MR. NIXON AND TAIWAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000800180001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 29, 1972
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

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C=S7IA:1 SCIENCE :4QNITDR
2 9 FED 1972
Mr. Nixon and Taiwan
President Nixon's political critics were
bound to look for something to criticize
in, the communiqu?rom the China trip
and have correctly seized upon the Tai-
wan part as being the most promising. It
is the only place where Mr. Nixon prom-
ises to do a specific thing which, at first
blush, sounds new and different.
But it is doubtfethit the critics (mostly
Democrats and right-of-Nixon Republi-
cans) will get much mileage out of Tai-
wan because what Mr. Nixon agreed to
do in the communiqu?s what he was
in the process of doing anyway.
Taiwan has long since ceased to be an
important American military base. In fact,
it never was. The total number of Ameri-
can troops there now is given as 9,990 ?
which isn't very much as such matters go.
And 5,000 of these belong to the 374 Tac-
tical Airlift Wing which was moved to
Taiwan at the beginning of the big build-
up in Vietnam and will automatically be
moved away when the big withdrawal
from Vietnam is completed.
The run down from over half a million
Americans in Vietnam to the residual
force to be left behind (somewhere around
30,000 men) should be completed by mid-
summer; certainly well before election
day in November. By that time the flow
of men and materiel to Vietnam will be
down to A normal replenishment basis. It
could be down to zero if the China trip
should happen to produce a negotiated
end to the war (which is possible).
So by the end of this year the number
of Americans based on Taiwan would be
down to 5,000 men even if there had been
no trip to China; and most of those belong /
to the American Military Aid Group.
At one time there was a large CIA es-
tablishment on Taiwan. But that belonged
to the days when John Foster Dulles was
talking about "roll back" of the "bamboo
durtain," and when some Washingtonians
seriously thought of a return of Chiang
Kai-shek's armies to the mainland. But all
of that is long since finished.
The promise in the communiqu?s to
, ?reduce American forces and military in-
stallations "as the tension in the area
diminishes." This is nothing new.
There is also a declaration of "ultimate
withdrawal" of all American forces. But
that, too, has been standard American ppl-
icy for 20 years. It sounds new. It isn't.
And besides, how long is "ultimate"?
Henry Kissinger, in his official briefing
to correspondents, asserted that the Amer-
ican security treaty with Tail,7.1n continues
in force. So long as it does nothing is
changed. Washington still guarantees the
military security of Taiwan.
The only thing really new in the com-
muniqu?s that Mr. Nixon has reaffirmed
standing American policy in a joint com-
munique with the Chinese from China.
Thus the emphasis is changed, a little.
The overtone is one of more concern for
Chou En-lai than for Chiang Kai-shek.
But Mr. Nixon can claim, correctly, that
he has given away nothing new.
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STATI NTL
Approved For Releasqpna3nsCIA-RDP80-01
-2 8 FEB 1972
US. Force on Taiwan
Is Said to Number 8,000
? By RICHARD HALLORAN
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Feb. 27 ?
American forces on Taiwan, re-
ported to number 8,000 to
9,000, are there to help defend
the Chinese Nationalist refuge
and they also support Amen-
can troops in Vietnam.
About half the men are sta-
tioned at the Ching Chuan
Kang air base in the center of
the island Rear the provincial
capital of Taichung, where
there are sizable repair iacili-
ties.Transports often stop there
on the way to Vietnam from
Okinawa.
American defense responsi-
operation. That presumably will
bilities under a 1954 treaty are continue to be true as the
exercised by the Taiwan De- United States withdraws from
tense Command, headed by Vietnam but the bases may
Vice Adm. Walter Baumberger.
The command has only a few have some use in logistic sup-
hundred men but could be en-
port :of South Vietnamese
larged if hostilities broke out. forces.
Air Force Headquarters History of Defense
The 13th Air Force has a When the Chinese Commu-
forward headquarters on Tai-
nists came to power on the
wan that is a detachment from mainland in 1949, President
iits main headquarters at Clark Truman said that the United
Air Force Base in the Pihilip-
States would not become in-
pines. It too has a small num-
volved in any conflict over the
her of men and only a few s1rd,to v% hich Generalissimo
Phantom jet fighters. Chiang Kai-shek and his fol-
? There have been reports that lowers had fled- .?
The United States has deployed But when the Chinese Corn-
nuclear weapons on Taiwan munists entered the Korean war
but they have been denied by toward the end of 1950, Mr.
lauthoritative sources here and Truman affirmed American sup-
in Asia.
port for the nationalists and be-
The American military ad- gan military assistance to Tai-
visory group on Taiwan num- wan. President Eisenhower in-
bers abut 300 men. They help creased military aid.
train the Nationalist forces and The 1934 mutual defense
supervise their supply of Amer- trey defined Nationalist Chi-
ican military equipment and nese territory as Taiwan and
weapons. the Pescadore Islands in the
A contingent of about 1,000 Formosa Strait. American ter-
men maintains equipment, runs ritory to be defended in any
post exchanges and performs attack was defined as "the is-
administrative functions.
- land territories in the West Pa-
The Central Intelligence
Agency and Air America, a pri-
FooChow ?
BISE 1
CHINA
. Pa"
-
izTa pet
I)
?
4CWINOCYLLW
AiRE4SE
'
r4' TAITAN
.6.4sE
e
The New York Times/Feb. 23, 1972
cific under its jurisdiction.
In 1955, the Senate adopted
.
vale Airline whose only custom the Formosa Resolution, which
was intended to giva the Presi-
er is the C.I.A., have instalia-1
tions on Taiwan. United States;dent a free hand in committing
Government agencies also havelAmerican forces to the defense
extensive radio facilities tol of Taiwan. An effort in the
transmit to mainland China and Senate last year to repeal the
to monitor broadcasts. 'resolution failed.
As,President Nixon has re-1 The Seventh Fleet, which had
duced the number of American j gradually reduced its forces in
troops in Vietnam, Americanithe Formosa Strait, ceased pa-
bases on Taiwan have becomeitrolling that area about two
less 'necessary to support thatlyears ago.
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Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R00
CHICAGO, ILLS
SUN?TIMES
_ 536,108
?$ ? 709,123
DEC 8 1971
!Suggestion on Taiwan
Since President Nixon has failed in the Two
China policy at the UN, I would suggest an
t alternative. Give generous financial support /
through the CIA to the Taiwanese who are "
attempting touverthrow their present govern-
ment, the Republic of China, in order to es-
tablish an independent Republic of Taiwan.
Since, according to the Pentagon Papers,
when Diem became useless in Vietnam be-
cause of his wide-spread unpopularity, the
' overthrow of his regime was easily accom-
plished with covert Washington support, sim-
ilar support in Taiwan might also be success-
ful.
Thomas A. 'lupe
ATIh.
:
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PUEBLO, COLO.
STATINTL
'STAR?J0101111 9 1971.
E ? 19,148 ?
S ? 46,601
Pueblo (Colo.)
Chiang Still Blocks Nixon In Detente
g !Zed Ch ma
By ROBERT A. DIAMOND direct threat to the security of
the Pacific area, and to the
WASHINGTON ? Chiang Kai- ,United States forces."
Congressional Quarterly rs'? 7
? I I ?
shek's government on Taiwan ! Peking's entry into the Korean
remains the major stumbling l War in November 1950 cemented !disclosed that the Nationalistsinumber recognizing Taipei is
block to President Nixon's ef- I American support for the Na- I had modified two airfields in the down to 58. Eleven nations have
forts to improve relations with tionalist regime. Washington and I expectation that nuclear-armed!made the switch in 1971, and it
Communist China. Taipei signed the Mutual De, U.S. B52s would be moved from is anticipated in Taipei that the
Nixon's journey to mainland fense Treaty in December 1954. l!Okinawa to Taiwan. U.N. exPulsion will induce 10 or
China ? the first presidential In January 1955. as the Com-; ? Also in July 1971, the ad- 12 more to switch in the near
'state visit in history to any na- munists mounted pressure on is-I ministration announced that it
tion with which Washington has lands lying a few mites off the had ended U.S. air reconnais-
future.
no diplomatic relations ? is now mainland and still in Nationalist sance missions over mainland Since no country has ever
'
scheduled for early 1972. I hands, President Eisenhower! China from Taiwan. maintained diplomatic relations
Conveniently removed from asked Congress for explicit au- ? Since 1969. U.S. forces have with both Chinas. Nixon nas
the agenda of the Peking summit, thority to use armed forces to been cut from 9.000 to a current been understandably reticent
! is the question of China repre- protect Taiwan and "related PO- figure of 8.000. Additional cuts when newsmen have raised the
sentation at the United Nations. sitions and territories." Cong-!are expected among units hav-! question of diplomatic ties \with
The U.N. General Assembly set.- ress gave overhwelming approv? log missions related to the Viet-, Peking. Whereas Premier Chou
tled that in October. But two key al. -
na
issues are left ? and a third In 1958 another offshore island
In
mn wl\?aIra.y 1971, the admin-
well be looming in the crisis occurred. Secretary of istration announced that it did
? The U.S. military commit: Taipei to announce that the ' forts to repeal the 1955 Formosa ing" relations and establishing a
rnent to Chiang formalized in a ,. ?
mutual defense treaty and erno-
bodied in the presence of U.S.
. forces on Taiwan.
? Washington's diplomatic
En-lai has talked in terms of re-
cognition and diplomatic rela-
tions. the President has more
may background: I State John Foster Dulles flew t
-0 ' not object to congressional ef- generally referred to "normaliz
United States would "stand l Resolution. a og Chinese1-
.
firm" to resist any Chinese! The Senate Foreign Relations ders and people. ,
Independence
Communist attacks and was I Committee approved the repea-
"not going to attack or tolerate I ler, sponsored by Sens'. Frank Chiang Kai-shek's son and
attacks against the Chinese! Church, an Idaho Democrat, and heir apparent, Deputy Premier
. .
ties to Taipei. . , Communists." Thereafter ten-1
, Charles McC. Mathias Jr., a Chiang Ching- uo, nai rov
? Premier Chou En-lai's, sions in the strait eased andl
Maryland Republican, and at- caped death while visiting New
there has been no crisis in the
charge that "some quarters in
tached it to the 1972 foreign aid York in April 1970 when he was
!
the United States" are involved strait since 1958. In the 1960sdauthorization. Before the aid bill fired upon by a member of the
in the Taiwan Independence the 7th Fleet presence in the went down to defeat Oct. 29 by al World United Formo3nns of In-
Movement. The movement, out- strait was reduced to a perma- 27-41 vote. the Senate voted 43-40 dependence.
lawed on Taiwan, seeks to nent two-destroyer patrol. i Oct. 28 to delete the repealer When the Nationalists and
create an independent Taiwan Nixon Cutbacks l from the bill, their two million mainlander fol-
based on the 12 million indi-, The President has prepared' A complete military pullout lowers came to Taiwan in 1948,
genous Taiwanese who rriPke up, the way for his trip to Peking by from Taiwan was recommended.' they brought with them a go'-
35 er cent of the population. taking a number of decisions re- in June by Republican Sen. e r n m e n t a 1 structure under
Korean War zra , ducing the U.S. military pre-' Jacob K. Javits of New York
The Chinese Communists muf- sence in Taiwan: and Democratic Sen. George
fed their best chance to capture' ? In November 1969. the 7th McGovern of South Dakota in
Taiwan in the first six months of Fleet quietly terminated its two- testimony before the Senate rule Taiwan as a province.
1950. In January of that year. The native Taiwanese have
destroyer patrol on . to Peking the Taiwan Foreign Relations Committee. I
China analyst Allen S. Whitirg been excluded from power under i
President Truman announced strait. This "signal '
,tl_at the United States would no is generally considered to have of the University of Michigan C h i a n g 's authoritarian rule. !
