DOSSIER ON THE C.I.A.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000800100001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1971
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP
P1 : TnO TSE
S PTEM_'E11 1971
For some time l have been disturbed by the way the CIA has been
diverted from its original assignment. It has become an operational and
at times policy,-making arm of the government. I never thought when I
set up the /-/A. that it. would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-
dagger operations. --ex-President Harry S. Truman.
has happened since that pronouncement by
the agency's creator in December 1963 to remove or
NOTHING
reduce the cause for concern over the CIA's develop-
ment. As currently 'organized, supervised, structured and
led, it may be that *the CIA has outlived its usefulness.
Conceivably, its very existence causes the President and the
National Security Council to rely too much on clandestine
operations. Possibly its reputation, regardless of the facts, is
now so bad that as a foreign policy instrument the agency
has become counter-productive. Unfortunately the issue of
its efficiency, as measured by its performance in preventing
past intelligence failures and consequent foreign policy
fiascos, is always avoided on grounds of "secrecy". So_
American taxpayers provide upwards of $750,000,000 a
year for the CIA without knowing how the money is spent or
to what extent the CIA fulfils or exceeds its authorized
intelligence functions.
The gathering of. intelligence is a necessary and legitimate
activity in time of peace as well as in war. But it does raise
a very real problem of the proper place and control of
agents who are required, or authorized on their own
recognizance, to commit acts of espionage. In a democracy
it also poses the dilemma of secret activities and the values
of a free society. Secrecy is obviously essential for espionage
but it can be - and has been - perverted to hide intelligence
activities even from those with the constitutional re-
sponsibility to sanction them. A common rationalization is.
the phrase "If the Ambassador/Secretary/President doesn't
know he won't have to lie to cover up." The prolonged birth
of the CIA was marked by a reluctance on the part of
politicians and others to face these difficulties, and the
agency as it came to exist still bears the marks of this
indecision.
What we need to do is to examine how the U.S. gathers
its intelligence, and consider how effective its instruments
are and what room there. is for irnprovernent. Every govern-
ment agency mr>APpraBe ftr, R~ f6
r
CIA's Director, acknowledged before the Am ri an
of Newspaper E
be. supervised i
Intelligence Ag,
The time is to
supervisory role
Central Intellig
War. Under this
CIA administra
of inquiry by i
and specificall\
requiring disci,
titles, salaries
CIA; (ii) expe
lions on expel
the Director's
.without adver
Government
the Governme
for staff abroai
their families
1Q49 Central I
Director a lice
With so mt
is seen by mE
stine coups,
in Guatemala
Mossadegh i
the Cuban I
failure). The
President Ker'
28, 1961, u,
heralded - v
Because the
representative of. the unending, gambrtry c mu u,yy...
life human aspect of espionage- and secret operations. At this
level the stakes are lower and the "struggle"" frequently takes
bizarre and even ludicrous twists. For, as Alexander Foote
noted in his Handbbok for Spies, the' average agent's "real
difficulties are concerned with the practice of his trade. The
setting up of his transmitters, the obtaining of funds, and
the arrangement of his rendezvous. The irritating administra-
tive details occupy a disproportionate portion of his waking
life."
As an example of the administrative hazards, one day in
1960 a technical administrative employee of the CIA
stationed at its quasi-secret headquarters in Japan flew to
Singapore to conduct a reliability test of a local recruit. On
arrival he checked into one of Singapore's older hotels to
receive the would-be spy and his CIA recruiter. Contact was
made. The recruit was instructed in what a lie detector test
does and was wired up, and the technician, plugged the
machine into the room's electrical outlet. Thereupon it
blew out all the hotel's lights. The ensuing confusion and
darkness did not cover a getaway by the trio. They were
discovered, arrested. and jailed as American spies.
By itself the incident sounds like a sequence from an old
Peters Sellers movie, however, its consequences were not
nearly so funny. In performing this routine mission the
CIA set off a two-stage international incident between
England-.and the United States, caused the Secretary of
State to write a letter of apology to a foreign chief of state,
made the U.S. Ambassador to Singapore look like the
proverbial cuckold, the final outcome being a situation
wherein the United States Government tied in public =
and was caught!
