striking flaws: accusing his superiors of "inefficiency, the big push on here?' At Fort Lewis,
^ Stacke~,~tj`~~i~?r~F~'~3r~ 20~34('1~~ : ~rl3~l~`'I~E~#Ylff1 @1~1 RC~O~9J?O~ti~~(3~1 1~rt Hood [sornc-
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R
[fu]rs called fort 1'otheadJ, it's marijuana.
You can't get an investigator at Fort
Hood to work on a robbery case because]
they're all involved in hunting down ma-
rijuana." The charge of command influ-
ence is made on an even grander scale
in the Song AI}' affair. Former Congress-
man Charles ?'eltner of Atlanta, who is
representing Fseduiel Torres, maintains
that President lv'ison's remark during a ?
nationally televised news conference
("What appears was certainly a massa-
Cl'e aIId llllder n0 Cll'CU111StaI1CCS ~i'a5 It
justified") made it impossible for any of ?
the Song A1y defendants to get a fair and
impartial trial.
Reforms: i?3ost of the reforms offered
to the code recently have been designed
in one way or another to reduce com-
mand influence. T'arlier this month, Dem-
ocratic Sen. Birch Bayh of Indiana intro-
duced the Ailitary Justice Act of 1970.
Under Bayh's plan, defense counsels and
prosecutors in all military trials would be
drawn from independent units (much
as judges ha~?e Been since the 1965 re-
forn). Republican Sen. Mark Hatfield
of Oregon has also introduced a reform
measure that goes bevo~ld Ba}-11's pro-
posals by granting Federal civilian courts
jurisdiction over crimes committed by
military personnel in all but twenty spe-
cific military-type offenses, such as dcscr-
tion, AWOL or failure to obey an order.
A good many critics of the code ar=
gue that these are only 11a1f measures-
that as long as a separate system of mili-
tary justice exists it will be impossible to
rid it of command influence or to make
it more responsive to the letter and spirit
of the Constitution. Ancl in any case, the
critics add, even the half measures pro-
posed by Bayh and Hatficlcl are likely to
be quarter measures by the tune they
emerge ? from Capitol Ilill's military-
minded Armed Selti'ices committees. -
"~'~~e probably will get reforms," says
ACLU attorney Charles \lorgan, "but
the reforms won't'go to the heart of the
matter. The olily way to do that is to
abolish the code--but tPiat will probably
take another war."
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 STATINTL
~-
~-~~~~~ Approved For R6~@~~~A~~~14~?:~~I~~f~BP~1D+~1.>~1
tivater. The Spa?'tans were said to have gap is continuing to use the ~;'bite and r,rh. GoaE na Ts~rrt;ssr's
besieged satellite cities of Athens in t):te blue herbicides ;vllich cause crop damage 7?lre victory of senator Atbert Gore in the
Peloponnesian Sx'ar with burning sulfur and often irreversible disrttpi.ians of the Teunessec Democratic primary appears likely
and p1tC11 to Create sttlfttt' L110:i1de, a ~aS llattlr`al eCOlogy of Vietnam. We aI'e de- to Sonora a genuinely significant election.
abaut one-fourth as irritating as chlo- stroying the environment and extin- contest in xovc,nber...s?. Gore, a cy ~o?Calc?_r, ~. _ _ ~-~ f--t ~~~~~ S i;; ;t forces ~icr~ }tit i;t Gti? r ~r c'~iy.
' , ~ ^+'~ 11 4i'artl ~ [ ~ 1 1 p ~ t :~ i. ~ n, G :c . .
~ -~ ('I >" ~ t st )crated areas. S?aclt str;ult ]ncous
Grtarrliml str.Jf correst~wuicnt ~ ..' f rr+, +
-, ,: i `} i-~ ~ ~ ~'+ ! ..- ~ f n. f..nb. .,r},i 1 ..t', r.rr?ot rr`+ , +? ^y
rr ei o. v1 has now and train a new beneration
been- converted into onto of of grass-runts Soutlt Vietna-
ter than the VC shadow ov- "The comp t?r a ~amne~ty and Reconciliation mere leaders.
ernment aygEpv~s~~t~r Release ?~~?0~/d~~0~ : `llat?i ~c~s4~c`fc~~'~~OSP~DOO,Oo~tQi~'oas~ soi cheast
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BEST COP
Available
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,~ ., !3v -
rblr. FULl3ItIGIIT, I wanted to. ask
about tills pnrticttla.r pohlt.
Air. I3YIZ.D of West Virginia. After I
have completed my remarks perhaps I
shall have explained it. I shall be Glad to
yield shortly.
;\2r, President, I was discussing signifi-
cant differences.
Second. A second distinction between
t.lie two Byrd amendments lies iii the
fact that the one on which we will vote
today spcoifically refers to U.S. "armed"
forces rather than U.S. "forces" as
stated in the first Byrd amendment. The
word "forces," as used in the rejected
a311e11d111el1t, could vcrY well include CIA
people, technical advisers, and perhaps
even civilian employees of the military-
although it was not intended t0 be so 111-
terpretcd-whereas U.S. "Armed Forces"
is a more limited trrnl and clearly refers
to military personnel, and it is more con-
sonant with tilt "constitutional power"
of the Commander in Chief.
Third. The words "in south Vietnam,"
ns used in the first Byrd arncndntcnt
were mare restrictive than the words
"rvhercver deployed" which appear in
ills amendment before us. In other
words, tilt words "whcrevcr deployed"
arc inclusive of South Victalant but arc
not lhnited thereto. I think it is only
logical that if fire Presidcnt has the con-
stitutional power-and I saY that he does
have-to act wltetl necessary to protect
the lives of U.S. Armed h'orces in South
Vietnam, he has the constitutional power
to do so elsewhere.
Fourth. A minor distinction-which is
really a distinction without a differ-
ence-lies in the fact that amendment
No. 708 i;ocs to the entire "section,"
whereas the orighlal Byrd amendment
specifically dealt only with paragrfph (1)
oP the Cooper-Church amendment, As
far as I am concerned, however, the
amendment on which we are about to
vote, for all intents and purposes, is,
it1 reality, confined in its thrust to
paragraph (1) just as if paragraph (1)
had been clearly specified, and that
paragraph only, I say this because
nobody contends that the President
has "constitutional power" to pay the
"compensation ' ? of United States
personnel in Cambodia, who furnish
military instruction to Cambodian
forces ' in support oP Cambodian
forces," as referred to in paragraph (2) ;
he has no "constiutional power" to enter
? into any "contract ? ? to provide mili-
tary instruction in Cambodia ? ? ' in
support of Cambodian forces," as mea-
t tioncd in paragraph (3) ; and he has no
"constitutional power," as such, to con-
duct "combat activity in the air above
Cambodia in slrpport of Cambodian
forces," as referred to in paragraph (4)
of the Cooper-Church ]anruacc.
So much for the significant distinc-
Lionshetwcen the two Byrd amendments.
Now, as to the similaritlcs. The basic
similarity is one of substance. While ills
first Byrd amendment used the words
"shall not preclude" as an afllrntativc ex-
pression with respect to Presldcntlal ac-
tion to protest the lives of servicemen,
the new Byrd amendment does the same
th1n8 by clear implication.
Amendment No. 708, upon which wo
shall shortly vote, mush be coupled with
the Maus(leld amcnd]nent in order to Get
its full meaning, The Mansfield amcnd-
ment says that "nothing contained In
this section shall be deemed to impugn
ills constitutional power of the President
as Commander in Chief." Webster indi-
cates that the word "impugn" means to
assail, to deny, to question,'to cast doubt
upon. Hence, tilt Mansfield amendment
may be said to state that nothing con- .
twined in the Cooper-Church languago
shall be deemed to cast doubt upon or to
question or to deny Lila constitutional
1lowcr of the President as Cominanclcr in
Chief^ The Mansfield arnendtncnt states
that we do not impugn the "constitu-
tional power" of the President, but that
is not enou^11. It does not say what power
we da not "impugn." It dots not specifl-
cate. Iwant to spell it out. The Mans-
flcld lauguagc goes part waY. Of course,
huplicit in the words "constitutional
power as Commander in Chief" the Pres-
idcnt has all such power, whatever the
bounds of that powel? which the Consti-
tution reposes in him or imposes on him.
But +the Mansfield lanruagc standing
alone falls to state explicitly the most
important aspect of that constitutional
power raid the aspect with which we arc
most couccrncd nt this tinlc; namely, the
constitutional porvcr whlclt may be nec-
es::a.ry "ta protect lire lives of U.S. armed
ford:; whcrevcr deployed"-whlclt in-
cludes South Vietnam.
Tltc Byrd-Grlllin amendment, No. 708,
spells it out in the four corners of the
statute, if the Cooper-Chruch amend-
mentshould become law.
Moreover, the Mansfield amendment
merely recognizes the possession-and I
emphasize the poosscssion-of constitu-
tional power by the ,President as Com-
mander in Chief. The Byrd amendment
recosnizes Hat only the possession but
also the "exercise" of constitutional
power to protect the lives of U.S. Armed
Forces.
A key word in the Byrd amendment,
therefore, is "exercise: ' Ergo, looking at
at ills first and second Byrd amend-
meats, I feel that the second Byrd
amendment, when coupled with the
Mansfield language, achieves in sub-
stance the goal which was sought by
the sponsors, or at least by the sponsor,
of the first Byrd amendment, but it is
more clear as to its intent in that it
bottoms any exercise of power by the
President clearly on the Constitution,
and it also presents the other distinctive
refincrnents which I have alluded to al-
' randy. .
Oxle might ask, then, why it is neces-
sary to write into law anything at all
with retard to the constltutlonnl power
of th,c Presidcnt.
Admittedly, the Senate cannot add to
or subtract from the constitutional pow-
er of the President by anything we might
wrirrl Into any statute. Nonetheless, in
consideration of the whole context of the
Cooper-Church amendment, those of us
who support the Byrd anlelldlnent feel
that it is absolutely necessary to indicate
in tYte four corners of the law that them
indeed is a limitation on what paragraph
(1) of the Cooper-Church amendment
may appear to do.
Even the authors of the Coopcr-
C1lurch amendment have said that para-
graph (1) 1s not completely Prohlbltive in
every respect, but I think that the limita-
tion must be cxplicltiy set forth in the
cold letters of the statute. I think the
President would be under some strain,
otherwise, bccuse he would have to Bo
into the legislative history in order to
find that there is indeed a limitation.
Whitt is the limitation that we have
been talking about all along? I quote
fl?om page 5870] oP the CONCAF.SSIONAL
R>;cono of June 10, 1070. I read the words
of tilt 15enato>v from Idaho n Cnm-
bodln after tho end of Juno.
Then again:
Mr. Clmncrl. The word "retain," Ica the do-
bnto has cinrifled, was caned to servo two ob-
ioctlven: I'lret, to make It clear that tho Con-
gress believed American troopn should not
stay 1n Cnmbodln after rho end of Juno; and,
necond, t;o allow far thonc partlculnr occnnlona
that might nrlno whcro tho 1'reslclent, 1n tho
oxcrcino of hln constltutlonnl nuthorlty oe
Convnandcr In Chief, might hnvo to mnko a
nuddcn ntrfka Into Cnmbodln In ardor to cifec-
tlvoly protect Amcrlcnn troops Hoar Lilo
border.
On page S87G5 the Senator from Idaho
(Mr. (71IUna22) said as follows:
The key word in the Cooper-Church amond-
mcnt 1s "retatning." Subsection 1 of tho
amendment prohibits the retention of Amer-
low, forces In Cambodia after Junc 30. I agree
with tho Senator from Kentucky that our
amendment is intended to prohibit a per-
manent or quasi-permanent occupation of a
buffer zone within Cambodia for an ex-
tended period of time.
However, If 1t wcro to happen that the
enemy suddenly utilized a staging area, and
there was a concentration of enemy troops
and equipment obviously Intended to be
used against South Vletnazn beyond the
border, we would agree that the President, as
Commander in Chief, has the constitutional
authority to order his field otncers to atriko
at and destroy such a brio to protect Amerl-
can troops In South Vietnam. This would,
however, be In the nature of a sudden strike
and withdrawal operation.
The able Senator from Kentucky (Mr.~
CoorEn) stated, as appears in the same
.June 10 CONGaCSSIONAL RECORD, at page
1387G5, as follows:
It hm9 been interpreted a.4 the power
to repel sudden attack. I bellevo it would
lnchulo rho nuthorlty of "hot pursuit." If
an' emergency should arise near or upon
tho border hetwcen Cnmbodln and South
Vietnam which should causa rho President,
as Commander In Chief, Lo tillnk it necea-
anry to tike llmitecl action to protect troops,
I would strew that ho Could and should pro-
tectour men.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
of Lilo Senator 11as expired.
Mr. BYILD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, Iyield mys,.lf .3 additional min-
utes,
In the middle column on the same
page, the $enntor from Kentucky b400 a month
Reuther hnd every chance to mako hla point !n benoflts. This year, the goal is a sorvice-
inslde the orgnnizntton rtnd tailed. based early retiremont plan at >g000 n month.
Many of rho things that Reuther wanted Daring RCUthor's cnreor, rho IIAW vycnt
to do, Monny pointed out, wero already being from zero to 1.8 million members. Ho took
done-usunliy !n a methodlcnl, buslnessllko auto wot'kora from Henry Ford's tgG-n-dny pay
contract. Tltnt eeotnod to bo nt rho heart of acalo to morn then @6 nn hoar 1n wages rtnd
Rcuthcra complnlnt, fringo boncflta. Rauthor hfmsol[ earnod
Ho wanted American labor to lend n groat ' >F3:1,008 n year, lawent of any mnJor union
social crunncfo on many fronts picking up lender. Ho liked tt that way.
steam through rho In[uslon of young peoplo, In April, UAW dologntes oloctod Routher
meat of poor people, minorltiea and other been tits last, becnuso of a conatltutionn
86t'
h
i
r
e
groups became, in eRect, one big union. bar to officers serving beyond t
Tnurn~d this Cant. the VAW lolned with birthday.
'? Labor Action, a group that grew to about 4
million with the addition of the United
Chemical Workers.
In St. Loula, Los Angeles and other cities
the ALA Is organizing community uttiana
among the poor, but there has been little
nntlonal impact. The broad social reforms
supported by the ALA leave yet to get oR
the ground, and there la a visible coolness
among many bread-and-butter Teamsters to
Reuther's programs.
ing, W.Va., one of nve cnuaren or vaienotne
Reuther, an organizer for the United l3rewerq
Workers. Walter loft achaol at 16 and learned
to be a tool and die maker at Wheeling
Bteel Co~
He went to .Detroit in 1928, worked- for
nearly seven yoars nt Ford Motor Co, during
the day rtnd completed high school and three
years of college nt night.
In 1933, Ford Rred young Reuther for
union tvativlty. The dny before the depres-
k h lid h d hl brother
n
l
b
River Rouge, Mich., plant rtnd worked thorn
ovor with chtlr fn whet becnmo known ns
"1`ho Duttlo of rho Ovorpnnn." 1'ho beating
was carried out 1n front of n Phottrprnphor
rtnd rho picturo of rho blood-npnttr.rrd pair
has becomo ono of rho boat-known 11bor
photos ht exlstcuce. Tho picUnro nhnwed eo
~mtcch bloat that n company omclnl nnld later,
"Tltero was n lot o[ ?blood but also a lot of
catsup covering them."
Reuther was nearly killed In 1948 when a
still-ttnldentffled person fired a shotgun blast
through his kitchen window. The shot struck
RettGher in the chest and right arm, nearly
severing the limb. Just over a pear later, a
similar attack cost Victor Reuther an eye.
?n both attempts on Walter's life, his wife,
Mny, was with .him. They were married !n
1938 !n Detroit.
Reuther became more influential in rho
-UAW during the war years despite restraints
on labor. When peace came, Reuther took
176,000 GM workers on a strike that lasted
113 days. In the VAW at that time, Commu-
nists were consolidating their strength, but-
when Reuther won election as president only
days after bhe GM atrike,? he proceeded to
weed out the Communist elements.
In 1962, upon the death of Philip Murray,
Routher became president of the CIO, and
led it Into the AFL-CIO in 196b.
Jio Joined with federation president Meany
in 1968 to elect the Teamsters Union from the
orgnnlzatlon for corruption.
Tho Rcuthcra arc survived by two daugh-
tore, Linda, n teacher in Cnllforntn, and Llen,
a collego student. Rottthor fa vino survived by
two brothers, Vletor, of WnahlnRton, and Ted
of Wheeling, W. Vn.; a strict, Christine `
Rlohoq, of Ronding, Mass.; and his mothor,
SAIGON PLUNDERERS
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President,
while 500,OD0 Americans fight and die in
Vietnam, Thieu, Ky, and their cohorts ' .
in the Saigon militarist regime continue ~
to fatten their pockets and their bank
accounts in Hong Kong and Swiss banks.
Now this corrupt junta, our so-called
allies, has come up with a plan to "as-
sist the budget" out of prostitution,
gambling, and dancing, They propose to
open a series of official "entertainment
centers" containing brothels, rambling
dens, and dance halls under the direc-
tion of the Minister of Social Welfare.
The first proposed center is expected to
show a $1 million profit the first year.
This is the same government that re-
an o ay a a
s
on
He had hoped to Imbue union members, .a
particularly young activists, with a sense of Vletor drew their money out of the bank
purpose to raise the llving standards of the ,and set out on a walking and bicycling tour
downtrodden, to aid them in gaining dignity ~ the world that lasted until 193b. During
ea workers did for themselves in the auto that time, they worked 18 months in a Rue-
industry. In an interview to Detroit last elan nuta~ plant at Gorki.
year, he talked In terms of Convincing In 1065, at the AFL-CIO convention in
young, well-paid workers that they had the Ban Francisco, Rttsslan reporters from Taa9
same duty toward rho less fortunate that and Trud accosted Rauthor !n tin aisle and
theft fathers during the 1930s hnd to them- asked him to compare the aationa' respective
__._.__ auto induatrlea.
mains in power solely because of the
support of our Armed Forces and CIA.
How long will this administration eon-
tinue to risk the lives of young Americans
for the sake of the plunderers in Saigon4
At the time of his depth, Reuther was on -" --_r?--? __ ____ __ _ __ ,
hla way to rho UAW's now f[tmily education toiled the virtues oL the Ruastan industry,
center at Black Lnke, Mich., nn B00-acre pre- pnrticuhtrly at the Gorki works.
serve where families of union members can , Don't give me that -; avid Reuther.
have a free vncntlon whilo rho union, aE the wry ink, I still have onlluscs from Ahtat fac-
same location, tenches rho member rho tech- -Whoa t+ho Routher brothers rotnrnod to
alquea and fundamentals of union activity. Dotroft thoy wero confirmed eoclnllata and
"General Motors will probably pay" for anger to orgnnizo workers. In 1D38, Wnltor ba-
the Black Lake facility, a UAW official Bald camp first president od VAW Local 174, a new
yesterday itt dlecusaing the wide tango of unit with 78 members. Within a year, Lhe
benefits that Reuther has negotiated with ' local had 30,000 members and Reuther ba-
the auto industry since becoming president Camo nn~ lnternntlonnl UAW executive board
fa 1948. member? He was elected a vice president in
His expertise as a negotiator to virtually 1942.
unchallenged, even by Industry. Routher's lie was a designer of the sitdown strikes in
death is even more untimely because cos- Detroit sand Flln?t !n 1938-37..13ttt he seemed
tracts aovertng shout 700,000 auto workers 'bo relish most the organizing campaign at .
expire this year, with aegotiatlona set to be- Ford 1n 1937, and he soon came la content
rtn In July. with Haery Bennett, Ford's security officer.
Louts t3. 6eatoa, who setlred ae Cl1tCs ahiet? ~ ? Borne od Sennett's "sorvloe mea" or oom-
negotiatoe Isst weep, add the state Of the ps-np pt~ltcs Caught iteurtibee and Rich'ar'd
bo~nom)/ and IIAW tgemands Ill'iy- brlnd 1!'rankefytAen handing dot lesasts near the.
.Approve, For .Release -2001 /03/04 :.C1A-RDP80-01601 R0009DOp50001-0
CONCLUSION OF MORNINC+
suslNESs
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, id
there further morning business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Ie there'
further morning business? If not, morn-
ing business is concluded.
EXECUTIVE SESSION
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate go
into executive session to consider the
nom[nation of Judge Harry A. Blackmun.
The PREBIDINCi OFPZC>3;~ ? Withoufi
gbjetstion, it is air ordered,.. t, . , ?
 Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA~~~~bT~16.01 '
Mrx~ 7, 19717 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 6829
the distinguished Senator from South Hvatzss), and the Senator from Call- come to my attention. het us get 20 mll-
Dakota for a unanimous-consent re- : tornia (Mr.CnnxsroN). lion signatures and let us call or write
~bst
Z'h
fi
.
e modi
ed nmcndment which I sub- every Itepre:,entative and Senator, and
matted on Tucsdny, Mny 6, with tho co- we will adopt this amendment.
THE McCiOVERN-IiATFIELD AMEND- sponsorship of Senators HATFIELD, QooD- Instead of wringing our hands, or
ELL
Iiva}tES
and CRAN
T
N d
,
,
9
O
MENT TO END THE WAR-ADDI-
rCw a9 c0- t,~nring our hair, or throwing bricks, or
TIONAL COSPONSOR sponsors that same day the Scnntor from blocking tratIic, or cursing tho system,
Ifnwall (Mr, INOUYE), the Senator from let us Go to work on our Senators and
Mr. McCIOVERN. Mr. President, I ask Mhutcsotn (Mr MONDALE) the Senator 17
i
t
t
Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) be added as a co- . serve our needs.
yesterday the. ~unlor Senator from In- .This is a prudent, carefully drawn -=
bnonsor Of the amendment to end the' a~?.,n r*,r- n.....~ ~h". o,.,,..,,.? ??,....