'longer "provide military aid pia paved the way for resumption of
i told the committee that main-
to Chinese forces on For- the U.S.-Chinese ambassadorial
land China had "never devel-
which Taiwan was considered a
province of the Republic of
China. They have continued to
mosa." I talks in Warsaw n January,oped the necessary air and sea
For the next six months, 1970. I lift capacity to mount an inva-
Chiang was on his own but the ? In July 1971, the admin- , sine across the TaiWan strait. Peking is opposed to an inde-
expected onslaught from the istration disclosed that nuclear;
!Other analysts testified that pendent Taiwan. Chou En-lai
mainland never came. Then in weapons on Okinawa would not. S i n o-Soviet military tensibns told a visiting group of Amen--
two days after the North be moved to Taiwan after Oki-. made it unlikely that Peking
Korean invasion of South Korea,
Truman sent the 7th Fleet into
the Formosa strait, declaring
that the "0ccApritii4,qUsThri4
by CommunrettretrifoIllbe
for this arrangement by keeping
alive the dream of mainland re-
covery.
nawa reverts to Japan in 1972.i
scholarsn July that the
! would open up a second front-on, "movement . . . has behind it!
Hearings before the Senate -the Taiwan strait,
foreign relations subcommittee, . ' i the special manipulation from
?%t latest count ? Nov. 5 ? the, foreign forces." And in an inter-
S, military_susArnera ,s Q.
le5i1MOdigleagle134nittgi VA rtftkliggPRIpitAnti00080:0 t80004g7n of the
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DES MOINES , IOWA
REGISTER
? 250,261
S ?
NOV 1 4 1971
.13y Charles F. Ransom
Of Tho Restsiers Editorlaf Page Staff
MBE NIXON Administration was of-
:- 1 fended by the cheering in the. United
hNations General Assembly at the aSSellh,
bly vote which led to the onstinh of Tai-
.;? wan (the Nationalist "Republic of
China").
, But for much of the world, Taiwan
does not have the "good guy" image it
has had in the United State-3, but is re-
garded as a usurper to the name of
"China" and a troublemaker in east
h Asia. Taiwan announced regularly its
-intent tO "librate" the mainland by
'force, and used what force it could nius-
ter.
Besides this .opcn goal, it took part in
a ,cries of secret wars, mostly with the
help of the United States, some at its
instigation.
The world laughed- in 1953, when the
neophyte Republican -Administration in
Washington `..`tudeashed Chiang Ma-
sher ? that is, stopped preventing him
from carrying on hostilities against the
.Chinese mainland. The U.S. restrained
him during the Korean War: one Asian
war at a time was more than enough.
Taiwan,13asecl:
. CIA Airline
c -
I, But it wasn't funny. Chiang was
serious. The .pin-priel; raids from the
(offshore islands to the mainland; the
heavy concentration of troops and guns
on Quemoy, five miles from the main-
land; the. overflights of mainland China
. with .Taiwan-oporated U-2 spy planes
furnished by the United States became
Xiblie at the limo or a bit later. But
cht-'
-,NT 7' I -tc;'),---ii-T1
IOVA
.vr
I,
?, (1
they were not all the "unleashed"
Chiang did.
Allen Whiting, one of America's out-
standing China-watchers, pieced togeth-
er the story for the New York Review of
Books. Whiting watched China from the
U.S. consulate general in Hong Kong
136-68 and is now a political scientist
at the University of Michigan's Center
for Chinese Studies. He found evidence of
Taiwan's secret wars in the Pentagon
Papers, in new studies of China-India
relations, in the memoirs of George Pat-
terson, a British missionary-journalist
and elsewhere. , ? -
? It was an airlin3 based on Taiwan,
financed by the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency, which provicio,d?nracno'pn...0 for
U.S.-trained sabotage and guerrilla
teams sent into North Vietnam in 1954,
when Vietnam was legally at peace.
The. same airline provided the trans-
port for the CIA effort to overthrow the
Indonesian .government in 13.
Warplanes and transports from Tai-.
wan airdropped Pfrris and supplies to
Tibetan rebels in the period from 1051
through 1962, though the maijor fighting
was quickly suppressed in 1951 and 1959.
They used refueling bases in Thailand
and flew over India and Burma without
permission. India and China each
'thought the planes belonged to the other
and complained. The Burmese shot one
down, it landed in. Thailand and Was
identified as a Chinese Nationalist
bomber from Taiwan.
Taiwan had a secret part in the wars
in Laos and. South Vietnam, too. Still
another CIA-financed airline was formed
in 1930, and a third later in the 1960s,
and carried on lcul commercial pas--
-senger and freight Lbusiness in Laos and
Vietnam, and also clande::tine military
_
i.. I I..)
operations. One job was ferrying guer
.rila paratroops trained by. the United
States in Taiwan. North Vietnam caught ,
soine. of them in 163 and sentenced
them, but the effort continued. Later
Taiwan more or less openly sent several
dozen psychological warfare men to
South Vietnam.
,
Equipment
Handouts
..
The United States palcl for a-lot of this
landhstine. r-tetivify, and also male it
possible fon Taiwan to maintain large
and modern armed force n for a country
of only 14. --11j01 pch-plc. With consic.
erable prhien- Talh an stopped taking
:open U.S. ".nilitary _aid" some years
ago, but it ha n continued to get handouts
in the form of "excess equipment" ?
including planes, tanks, missiles and 'de-
stroyers of not quite the latest model.
Whiting does not say so, but Taiwan
enlarged its airport runways to take
America's biggest planes, in the hope of
replacing Okinawa as base for Ameri-
can strategic bombers an d nuclear
weapons. .. ,
There are only about 8,000 American -
servicemen on Taiw.'en now and routine
U.S. naval patrols of the Taiwan. Strait
have stopped, and still more recently
U.S. overflights of China have stopped.
.But the U.S.-Taiwan military alliance
continues.
In words this alliance is .defensive.
But Taiwan's record inti.st look pretty -
a.gonessive to mainland China, Burma,
? India; and ether countric; which learned
about it. long before it became public
knowledge. in the United States.
''s.....?.?.h
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STATINTL
1 0 _NOV 1971%
-1 IJL 1 1
' -,?!11 ''..7
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. ? ...2:7A t. -13 d ., -,?_...J U Is. -; . . .
..7,,..i.,....r.,,,....--,,,,..,....-- -r--,.,-...-...,--...7-7=,-,,,-, ?
Burcbett on Taiwan
\ .:their U.S.-protected hide- , dam declarations. The only
Wilfred Burcheit, New York out. . ? ? -;7 logical explanation for _Ja-
The myth of. an autonce- pan's dogged support of the
City: Baying come to the
'end of a 20-year-10ng road eno us Taiwan . "indepen-? "U.S. on the Taiwan issue is
of pretence that mainland. dence"? !novement will be that this province of China
.China belongs to Taiwan: propagated with gredt? fer 'is ear-Marked for the ?next
? the ixo dministeation is
your from now oil .'n ut ,the,:, phase of Japanese expan-
' eNn a
. now pretending that Taiwan fact is that the only such'', sionism?unless the present
. is an independent entity, 0 r ga n iz e d move merits .trend in Japan's ruling Lib-
virtually belonging to the known to ?exist so far: are era" Democratic party is re-
'..' United States. The cam- based in Japan and the U.S. versed;? ?. - .
. paign has started in the U.S. CIA agents . were ...expelled ,/
^ .and Japan for an "indepen-
from Taiwan in lithe this
dent Taiwan." As shown by
year for trying to organize a
:
a reader's letter in the movement there. Can any
Guardian (Nov. 3), people one really believe that the
CIA agents were dispassion-
are already being barn-
ately acting in the interests
boozled by. this. But we
e,
'should be clear about this, of th Taiwanese people?
y have been doing is
Jt is a logical and expected.
All the
move after the U.S. was to find'a Taiwanese Ngo
forced to retreat first from Dinh Diem to replace the
the "one-China based
aging Chiang who refused to
.on
a
Taiwan" line to the "two- accept a "two-China" or a
"o n e-Taiwan" policy - be-
China" policy and now to
_the third line of retreat?
cause on that, at least, he
"independent Taiwan.. knows better.
Nixon's. new gimmick is
Anyone supporting this,
an "independent 'Taiwan"
whatever their motives, is.
supporting U.S. aggression
under a more compliant die-
?
against China and the future tator than Chiang, one who
? "
expansi will obviously invite"! con-
Onist airns of a remi- -
tinning U.S. "protection"
litarizing Japan. - until such time as the Japan-
The Guardian reader who
? referred to the "75-year his- ?ese, having digested Okina-
via, which they are due to
tory-of Formosan national-
take over next year, make
Iism" and "an abortive revo-
lution even before the CIA their next move to Taiwan
d
up the ?perhaps under an agree-
existed" ? is mixing
? anti-Japanese struggle of the ment similar to that signed
entire Chinese people in-
in June which 'enables Japan
,
- chiding the Taiwanese dur-
and the U.S. to sharer?the.
? i
ing 50 years of Japanese oc-
orignal U.S. bases on Oki-
? eupation and the 1947 up-
nawa. In the late 19th cen-
rising against the Kuoniin-
tury. it. took Japan just 16
. .
'tang, just as the people' of years.16 move; into Korea
mainland China rose up aridlTaiwan ef t 61 having oc-.
etwie'd1.1lie Okinawa step-
dictatorship. This uprising against the Chiang Kaishek
ping-stone. in 1379. This
time Japan is already solidly
was put down?with U.S.
implanted, economically in
arms--in a terrible blood-
South Korea and Taiwan. ?
bath that cost at least
101000 lives. It is true that Under the division 'of
the Taiwanese have never "defense" resPonsibilities of
ceased strul!gling against the the . Nixon Doctrine, mili-
? Chiang Kalsliel; dictatorship tary implantation is sure to
asdid the people of main- conic unless Taiwan is fully
. ? land China until they threw . restored to China as stipu-
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-r-1 '':7:-..'41.1,,.'-',1-1L;
11 ..I 111/ 1: I I?
I Ii
- -IT1 '1--i1).
i I1 I Ii
17L7
-
?
LI
TOMall illOr:2nc.7ance -
Joseph T. Hiller, Niles, Ill,:
1,t is obvious from your edi-
torial in the Oct. 20 issue
:that the Guardian staff...has
.:corne down with the same?
. malady which afflicts Wilt
fred Burchett;.The editorial
of which I write is that
he "Two Americas:.
? and the malady is that of
."myopic Sinophobia".
*Any radical parsonage or
publication which touts
self-determination for the
peoples of Indochina and
yet rejects the same for the
people of Formosa can only
hold a double sHadard. This
is one of the '')s.t unrealis-
tic viewpoints now prevail-
ing in the U.S. radical move-
ment. Just because China
..says that Formosa is part of
her "sacred territory'
doesn't make it so. Mao,
himself, rejected that idea in
an in terview with Edgar
Snow in 1936.
Whatever happened to
the Guardian of June 9 and
its report of a Taiwan inde-
pendence movement which
was frightenin Chiang
Kai-
shek? Did the Guardian pro-
ceed to analyze the move-
ment and its history? No, it
did not. Instead, a very eon-
yenient item in the 1,10).4
York Times solved the di-
lemma. The item talked
about some ArnMcans, one,
a CIA agent, being told to
leave Formosa because of al-
leged connect ions with the
independence movement.
P,urchett hopped on
this right avfay, readily ig-
noring the 75-year history
of Formosan nationalism
and the fact of an abortive
Formos-an revolution even
before the CIA existed, He
repeated the Chinese
both nationaliiA and corn-
munist, that the movement
for Formosan independence
was a U.S.-Japan ."plot.!' I
will allow that with present
circumstances, the U.S.
would very mtkeh. like -to
keep Formosa in its sphere,
and the CIA could very well
become involved. But, our
job is to keep that from
happening; to.allow the For-
mosan people to decide
their own fate.