4: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000800100001-5
 STATINTL
Approved For Rele'aseD2W1 : CIA-RD
2- .JULY 1971
c: r:u, V. fi
i;_ C) 5-,Nro l `f i!,oss
By WILLIArA J. P0ME OY origins of which Ware diffici!lt to
LONDON, June 14 (By airmail) trace through a labyrinth of links
The western press began a viii- with Hong Kong and ' Malaysia.
fication canipaign against one of One source Was visible: the paper
the (up to now) favorite sons of was allowed an overdraft of
neo-colonialism in Asia: Prime $125,oC by the Chase Manhattan
Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singa- Bank of New York.
pore. It seems that Lee has dared In its 10 months ?of op .,ration,
to rap the I.nt!caes of foreign o;gn;er He i, ,, the a.-g~;,.-?- e -Ii,gdc;ii;
uii at ractive salary, ands ail elc.
 STATINTL
IYASHII GT )- UST
Approved For Release120036?,33Yi : CIA-RDP80-
Aid i g Paper
Reuter
SINGAPORE, June 11-The
U.S. embassy today denied
suggestions by Prime Alinister
.Lee Kuan Yew that an Ameri-
can agency had been financing
.the Singapore Herald.
The IEngllsh-language daily
shut down May 28 when the
'government withdrew its
.'printing permit. Lee earlier
'implied that the paper was
linked with "black" (subver-
sive) operations directed from
abroad.
-At a news conference in
Helsinki yesterday, the prime
minister said he believed the
`CIA was not direcly involved
with the Herald but added
that there were other agencies
,in the U.S. government, such
as the U.S. Information Serv-
`iee and the Voice of America.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000800100001-5
 Approved 16 A7RDP80
24-
Jet, l:~f
t 1
A
D
A. natural sympathy for the'
Herald's staff had served to os
score in sonic minds facts about
the protagonists in the affair.
On tile one hand there were the
elected leaders of Singapore. on
the other were the " obscure as
well as not-so-obscure foreign
politicians, financiers and guar-
alitors from a variety of foreign
lI
I3y JAI! 11
, ceLcuscd
Singapore C I A
In Singapore
SINGAPORE leaders last Mr.`?Devan Nair referred to
'
t~ : night opened their ; the t' mounting anti-Singapore
campaign to rally support clamour from Foreign sources
mainly centred in that well-,
for Mr Lee Ituan Yew, i known beehive of international'
Prime Minister, who has .intl?lglic, of ugly men serving
.come under heavy criticism Eastern or western masters-.
-for- his tough measures Hongkong."
-S!!I`` 1 OlflitE
AAA tL -4Jj. L i,i
against the Press. his list o r "black op
The Government issued a
sweeping history of "black'
.operations conducted by Ameri-'
cans, British and others who had
better:remain unmentioned."
And in' a six-page statement
from the Chairman of the
'Government-controlled ' national
'trades union congress, asked
Singaporeans to " give the Gov-
'ernnient the benefit of the
'doubt " until all facts' in the
Press war were known.
This plea by Mr C. J)cvan Nair
dealt primarily with the Govern-
nient's roiv with the English-
language - Sinnajlore Herald,
which last week quadrupled its
circulation after the Prince Min-
ister fired a series of verbal
broadsides at its management
and questioned its financial
backing.
Staff rescue
An attempt to kill the paper
was frustrated by the staff -
who gave up their salaries and
went into the streets to sell
,copies - and by the Chase hian
Italian Bank,'which has deferred
foreclosure on its mortgage, to
the Government's annoyance.
Ileaders used to a highly re
strained Press have been
edi-
stunned by the Herald's
tori;tl content these past few.
days as column after column
lashed into the Government, its
,leaders and their policies.
Newspajler comment through-
)it the re ion' has over whclin-
ingly -supported ' the , paper's
stand. to the point that Mr Lee'
appears to be facing the
toglitest political test of his 11
:years as leader.
Last night's statement by Mr i
Devan , Nair predicted that a
.number of Singaporeans would
sooner or later have reason to
feel ashamed of themselves for'
giving the benefit of the doubt
to the wrong side in the con-:
,froittation.
'}lc mentioned the 1959 Chee
Swee Kee " casein which " large
stalls of Alliciiearl money from
? a bank in New York found its,
way into the pocket of a Singa
pore politician.
"There was the. case of?a
CTA attenlpt.to bribe a senior
Singapore intelligence officer,
and the " uniquely British-type
of dual, black operation-tbe,
Eden Hall . affair. "
This was a reference to meet
logs head in 1960 between the
then }Iigh Conlniissioilel?-GCnel?al
in Singapore. Lord Selkirk, and
the Communist leader, Lim Chin
Siogg. who were supposed to
-have talked over cups of. tea at.
the British representative's
official residence, Eden I-Iall.
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000800100001-5