,o
prc.,cn
a
vcs, neighbors and friends,
wlnni}Woos consent that, nt the next from Montnna~(Mr. METCALF), and tho. and mako constitutional govcrnrnent
printing, the name of the Senator from Senator from Ohfo (Mr Yovxa) Then
not going to end the war by wringing our recorded reason for an extension of time.
believe that before the Senate votes on . In addition to permitting funds for the?
'' hands, by throwiIg bricks, Or by bUrnlrig this amendment. in annr~xlmatvly as __._ ___ . .. ... _ _ _
i
e dynam cs t at are unfolding in castrate the need for a specifle, publicly
Asia by backing it in America. We are the Nation and in the Senate lead me to
sty loader. There is no question that a - joined in ?days' time ns Cosponsors, unless a joint and specific declaration'
h ~ by the President and Congress can dem- '~
person cam}ot hope to end violence in
Th
waauug an.r- with all forces out by June 30, 1971-'
' marks made by the distinguished mayor- ,day. Thus a total of 14 Senator have .
___._.. _ _ _ ___ __.._____ ____. _____ __.._?_ __ +~,,,,, V,litL,1V1?t- \1Y11, nn??1?, , iL11U 4?G ? after passage. It bcrlns the cutOR regUir-
14 the number of Senators who are co- Senator from Alaska (Mr,l3nevEt) joined? ing withdrawal from Vletnarn and .'.,acs
snonsorlne that amendm~nt_ .,.. .,......,.....,.?.. ...~,,. ,,... ......,.._ ~........._
-------- ---? - ----~ ? ---- ~------- ---?- amenamenr. 1t Cuts oti funds for m111-
war in Vietnam, an amendmenE to the Wisconsin ;'+ faou:lty at lblumibia Univerelty, have . one of his salretarlee.: ? ~ ..
~ ~.
~. ~yApprgved? F(Sr~Release.20Q'1103~04 : ~Cl~i4'-RbP'8~ 0~'~6p1 ROO~~QO~Q50b01~=0 ?. ;
ng o ands for U.6. military forces , Already petitions embracing over a A message 1n writing from the Pres!-
1n Vietnam, lofned as a cosponsor with: ,hundred thousand elgnatures including dent of tho United States was comm~-
two highly respected Demoaratla Sena-' 60,000' names secured by students ands ~ nlca'ted to the Senate by Mr, t3eisler,
t
senator who had earlier proposed Cut-' -resentatlves and Senators to vote for it " .' Me;~AC3E FROM TSE PRESIDENT ' ? ~ .
ti ft f `
 . ~t,,iG~ov sz',uz
Approved For Release 2001/U3/04~ ~~~P80-01601 R000
n [oc of President Nguyen Van
Thieu, was convicted of crimps
unconstitutionally by a military
court, South Vietnam's Supreme
Court ruled yesterday.
The ruling apparently clears
the way for the release of Chau
from a 10-year prison sentence
imposed March 51'oy the military
court. IIe was charged with pro-
CommuNst activities.
It was the second Iegal break
for Chau, who charged that.by
arresting him Th.ieu was trying
to throttle ppolitical opposition.
Feb. 24 he was ;sentenced to 20
years in prison by the same mil-.
itary court. A new trial was or-
dered because he bad boycotted
the court and taken refuge in tho
National Assembly.
Police hauled him from the'
assembly building two.days lat-
er., in .a melee in which a dozen
newsmen were attacked.
Police took Chau to prison and
put him- on trial the next week.
Throughout his trial. Chau de-
nied the government charge that
ha worked in collusion with his
brother, Tran Ngoc Hien; an in-
tell[geuce went for North Piet-
.
Chau maintained he contacta.l
his brother between 1bG.i and ,'.
19Gti but was reporting the con- ~
versations to the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agoncy. IIe admit-
ted ho did not report the talks to
the Saigon government. i
Chau accused the U,S. Embas-
sy of refusing to come to his ".
defense and charged that U.S.~
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker ;
was supporting a Thicu~ cam- -,
paign to sIlence political,opposi-
The United States refused to {
be drawn into .the case; main-
taining it .was ~a domestic. mat-. ~'
ter, . :;
Chau's case,,, however, drew ~
considerable support? from such'.
Thieu critics as J. W. Fullbright, ;i
D-Ark:, 'chairman of the Senate
Foregin Relations Committee.
Many South.Vietnamese claimed s
Gently that the Supreme 'Court '~
had challenged the military ,
court. It ruled 'two weeks ago J
that tho' trial `of 215aigon Unx '
veraity students-was unconlstitu: ,~
beon beaten end? tortured'to, ob-'";
Approved For ~Rel~~~e, 20D~i103/04 'C1A.-R~P.80=0160,1'R000900050001-0
~ SATGON (AP)--National As-
scmblyman Tran Ngoc Chau, 4G,
 STATINTL
Approved For Release ~nY0Bm8~ CIA-RDP80.
~'
r
i tt~ t'~-11 I~l-LI;Y ; Nixon has been able l-~ nuitil~+r and Ix new insisting that the bomb-.
~.~ '1'hr :\iu-?rir;u- pt~cq-Ic were '~ what little support he has for hi!r ..; ing cannel be halted.
i nrrri? a~kcd beforehand whether .; so-called "Vietnamization" pro-: ?r The Pentagon and the U:S. mil- ?
',,they wanted to get involved in :. gram, because he promised it {nary command in Saigon both ;
't Vietnam. They were presented ~':~ would get the U.S. out and bring~?'.have argued that they can "win"
;..with an accomplished tact. Bla- ~;, the troops home from Vietnam. ..?~In South Vietnam within a year it
' ~tant fraud. was used to get the ~?Yet' it i5 clear today that those, ?~they go into Cambodia. As a re-,
' 'Congress to agree to the Tonkin ~ ,wtuo were misled at first by "Viet-`,~.! suit, "Vietnamization" as a mill-.
';Gulf Resolution, which was then~!'?namization arc growing inereas-:'. lacy solution has come to mean
stretched to the breaking point ~~' Inf;ly unhappy about it. `,spreading the Vietnam war all ?
~''to cover anything the Pentagon't~;~ "Vietnamization" is a military :'~ over Southeast Asia.
t, teltlikedoing. ~ ;l program, not a political one. Its,; The peace movement in the
'~ The Tonkin Gulf Resolution has means that Nixon. will continue to ?.,,U.S. has got to get busy in order.
' ~ now been repudiated by Congress, ' ; ignore the Ten-Point Peace Plan ,~: to prevent thousands more Amer- -
''::and most strongly of all by the "~ made public by the new Proisional ~.'~ lean GIs from dying in senseless'
~?man who got it through In the :, :,R~evolutlonary Government of battles in Vietnam. Cambodia
first place - 'Sen. J. William :.South Vietnam. in the Paris peace ?,:.and Laos. It must insist that the
t Fulbright. I think few observers,~~~~ta,lks last May 8, although in real-;'only solution to the war is a poll-
; 'would disagree .with the state- ?,?;~ it;y this plan is the only way of end-:~ ~tical .one which recognizes the
j: ment~? that the American people;,`; ing the war. :.'points put forward in South Viet-
- '~ .are heartily sick of -this, wad to-t;;.:~ What Nixon and other members '. ~~ Government'sonaa~ e'anutalmos
'i day. anal woYid do almdit tlny~;'~;: of his administration most of ,:~, pe p
thing to end it. ;' . , . '_.;~w'' "~~ ' "`,Halm isla ~~solution"abased on the ?~'~ administrata~on.wtws beep evading
' t .South Korean ntinclel : a ' CIA- ~ ~ ever since. 1 ,~ . '' ' ' '~
,:.
? ~ ~ ~~~. backed military dictatorship, sup ,"x'=~-""' -
? ''~` ' ' ~ + ported by Asian troops used as-
;,, -? cannon fodder pure and simple. f ~~ ~ ' ~ ,~ ~
??~ ; ,t_ ~ ~'~~ No master who does the tight , ; , '=
? `c '1'~ing, the Pentagon is clearly com
milted to "winning" a military ~ _ ~'
~~, .,victory in Vietnam and is in tact t ,
' ' (' responsible for spreading the war j ,
' ~vvith much greater intensity thane ~`'~'
,' a , . ,. ' brewer before into Laos and Cam ~ ti ~~ '
:.~ ,'' #{ F "r ..t-odia. It; was the' Pentagon ,
r.~.,?`
'which insisted on stepping up they
' ~ ~ "? !-.bombing bt Laos` in conjunction.,. ,~/
~ F
-, rrith the CIA-directed assault on 1
' .: ,~:I;hb -Lao Patriotic Front _lar bc-
. ing; used under Phoenix was dcscribc:d as
follows. A wounded V.C. under iinter-
rogation was promised treatment if he
tallccd. After he did, he was left bleeding
. in the middle of the village. The rsext
day, his screams were silenced by decapi-
ration with a rusty bayonet. While. this
was done, the American advisors were
having breakfast at the scene-forty feet,
away.
USA Version of "The ?Lighter
Side"
visors) and South Victnamcsc soldiers
throwing hand grenades into a pond
whcrc Vietcong wcrc submerged. "Al-
though this incident might appear some-
what gory in this classroom;' he was
quoted in the document, "it was actually
. a lot of fun to watch the bodies of tlic
Cong soldiers Fly into the air like fish:'
Rcitcmcycr and Cohn wcrc told chat
Phoenix was aimed at civilians and politi-
~cal enemies, not soldiers, however. I'hcy.
were warned that if caprured they could
stepped-up terror against civilians known be tried as war criminals under the \'ur-
as Phoenix. This CIA brainchild was in-~ cmbcrg rules "as well as other interna-
stitutcil by the U.S. military in July 1968. tonal precedents such as the Gcncva
Officially, Phoenix is a plan for destroy- . Convention."
ing Vietcong lcadersliip. Onc or two re- After the judge read Reitemcycr and'
porters in Vietnam have mentioned in Cohn's description of their training; for
their dispatches the summary executions ..? .Phoenix, they were granted C.O. status
taking place under Phoenix, but details and released from chc Army. The Baiti-
e~f its cold brutality only began to come ~. more Sun and the Washington Posr. had
t~ light when two officers in training for hits of chc story, but did not pursue it. A
the lsrvvram at Fort Holabird, Md., std- long story about it in t1~e village VOICE
c~cnly balked and asked for C.O. status, last December, by Judith Coburn and
2~i~`n~~~~~_-~~ 1,R~~~alcl~cs the following
:.?.. ,.,ic ~:~a~ Alin, wcrc atunnc 13~r ^+vr~~t comm?nt: ,
cesscs by adopting the military view-
point: that every South Vietnamese who
.'is not V.C. should know about, and
warn Americans of, the .presence of
mints.
The newly-arrived G.I. Ends old hands
who think it's fun to use peasants in the'
field for c~~tj~s~~'~-~t~~~e
?~*~ld thcir',~'_. ~ "In rcce~~ ~? .''',ocnix has bcc:omc
 N,GTIO~'.
Approved For Release 2001/03~~A~IDP80-01601
a '~~II~?~9s~ ~~a~~~~ ~~~II~~
i
STATINTL
~ D. GARETH PORTER .'
~ .~ ", piques of population management with South Vietnam- '~
' Alr. P~irter is :~ ~r.~duate student in the Southeast Asia Program,;.;; '; ese concepts of political surveillance.
? ~ at Cornell University. He has rontributed to n volume of es?;~;.~;; Apparently convinced that British methods in Mala
:~ys on Viefnnnt, soon to be published by Random Nouse. ?? Ya .
,~,:~, .were not sufficiently tough to control the populatiot7 of ,
'~ ,;;;.' revolutionary Vietnam, the United States pushed a po-
In 1967, New Jersey Gov. Richard Hugh?s, sent to Viet-~;~ ?,,lrce program which involved a degree of political ;our-?
,' nom to help legitimize the Presidential election there,~?a`''..?:veillance that had previously been attributed only to
remarked to repvrtcrs that rf peasant voters were Ares- ;~:'::? Communist totalitarran regimes. Far from hidrng the ;
sured or intimidated, they could "call their policemen" ? ~: ; fact, the manipulators who planned it have done tlheir
= as though the friendly local cop would save them,;;,, ~ 'best to publicize their accomplishments. ~
from the political thugs. The U.S, Public safety Division. "~'';:' ~ '
of AID, in the more grandiose rhetoric of the "nation - ~~~;'` The main features of police control in Vietnam
. ~ building" bureaucracy, refers to the Vietnamese Nation- ~~ i are the national registration card program and the fannily
i al Police as the "builder/protector of they.orderly politi- ;~ `? census program, which together are intended to bring ~ -.
' cal development of Vietnam's newly emerging Democ- ,~?`.;everyone living in government -controlled zones under ~:
' ~ ~? racy." ~.:.. effective observation. The registration card program, `;
~, ~,,, decreed by former National Police Chief Nguyen N,goc
The reality behind this benign imagery is a police ?'ui . Loan after his American advisers had, in their own
apparatus that has always been an instrument of politi-.'-;'' .'words, "provided ...the draft of a suitable decree,"' is
cal control and repression, but whose capabilities have','r~'.supposed to be, when finished, "one of the most com-
been enormously increased by a determined effort orr :.~' plete national identification systems in the world." '(he
j the part of the U.S. mission. Only in the last five years,~~',:~.technical machinery put at the disposal of the program
in fact, has the Vietnamese National Police been molded.,;;';:;?,is indeed impressive: the national repository of finger-',j
into an effective, nationwide apparatus for controlling .? ;,.
,? ,,, prints and biographical data, for example. will be cam- ?'
the thought and behavior of the Vietnamese
eo
le
O
~
p
p
.
ne
;;~ :.parable to the files of the FBI.
of the costs of maintaining in power a ;government as' f~ ~ ~ ',l
unpopular as the Saigon' military regime' has been the ,: `'?~`, The cards give the police a basis for automatic arrest, .,i
r~ since the lack of one is taken as proof of complicity ~?
;creation of a police state as complete as ainy in Asia. ~;y'~,,~'with the National Liberation Front. On March 8, 1968, ,:
The basis for this police state was laid during Ngo ,;,.:,the very day on which~General Loan announced that all
;Dinh Diem's regime, which ruthlessly tracked down poi- ,,,; ?~' male citizens from I S to 40 would henceforth be re- ,, .
itical opposition and rounded up tens of thousands sus- ` r? ' quired to possess registration cards, Saigon police ?'
peeled of working for the Vietminh. Die,m's secret po- ?r~:;: seized more than 1,000 youths who didn't have cards .
lice were only one facet of his complex machinery of :~.;;~~~,? ?and prepared to send them to prison on Con Son lslarid. ,' ?
surveillance. The system was nevertheless ~ too limited ;j~',:. Far more important for the purpose of political sur-
and ineffective far the counterinsurgency specialists in a?~; veillance is the attem t to classif
the U.S. Public Safety Division, who took the initiative ~,;,. vidua) and family regrstered by the goverlnment This
' in creating a "modern'? police system in Vietnam. In '.,~, scheme is a major component of the overall "population '`'
? ~ 196' they prevailed upon Diem to create a unified Na- . , ?' , control" plan put into effect beginning in 1965. As cie-
tional Police out of several loosely coordinated national -~~, scribed by ttie Public Safety Division's E. H. Adkins in ?
j and local police organizations. The next step was to be- ~; ; ,his handbook on the police and counterinsurgency, it''
gin experimenting in 1.963 with techniques of "resources ,involves gathering information not only on the behaviior
control" borrowed from the .British operations in Ma- ,.: ~ but also?on the political attitudes of families and indiviid-~
j? Jaya. By March i 964 police advisers had completed an .:.:, uals, '? ~ '
~~ ~~ elaborate "National Police Plan:' which envisioned'. ~'.'. ~ Each booklet issued to a family under the family cep- ~
} building up the numbers. equipment and technical com-,'~.'>~.~~ sus program has aa~ dup~ieate which is retained by losrv CIA-RDP80-0
~~ ~~~~~
~~~ambodia ~ ~,~~~d~s~'l hel
p
PRESIDENT NIXON'S decision to send ~ gon and the Mekong Delta if however
h' / P ........:~.,,...,,..~ ..,,,.; ..,,,.,,a ,",,,':., c.,?~~" -With _so much at stake, Mr. Nixon
.al[les to the beleaguered government of they can turn all of Cambodia into a1
~~Cambodia was a correct one :in a very :.sanctuary and supply area, South Viet-
i Hain would appear to be doomed.
l un romising situation
Stlff~ening. .: ~ ;~, spread the war by openly ? invading
in the ? 3,000 Cambodian mercenaries ~.':? w}~at he cap to save Cambodia: The
that the Central . Intelligence: Agency .. ;South Vietnamese army, for instance,
has working for it- in neighboring. South ~..~';should get. carte blanche to attack the,
Vietnam. They could. help the Cambo- '~ North Vietnamese inside Cambodia'
dian arm which.~is badl . iii need of .. There is no~.reason for Saigon to be a,
Y+ _ Y ,.. ~tiekler fnr' hnrders after Hanni has
dia really make an effort, they can ~ hard-nosed geopolitical point of view, it
i~..;.,.~..,,,,.. ~..u,.....,,.. +,,e .,.,t:?o non??f,.i, .might be a good investment) :But if~the
+.namese and Viet Cong troops in Cambo- '"?forces to C a m b o d i a (al~ho, from a.
Neither step, to be sure, twill insure ?~ South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
!,the survival of Gen. Lein Nol's anti-Coin- t^ " Given the ~ mood of this country, the
C monist regime. If the 40,000 North Viet-. , ., President will not send U.S. combat
Nevertheless, a modest American aid their own ,defense, Mr. Nixon should!
~tirocram is worth trvine. It rnit;ht nre- ~. ~ give them aid=short of our troops. ~
~. and neutral land. -- ~ ~ . -der, the howls would be heard in heav-~~
their illegal invasion 'of that; peaceful ? ;"put so much as a platoon across a bor-';
r;concefvapty deter them frorri pressing's and at work, If we "imperialists" had
the whole Vietnam War, If ;Cambodia ;, went, from: the Conununist bloc and`:
ova~a may aelermine Ana V~L,LCVii1C ui .from our own. doves and peace move-}
North Vietnamese supplies, lid a n o.i's:,United Nations. '~
Approved For Release2001 /II3~04 ::.CIA-'R~p80=01601 ROOOJ0005a001=0 '
 Approved For Release 20Qi~~Q3/A~~jC~~-,~tDP80-0160
2 2 APR 1970
STATINTL
L~ r~.: ~ 11 L ~!.dJ ~.1 ~.t ~ GJ U ~ ~l ~.! ~ ti Ca ,
namesc and Vict Cong positions . ,
inside Svay R1eng Province.
Shortly after the meeting,
South V i e t n a m e s e fightcr-
bombcrs began attacking sus-
pected North Vietnamese base
camps and troop positions along
a 30-mile stretch on both sides of
the border. Their effort was
aimed at softening up the enemy
positions Cor a division-sized in-
fantry assault that was to fol-
low.
At daybreak Monday, as many
as 5,000 South Vietnamese,
troops and hundreds off armored ~
miles west of the South Viet-
namese border.
The informants gave this ac-
count:
1~'hen the helicopters landed
the two Americans were met by
Cambodian officials carrying
? maps in their hands. The Cam-
bodian officials pointed out to
the Americans the North Viet-
4 l: i1~C: ~ 1t`~1,
Sources said that in the first
two days of the operation, South
Vietnamese forces have killed
221 enemy troops, seized nearly
1,000 new weapons trom base
camps, and destroyed 90 huts
apparently ~ used as storage
~
forces } ~ west of the'Gapita~ ~ ?.' lareas. Field. reports said South
11uy reported two South Vick- _ .____ _ ?.'______._~_,
name se helicopters flew the
Americans into Svay ltieng, 25: 'S~
cans bcliercd to be from the from the South Vietnamese dis-
Ccntral Intcllificncc Agency flew trict town of Tuycn Binh, 55
,into the Cambodian provincial miles west ad Saigon, to the dis-
capital of Svay P.icng last wcclc trict town of Tuyen Binh, 55
apl>arently fo coordinate milt- milts .west a~f Saigon, to tho dis-
r o xr~tions agai~ut enemy tract town of Ilon Nett 76 miles
t ?
SAIGON (AP)-Informed personnel carriers bean a drive
SOUI'CCS said today t??o ,Uncri- across a 30?.milc line stretching
Viclnamese forces suffercrl 26
trrx,ps killed and 141 wounrlr_r1.
Efforts to reach CIA officials
In Saigon fnr comment were
fruitless. There was no answer
at flit agency's phone.
Sources have said the South
Vietnamese and Cambodian lo-
tai officials .arc collaborating in
efforts to crush up to 20,000
A'orth Vietnamese and Vict Cong
troops in base camps in sout}--~?
leastcrn Cambodia. ~ ~.~??.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-016018000900050001-0
 STATINTL
Apptoved For Release 2001/03/04 : C~~pp~~~RQP8~0-01
ASHINGTUN F05~
.