Self-determination, can-
not be limited to certain
struggles and the fallacy of
Formosa as Chinese territo-
ry should not deter us from
support of the Formosan
people's struggle. Also, we
should not cloud the issue
with silly 'editorial analogies
which do not jibe with the
historical situation of For-
mosa and her people.
?::
?:.
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NATIONAL GUAR=
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STATINTL
1-1 ?
r:. CY.7771,r7)7,71,ff-.1,17
taia i:.1 ;17:j i:11 t,? In 1949, Chiang and the remnants of his government ana a
LI a; r-
Ll] aaa'ai aaa ; a:a; r, mies were driven out of the Chinese mainland and sought refuge
on Taiwan. To ensure its rule over .Taiwan, Chiang proclaimed a
general "stage of siege" or martial law to last as long as the
"period of communist rebellion" existed on the Chinese main-
land?that is, until Chiang's troops reoccupied the mainland.
Thus, for more than two dedades Taiwanese have been subjected
to rule by martial law without any civil liberties.
? Of Taiwan's 15 million 'population, about 85% is Taiwanese
71-1-1 and 15% Chiang's Nationalist mainlanders. The hostility of the
Taiwanese towards the repressive Nationalist rule is deep-seated.
I;In the 1960s, Taiwanese in Japan, Europe and the U.S. formed
different groups agitating for Taiwanese independence. Most of
them came from the upper-middle 'class which aspires to get into
The author of this article, a native of Taiwan now teaching in a the driver's seat no occupied by the Nationalists. (The super-
North American .univer'sity, (hies not -wish to be publicly rjch Taiwanese are content to serve the Nationalists as they did
identified. the Japanese.) -
The People's Republic of China has made it emphatically clear Communism the main enemy
that one of the minimum prerequisites for any kind of "normali- They consider Chinese c8"ramunists their enemy number one
zation" of ,Peking-Washington relations is that the U.S. govern- before the Nationalists. Their main strategy?that of convincing
ment must recognize Chinese sovereignty over the offshore island Washington that an independent Republic of Taiwan is, in the
of Taiwan. hang run, the best means of preventing the island from falling into
There are not "two Chinas," insists the Peking government, or communist hands?obtained no sympathetic hearing at the time.
"oneaChina and one Taiwan," but one China, of which Taiwan is To placate Chiang Kai-shek during the early 1960s, the U.S. re-
historically a part. peatedly refused to permit then leader of the independence move-
. ?,. There is no indication whatsoever, however, that Washington is ment, Dr. Thomas Liao, to come to the U.S. from Japan to
prepared to recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan, an impor- publicize the movement's cause. Under severe Nationalist pressure
tant link in the Chain of U.S. military bases running from Japan 'upon his family in Taiwan, Liao capitulated and returned to
and Okinawa to the Philippines. Despite the "two Chinas" policy Taiwan in 1965. There he at once pledged support for the Nation-
Washington is pushing in the UN this week in an effort to save alists.
Chiang Kai-Shek's seat in the world body, long-range U.S. politi- The movement fell into disarray for the next few years until
cal objectives focus on the "one China, one Taiwan" formulation. 1970. In January came the news that a respected Taiwanese pro-
At present, Washington is apparently pressuring Chiang's Na- fessor Peng Ming-Min had mysteriously escaped from the island
tionalist regime to renounce its claim to, being the government of and had turned up in Sweden. A law 'professor at the National
all China. If this fails, as is likely, the adamant Chiang may be Taiwan University, Peng had been the "kept Taiwanese" dis-
replaced by someone willing to cooperate with Washington. This played in the .Nationalist UN delegation until 1964 when he and .
may require a coup similar to the one that toppled Diem when he several of his sttidents were arrested on charges of subversive
became a hindrance to U.S. policy in South Vietnam. It is signifi- activities. In a secret summary trial before the military tribunal
cantthat Gen. Sun Li-Jen, the pro-American former commander that handles all. political cases, Peng was sentenced to eight years ?
of Chiang's army, who was purged and placed under house arrest in prison. Pressure from the American academic community se-
for allegedly masterminding an ill-fated coup against Chiang in cured his release from prison although he was kept under continu-
1955 "escaped" from Taiwan 10 months ago. He was a graduate ous house arrest. A few months after appearing in Sweden, Peng
of the Virginia Military Institute and served with Gen. Joseph was admitted into the U.S. and is now a research scholar at the
Stilwell in the China-Burma-India theatre during World War II. University of Michigan. It's a well known "secret" in the indepen-
Some of, Sun's officers charged in the 1955 coup were executed dence movement that the escape was the work of the CIA. Both V
but Sun was merely put under house arrest, thanks to his power- People's China and Chiang accuse the U.S. of "smuggling" Peng
ful American friends. His "escape" could inean he has a part in out of Taiwan to make him the puppet leader of the future
Washington's contingency plans.- "independent" Taiwan. ?
Another active ? consideration in Washington, in conjunction Early in 1970, .various factions of the movement united in
with the above or perhaps separately, would require the active New York into the World United Taiwanese for Independence
cooperation of the "Taiwanese Indepehdence Movement." For and hailed Peng as its leader. In April, this organization made
those unfamiliar with the history of the Taiwan qUestion, a brief international news when two Of its members attempted to assas-
outline here may be necessary. Taiwan was settled by Chinese sinate Chiang Kai-Shek's son and heir apparent in ,New York. The
:from Fukien and Kwangtung Provinces in the late 15th and early two terrorists are now out on bail and the organization which
16th centuries. After being defeated in the Sino-Japanese War of openly claimed credit for the assassination attempt has been left
1894-95, China ceded Taiwan to Japan. For the next 50 years
n gtrr?1
9iJLJ
?Taiwan was ruled by Japan.
Taiwanese have always regarded themselves as Chinese. When
Taiwan was returned to China after World War II, Taiwanese
welcomed Chiang's Nationalist army as a liberator. Chiang's
troops, however, soon showed their true nature by widespread
pillage, rape and murder of the native population. Taiwanese rage
exploded into open rebellion on Feb.. 28, 1947, after police beat
to death a woman who allegedly sold untaxed cigarettes. Within
one month, the rebellion was suppressed at the coSt of. at least
10.000 Taiwanese lives. ? . .
unharassed by U.S. authorities.
Congress members see "moral" issue
In the meanwhile, voices have begun to be heard in Congress
advocating the "one-China-one-Taiwan" policy. On Aug. 28,
1970, Rep. Donald Fraser of Minnesota made a speech and placed
in the Congressional Record a long paper entitled "Political Re-
pression in 'Free China'," in which he concluded "Free China" is
neither "Free" nor "China." (Copies of this paper were reprinted
and widely drculated among Taiwanese in the U.S.) He empha-
sized that "just as we must cease our support, moral and material,
00atinued
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?of tir Natonalist regime on Formosa [Taiwan], we mast not
surrender the fate of Formosa to the Chinese... it is clear that
the most important contribution the U.S. can make is its support
of the morally right position?self-determination. The people. of
Taiwan are capable of directing their own affairs."
On Feb. 2, 1971, a group of 10 influential Congressmen, led
by Jacob Javits of New York, introduced a resolution in the
Senate urging the U.S. to drop its opposition to People's China
admission to the UN. The resolution specified Nationalist China
should not be expelled from the UN to make room for Peking.
This is exactly the line the U.S. is following in the UN now.
However, Sen. Javits also proposed that the people of Taiwan in
an "internationally supervised plebiscite determine, at a suitable
time, what they wish to be the permanent status of Taiwan in the
community of nations." This is what the "Taiwanese Indepen-
dence Movement" has been requesting for years.
- It seems quite evident that Nixon considers the "one-China-
one-Taiwan" scheme the best solution from the U.S. point of
view. Just as the U.S. stalled for time at the 1954 Geneva Con-
ference while actively preparing to set up a puppet government in
South Vietnam, Nixon's forthcoming trip to Peking and the half-
hearted peddling of the two-Chinas policy in the UN may be just
a smoke screen under which a made-in-U.S.A. "Republic of
Taiwan" is being manufactured.
The idea of an "independent" Taiwan at this point in history
is a charade to cover up continuing U.S. (and to .a large exten,t,
Japanese) economic domination of the island and to retain
Taiwan as a U.S.' military base a stone's throw from mainland
China. The Peking government, of course, has repeatedly warned
Washington that the "one China, one Taiwan" scheme is just as-
unacceptable as the "two China's" policy and there is little possi-
bility its position will change,
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!AA& a Wpm
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By TOM FOLEY ?
.Henry hissinger's trip to Pek-
ing anll the forthcoming visit of ?
President Nixon to the People's
Republic of 'China are now get-
ting tremendous .publicity in the
U.S. news media. But many ques-
tions about this apparent U.S.-PBC ,
rapprochement remain tiiVanswer-
ed?at least, publicly?and the de-
tailed speculation in the U.S.
press deliberately seems to avoid
these areas. They are the follow-
ing:
I) Northern Burma and Laos:
ever. since the Chinese civil war,
the US. Central intelligence
?Agency has been deeply involved
in this region just south of the
Chinese province with the roman-
tic name of Yunnan, or "Cloudy
South" province. In 1949, the/de-
feated remnants of Chiang Kai-
shek's army crossed. over into
-.north Burma and Laos, seized
control of these outlying areas,
and began calling themselves the
Yunnan Anti-Communis.t. and Na-
tional Salvation Army. Actually,
they are the biggest opium deal-
ers in Southeast Asia and they
have been financed and armed
since 1949 by the CIA. .
In* Laos. the CIA organized,
trained and equipped. the 50,000-
? map secret army led by Gen.
yang Pao. composed of his Meo
tribesmen followers, who are the.
biggest opium smugglers in South-
east Asia. But everybody knows
that the CIA created this Meo
:military force not oiily for use in
? Laos: in Yupnan, there are 4.5
million Meo tribesmen who form
the most important national min-
ority in south China and who have
maintained their ties with .their
relatives across the Laos border.
. ? 21 Tibet and northern Nepal: in
-1959, when revolt broke out among
1 'the Amdo and Khampa tribesmen
Q of Tibet. it did net require great
insight to see the CIA hand involv-
ed in it. The Khampas were arm-
ed. with :brand .new U.S. equip-
ment, including GI fatigue uni-
forms and thermoboots. Since both
'Tibetans and Chinese hate and
Var the Khampas, the CIA made
a serious political mistake in
backing them, because everybody
. else allied against them. They did
get the , Dalai Lama, however,
probably because he is .of Amdo,
?
Atigtigkciortgbie a s b
Kkg104001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000800180001-7
and Amdos fled mainly into north-
ern Nepal after .the 1959 revolt
and simply took over the country
in ,conjunction with the CIA and
U.S. military in Nepal. As far as
anybody knows, most of them are
still there.
31 Taiwan and CIA air bases:
as everybody except the ordinary
American. citizen knows, Taiwan
is headquarters for the CIA's vast
air operations in Asia. The CIA
base is at Tainan and is run by.
a front organization called Air
Asia, which also has an office in
downtown Taipeh. Air Asia in
turn is a subsidiary of Air Ame-
rica, the CIA line which provides
all supply and transport runs for
CIA operations in 'Laos, Burma,
Thailand. Vietnam and Cambodia.
Air America has its offices in
Okinawa; it is a Delaware corpo-
ration with about 4,000 employees
listed on its records as working
in Asia. -
The CIA base at Tainan, in
southwest Taiwan. was the launch-
ing' point for. all CIA operations
against the Chinese mainland, in-
cluding parachute drops and re-
connaissance- flights. This is also
well known- to everybody except
the American people.
