(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 173
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 13, 1970
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601RO%Or7Al9ipA901-2
BLUEFIELD, WEST VA.
SUNSET NEWS?,
OBSERVER
E-7,1figR 1 3 1970
'
1 /it is reported that qls agents posing as 417:)'''-!
men are taking part in military operations
Laos. But no ground troops, mind you.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01501R000700050001-2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-.01601 RoinippmqviiT877?
OBSE,Ilyca
tviikii 1 3 1970
Li ? 174,906
S 204,225
0 0
Lell El Si
oit
1111 WEDS!
? Nixon's estimates of overall t ? ?
? '?
:Observer Washington Bureau
? By JAMES i?ICARTNEY 1 N o r t It Vietnamese strength .' you know that the ;
. VIENTIANE, Laos ? Presi? ? were also far larger than really would have no interest in
i
i A
dent Nixon's charge that North , seeking to downplay North i
anything that makes sense to ??
the embassy here. Nixon said, li Vietnamese strength.
Nietnam has escalated the war
. total North Vietnam ese
in Laos with a huge military strength in Laos now is over
''buildup is flatly contradicted .: 67,000.
:by official intelligence esti- He said this was an all-time
, mates here. In fact U.S. cm- high.
?:bassy officials here were as- , The day before he issued the
? ;tonished at figures cited by ? statement the official estimate
'Nixon in his major policy given here in Vientiane was
'statement on Laos in which he 50,000 and that figure has been
'claimed growing North Viet- . used repeatedly in Washington
:namese strength. '..for many months.
They say it just hasn't hap-
Ipened. But they are reluctant to Officials here were jolted by
f
? "Asked where he , thought . ?
Nixon may have gotten his
figures, he replied he mu5t
have gotten them from the Or
force in Vietnam. ,
.1 "They'd like to justify the i
.? bombing ,of the Ho Chi Minh
i i '
,
Trail n every way they could." I
). .
1
, Most intelligence estimates,.
' are not made by the Air Force i
, nor exclusively on the basis of
the ? .1 '
I
aerial reconnaissance. They are 1
? a product of all ? forms of .1
1; information, including question. publicly dispute the President:: tires. One wrote a long memo '
, They have frantically been saying that the government's i ing of prisoners captured doe.; .I.
? seeking an explanation from credibility again was threat- 1 uments and an other. possiblt:.
i Washington but as yet have not cued in Laos. He suggested I sourgegi ? ? .... ,
. received even a courtesy reply. that the government furnish an Vo..?.4.....,..,;,?,,:i0,4?,??..??,?. ,4::,17..1....:3i.f!..?
' The "buildup" was a key point explanation for the President's I '
t ' in Nixon's Laos policy stale-. figures mid for the difference , ;11
i ment a week ago. The President, between those figures and of. 1
I said that North Vietnam has: tidal estimates made here. He 4
: poured over 13,000 additional ' was told that no explanation' i
l' troops into Laos during the, past could be given until Washington i
? few months. He cited 'thisr provides new instructions. 't
; buildup as a justification for i Officials have considered it i
the highly controversial in. possible that the North. Viet-
crease in U.S. bombing.
; narnese may have added about
' 2,000 troops to their forces
' Intelligence estimates ' here over the last six months. Up
are that North Vietnamese
to the time of the President's
statements, however, they had,
'strength has not changed sub. not added 2,000 to their Seicial
.stantiaily in the last six estimate because they consider.'
'months. An official estimate ed evidence to be inconclusive.
;given to reporters inVIentiane One North Vietnamese division,
;the day before Nixon's state- the 312th, was moved from the
!tried made no mention of any '
Hanoi area into Laos' last fall..
;kind of buildup In North Viet.;
I Officials say however it is be.
'was
strength. One official
;was asked If he wa surprised 'loved the division was sent to
s
f by the figures In NIxon's Laos in part to replace losses.
. statement.
The embassy here has its
I
"I Was damned surprised," own intelligence specialists. In
-;
'she said, "and Fm damned : fact it is shot through with ,
been, representatives of tho' eirCLArrlit
; surprised there haven't
:more questions about it.
One. offil
alai remarked_et ? ti.:01si
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160
DES marrzEs, /07/A
IEG/STE.11
M
S:.. 14,490
1 4 , 4 96
3 110
.:AID a c
STATI NTL
1 ' The United States economic aid pro- ., ,?:?whickArgericans: copy th'cir;tornratinist"
-gram in Laos dvIdently has been a front -.foes:, ' y,;? i,',.'," ' . .',:/t:. ,.'',' *.i';:'1.'7/''.1.`
for CIA operations, Jack Foisie of the , -, `. 13ui, that ' Sott":;ofi'spying ;;Is ',at, -least '
Los Angeles Times ,reports from Vien-",,,'',Understood and ateepteci.?WhenAhe U.S.
tiane that CIA agents have been posing;',!, uses an economic ,assistance agen0 for"
as members of the U.S. .Agency for .', ;Conducting hostile ,acts ' againSt ` an ene=
'International Develdpment (AID) rural '.my, however, that is something else. In
:development staff in Laos. - .. ' ,i: ''','-'Laills,., as .in i Vietnam, and '? prabably, -
'. !These agents have been recruiting and .:',Inany other countriesi,'MD efficialS andL
'training guerrillas to fight against the ' ',employes. evidently must be 'assurned 1...4 i
North Vietnamese and Laotian Coninnu-":ticia not just spies but:agent? provdcateuts'
nist fortes. Foisie estimates that the,)./-who may be aiding and abetting ,.:-.nti.:,
number"of CIA agents .posing as civilian ''.;, Communist guerrillas or trying .to. fait:
,economic aid ' workers totals several ''','' Communist , guerrillas; ;`, engineering :as-,.
hundred. ,' . . '.. 7 : ? ?'.? \ SaSSirlatiOnS; destroying military supply:
r . In 'modern diplomacy it is common '' ..caches. etc.,:. :., `.-;,
-practice for some officials in foreign :'::,,.;. The United State liaifailed to receive7
erribassies to be leading a double ' life ' credit for ,much of the,?yaluable',etoncim-1
ai.-elandestineA CIA 'agents, that 1 is,-,4IC.assistanee It has proVided, fOr'linder-:1
;
spies. Sometimes the ambassador him-'',?:''..iieveloped`.countrieS 'just because' of ,the !
.-;
self may not know all the CIA agents he.,', ,:?suspicions that it ,1 Was . being, cOndlietedi
,,lidS' working :under him in such jobs as \-',.,;f as part of the'cold'war.:?The,,news about 1
ZArmy attache or commercial attache. ' '...; what is going on in Indothina will surelt,
The "spooks" aS they are called seerivt2,',,i.'reinforce 'Mid -opiniew. of American 'aid.
IO :be :an -essential part' of foreign rela,-. It is flat,tiossIblei Of., teintse; to diVorce;-
.tions. Certainly, the United, States has to ,::..,i the, activities.: of, an'elConomii-asSista,nCe
;dgatherintelligente about foreign poWerS;',A.agency or of the ?tate 'Corps volunteer.;
'2'aS- they :?-cle-:'aboat ; the U.S." But some :.from the government of which they are
1. times this, cloak and -digger.,...Stuff seems '-'a ?.pai*.L ,;.Dut':?If. ' the U.S: : is '.; going: 0?;
.- ridiculously' overdone-;:?;kThe::inajot. ,ele. .i,,-oonduet these- pi.cgr,arris 'for:4 peat'e ipid .i
:moots' of intelligence 'are.:open,,reven Id.',-,',) econernia improvement, Alien it ought At;
cjiltussia,',and, do, net call '"for :ariy; eiabo. 4`!:l'e4st , to tno10. A dOett,oined 'tempt to.
rate- Under.COvervork."-,Spyirig...has.,;bt.:::7):kep ,ilic? agencies.:azul%their:personn&
,i.goine ',Ii.i-Passlen,',:4the;::ILS.:;?S.inC:e , WO ;Y:''.6c1)**astetr00.e.'34et?#rtie:tir,aC00.:,-,rii.,
i.'.. ci ,,ly,pr. ,1J pg:antat,.;r4;'ti011.10wayjn,?* niwnti"gso,viirnxr.1 ?
? ' Z'Ii.:: ...!3 r54 '1 4., '0.;i14.044.4,t' 7,..,.;.:
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0
ELVIRA, N.Y.
STATI?GAZE.qTE
D 51,075
TELFGRAM
? 55.644
MAR t3 1910
So. Toppling
?To the Editor:
i It seems certain that Nixon
has adopted the domino theory.
: We are now bombing Laos to
protect South Vietnam, and
tomorrow we can bomb
Malaysia to protect Laos, and
,the day after that we can bomb
Formosa to save Malaysia, and
,then maybe we can lay one on
Hiroshima for old times' sake,
to. protect Japan from itself,
and after that we can demolish
China and get it over with once
;and for all.
1 Except this time it is not the
'Communists who are pushing
;over the dominoes?It is us.
To be an American these
days, you must walte!up in a
state of lunacy or wonder.
; Nixon has said no more
', Vietnams and there we are in
ILaos, with all those crewcut
overgrown boys iu the SIA
, playing James Bond, and'ili
those brave pilots dropping ex-
plosives from on high, and
!there doesn't seem to be any-
:thing we can do about it.