TIi1~ W
, :; ,
1 ~ pPR .~9~0
Coi respondents' Dfnner a
s
r
en .. able mention? tar hie wor>~
The death last week of Mer- covering the Supreme -Dour
Nma~ Smith; Whi4re~. Hauae reN norninatlan of dud~t-~ Clemea~
poT~ert,Q~ , UNt~d ,~!reaa, Inter- P'. ~Hayn~worth-, ~;,?-,j, .ni ~ r;:~.ti,} ~~'
rirl~Ww4Mi-'r~.::.'a~.:~,~::-:rir ~ J.r t ~ .1..:.~ -~-:_L=Y{,idaM~YJ~~-
Court ,substituted far. the' cago Daily News won honor:~~ ,
a
P
id t
spondents Association held itslsteys of-the annual event, cast
annual dinner at the Shertaton a pall over the dinner. Btii4~
Park Notel last night under~otflcers cif-the association dP.r~~
somber circumstances andlcic~ed noJ, to cancel the dinner;n
with ils Ruest of honor and ~ bccause~~pey said Smith would;
many of its members spendinrilhave w shed. it to go onyw
the night on the Pacific island 5m~th'a colleagues attending~~
stale of Hawaii. ? ? the dinner offered a toast to ,
President Nixon 'had been him last night. " ,
expected to make the princi~l Tom Lambert of the Losu~
pal speech this year;'as he did,Angeles Times was aamedn~
last year, but the decision to winner of the Raymond Clap-
meet the Apollo 13 astronauts per Memoriat Award at the.
in the Pacific changed all that. dinner for his coverage of the ~
The newsmen cowering the death of a South Vletnames~ ,
White House regularly went intelligence. agent said to,~'
along as always. (have been killed ' by U.S~o~
Chief Justice Warren Bur-Green Berets.
ger of the U.S. Supreme William J Eaton of the Chl=
hisses west of Donor
The. White House Corre? national and one of the mairn'~
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 ;GIA-RDP8~0=01601~R000900050001-0
 STATINTL
Approved For Release 200~~3~~1~~f~t-RDP80-0160
1 8 APR 1970
Madness'on the Grand Scale.
nee
eY g
a -est enough to refrain from robbing and east Asla, American military' Ihvolve- crusading anticommunism which has ,
exploiting them, purposeful enough to meant has turned out to be a powerful colored so much of American Foreign
want to modernize their societies, and magnet for it. , 'policy over the years. The charm of .
efficient enough to have some ideas VYe have one great liability and one the rightwing dictators has been their
about how to do it. Whether such gov- great asset for negotiating a political stanch anticommunism, and that ap-
ernments are capitalist or socialist can settlement. The liability is our peculiar pears to have been enough to compen-
_ be of little interest to the people in- ,devotion to the Saigon dictators. Since sate ,for such trivial defects as their
volved, or to anyone except their Ares- they survive at our sufferance, the despotism and corruption ... If devo-
ent rulers, whose perquisites are at handicap could be removed by the lion to Thieu and Ky are the obstacle
? stake, and their great power mentors, simple expedient of putting Mr. Thieu to a compromise political settlement,
fretting in their distant capitals about and Mr. Ky on notice that they can the asset we have is our remaining
ideology and "spheres of interest." either join us in negotiating a compro- force of over goo,ooo men in Vietnam -
Yam apprehensive of our ability to mice peace or make some arrangement and our freedom to take them out. They
stay out of war in Laos and Cambodia of their own. tJf all the options open Communists want them out, and it is
as long as we remain at war in Viet- ' to the Thieu government, the only one supremely in our interests to get them
nom. The issues In the three countries we can and should remove is their ."qut. That would seem a promising basis
( are inseparable, i do not see how we present veto on American policy. Foe doing business.
tan get out of any of them except by 1( have always been puzzled by our ~ ]. W.~ FucsaieHz
means of political settlement applying gratuitouf tenderheartedness !award, -on the floor of the United
to all of them. As they have shown rightwing dlctaton who need w fu States Senats, April a, ag~o~
v~chich will provide medical services and the: rattonate for v~emam proven u~.- a ra~C~ ,~~~.C u,a....~o.t+........ ?....~-
education, Fertilizer, high-yield seeds founded; it has shown itself to be. ,plain such gratuitous friendliness to-
and. instruction in how to use them.. ~ disastrously mistaken. Instead of deter- .;ward rightwing dictators. I suspect that
d overnments which are hon- ring Communist intervention in South-. the explanation lies in that attitude of
Th
At their current stage o un eve op
went these populations have more basic make. "Myth" is a mild word for mad- ~, that Chau reported these contacts to f
__ _ __._ _...... ,... -., ...,..a , ~,-~tp iu~E nnly 1,a4 the CIA and the US Embassy. "r(
o
Y
Lary dictator, a royal prince, or a so- can farce upon us the choice of either ,the South Vietnamese dep+'ty who was
cialist commissar in some distant Capi- plunging in altogether or getting out? sentenced by a kangaroo court to io ,
tal that they have never seen and may altogether, ~ years at hard labor for maintaining
never even have heard of7 It is this choice-that the Nixon Ad- Contacts with his bcother, a North
f d I - miinistration has thus far refused to Vietnamese agent -despite the fact.
It simply does reot matter very much by ttheir advance in Laos, and as fur- more than we need them. ft is one ' ,
`for the US, in told, unadorned stra- they developments in Cambodia may "thing to tolerate such regimes, becav~e
tegic terms, who rules the states of also demonstrate, the Communists are . it Is not our business to be overthrow-
Indochina. Nor does it matter all that not going to confine the fight to a, . ing foreign governments anyway. But
terribly to the inhabitants. At the risk batl:lefield of our choosing and, as in the case of such unsavory military .
of being accused of every sin from .Secretary Rogers readily admitted, the dictatorships as those in Greece and
racism to Communism, I stress the initiative is theirs.. ~, South Vietnam, we have been much
' irrelevance of ideology to poor and ~ I do not know what more is needed more fhan tolerant; we have aided and
' backward populations. Someday, per- to demonstrate the incongruity of the '' supported these regimes against their
' baps, it will matter, in what one hopes policy of Vietnamization. The Admin- own internal enemies. 1 do not think
will be a constructive and utilitarian istration is trying to strike a "low pos? this is done oft of softheartedness - .
way. But in the meantime, what earthly turvz" in the rest of Southeast Asia although our Embassy in Saigon has .
difference does it make to nomadic while preserving an American bash fn seemed extravagantly solicitous of Mr.
tribes or uneducated subsistence farm- Vietnam, and the Communists are not ,?'Thieu, even to the extent that Ambas-
err, in Vietnam or Laos or the north ~ allowing them to do it. They cannot ~ sador Bunker has stanchly refused to
f Thailand whether the have a mill- drive us out of Indochina, but they intercede on behalf of Tran Ngoc Chau,
Approved For Release,2001/03/04 : DIA-R.DP80-01601 8000900050001-0
. .
 Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-01601 R0009
18 /lpril 1970
THE TALK OF TFiE TOWN
? ~ ~ ? ~'?cannat he aflcctcd by ~?li~rman efl'art. health resrrrt and those of a concrntra-
. /Volt'r r/1/r~ (; 0///-11c'JJt ? 'The war has crriijivcd ?,tlic force- of dre tiara camp, 1Vc mi6ht well feel slightly
war. ~ '~ .macs as we wrote things such as
N 1961+, Anrerira lucd a k+nd crf ltt the days whin the dch:cte was Wheresis in a health rescrrt there arc
' ~ natinnal debate rnr the Victn:un still
vigarrnrs, apl>,rnrnts of the w:cr doctors Giving Ixople medicine, here, un
?
.
war. and it apl+carrd th:ct, as far used to find it helpful to rxlrc+w~ Ld.e ~
as the drbnrr was ennrrrnrcF, the di;r- .claims made by the l;nvernnu?nt, :uul' Ihr contrary, we find armed guard?
h
i
t
l
i
i
ll
?
ama
rs.
er
nl; t
e
y nurrc
ca
systemat
seating f++rres won a victory uF sc+i?ts.~ to )Krim out ironies :wd arntrarlictinnti
le-
?
f
h
i
l
h
1'V
a
nse o
e s:uae w
g
u
ave t
e m
' :111 .+f the lrnlitira) c:urdidatra leer na-
the nc~tnric ++f the peace nrcrvrment in s:ry things like "'1?he hndy count rs Anrcrir:ur farces arc suplx,sed to Ix;
-
..., - -
.~~~,. c.......,, .------ --?.
ersuaded that withdrawal of is nar real nre::arrc of success," ar "'1'hc ~ in the villages aF Vietnam, w.e find that
mcd
p
tcec
mrr troops wa< the i+nlv rnursc the next ? F,aC:ficatlulr prngr:un iwr't gyring as well ~ they arc I>,rmhing tlrc villages and shcx,t-
~'President could afford to f,+llnw. '1"Ire as the government a'?s it is';' ur "The ing the viilagcn." Thr disparity hc-
~' war was shnrn of its justifiratinns not South Vieauunese clict)ucis arc rigged, tween ehc~nffirial I?diry and the reality '
hi
h
h
s'i{i
i
~
oug
ctctnrs
t al+lxar+::s t
lti is now scr great that
n reifies cool the Saigon rebime is
oral)- in the minds of its vetcra
wn
with
f it
d
i
i
h
h
i
d
h
di
'
s o
ance
n accor
e sr~pl>,+rt o
rp
ng
evc
t have t
l>!
s
cy
e andi dc-csn
but also, somcwlrat surprisingly, in t
minds of its farmer snplrcrrtrrs. 'fhe people." And finally they piececl to- a set' uF rules that will he rrsp+rnsive to
demand for military victory in Vietnam get;her the ultimate irony-that we 'the political situation in America beet
aU but disappeared fmm natinnal pcrli- seenrcd actually to he physirclly de- . that the aetuai cnnduet of the warn
' tics, and the cnnsiderahly slackened dc- straying the country we were auplHr::rd' developing arrnrding to a completely
~ bate centered almost exclusively an the to he saving. in the last year nr scr, ,'s,.paratd ~srt of talcs, determined by
~~ ~ question of haw lung it should take us however, npl?-nents nF the war have the eanditinns of unslreakahlr brutal-
' to get out. Hawkish sentiment appeared 'finund that it is inadequ:cte to repeat ity and eonfusinn in Vietnam itself. .
' to undergo an add twist, in which these arguments. 1'erhal's unc reascm (par s+ddicrs in Vietnam hart started
'; anger at critics of dre war intensified is that the gap between the afliri:rl ex-? referring to tl-r United _Statc~ and
but suplxrrt for the war actually de- pl:cnatinns curd the realities wr are odrer place' autsrde Vietnam as "the ?
elined, (A rally held in 1Vasbingu-rr fared with daily mr tclevisinn and in .'world"--as thnngh Vk?uram wcrr
last work in sccppnrt ref military vittnry the nrwspalrers has became sa stag- tree another planet.) Thr war, which
' in Vietnam drew, arrnnling t++ police ~ gcringly huge soul s,r obvious tlrat whin now grinds an without evnking either
'..estimates, only fifteen thnus:urd Ixcr- one persists in making these Ircrints one much suplxrrt ar much new eriti-?
? plc.) And yet now, nearly two ycara feels almost ludicrously sinrplrmirrclyd? eisnr, or much national debate of any
? ~ ahcr the heginninb of the 196K cam- Also, lxrinting out tlisrrrpancies lx- kind, sercns to have acquired an in-
paiFn, in a Ixculiar auncrrphrrc uF twcen the uflirial versions curd the re- s;ccrc life of its own, and to burr de-
~ mrntal exhaustion, in which bath crlr , ' Ahtll'~ Mlm{ to presume a ratinnalitY velnped in utterly ~ unexlxetrd ways _ ?
' lxrncnts and sapprrrtcrs of the war scam in the whale enterprise that is now rc:- that neidrer its critics nar its supl*-rter3
. ~ to have lest their fnrrnsic stamina, our vcaled to he entirely lacking. ~ It is as ever anticipated. $evcral recent ncw~
.?--,: , ? inrolvemcnt in the ennflict cnntinucs thouglr we wcrr taken rat a t+nrr crf nn stories have hmught this feeling hmmr
' ..J nn almost the same scalc~ and even alleged health resc-rt that turned out in to us with particular facer. A number ,
thrcatrns to escpand into i.arq- .anti ' :fact tr- he a conccntratirrn camp, and ttif tlrem have hccn txr strange a.. a? al- ,
~Camhadia. tt is as thou~th the public , w~cre then crl,liged to write at relrort most -defy raticutal comment, and we .
? had sltruggcd it.~ airruddera and dcettktl ; . dc:~crihing in great detail tyre tipcci6c have hccn trying m imagine wharf tha ,
b "OOQ~Approved ~or`~~~~lelase'2001%03% ~w CIA RDP80-01.801 R0009Q0050001 ~O~~rt t~~
..
STATINTL
 Approved For Release 2
' e -
. o 00
c~~~a~~~ ~ {~ ~ ~~~a ~a~~
? Daily World Foreign Department
Spokesmen for the Cambodian military regime admitted yesterday that hundreds of
corpses reported floating in the .Mekong, River south of Phnom Penh were Vietnamese
civilians. They claimed, however, that the corpses, of which there were hundreds. some
with hands tied behind their backs, were "Vietcong" or "Vietcong collaborators."
A Cambodian Information Min-
istry spokesman denied that the
bodies came from 'a single mas?
sacre, such as the one that took
place at Prasaut, in Cambodia's
Svay Rieng province, last Friday,
in which at least 90 Vietnamese
refugees were massacred by arm-
ed Cambodian ''civilian volun-
teers."
Cambodia's military dictator,
General Lon Nol, has issued .a
call for a campaign to drive the
Vietnamese out' of the country.
The I,on Nol regime evidently has
distributed arms to "civilian
volunteer" forces. it has rounded
up. '? ' .
In South Vietnam, the ?U.$.
Special Forces and 'CIA have
drawn heavily on the Cambodian
minority for. `recruits for their
mercenary forces.
The CIA-oganized .mercenaries
are referred to in U.S, news :re-
parts as , "Civilian' `Irregular De-
fense Croups" iCIDG 1, ,
The.s~GIA mercenaries man
Hearty 'all the "Special Forces"~
camps, along the South Vietnam-
Cambodia border.
In the Paris peace talks yester-
day, the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam and the' Provisional
Revolutionary overnment pf
South Vietnam blamed the U.S.
' for the massacres of Vietnamese
-now going on in Cambodia. PRG
delegate Dinh Ba Thi said the U.S.
plotted the coup which brought
Lon Nol to power in Cambodia on
March 18, and therefore the U.S.
"must be held responsible far the
criminal acts of its henchmen in
Cambodia and for the conse-
quences of these acts." .
The DRV and PRG delegations
said the U,S, side's call far 'a
'"slowdown" in the war .was
"arrogant" and hypocritical,
when the U.S. was doing ev-
erything it could to step up and
expand the war,
In Washington yesterday, Sen-
ate Democratic majority leader
Mike Mansfield (D-Mont) urged
the Nixon .administration to turn
down the Cambodian govern- .
ment's appeal for U.S. arms.
Mansfield said the Lon Nol re-
gime is "already in deep trouble"
and the U.S. should take no action
to rescue it. He said the cry for
arms has dragged the U.S. "time ;
and again ever deeper into the ;
morass of Southeast Asia."
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-01601 8000900050001-0
 STATINTL
Approved For Release 200gM~U~p~~IA-RDP80-
1 7 APR 1970
tiEW YORK, April 10 -Eye-~
witness accounts of U.S.. torture of
prisoners in Vietnam will be given
on April 19 in hew York and Los
Angeles by six Vietnam veterans
who served iri military intelli-
gence units. '
In simultaneous netti?s confer-
ences a,t New York's Overseas
Press Club and the Los Angeles
Press Club, the Vietnam vets will
give eyetieitness test.imon~? of
electric shocks, severe beatings.
and in some cases murder of prls-
oncrs.
Testimony :by the ex-CIs was
arranged by the National Com-
mittee for a Citiitns' Commission
of Inquiry an U.S. War Crimes in
Vietnam,
Those testifying will be:
In New York, Michael J. Uhl.
former First Lieutenant. Chief,
Military Intelligence Team. lath
I3ril;ade. ' Amcrical Division:
Gordon 1I. Gra,y. former E-5 i ser-
gcantr,in Counter-Intelligence, at?
tached to Lt. Uhl's unit: Edward
Murphy, former E?5, N,lilitary In-
telligence Detachment, Fourth
Infantry Division.
In Los Angeles: Robert Stem-
mes, Cormer E-5, Counter-Intelli-
gence Special Agent. 172nd Mili-
tar~ Intelligence Detachment.
~'~3rd Airborne Brigade; ? Fred
Browne, former 5P-5 ISergeant-,.
N[ilitarv Intelligence Interrogator,
in M11r. Stemmes' unit: Peter Mar-
tinsen, former SP-5, Prisoner-of- .
~Var Interrogator. 101st Airborne i
Divisigil? ,
The Vietnam vets will tell how
field telephone electrical ~quip-
rnent are attached to prisoners' .
breasts and genitals to give ihem
electric shacks, a form of torture '
used earlier by the French in Al-
geria,
Sgt. Murphy. will tell how scout
dogs attack prisoners and hotic
murders are committed in the
CIA's "Operation Phoenix" in
5auth Vietnam.
Sgt. Martinson witnessed a Na-
tional Liberation Front a!'ficer
being tortured by gouging bam-
boo splinters under his i'ingernails.
He has cited classified U.S. Armv
documents listing procedures for
tarluring prisoners,
Approved For Release 2001/03/04:"'CIA-RDP80-016018000900050001-0
 STATINTL
Approved For Release 2f~Q31~(~~~a~CIA-RDP80-
. ? The Third Yndo-China V~Yar
have been tosse
It is the nature of governments to deceive. In the; intermediaries. fWe know that Thai troops have been
perspective of its two-century existence, the govern-i~f~ghting on the :'~merican side in Laos, and that the
_ _ ..,,__. __a,.....,. .,..., ..nnvrnllarl in intriPUe.l i
takes forthright action to arrest -this trend, it will be
cent vents have been largely of our making. ~ such importance without American approval an ,
Of course, that is not the official scenario. Official- I some kind of commi menu that, if the gamble turns '
ly, we were taken by surprise when the coup ousted .j against them, Uncle Sam will not let them go down
Prince Sihanouk; we are now waiting for the dust to ~ the' drain? The Cambodians say they are not asking s
settle, and perhaps hoping for events to take a turn for American miliitary help now. They do not say ~ ,
that might redound to our advantage. Ther~e?is a sug- ? they will not ask tomorrow.
gestion that Sihanouk was overthrown because the ~ What has happened took considerable rigging. Did .
enemy is losing, is being pushed back, amd that this ? .the Prc~: nt know about it? Did he want to know
accounts for the turn to the right in Carnbo~dia which, about it? I-Iow -much corvtrol has Mr. Kissinger got
though nominally neutralist had been giving shelter over operations in the field? Does even General
to some 40,000 to 60,000 North Vietnamese or Viet- :Abrams know exactly what goes on while he runs ~.
Gong troops. ~ ! the war from a desk in Sargon anti with an occasion-
That scenario warrants scrutiny. It begins in Laos, al visit to the numerous fmnQs for which he, or the
where there was a tacit standstill with t:he enemy. ,CIA, ins responsible?
It was incomplete, to be sure, but fighting; was at a In the news these latest developments are referred .
low level. The CIA upset that balance by egging on . to as the second Indo-China war. The count seems
its mercenaries, deployed with the aid of American ' ' short. First there was the war in which the French
"advisers." The enemy retaliated and seized a ma- ; :lost the flower of their officer carps and got the coup ~
'? jor piece of the Plain of Jars. Did the CIA plan it. de grace at Dienbienphu. Then there was the second
-that dvay? They may have been as in~tocent as un= ?Indo-China . war, engineered mainly by Lyndon S. ~
born babes, but that is not their usual role:. Anyhow, Johnson, and whi.efi proved his political nemesis. ( .
it happened; and it now appears that Laos is in dire." Now we Crave the third war. Will it rescue M?r. Nixon'.
straits-another domino is in danger of falling. There .. ,?-politically, ar runt trim? He mast be thinking hard;.
fact, in its early history, its candor was considerably
better than the average. Now, hawever, it appears to
be making up far lost- time. Mr. Nixon may plead,
',plausibly enough, that Vietnam is not his war. He
? did, however, undertake to get us out of it. The plain
fact is that the war is being extended, and so far Mr.
Nixon has done nothing to prevent its spread. On the
contrary, his policy of Vietnamixation is dragging us
deeper into the Indo-Chinese quagmire. Unless he
d indirectly--perhaps through Thai
~
So now the v~otcong ana ivurwi ~,c~?amese who
have been using the Cambodian sanctuary are caught
in a squeeze between, on the east, the South Viet-
namese, aidbd by reinforced American detachments
close to the border and by American gunships firing ,~
into Cambodia, and on the west, such forces as the
From the
can muster
di
b
C
~,r
.
a
o
am
new government of
standpoint of the Pentagon and the CIA it is a muchY
more agreeable situation than when Pt*ince ~ ` 'jnouk
It is worth noting, also, that General
'held the reins
.
dit[icult to avoid the suspicion that he is .not averse }Westmoreland has long advocated military action
to developments that will enable him to keep mas- t against Cambodia.
sive American military power in Asia, and that re- Can our Southeast A57an allies act in mathers of ~
a
. ; game: the public does not seem to be concerned. It?
does not demand that we "save" Laos; i.t vvould rath-.
r er that we got out of Southeast Asia, and the sooner
' the better, as Tong as we retain ,some shreds of
[superpower dignity.
', The illicit scenario continues with the coup in Cam-
. bodia. Whoever pulled the strings, the rresult was ,
very much to the liking of the Pentagon and the
CIA, .and perhaps of an Administration bent on keep-,,;
. ing a big, sprawling foothold In Asia. (Sege Michael
Klare: "The Great South Asian War," Tike Nation,':
March 9.) It passes understanding that Prince Siha-,~
nouk's rivals should have acted so boldly, unless they .
. had substantial covert backing. It may be assumed
that the CIA no Longer delivers sledgehammer blows,
as in 1fl53 hen Moss h I'r~i ~ ?
Whatever ~pftgX~~~~ir~~t~~t~se1~~4 :, C:IA-RD~$0=01601'R000900050001-0
 Approved For Release ~~ 1 ~~~~~'~~~~I~I~~~-1601
9 ~,~ Dovrnfall o$ Sihanou : on t
f f. ,
By DONALn I:1Rl{ ; ~ ~ ~ ~ `
Star Staff Writer ~ e?r~i ~Fi q f
PIINObI PENII, Cambodia - f ~ ~ ~
-
!. The American Central intelligence i American presence -here before Si- threats and intimidation. He was
V Afiency could not claim the credit ~ hanouk's dov~nfall .does not of strong enough to keel anyone from
for overthrowing Frincc Norodom ! course excludlj the possiblility that urging him to resign.'