But the Coriolis fact is that the
U.S. news media have not men-
tioned a word about any of these
areas, and 'neither has the U.S.
government. The Chinese side has
been completely silent about.them
as ';ell.
Any real normalization Of U.S.-
China relations demands that all
these .CIA operations be ended?
and not only in China?and that
the American people finally be
told the truth about them in de-
tail.. ?
_
STATINTL
17 AUG 19T1
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? ? .? ?
Litt .1 0" S'-ir
L.L ?)?:9
In a T.- ulkya From aiw
,
?
/3y WILLIAM BEECH
? Special to The Ns v.: Yu-% 'ilmes
- WASHINGTON, Aug. 16 ? ? IUStores of tactical nuclear
Many United States
weapons for use against China
military
planners, looking to in the event of a major war.
the pos-
Vietnam Pullouts Cited
,sible results of change in Wash-i
ington's policy on China, be- On the first factor, military
lieve that a withdrawal
planners say that as the United
of States continues to reduce its
American -forces and installaa" troops and activity in. South
tions from Taiwan would not Vietnam, the need for repair
substantially weaken this coun- and resupply facilities dimin-
Iry's strategic. position in .the'
.Far East. ishes.
.-- Senior military :nen inter- Of the fewer than 9,000
United States military person-
- viewed here said that while nel stationed on Taiwan, about
:they would rather not see a two-thirds are involved an the
-sudden reduction in forces on ?
repair and supply effort. Thirty-
the Nationalist-held island; three C-130 transports, based
they foresaw no dire conse- at Ching Chuan Kang Air Base,
' quences if political . decisions fly regular resupply missions to
called for withdrawal as urged South Vietnam and Thailand.
lay Peking. The Taiwan Defense Com-
Premier Chou En-la! of China, mand, which is manned . by
in meetings with visiting jour- about 200 Americans from. all
nalists and scholars in recent services, works out contingency
weeks, has insisted that the
American military presence plans with Taipei under the.
195a mutual security treaty.
tnust be removed from Taiwan Military sources say that if
tif Washington wants more nor-
mal relatiens with Peking. it becomes necessary to reduce
Nigh American officials have this command to a handful of
avoided public comment on the men, they could be based in the
demand. But late last month, United States Embassy, . with
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. the others transferred to Pacific
- Laird, when asked about the command headquarters in Non-
military value of American olulu. These men could shuttle
forces on Taiwan, answered: baelt and worth to Taipei as
"If we are going to perform direct consultations were re-
adequately and carry forward quired.
on the Nixon doctrine of part- The planners say that con-
nership, strength arid showing tingency plans do not include
a willingness to negotiate, now the use of American ground
is not the time to take unilat- troops in any defense of Tai-
eral actions in withdrawing or wain. United States military in-
in lessening the credibility of volvement, should it become
our deterrent"
Advantages Outlined
- Nonetheless, military plan-
ners are assessing the impli-
cations of a force reduction on
Taiwan if it should be or-
dered. 'In their view, Taiwan
currently offers these principal
advantages:
gExcellent repair facilities
for tanks and trucks used in
Vietnam and a relatively close
supply base for the Indochina
war.
(IA relatively small headquar-
ters to develop joint contin-
gency plans for the defense of
Taiwan under the mutual
defense treaty between the
Nationalist Government and
?
More useful, they say, his
been information on. the radar
frequencies air defense facili-
ties for use in the event of
war. Pentagon sources said this
sort of inforination could be ob-
tained just as easily from elec-
tronic intelligence planes arid
ships operating from interna-
tional waters and air space. I
. ?
Overflights HaltedReconnaissance
Reconnaissance flights over
mainland China were termi-
nated in July to avoid any
incident that could interfere
,with President Nixon's planned
;visit to China. The most valu-
able intelligence information,
however, comes from recon-
naissance satellite missions,
which are continuing.
Experts say China has been
very skillful in hiding military
construction from reconnais-
sance cameras. Railroad spur
lines to missile sites were clev-
erly camouflaged, they say, that
it was difficult to confirm
China's first deployment of op-
erational medium-range mis-
siles last summer.
Tactical nuclear weapons,
primarily nuclear bombs with
about three times the force of
those dropped on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, are the most
controversial aspect of the
American military presence on
Taiwan.
? Three F-4 fighter-bombers
able to carry nuclear bombs are
based at Tainan Air Base, on
detached duty from the Philip-
pines.
necessary, would be primarily Military planners say that in
those of ships and planes of the unlikely event of a major
the Seventh Fleet, together war with . China, Washington
with Air Force planes from the would probably not want to use
Philippines and Guam.. : - Minuteman or Titan missiles
The Military assistance and fired from the United States
Advisory Group, which helps since they .would have to pass
train Nationalis't soldiers in us- iover-Soviet territory on the way
lag American equipment, -num- to China.
bars 300 to 400 men. This ? .
awa ; : to - Leave Okin
.. ,
group, too, could be sharply Weapons -
reduced if necessary, officials I The hulk of nuclear weapons
say. ,that might be employed, they
The United States maintains say, are Polaris missiles on sub-
a substantial eavesdropping marines in the Pacific, bombs
and cryptographic effort cen- stored aboard Seventh - Fleet
tered at Shulinko Air Base) carriers and tactical nuclear
While sources are reluctant to weapons on Guam and in the
discuss this intelligence activ- Philippines, Taiwan and South
ity, some have suggested that Korea. Additional weapons on
the information it develops? Okinawa are to be removed be-
!fore the island reverts to Japa-
nese control.
"Taiwan, in effect, is an un-
sinkable aircraft .. carrier 100
the United States. on such matters as the move-
? iliEnctensive communications- ment or stroops and air units
Intelligence facilities to eaves- within China-has not been all
drop on military corrirnunica- ,that valuable.
- - --- - - '
tions on mainland:China. ... , ?
miles from China," one general
said. "We'd like to keep some
weapons there." .
But he and other military
officials acknowledged that if
the White House decided other-
wise, greater reliance could be
placed on 11-52 bombers oper-
ating .from Guam..
?
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?
It
ii
? mill
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eee:
jfTi
Al t,q'ss,\13.11.
. -
Fought, vilified, snubbed during the 22 years it has been sovereign,
the Peoples Republic of China now takes note of the President's de-
sire to talk and states that he will be ,welcome in Peking. It is a high-
risk journey and those who want peace will wish him well. They will
also keep their fingers crossed. The .procedural arrangements alone
are tricky: who cart recall when a head of state visited another state
that he did .not formally recognize? Protocol covers such small
but symbolic items as 'whit flags will fly, in what position, and
where; arrival and departure ceremonies; .press and personnel pri-
vileges; security arrangements; the question of joint or separate
communiques and the language they entail. Transportation may be.
thorny. Presumably the head of state has his own plane, and the
intelligence implications of this are apparent to both parties. This is ?
true also for communications facilities during the President's visit.
In short, what is dismissed- casually as -"technical" consumes a great .
. ?amoura of time and may cause trouble ? if either side at any point
? chooses to use "procedural" questions for that purpose.
The main item on the agenda is of course Taiwan. Here the Presi-
dent is in the position of a man wanting to hurdle a fence while *keep-
ing one foot, or at least one toe; in place. He ?would be faithful, in
his fashion, ? to an Old Friend, while courting the Old Friend's
enemy. Chiang has doubtless been informed that the United States
will no longer resist Peking's claim to the Security Council seat in
the United Nations. But if Chiang insists (and would he not?), the
US ???ill try io make the expulsion of Nationalist China from the
General* Assembly an "important question," thereby requiring a .
two-thirds ASSernbly vote. It is reasonable to assume that an agree-
ment with Peking to disagree on this issue has already been reached,
and that the trip was deemed sufficiently worthwhile- by both sides
to warrant separate positions, at least for the coming UN vote. It
-amounts to Mr. ?Nixon's telling the Chinese what he will do and. the
-Chinese agreeing that this will not upset the visit, although they op-
pose his doing it. Then comes the hard part.
Chou En-lai's position has been consistent since the mid-fifties:
Peking's relations with. Chiang Kai-shek are Peking's business;
the American presence on Taiwan is an international question on
objective, at a Minimum, is the removal of all US mili-
tary presence, materiel and personnel from the islands
under Chiang Kai-shek's rule, including the offshore
islands. Next in order of importance to Peking is ces-
sation of all clandestine operations directed against the
mainland from Chinese-Nationalist bases with US as-
sistance, whether mounted in this area or elsewhere.
Third, less burning, is an end to intelligence collection
(reconnaissance flights, infiltration teams). Fourth,
and perhaps not:foreseen by Peking as ach:evable in
this round of talks, is US renunciation of its mutual
defense agreement with the Nationalist Chinese. Final-
ly, Peking would like Mr. Nixon to terminate
. . _ .
diplo-
STATI
which Washington and Peking can deal. The US view
has been that before our presence can be negotiated
away, Peking must renounce the use of force. Mr.
Nixon .will probably not now ?insist on this explicit
formulation; at the same time it is highly improbable
that the US would "negotiate" an exit from Tai-:
wan, unless the Chinese -did in fact '.'renounce the
use of force." So the differences must be deftly
skirted; the game to be played is the eliciting of *tacit
positions which Meet the other side's goals, Without
specifically devising a qui4 pro quo that loses too
much face for anyone. This makes the shaping of an.
agenda a task of extraordinary intricacy. Peking's
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contirralid
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JI,IL 1971 STATINTL
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N4tiona ist Chinese Unease
Repression in .Taiwan
Taipei
.The Nationalist Chinese government, made up for the
most part of the two million Mainlanders who moved
here in 1948 and 1949, rides uneasily 'on the backs of
the ? 12 million native Taiwanese, whose ancestors
emigrated from the Mainland in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. The reassertion of the National-
ists' political authority after 50 years of Japanese
occupation that ended with World War II was sealed
with the execution in March 1947, of some 10,000
Taiwanese business and intellectual leaders by newly
arrived Mainland troops. Though discussion of it is
forcibly repressed, the schism remains.
The Taiwanese uprising of February 28, 1947,
which inspired the brutal repression, was in protest
against the heavy-handedness of the occupying Na-
tionalist .forces and the appropriation of jobs and
property by the newly arrived Mainlanders. Little has
changed in 22 years. Only death has any significant
effect on .this gerontocracy. Taiwanese are almost
completely shut out of jobs in the National govern-
ment; all police chiefs and most officers in the armed
forces are Mainlanders or their descendants born here;
40 percent of positions in the provincial and local
governments are held by Mainlanders, and their
children are 29 percent of the college and university
students, though they make up only 13 percent of the
civilian population. Economic growth has reduced
this imbalance (Taiwan now enjoys a standard of
? living second only to Japan's in Asia), but it is a
rare Taiwanese who has anything good to say about
the government in private.
Should the almost unbroken economic improvement
of. the last 15 years begin to falter, only their mo-
? nopoly of armed power would stand between the Main-
landers and the Taiwanese majority. Always acutely
conscious of this fact, the government has built a
large and extensive network of political police and
informers. Anything remotely connected with political
dissent that goes beyond nit-picking is suppressed,
including scenes of a political demonstration in the
Jack Lemmon comedy, "The Out-of-Towners,"
and the entry for "Mao Tse-tung" in the English-
language dictionaries pirated tie're in great abundance.
(The government has never signed the -international
copyright convention.) Reasoning that the "tem-
porary retreat" to Taiwan constitues an emergency,
the government retains martial law. "Spreading
rumors" is punishable by a 'term of from seven
years to life. The controlled newspapers used to pub-
lish news of arrests for "anti-government" activ-
ities, but this practice has ceased; informal channels
have had to take over. It was estimated late last year
Approved For Release 2001/03/04
that there are some 4,000 po Aka prisoners inTai-
wan's jails. The vast majority of these are Taiwanese.