1 We now have a Laos-Vietnam
war and there is .,no way to
' disguise that by announcing
that you are bringibr home
, 50,000 men while you' ,simul-
itaneously:' spread 'death... across
.- f, .. WIN' ?O.: ?71-0".....:pr,... ....??? , ri..44f1..,1
the Plain of Jars. .
Agnew, I suppose, will start
some sort of counter-offensive.
After all, the CIA and th
Pentagon were having a nice
little war in Laos until the
news media started blowing the
whistle.
STATI NTL
ominoes?
I suggest that Nixon and Ag-
new and any congressman who
votes funds for Laos be re-
quired to serve in that country;
that the great pilots who make
their living by bombing Laos
be brought home and put to
work with their hands in a
slum, and that it is late in the
day for Nixon & Co. to get a
case of Asian infection.
The Laos-Vietnam war is not
going away, and if you buy the
Nixon-Agnew public relations
job you can be sure that the
son you have in the first grade
this year will eventually end up
hi the muck of Asia. .
However, you don't have to!
buy that public relations job. MI
a democracy such as ours we,
the people, are the boss and in
the last analysis we get the
kind of government we demand
and deserve.
Some Elmirans, don't deserve
good' government because when
hr' I5 a speci$ City .Conneil
...truswiAgnii,,
election less than half of those
registered to vote do so and
when there is a City Council
ceting the members of the
Council and of the news media
far outnumber the audience.
That may be one of the
reasons for the declining
population of Elmira, the
business district which is
starting to approach that of a
ghost town, and the poorly
lighted and potholed streets.
If we Americans don't write
our representatives and our
newspapers, we will surely get
a larger war in Asia and a bad
political system, for a
democracy without participa-
tion is meaningless.
EDWARD M. LEPKOWSKI
; ? 1013 Davis St.
? ' Class of 1970
City University of NowlYnrk
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R
LITTLE ROCK, ARK.
GAZETTE
M - 108,821
S 124 742
mAR 1-6 1970
STATI NTL
"?The Congress Shall Have Power--All This Time
I Thought It Was the C4A.--to. Declare War?"
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
.LOS 417?",:rJ::S TIMES
Approved For Release 2001/93M1iA-RDP80-01601R0
I...
VIEW U.S. AS SENIOR PARTNER , Yanks Get Along Better With
Laotians Than With Viet Ally
? BY JACK FOISIE ' ? : p.:
Times Slal/ Writer , , . .
VIENTIANE, Laos?one of the
notable differences between the Until last year, the
A
wars in Vietnam and Laos III that Americans in Laos also
felt restrained in what
' generally the Americans get along
La-
better with their Lao ally than with they could do for the La-
otians. With neither press
? their Vietnamese counterpart.
In Laos there never has been nor Congress paying close
attention, it was easier to
uncertainty over who is the senior ! make allowances for Lao
? partner. It the American. Laotian
military commanders tend to be
more willing to accept advice. If,
they sometimes play the American,
for a fool, it is mostly to gain.
I personal profit.
inadequacies.
As a major participant
ta raising guerrilla forces
to stiffen Lao government
resistance to the Commu-
,
toss of / "face" seems not as. nists, the Central Intel
Important. Talking out a problem ' gence Agency had secre ,
? here doesn't have to be an exercise ; funds to spend. Agencies1
' in. obtuse diplomacy Candor is ' which had to keep public
.? possible. At Pakse, southern Laos, ! books were able to dis-
the other day, a Lao pilot readily ' guise some of the extra-
explained that his T-28 prop plane legal expenditures. ,
bombed only in areas not, heavily ' Partly because of such
contested. The Ho CM Mthh Trail' comfortable working ar-
.,-. and other "hot" places are left to'.thrangements, some strong
I'
---'faster, more expertly flown Ameri-;
can jets. ? , .. .. ? . .Americans and Laotians
.
attachments between:
? ? ? :have developed.
Genuine coordination, In assigni-,, One remarkable. friend-,
? ment of air ,missions is possible..siop Is that of Gen.? yang
. because of Lao reality: Air, strike; Pao, fiery leader of
.' ' forms reflect it:' "Request Lao AF?
: /government troops in
.... or Allied AF-.-check :one" is about, northeast Laos and Edgar,
how the choice is presented.. ' ? (Pop) Buell, an Indiana'
Unlike in Vietnam,. in' Laos there farmer 'and widower who
r has never been debate over whether came to Laos as a volun-
:' Americans can supervise the distil- , teer - aid worker 10 years ?
bution of aid supplies down. to the ago.
? village level. , , ? ? ' The affection is voiced in.
The Laotians' readily' agree ;the psuedo-tough language by ?
' task is beyond their capability; The "lop."
... Vietnamese wanted to take. charge ' .
of American aid cargo from the. Deprived of Booze
Asked about his health
'moment It was unloaded :from ship
when visited by corre-
4. or plane, With resulting ,largo4cals,
, spondents recently at his
' (livers" int"laCk markets, ? :"'''!..''' ..1 mountainous headquar-
. . ? . ters at Sam Thong, "Pop"...
replied: "My last malaria
attack was a bad one and ?
I've had no booze for three
'months. The general
(Vang Pao) told his people
anyone who gives "Pop" a,
' drink goes in the hole for
, three days." ?
' "Pop" reciprocates with
1 superlative praise fey.
; VangPae........___;_!_,
1/??\IINIL
, America civilian pilots.,
Air America is a U.S.
chartered air-
line in Asia.
Vang Pao is accompa-.
nied by several non-Asi-
ans in civilian clothing,!://
presumably CIA and U.S.
military men. The flights
originate' from Long
Cheng, Yang Pao's head-'
, .
.? quarters just over the hill
"Ile's the greatest leader from Buell at Saha Thong.
of men and people in the ' There never has been any
world," Buell said, refer-.. h explanation as to why
ring to Vang Pao's corn- there sareap watrt.o air essbibaisyth150
mand of an estimated 10,-. idea was that separation of
000 Lao army regulars and civilian aid and military
' an equal number of guer-
,
rillas. Most of the guerril- assistance w a s possible
las are Meo mountain and desirable.
tribesmen. The twin basei have
, been politically con v e-
Vang Pan is a Mco, and
acknowledged leader of '
850,000 bill tribesmen who
live in northern Laos,
according to "Pop." Buell
Is p ro to a b 1 y the most
lw 1 mi ffeable A merlean ,
on the tribes In the high.'.
lands after his year of
catering to their needs,
through distribution- of..
nicnt. Curious congress-.:,
men and reporters, are,
shown Sam T hong and ',
kept away from Long ,
Cheng. Vang Pao tends to 4
bristle at outsiders.
Vang Pao's daily trips
are dangerous. Only two e
weeks ago, the doughty
general, who claims to be
only 40, survived his ump-
U.S. aid supplies. tecnth crash. His plane's
Daring anyone to criti., engine lost Power on
cize Vang Pao, or suggest ? takeoff and t he pilot
that he has a challenger . crash-landed wi th Vang
for power, the 56-year-old.
American declared heat- ?Pao getting only a cut
nose.
tedly:
"There's no other Meo
Yang Pao accepts advice
? ?I' but sometimes his deci-
living who could do ,the sions do not have the
job the general's done. 4 concurrence of his Ameri-
Such untempered ad- 'L. can advisers. Nor does he
miration makes Buell the always inform them of his
target of some criticism in ? plans.
the rear areas. But the' ? The general decided to
unschooled man from Ha. ,?
evacuate the road junction
milton, Ind., is not unset- .1 town of Muong Soot with-
tled by it. American am- ? E. out a fight during the
bassadors and air directors ? i. enemy's current' offensive
come and go, but Buell . on the Plain of Jars. The
remains the American Americans did not discov-
with the most influence on' er that the small garrison
the fightingest general on had pulled out until nine
the Royal Lao government? hours later.
side. Vang P a o' s offensive
Less Confidential 'tover the same ground late
Vang Pao's relations last summer was his own
with his American military ;1 idea. He differed with
advisers seem less confi- Americans on how far .he
dential. During the season- fi should push the retreating
al Communist offensive it enemy. They feared that
now, under way against , Vang Pao, with his limited
Vang Pao's forces, it is the forces, would try to gobble
general's habit to visit his .r up too much territory.
major units each day. He- This year's enemy
goes by helicopter or light comeback with not too
aircraft flown by ?
Air much resistance by 'Yang
? 1 Pao's troops may have.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000703ri
las
'the Art e5ican
3
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160
LUAE,
J.;URNAL
V - 63,232
h 5. ,75t
S
_ !MR .; ?c?RO
NIXON PATIENCE STRAINED
Nonsense About Laos Overdone
TITERE ARE two methods -through which
Sen. .T. William Fuibright could be told force-
-Italy to lessen his umtecessary mouthings
about the U.S. Government's efforts to settle
:.Southeast Asia's bloody conflicts.
His latest performance is introduction of a
resolution that would put the Senate on re-.
cord as opposing use of U.S. air or ground
/forces in Laos without prior Congressional
approval. He complainS illogically that the-
Central Tutellig,ence -Agency and the Agency
forin tern a tional Development seeni to have
coonerated in an effort .to block conquest. of
Laos by North Vietnam and the 'Conimunist..-
Pathet Lao. ? ' ? : ' ' ..