Sihanouk as Cambodian clucf of CIA-hired operatives could some- ~ One of the strangest ironies of the
drama of Sihanouk s decline and
~
state even if it wanted for some . how have engineered the movement
fall was that his opponents 1n the
reason to publicize its role here. against him. assembly critized him for his mil-
All the ingredients exist in this : The anti-Sihanoidc drivo among itant campaign against indigenous
pleasant, intrigue-filled capital, only' :intellectuals politicians and cabinet Cambodian Communists, who were STATI NTL
80 miles from the South Vietnamese ; ~ ministers wa.y so overwhelming, supported by the North Vietnamese
border, for high-level international ~ however; as to contradict any im- and Viet Cong troops.
spy drama, but no one here has : pression it might have been the , "I said he must have the proof,"
found a shred of evidence to indi- result of a plot among a limited said Rasy, "but he said he had the
Cate the CIA was even remotely circle of American-paid operatives. right to suspend the constitution if .
involved in Sihanouk's downfall. ~ The pressure against Sihanouk, : he wished and jail these people,
The truth of the CIA's non-role in ` mounting almost unnoticed for the ' without trial."
Cambodian politics strains credibil- ~ past two or three years, already The reason Sihanouk'a anti-
' ity, particularly in view of Sihan- ~ had become apparent to analysts communist. critics objected to the }
ouk's hostility to America's role in : ;, here when the; prince appointed his ~ manner in which he fought the
Vietnam and the desire of Ameri- , ; conservative mtlitary commander, ' Cambodian Communists was their
can military leaders and diplomats .Gen. Lon Nol, as prime minister in fear he might employ the same
for Cambodian cooperation in fight- '.? August. ~ tactics against them. ~
ing the Vietnamese Communists': `,. The reason for discontent, be- Sihanouk's opponents were afraid
based in "sanctuaries" along the R sides 5ihanouk's reluctance to at- he might finally ,suspend the con- ;
;frontier. ,tempt to drive the Vietnamese stitution entirely and turn the ?
Yet the American presence in ~ Communists from frontier base country into a complete dictator-
~
areas; was his. failure to cope with
,~'" ~ Cambodia, when Sihanouk was ~
' ,overthrown on March 18, was limit- mounting economic problems.
ed officially to only tWO diplomats The national assembly in Decem-
and a small embassy staff. No?~ ~ ber approved: a bill undoing his
'American businessmen lived here. Socialist econa~mic policies.
American newsmen visited the' Sihanouk clashed openly with
country only rarely, and then usual- Prince Sisowaitl;l Sulk Matak, the i
- ly on tourist visas, and no Ameri- . first deputy prime minister, whom_';.
,
..a.. ~ .........: .....,,.;,gyp ,,,., v.uc,ma he accused of attempting to "lift- ,company of Americana and do not
or lnfurnry,ltl~m officers hod been dermino" Lon Nol. seem attuned to "American influ-~
I hcre.sinc_ Sihanouk cxpchrd them
all in fAS3 and 1x4. Sihanouk's accusation aga[nst ence" in general. M
- ..,,,..,,.,,,?..y ~~ a~~ivus ~a~~aU?~~a?3, mized the mariner in which ho was
but the agency s activities in all accustomed tai playing his minis-
. other countries in Southeast Asia . ters against each other In order to
tt seem to depend basically on the .maintain his own position.
t existence of large Amertcan em- And et Lon Nol althea h be did
' bassies and aid missions. Y ~ B
The GIA "station chief" in most not directly oppose the prince, was
s countries holds the title of "s eclat already known to have allied with
`assistant to the ambassador ~ and ? Sirik Matak, the prime mover bo-
` members of his staff serve as em- , hind the opposition to Sihanouk's
bossy "political officers,"? Ameri- ~ economic outlook.
/ ;can AID officials and the like. !~' Sihanouk was also confronted by
~ In neighboring Thailand, for in-,'.increasingly vocal, though subtle,
~~ ? hostility among a handful of depu-
atance, the GIA assigns agents un- ties who persisted In posing embar-
der the auspices of the AID mis- rasing questions about the influence
sion s public safety program, osten- of his wife, Princess Monique, and
. sibly an ef[ort aimed solely at f ,,;- ;? ,,,,,,- ~?~, ?,,,,~??,; o..fe?~a
force. In South Vietnam, CIA rie aaemp~ea w cui aowo one
agents in the field often advise the influence of same of these deputies
Phceniix program, tlse South Viet- by police invesdgattons of their ac-
tivities, but he was always afraid of
namese governmenk`a American-
,
._ inspired intellfgeac? gathering , the reaction he might provoke by
:, operation. arresting them or attempting to ex-
Approved For I~d~`~~i~ !`~~`~
prince, however, none of Sihanouk's
opponents seemed particularly ?,
aware of the consequf~nces in terms
of tho United States, much less the
Central Intelligence Agency, Most.
of Wem, including Lon Nol, do not _
do not seek out the
speak English
the country untu amanoux ;iumsetc ,
led a bloodless campaign for inde?'
ppendence after World War II. Si-'
hanouk, after obtaining complete'
independence in 1953, developed
close ties with France and permit-?
fed French business interests to re-'
main here..
The French also maintain a mIl-
nary advisory missies as well as'
advisers 'in all fhb ministries. ;
Frenchmen helped Sihanouk write;
his speeches and edited some of
One difference between Sihanouk!
end his opponents was that most ,
of them did not share his antip-
athy to the U. S. Military offi-;
cers, although they gladly accepted
Chine9e and Russian arms and
equipment, did not think he should t
have expelled the American Mill- .
tory Assistance and Advisory.:
Group in 1f1G3. . ~ .
Cambodian officers ht partlcuiar~
~l0~~9~~~50001-0
rebellious deputies, "bu~ with maw '
? ,asters _ and ~asemblymen , IN fused ~.
Afnorkw effort, in ,thi opinion of
.Qp71 ~~:1t-~a
 The New York Review of 8ooke
Approved For Release 20.01 /'~3'~x Gl~~t~1 ~1
~'~~;~m I~~Il~ ~c~
^
Ii~~,~~, k~~ns~~m~, ~,~ncdl {~Pcn~ cCIC
s,A,~~,~
La?~: ~Yie ~~ony h~'a~o~n ~Jo~.'~ 7C~h1
STATINTL
Peter Dale Scott '~Ithough the present war in Laos the then Premier Prince Souvanna
dates back to 1959, the President's' phouma, received more votes than any
President Nixon cannot expect peace statement is fatally silent about the other candidate.) ,
in Vietnam while escalating the warln I')Sy.t;l period. Phis is understandable, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in A Thoa?
Laos. His Key Biscayne statement on since virtually curry Independent ob- asnd Days, has recorded the response
Laos of March 6 itself draws attention server has condemned the subversive of the US to the erection:
to the connection between the two activities in Laus of the CIA and other
conflicts, which has since been under- US agencies during the period when. Washington decided to install a
lined b Vice President Anew. in reliably pro-Western regime. C1A
Y' g u. ruitn? mra 'Vice President. A ? ..,,,,,~..,,,? t? thou annearance_ set
reality the so-called "Vietnamitation" "
in 1969 of the ground war in South RANID. Corporation report on Laos ? up a Committee [or the Defense
Vietnam was balanced by a sharp concluded, for example, that in 1959.. of. National Interest (CDN!) and ;
escalation of the U5 air war in Lavs, it was not the pro-Communist Pathet ~ brought back teem France as its
beyond the range of inquisitive TV; Lao but the right-wing 5ananikana~ deviousnot[icet n med Phtoumi No- '
camera teams. This escalation is now govetrnment (which- had been installed ' ? raven. Prince Souvanna, who had ' '
rationalized (though not admitted) by by U5 intrigue and was counseled by ? . shown himself an honest and ~ re-
thc President's statement on Laos, ' US .titiviscrsj that~recipitaied the ~' sprctrd it impulsive leader, was '
" '~ forced out of office Iby a with- I
l
di
l
i
L
y m
s
ea
sus.
v-hich puts forth a gross
ng final crisis which Ird to war In
history of Worth Vietnamese "persist- Thls "final crisis" followed a probe ~~ ~ holding of US aid and CtA encour- ?
'rnt suhversion" and "invasion." agemen! of r parliamentary crisis, '
by a govcrnmrnl putrK-I into the small ~' ? allegedly through the use at
This story was put together long but sensitive disputed area of NuonF ' bribed ... a veteran politician
before the present administration. Lap on the Nurlh Vietnamese border. ~, ,named Phoumi Sananikone look
Many of its.allcgations were supplied which had been governed as part of;? his place. ,
years ago by US intelligence sources, Vietnam in the days of the French. ~ ..
who had a stake in misrcpresrnting the When the patrol was, predictably, , The Pathet Lao were then excluded
Laotian war which they had themselves fired upon, the government chargrtl from the new Cabinet approved on'
largely helped to create. The statement the North Vietnamese with fn-ntirr ? August 1if, 1958.
must however be answered, since it is incursions and chimed that this was
at least as misleading as the intelligence related to a planned insurrccliun by; '
reports of North?Vietnamese and Chin- the t'athct Lao. It then oMaincd a vote In May 1939 one Pathet Lao bat-
ese aggression in South Vietnam, which of emergency powers from the Asscm- ration refused, understandably, to be
preceded our air war in that country. ,bly, and soon ordered the two remain- assimilated under the new right-wing
Of course, the escalation In the long ins battalions of the Pathet Lru t~- 1-e government, and It decamped to a
run will involve two sides, and some integrated forthwith into the national valley on the North Vietnamese bor-
day historians can analyte the whole army. der. The Sananikone government then
involvement in Laoa of Thailand, the. The Pathet I.au had prrvinusly tin declared that !the Pathet Lao had
Philippines, South Vietnam. North November 1'157-rtteeed to this intcgra? committed an act of open rebellion
Vietnam, the United States. ~'siwan; lion, as part of a political settlement in and. that only a military solution
sand China. which they received two Cabinet posts appeared possible. tl thus by its own
It is important, however, to see that and were permitted to participate in actions deflccicd the Pathet Lao from
it has been not North Vietnam but the erections for specially created seats in the role of political opposition into a
United States, and more particularly its the National Assembly. to this election military insurgency for which it was
apparatus of civil and military Intel- the Pathet Lao and their allies (the poorly prepared, and huncc it was
~ligence agencies, which has been con- party of loft-leaning neutralist Quinim forced increasingly to depend on North
sistently guilty of the initial subversion ; pholsena) obtained 32 percent of the Vietnamese support. (By ,1969 this
of whatever order has been established 'votes and thirteen of the twenty-one Ipcludcd regular antra of the North
in Laoa through international agree- '.contested aesta, showing that they had "Vietnamese army.)
' menta. Thus the President's statement:, grown considerably in popularity in ~ In August 1959 the government
sttoutd be examined in the light of; 'the teat scan since tha 1954 Agtee? ~ ttselt received ? large Increase in US
,~ indubitable .0114 and US air force' ? me,ntr. (prince Souphanouvong, thalmititary wpport by claiming. falsely.
activities that ha wholly leaver out. ~ ~. pthet Lao loader gnd half brother oti,thal~ it ,had, beats ~irwaded" by a North;
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : C.IA-RDP80-016018000900050001-0
 STATINTL
Approved For Release 2t~D~1/6~it~aG~d~~P80-01601 800
9 APR 1970
Correction
1t~tembers of U.S.-financed
mercenary forces in South
Vietnam reportedly get no fi-
Inancial asal8talce beyond a
."h200 paymr.nt if they are dis-
abled ir- the line of duty.
Because of mech niraLr?rrOr,
a'' f~tory'- i y sterday's Wash-
ington Post Rtated chat these
fdrecs can expect further as?~
IAiatance. .. -? '
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-016018000900050001-0
 xLwsW ~' ~~ STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-01601 R
G APR 1970
AIR AMERIICA: ANYTHING GDES
t docsri t pipe I`(antovani into its cabins,
I dress stewardesses in colorful Puccis
ar serve Locu/ 6anrgulgnon oar any of its
flights. And yet Air America is one of the
largest U.S. airlines, ranking behind Na-
tional and ahead of Northeast in the
number of its planes and personnel. Air
America can alford to be fntliffercnt to
the extras provided by other airlines be-
cause it has only one customer to please
--the United States Government-for
which it performs a wide variety of
services connected with the American
military involvement in Southcask Asia.
As a rule, these services go unpublicized.
into the spotlight when it Elew several
hunched Thai troops into Laos to help
the CIA-sponsored "secret army' of Gen.
V:uig 1'ao defend the outpost of Long
(:bong from Communist attack.
Although in practical terms it is an op-
erating arm of the CIA, Air America is
ownecl by a private aviatipn-investment
conccru called Pacific Corp. ha managing
director and chief executive, n large, af-
fable man named George Doole Jr.,
lau};hs heartily when questioned about
dealings with intelligence erg;mizations
-but hedges hir? answer. "I dori t' know
all of our customers' private lxrsiness and
rclations,'? he said last week. "So help rnc,
that's a fact." But while tiuat may be
so, Air America's moth, "Anythin~, Any-
time, Anywhere-Professionally, sug-
gests the company plays by rather frce-
whccling rules.
"i guess we carry about everything
except bombs under our wings;' says Air
America Saigon manager E.J. Theisen.
And ~in Fact, the range of the company s
activities almost Lives up to its motto. CIA
ageuta working in the Phoenix program-
n campaign to ferret out Vict Cong op-
eratives in South Vietnam-fly Air Ameri-
ca when they need to move ahigh-level
prisoner. Green IScrets use the airline to
carry supplies to \iontagnard mereenar-
ics. And according to Theisen, even the
U.S.'s supersecret Speeial Operations
Croup in Saigon, which works almost ex-
elusively behind enemy lines, relies on
Air America for some of its transport
~~ecds within South Vietnam.
Cantrac:: At present, though, the bulk
of the line's work is in Laos, w1-cre it
drops tons of rice to \1eo tribesmen un-
der a conh?act with the Ai;ency for Inter-
national Development, carries troops to
the front and evacuates refugees. But
when it comes to discussing operations
beliincl Patliet Lao lines, only miles from
the North Vietnamese harder, Vientiane
manager James Cunningham Jr. is not
giving away an secrets. "1Ve operate on
a you-call, we-haul basis;' he said. "1\'e
dori t go into details."
For its varied operations, Air America
uses a Elect of some 150 planes-mostly
unmarked hvin-engine Vo!par 13eech-
crafts and Swiss-built Pilatus Porters.
Its G00 pilots, many of them \'ictnam
veterans, make ns rnuch as 525,000 a
year-:md earn every penny of it. Under
all kinds of wcatltier-and often under fire
as well-they fly into remote junfile air-
- strips no bigger than football fields and
wear thick gold bracelets. which they
can barter for food and medicine in case
of forced landings in remote regions. But
' in spite of tl~e risks they take, tl~e pilots
. are rarely the daredevil Steve Canyons
one mi~ht expect. "Thel%re in it Eor tha
money,' comments one old Asian hand.
"These guys all read Barron a for stock-
~. market tips."
STATINTL
D001-0
 u.t...?l; ..,...~ .,~T.d
Approved For Release 2001/m~~~lA-RDP80-01601
~I,~11~11~~~s 71'~~h~~$~ ~;
Q~~~ l~~s ~~~~~a~~? ~~~~s
ny GIiNF. OISIII
(lVnxhAipton IIu~cnu.o/ 14tc Sure)
Washington, April 4-The Virl-.
namcse are "the most polled,
and researched people in they,
world," says a former official of i
the tinited States Information
Agency, but there is but scant
evidence of that research in the
agency's public files.
Tha retired official, who was
stationed inOSaigon during file
late 1960's, said the USIA took
weekly readings of Vietnamese
public opinion, in addition to
special "fiasli polls" an any sig-
nificant occurrence.
The USIA also had access to
the results of surveys taken by
Vietnamese agencies-usually
directed by the Central InteL'i- ~
genre Agency. It also "piggy-
backed" questions on polls bcing~
taken by private organizations, I
with the USIA paying foe part of
the survey cost. _:
Only 3 Surveys Turned Up '
Yet a search o[ the iJSIA's~~was cut almost in half in
public files turned up only tlueej, Fraucc, Gei?inany and Italy and
surveys taken in Vietnam. Oiie
dealt with the use of the mass
media by university students in
Saigon and another with "users'
reaction" to t11e USIA's library
'lin Saigon.
A third showed that Vietnam-
ese University students were
generally well disposed towards
the United States. That survey
was taken in 1959, when L'.S.
involvement in Vietnam vas
Immimal.
The agency appeared -only a
`little less reluctant to make pub-
lie polls taken in other countries
labout U.S. involvement in Viet-
nam.
STATINTL
Advcrsc'Co Policies A USIA official said the agen?
In Japan and Singapore, pub?: cy is supplying the committee
lie opinion was adverse to U.S. with Vietnam poll information,.
policies in Vietnam. but only on the basis that it be
'1'he only oUit;r such polls that kept confidential.
have been made public were . According to USIA policy, all
taken in Western Lurope: ;poll results are supposed to be ':=
One showed that the United made available to the public two
States' image as a peaceful na- years after they are taken,. uh- ,
tion dropped sharply there in .less national ?security is 'in- `?
1965, when the U.S. first commit=:volved. ? . i
ted combat troops in Vietnam. ~j Among other reasons, national,, ~
Two .other polls showed that ~ secu~ ;ty would be involved if the ..
public support in Western Bu- ~ release of poll results would
rope for U.S. actions in Vietnam "embarrass the host country 1
fell sharply again between Feb- and affect its relations with the
ruary and May of 1967. That was United States," or "embarrass"
a period in which there was a a third country and affect its :';
-`xable build-up of the U.S. war relations with the host country, .
effort, both in the commitment according to the USIA. ''
o f troops and bombing of North ~ Criterion Dropped
Vietnam. The USIA said that at one
Opposition heavy time national security was ;
During that period, public sup- thought to be involved if the re- '
port of U.S. actions in Vietnam lease of poll results embar-
to a .point where opposition 'to
U.S. policies was heavy in alI
four countries.
7'he biggest opposition was in
trance, where 7I per cent of
those polled said they opposed
U.S. actions in Vietnam, while
only 8 per cent approved. In
West Germany? 55, per cent op-
posed U.S, actions and 20 per
cent approved.
The United States got the most
support in Great Britain. But
even there, 43 per cent of those
who had an opinion said they
opposed U.S, actions in Vietnam
A survey of the Far East tak-' """? ?` t?'` wn~~ satu they sue-
t en in 1larch, 1964, showed that portad U.S. actions.
' Poll Itcsults Withheld
th
t
it
f
~
e vas
major
y o
Asians were
'unaware of or had no opinion
about U.S. policies in Vietnam.
Among those who were aware
j and had opinions, the United
iStates policies got. good marks in
l Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and
llllMarbil,~,-..~. _ _ _ .
The USIA has not made public
the results of any subsequent
polls on world apinIon toward
U.S. policies in Vietnam.
fusee] ,last ,month io ,give,, any
information whatever to the Sen-.
rassed the polling organization.
That criterion was dropped, 'but '
even now the-USIA does not,
identify the polling organizations '
doing work for it... ,
The USIA spends about $360,-. ;
000 a year on surveys-and esti.
mates that it has taken abaut 600 I
of them since the agency~?was
created in 1953. When asked for '
its complete file of declassified
polls, the USIA produced 40I ~'
surveys: But a spokesman said a ~
large number of polls taken dur- ~
ing the agency's early. years .;
imight be missing from the four-''
foot-high stack. ?
There seemed to be little,
doubt that the USIA is keeping '
confidential most of its polls tak-
en in Vietnam. But according to,;
one former USIA officia)., who
was in the' top echelon of the.
organization, the agency actual- ''
ly cut back sharply on opinion
polls,, taken elsewhere about'
Vietnam during the late,1960'sy
'ata Foreign, Ralataons Commit?~.
`.ee.~tti:pgals taken anywhere.`:... .
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-016018000900050001-0
 STATINTL STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-01601
'A~aril .4, Y 9 J'D CONGIitESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
said he still had "nn open mind" an the .
subject. Then he voted for Ilnynsworth's
conllrmntlon.
Smith is not fond of dlscusing the subject.
' Again, ho says he wns misryuotcd and m1s-
undrrstood, [The high school debntcr in him
affil doesn't communicate with newsmen.] It
Is obvious that he wns apprehenslvo about
the mood of his home state fallowing ttte
recent scandal in the Illinois $upremc court.
7t has been rumored tlrnt 6mlth wns er-
roneously Informed that Nixon wns going to
'withdraw Hnynsworth's name. Tho rumors
cannot be substnntlnted, but ho did try to
contract rho Presldeat several times before
coiling his fnteCail press conference. Tho
Presldent, ns moray congressmen bravo dla-
covrred, could not bo reached. When ho
could, ft wns too late rand too brad for Smith.
He bras denied that the President pressured
hint Into his nfnrmntlvo vote, but it fs obvf-
'oua that Nixon exerted his executive 1n-
flurnco on every scooter he thought could bo
budged. Smlt.h does not deny that ho wns
grcat.ly Influenced by n heap of moll, most
of It angry and nearly nil of It demanding
'that ho veto for Haynsworth'e conflrmntlon.
Bt~t tha Hnynsworth incident occurred
earlp In the gnmo, rand Smith Is still ottt there
nutning around with the ball. He has learned
to maneuver most adroitly; it was n slgnifl-
cantly dlRerent Smith who attacked the
Democratic-sponsored tax reform bill.
Sen. Albert Clore ~D., Tenn.] Introduced as
amendment lncrcasing Individual tax exemp-
tlons from tBG00 to 76800. Hla fellow Demo-
crats called It nn advantage to the taxpayer.
Smith called it a fraud,
He noted that while the amendment in-
creased the lndivldual exemption, It cut rho
tax bill's proposed- Uasfc deduction from
E2,000 or 15 percent down to sdI,000 or 10
per cent. Also, lie sold, it removed other
possible deductions to the point where any-
one earning between 18,000 and (815,000 a
year would pray more taxes than before.