Writers, teachers, and intellectuals are among the
? most prominent recent victims of the security forces.
Po Yang, a leading novelist and essayist, was sen-
tenced in a secret military trial in the fall of 1969' to
12 years in prison; his crime: attending a Communist
spy school in 'Manchuria for two days 20 years earlier
and trying (unsuccessfully) to persuade a friend to
remain behind on the Mainland rather than flee to
Taiwan. Last fall several writers' on the .Central Daily
News, the newspaper of the ruling Nationalist Party
were rounded up, along with a vice president of the
leading broadcasting company. In April, another of
the island's leading writer's, Li Ao, was arrested in
a sweep that also gathered in Meng Hsiang-ko, a
translator of Hesse's works into Chinese; Ts-'ai
Mao-t'ang, a scholar and teacher at the American-run
Stanford Language Center; and perhaps a dozen
others. One reliable estimate is that 65 such suspects
were picked up in February and March alone.
? The -political prisoner here is held incommunicado
for months. Nothing appears in the newspapers about
arrests, charges, or sentences. Chinese officials con-
tend that the torture and beatings used, in the past
have been abandoned, but in the rare case that is tried
publicly witnesses are likely to hear the defendant
repudiate his "confession" on the grbunds that
it was extracted only after long and uninterrupted
questioning. The right to cross-examine is denied. Like
their brothers on the Mainland, the government pro-
vides a kind of thought-reform for its most tractable
dissidents; officials consider a three-year sentence to
one of the minimum-security thought-reform prisons
' a merciful outcome for the defendant, even where the
offense is negligible. Given the ugly reputation of
other prisons here, they may be right.
An American missionary and his wife were expelled
in March for alleged involvement with the Taiwanese
Independence Movement, which is active in Japan and
the United States but rarely surfaces here. Within the
last few. months the American Armed Forces have
quietly shipped out several military men at the behest
of the Chinese authorities, for the same' reason. Tai-
wanese and Mainlander alike believe that the escape
from hot-Ise arrest here of ..the Taiwanese professor
.P'eng Ming-min, who is now in Michigan, was engi-
neered by the CIA.cry
. .
?
The government has argued that it is in the interest
of the US to help suppress the Taiwanese, on the
theory that an independent Taiwan would be sympa-
thetic to the Mainland. This assertion has found a less
sympathetic hearing on the US side in recent months,
especially since the mild flirtation between the US
and the People's Republic of China. It is conceivable
that a Taiwanese-run government with
province or semi-autonomous region of the People's
Republic might serve the US and the Mainland as a
: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000800180001-7
Dom Sin) ed
status as
PHILADFLPiiih s.Pit
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D
STATINTL ?
E 634,371
S ? 701;743
AUG 1 .1 III
peril to Nixon Trip Seen
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tze .?1 af ..1?21
U0 S.-40
Lis
p -
JLLI
1?' ?O
(1 a, hi ei Vir tr. I n
Ey RAY MOSEL'EY
Bulletin Washington Bureau
Washington ? ? A former
- State Department official said.
today the Government is-con-
cealing the full extent of U.S.
'military and intelligence oper-
ations on Taiwan (Formosa)
' from Congress and the Ameri-
can public.
Such operations, directed
against mainland China, must
cease if President Nixon's
? forthcoming "journey for
jpeace". to Peking is to suc-
ceed'a said Allen S. Whiting,
chief China specialist in the
State Department from 1952
to 1966. ? ' ,
Whiting, now a professor at
? the University of Michigan,
testified at a hearing on China
policy conducted by the con-
gressional Joint Economic
CoMmittee. , ?
Quotes From Documents
Quotes
official documents
. and news reports, Whiting
outlined a variety of alleged
U.S. intelligence activities in
support of Chinese Nationalist
forces. on :Ta that have
come to light over the last 20
years, and said:
-"In ,sum, there is a credible
case that overt ? and. covert
U.S.-Chinese Nationalist activ-
ities have aroused Chinese
Co:nmunist security concerns,
resulting in heightened mili-
tary deployments toward .and
across China's borders: .This
activity, in turn, .has been
used to justify increased
American and allied military
investment throughout Asia to
guard against the ,so-called
Chinese Communist aggres-
sive threat."
.Whiting said a complete as-
sessment of U.S. involvement
with the Nationalists has been
seriously hahmered by secre-
cy and censorship.
,-"Certainly Peking has
known more of what has been
going on than has Washing-
ton, or at least the legislative
branch of -our government,"
he said.
May Block Settlement
Whiting said U.S. covert ac-
tivities on Taiwan may block
a peaceful settlement of the
Taiwan problem by the Na-
tionalists and - Communists
and lead to continued military
?
?
Allen S. Whiting
? escalation on both sides. ?
"Only a convincing ?and '
credible, reversal of our mili-
tary-intelligence use of Tai-
wan can lay the basis for con-
fidence necessary to make
President Nixon's 'journey for
peace' a successful reality,"
he said. -
The Nixon Administration
was reported recently to have
ordered a halt to clandestine
activities, including U.S. spy
plane flights' over China, to
avoid upsetting plans for Mr.
Nixon's trip. ?
- In his testimony, Whiting
cited these examples of covert
activities allegedly supported
by the U.S. -against China:.
:Airlines' Activities--; -
? :The* Nationalist: airline.
Civil Air Transport
'identified in the recent Penta-
gon Papers as owned by the ` a
Central Intelligence Agency,
operated from bases in .Thai-
land in the-1950s :to ferry sup-
plies to guerillas in northern
Burma, Laos, Tibet' and
China's Yunan Province. /
? China Air Lines (CAL), ?./
another ? apparent SIA oper-
ation, provided planes and
pilots to Vietnam and Laos
and admitted involvement in -
"clandestine intelligence oper-
ations."
.?-? 6 CIA.jinc., called Ai.V.
Asia rsheadquartered in Tai-
wan, with the job of servicing
jet fighter planes.
? ' ? U.S. Rangers have .?
trained guerilla paratroopers-"
in Taiwan, and some Nation-'
alist forces ha..ae served se-
cretly in South Vietnam.
? Nationalist China has re-
ceived "a steady stream of
? cut-rate weapons out of, the
mammoth Vietnam stockpile"
and Some deliveries have
? been "unauthorized, uncon-
' trolled and often unknown to? .
the Congress." -
STATI NTL
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Approved For ReleasetiNiffit?SibiRMWOMASTAROO
FITIVER
P"1 r "IP spent 50,000
elVid44' isill young lives,
120 billion dollars, and
300,000 war casualties to
prevent South Vietnam from:
going Communist, will prob-
ably recognize Red China
within two years.
The word around UN head-
quarters is that Red China
--the Nixon Administration
now refers to Mao's nation
as "Mainland China"--will
be admitted to the family
of nations this fall.
This means that somewhere
along the line America's
22-year-old recognition of
'Chiang Kai-shek's regime
as "the Nationalist Govern-
ment of China" will go by
the boards._
EDITED
by LLOYD SHEARER
This clountry,
which has
? As President Nixon talks
of the "journey" toward
"a more normal relationship
with Mainland China...,"
Chiang Nai-shek at age 83
is confronted with a loss -
of face on Taiwan and can
no longer perpetuate the
fiction that he is the
rightful leader of some
750 million Chinese.
Chiang fled to Taiwan in
1949 with 2 million Chinese
mainlanders and has kept
12 million Taiwanese Is-
landers under his benevo-
lent despotism ever since.
Once he passes on, his
son and successor, Gen.
Chiang Ching-kuo, 65, will
find it difficult to con-
trol the local Taiwanese
militants.
A few weeks ago five
American military personnel
and an agent from the
Central Intelligence Agency
were transferred out of
Taiwan because Chiang's
secret police said they
were teaching the Taiwan-
ese guerrilla war tactics.
STATI NTL
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Approved. For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-AW1-8060
_
PHOWX, ARIZ.
REPUTSLIC
? 166,541
S ? 252,975
i-fty107,1 ,
w CI; T
-11.3) fDY 1' 0 ir?fl
? - it; *
t.,
Ti fen p nesec_ievrf.e., ,rs 11 .r.s se71
-
?1.d
Sometimes it
nesl takes years for the
news to make Page
One. In November
of 1::63, any well-in-.
formed Washington
correspondent knew
that the Central
_
. Somewhere within the bowels of CIA
headquarters, plans for the assassination
of Chiang Kai-shek were made. A team
was assigned to do the job mid :!?; mil-
lion was allocated?the money to be ,
'spent in setting up the operation in
Taipei, bribing such officials as could '
be bribed, creating a cover, etc. I was ?
never able to determine what nen-rIA
officials?if any?were informed. ?
* s
But because CIA security at the time
was; about as water-tight as a colander,
the Republic of China's Intelligenee pick- ? .
ed up details of the plot even befoie the :
CIA team hadimpacked its bass in Tai-
pei. President Chiang was informed. Ac-
cording to my account, however, the
Generalissimo refused to give the order
to "take care" of the team. "Let's get
f\ Intelligence Agen-. their :FF_, million first," he is reported to.
; Cy had been deenlif? have said. The CIA team, therefore, was
led edown a cloak-and-dagger garden
path, never getting within range of Pres-
ident Chiang.
By the time the money was spent, the
Central Intelligence Agency had changed
its mind?or had it changed by more re-
Erionsible people. in the United States
government. The team was recalled.
:involved in the overthrow of Ngo Dinh:
Diem, president of South Vietnam. And
' at the cocktail hour, in the 'capital's
most frequented watering hole, the sus-
picion was frequently voiced that CIA
shared complicity in .Diem's assassina-
: tion. Today,. almost seven and a half
years later, Americans can read the
? story over their morning Coffee.
. There are other CIA stories *of some
concern to the citizenry, but since they
do not touch on the Vietnam wan, they
will not *be found in the batch of
classi-
fied papers now being. pawed over by
the nation's press. One such story is so
incredible that I- have not published it
even.though I checked it out just as high
; as you can 'go in. this government with-;,
out talking to the President. In the gen-
eral letting-down of hair that has follow-
ed publication by the New York Times
? of the Vietnam -papers, there may be
? some value in reciting my story?if only
?, to use it as .a_peg on which to hang some
'questions about CIA operations. .
? .? . .
?
_Buck in the early .':70s, the C.entra
Intelligence Agency, decided that it would
i;.1i,o a *batter *world if President Chiang
" -Kai-shek, then. digging in on Taiwan,
would shuffle off his mortal colt With
.? the Generalissimo gone, all those pesky.
, questions of Red Chinese admission to
? the United Nations would become- moot.
The Nationalist regime would collapse,
- and Mao Tse-tung could move into the
vacuum. .
7 2 ,
- 'Wheal checked cut the story, the very
-important official who confirmed it said,
"Sure it's true. CIA had a similar plan
to knock off Syngman ? Rhee (then
President of Korea) but we stopped it.-"'
In the context of the conversation, the
"We" _referred to the National Security
Council.
$' * '
That the two operations were scrubbed
of course made a considerable differ-
ence to Presidents Chiang and Rhee?
not to mention the course of history.
But scrubbed on completed, the -principle
remains the S2,Me.- The Central Intelli-
gence Agency, a secret arm of . the
American government, had taken on it-
self life and death decisions which in-
volved the integrity of this nation and
which could have gnerated results
tonching on war or peace in the world.
CIA, moreover, had. embarked on ac-
tions which went far-beyond the all-too-
liberal license it had been given by the
Congress in authorizing the agency. And
that has been CIA's way in less grisly
areas of its endeavor. It compromised
the freedom- of the press in the '50s by
iring newspapermen as "consultants,"
thereby sealing lips and silencing cri-
ticism. Whether or not this practice has
continued is anybody's guess, ?