The best method of nubile.' deflation Of ?
this sort ol arrogance from the. chairman
of the Foreign Pelations: ?,Committex: would
be censure by the Senate, calling for ad-
herence to the Committee's... constitutional
. role in foreign affairs. : ? . ? .,
Another would be a hard-hitting-denun-
ciation by President Nixon...'. :
.: Mr. Nikon has been most thoughtful in
seeking (c'i1rrio11i1 coi-, oora ; *ri
. peace efforts. However, surely there mut
-a limit. Last year. the Sc-Ttate adopted a
resoltition saying, the President should
denied -autliority _to conunit troops oversepl
.without congressional am-Tow:1. It
. binding:and neither would be the new Fill-
brigh t resolution. -. ? .
'Fulbright 'hac'agone. to the. Peonle" in an
:effort to force 1m ",Peace-at-any-price"
tions on the Government, Mr; Nixini
- to_the, opi Nyjt h far?better
? 'There's little.,-chailice for 'Senate :action.'
For_ one 'thing,. 115ajorit4:-.- Lea cl er Mike- Mans-.
; field is , far too. 83-.mpathetic. to the ,"1114?out"..
"
,lie did say ,Thurscia'y that 1 failocl to
'? see the point of ;Ftilliriglit's delusikm that
-Comniunist aggre.ssion in Loos isnrelnted
to. the war in Vietnam." However, that's
scarcely. the reprimand ;needed. ?
'It might be up to the President; IN-11.0s"
patience has been sorely strained ? ??
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R0
FLA.
HERALD
- 3-0,469
LE.I7
VA 1 3 1910
.
?reign
?,, HAVE you 'ever ,ond-efed' syhylfor
..eign aid so often fails? . lr ? ? ?
one good example wa the sto,
y out of Laos that;cIA ?agentsAirto
posing as aid worIcersina:rural dey,elop '
merit mission. ' ? .4- ' ' ?
; The CIA men recruited and ,,trained;.:::
Scouted ?enethy moVcinents;?,
n d helped dii?ect:, aircraft, frOir the
1110und: "
???? 1. ?
What was the effect. In the !?Lnatiarif
:srillages where that occurred?:
tLaotians logically would 'regard ithe7
14,414 mission as suspect. They would have?,
rrample reasonlo believe. the .true /3irliosez
1 .wes net to help Laotians but ttijorwAixt:
Military ob3ective.', 44
S,I1C11! 'a. conclUsion'destroys,,Sicreb*:i'
I jectiveg at their base. 4
Let us consider further the l 'covet,:
hese CIA: agents. The 'Les: Angeles '
alMes' dispatch explained that digging:5
wells was one ,of the eid objectives; gn-
'ohand, ]\vere?:,15
en of these were. CIA agents.
Even if :Laotians did ,not tealizertliem;:
?UilaWateness,..not
Jike1y ii these 'elTeemetalces,.,,
surplus of: well-digger siiperylsora 6014
re::#014iOn
or gross nJLrIeny
hy". does Jorezgni ?!
:exaMp.le?f
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
?
TkiS WASHING= posT
Approved For Release 2001/14011111M-RI5P80-016
STATINTL
All Foreign Forces
U.S. Endorses French Gail
For Iv daival FT-9m Laos
A French call for the with-
drawal of all foreign forces
from Laos, including Ameri-
can air and North Vietnamese
ground units. was endorsed
yesterday by the United
States.
The State Department en-
dorsement came in a state-
ment that also urged that all
14 nations which signed the
1962 Geneva accords neutraliz-
ing Laos "live up to their res-
ponsibilities."
The United States has sup-
ported informal consultations
among the 14 nations but
progress in this direction has
? not been made because the So-
viet Union has not responded.
Further attention on Laos
will focus today on the appear-
ance of Richard Helms, dime-
Agency, in a closed-door ses-
sion of the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee on covert
CIA activity.
Helms was summoned as
Committtee Chairman J. W.
Fulbright (D-Ark.) pursued hi
inquiry into reports that great
numbers of U.S. personnel
listed as employes of the
Agency for International D
velopment in Laos are actuall
CIA agents.
Published government mt.:
ords show more than 230
Americans in Laos as AID per-
sonnel. The personnel are
listed in a wide variety of cat-
egories, ranging from "corm
munity clevelopwant adviser"
and "air traffic control ad-
viser" to public safety advis-
ers, engineers, and, 'ares,goor,
tor of the Central Intelligence dinatot.
wA
?
In another development in,
the continuing Laos contro-'
versy, Senate Democratic
1 der Mike Mansfield (Mont.)
xpressed "grave reserva-
tions" about one implication
of a resolution on Laos intro-
duced by Fulbright on.
W dnesday.
The Fulbright resolution'
ould require action by the
legislative branch, as well as
by the executive, to justify use
of U.S. armed forces "in corn;
bat in or over Laos."
Mansfield told newsmen
that he was concerned that
the resolution, even though
not binding on the President.
might Impede U.S. bombing of
North Vietnamese troops and
supplies infiltrated down the
Ho Chi Minh trails across Laos
and into South Vietnam "I
don't think anything should be
done to make it more difficult
and deadly for our 400,000
troops in Vietnam," said Mans-
field.
Fulbright's resolution was
intended to distinguish be-
tween air interdiction of the
North Vietnamese infiltration.
?and what he called "action in
Laos which is unrelated to the
war in Vietnam," Senate
sources noted.
In presenting the resolution,
Fulbright said, "An argument
might be made' that the Ton-
kin Gulf resolution (of 1964) is
broad enough to authorize the
President to engage the armed
forces of the United States in
stopping North Vietnamese,
traffic headed for South Viet-
nam over the Ho Chi MinN
trail." But there is no eongres,-.
atonal action authorizing U.S.
forces to engage in combat in'
the war directed against Laos,
iself, Fulbright emphasized. '
This distinction between the'
two kinds of combat in Laos IS
made , in the "whereas" sec--,
tions of the Fulbright resolu-;-
tion, but not in .the operative',
section alt.: ' ?
Approved For Release 2061/03/04 : CIA-IRDP80-01601 R000700050001-2
I
ii
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-016
.....
CH APLOTTE,
NEWS
E - 65,014
? MAR 1 2 1970
Terry And The Pirates, AFL-CIO
STATINTL,
In a world that is fast losing its' Apparently money?$24,000 to $30,-
romance, we suppose it had to happen. 000 a year including overtime pay? is a ;
ut nonetheless we were shocked to read major attraction for the pilots, many of
that the real-life equivalent of Terry and whom are ex-Marines. Though, says one,
the Pirates--that is, the, GIA,pilots flying "Practically all of these guys have a ;
in the shadowy Laotian war?now have a; streak of Steve Canyon or Terry and the '
, ? union. , Pirates in them or they wouldn't be out 1
That's right, a union, just like the
:
here." Many of them also have families .,
' unions for railroad workers and truck with them in the Far East, children in
drivers. Known as the Far East Pilots ? school, and, no doubt, membership in 1
whatever passes for a golf club in that 1,--,
1 ?,'- Association, the union has just negotiated
a new and finer contract for the men who',' corner of the world. ,
, ' ? fly supplies to the Laotian forces and, in ', We don't begrudge the men their pay
i
i .? some cases, fly the troops to and from '
and some amenities, for their work is ?,,
. ' battle. The new contract gave the pilots '
: better pay, plus hospitalization, life in- 't long on hazard and short on reward. But .
surance, home leave, sick leave, a. senior-- somehow the romance is gone now. After
ity system and even tuition payments' to ': all,' can you imagine John Wayne with a
4\442;and thci; children to privata school& :, . '' union bug stenciled on his Flying Tiger?
?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA:RDP80-01.601k000700050001-2
Approved For Release inCilln/FRPZIPA-RDP80-01601
1 2 MAR 1970
Asks Congress ule
on U.S. Laos Policy
?-1 lllll I 'I I
taking. Tribune Press Urdu)
Washington, March II?Sen.
J., William Fulbright (D., Ark.]
proposed today to advise Presi-
dent Nixon to obtain congres-
sional approval to use United
States troops or airmen in
Laos.
Fulbright introduced a reso-
lution Stating that it was the
sense of the Senate that Ameri-
can military opeprations now
being conducted in Laos re-
quire prior approval of Con-
gress under the Constitution. ?
No Treaty on Effect
? Fulbright, who is chairman
of the Senate foreign relations
'committee and a leading Viet
Nam dove, declared in a state-.
meat:
"The United States has no
treaty or other national com-
mitment to the government of
Laos or to any faction in that
country. The Congress has not
granted authority to the'Presi-
dent to wage war there.
"As cOmmander-in-chief, the
President may use the armed
forces of the United States to
defend the United States. He
may have authority to dispatch
American armed forces abroad
to protect American citizens.
"The President does not have
authority, however, nor has
Congress given him - authority,
to engage in combat operations
In Laos, whether on the land,
in the air, or from the sea.'
Not Authorized
Fuibright said an argument
might be that the President
received broad enough author-
ity under the Tonkin gulf reso-
lution to use American forces
to engage North Vietnamese
troops and supply trains going
down the Ho Chi Minh trail
thru Laos.
"But neither that resolution
nor any other affirmative con-.
stitutionni action by the Con-
gress has authorized the use ,
of any United States armed'
forces in action in Laos which
is unrelated to the war in Viet
Nam," he said. ,
Fulbright Charged the Nixon.
administration has attempted
,to, distinguish between combat
action in the air and combat
? action on the ground. '
' "I submit that such distinc-1
tion is specious," the senator
said.
Earlier Fulbright said he!
thinks it is obvious a relation- I
ship exists in Laos between,the
agency for international de-
velopment and the Central in-i
telligence agency.