The Clore amendment lost and was replaced
'with ono that increased Indlvidunl exemp-
tions by tdlb0 over a period of years and left
the deduction provisions lust as they were.
But altho Smith has many admirers in
Washington, hla political fate fa about to fall
Into the hands of the voters. By taw hfa
appointment Is tcmpornry. Yf he !s to serve
out the four years remaining 1n Dirksen'e
term, he must run for reelection-first In
the March 17 primary, then in the Nov. b
election against Adlat Stevenson III.
Should ho lose, it could be the last the
political world sees of the Senator, Certafnly?
it would be an Irrevocable tcrmination of his
school boy dream. Should he win, he will
be provided a future in which to dream
'further. Perhaps the will ascend to the power
and Influence of his predecessor, perhaps
even too "higher office." I once asked him
it he would like to bo Vlco Prealdent. lie
replied automntlcally that his place fa in
the 13enate, but when he did so he grinned.
? R'he odds are ngafnst him, but, charao-
terlatlcally, ho fe confident. There fa a bit of
rho cocky kid 1n this, tiro small town boy !n
knlckere who went up to rho blackboard and
tossed the chalk Into the air.
But then, the small boy solved the equa-
lion.
IRAN NGOC CHAU
Mr. FULBRIG$T. Mr. Prealdent, last
week, several news stories appeared
which cast new light on the case of Tran
Ngoc Chau. These stories, apparently ob-
tained within the executive branch,
raised serious questions concerning the
role of our $all;on Embassy iri the Chau
affair.
i urfe that asenatora read these ar-
tJclefr, and I aelc unaNmou(l conaear tliair
they bo printed in the RECORD at the
conclusion of my remarks. They were
written by Ml?s. Flora Lewis of Newsday,
Mr. Murray Marilcr and Mr. Robert G.
I~aiscr of the Washington Post, and Mr.
James Doyle of the Washington Evening
Star.
C)n Saturday, Mr. Tad Szulc of the
New Xork Times reported that "admin-
istl?ation sources" had acknowledged the
substance of the earlier stories, including
the fact that the Embassy had delayed
from December 22 to February 7 in in-
tci-vening with the Thicu regime retard-
ing the Chou erase. I ask unanimous con-
sent that Mr. Szulc's article also be
printed in the RECORD.
The more we have learned about the
Chau case the mare deplorable and sig-
nii scant St becomes. I would hope that the
a.dminlstration and the Senate would
give serious thought to the implication
of file case as presented in the articles
mentioned.
(>ur Embassy in Saigon appears to
have misread and misinterpreted Presi-
dent Thieu's motives at every point in
rho Chau affair. At no time does the
Embassy appear to have concerned itself
with the substance of the case. Instead,
thf: Embassy seems to have been ob-
sessed with appearances and the main-
tenance-at any price-of good relations
with the Thicu regime.
~Dnc may well ask, toward what end
are we so solicitous of Thicu? He has cor-
rupted the constitution we are supposed
to be defending and he is prosecuting an?
anti-Communist Vietnamese nationalist
for' espousing views on ending the war
which appear to be closer to President
Nixon's than President Thieu'a are. Per-
. baps this is the answer. If 1t is, how great
. a veto power does the administration in-
tend to give President Thicu over matters
affecting how the war is to be ended?
What price do we pay to maintain Thicu
fn power? It is time this was made clear
to Congress and to the American people.
1[t still may not be too late for the ad-
ministration to salvage something from
the Chau affair. The Vietnamese Su-
preme Court has already ruled that the
original petition used to prosecute Chau'
Was illegal.
.Appeals on two other cl'itical points in
the case are still before the court. If
the court also rules against the tovern-
ment on these remaining points there
will no longer be any vestige of legality
in Thieu's actions. Should the court rule
ntainst Thicu but refrain from ordering
Cllo,u's release out of fear of a direct
confrontation, it will not detract from
the fact that Thicu has acted illegally
throughout.
'The U.S. Govcrnmct has every right to
tell President Thicu that we expect him
to observe all the provisions of the Viet-
namese constitution, not lust those
which he chooses to observe. If it should
be argued that this would constitute un=
warranted intervention in Vietnamese
internal affairs, then it would follow that
there is no basis whatsoever for our in-
volvement fn every other aspect of Viet-
na~mcae internal administration,
We are told that the war in Vietnam is
belrlg fought to allow the Vietnamese
people the opportunity to determine their
own future. resuma q is Implies that
they should have the protection of a
political system which guarantees ind[-
vidual rights and political freedoms.
In this respect I would mention a very
pertinent statement, reported In the
March 27 New York Times, made in the
.course of the court martial proceedings
of a young American Army officer ac-
cused of murdering a Vietnamese civil-
ian. According to the Times, the 1;r'~r~d for,R,e~,~e 2b01/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-0101 R00090
%'
~'Chau's conviction has had a
"Gliau never was I a b e l e d a
t~ummunist to Bunker's cables,
mforined sources say. Nor does
'>alieu. really consider Chau, his'
~(d .friend and former ra>m-
E.le- in m i l i t c r y service, a?
?immunist. Thieu is acid to ?~
aye told Bunker that he had to
rasecute Chau so that the g;en-
`"His and other s t r o p ganti--
nmmunists would not think; he
-s ? leaning toward the idea o[
t~~~ch broader effect. It has'
ll,~~n regarded as a signal toy all .
:iLi'f;U t h Vietnamese politicians,
tial~ any moves in the direction-
-poHticalaccommodation prith
t t~, enemy to end the war could,
r~'C;~n prison. '
? haws prosecution was Hirst
tpdught to require the lifting; of
f ftt~ immunity. When an effort
o~i'the National Assemblyfl~oor
If}fl!'d to getthenecesaary
tpt~tc-fourths votes, T h i e tt'a
ap.,~nts began cicculating a peti-
t(grr, a move of duMous consN-
tdtilmality.
} R^trorts of Bribery `
l [SYhile $unker was assuring
,V(JShington that Chau w o u l d.
nptti be imprisoned, others in his
o~;tt Embassy were reporting
t~pi; Thieu seemed to bs plan-
r~sj?rtions against the'
Prosecuted A
bl
mock of the United States House of Repre- that Chau had called for a coalition govern-;
sen.tatives. meat, which, he said, was "tantamount to'
As an able, independent-minded man who ,~
was lookine far a political settlement of the ~ .advocating the Wiet Cong's war aims." ;'~ .
Vietnam War, Chau incurred Thieu's disfavor. I' This remark seemed to disregard the fact
i Most authorities agree that the Thieu regime J that Mr. Nixoxn had said that he woulcl ac-
~~ could not survive a compromise political settle- , cept a coalition government in Saigon if
~' merit with Hanoi and the Viet Cong? '
.?' The charge against Chau was' that he had
illegal and unreported contacts with a Com-
munist agent from Hanoi. The agent is Chau's
I brother, Capt. Trap Ngoc Hien,-who was ar-
.~
rested in Saigon and testified that he was sent
?the South Vietnamese people wanted it.
Bunker had noted in a cablegram a year
ago tfiat. Chau never had favored coalition
i ,.tefrrrts of membership of Communises in
~.-~ ~ --
;'south in an effort to persuade Chau to defcct,~~t
to the communists..
Chau admitted seeing Bien, but said the cort- ~
! tact:v were with the knowledge and backlog of,
Startles Guests r `~
?
Political specialists at the Embassy are said' ~'
? to t>e convinced that Chau is neither a Com-.;'~
munist nor is he pro-Communist. But Bunker.+:
startled his guests at an Embassy dinner party's-,
in C)ecember Ity saying that he knew Chau toy-~i<
be a Communist.
Among the guests dt the dinner party was ,
Dong Van Swig, leader of the government blor, .?,
in the' South Vietnamese Senate and n strong
anti-Communist. A move to lift Chau's nark. ,:
~ structing him to head off Chau's prosecu=~'.
?tion. Richardson made the point that Clrau-., ,
.was considered loyal to Sauth Vietnam and ;, .
important to the interests of the United r
'Statcss: He said also that Chau's backgroundA
in tiae country and would damage support for
President Richard M, Nixon's Vietnam poi-'
 Approved For Release 2001 I,;. ~/O~k~"~C`'~iAi~P80
2 $ MAR 1970
~J.~. S laid to ~ava~ ~iac~eci ~Tisi~ by Chau, Thieu Foe-
~ i I I I
By TAD SZULC
S-~?I,I In Tli~ \,N Yort Tlmti
WAS1lINGTON, March 27-
Thc United States' blocked a
visit here by a South Vietnam-
ese Deputy, Tran Ngoc Chau,
last summer after tl~e embassy
lin Saigon had advised that his
trill would displease President
N;uyen Van Thieu, authorita-
tive quarters said here today.
This decision by the State
De"partment came according to
highly placed informants, at the
time when President Thieu be-
gan the pressure against Mr.
Chau that led to his azrest and
trial three weeks ago, when he
was stentenced to 10 years at
hard labor.
The charges against Mr. Chau
in a Saigon military court were
ithat he maintained illegal and
criminal contacts with his
~brothcr, a North Vietnamese in-
~telligence captain, Tran Ngou
Hion, despite srcret information
conveyed to the Saigon Govern-
ment by a higt:-ranking Arncri-
can official in July, 19G9, that
Mr. Chau had acted with the.
(knowledge and approval of the'
United States F?.mbassy and the
Central Intclligcncc Agency.
First Move Iasi Summer
As reconstn-cted from Ad-
inistration, Congressional and
other sources here, the first
effort by Mr. Chau's American
friends to save him from pro-
secution by the Thieu rc;ime,
which regards him as a poli-
tical foe, carne last' summer
when it was? first recognized
that he was in danger of arrest
and trial. .
John Paul Vann. chief of the
a closed scs>ion of the Senate
l~orcign Relations Committee
last month that he had pre-
sented "in detail" the back-
ground of Nlr. Chau's associa-
tion wPEh the United States
Government at a meeting in
July, 19G9, with Tran Thicn
Khicrn, who was then Deputy
Premier and now is Premier.
Mr. Vann testified 'that ~e
informed Mr. Khicm of Mr.
Chau's status with the author-
ization of his immediate su-
perior, the Deputy Ambassador,
William P. Colby.
The United States Govern.
merit has not, however, pub-
licly concedlsd that Mr. Chau
was acting in concert with
American political and intel-
ligence officials.
Mr. Vann':; testimony before
the senate foreign ~ relations
committee was heavily censored
by. the State: Department and
was returned to the committee
this week pe:iding a decision on
its release.
Bunkers polo Repealed
Mr. Vann"s testimony, ac-
cording to s~enntorial sources,
alSp touched at length on the
alleged delays by Ellsworth
Bunker, the United States Am-
bassador in Saigon, in carrying
out instructions from the State
Department Co intervene in fa-
vor of Mr. Chau.
At about the time Mr. Vann
conferred wiCh the Deputy Pre-
mier?a number of Mr. Chau's
American friends in South Viet-
nam arranged for him to visit
the United States. But when
Ma Chau applied for a visa, he
was refused one. informants
Dunkcr's rccommcndation,bssed
on the belief that President
Thieu would resent Mr. Chau's
departure.
Mr. Chau's concern was com-
municated to Senator J. W. FuI.
bright of Arkansas, Chairman.
of the Foreign Relations Cam-
mittce.~He is reportedly to have
suggested ko Under Secretary of
State Elliot L. Richardson that
the Administration intervene.
Mr. Richardson cabled in-
structions to Mr: Bunker on Dec.
23-the date was erroneously
reported in The Times today as
Dec. 22-to raise the Chau case
with President Thieu and in-
form him of the Administra-
tion's desire to see the charges
dropped. '
Officials confirmed yesterday
that Mr. Richardson followed
up the first cable with a second
one on Feb. 7, when it devel-
oped that Mr. Bunker had con-
veyed softened expression of
American concern to lower
ranking South Vietnamese oifi-~
cials.
As a result, Mr: Bunker met
Mr. Tliicu on Fcb. ]0, when he
was informed that the case was
already in the hands of the
military court.'
Bcforc his audience with Mr.
Thieu, Mr, Bunker was Yelay
ing assurances to the State
Department that even if tried,
Mr. Chau would not `be im-
r Meanwhile, 'the Administra-
tion continued to maintain
silence on the Chau case.
The' State ? Dcpartment's
spokesman; Robert J. McClos-
key said today that he would
net comment on any aspect of
the case, and did not anticjpate
STATINTL
that comment would be,forth-
coming.
In Key Biscayne, Fla., where
President. Nixon is spending the
Easter holiday, the White
House press secretary, Ronald
0. Ziegler said that there "is
no displeasure on the part of
the President whatsoever la
relation to Ambassador Buak-
Sal one" ~ of his post io
ii
Appr?ved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA=RDP80-016018000900050001-0 '
 STATINTL
JOURNAL
MAR 2 ~3 190
- 35,739
S - 41003
Vassar Group Plans Protesf
Of Defense Con'~rcacfis O~ I~;~A
,IBM to re)ec
th D a tment of Defense un- manufactured everything from
r
Mac roes p.,
April 27, business. As part of the increas-
The resolution would compel ing computerrzation of the Viet-
' t contracts' with nam War, the company h a
i VI 1110 111LG. ~~QY.v..aa, ++.~.^???-^.^?- -------
h' Cor in Atlanta on million in Defense Department
a1U111Ly lulvao /, .. ,.. ...,.. ..., -
~-...a,,,.a ~., ~?r~.a,ar resolution IBM, Novack explained, was
ca rng
i tee on IBM's Corporate Respon- terials that make the war pos-
facu ty me
's 11' themselves the Commit- companies that produce the ma-
A group o
1 tubers and students Now we intend to confront the
f f Vassar College said '"and little has happened.
~ e ep
`tit "all United States t-rmed bomb-sights for B-52 bombers
~ tortes personnel and all mili- to data-processing ,systems for
__ L.--..
ldly vyc,aL.vuo yw ........... ... .. - - -
.r.,.,+.~1 Tntnlliennrry AaPnr.V are And vet, if ,it. wanted to do
111 ~.,,.,u.,., ............. -? -- ---- ---- -- ~ P
ublica of Vietnam." a war roducer "without -major
Re
p
The committee intends to ask economic drslocation, he con-
IBM tockholders to sign their tinued. Military work in 1969
s
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-01
J
proxies over to them i~t sup- comprised only about 4.per cent
,port of the resolution. , , ~ ofl~ IBM's gross income of $7
IBM,'" Novack emphasized. "It
is an attack on production for
war. IBM, and all corporations,
will simply have to accept re-
sponsibility for what they pro-
duce and how it is used."
The Committee on IBM's Cor-
porate Responsibility is an rode-)
pendent organization that op?
erates without the official sang
lion of :Vassar College.; ,;
~~,~~ - -:+.ara'..,wa~H1.aY.iiiil.iL1.
Earl and spokesman for the also intends to leaflet and or=
s
group, calls .the move "'part ganize in support of the resolu-
of an exciting new phase of lion throughout the Mid-Hudson
~ the anti-war movement." region, where IBM has many
`~ "For six years we've been of its major research installs
demanding that the government lions. ~ ~ - ~ '~
i end ,the war is Vietnam,"'~ he "This is ` noE an attack on,
- - - -,.I...,~+.srrera~rr4~~ ~1S N ~ 1-~--se's-'~
.~
Approved For Release 201/03/04 :CIA-RDP,.80-016018000900050001-0
 STATINTL
Approved For Ie 1~~ :o~IP8O-01601
26 March 197?
The resent stratc ics do not com- ~- '
P g of police, and the Binh Xuyen bandits
arise a nlan fnr neacr insirlr. Snufh ~' L,.,..i,~ ~,.. ,.,.......,t ..e ?-,.. ..-...u:..- ' ?
?F.a? ,,.,,~, .,,~ ~y,,,~..,,,.. ,V.VIJ", ..~,.. Vietnam. In fact, uite the o osite.
q Pp dens with grenades and submachine
"escalation" to "dc-escalation," there By maintaining the current Icvel of '~; guns.
` has been little Change ih US policy hostilities. the Nixnn adminisfrafinn is " c..t....~..a ti..a~ -..a r..,-.....a ti., .~..
"'""'"" """"""'' """"b "" """ weakening the prospects fora "South- 'American mission, the Diem regime
year President Nixon has lowered ern solution"-that is, a peaceful settle- . was no more than an act of will-a vast
? the troop ceiling by 110,000 men, went among South Vietnamese, inde- :artificial bureaucracy, representing no
bringing the American forces down to pe;ndcnt of the North. Each da as the ,one
,the level they held at the time of the ~ y ,governing no one, except perhaps
war goes on, the North Vietnamese go :the 800,000 Northern Catholics who
Tit offensive. Though General Abrams,, deeper into the South
taking up the had with American help fled South
,
a much abler commander than West- 'responsibilities of the NLF guerrilla during the period of armistice. Though
di
U5
d
l
d
h
t
j
sen
ng.
as s
oppe
an
,
,? mare
-units and political cadres until even the ' Ictt-wing journalists have usually ar?
t
i
d d
o
es
ns an
r
troops to storm mounta
y village forces become a thick mixture, gued that the National Liberation
urge swaths aF jungle, the remaining of Northerners and Southerners. 1
American forces continue to pursue Front grew up in response to the
~ '~
Dicmist re
ressions
the truth never
,
p
,
with minor ~ variations the strategics 7 he present war is not only eetatd- 'ade
uatel
em
hasized is that the Viet
q
y .
p
they have been following since 1965: ing the process of accommodation Minh had been ruling various parts of
u
hout the
th
ti
f b
h
g
ases
ro
e occupa
on o
t
ernong the various South Vietnamese the country during the past decade:
'~ country, the search-and-clear opera- ,
political groups, but also creating the ~~ the NLF had merely to continue their
- lions in populated areas, combined "conditions for an extended and bloody ;work 'bf driving -out the old viltsge :.-
with th~usual amount of bombing and political conflict after an American, ;oligarchies and the bureaucrats from
shelling of unspecified targets. withdrawal. Though supporters of the i Saigon.
As for his policies toward the Saigon, war have usually' defended the Admin- ' After the fall of the Diem government
government, Nixon has shown respect ;stration's policies by summoning up ' in 1963 the non-Communist re Mme
'. for an even longer tradition. if "Viet- g
'" namization" means anything at all; it ~ the specter of a Viet Cong massacre, again disintegrated in the anarchic
`means the continued support of an 'they have misplaced both. the cause struggles of Buddhists against Catholics, ;
? .and the agent of the massacres. In fact urban Central Vietnamese against Sai-
_ ~. anti-Communist government, the en- it. is the Vietnamese who will suffer- gonese, soldiers against civilians, and al- '
~ i .largement 'and re-equipment of the not from an American pull-but but .. most everyone against the central gov-
~. .Vietnamese army on an American .from the after-effects of current Amee- ~ ernment. In the midst of this confusion
:. model, the increase in the number of , , th U 't d St t t' u d t
ur
e
e
s c
n
n e
m
a e
o
i
o po
.. .
US advisers and support units, and the ., lean war strategies. $ecause neither
attempt to create a "really" effective hawks nor doves have yet grasped the- money and arms into the Vietnamese
ies army in the conviction that because it
fudl conse
uences of these strate
,
q
g
~ counterinsurgency program. Or pre- ~
~? cisely the strategies the , US adopted ~ .I for the Vietnamese, it is perhaps useful was an army it was therefore a strong
'~ after the French withdrawal in 1954. {~ tee clear away some of the ?misappre- anti-Communist force. To the Vietnam-
.- These strategies do not appear to ~ h~:nsions that most Americans 'have ? ese, however, the army seemed no less
? ; ? serve the long-run interests of anyone, '~ long held about Vietnam, the most ~ divided than the country itself-a
President Nixon and General Thieu :fundamental of which is that there are group of men, all of ,whom were
? included. In the first place they do ' tvvo sides to the present conflict. ~ carrying weapons. When in the spring ~
~ To the Vietnamese the simple Amer-J of 1965 the US sent its first regular
"'~ not, 'any more than they did two years: i Icon apposition of "Communist" and I. combat troops to Vietnam. it con- ~:.
- ago, constitute a strategy far winning. ?anti-Communist" is an arbitrary one. firmed in power not the army leaders,
'.the war. At (cast same of the Adminis- , As a glance at the post-Geneva period: but those- generals who, after a dozen ~
tration officials recognize that they ~ will show, it is a Manichaean idea I coups and counter-coups, ha ened to
cannot defeat the NLF and the North ~ applied, indeed im osed, regardless of be occu PP
p pying the Armed Forces Hcad-
? Vietnamese. They may have adopted ~ ~ !
'the more limited goal of a slow US f thic Vietnamese reality. When the quarters at that moment. i
disengagement. that will keep the NLF ~ American military mission- first in? For the past four years the United ,
. I stalled itself in Saixon, the ? southarn States has proceeded systematically to
_ out of Saigon far as long ~as passible.' , a
In this case-rho case of slow retreat- half of the country was a mosaic of increase the size of the regular Viet-
the "Vietnamization" plan is folly. for :warlord fiefdoms, Viet Minh districts, namese armed forces while depriving it
it is no more than a return to the and regions controlled by various pout-' of its regular military functions. An
strategy which failed in the early .-foal soots-most of them managed, but- army trained with Fort Banning stand-
1960s and whose prospects have by no means governed, by the 'French ards of expertise to fight a comen-~
not improved with the entry of the- and their Vietnarrlese?minions. As soon tional foreiga.invasion, ,the ARVN?has
North Vietnamese into the war and the as. the French departed, .the thin. shell t had to -cope with a domestic political-
- growth of political awareness among all of the administration collapsed, leaving insurgency and to administer every-
" the South 'Vietnamese. While Nixon ~ the countryside in rho control of thing in the Gauntry from cultural
can prolong the current stalemate for an' autarchic villages; and Saigon an an-exchanges to water works. ~ ?
indefinit~~iraO,V1@~~n~dt I~~lle.~atr ?~t?/(~ut~4 tof~hAia+~DrP$?f0Ek6~1~R.OO'O9?005~000~1-b? '
Vietnamese army fight his war for him.'- E;mperor.. the prime minister. the chief '''~ ''' ' "'
,~,,.