The CIA's :original funetiori was-'
to
gather intelligence; not to interfere in
world *politicS. There. might have been ;
some justification for its activities 'as
one of many participants in Guatemala-
and in Cuba where it; was involved .only
with the sanction of hishei? autherity,
But ia the inAsmt enees, -CIA was a law
unto itself. -A thoughtful person might'
ask: Is it still?
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Approved. For Release
0 I
?
igoto -RDP80-01ATlialk0=M
WIRETAPPING IS IS ON THE UPSWING in Asia.
Taiwan and South Korea have joined Hong Kong and Japan in extensive
utilization of electronic eavesdropping.
Most of the bugging is to nab tax evaders, wheeler-dealers, drug
king-pins.
But a lot of the snooping is done for political motives.
Especially in Taiwan.
Taipei's hallmark used to be simply the regular opening of mail of
foreigners, or local nationals who corresponded with foreigners.
That old-fashioned tactic is still used extensively in Indonesia,
Thailand and Burma.
Taiwan "graduated" to electronic eavesdropping recently.
Now .virtuall ever forei ner on the island has his tele hone ta
DO
ed!
Wiretapping evidence was responsible for the recent expulsion of several
American military and intelligence operatives.
Japan's snooping is rnay for economic and commercial reasons.
Several of the largest---and most respected---Japanese firms hire
private detective agencies to snoop, on foreign competitors operating inside
Japan.
Corporate espionage is big business in Japan---snooping on foreigners
is only slightly more comprehensive than Japanese commercial firms' snooping
on each other.
South Korea's Central Intelli ence A enc is the No. 1 b in outfit
in that country.
The operations have the tacit approval of new Premier KIM CHONG-PIL.
Hong Kong has probably used sophisticated wiretapping methods longer
than any Asia locale.
The standing joke among Hong Kong police officers is that the reasons
for entry visa restrictions is that "if we tap one more phone thp bloody
island will sink into the sea from the sheer weight of all the electronic bugs."
Lately, Hong Kong authorities have begun to tap the phones of certain
real estate, advertising, and airlines offices in the colony.
CHANGE OF VENUE, or at least location, for, the U.S.-China talks is
due soon.
The talks, when
to Ottawa, Canada.
HUANG HUA, China
Ambassador to Canada.
about the U.S. rather
they are'resumed, will be switched from Warsaw
s most experienced diplomat, is the present Peking.
He spends most of his time these days studying
than Canada.
Poland
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HOU I
? ?
kro464-For Release 2001.103104: CIA-RDP80-01601R0
TRI
JJL 11371
liEEKLY - 33,102
C Ot.a-D
[IAtT e,
.By ROSERTitiOlIZIS
TAIWAN,- -1-lore in
.1 Taipei I am experinechn!
for the first time not only a
lack of optimism for the future
13 0, fTg ye]
?
VD a S 0
r g
sion and as to spike it as a:
springboard for liberty's re-
turn to the mainland.
There Is much talk among
? but an uneasy sense of alarm. the Americans here of a two
I am here to address the China policy but this is decep-
- graduating class of Fu Jen, tive because. those using the
the young, vigorous Catholic expression must intend to be -
-University in the outskirts - guile because they cannot
Tiapei and to participate ivith -mean what those words con-
the magnificent cardinal Paul
Yu Pin, Fu Jon's rector, in
the dedication of the new hos-
. ? pital grounds hi the suburb of
There is no unrest here,
.. crime is virtually non-exis-
tent, -prosperity abounds (per
? capita income here is 38times
that of mainland China and
? foreign trade for the 13.i mil-
lion in Taiwan is fastn ap-
? proaching that of the 7i10,000,-
.000 people in Red China).
The clear innocent face s of the
undergraduate!' at th e
Urd-
ye s ity and of the student
? nurses at the hospital are a
: joy to behold and a striking
contrast to what we are be-
coming used to in the western ,
capitals of the world.
: Yet one experienced obser-
ver said to me, "The Com-
munists could not conquer -
Taiwan by military means but
; it looks .as if they may now
by diplomacy-ours."
"SECOND BETRAYAL"
? ? Dr.. ritsiliony Kubek, the
, respected historian who has
?.-0:?eeiV here since February
teaching in three different uni-
versities, is planning a new
book which he will call "The
Second . Betrayal of China."
On June 15 President Chiang
Kai-shek said, "During the
:last five months we have ex-.
perienced a sequence of ad-
? versity, insult and suffering."
. All evidence points to a
,campaign at State Department
and CIA level to isolate this
island republic as a redoubt
to .cAppitivednizbirxRel elitev2001*3104hPE P80-01601 R000800180001 -7
vey. There just cannot he two
Chinas in the United Nations.
Those using these words do
so to coned l the repugnance
of expelling the Republic of ;
China which has been a model
member of the U.N. and a loyal
ally, to support in its pla.ce the
s-anguinary "People's Repub-
lic of China which is, by
every civilized standard, in-
eligible to become a member
of the "peace-loving" council
of nations.
W hat these planners are
trying to accomplish a s a com-
promise or a sop, perhaps
even by resolution, is to ad-
mit the government hove, not
as the "Republic of China'
but a s "Taiwan". -
?CIA FABRICATION
But since this would mean ?
the 'admission of a new
member, it would be vetoable
by either the Soviet Union or
the newly admitted Red China.
In other words,,,."Taiwan's"
admission would be dependent
on the consent of the Com-
munists. Already, as if to
curry Mao's favor for the
eventuality, the evidence
points to the CIA fabricating
an inde.dendent Taiwanese'
movement on the island. There
is no such thing here -eicept
as it is imported from the '
United States.
The "T a i wa n e se' ? are
Chinese who originated mostly
from South Fukien province
in mainland China. Under
Chaing's rule they are' emi?
nently successful and some
STATINTL
a difference between the tiSo
groups of China se but it is even
less than that which exists ;
between the very heterogene-
ous provinces and dialects on
the mainland.
. With the isolation of Taiwan,
recognition of Red China would,
follow admission to the U.N.
and the insurgency that Mao!
is waging all over Asia at
this very moment would be
come legitimized and it would
only be a question of time be-
fore the whole continent IS ould
become crimson.
But there are area s of hope.
So far President Nixon has
not indicated conclusively that-
he is going along with these _
CIA maneuvers 'but ?the state
of alarm persists.
? President Chiang is a proud
man and he will never surren-
der and he has the complete
-loyalty of all the people here.
Approved. For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP8
DANVILLE, VA.
REGISTER
M ? 10,742
S ? 22,644
? ? ? t ?
'Rill 27 1971
,sRalph de 71 oregano
Diem s Dav,th Siwed
CIA Law Unto Ibeli
40,
. Sometimes it takes years for: Somewhere within the bowels
the news to make page one.: of CIA headquarters, plans for
In November of 1963, any well- theassassination of Chaing Kai-
Informed Washington corrc- shek were made. A team was
J:spondent knew that; the Central assigned to do the job and
Intelligence Agency had been $5 million was allocated ? the
deeply involved in the over- money to be spent in setting
throw of Ngo Dinh Diem, presi- up the operation in Tapei, brib-
'dent of - South Vietnam. And jng such officials as could be
at the cocktail hour, in theibribed, creating a cover, etc.
.capital's most frequent water-!I was never able to determine
. ling hole, the suspicion was ire- what non-CIA officials ? if
:quently voiced that the CIA any ? were informed.
!Shared complicity in Mr. But because CIA security at
:Diem's assassination. Today, al- the time was about as water-
most 71/2 years later, Ameri- tight as a colander, the Re-
cans can read the story over? public of China's . Intelligence
their morning coffee. ...
There are other CIA storie }picked up details of the plot
of some concern to the! even before the CIA team had
citizenry, but since they dol unpacked its bags in Tape'.
'President Chiang was informed.
not touch on the. Vietnam war,
will not be found in the .e1ccorcling to my account, how-
they'batch f classified papers.. ever, the Generalissimo refused
being pawed over by the na-![ to give the order to "take care"
s_ ;: of the team. "Let's get their
tion's press. One such story i
so incredible that I have not5 million first," he is repcirt,
published it even though / ! to have said. The CIA team, t
checked it out just as high as
herefore, was led down a cloak-
? tyou can go in this government land-dagger garden path, never
without talking to the Presi- getting within range of Presi- -
dent. In the general letting- !dent Chiang.
down of hair that has followed 1 By the time the money was
publication by the New York spent, the Central Intelligence ,
Times of the Vietnam papers, Agency had changed its mint --
there may be some value in or had it changed by more re-.
reciting my story ? if only sponsible people in the United
to use it as a peg on which States government. The team
,. to hang some questions about was recalled.
cIA operations. WWI! I checked out the
,
Back. in the early Fifties, the story, the very important of-'
- Central Intelligence Agency de- ficial who confirmed it said,
cided that it would be a better "Sure it's true. CIA had a
world if President Chiang Kai- 'similar plan to knock off
shek, then digging in on Tai- Syngman Rhee (then President .
wan, would shuffle off, his of Korea) but we stopped it."
mortal coil. With the, Gen- In the context of the conversa- ?
eralissimo gone, all those tion, the "we" referred to the
pesky questions of Red Chinese National Security Council.
admission to the United Nations
would become moot. The Na-
tionalist regime would collapse,
and Mao Tse-tung could move
into the vacuum. From the,
wish that President Chiang
should depart this life to a
":- 'decision that he be speeded
on the journey was i small
- 'step. _. . _ ?? : . .. .
That the two operations were
scrubbed of course made a con-
siderable difference to Presi-
dents. Chiang and Rhee ? not '
to mention the course of ,his-
tory. But scrubbed or complet-
ed, the principle remains the
same. The Central Intelligence
Agency, a secret arm of the
American government, had tak- ,
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STATI NTL
en On itself We and death de-'
cisions which involved the
integrity of this nation and
which could have generated
results touching on war or peace
in the world.
CIA, moreover, had embark-
ed on actions which went far
beyond the all-too-liberal li-
cense it had been given by the
Congress in authorizing the
agency. And that has been
CIA's way in less grisly areas
of its endeavor. It compromised
:the freedom of the press in
the Fifties by hiring newspaper-
men as "consultants," thereby
sealing lips and silencing crit-
icism. Whether or not this prac-
tice has continued is anybody's .
guess.
The CIA's original function
. g
was -to gather Intelligence, rya
to interfere in world polities.3i
There might have been some f;.
justification for its activities as
one of many participants in
'Guatemala and in Cuba where
it was involved only with the fi
sanction of higher authority. ;
But in the instant cases. CIA 3
was a law unto itself. A
thoughtful. person might ask:?
Is it still?
??7
3
DEN Release 2001 /03/04 : CIA-9991L6CIA-9991L6vER APcgro?.vedf?1"
MN CIRCLE
JUN 2 01971
?
WEEKLY - CIRC. N-A
The real China lobby
Curious behavior
*island. Exactly as the raciall
,issue is depended upon by
the Red network to ?create a
,ferment in the United
States ultimately leading to
'our downfall, so can obses-
Sive-minded propagandists
of CA in Clif-h-11-0-1\ 6-1N . and enemy agents exploit..
I MR 11 ed, the so-called 'Taiwan for
the Taiwanese" line.
__ __ .
doesn't get all he wants.
-2. -- President' Nixon's, public
outright betrayal by Wash- turnabout in favor of.unilat-
ing,ton of the recognized eral -concessions to Red
government of China at China could, only be consid-
Taipei, by ousting it from ered as the "go ahead" sig-
the U.N. : nal by such conspirators. A
Edward Hunter is editor of
'the monthly Tactics magazine of
'Arlington,. Va., that focusses on
analysis and news of psycholog-
:lent warfare. He has authored a
:number of _books on the subject.