Cites Published Reports
He cited published reports ,
and , the testimony, of a reluc-
tant AID official to support'
this thesis.' '
The AID official, Robert H.
Nooter, agreed to supply Fill-
brightis foreign relation com-
mittee with a memorandum on
any such relationship.
STAT1NTL ?
Approved For Release 2,001/03/04: CIA7,RDP80-01501R000700050001-2
4111.: 1.
STATI NTL
S 3570 Approved For ROMixttggight190/04REetketlaR11)41111101R0
In view of these other cuts, I cannot I
conscientiously and rightfully contend
that Portsmouth is being discriminated f
against as compared to other Govern-
ment shipyards?ns I could, and did, in
the case of the 1964 McNamara-Johnson
closure order against Portsmouth and
which discrimination I proved by facts
and statistics.
? Nor can any of us contend that we are
taken by surprise with these cuts, Anyone ?
? who read in the newspapers about the
onslaughts of the Defense budget in the
Senate last year by the critics of the De-
partment of Defense and those who were
? pressuring to take away from defense to
give to welfare spending and antipollu-
tion spending could see what was com-
ing.
? It was as plain as the nose on your
face that money was going to be taken
away from defense and given to the do-
mestic welfare and antipollution pro-
With the exception of the Safeguard
? ABM, which I think is worthless, I op-
posed deep cuts in defense spending and
' defended the defense budget against the
Senate attacks on it.
Nor can we of the Maine and New
? Hampshire congressional delegations be
surprised, for Portsmouth has been living
under the closure-10-year-phase-out
McNamara-Johnson order for more than
5 years since its announcement on No-
, vember 19, 1964. ?
In a way, since Portsmouth is under? ?
the closure order, it could be concluded
'? that Portsmouth has fared comparatively
? . well on this cutback in comparison with
, Government shipyards that have not
been ordered closed?such as Boston,
Philadelphia, and Mare Island.
? It may be recalled that when I warned
in a December 16, 1963, Senate speech a
year in advance that a decision had been
made by Defense Secretary McNarna
? to close the Portsmouth shipyard bu
that the decision would not be announe
ed until after the 1904 November ,elec
? tion, I was excoriated by a Portsmouth
? newspaper, denounced by a Senator,
charging that I was deliberately "calcu-
lating to panic the employees," repudi-
ated by another Senator, and contra-
dicted by then Deputy Secretary of
Defense Oilpatric.
Yet, just 16 days after the 1964 No-
vember election, the McNamara-Johnson
? , decision to close Portsmouth was an-
' nounced by Defense Secretary Mc-
Namara exactly as I had warned.
I have repeatedly talked with Secre-
tary of Defense Laird urging him to
. rescind the post-election-1964
Namara-Johnson closure order. On the
- basis of those talks, I have repeatedly
stated publicly and privately that I saw '
no indication of any tendency to rescind
that closure 'order. I have done so be-
* cause I wanted to be as truthful and
realistic with the people as possible, just
as I unpopularly was with my December
1963 warning instead of getting their,
hopes up falsely with optimistic talk that
I did not feel was justified.
As one who has fought against cuts in
? defense appropriations, X am in a far
more consistent position to protean de.,
, ? tense cut in my State than moms (Ahern
?
-???
Approved For Releale 2001/113/041:.CIA-RdP8(41601R00.0700050001-2'
am not in the politically hypocritical
position of leading a fight for cutting de-
ense spending generally but then mili-
tantly protesting any cut on defense
spending in my State.
In all fairness, consistency, and politi-
cal honesty, how can any Senator or
Representative pressure for large cuts in
defense spending so that the money can
be diverted to domestic welfare programs
and fighting pollution and on the other
hand demand special treatment for mili-
tary and naval establishments in his
State or district and oppose any econ-
omy and defense cut moves with respect
to his State or district?
In all good conscience, how can any
of us support cutting everyone else but
demand special exemption for ourselves?
If there are to be cuts, I expect Maine
to take her equitable share of the cuts
directed toward greater economy, better
domestic welfare and antipollution pro-
grams and fighting inflation?and I
think that the unselfish people of Maine
feel the same way.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the
roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, /
ask unanimous consent that the order.
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I also ask unan-
imous consent that, pending the arrival
of the senior Senator from California,
the junior Senator from California (Mr.
CRANSTON) be recognized briefly.
? The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from California Is recog-
nized. _
HOW WE OBSERVE THE GENEVA
ACCORDS
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, yes-
terday the Senator from Arkansas, the
distinguished chairman of the Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations (Mr. Fut.-
BRIGHT) , rendered a very valuable serv-
ice in discussing Laos, and introducing
a resolution relating to our military ac-
tivities ..there. Among other things, he
cited the fact that we are riot fulfilling
any treaty obligations in going to the
assistance of Laos. I would like to point
out that, even worse, we are violating a
treaty signed by our Nation by the mili-
tary actions we arc now taking on the
ground and in the air over Laos.
, I ask unanitnous consent to have
printed in the RECORD at this point the
relevant passages from the Geneva Ac-
cords.
There being no objection, the excerpts
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
EXCERPTS FROM GENEVA ACCORDS
The Governments of the Union of Burma,
.the Kingdom of Cambodia, Canada, the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, the Democratic Re-
public of Viet-Nam. the Republic of Prance,
the Republic of India, the Kingdom of Laos,
? the Polish People's Republio, the Republic
of Vist-fiam, the Kingdom of Thailand, the
Vision cd Roulet aloolidieb Republic* the
, .
1970 ?
United Kingdom of Great Mita n an o -
ern Ireland and the United States of Amer.
ba. . .
2. Undertake, In particular, that
(a) they will not commit or participate In
any way in any act which might directly or
Indirectly impair the sovereignty, Independ-
ence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity
of the Kingdom of Laos;
(b) they will not resort to the use or '
threat of force or any other measure which "
might impair the peace of the Kingdom of
Laos; ?
(c) they will refrain from all direct or in- .
direct interference in the internal affairs of
the Kingdom of Laos;
(d) they will not attach conditions of a
political nature to any assistance which they
may otter or which the Kingdom of Laos
may seek;
(e) they will not bring the Kingdom of
Leas In any way into any military alliance
or any other agreement, whether military or
otherwise, which is inconsistent with her
neutrality, nor invite or encourage her to ,
enter into any such alliance or to conclude
any such agreement;
(I) they will respect the wish of the King-
dom of Laos not to recognise the protection
of any alliance or military coalition, includ-
ing SEATO;
(g) they will not introduce Into the King-
dom of Lam foreign troops or military per-
sonnel in any form whatsoever, nor will they
in any way facilitate or connive at the Intro- '
duction of any foreign troops or military
personnel;
(h) they will not establish nor will they
In any way facilitate or connive at the estab-
lishment in the Kingdom of Laos of any ?
foreign military base, foreign strong point
or other foreign military installation of any
kind;
(i) they will not use the territory of the
Kingdom of Laos for interrerence in
internal affairs of other countries;
(5) they will not use the territory of any? . ?
country, Including their own for interference ?? f
in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of
Laos. . . .
For the purposes of this Protocol
(a) the term "foreign military personnel"
? Shall include members of foreign military
missions, foreign military hdvisers, experts,
? instructors, consultants, technicians, obser-
vers and any other foreign military persons,
including those serving in any armed forces ?
in Laos, and foreign civilians connected with
the supply, nutintenante, storing and utili-
lization of war materials;
? Mr. CRANSTON. The President stated,
in his report on Laos last Friday, that
the North Vietnamese were escalating
the Laos campaign in violation of the
? Geneva accords. Any introduction of
military personnel into Laos is a viola-
? tion of those accords. We are escalating,
too, in violation of the accords.
I suspect that the first to violate the
? accords were the Communists or North ,
? Vietnam. I presume this although I do
not know it. Conceivably we had military ? ?
personnel in there, or began to recruit
the Moo mercernaries, before the Com-
munists moved in from outside.
This did not happen, I point out inci-
dentally, under the Republican admin-
istration of President Nixon. Except for
the current escalation, the violations be-
gan under a prior, Democratic admin-
istration.
The Communists deny that they are
' ? violating the Geneva accords: so we deny
;that .we are violating the Geneva Sc- ?
? cords. U we consider that the Geneva /
? accords are null and void because- of
CommUnist violations of them and what -
?
"
?
3 ?IMPo........."??? ?=????????/.7r.......
DFTRoiTAptived For
I NEWS
Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601
'STATINTL
E 592,616
S 827,086
' MAR 1 2 1970
rfrAt--.=-THE DETROIT NEWS? Thursday, March 12, 1970
[
I By COL. It D. IIEINL JR.
News Military Analyst s
tr 1
r ai Cuk
in
'WASHINGTON ? Whether
? ,
?
' the attack of Laos jitters in LAOS SHARES common I -coMmtinications zone for both
i the Senate and segments of 1: frontiers with almost every 1
i. the press results from hyper- ,; other state in' Southeast Asia: I
i sensitivity to "another Viet- ? with China, the two Vietnams,
,i nkm" or a desire to sore A Cambodia, T ha ii and, and
' points on the Nixon adminis- : Burma. .
? sides.