 ,_ ,. ~ r
N ?~(pproved For~~Re.lease '2001/03/0~~,`;..' ~, A"-R;DP -A1
'SENTI;tEL
E - 19,225 ,
MAR 2 6 1970
j~~aims .i~ixon's ~Ac~rninis~ra~ion Blot~~n ~ ~~Qu~ l~-~is~or~
the Saigon police chief shnotiiifi
? By Mary McC-~rory an enemy in the head. in the
`- street and more recently to My
tvecuirvr_Tnty - T>,n Nivnn
administration continues to
show n special gift for bringing
the disc-sssion of those old and
inflamed issues -war and race
'- right back to ground zero.
E It is a technique of blotting
out history and restating blood-
. stained problems in sanitized
and unassailable terms that
:mean nothing.
Before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee the other
day, a suave, imperturbable ex-
h
titl
i
i
IA
ffi
l
ose
s
, w
e
~
o
c
a
~~p ti ty to COb1USN[ACV for
CORDS, was skillfully covering
familiar territory as ~E it had)
just been discovered.
As Ambassador 1V. `E. Colby
' explained il, evcrytlling is at
last going well because of ow?
"'new approach."
i Chairman .1. W. T~'ulhrinh
~a-.
Phoenix, an' oporation~ the
might not bear too much look-
ing into, is a new method of
destroying the Viet Cong in-
fi?astruclure. The ambassador
thought it might 'have a few
administrative flaws.
At about the ,same time, the
President wag issciing along,
solemn paper on ?lhe state of
the world. In at he announced
flatly: "This administration is
carrying out `a concerted and
coordinated plan for peace in
Vietnam."
' Also on the same day, Robert
lf. Finch, 'the secretary of
Ilcalth, Education and Welfare,
went before the ))louse Rules
Committee. The ~s~ubject wag
school integration tend, listening
to the exchanges, one would
belief. The ambassador said. it Court decision on desegregation
~. :was because "we have involved had been handed down the day
~- 'the people of South Vietnam"~bcfore and no one had the
J
The ambassador said wo had
? decentralized the government,
'as i[ it had been a tremendous
feat, when, in fact, Vietnamese
observance of law and order,
which means ,obeying the
Supremo Court, whose rulings,
Collncr said feelingly, could
lead to the destruction of the
cp, John B. Anderson, R-III.,
these yoars, "tharo is all this
furor about busing." ,
It is; of course, because the
Nixon administrations ,George
Wallace ever in mind, ~ en?
couaged the resistant South to
believe that all was ,not lost.
By asking for delay in Mis-,
sissippi :,integration before the
Supreme' Court, it brought the
controversy to where it was 18
years afro. :_
Ambassador Colby cautiously)
under questioning froth!
said
,
Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo.;
I that the war in Vietnam mi~h~
be over ? in 1b ears. The
' 'prospect for peace between the
~ 'races at home_ seems; more
lead for centuries govcrned~oulllic school sysl~em and nar-
themselves at the village levcL~:icularly # h e neighborhood
He spoke of ilia miraculous new ;chovl so dear to .Richard
rice we had introduced, al?: Vixonrs heart.
though before we got to savings ~ But it is, on they other hand,
them, the Vietnamese exported; apposed to busing, the ,most
'rice in large quantities. ? )tract way' of bot`reeting 1?acial
i The ambassador admitted! mbalance. Flnch~ ~ pleasantly
~.- 'delicately that the methods oF~'icoeheted frnm owte pillar of
he
u
ument
~o
Other
the
ti
t th
Vi
t C
hil
,,
a
,.4
,
,~~<
~?
rou
ng ou
e
ong, w
e
e
edmirahle nn paper and im-~ ? ,
maclllately couchccl in Weslcrn
~udicia terms, hail resulted in
'procedures that have not hecn
totally soli ? actory "_ -_ Q rye
Wouyht baclc~ii..$l- ~~Oi~l-
in the struggle. slightest idea of what would
One's mind slid back to the happen.
j"Hearts and Minds" program of Rep. William 112.. Colmar, the
the Diem regime. O n e Mississippi chairnnan of the
remembered ilia buoyant de-gales Committee, looked the
' parture in 1967 of Robert secretary straight in the eye
Komar, another former CIA o[-and said in a voice throbbing
~.ficial, for the RevoiCtiitltl'aryw~th grievance: ,
Development program, which You know, Mr. Secretary,
=took over from the Pacification the great importance of this
;program, .which is now known troublesome question to our
;as the Civil Operations andpeople."
Rural Developm~nk Support; The secretary n o d d e d
`program.sympathetically ~. and for ? the
Fulbright growled that what ?ext half hour' demonstrated
that the administration has no
W8S "different" about this War ..M:1..~.,,,6....n f6e ~.nc.F onnnivaA
??b?^???b social question of the cemury.
against the guerrillas instead ol'I It is,, of course, for the
Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP8~0-01601 80009.00050001-0
 STATINTL
Y[ASIi~.N4TON STdR
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :_CIA-RDP80-0160
T NF ~f;'A(I AFFAIR . sTf.~INT~ . '
.. , . ~ -.
~~ . I~ ~~a~o~, ~~r~@~~rr?s .i~ ~~i~
By JAJiES DOYLE
Sur Stet( 4Yriler
A ruling yesterday by he
South Vietnamese Supreme
Court has placed American
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker
squarely in the middle be-
? ~ twecn the Thieu regime and
' the State Department.
The court, which has shown
' some indepenlence from Pres-
ident Nguyen Van Thieu, ruled
that the arrest of Assembly-
; `man Tran Ngoc Chau was car-
- ried out in an unconstitutional
manner.
The ruling lent support to
the -heavy pressure that has
emanated from lower levels of
the American Embassy, and
higher levels oC the U.S, gov-
ernment here, to see that Chau
is freed from his sentence of
10 years 'at hard labor on
charges of aiding the enemy.
' In a cable to his superiors
some weeks ago, Bunker de-
fended the South Vietnamese
government action in prose-
cuting Chau and suggested ~ 1mpLcuty ap,~tvveu? Chau would be harm[u[ to
,'~ that judgment against it be In fact, Chau's recommen- United States' interests.
~..r suspended until Saigon's Su- dations be[or~e the Tet offer-; The ambassador chose not
preme Court ruled on the con- slue of 7968 were taken most to see Thieu himself, but to
atitutionality of Chau's arrest. seraousiy,~by some, military have the instructions _t~om
~nel and province chief who ~u, ttc~ ouo -~~ t,4 a ~,~ ~~:. ~ ` er -evet ~n a very low-Key
was in communication with his spouse to they North Vietnam- manner. ile reported back to
hrnthar frPrntontly .r, Saienn_ ; ese tactics that subsequently Washincton assurances that
would be vie~+vod as un f ust. , .
Aontinued
anyone t a d any l" r son
aor. ~`~`~r~ve~`~'~`r~.F~~P?aye.~~~~/~'[~-yC11P~-duQ~,~~j900050001-0
He painstakingly passed on ever necessary to convince Chau was guilty of a crime ! """" ""`?"' " `~"'
to the U.S. government in tor- President Thieu that the U.S. under $r,,l~h Vietnamese law better ass (tconcertedat move
mation he gained from convey- ~ wanted the Chau case because he had advocated a against Chau, and Bunker be-''
sations with his brother. .quashed. coalition government. g~ to downplay the cables
And at one point, in 1966, he The cable said that IoweT. In [act,say Chau's suppport-' from Washington.
undertook to set up a meeting level members of the govern- ers, ho never advocated allow-. - No member of the Vietnam
between his brother and then- ~ ment knew Chau and consid- lug Communists to serve in ' actioa group at the'State De-
U.S. Ambassador lfenry Cabot eyed him loyal to South Viet- the cabiniet but only to allow partment professes to believe
Lodge, with the knowledge and ram and an invaluable aid to/, an accommodation o[ mem-' that Chau is a Communist. No
caopcration of the American the United States, bers of the National Liberation
Embassy. Before the Paris Beyond that, Richardson Front oa the province level other member o[ the U.S. Em?
peace talks, this kind of con- said, high level government ot- through negotiations. Presi- bassy in Saigon has ever sug-
taet width North Vietnam was ~ ficials were concerned that an'' dentist advisor llenry A. Kis- Bested it, btany in both groups
sous;ht. adverse press reaction to ? sin er has advocated the same have said on the contrary,
The 1J66 meetin never Chau's trial would hurt su g that Chau fs not a Communist.
g ~'~ thing in published articles. Bunker has never charged it
came off because Lodge want- port for Nixon's Vietnam po - .
ed to send a lower official and ey. ~ A D[naer Party Remark ~ ~- writing or within official
Chau's brother, North Viet- The cable pointed out that channels, and he has never
There are various theories d l s c l o a e d his "irratutable ,
namesa Captain Tran NgoC? Chau'a background was well , on why Bunker decided to yrpat t.
tiler, refused to mcet with known in the United States, ,~ down lay the State Depart- ~ -?
aunougn nts ~rotncr was aft The Chau base has caused but that he might be prosecut-
agent of the,North Vietnamese ' rest anxiet in U.S. di lomat-
government. g Y P ed "in absentia" for seeing his'
Aside from the fact that a' to circles -especially sugges-~: brother.
number of the South Vietnam- tions that Dunker is responst-' Despite the tact that Presi-
ese overnment have family ble for not heading off Chau'a ! dent Nixon has said he would
g prosecution, accept a coalition government
members fighting on the other Bunker received a cable in Saigon if it were the peo-
side, Chau's case has caused from Undersecretary of State pies' wish, Bunker also cabled
much criticism for the other Elliot L. Richardson on Dec. the State Department that
TRAN NGOC C1iiAU / AAiBASSADOR BUNfiER
But agents of the Central Bunkcr'a Decision ?
Intelligence Agency and mem- Bunker was told to "leave ;,
bers of the U.S. mission in
Saigon knew about Chau's' mop ~onb pot o~^ t Th ieu ~~and
' /: vii- ! Y/ry .iii jr/ //rjr.y~
/ ,~..,
PRESIDENT TIIIEU ~
early December, before- the
cable traffic started to flow on .
Chau. .
Bunker told his guests that
night in early December that
he had ' "irrefutable proof"
that Chau was a Communist.
Among those present who
heard the remark were Dong
Van Sung, leader of the gov-
ernment bloc in the South Vi-
etnamese 5cnate and a strong
anti-Communist.
Also on hand was a staff
member of the National Secu-
rity Council during the John- '
son administration and the
early Nixon administration.
Richard bfoos, ?ho was in Sai- ~
Bon on atact-finding trip for
the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, confirmed today
that he had heard Bunker
make ttu~ rnmark, and thaq .
.;
 ~' STATINTL STATINTL
~!
.--
HON. WILLIAM F. RYAN
~TIiE GREAT SOUTH ASL!,N WAR falling to render effective oversight of
our foreign policy,
Dlarcli~'~f 1r9~f~d F?~~~~i~I~t~~0~~0Ii~~=~,~~r~~~'1~ _ ~ .~,
or Ntnv 7ortrC
IN THE ROUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Dforlda3l. Dfarcll. 23, f970
Dfr, RYAN. Mr. Slxakcr, the revela-
tions of past weeks about U.B. military
and paramilitary act(vlties in Laos por-
tend a repetitioli of the tragic history of
our involvement in Vietnam.
Any student of these events must co11-
clude that there is more than happen-
. stance which accounts for America's in-
colvement in Vietnam, nor is the United
States increasing role 1n Laos uninten-
tioncd.
' Michael Klnre, a staff member of the
North American Congress on Latin
America, has Written a remarkable ~sia and Indonesia. Combatants in these con-
analysis Of U.S. policy in Asia eritltled . filets have included, in addition to troops of
"The Great South Asian War." This aril- ~ the countries named, the armies of Great
r cle appeared in the March 9, 1970, 15sue Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand,
Of the Nation, It is Mr. Klare's tllesls' South I{ores, Nntlonnllat ,China and, of
' To nht n world-hlstorlcnl ers cctlve ?on courso, the United States.
6 P p These episodes constitute n common war
', rho war in VleLnant, ono must sco ft as but ,not only because they occupy overlapping '
ona eplsodo in a Great Soutlt Aslau War that zones fn a singlo thentro of war but also
began almost imtnedlntely nftor World War because they spring from a common cause.
II, and can bo expectod to continue into file '? the. determination of the advanced tndttstrldl
1970'x, if not well beyond them. 'notions of the West (led bq the United
In support of this thesis, Mr. Klare ~ Btn?tes) to .intensify their wntrol over the
' points oUt that-- destinies of the underdeveloped lands of Asla.
~ Tho Western presence In South Asia is nat-
United States military activity in Boutheast
Asia has actually increased !n the past few
months, with mast of this Increase taking
place In Laos.
And he maintains that.-
Tho Pentagon la now preparing for eombnt
opcrntlons in tlao nolghboring roglons of
? Bouth Asla.
Mt?. Klarc predicts that future conIIicts
are inevitable. These conflicts stem from
the United States' "stabllizatioil of Asia's
dependent status vis-a-vis the United
States, as a supl>licr of raw materials and
market for manufactured goods." This
? strategy "will doom South Asia to a con-
." dition of permanent underdevelopment,
and most of its inhabitants-especially
these in rural areas-to a condition o!
permanent impoverishment."
?' ~ Michael Klare concludes: ,
It has become abundantly clear that Amer-
ican plans for creation of a mercantile em-
'pits in South Asia will require the continued
troops (or native' troops under American .other's spheres of Influence !n Asia. The
command) for as long ss one can see Into United Btates, having conquered Japan, was
the future. to be dominant in the western Pacific
The article referred to follows:
(From tho Notion, Mar. 8, iD70]
TIIE GREAT BOUTII ASIAN WAA
(Dy Michael I{late)
('Mr. Kinre, a atnlf member of the North
Amerlean Congress on Latin America, fa com-
pleting rebook on counterinsurgency plan-
ning In rho United States.)
T'o gain a world-historlcat pcrspectlve on
the war 1n Vietnam, one must see it as but
one episode in n Grrnt South Asian War that
began almost immediately after World War
Ii, and can bo expected to continue Into rho
iD70s, 1f not well beyond them. The Great
War hoe already encompassed the Iado-
Chlneso Wnr of Independence (iD4~64),-the
guerrilla war 1n Malaya (194D-OD), inter-
mittent warfare In Laos (continuing), guer-
rilla skirmishes in Thailand (continuing),
and other armed struggles 1n Burma, Malay-
1t took Britain (with the aid of Australia and '
Gurkha tribesmen) twcivo years to force the i
last remnnnta of tha Maiaynn notes Llbcra- ,
tlon Army across tho border into Thailand. In ~
Indo-Chino, Franca faced an even mono for- ,
midable foo. In IDGD, confronted with a de- '
tcriorating military sltuntlon 1n Vietnam and
growing discontent at home, France appealed
to the Unltcd States to honor its comm-t-
ment and help prevent a breach of the
Allan defenso perimeter. Attu+..iRh the '
United States hod already deploycct fta troops
in South Korea to protect the northern
flank of the perimeter, it nevertheless agl'ced
to supply Franco with arms and badly needed
funds (the total U.S. contributlona to the
French military struggle In Indo-China
amounted to 82.8 billion, or 80 per teat of
the cost of the war),
Despite this help, the Vlet Mlnh won at
Dlenblenphu, and the French army withdrew
from Southeast Asia, leaving a substantial
mllitary vacuum at the mid-point of the .
French colonial apparatus hod not com-
pleted its removal from Saigon when Amer-
ica's arat pnrami-ltnrq legions began arriv-
ing. To circumvent the Geneva Accords,
which prohibited rho introduction of new
weapons or foreign military personnel Sato
Vietnam, the Michigan Stato University
Group (M5UG) was established to provide
a "cover" for the CIA team which armed
urr:ily a military a~td economic challenge to , and palace guard. The gradual 1nte11Si8c3-
Contmunist Chinn, whose real or imagined tlon of Us. military activity in Vietnam--
influence hn9 been a factor 1n each of these from the arrival of the first Special Forces
struggles, Bttt !t Is not the threat of Chinese " "advisers" to the deployment of a half-
bcilicoslty that lends unity to ail these cpi- million-man army-19 too familiar to tteed
sodas; It Is rather the determinntlon of file repenting. Less familiar, perhaps, is the hls-
regaon's Indlgcnous peoples to sccuro n futuro Cory of U.S. Involvement In Leos and Thal-
land; it 1s only In tho peat few months, In
Ilocrtuso
n cantroi
o o[ forM
fr
th
ill b
t
.
-
~
n
o
c
w
rho nations of South Asla nro frozen !n a fact, that rho public has learned that the
stn.te of vuderdevelopmont, and becauso nn- United States mnlntalns a substantiai-and
tlonnl boundaries (which, more often than active-military establishment !n Laos, nntl .
no"t, wero established by European powers) that we are bound 'to the Bangkok govern-
do not always conform to ethnic distribution, "meat by secret mllitary protocols. Despite
those coltfllcts often take the form of "ln? .the- well-publicized U.S. troop withdrawals
surgeneiea"-S,e ;local struggles against ten- `from South Vietnam, U.S. mllitary activity . ,
in
reased fn
t
ll
a h
ua
y
as ac
c
trn:llzed authority-and the response to them 1n Southeast Asl
has been n succession oL "counterlnsvrgen-" ? the past few months, with most of this ln-
clesl' Although the doctrine of counter- crease taking place in Laos.
'insurgency was orlglnaily formulated to aub~ During his recent eleven-nation tour of
stltute a strategy of "limited warfare" for the -Asia, Vlca President Bpfro Agnew stated In
obsolete strategies of "all-out" (Le., nuclear) Austrtilia that "despite a great deal of specu-
warfare, in Bouth Aala counterinsurgency latlon and rumor, the Uafted States is not
threatens to become unlimited in its dura- withdrawing from- Asla .and the Paclflc."
flan. Thanks to the assiduous iournallsm of a
At the end of World War II, the United few "Establishment" newspapers-partlcu-
laxly those which have Dome under attack
from Mr. Agnew-there caw no longer be any
denying that the U.S. war effort in Vietnam
has "spilled over" Into the rest of Sou(lteast
Asia. What la not known by most Apierip+ns
fa that the Pentagon 1s now preparing for
combat operations is rho nelghboting re-
glona of South Asia.
On January ID, 1968, Prime Minister Harold
Wilson announced that Great Sritnln would
withdraw all its troops stationed east of the
Buez Cnnni by the and of 1971, British bases
!n Asla=located in Singapore, Malaysia and
several Perefan Gulf sites-formed the back-
bone of a defense Ilne extending across the
entire Indian Ocean. Hrltain'e impending
withdrawal from this region produced con-
riternation In ~Yashington, where it had al-
ways been assumed that the English could be
counted upon to protect America's western :.
flank in Asia, One U.B. atrategtst, James D.
y
volvement up ta, and even including, in- 'w'here continued occupntloa would have Atkinson, wrote: "For almost a century the
tervention, 'Clearly, the warning Mr. boon unprotitabie (Burma) or boyond the vast Rod Bea-Persian Oult-Indian Ocean
Klare sounds in his article should awaken 'capacity of the home' econoaty (Indonesia) : oomplox was an area of relative stability, Thu
Congress so It defaults no longer on its Lta wenoprapared~toaenroper, the eolonlai- was so because ... Sritieh stpo~ andr ab a
gaga In protracted hand throughout iheee sea
1-esponaibllity t0 We Amei'1CaU ,peope8 by. oo+Anterguu'rilia atruggla~,to matntsla ihste.,' ip.serpond gnlcitiy for.rrq n..da polfoa .o- -
I commend this article to my col-
- leagues, and urge that they give it the
most careful and thoughtful considera-
tion.
I further urge them to support the
creation of a ,faint congressional Com-
mittee on Foreign Policy, which I hive
proposed in House Concurrent Resolu-
- lion 531, and in which 17 of my col-
leagues have joined. This instrument
would enable Congress to analyze and
assess from all aspects those political
and economic moves by tills Nation
which all too often result fn militar
in-
Approved .For Release 200.1'/03/04 :CIA-'RDP80-0,1.601 R0009~00050001 ~0;
(China, Japan, the Philippines, etc.); Francs
would remain In Indo-Chinn, and Brltaln !n
the Indian Ocean area tIndfa, Surma, Ma-
lnya, Signnpore, etch. Tho Allies also appor-
tioned responsiblilty for the mnintenanco of
a defenso perimeter, correspondlug to their
colonial holdings, which encircled the east-
ern half of Asla from Korea to Kashmir, nud
pledged to assist ona another 1f any point
on rho perimeter same under heavy attack,
This "gontteman's agreement" was soon put
to the test, for the restoration of cotonlal
rei;imes In South Asia (revoking wartime
promises of Independence) produced guer-
rilla warfare throughout the region. Beveral
countries won their independence this way.
 ^
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Approved For Release 2001s~/0~4 ?.~CIA-RDP80-01601
22 Mer 197a STATINTL
r,~......: , . r..rr J.~?A~.~li.`r~.:. i~ 1.:..' ajr?L':iSti+4JI.:: K_r1r...WLIYPIN/!
~~ O .
~,,,... ,,f ~ a G~''ii t~a'~~''~~
?+ 7
n~
vrrm ~o1.~J.:rLi,is bu.`1 4!/17 ~iiir~i/
~FT1JR several years of w ait?,
~n~? in the shadows, Ameri??.
ca's central Intelligence A~en~~r~
ma~? der lul{~f oi~erational main.,
l'hi~ ~~~crk's incredible coin in Cam?
bc'+alia. ~~?hich sti?ill have such far-reaching con-
c:~lucnccs thruu~~h the entire Asian theatre,,
h;tJ the stamp of the C.LA. at its most peer
fcsional.