.His enlarged edition of "Brain-
Washing in Red China''
(Vanguard Press, 'Inc., New
'York), that gives the pattern for
"sensitivity training," is now
? Coming from the presses..
- By Edward Hunter
:THE REAL China Lobby ?
? Red ? is operating with
..renewed vigor but oldtime
:ruthlessness. . This lobby
consists of a policy-manipu-
lating segment of the unre-
formed State' Department,
its allies in the Central In-
telligence Agency, which it
controls, policy-maneuvering
elements ,on the New York
--Times especially, and a
?::_bevy of self-considered "Chi-
na experts" in 'the academic
community, spilling over
into the Defense Depart-
ment and.. Wall .Street. In
other words, today's Eastern
Establishment.
? .L.:..:,(3.49.11
.Objective
The ? objective is to take
advantage of the Republican
'Administration to put across
.,brazen maneuvers in foreign
*policy that Democratic
Administrations did not
Peking's entry into
'the United Nations and.,
Washington's recognition of'7
Red China are two prime
goals.
_Mao Tse-tung has never
been willing to compromise'
except as a tactic, . and is
-threatening to upset this
;cunning inAppitoved 131"
. -Background Setting slow process of attrition has
?,
This is the setting against made anti-Communi?.ts the
c
which certain, astonishing considered "security risks"
news articles from Taipei in government, not pro-
must be gauged. Particular-
Communists. Former Con-
gressman Walter H. Judd
ly among them is the New and Otto F. Otepka, of the.
York Times dispatch that a"
Subversive Activities Con- ?
number of U.S. military
men and certain c.LAJ trol Board, are symbols of
agents have been quietly policy pariahs, new-style.
removed from Taiwan be-
The shocking manner in
-
cause of involvement in which the highly knowl-
edgeable, the 1
- - -lChinese-speakinrf
so-called "independence
Judd is kept at arms length
moven-lent" on the fgland.
This is about as legitimate' is a clear signal of Ma-
chiavellian policy as regards
a movement as the propa-'
China.
ganda for a black republic
on U.S. soil. Third Force
The highly publicized, What- must be kept in
diabolical "China Lobby"! mind, for correct appraisal.
that was supposed to be ? of ?Far East developments, is.
supporting Chiang Kai-shek that the only consistency in.
always was more of a State Departinent policy as
"cover term" than anything regards China is the 'third
else, to divert attention force" formula. This is the-
from the powerful, genuine, direct inheritance of thepro-Red China Lobby. This twisted rationalization that
latter lobby invariably seeks made a betrayer of China.
to maneuver American poli-
out of unfortunate .General
cy in such a way as to meet George Marshall. ke pro-
Communist demands. Red
ceeded along the theory that
China's intransigeanee
neither the Kuomintang nor
on
Taiwan (Formosa), is one of the Chinese Re(' were not
those pressures. ? ,-"prejudiced," so he would
?
Discrediting Is Goal depend for intelligence and assistance on the center
So the discrediting of, groups or "moderates." This
Taiwan abroad, and artifi- pleased Yenan then
cially-induced "dissent" with- Mao's capital ? immensely,
'in, constitute the assign- or these "moderates" were
ment these lobbyists have ,clominated and steered by .
Reltiest6200.11103/04,:q31Akft,peaoy9160 R000800180001-7
OratInikp4
STATINTL ,
Approved For Release 2001/6344 MASRD1PNIT11
r
rtf-moo'n-opc_..1;
-
By PETILIt S. KUi1PA
IVashington: Bureau of The Sun
Washington, June 3.---The Unit-
ed States takes "no position" on
the question of self-determina-
tion for about 12 million native
Taiwanese., the predominant
majority of the population on
Taiwan, according to a State
Department spokesman.
. Mr. Charles Bray, the spokes-
man, explained that this was a
matter of "internal concern" to
the government of .the Republic
of China.
The question was raised after
Mr. Bray confirmed that four
U.S. servicemen had been trans-
ferred because of Chinese com7
plaints that they had acted syin
pathetically with Taiwan inde-
pendence "elements" by send-
ing and receiving mail for them.
Last week, the State Depart-
ment had "no comment" when
asked to compare the American
position on self-determination
for the Taiwanese as opposed to
the South Vietnamese.
. Self-determination for South
Vietnamese is, as President Nix-
on said in his State-of-the-World
report the "one guiding princi-
ple, one irreducible objective"
of American goals for the Indo-
china war. "We seek," he said,
"the opportunity for the South
Vietnamese people to determine
their own political future with-
out outside interference."
Taiwan independence move-
ments, which seek varying de-
grees cir autonomy from the Na-
tionalist government in Taipei
Or the Chinese Communist gov-
ernment in Peking, have been
suppressed harshly on Taiwan.
? They also have been denounced
? by. the Communists. ? .
Immigrants' Descendants ?
. The .Taiwanese are descen-
dants of immigrants from Fu-
kien province several centuries
ago. They speak a Fukienese
dialect which differs from Man-
darin, which is spoken by the 1.5
million "mainlanders" who
? came to the island after military
- defeat by the Communists.
Because of long separation,
many Taiwanese consider them-
selves a distinct people. Though
they form a majority en Taiwan
itself, political control of the.
government remains in the
hands of the mainlanders. Effec-
tive power is wielded by the
Legislative Yuan elected in
mainland districts in 1947 and
1949 with Taiwanese representa-
tion restricted to roughly the
proportion of its population to
that of all China.
' Local Issues
The independence movement
flourishes outside of Taiwan, in
student, intellectual and other
exile circles in the United States
and Japan. Approximately 90
per cent of students leaving Tai-
wan never return.
Inside Taiwan, politics is re-
stricted to local issues and elec-
tions. Taiwanese form a majori-
ty of the. Nationalist Army,
(though not its officer corps)
and also have shared in the is-
lands economic prosperity. It is
conceded that in time, their
views will have to be taken into
account en such natienal issues
as the government's fate.
Politically conservative, the
Taiwanese have few leftist ele-
ments. Those who speak out op-
pose rule by "mainlanders,"
whether they be Communist or
Nationalist. They differ in want-;
ing either eventual complete in-
dependence or some autono-
mous status with China, perhaps
in a commonwealth affiliation.
For the United States, the
question of Taiwanese aspira-
tions has been 'a difficult and
sensitive 'question because of its
alliance with the Nationalists
who form the government of
the Republic of China.
The State Department version
of the case of the four trans-
ferred American servicemen
differed considerably from Tai-
pei accounts. The Nationalist
-) a v777114 ? 3 e ri) ;?1 ", /t 71?
j tu7
a ggvare...ese ..1
government there charged tha
the Americans had- provide('
technical advice on explosive:
and publicity, as well as hand-
ling mail for Taiwan independ-
ence supporters.
One of the men was supposed
to have been a Navy physician.
!Others were enlisted men and
I one a junior officer of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, ac?
cording to Taipei stories. .
Mr. Bray had "no knowledge"
of others being involved beyond
the four servicemen. He said
two had been transferred last
year and since have left the
service. For the "same indis-
gression," two more were trans-
ferred last month. Officials here
said they all served with the
Military Advisory Group.
Neither the State Department
nor the Defense Department
Was able to provide their names.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000800180001-7
-
NEW YORK TIMES
Approved For Release 20011/Me'elA-Fr4W06-q160
U.S. TRANSFERS 6
IN TAIWAN UNREST
Men Said to Be Accused of
Aidincr Dissidents
Special to The New York Times
TAIPEI, Taiwan, May 31 ?
The United States has trans-
ferred four or more military
men and a junior officer of the
Central Intelligence Agency
from Taiwan in the last month,
reportedly after Chinese Na-
tionalist officials accused them
of assisting native Taiwanese in
'plotting anti-Government activ-
ities.
The Nationalists, according
to reliable sources, charged
that the men had given tech-
nical advice to dissidents on
the use of explosives and on
ways to generate international
publicity favorable to their
cause. The Americans were also
said to have used their mili-
tary postal privileges to help the
Taiwanese communicate with
colleagues abroad.
In its protest to United States
diplomatic and military author-
ities just over a month ago, the
Ministry of Defense reportedly
included detailed evidence ac-
cumulated by Chinese security
agents by close surveillance of
the men over a long period.
The tranSferred Americans
include a physician at the Navy
Hospital here, an enlisted man
in a psychological warfare de-
tachment, an officer in the Mil-
itary Assistance Advisory Group
V" and a civilian official in the
Army Technical Group, the cov-
er name for the sizable Central
Intelligence Agency detachment
here.
. . .
Agent Defends Action
. American sources said the in-
telligence agent had asserted
:that he was simply trying, with-
out orders, to broaden his con-
pets among the Taiwanese:
The Chinese security agencies
'are understood to be investi-
gating several other United
States military men who left
;Taiwan some time ago under
routine reassignment.
Both the United States and
.the Chinese Governments are
said to regard the case as a
;source of embarrassment that
they had hoped would not be-
:come a matter of public discus-
sion.
For that reason, it was said,
the American authorities ar-
ranged for the quiet transfer of
The men, who were ordered not
to discuss the affair with any-
one. The United States Embas-
sy has refused to comment oni
the case.
, The embarrassment for thel
Nationalist Government stems
largely from its reluctance to
admit that there are any active
supporters of the concept of
"Taiwanese independence" on
the island.
The dissidents said to be
involved in the case are be-
lieved to be proponents of in-
dependence from any govern-
ment of China, either Commu-
nist or Nationalist, on the'
ground that the 12 million Tai-
wanese have their own inter-
ests and historical identity.
Organizations advocating inde-
pendence operate abroad among
Taiwanese students and exiles
but are outlawed in Taiwan.
American officials here, who
have been trying to assure the
Nationalists that United States
support for their Government
will not diminish as a result
of Washington's efforts to ease
tensions with Peking, appear to
be even more upset than the
Chinese over the case.
C.I.A. Activity Denied
They have already had a dif-
ficult time convincing some Na-
tionalists that rumors of finan-
cial backing by the C.I.A. for
the Taiwan independence move-
ment were unfounded. Reports
that the American intelligence
agency arranged the escape
from Taiwan of Prof. Peng Ming
Min, an independence leader,
have also gained wide credence
here.
In an effort to prevent
further such incidents, Vice
Mm. Walter H. Baumberger,
head of the United States'
Taiwan Defense Command, re-
portedly has ordered com-
manders of American units
here to warn their men to
steer clear of domestic political
activity.
A large number of suspected
anti-Government activists ? as
many as 65, according to some
reports?have been arrested in
the last three months in what
may be a reaction by the Gov-
ernment to recent setbacks af-
fecting Taiwan's international
position. In recent months the
Government has also expelled
an American missionary couple
and arrested several Japanese
tourists for allegedly having
aided Taiwanese dissidents.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000800180001-7
-0. pn"gi STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 ? CIA-RDP80-01601R
1 JUN 1971
Americans -
Transferred
In Taiwan
TAIPEI, May 31 (AP)?At
least five American officials
and perhaps more have been
transferred from Taiwan after
the Nationalist Chinese gov-
ernment charged they were
aiding the outlawed Taiwan
independence movement, In-
formed sources said today.
Newsmen confirmed five
transfers: two Army men, two
Navy officers, and a civilian
employee of the U.S. Army
Technical Group, and organi-
zation of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.
Some sources said three
more persons were trans-
ferred, and others said there
were even more.
[Officials at the State De-
partment and Pentagon said
they had no knowledge of the
incident.]
Nationalist officials pro-
vided U.S. diplomatic and mili-
tary representatives with what
the Nationalists considered
was proof of antigovernment
activity, including an attempt
to visit persons convicted of
political crimes and providing
advice in the preparation and
use of explosives, the sources
said.