' Its potential importance to
both is heightened in that it
affords a direct access for the
Communist powers to Thai-
1 tration, or both ., the subject I As one planner remarked, 1, land. Thailand is the largest
1 is one which 'needs to be put "Almost any straight line 'country and principal Amer--
i into military perspective. . from here to there, ,as the .. can ally in Southeast Asia.
i The fact that out., or five, or 'crow flies in Southeast Asia, ? , Even so, there are few min-
t i
. even 27 American advisers ; passes through Laos." . ary or political planners who
t may have lost their lives in/. Laos therefore lies astride .: would claim that Laos repre-
1, this obscure and intermittent ,t the interior communications,i ' ? , sots a vital interest of the
i conflict (which has gone on .i such as they are, of, the whole . United States. Former Secre-
since 1949 with U.S. involve, region. . tary of State Dean Rusk once
merit for at least the past 13 .i Laos is therefore a buffer' said, "Laos is not worth the
l years) doesn't ?make Laos .' state for Thailand and Cam- '
1 life of a single Kansas boy."
, "another Vietnam." ? ? ;.bodia against the Communist ' ,s Despite Senator Mike Mans-
For that matter, the fact ,aggressors, China and North ':' field's statement? last week
1 that certain U.S. military peo- ., Vietnam. ,, . that "We are up to our necks
,, .
? ple in Laos are drawing cora, ? Because, however, of bla- in Laos," the facts hardly
: bat pay means nothing more I tant North Vietnamese viola- . bear out the metaphor.
'
than that their duties involve ! tions of the 1962 Geneva ac-
BESIDES OVERT advisory
i individual hazard on danger- .1 cords, supposedly neutralizing ;
: work with the Royal Laotian
ous business in dangerous ,' Laos, the country, instead of '
Army and Air Force, our
places. Laos itself is bound ; being a buffer as regards the ;
, main military involvement is
to be a dangerous place in a i Vietnams, is a Communist
i war whose guerilla aggres- ' communications zone. ? ' clandestine but extensive
sors proclaim: "The front is ,I Along the Ho Chi Minh Trail '' ,s u p p o r t of Neo tribeemeno
' i eastern,, Laos more than blood enemies of the North
! everywhere.'" " n,
. Vietnamese and of the Viet
Minh before them.
Under Gen. yang Pao, the
Meos have a 36-000-man tribal
army that does more fighting
than all the regular Laotian
forces put together. We stip-
ply and advise the Meos,
mainly using Special Forces
teams under CIA control? for
mer Green Berets hired by
the agency.
In the air, the U.S. Air
Force flies extensively over
Laos from Thailand bases, as
do Navy pilots from. Tonkin
Gulf carriers.
Nearly 200 U.S. pilots and
crewmen are said to have
been missing from flights
over Laos since 1964.
Ever since the recent Plain.
of Jars defeat, B-52 strikes
have also been flown against
North Vietnamese formations
in Laos.
The CIA operates two air,
lines in Laos, Continental Air
Services and Air America.
NEITHER FACT ought to 3, 'half a million North Vietnam-
be used to try to hang some ese soldiers and countless ,
". kind of credibility gap on Mr. thousands of tons of supplies
which apparently is , and weapons have marched-
rthe object of some of the Laos ' iince 1964 through the jungle
hand-wringing. There is noth- to invade South Vietnam.
ing in the Constitution which Of these, 67,000 Communist
requires the' President to tell troops have occupied, and to-
all he knows, especially when 'day arc operating, in northern
there are good reasons not to. 'and caste] n Laos.
?
i A thiird cause for alarm ?
the recent COmmunist recap-
BESIDES TS strategic le-
ture of the Plain of Jars from , ? cation, Laos, in the eyes of
I
i the Ladtian government?has Hanoi, is part of the old
to some extent been defused French Indochina which was
by the Communists them- Ho Chi Minh's ? goal to. cont..
j selves. munize.
I Prince Souphanouvong (the ., Laos, in other words,, con-
Pathet Lao "Red Prince") ? stitutes the hinterland
e has apparently signaled to his ' r.of North Vietnam. '
half - brother, Laos Premier Significantly, Dien Bien
= Souvanna Phouma, that the i? Phu, the crucial battle of the
recent offensive was a French Indochina War, was
cal" attack intended, to lay' ? fought for control of a route
favorable groundwork for r between Laos and North Viet-
ternal negotiations, rather . nam.
than a North Vietnamese esca-; For all the foregoing ma-
' lation of the war.. t sons, Laos, remote, sleepy.
The main reasons why Laos, j? politically unstable, in some
cal , ? leis OA i1111011140)1111biler..andEfe
; iS worth Amo&Leptperlee,.. ovhaktotn
are geograplEiV 1,1 bY'
These provide interior corn-'',
munications and airlift to sup-
port anti-Communist hands ".
,and agents and tribesmen in i
? remote mountains and jungle.
TO TAKE CARE of all the 1,
foregoing U.S. activities, ?
President Nixon states that t
we have 1,040 Americans in
the country. Fulbright says
..we are paying over $160 mil-
lion a year for what he char-
ecterizes as "a well fleshed- !I
but war."
?-'?'.11"lie reason why American
e
divolvement in this covert -..
'.1ear has been kept secret is ?
not a desire to deceive the
public, as Senators Mansfiield,';
Fulbright and McGovern, j
among others, have charged. ;
The Geneva accords, nego-
tiated by President Kennedy
and Nikita Khrushchev in t
1962, provide for complete .
L.military neutralization of
? Laos. We complied faithfully,
.but the Communists did not. I .. ?
Only when we realized that!.
they were keeping thousands
of troops in Laos, in violation
of the accords, did we again?
ph se in American advisers.
As the Communiist presence
mounted astronomically, ours ?
rose modestly to present ley- s,
els.
, But today, Hanoi will not ),
acknowledge the presence of
a single North Vietnamese ,;
soldier in Laos. ?
Until it does, we cannot be
the fiirst to admit involvement
and thus submit ourselves to '
world flagellation as a treaty
breaker.
Hanoi, of course, is under, ,
no internal pressure to con4
, and has no public opinion',
answer to.
In Hanoi they have no Mce4.,
Governs or Fulbrights to com..."?
licate their war ffort
CIA-RDP8Q-01601R000700050001-2
STATI NTL
LOS ANGELES TIMES
Approved For Release 200i1F4Ori1ighlA-RDP80-016
I ' (One of the stopovers been fortified by the hell)
U.S.-Backed laotiatt
that amuses him is Dia: he has obtained for them
I
, from the Americans. Air
neyland.)
. .? drops of rice and other
? The Americans give essentials In Milos fighting
GeneralScorned by, Vang Pao's army?hoth his nr?as need be ? rel reat-
regulars and guerrillas ? Ing from the Communists
the latest equipment and , have high priority.
?
large numbers of soldiers
who deserted.
Vang -Pan is trying to
establish a defensive line
on high ground south and
west, of the Plain of Jars.
This half-moon line
stretches some 75 miles
? through jagged mountain
' Other Army leader5 bountifulrtostnft
IieregTli:;istint; - seems genuine. With is;
,.. The doughty chieftain's
-concern for his people 1 Country. Even by Laotian
standards,ifr elv ells to ;)-;
BY JACK FOISIE . . i . Army's hest rifle. , guerrillas . supported by; vi ns ? ' have M-16s, the , .U.S. '
inly held.
? ? . Times MO Writer' .1 ' Yang Pao, being no dip- _.the Central Intelligenc -
? . Despite American pres- '
?
! . VIENTIANE?One, Of ;the many. lomat, returns the chur- .. . %Agency. and his regulars: sure, no regional comman-
? .
, problems worrying :the American' , lish attitude of his fellow ': ' by the U.S. Army and Air l'etle:r 11;tanst yet beenbseheenurdernsullandw-
. mission in Laos is that it is heavily: generals in full measure. ,
udnits to be shifted to Yang
supporting a general Who is de-: He sometimes rejects a Force, Yang Pao fights on ,
Pan's command.
. . while "Pop" Buell hares-
spised and distrusted by other Lao. summons to Vientiane. for
: The U.S. Army, in asseeint inn witIn..:' . general s t r a t e g y .1 ses the U.S. AID mission
the Central Intelligence Agency, lo', . Recently the premier. t.for, more help for the ,als can claim, with some
refugees. justification, that his sec-
Each of the other gener-
/
.military leaders.
assisting Gen. Yang Paoln northeast; acting upon the urc:111a of ? The Laotian establish- tor is also under attack. In
Laos because: ;the American ailo- -!,-ir, ' ment h more than
.
ere i
' ?That is where the eneniy is most arranged for a nr.. --. 7 : i irritated with the Amen-i? s ?
fact, there is evidence that
.'?,1.to gain world admiratin., ' ? toward the enemy is purposely
I active. . ? ,?tour of Yang Pao's "(yin; ? , , ?m generosity
.y
?An enemy advance from ? its and sympathy. Yang Pan Pao: Its 1 e a d e r s 'putting light pressure on
, northeast bases threatens both the., torpedoed the *visit w i t h '. warn that at a crucial time government positions in
, ,in the Laotian war he will all other areas and rocket-
. i royal capital of Luang Prabang, ? the 1 a me explanation he try to form a "Meo nation" ing several Mekong RNer
where the king lives, and the i' was ill and the area inse-.
. / .. Mekong River city of Vientiane'', Lure. . northern Laos. trINVog PIA to keep troops
',...." i J? ? They believe that Yang from being transferred to
, where' almost everyone else - Iln : In this standoffishness r an will abandon h i s the northeast.
t government lives. . he is abetted by an irasei- : '
American friends and join ? If military considera- ?.