(~' ntr.c there wall he no offs-
1
Ca
cid) alct.ril un the C.t..\. rule, but it ~~
taauhl h~ nais?c in today's world Io ~ 3
`~-- n,+uk'. a~?crthmw was just a luck'
a:rd;nt i'~ar thc'United States.
\~ :t~? hack in 19tiG, the agency
t??ac accused h}' some watchdog
' Am.rican S~n~~~ars of supporting
lami~o~iian rehcl~ who opposed the
Princr -- an accusation that was
.
ss?iJch? trumpetcJ about South-East ~+... ~ ~.~ '
? A.i~ aa?hcr.? the C.1.A. IS Cfedlted ~Y
? with h~a?in~ spies in every town and
? in ,;acr}' Government.
It probably dots.
While the super-apy agency has
maJa _mtc~quc mistakes over the
p~~t 111 ~?cars, it has also scored
some brsltianl successes and, -under
tha enthu.ia!~tic support of t resi-
dtnt tiixon, t^.LA, director Rich?
arJ Helms and his world-wide net-
work of spits arc doubtless mart
poa~?~rful than ever.
Char;cs that Ihcy had meddled
far too much in Asian politics
eat:~td the C.i.A. men to tic low
for some time. but 6t was obvious
t~?en to a reporter on a brief vi~:il
to South-East Asia this month that
. ~ the C.I.A. a?rs "gong-ho" again.
T r a n a p n r t and rns!knger
planes of Air /\me-~ca Inr.,
which is run as a C.i.A. sub-
.?.
- - ...,y.
t,..1./1. chief RicFtard Helms ... ~~ po..arful
? ; tltsn ttwrar
rr.rr~M --- -
From ~~ET~ft
M~~HE.LM0~2~
in 1,+le~w York
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 ?STATINTL
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21 MAR X970
7 T~omen T~ief~cong Suspects Sit and V~1'ait
---_ ____
L'y GLORIA ED9ER50N months," Mrs. Dinh said. "I water and the pot that serves
,p
CAOLANH, South Vietnam, was arrested one month and as their toilet. Prc aced meals
il4arch 14 -- It' is a smaller, thirteen days ago:' arc given to the seven women,
quieter war now, ? but the How did she ltecp traclt of acid a guard said their families
wreckage can be seen even in time? Mrs. Dinh was asked if were able to bring them clothes
a small, bare room here where she make markings on the wall or more fpod but' he did not
seven Vietnamese women sit, so she would not bu confused know how they were able to
brushing the flies away from or forget ~t1c passing of each let their families know where
their faces and bare feet. 24 hours. Something close to they were. During the day, the
They are Vietcong suspects. a smile moved her mouth. She seven women work cleaning up
The seven women are to- was, the prettiest of the women. the police headquarters or the
gethcr in Kienphong Province "I do not need to, I do not grounds ar the detention cen-
detention cotter, one of the 44 lose track, she said. Her fam- ter.
in South Vietnam, waiting for ily farmed and she was a It is not a brutal place by
a local security council to de- farmer, Mrs. Dinh said. The Vietnamese standards. The
vide whether they are guilty other women looked at her, women did not look maltreat-
and, if so, the degree of that but not ojtenly, as she spoke. ed. The ?smallest of them=24-
ear=
ld N
e
Thi H
that identify people in other
nations: ? education, health, fi-
nancial status>>, voting habits.
The objections voiced by
some Vietnamese - usually
experienced anti-Communists--
to the Phoenix program is thzit
detention may help the Viet-
cong recruit new people. They
do not seem as.concerned thzit
the Phoenix program may de-
tain and embitter the innocent,
and cause anguish to their farri-
ilies who in some cases do
not. even know where these
relatives have disappeared.
They worry-although not'
loudly -that Phoenix, which
is part of the- pacfication pr~~-
gram, may ironically increase
the ranks of the Vietcong
when its purpose is to dimin-
fish them.
A typical reaction came from
y
o
guy
n
on -
guilt. Iiusban~d Was a Vietcong looked very frightened. She was
A one-story building where "My husband was a.Vietcong arrested a month a o
men and women are segregat- . g '
ed, the detention center in the mformatio~n cadre," she said, Only one of them was sched-~
Mekong delta town of Caolanh not hiding an inflection of pride. uled to be released soon: Thu-
is hardly a tourist attraction. The last .time we have. seen ong Thi Dung, 34, who had
The province police .commis- each other was a year ago. I been .cleared by, the province
sionet? forbids unauthorized do not know whether my has- security board, which is headed
visitors to speak with the de- band still lives:' She would by the, province chief.
not give his rank .in the Viet-
tainecs, or to ask about them. g Unaware of Rights
Any films taken of the people COWho takes care of her child? Five of the women did not
are confiscated. "My mother-in-law," she said. seem to know how long it
.But sometimes it is possible Her fact; had showed only. a would take for their cases to
to slip in. widening of the eves whop th.e be decided. They also did not
If found guiltty, the women American ,visitor walked into know that the alleged limit for
in' the room could serve ]ail the cell. detention was three months.
sentences u.p to two .years. ? The fcek 'of Mrs, Dinh., were One woman said she had al-
They do not know it. different from the feet of the ready been found guilt}r ? al-
Their detention is part of a other women, whose soles and though, unlike Mrs. Dinh, she
three-year-old operation called toes show that for years they was not reckless enough -'or
Phoenix-Phung Hoang in Viet- h It d in the fields or perhaps proud enough -- to
r
e
~amesr-whose purpose is to ave wo
icatch Vietcong leaders and rice paddies. Hers looked too say'why. Nguyen Thi Rrnh, 3G,
~a ents from the civilian popu- soft. has bet:n in the room for nine
S Wh were her feet not the months. She''was sentenced to
+,lation. It was established by feet. oP far,m women? Mrs, Dinh one year in jail but 'returned
the United States Central In- ignored the question. She made to t>ae. detention center to act
,telligence Agency in 1tJ67 and ~,,s +nn t1,at chn waa not as snnnrvisnr of tha nthpr wn.
South Vietnamese Government.l'""""b'?'""'`"' ?"`" ~"""` ~~ ?'~
not seem to care much al. "The'reason is my good be-
They Are Used io Questions though no one accused of being havior," Mrs. Ranh said.
The seven women, who have a Vietcongg,,.suspect wants to by The. women spoke in Viet-
all been interrogated. by the photograplied. .Their pictures, namese through an interpreter
provincial police for at least if they moved, could be .used, in low voices so the guard lis-
one day, are used to questions. in "wanted" .posters to locate tening outside the door of iron
They answer with a slow, al- them. ~- bars would not report the con-
most mournful manner. Name, 'The:room appeared to be 10 versations. He finally did.
age, village, parents, husband, by 12 feet wide, most of it a Thci?e wa.. not enough time
children. raised cement platform where to ask the women who had ar-
? It was the first time they the women sat, -ate and slept, rested them. They ail came
had seen a white person who There was no room for any from villages of the province.
'was not a man. They refused two of them to walk up and There was not time to ask them
to accept cigarettes-very few down while the others sat, but whether informants in their vil-
Vietnamese women smoke - it is not a. habit of Vietnamese loges had reported them to the
but they refused with a smile, women to pace. police and' if so, .they would
except for one of them, She Thex do not mind sleeping return to the, villages and live
?was the only woman wha did on thin straw mats covering with ease among the inform-
not looked downcast, or the platform, because , most crs again. '
'dimmed by her confinement Vietnamese -like very hard Some .of' the' methods of
or what might be ahead. The wooden beds with no mat- Operation Phoenix ~ seem too
iron self-assurance of that 25- tresses. Btrt the cement is cold sophisticated far Vietnam. There
year-old woman, who have her at night and there are no is na trial to pass a verdict.
name as Tran Kim Drr-h, and blankets iq the detention? cen= The province security ^ouncil
the coolness with which she ter. Tho ceiling of the high needs a dossier on each de-
voiunteered information not room is barbed wire. -tamed person. But it is hard,
asked for, mado her very dif- Below rho platform is a nor-loften impossible, to gather a
ferent. row ditch apd ' in the right- dossier on a Vietnameso vil-
a village chief in the same
province, whose anti-Commu-
nism has shaped the last 20
violent years of his life. lie
asked that his name not 'be
used for it would not do hi,m
good to criticize a plan ap-
proved by his Government and
the Americans.
"A detention center is a wiry
of ht;lping the Vietcong to
reach and influence other Vit;t-
namese;' the 51-.year-old vil?i
loge chief said, "for you can-;
not expect the Vietcong, even:
the lower ranlts, to be cori.~ ,
fined in quarters w;th unhapl?y ~ "
pooplo for so fang and not try
to win then ovcr.:It is a ra,~di
~Yi-etco._n8, tr.~scho+oi. u~ ..,(
0050001-0
 DA2LY. PIORL~
Approved For Release 2001~0~/~1~R~?j~~-RDP80-01601 RO
~~ oro dao~ pow
STATINTL
U.S. B-52 bombers and other warplanes were diverted yesterday to missions over
northern Laos as two outposts barely six miles awary frol4l the U.S. CIA base at Sam
Thong fell to the Lao Patriotic Front. Military sources in Saigon said the B-52's made
only three raids yesterday over South Vietnam because most of them had been sent
,~ o
~~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~~ a ~ a~~Q
J
Daily World Foreign Department
state, postponed his scheduled respect , Cambodia's ? neutrality, ince in Cambodia, where the U.S.:
departure for Peking on his way territorial integrity and inde- ;? and Saigon say thousands of ??Vi-
home, and in an interview he..~pendenceu and also asked [or ? etcong" are hiding, found it to '
said: "The events which have, damages to pay for last Wednes- ?? be an absolutely flat. almost .,
just occurred in our country may' day's mob attacks on their two treeless area surrounded. on ?~
make some foreign observers , embassies In Phnom Penh. . ? three sides by South Vietnamese + ?
think that Cambodia may change Informed sources are dubious , territory,-where nothing could be ;
its orientation acid its ideology. ?~ about General Lon Nol's wild . hidden from patraUing V.S. air-
u..i -,.,..a ..s ....,.,.
Cambodia has suspended its ~ "" ~~un~~ers,- ana saga, that. the [nternational Control Com-
earlier demand that what it al- :Cambodia and Sihanouk'could. ? mission iICC- on Vietnam, ad-
leged to be "North Vietnamese reply oni the Soviet Union's all-; ~ milted that he "passed on" in-..
and Vietcong" troops (cave Cam- .round support in the struggles ?? formation to the U.S. C[A. The
bodian territory. The change against imperialist provocations, Canadian officer said the CiA
was indicated during a Monday and interference in her affairs."~ would come to him claiming that
meeting between Cambodian For- Cambodia parley ^an entire Vietcong corps" was
. eign Minister Norodom Phouris- U.S. news sources in Cambodia. ' i~ a certain border area. and
Sara and representatives of 'the ;said that in Monday's Cambodia?? ?Ketcheson said he would dis-
Democratic Republic of Vietnam DRV-PR(; meeting, the .two Viet? 'agree "but very often they chose
and the Provisional Revolution- ~ namese rrepresentatives did not ' ? to believe their own spies.'
ary Government of South Viet- "discuss the charge of Cambodian ..' A report in the Feb: 26 issue
nam, in the Cambodian capital .Premier Lan Nol's government of the conservative.'?Far Eastern
of Phnom Penh. that NLF' and DRV troops were :.Economic Review" Hong Kong-
Irn Moscow, Prince Norodom operating on Cambodian territory. ?;: says that a reporter who tray
Sihanouk, Cambodia's chief of 'The PRG~ and DRV pledged to ? eled all over Svay Rieng prove
- . cnarge5 [nay 9u,vw LJIi V ana ? Cralb
sure you that we shall not change ~ NLF troops are in Cambodia, a ~ - - '
our principles. We shall keep charge that U.S.-Saigon military
our neutrality and our.independ- propagancla has been making for
ence. 1'he Cambodian people and several years. in the Nov. 16. ,
I personally will not permit any ?? Iggg
Washington Post
Canadian
,
.
changes concerning our friend- ,General Donald Ketcheson gave
pecially with.the USSR~'_ - , :,~ Gen.~Ketcheson. a member of
5-hanouk met with top-level So-
viet officials on Monday, includ-~' '
ing President Nikolai Podgorny
.and Premier Alexei Kosygin. The.
joint Soviet-Cambodian statement-
at the end of the meeting stated: c.
?'The aggression a[ the Hmerican ?
imperialists in Vietnam, armed
intervention in Laos, U.S.-Saigon
provocations against Cambodia
and Cambodian neutrality are the ;,
main reasons for the aggravation
o[ the situation in Indochina and.
in Southeast Asia as a whole."
The Soviet government "again
confirmed its resnect lei ~ha
neutraity and territorial Integ- ?; ~ ~ ,i
~b`~~'~b~''1''~Iease 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-016018000900050001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80?01601 RO
-----o--?-? : ..?
columnist Flara Lewis that brings its dan- internal affairs," but Miss Lewis spells ':
gars -and dishonor -into focus. out several practical dangers: '
Mr. Chau, it may be recalled, was a ~ First and most simply, it may have ruined
? member of the anti-Thieu faction of the .Americans' ability to hold the confidence of any i
South Vietnamese National Assembly. At .Vietnamese outside of President Thieu's coterie i
( the insistence of the ThieLt regime he was since the 1J. S. cannot or will not protect them.
recently dragged by police: from refuge in : Second, it is clearly a power play by Thieu to i
' the assembly building, tried, and sent- smash -his non-Communist opposition in South
enced to 10 years at hard labor for "talk- Vietnam.
ing" with his brother, a North Vietnamese i
army officer. The case has strengthened Thieu against any
? Now a senior American corps adviser in non-Communist rivals, but it has,much weakened
.Vietnam has testified secr~ztly to the Sen- Saigon's 'chances of building a national political
ate Foreign Relations Committee that base that. could hold its own against the Cam-'?+
Chau "kept him informed of .those meet- ~ munists. That is- a blow against Mr. Nixon's 'i
ings (whit his brother) to help the allied ? Vietnamization policy Because it reduces hopes j
r: cause." It is reliably rumored that Chau . ~ for' an "orderly wbthdrawal." Ir 9s another ,
~' regularly passed information to the_ C.IA, example of the' wily way Thieu has managed to ;'
although never a CIA agent. box the Americans and.~gain power through his
? Chau, in short, is considered by Wash- ~ own weakness. .. ~..
ington officials to be "a loyal patriot who -? We would ?suggest, moreover, that U. S. f
;~ U.S. o es some protections ?to whom the.: ; honor is at stake.? ?~t is intolerable, a !
cc~= ~ ~s~:l3o. nl. ~.
NEl';s
RkaR 1 ~ I~~7o
LI -
8;,477
S -
10I,08I
? i Although the case of the South Vict- The case is very delicate in view of the
`namese assemblyman Tran Ngoc Chau has' touchiness of the South Vietnamese gov- ~
,, been much publicized in recent davs. it is arnman* ~>,.,..~ ~..._.,,___ ,_. ~
But the protection is na~t forthcoming;
and Chau, is off to Tiileu's prisons, in
.,,...~.y ~~ ail ine goals we profess in . j
? Vietnam, .to permit the political persecu-
tin? -.d _ r_e__
? happen to'be a fr1- ---~ ....., ..~.~. u~~r.~
end of Thieu's..
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-016018000900050001-0
 STATINTL
Approved For Release ~1i~~i~~s: ~`~~tDP80-01
' 1 6 h1AR 1970
~~ri~~I~~~~.~.~ ~~~v~~~~.~~~~~'~ ~~.ili~~
tralion is now ironicauy nlamtng ine.
The Ci~1. and At?my Chief of SlafUhnn~+ca- iia:,c ~~~~~~ ,.~~,.?~ ,?.?.,..-.' ....._
Ccn. Wc~lmorcland, then comman. a,ainst the Community. 'c'hat is a
der in Vietnam, havo so far refused blow against Nixon's Victnamiza-
to confirm or deny reports that they lion polity y hecause it reduces hopes
got arlvance warning of the 17(i8''1'et for an orderly withrlrawal." It is
offensive ihr~u~h Chau. But ,it is another example of the wily ?vay
known that Chau. did provide infor-yZ'hieu has managed to box the
ower through
i
d
ga
n p
malign to the CiA though he was Americans an
never a it.S_ anent, his own weakness.
t,.,.,..,~ h;c rr*ai mntive~.
~yY~ ?~!~!-~';.?; A high State Department official
~-~'`~ r '`? zvas in Saigon last week tryinri to ,
'
,
~
("i'~..?~~s=;,;; .,:i? fi;ut?e out what can be done now. ?
!r.~; l' ~ c~ 1Vhite House advisers are urgently
~' ;I"'~~ . ?_~~? ~ ~(`-`',` ;debating further moves, including
'the possibility of rescuing Chau
from prison and getting him out of .
the- country. A numher of senators,
botl,l Hawks and Doves, are pressing
The case of a jailed Vietnamese
dcltut~? is threatenin5 to becomo 'a
critical ~~?atershed in the Nixon
Adminicu?ation's relations wit h
? .5'Alfllll >~lelnanl.
It has provr~ked an intense ar-
gument inside the U.S. government.
c,,,,,o nrr;r;als feel it ieo?ardizes
I;'iCSldent NlxonS wno~e vae4uauu- Kutt1S 1'ri1111ps, woo was senor -?----?-?
nation plan, as well as discrediting U,S, adviser in I{ien il:oa province but he seems to he ptayin~ for the
the United States in Vietnam and .when Chau was the province c??.ef, highest slakes-maneuvering him-
abroad. ~-says, "I'm, sure he wasnti workinb self into a position where ~Ir. Xixon
The immediate dispute centers on for us, he would never be on will have to choose either indefi-
~vhat the United States should do anybody's payroll. He 'would have nite .support for the ??ar with a
.about Tran \goc Chau, the ~l6-year-.told nvhat he learned- because he Thieu veto on any proposals for
old opposition member of the Soutit settlement, or risking total collap=e
. 1'ictnamcse assembly who has been ~,houl;ht ~~ it was ' in' the national inBunke ;bfor ~ hom Ir~eAixon is
sentenced to 10 years at hard labor interest: seeking a replacement, arhues' that
on charges o[ compromising nation- ., gecause.~f the widespread convic- Thieu must not he challenged
al security. Private reports f r o m ~ lion of U.S. Vietnam experts that o enl because nobody else can hold
?Saigon have been received in Nash- Cliau. is a loyal patriot who has South Vietnam together 1 o n g
infiton saying there is serious risk helprd Americans and to wham the e1iau h for `ir. Nixon to seek his
that if he is left in jail, C11au may United States roves fiamepl'atCCtion,."honorable peace." Some .~-dminis-~
suddenly be reported a mysterious ~Vashin?ton ordered U.5. Ambassa tralion ofticials agree.
prison "suicide" or "killed while dor :Ellsworth Bunker to head off . gut .the Chau case is another
'attempting to escape." ~. the trial. Bunker, who was in Saigon distressing s(gn that Thieu has ne?
Chau's prosecution, on the orders .during the Tel offensive, did not. He intention of letting the United
of President Thieu. was based on the told 1Vashington he thought Chau States off is painful Vietnamese
:fact that he was in touch with ]iis was a Communist. h~k, and teat once again he has
;brother Capt. Tran Ngoc Hien, nowt 1\'o American evidence ~of Cltau's outwitted Washington for the bens
in a Saifion jail as a convicted agent; loyalty and scrvlce to the nationalist fit, oi? no opa_but himself. '
. _ __.
of Hanoi. But Sohn Vann, .senior cause was presented at his trial, a
i.%!~I~~U~~~ti ~.//'"'~'I~I~I'~~~ I ?The case, as all thinks Vietnamese,
ti} ~ L.^4'~'~~i%'~/`j~l'IS!~? has_ layers upon layet?s of cornplica?.
a~ r . -- _ _:_ ..:..
~ip~,~~'_:~--~~"-i'.:....~~.:~~~~r{~I^'?'tr ruined Americans' ability to hold
outside of President Thieu's coterie
"Anrl nn my left the South Vietnainer,c sloes the United States cannot or
government iq demonstrating the self-. will not protect them.
drterminaticn we're fighting fort" 'a'C
American arlviscr in South Viet- "~"""""' '" '" ~'"~"'' ' `" ~ -" ~~~"
t,~ rt,i~u to smash leis non-Commu- ;
c1nsed scssMn o{ the Senate hbrcign ' The case has strengthened Thieu
that Chau kept him ]in[ormedlied but it has much weakened Saigdn'e ,
cdurc.~'~Ni~~~'r~~l ~d'r~e~ease~l~6~f10"~/0~'~`~~`'Fi4~-f2[~'~eb~1601 R00090~0050001-0
 Approved For Release 2001~~~~xCI~T~T~~ab16
Laos: Ano~~~~ Vietnam?
here was a time when Laos-the Land IIo Chi Minh Trail;' he said, "we have
T of the 141illion rlcphants :rnd the continued to carry out reconnaissance
White Parasol-was a subject of consider- iliglrts in north Laos and fly combat sup-
' able mirth in Washington. 13eside the port missions for Laotian forces when re-
slau~;htcrhouse realities of Vietnam, quested to do so by the Roy:rl Laotian
events in the remote Buddhist kingdom 'Government.
seemed almost like an opium dream in While admitting the U.S. air role, how-
which little men with unprrniouncotthle ever, the President denied that there arc
.. .,
panics chased each other back aril forth any AmeLrican ground combat troops in
., ,,, ,-_ _[ 1_..- ...:,r. ..,.,.,.,lnnnnu 1.:rCFS OY plat his Administration had any
this time neither the nwnnnsu~anon nv~ .??~?~? ~?..?, .. ~ --- --
its ca?itics was finding it a laughing matter. ploycd" or "on contract" to the U.S. Gov- 1
One reason fur the seriousness in Wash- ? .ernment, and that of this number 843 S
ington was the stmmirrg success of the are engaged as military advisers or in j
current dry-season olfensivc try tl~e North logistics. "U.S. personnel in Laos during
~ Vietnamese and their local Communist the past year has not increased," Mr. Nix-
' allies, the 1'athet Lao. But even more un- on stated, while the North Vietnamese
settling to the White llousc was the "have poured over 13,000 additional
1 ? trop >s into L~o4 during the past few .,
?
ll
STATINTL
, w rc,re i ?