They said some of those'
transferred were cooperating
with each other in these activi-
ties while others were working
alone. Some of the men admit-
ted that their activities were
antigovernment; others denied
any such intention, sources
said.
But all reportedly said they
were acting without any kind
of official U.S. approval.
. American '? officials refused
to discuss the transfers, but it,
was believed the men faced no
disciplinary action and U.S.
military commanders have is--
sued an order to all units in .
Taiwan prohibiting involve-
ment in local politics, sources
said.
Names of the men trans-
ferred were not available, nor
was it known where they were
transferred to. Their activities'
were believed to have been
uncovered during interroga-
tion of antigovernment .
Chinese and Formosans ar-
rested in late. February and,
early March.
The Americans Implicated
were followed regularly by
Nationalist security police and
the police compiled very thor-
ough records of those they
met and what was said at
some of the meetings, the',
sources said. *
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000800180001-7
voN0
STATINTL RAMPARTS
Approved For Release2a01/0vSMA21bP80-016
Air erica:
Flying the U.S. into L
had begun in Laos in 1959; moreover, it appears that President
Eisenhower was not informed and did not know when his
office and authority were being committed in the Laotian ,
conflict, just as Nixon did not know of the intrigue of Mme.
Chennault. But that is precisely the point of parapolitics and
private war enterprise. ? ,
In its evasion of Congressional and even Executive controls .
over military commitments in Laps and elsewhere, the CIA
has long relied on the services of General Chennault's "pri-
vate" paramilitary arm, Civil Air Transport or (as it is now
known) Air America, Inc.
[How AIR AMERICA WAGES WAR]
IR AMERICA'S FLEETS OF TRANSPORT planes are readily
seen in the airports of Laos, South Viet-Nam, Thai-
land and Taiwan. The company is based in Taiwan,
where a subsidiary firm, Air Asia, with some 8000
employees, runs one of the world's largest aircraft maintenance
and repair facilities. While not all of Air America's operations
are paramilitary or even covert, in Viet-Nam and even more
in Laos, it is the chief airline serving the CIA in its clandestine
war activities.
Until recently the largest of these operations was the supply
of the fortified hilltop positions of the 45,000 Meo tribesmen ? ?
? fighting against the Pathet Lao behind their lines in northeast ,
"6
Laos. Most of these Meo outposts have airstrips that will ?? - ,. ?
,
. accommodate special Short Take-off And Landing aircraft, but ?
?
because of the danger of enemy fire the American and Na-
tionalist Chinese crews have usually relied on parachute drops
of guns, mortars, ammunition, rice, even live chickens and ,
pigs. Air America's planes also serve to transport the Meos'
main cash crop, opium.
The Mc? units, originally organized and trained by the
French, have provided a good indigenous army for, the Amer- ?
41'1.
jeans in Laos. Together with their CIA and U.S. Special
Forces "advisors," the Mcos have long been used to harass
Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese supply lines. More recently
they have engaged in conventional battles in which they have
N THE CLOSING DAYS OF THE 1968 presidential campaign,
the Democrats made an eleventh-hour bid for the
presidency through a White House announcement that
all bombing in North Viet-Nam was being stopped and
that serious peace negotiations were about to begin. This
move was apparently torpedoed within 30 hours by President
Thieu of South Viet-Nam who publicly rejected the coming
negotiations. Three days later, the Democratic candidate lost
to Richard Nixon by a narrow margin.
After the election, it was revealed that a major Nixon fund
raiser and supporter had engaged in elaborate machinations
in Saigon (including false assurances that Nixon would not
enter into such negotiations if elected) to sabotage the Demo-
crats' plan. It was also revealed that, through wire taps, the
White House and Humphrey knew of these maneuvers before
the election and that a heated debate had gone on among
Humphrey strategists as to whether the candidate should
exploit the discovery in the last moments of the campaign.
Humphrey declined to seize the opportunity, he said, because
he was sure that Nixon was unaware of and did not approve
of the activities of his supporter in Saigon.
The supporter in question was Madame Anna Chennault,
and her covert intervention into the highest affairs of state
was by no means an unprecedented act for her and her associ-
ates. Madame Chennault's husband, General Claire Chennault,
had fought in China with Chiang Kai-shek; after the war he
ormed a private airline company. Both husband and wife
have, through their involvement with the China Lobby and ,
the CIA's complex of private corporations, played a profound
.role throughout our involvement in Southeast Asia. General
Chennault's airline was, for example, employed by the U.S.
government in 1954 to fly in support for the French at Dien
Bien Phu. It was also a key factor in the new fighting wh'
by Peter Dale Scott
Approved For ReleasmipaRKV
.3
4 I
IP
I II
?
?
been transported by Air America's planes and helicopters (New
York Times, October 29, 1969). The Meos also defended, until
.',.

? its capture in 1968, the key U.S. radar installation at Path i
i!
. near the North Vietnamese border; the station had been used
?,i..,.
'
.
in the bombing of North Viet-Nam. ? '.
Further south in Laos, Air America flies out of the CIA
operations headquarters at Pakse, from which it reportedly . .
?,/,
supplies an isolated U.S. Army camp at Attapu in the south- .
east, as well as the U.S. and South Vietnamese Special Forces ? !Ii?
? 1..1.
operations in the same region (San Francisco Chronicle, Oc-
tober 15, 1969). Originally the chief purpose of these activities
was to observe and harass the Ho Chi Minh trail, but recently .1
the fighting in the Laotian panhandle, as elsewhere in theSTATINP
country, has expanded into a general air and ground war. Air - ? 6
America planes are reported to be flying arms, supplies and
reinforcements in this larger campaign as well (New York
it\
?
STATINTL This is a more legible copy
Approved For RitialMIZOgNOTAMY GTABMP80-0160140008004&06011rilviousli?
29 January 1970
Tonkin Bay: Was Th0:00 a Coals
-1- t
?
- Truth Is the First Casualty: The Gulf sarily?firing at an unseen enemy '1
b
of Tonkin Affair?Illusion and Reality, lurking behind the blackness of .
?
by Joseph C. Goulden.
A James B. Adler Inc. Book, ?
published in association with-
Rand McNally:, 281 pp:, $6.95
Peter Dale Scott'
Seaman
? Seaman Patrick N. Park, on the night'
of August 4, 1964, was directing the:
gun-control radar of the USS Maddox.
, For three hours he had heard torpedo:
reports from the ship's sonarman, and
he had seen, two or three times, the
, flash of guns from a nearby destroyer,:
the Turner Joy, in the rainy darkness.
! But his radar could find. no targets,:
? t "only the occasional roll of a wave asi
? it breaks into a 'whitecap." At last, just
misinformation.
a
Not all will accept the analogy be: II
tween Washington . and a confused fr;?th
young seaman, but this hardly lessens "1
the importance of Gouldep's patient ?at
researches. The author of a book on sh
AT&T and a former reporter for the re
Philadelphia Inquirer, Goulden has , ,tt
made good use of his years of experi- ?at
ence in Washington. He has not really, M
written a "thesis" book; his method is ! :"4
to stick closely to official documents w
(above all the neglected Fulbright
Committee !tearing of 1968)1 and. te
first-hand interviews with witnesses the
Committee? failed to call, including p
Seaman Park. At times he Can be '
faulted for believing so much *hat was ' ? '
before midnight, a target: "a damned' , heard- North' Viefnam? ese orders to?
: big one, right on us ... about 1,500 position a defensive ring of PT boats
told him in the Pentagon. Even so, the
, yards off the side,: a nice fat blip." He :result is .devastating. It ? is now even
was ordered to open .fire;: luckily,, more clear that the Tonkin Gulf ' ! I
I however, not all seamen blindly follow Resolution (in his words):"contains the i
... 1
: orders. . -
_ ! fatal taint of deception." The Adminis--.: about the possible link between the
Just before I pushed the trigger 1. : tration ha4 withheld much vital in-' . .?..
,Maddox and the raids.
' 1 : Near Hon Me on the morning of,
suddenly realized, That's the ' formation in formulating the. simple"
n Turner Joyl... There was a lot ;Story of '"unP;ovoked attacks' by" August 2 the NSA_ technicians-
of yelling of "Goddamn" back and' :which that resolution was' pushed ', 1, intercepted orders for PT boats to
forth, with the bridge telling me through Congress. : -, a ,. -? ''': ? ??? , attack the Maddox. Captain Herrick.
.to "fire before we lose contact," i - aboard the Maddox cabled to his
and ' me Yelling right back :at. The Maddox, according to McNa- I i.. superiors in Honolulu that "continu- ?
, I
them .... I finally told them'
"I'm not opening fire until I know' mara in 1964, was on a "routine patrol :: ., ance of patrol presents an unacceptable:
, where the Turner Joy is.", The ! in international waters." In fact it was, ' 'risk," but: was' ordered to resume his'
bridge got on the phone and said, ! :on an electronics intelligence (ELINT) '
around Hon Me after the first South- ?
Vietnamese attack on the North Viet-
namese islands, as well as speculations.
(-7).
itinerary. The Maddox returned to a
: "Turn on your lights, Turner '1,-o. r spy, mission for the National Securi- ' '
' Joy." Sure enough, there she was, . '.ty Agency and CIA. One of its many .
point eleven miles from Hon Me island,
and then heard a North Vietnamese
I right in the cross hairs... 1,500 ' order for its attack. This *as the.
yards away. If I had fired it' intelligence requirements 'orders was ?
would have blown it clean out of
the water. In fact, I could have
been shot for nnl smieezin, the,.
trigger. Then people started asking, s?
"What are we shooting at ......?".; :1
We .all began calming down. The :
whole thing seemed to end then.
. ,
"to stimulate Chicom-North Vietnam-
ese electronic reaction," i.e., to pro-
yoke the North Vietnamese into
turning on their defensive radars so
, ?
that the frequencies could be
measured. To this end, between August .:
I and 4, the Maddox repeatedly simu-
Iated attacks by moving toward the
Goulden's fascinating book. which ? .
shore with its gun control radar
has gathered much new information
mechanism turned on, as if it, were ,
'about the Tonkin Gulf incidents, seer , ;
the experience of Patrick Park as, with: ...prepa.ring to shoot at targets. In so
one exception, a microcosm of the doing& it violated the twelve-mile limit -
,?
'
entire Tonkin affair? . which Pentagon officials thought North r
I, Vietnam claimed- for her territorial .1
illustrating ,the confusion between ? - ! waters.2 Far from being "routine," this
illusion and reality and the inclina- was only the third such patrol in the
lion of man to act upon facts as . Tonkin Gulf in thirty-two months; and,'
he anticipates they should be;
the North Vietnamese had to assess it
rather than' what rational examina-??
? ? in the context ,of a recent US build-up.' I
tion shows them to be. The ex- ? ?
..and South Vietnamese threats to carry
ccption is that Park refused to '
ington actAd on tx:i Ate' On July before the patrol,
. the war north.'
squeeze the firing key, while Wash-"
assumption aasis , it-PrditY :19,r ase. 0,4se ekkciFi. 1601R060800/1410100,*-7 -
eipitously, perhaps even unneces! '
.prelude for the first incident of August
2?it is clear both that a North
Vietnamese attack was ordered and '
According to The
(Aug. 11, 1964, p.
oga's Task Force
Admiral Robert B.
New York Timer
15) the Ticonder-
Commander Rear
Moore "indicated
that the destroyer might have been
two or three miles inside the 12-mile
limit set by 'Hanoi for international
waters."
? .
McNamara told the Committee that
the Maddox could simulate an attack
on the coast by turning' on special
transmitters, but the Pentagon later
id the ship carried passive equipment
.?...... ? ?