?
. ?Over the Years yang Pao has ble American, S e a g a r '
I.; the N or t h Vietnamese t lo n s were paramount.
: been the general most eager to fight`, (pop) Buell, who super- cause, providing he thinks however, yang Pao and
;* the Communist foe.. His admirers; irises the distribution of re-: ...?
' he has Hanes promise tO his A m e r i c a n backers
: still call him "another Napoleon." ' i lief supplies to thousand's
. 'v.-support a separatist state. ? .-:'
? The generals in the other -most, .0,.the.m Me?, and. i li_....,, The. theory ,sounds fuzzy'
but almost everything
(night win out in the high
'? ouuncils of strategy and ,
Leader of Mountain People ' : of war-displaced refugees c.i. IY:
' The uneasy relationship tict les. W It h increased '
4ose U.S. air support of
!does in Laos.
between Yang Pao and ibyal Lao army troops, all ,
dommanders appear to.: ..,. ,
lave added capability to
psist the enemy.
! However, there is an,-
Ither factor involved in
lhe reshuffling of troops.
No commander likes to
:urn over men to another 1
military field commands in Laos do
not like yang Pao because he is not a
1. Lao. He is a Meo?a leader of moun-
- ? tain people whom the lowland Lao-
tians look upon as an inferior race.
l' ? Lao generals, and the entireIcon whom ' Vang\ .Pan
' aristocracy of this feudal kingdom, 1
'..trusts."
' are related to the royal family or .. ?
? belong to families that-have fiefs of ,.. Van g Pa 0, S' strength
: their ? Own and pay . only , nominal 'stems from his leadership ,
; allegiance ' to the gover,nment of . of the majority of the Meci,
. other hill tribes. He has
worked with 'Yang Pao for
nine years and is regarded
by many as "the one Amer- ,
Premier Souvanna Phouma,. himitelf "'all hotigh some fight for
' a royal prince; . tJhe Communists. The 40-.
? None of them accepts yang Pao as ' year- old general claims
an equal. but as a 'Montagnard, a , '450,00n followers scattered
Frerich word used derisively in ,thrnugh the mountains of
' Southeast Asia. for savage. French-
r :northern . Thailand. Laos
"educated themselves, ,the generals :
'and Vietnam. Others our-
.consider Vang Pao's French is ces believe the number is
,
vulgar, which it is. Before he came a . :much lower. ?
Lao army general, he was a French
, His rise to power has
army sergeant and learned the ? been achieved through
: down to ? 10,000 or fewer.
language in the barracks
' years 'of tribal politicking .1
Furthermore, the generals are . and the accumulation of a . .Comhat losses were re-
jealous 'of the Men's favored status
number of wives to fnrni.1 ,pOrted to be relatively
'
, with the Americans. ? On occasion,: important. alliances. , ,light in recent fighting on
Yang Pao is treated to an?Amerlean. t: , Vans Pan's position as I, !the Plain of Jars, but by
. financed trip t4). " Unit4d'atatelV' nig' ef the ?oleos has 1 ,all indications,. there. were .
other Lao generals has pre-
cipated a minor crisis now,
for to stem further enemy
advances in his region
Yang Pao needs more
'troops. None of the other
'general seems willing to , general because then his
give him any of their ' . payroll declines.
forces: ' '" It is a well-established -
1 Many Desertions practice in Laos that the ?
? Military observers esti- 1 larger the roster on .pay
I
mate that yang Pao's re-
gulars, who may have clay, the richer the general ,
becomes. The general gets ,
once numbered 18,000 are his cut of the Amerirati.
provided funds for the '
troops.
? Ad i;- Re 162ii e 01/03/04 :.CIA-RDP8a-01601RO00700050001-2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 ':.CIA-RDP80-0160
MIAMI , FLA. ' ?
HERALD NIAR 1 2 1970
14 - 375,69
S - 46,167
Jack Rayed Says
Fr
STATI NTL
dace Guar Failed
n Facts About Laos
-
?, r, , ' student had even received his
Sometimes the Palacel PRESIDENT -Nixon foundt11 ? IN -SHORT, the professor ,, , ?
.: diploma, would have beett.
..Guard, hard as they try to 1 'i himself; in somewhat the ) . who once was supposed to
' k e e p presidents guarded..:_ Considered a miracle. .
same boat, but efforts will be ' teach-American youth some;
' from bad news and wrong ut- '
made to keep the death. of
: terances foul 'up the details. rimy other Americans on the
, Mr. Nixon tried to smooth j'1, ground a deep secret. Don
( out strong public reaction to 1, Sanche, who reported the ca.,'
i? the air war in Laos by saying 1..sualties, was ordered out of '
. not one American there had 1.'.the area. If any &lief Amen-
been killed in ground action
p : Can "advisors" -get blasted ;
? thing About life .as .well as .; .' Half a century ago the:
.,chemistry figures it's better ' . great industrial complexes:
for a .healthy guy to sit on ; , didn't comb graduating class-i
\
'his frances with a ?pipe and a' 'es for talent. They waited for, ? ..
can of beer than' to earn the .young men to come to them.1
dollars he, gets. Mr. Wiley .. A friend of mine, Geary Lau.;
,? suggests that charity is easi-1.. der, graduated from the engi-1
by the enemy. Then, a free ;into eternity, the government .1 er than sweat and calloused, nee ring school of the Univer--1
it, 3
? lance journalist, Don Sanche. "):will have a 'Chance to do a..1.-- .. ' sity of Pennsylvania. He :. ap-
''revealed that not only 26 ci- 2.1 little doctering on the news. V,' hands; that anyone ?' who'd"' plied for a job with the big-
vilians, but an Army officer. ,-' Are you listening, Mr.' Vice 17 work when he can get by gest construction firm in the '
? had suffered fatal wounds. ? President? ? :' ' 1 ',: without. it is a long eared ;?- city: After studying his rec-?
1 ?
This made Mr. Nixon look ' * * * 4 '. . jackass. Leary ruins bodies i.".ord, it agreed to take him on., .
.11 ,
pretty ,pad, and his phrase l' ??,,,,..and minds with. his espousal ". Pay? Don't be ridiculous. For! '.
, polishers huddled to find a ' . There's always somebody
. 'drugs. Wiley is doing all the first six months GearykA,?-?'?'....;..'-.,:
way out. They tried to make fto drag his profession , or': ' of
cause to a bottom. o t , he can to make America a had to pay five dollars a; .2. ;--? -_-_,??
s p ?".
? out a case that when the Viet 1? ,. nation of loafers. Work, Pro -,.1. week for the privilege of, ",..-'? -:-."--
: C o n g ...,..unned": down the ).:Judge Julius Hoffman did it..!
.low rung of public opinion .
fessor Wiley would have you , working. For the next six;
'-
1 -Americans they r e a 1 ry Brown for the judiciary., Rap o '?,- brelieve,,is degrading. Maybe ..1 he'd pay nothing and neither;
weren't engaged? in ground :did his own people a great I 1. he could make waiting for would the company. In the
action. So, what the heck ..:
e when he a
di lleged-
1,, the welfare check more bear-: ? second year he would start at se ic
was it, a strawberry festival
that got out of hand? . 1- ly, incited to -riot and arson.1 ..
' I:'.
able if he could get the gov- 1, $25 a ' week. Now, young
' ? He said that if blacks didn't"! ernment to supply LSD free men, still wet behind the
: got what they wanted, they'd ,'r t0 the $1.00 a year recipl- '; ears, begin at $12,000 to .
hum America down. He. ad- .? ,:- ents? ' ' .. , ' ", $15,000. Yet? at Wisconsin
1
' :vised his listeners to get guns 1 ' ' *;* * . ,! s was protested. Its
' . - . ''. -a 11 ill
all the' i
The stupidity of some pro-'7, 'unimaginable, .but that's the -
'arid kill whites they "'
i .could. Now, a former chemis- I
,. try professor has.joined Tim-..f.
.othy Leary. in smudging the"..!
teaching image. . ? ,
' President Nixon's welfare.,
? scheme guarantees a mini-'t
mum Income of $1600 a year ,
for a family of four but re-.,
quires recipients to accept.'
jobs or : job training if they,i
are able to 'do so. George Wi- 1
le)?,' who gave up pedagogy',
to become directer of the Na-1..?
,tiOnal Welfare Rights Orga-
nization,
nization, roars like 'a lion in
the mating seasan about
.',
that. Wiley swears: "Nobody?"
.is going to force us to work,
In order to get welfare. Our.'
;Interest is in keeping people.:n
from accepting menial jobs.;
" 'or': go through 'the revolving'
: ,doprs 'of: attaining program.'!.'...
..;,?.d.o...,....4.4'0,..iv: ..... ? .4.......,1,...;C,4.:.,,:i
' Government efforts make
it seem a war's not a war un-
less there's infantry in it ?
that the loss of hundreds of
1
General 'Electric, as do other% ii?laiashilii666.00441;.
. aircraft and 600 American
'airmen doesn't make Laos a v
real battleground no matter /
what semanticists say. That's
war, and all the public infor-
mation officers on the pay- '
roll can't change its complex-
ion in the slightest degree..
But the Palace Guard goofed,
just as it did with Dwight D.