~ capticnrs mood on Caprlol Iir
' rn:ury congressmen, not all of therm doves months3~raising their total in Laos to over', '
on Vietnam, were making plain +their nn- ~ 67,000. Irr view of the massive North ! '' '
happiucss with the sub-rosa nature of the Vietnamese buildup and their recent oF- j
U.S. role in Laos. A sizable number even fcnsive, Mr. Nixon disclosed that he had ~ ,
. shared the fear of South Dakota's Sen. written to Prime Minister Harold Wilson: ?
Ceorge i`icC;overn that "'in spite of the and Premier Aleksei Kosygirr, urging i
painfiil lessons of Vietnam, we are going , them to help restore the 1962 Ceneva i
,down the same road in Laos, and we aro accord. (Britain and the Soviet Union
doing it in secret." were co-chairmen of the Geneva con- ; -
ftole: Trying to contain the riising tide : 1~ference that. established the neutrality of
of Congressional-criticism, President Nix- ?ii~,aos and set u~ a government in Vien- ,
on last week issued a carefully phrased, tiane theoretically composed of rightists, ~ ?
3,000-word statement from his Florida neutralists and Communists.)
.,~ White House at Key 13iscayne. 'The U.S. Buffer: Whether that help would came
r commitment in Laos, the President said, .was subject to considerable doubt. The
,~, , ~,,1; ,.r'~ "is limited. It is requested. It is supportive British appeared willing to have consul-
-,`: ?,,i'"~' ,and it is defensive. Mr. Nixon then, tations among the fourteen signatories ' -
?~/' for the first time, admitted the U.S. had of _khe 1962 convention. Rut the Russian
._,___ _ .?-.~t,i.,n nF A nnmtt:fit rn1P iA attllude WAS another matter. A'IOSt Ob- ,
'
? -~
~ "
servers are convinced that Moscow, al-
ready concerned over an ambitious Red
,~ ` Chinese road-building program m Laos, ~ -
g ;~ ~ ty.; ~~ . , would like to preserve the precariot i It f .
denouncing the U.S. as :t vto .+ ~
Ccneva pact. Hanoi, of course, has never !
ndmittcd that it has troops in Laos. ,
Domestically, it was not at all certain'
that Mr. Nixon had managed-as ha has
done in the case of Vietnam-to throw i
his domestic critics off stride. For despito ~ ? .
his assm?ances that he was leveling with ~
the American people on Laos, it was
readily apparent that the President had ~
tiptoed through some delicate semantic
hrlips? There may not be, as he stated,
any uniformed U.S. "ground combat"
s,, ,-.,,,,.,,:,
+ (`y i ?~ ~ 'r ~ ~ , M~',r '"' '''` ~; ~~, p? ,s. But carrel ndents on ~
' ~ 1 ~1~ troo ~ in Lao' po
~ - ~ ~~1,, ~ 1~ i ~r~ ~~~ thg??scene in Laos have reported that a ~' ,
l be f American "civilians =
` balanced bu[Fer state much as rt ex s s
'C ~ .r. ~ ._!t_.. .?...?r.? M t,tnntr AnV Further en- 1
~, ,
?~.''~--..~ ? ` ~ iti" r' ? ' ? ~ ~ ~ .. Asia. taut now that the U.S. has public y
;i !~' "" ';.,u'' ``~ -~- '~~~n'~' t : 'admitted its military role in Laos, it i
-- ~~~ r . ? '' ~ --'`'y~~' `~~ ~ J ~~ ?~ might he difficult for Moscow to avoid
~~ -- ~^^ -''~~~ ~ 1? t rr of the ~ .
Coned O ~B70 bs~ hnKda~ SIwM IirLable num K O
'Eve bad lower your v~olcea ', ananY.Of . the~n~ former-GI':-, are not on}y,,;
Appr'ov:eyd.~b;~~~tl(~.3J.09i :CIA-RDP80-016018000900050001 ;~~,rtinurd
 Approved For Release ~~1~~~~~~I~~~bP80-0160
16 MAR 1970
r
"~~"~ SIn,Jt .~y ~1.t1,t'/t0'tU
~~p~sy-curvy t~si~n Events
~Il?e~d~fl~~~t?e a~io~aal P~~i~ies
IIONG KONG-This is '.i'hc ~ President also "~ dudginq from their con'?'
one of those periods in stressed that the bombings sptruous silence on Lhe suh? 4
Southeast Asia when events arc being carried out at the jc?ct, fDr instiince, the
are so tan~;lcd that, to cite ~ rcgacst of the Laotian gnv, (;hincsa arc clearly unhappy
. ernment. Asked whether the with the Laotian Commu. ~
the old adage, anybody who 'bombings would continue if ~ nist's recent five?point pro? +"
is not completely confused ' .Hanoi accepted his offer, posal for a peace settlement
? is just very badly informed.
The mayor powers as wr11 .; , $OUVanna Phouma replied: ! in Laos. ;
~~ as the states of the rcgign 'i ~"It is up to tine, Amerlcans~to ';'9 j ? Moscow, Peking, Hanoi j.
themselves are apparently ~ decide:' 'and the Vietcong .have un?~'.
? being swept along; in a top? ~ In the cneanttme, Lhe
sy-turvy momentum over ?~ Thais fiave been blurr[ntf
.which they seem to have lit? the situation beyond com-
tle control. And, as a cones- prehension by characteris?
' quence, well-planned polio ~ tically taking; firm, unswerv
Gies have degenerated into ing stands on both sides of
irrational, knee-jerk reac? ~~ the question.
lions that compounfl the con- ~ ; ?; 'Speaking in New York a
.fusion. ?'I few weeks ago, for example,
Nothing illustrates the i the Thai Foreign Minister
contradictions of American i Thanat Khoman asserted
conduct more draruatieall~ ;that the nai>ions of South-
than the spectacle of the east Asia could no longer
United States despFFately ~ rely on the United States
seeking to resurrect the coa- ;
lition government in Laos
' while balking at the crea? }
lion o[ a similar coalition in
,' South Vietnam.'
The argument against a ~'
. coalition in Saigon is that it .
will open the way for a
Communist takeover. The.;;
argument for bringing the; ;.
~ Communists back into the '
.
Vientiane coalition is that?it ; ~~ ~xrcTnr.. n,vrntve.raT>r~r."' 'as the Slno?Sovlet conflict;
ity to Laos. c1.~5 atso emnrou ~ouLn ?. withdrawal from the area:
' The official line, more- '~ Vietnam, where President ' ~ ' Whatever unfolds In the
~~'-over, is that a coalition can- ~? Thieu s regime alternatively ~,; future, then, the. past tur-r
not be "imposed" on the i~ Praises U.?;.:support and dis? .'."moll and present instability,
i
b
+
i
'
~ant
+Mm~ r
l{ ta~n
~a f :
': South Vietnamese. In Laos, Plays^
of Southeast Asia are proof
?' forced the- right -wing, to ro?
~~ operate with the Commu-
nists when the original coa?
AN EQUALILY CIIRIOIIS
contrast between American
and Laotian attitudes
emerged on the name day
last week in simultaneous
but obviously uncoordinated
statements by President
Mixon and Prem[er 5ou?
doubtedly been thrown into-
a tizzy as well by the sudden
-i?turnabout In Cambodia,;,
-which served as their kPy?-
~. pied?a?terre in the Indochina',l
peninsula.
?' In places like lndonesfa~
p and Burma, meanwhile; both t
? jthe Russians and Chinese
,have nothin~q to show fir
.. their efforts to encourage.
native insurgents or to ,im-`
prove their relations with
~.,~ the local. government.
TH.. u.1d..-..?....a at.......-.._
with Communist China.
Thereupon, it was later
disclosed, he proceeded to
Washingtott to put to an "ur?
gent" request for an in~
crease in American military
~'ti :the region as a younger gen-~
;u" eratlon, dissatisfied with the
doctrines ? that stirred Its;
fathers' thirsts for fresh ap-
the Communist oftenalve in .,;, for new alignments to rem
adjoining Laos. :~~
aponse to such developmenta~
Nv..~.~~u~. QI:GNJVM ....:....~..-~ mat, brJ~llanc..oit,atrat~~ey .
intt with the Central Intelli- ..... ,
i' Bence Agency. '
~ Odc11y enough, in a broad-
~ cast the other day from ~
Ilanol, the Communists
name to Chau's defense de- ;
..spite his admitted CIA
connections. His conviction, '~
said Hanoi, was "a fascist ~
act of repression."
Americans baffled and. a
dismayed by all this lncohet- :~
vanna Phouma. ' .
:fir. Nixon insisted in hIs
statement that the U.S. eonsolatlon in the fact that ~:,
bombings of the Ho Cht the Communists, whatever ,~;
.:4linh trail are imperative ,~ their tendency, are miMeduy '..
"in save American and al- as>nquei-M,mer,~oaeelre.,;.,;~
lied lives" in Vietnam. In
hua view, Souuanna Phouma
said, the Communists could
use the trail as much air ,
they w CgrC~' F
'Ieaye t o t o oa a one.,
coca may find a measure oP `~
STATI NTL
elease 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-016018000900050001-0
TO a Aiphifiranf atr4an}
 . STATINTL
Approved For Release 1`~"G~d ~q~~tDP80-,01
15 bier 19'110
e t
o
? , Development and the CIA. rna tonal ?.: ss~s nce are re-.?
~ ~ , ; sponsible for the miajor planning of their.l
rar~in.. awn l~PVe~nr?v... ....+
-. ... _ ,
,~ estror~s ~ ,
? ,
A
~` ~es~~we Porn ~ ~4n ,
ewers ,
Sen. J, William F
lb
i
u
r
ght, D=Ark., ,
a leading anti-war critic of the Nixon AID coordinates public and private
Administration, is right to question some foreign-aid programs with U.S. foreign
of the alleged improper involvement of, policy, Tainting AID with CIA partici=!!
the Army and Central Intelligence ~ 'pation can only impair its~effectiveness,l
Agency in. Laos and South Vietnam.
There-has been-no d
social,
i'i
'
n
o
e
nite confir-
and eco
omic
developmentrand
mation, b"ut word has leaked out that a ~s tries to`
secret report defines the relationshi ,help countries help themselves. Coun-~
.' between the Agency for Int
? p' tries that receive AID a ' t
`. w -____ ..Nv+..., ovl,iirmea that the ~ --`---- -" i'+vZr+auly.
U.U. Army haA ?fi74.._+_., .,,
?~~* ivvu~ll Viet. `~ u~C sucn an organization as an.,
r. =? namese government offices by providing intelligence front i8 'an insult to the re=,~
agents with phony press accreditation, clpients of the aid. `
?~ Compromising the integitity of these ilZisusing the press is just as re re-~
?,: institutions is appalling and should ba':,~onsible, Tho Administration allows in-~
f ~ .'discontinued immediately,
~? ~ telligence to misrepresent accredited.i
The, N'i x o n. Administration can'' newsmen while the vice president assails
t hardly disapprove graft and corruption ~ .newsmen- and television cozrirnentators
i ; . in connection with foreign aitl if its awn for' being ~ biased in their coverd e' .of
intelligent agencies have no ;respect for Sovernment. . ? q.,
g
'~;'- 'the State e a . ~ . , . .
.54.
A p rbment ~ foreign assts-' ,~ ~ . The ~ ~governmenbL $hduld ,pxactice~
^_._v.?..wiv,~+:a1.L.wr,:w~.HJw~ltirti?rw16i}r~.5~i~?,.:'~.L~s~,,~~~1,.:4! j_ ~~Z~t?lt 'tl2'PAt!~IOn
.2~'~ ~ ..r._r
4
J
a
~, ?
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 1~gILx 1'VORLD
Approved For Release 200/ MAR 19~~CIA-RD~80-0
"every resource at his command to apprehend those re- ~ N
He ordered Police Commissioner Howard R. Leary to use.
I3o~n~ers anc~ framers
Mayor Lindsay has denounced the perpetrator;. of the'
',atest bombings in New York as "'morally reprehensible.'`
.:r....~..,....
It would have been more appropriate ~f Mayor Lind- ;
?,ay had assured New Yorkers that the FBI was not in'vol-: ;
.cu ... ...,,~ .. ............a... -- -- --
an FBI-payroller, was one of the'~?;
e Demmerle
Geor
,
g
cause
t ~:..e ?o..~,,,,,~ ..~,~rapa with tessin~r a bomb into a NationaL?~
Guard truck here only four months agq, on~tine ?~~,~-~ ~^ .
'
'
,Nov. 12-13. .
i
of complicity in the bombings.
~
.. accused the Black Panthers, the Yvung Lords. and others,..
` City Council President Sanford D. Garelil~ virtually,t:,
?
.." It would have been more appropriate ~f Garelik, form-:?%
i tidy Chief Inspector in the Police Department, has assured
,.ure" of the alleged plot in which he was a conspirator. he .
received an $1;500 raise in annual pay, with ex-police com- '
? missioner Michael J. Murphy making the award.
`? ? ' The probable involvement of the forces of "law and~,?.
order" in'the latest bombings is heightened, by the state-
F '?ment of Assistant District Attorney Joseph A. Philips last
week that f iye cops were part of the alleged dynamiting,:
' .plot for which 13 Panthers are now being tried: Who can';
assure us that one or more of the.five cops was not ready.
to win a promotion, a hike in pay, an award at the hands of
? the chief of police and perhaps even a City Hall comtxten- ~,
~' mPnt antl framine of radicals in violence plots.
' rrom 1960- 1962, one of whose special funct~ans t:~ entrap-
of dynamiting, was chief of the Bureau of.Spec~al Services,
-.wSuch an^assurance of innoc~enco wound' carry- special.:,.
~:~?eight since Garelik. champion of law?and order, and foe
? :alleged conspiracy to blow up the Statue of Li erty, an
. ~ eau of Special Services, was one.~of the four members ol? an'
? 'b d
' .~? tt might have been reassuring because m 1965'. Kav= : .
.the public that the New York Police Department was not.,
+nvolved in the present bombings? f:
lotion for providing the police v~tith pre-determined'"aus~'
^` ~
,
~~~~ ,after s-n exp.. _ - -- ---_.:-. ~ _.~_ -: -
STATINTL
.Approved -For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-01601:R000900050QOf+pO't1?,'led
 Approved For Release 2001/03/~~~4-RDP80-0
l~ Mfsrch 1970
STATINTL
The 57th session of the Paris peace talks was cut short
'last Ti[ursday when the U'.S. refused to discuss unconditional
withdrawal. Philip Habib, the acting U.S. representative at the
talks, tried to discuss Americans being held prisoner. In a
statement issued by Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, Chief of the
Government of
tionar
l
R
y
u
evo
.delegation of the Provisional
ification" program of
"
h
-
pac
e
South Vietnam, she discussed t
'the U.S.:
ets
i
ts pupp
"To implement that program, the 11.S. and
have spared no brutal methods: air bombings, shcllings, spray-
___.. ..o .~..:., n[.nmit~atC_ 9WeeD operations, complete destruc-
f "no?man's lands" itnd "free bombing zones,"
'
the setting up o
? .
? ', all the above combined with extremely perfidious political
w ..- .~-..-- - .~. - , mauau..ca ....,...,.. _.. ------ - - - ., ..
....
" .~'..
'camps dubbed "prosperity aonet-, . strategic hamlets," "new-life hamlets, refugee camps, rese -
tlement camps" etc.... .
f 1 200 000 tons of bombs, the firing of dozens of
er
captured: 1447?("Figures for current week not ava[lal-Ic.).
.
"In 1969, along with the release o ov
', n[illions of shells and the spraying of scores of millions of litres of toxic chemicals and gases to
destroy many populated areas; and .raze to the ground whole areas of villages ...the U.S.... con-
ducted tens of thousands of sweep operations, perpetrating so mi mihtars mos seand~basesertreading
the population into so-called . safety zones around U.S. pupp Y P
upon ail liberties, destroying means of living, sowing famine and misery among the South Vietnamese
population .... "
Tran Ngoc Chau, the Saigon assemblyman who was sentenced in absentia last week. to 20 years
., in prison, was sentenced by the same military court March 5 to 10 years at hard labor. Tran is accused
of endangering the security of the Saigon regime by meeting with his brother, Tran Ngoc Hien, who is
alleged to be an agent for the; Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Sen. J. William F.ulbright (D-Ark.)
blamed the U.S. for "shrugging its shoulders over the case. On March 6 a Saigon deputy said that if
.the C[A had acknowledged the now imprisoned man's assertion that the CIA knew about the visits
and had encouraged them, ths~t Tran would not have been prosecuted. While the U.S. has not issued a
statement about the cast, it i:s reported that ambassador to Saigon Ellsworth Bunker privately urged
that Tran not be prosecuted.
In a report to the.New York Times Feb. 28,from "Landing Zane Baldy," South Vietnam, it was
reported that officers handling the ,case of the five marines accused of murdering 16 So[ith
Vietnamese civilians "appear to be taking pains to avoid the controversy that surrounds the ... m~s-
sacre at Songmy."The marines, all between 19 and 22 years old, had volunteered for an ambush team
in 5onthang, about 28 miles firom Danang when they allegedly commited the murders.
The following U.S, casualty figures arc based on government statistics. They are lower than
casualties claimed by the NLF..The first figures cover the war from Jan. 1, 1961 to Feb. 28, 1970.
The figures in t>arenthcses show increases from Feb. 21 to Feb. 28Wounded: 268,41 S (465) Missing.
Killed: 40,758 (l13) "'Non-combat" deaths: 7534 (45) \
Approved For Release 200.1/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-016018000900050001-0
 ~%1ti.J,r, ~T.f;k:::;'I~ illiili~id~1~
Approved For Release 200~/30~~~ ~~IA-RDP80-01601 RO
STATINTL
VIET1kADi SETIiACIiS threaten to result
from Thicu'e tougli behavior.
U.S. analysts worry about his relentless ef-
forts to jail as a spy Tran Ngoc Chau, ~ former
army pal turned political foe. Thieu's attempt
antagonizes some potential allies in.South Viet-
nam. It bodes 111 for a political settlement with
the North; Hanoi will view Thieu's stance as a
sign he'll be intransigent 1n negotiating.
Another problem: The action against Chau, ~
who had :reported contacts with his Communist
brother to the CIA, implies the U.S. can't be V
trusted.. Ambassador Bunker advised Thieu not
to prosecute Chau but didn't press hard. Some
diplomat: evidently reason that backing the
Saigon chief is essential, even- at the risk of ril?
ing U.S. doves.
Field reports /atI to support a Washdng? .
i~igton theory: That .Mekong Delta peasartt~
resent lately arrived North Vietnamese.'
troops with di//erent .acoenta a~td manner, ;
? lams.. ; ~ ,
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-016018000900050001-0
 STATINTL.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-01601
UTICA, N.Y.
1ti'RESS
ld - 28,7$2
...MAR 1-~-;~',~ :--.
1 :~ Are the North Vietnamese showing signs ? ' :'it suggests the North ,Vietnamese might',1
of wanting peace in Vietnam and Laos? ,.; .:have allowed DeLuce's visit so they could
Their latest moves in this direction could
present a true ceasefire plan.
,
~.b~e: just another propaganda' effort, but
? ? ?
~'~,,
there is enough substance to 'suggest that ~ ~ : TT MIGHT BE SAID that such a pra : '-~
' a,~major peace effort could be 'in the mak-' ~; ~ posal could have been made at the- Paris
~ing. ~ ~ ~? talks, but Hanoi might have felt it would ? ,~
~; ? ? ? ' . lose face if it, made such an important pro- ,~
;THE OFFEit TO CALL a halt to the ~~posal in Paris, after .it has refused to talk ~~
fighting in Laos has been given consider- r. ' ~ without atop-level replacement for Henry
.L.1_ __.L12~!L._ -.-J'LL_ T ~wL:..r .-w.awrw..n ns.? ? ? ~.1~
,that will stop the fighting. -..:ry out such a withdrawal, discussions can ;,.
Our involvemenk-there is Yiighly'ques- ~.:,be held and a date agreed on for compie?.
(support withaut congressional approval or' '':~Hano[ spokesman as. saying. ~ `.~ '
'
tYie public's knowledge. Now we have ~
~ a "Conditions will be assured that all for- ~. `~
?also extended our Sauth Vietnamese forces ~~ eign troops will be:able to leave 'South' "A
~. provide aid combat assistance. ~ ,-' Vietnam in perfect -safety and without ;~+
`:More important, but less publici2ed, is.:, harm."
'the report from Daruiel DeLuce, of the As-'. ?'' . Assuming .that the two' offers are bona .~
sc-ciated Press, that the North Vietnamese "~'~: fide, it would suggest that Hanoi has rec- ..'
told him they were willing to agree to a ~.,?- ognized that we are not giping up easily in ' ~'
?~
ceasefire in Vietnam, if we +would make'., ~: either country and that they might do bet-'
public a total troop withdrawal plan. ~ ~ ":.-'ter by .talking. . .';~
Normally. this might be considered an-''.; ?:..~' ? ? ?` '. . , ,~
other of many.~similar propoa~als that alp.:::;," 'THE OPpORTUNITY''appears .~ta..be
'
ways seem to have strings attached. l?~ But ~ ? ~: there for us to exploit,;and, hopefullyy we'
~
a
w~
:
ect;th
t .,~
ll.. dq aq
,witho~t delay ,
thss one, appears so, airnple.~aad dic
~-k. i. ..-a-1~wv`i.M../MXi:iMv~y:'N-'"~1..;75k~/rl{~~sfiri~E?1?i~.y~~.~.sai~~Kt'VwW.lY~" ~~~~~ /y~Ii1~w~~'~.Lt?~7:.fYr.i'i'd.Ikti~: 1.6F~i'..'le,,~e...1
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 T~~KR~80-0160
9 Me~rch 1.970..
" Desll