Eisenhower. Ike wasn't told
that the CIA had ordered re-
, connaissalitr. flights over'
Russia. When one of our spy
, planes was shot down, the
!president emphatically an-
nounced it wasn't true, be. 1
Icause the United States nev-
ret had ,planes in Soviet air
ispace. Next day Ike had the
freddest face in Washington, i!
and when. his ears burned,
I heads were lopped off.
?
? testers is beyond imagining. way it WaS. ? .' 1
large corporations, 'r i;
-campus on recruiting mis-
sions. They offer fine start- i
ing pay and glittering poten- 1
'tials. Scouts sent to the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin were
I
chased away, because under--
graduates didn't approve::
General Electric's posture on,l
the war. In any age but this, ',',
',the :offer of a fine future, a' ?,,I, .
34h13r Rticl gob,. even before
. ,...1, Amin -. , : " 'WAtiollil
Approved For Rblease 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-016.01R009700050091-2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01 STATINTL 01-2
CITY, N.J.
SENII : I. 1:C1ER
MAR 1. 2 1970
WEEKLx ./ :,604
Capitol Hill
A bottomless pill
?
WASHING TON,D.C.?The North Vietnamese Offeregve
North Vietnamese offensive in ? ? retook the plain; if rviiii4rs
; Laos may or may not be a operations continue iinci the
challenge to President Richard ' enemy seeks to overthrew the ,
Nixon and a test of his government and capture the
' announced new policy of capital and the rest of &he
lessening U.S. participation in country, Mr. Nixon woulti lye
Asian wars. very much on the spot.
This country has not been For the war in Laos is 'part
wholely under the control of of the war in Vietnam. The..
' its government very much of --three Presidents preceding Mr.
the time since the 1960 Geneva Nixon were aware of this and
; accord declared it neutral. The the late President Eisenhower,
-
Communists have held the 'who? would not commit U.S.
eastern part of the country for soldiers to Vietnam, was ready
many, uninterrupted years. to fight to keep the
That is the area which includes Communists from taking Laos.
t e Ho Chi Min trail. But Congress is nervous over
But last year a 1,CIA any U.S. involvement in Laos,
organized. and equipped rmy fearing it might escalate.
helped government forces push The President knows the
the Reds out of the Plaine des American people are in no
Jarres, where they had been in mood for such a turn of events
control since 1964.- The recent but he also feels he can't all?
? ke;,. ;;.4 ? 1.:4.41dr, '?;;;.4;1-1,:N. .
the enemy to take the country,
which would almost surely
place a stamp of failure on the ,
Nixon Doctrine. That is why,
for ;the first time, U,s. heavy
bombers went into aation over ,
the plain recently.
This prompted a warning 1
Crorrit Moscow, perhaps
sieniming from a fear of
. counter U.S. escalation.
Vikokington meanwhile let it be
httOwn,. even ?though ?various, ?
rptertbers of Congress were
Speifsing out against any U.S.
iparbicipation in the struggle,
-
Viet it, considered the situation
SefjOUS.
.1414 it would be almost
impos.,ible for the President to
do nothing if the enemy sought
to take over the country
completely. That is because the
next step. would ;most surely
?
he ?i');enetration of Thailand,;
ViKosC bort-ler adjoins the
vrestern ? Laotisri border now
tanricr,BOvernrnetA control. The
US.' Las no treaty obligations
with Laos but does with
Thailand, and has bases and
men stationed in that country.
1, If the enemy offensive, then,
1, continues, and Thailand
appears to be the ultimate goal,
Mr. Nixon will be under very
heavy pressure to react. The
only question is how, and when
ecause of the lack of
'enthusiasm in both CongresriL
? and among the public
7general. , V,
'
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Approved for Release 21001103104 : CIA-RDP80-016
HILAr.-71r ['IA, rivt?
INQUIRER STATINTL
- 505 , 173
S ? 913,045
MAR 1 2 1970
CIA-AID LI
Ia os 60bvi us,
',.Fulbright Charges
"As usual with those who
put their trust in a foe who
has an unbroken 'record of
betrayals," Bellmon said,.
"the senator seeks to put the,
onus on the back not of the'
enemy but of the AMeriCall
President."
A new attack on the admin-
istration was delivered by ;
Sen. Stephen M. Young (D.,4,
0.), who asserted Mr. Nixon's
statement on Laos last Fri- j
day "represents a massive
effort by officials of the de-
fense establishment of the'l
United States to deceive the
American people."
i The question of the relation-1
WASHINGTON, March II
(AP). ?Sen J. W. Fulbright
1, said Wednesday he thinks it
t is obvious a relationship ex-
ists in Laos between the
r Agency for International De-
velopment and the Central In-
telligence Agency.
The Arkansas Democrat
[- and chairman of the Senate
t? Foreign Relations Committee
1, cited published reports and
the testimony of a reluctant
t?AID official to support this
thesis. Then he added:
"If it is true, it is only
t another sign warning that we
are in over our heads."
1: PROMISES MEMORANDUM
? The AID official, Robert H. ship between AID and the I
, Nooter, agreed to supply the
, committee with a memoran-
dum on any sue& relationship'
after stating: "Or guidance .
ion these matters does pre- '
elude us from affirming or
/cr 1
enying" in public reports I
/
that AID serves as a front for
the CIA in Laos. ?
Fulbright said he is sure, if :
no relationship exists, that ?
Nooter would denounce the ,
reports. ,
CIA was raised by Fulbright4
at.a hearing on Nooter's nom-
ination to be assistant AID
administrator for Vietnam. :
He has been deputy assistant,1
administrator for the rest of',
Southeast Asia, . Including
Laos, 1
Fulbright asked about a
report that some AID person- :
nel in remote areas of Laos
serve also as forward air con-4
On the Senate floor, mean-
trollers. ?
while, Sen. Henry Hellman 1 "To the best of my know1;4,
(R., Okla.) defended Pres- 1-edge," Nooter replied, "that A
ident Nixon's handling of the is not true, 0,
situation in Laos and Vietnam ,' Asked then about AID's ,
. , (D., Me.), a potential 1972 1
tack
Bellmon noted Muskie's call'
t whileodnelievreitriicnigs ma Isahsatrpweaetki
ations, including a firm U. S.
. which have CIA fronts, Neater said the
been described as
'l
two lines perform various
1 services for AID, including
1 ,
and Continental Air Services, ;
relations with Air America ,i'l
transportation ,of rise to Lao- ?,,,
tian refugees.
He said, in response to a 4
..
1
by Sen. Edmund S. Muskie
rival of Mr. Nixon.
'CUT AND RUN'
for renewed efforts for negoti-,,
withdrawal plan linked to "an' further question, that he be- .1-1
Informal arrangement re.', Reyes Air America is owned !
garding the withdrawal of! "by R Taiwan-based corpora.,
'North Vietnamese forces." ., tion." He added would sup. .I
I The Oklahoman 'then de- ply details to the committee. 't
I eared, "This is just a prefab- Nooter, 43, is a former SL
ricated excuse lb (cut and run Louis businessman. ..........0.00,
ApprevedoRotrilitthvalsprep-Iffra : CIA-RDP8Q-01601R0007
00050001-2
on our ....
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R00
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
CHRONICLE
- 480,233
ffi.:n 1 2 1970 -
STATINTL
"You mean we're all CIA agents?" -
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
4
'?
TI1E WASHIDIGT011 POST'
Approved For Release 2001/03/1442: VIA*PP80-016
4
11
P
i
Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) staff in Laos are actually Cett-
introduced a resolution mien' tral Intelligenct Agency men.
i day challenging the w.- ref At a confirmation hearing
i American armed .forces "in for Robert ? H. Nooter of MI5-
). combat in or over Laos" with- souri to be an assistant admin-
tout congressional action. istrator for AID, in charge of
i The chairman of the Senate the Vietnam program, Nooter,
i Fdreign? Relations Committee'reading from a prepared state.:
1 Mid several' other members of ment, said:
, Congress pursued thelr Oppo- "We prefer that theie mat;
1, sition to U.S. policy in Laos ters should not be discussed?
despite 'recent statements in either confirmed or denied?,
1 which President Nixon denied in public session." .
i'.,' any intention to send ground ? Fulbright retorted: "I think,
i4cembat troops into Laos .and it is obvious from both the ar-
' said there are only 1,040 tide (a newspaper article by.
Americans on the ground in jack Foisie of the Los' Angeles
Laos.
.. Times) and your reluctance to
"'Efforts have been made to speak that , a relationship
?
: distinguish between combat exists . . : otherwise the re-
action in the air and combat port would be denounced as a
action on the ground," said gross libel on the integrity of
' . Fulbright, but "I submit that your agency."
' such a distinction is specious." Sen. Stephen M. Young (D-
: Fulbright was referring to Ohio) said the disclosures oft /
President Nixon's first official operations "of .our CIA In
acknowledgement that U.S.
Laos and of our air and
aircraft are engaged in "corn- ground forces" are "shocking,"
..1 bat -air operations" in north- and "in direct 'violation of the
: ern Laos at the request of the national commitments
Lao goyernment, as well as resolution -. . ."
??,"air operations" to "interdict" An attack from the opposite
/
)North Vietnamese troops and direction came from Sen.
supplies sent down the Ho Chi Henry Bellmon (R-Okla.) who
Minh trails to South Vietnam. defended U.S. policy in Viet-
"The President does not iac-
cused Sen. Edmund S. Muskie
nam and in Laos. Bellmon ac-
! have authority . .? . nor has (D-Maine.) of advocating in a
?, Congress given him author- National Press Club speech
. Ity," said Fulbright, "to en- last week a "cut and run poi-
; gage in combat operations in icy" in Vietnam. Belimon said
Laos whether on the land, in "the senator seeks to put the
'the air or from the sea. onus on the. back not ofthe
i "Two years ago by an over- enemy .,but on the American41, whelming vote," said Ful- presideMOviiomerk he ?Inly
; bright, "the Senate went on 4,141.4,Aiial tio
. record stating that a national
. commitment to a foreign
i power arises only from a (limn.
. 1
iative action taken by the exec-
rtive and legislative branches
. . . The Senate must not rep
,main silent now ? while the
'president uses the ? armed
forces of the United States to
,.
,fight an undeclared, and undis-
closed,war in Laos." ? '
.' What Fulbright proposed is
. a "sense of the Senate" resolu-
tion, in ' effect rebuking the
. r President for 'failure to com-
ply with the national commit-
1,inents resolution. ,
1.1 Fulbright., also ?elashed:?Yes. I
t, ,
' 'yes-
terday with: a nominee for the
i,
_I Agency for Internationl Devel-
Approved For Retee4e02001140iiiesV:
discuss reports that about oalf
; of themembers of Abe', AIP:i
L. '.4 ..i...??'...? ' ? . ? ....,'?.f- ..:?.,???? ....,%,;,,e:
Fulbright roposes
HillReb eon Laos
By Murrey Marder'
Wallington Poet Staff Writer
STATIJ\ITL
IA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601
YORK, PA.
GAZETTE & DAILY
- 37,175
r: 1 21970
_
REPEAT PERFORMANCE? :-
President Nixon, in a major policy
speech last November, said, "I believe
lthat one of the 'reasons for the deep
'division about Vietnam is that many
Americans have lost confidence in
what the government has told them
about our policy. The .American
people cannot and should not be
asked .to support a policy which
involves the overriding issues of war
and peace unless they know the truth
about that policy."
This is the kind of logic which
should, but doesn't, govern the
Administration's flow of information, 7
not only in regard to Vietnam, but to
neighboring Laos as well where we
seem bent on repeating the sante
pattern of mistakes, operating under'
- the same lack of government and
'military candor, that led us into the
, Vietnam mess.
The President has paid lip service to
lull public disclosure, but his practice
has been quite the opposite. It is only
now, after continual prodding from.
CongressiOnal critics and news reports
filed from within Laos, that the
American public is beginning to get
true wind of what has been going on
in Laos.
Until this week, for example, we
;. were not told that American military
ground forces have been killed during
attics in Laos; we have not yet been
told the full truth as to the number of
American fliers who might have lost
;. their lives in air missions over Laos;
we haveot been told how much
money we have poured into Laos,
what this money has purchased in
terms of equipment, manpower and
operations; and above all -- what for?
Now for the first time,' the U.S.
Military command in Saigon indicates4
7 a reluctant willingness to discuss the :
.extent of ,America's military
_involvement in and over Laos;:
heretofore, it was an unpentional4pj
subject, off limits in militaiy jargon to
the press, who were also refused
permission to visit the American-run
. bases in Laos.
Finally, a reporter for, the New
York Times took a fifteen mile hike
through the forests of Laos with some,
other newsmen and wrote a first hand
report on an airport operation there-.
involving the c.,141.,..V S planes and
? supplies. And there' are American'
ground forces in Laos too,_ most. or
them ex-green berets, hired on CIAi
? contract to "advise" and ."train".
Laotian troops. In truth, they are.
temporary CIA personnel no longer,
connected with their army 'units,
subterfuge which the U.S. employed,
to say it had no soldiers fighting in
Laos. .
? If there's any merit to the truism
that those who don't profit from their;
mistakes are doomed to repeat them,
we have only td look at what's going
on in Laos, where the same kind of
pattern we saw in Vietnam is now,
being unveiled next -door where we
are becoming involved in the internal.
military affairs of a foreign cOuntry,''.
fraught' with the- dAngel- that'
Washington will involve the American
people in another illegal, ill-advised-
. .
!war. ?
.
Let's not allow those 'who would
?epeat the. past mistakes, of Vietnam
o :get away with it 'a second'. time
around in Laos.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
,
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160
CHARLOTTE, N.C.
OBSERVER
- 174,906
S
225
MAN 1 1. 1970 -
,
Nixon's Statement On Laos:
. Doe.. It Really Lead, At .A1.1?
Suddenly, President Nixon sounds like :. to be promptly and embarrassingly clari-
a president who never heard the sad story fled in hair-splitting explanations by lower -\
of Lyndon B. Johnson. ` ? ranking White House spokesmen. I,
Suddenly, another benighted piece of The sick feeling generated by the Nix- '
Asian real estate seems to be moving him on statement on Laos is not a matter of :
to utter a familiar kind of double talk: No fearing that Preside-Nix on 1s leading us
' Americans die in Laotian combat; one or into another Vietnam, next door in Laos.,
two or 10 or 20 simply fall victim to ? What the statement generates are doubts .
hostile action. , that the President is leading anyWhere.
Then, there ?are variations on tired , Where is the new era? 'Where 'are the
themes about troubles inherited from past ,new directions proclaimed in the Presi-
Iadministrations, about wanting no wider dent's "New Strategy For Peace?" Is there':
war, about the other side doing what it's no Nixonian approach to Laos .except
doing .. ? shopworn games played by the CIA ?,
i And suddenly, there seems good reason , games whose danger is diminishuNtly,
1 for the country to get a sick feeling in its because a general call to wade in patriotic
; collective stomach. It's as though someone gore in Laos would be rejected by the
I said, "Here we go again." ' American people? ,
,
; Happily for the nation and for Mr. , At the moment,. Laos bids to be a dif-
, Nixon, we aren't going again: The trip we ferent order of tragedy from the one that
i took in Vietnam was too recent and too Lyndon Johnson led us into. But unless
, bitter to be repeated any time soon. President Nixon can come up with some;
, Americans won't be conned now by thing better than his Key Biscayne state-'
"frank" presidential appraisals that halie tri,ent? on Laos, it will be tragic nonethelesq.
1 - - -- ,? . - -.. -- -------- .,..41.--.4411,...,..,.-- ,......,..._.... ',I. 0..;.., % , J d ...: . ..r.4,4
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Approvg_L: fl ..or.Release-2601.103/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0
CliTeMlu, ILL.
NEWS
E 461,357
MAR 1 1 1970
STATI NTL
Contract settlenamt
? 1?.
I .
'
? 'By Keyes Beech
-
: Daily News Foreign Service
I. .
, VIENTIANE -- A threatened ,! ?
strike by 160 American "bush ?'
:pilots" that would have para-'
i lyzed the war effort in Laos has .,
ts been averted. .
! . James A. Cunningham Jr.,:
, base manager for Air A m e r-;
t."
, ica, better known as the "CIA
'airline," said Wednesdarthe,
i:o mpany and the pilots
':reached agreement on a con-,
, tract four days ago in Japan. .
Last month when the pilots
.. threatened to strike, U.S. Am-
bassador G. McMurtrie Godley
'e warned that he would hring In
U.S. Air Force plane; and pi-
, jots If they did. .
Strike of .
pilt,rts in Laos
The alternative was a col-
lapse of U.S. logistics support'
'for Laotian army forces.
CUNNINGHAM SAID the pi-
. :lots, many of' whom average
'about $25,000 a year, agreed to
,Continue all "essential" oper-
,etions pending settlement of
,the dispute.
17 Air America and its smaller
competitor In Laos, Continen-
tal Airlines, operate under a
$6-million-a-year U.S. govern-
ment Contract. The lion's share
? Of this goes to Air America. ? '
? All but a few Air America pi-
lots are former Air Force,
Navy and Marine Corps fliers.
A few. are World War II pilots
now in their 60s. , ?
including five helicopter
; AIR AMERICA IS an off- crewmen., Some died in air
? - ? NJ:
. ,
spring of Civil Air ? Transport,
founded by the late Gen. Cla
Chennault, of Flying? Tiger
fame, in China more than 20
years ago.
Air America pilots in Laos
fly a "cat-and-dog" operation
'that includes hauling every-
thing from pots and pans to'
refguees, 'guns and ammuni-,
tion. ?
Last month t'wo C-130s evac-
uated more than 15,000 refu-
-Iirsoot1oft
gees from the Plain Of Jars in
shc, days, flying 20-minute
shuttle runs between the plain
and Vientiane. This happened
as North Vietnamese forces re-
captured the plain from Lao-
tian government troops.
None of the pilos is signed
up for combat, but this doesn't
mean that they' don't get 'shot
at. Since October, 1968, Air
America has lost .eight Amer-
0
;Civil 0 10
avertect
' crashes that had nothing to ad
with enemy action. But one'
fixed-wing aircraft pilot 'wag
shot through the head while in,
his seat.
"What bugs most of the p1-
lots is that they make any-
where from 20 to 40 landings in
f the course of a day ? and each
? one is a thrill," one pilot said..
? -"Sonic of the strips where they
land are no bigger than a car-
rier deck."
Treacherous air current,
and temperatures, especially,
'n mountainous northeastern
Laos, are bigger hazard than
occasional enemy fire.
A FORMER marine pilot
said the pay is the major in-
centive for most of the pilots.
"But practically all of these
guys have a streak of Steve
Canyon or Terry and the Pk
rates Ip them or they wouldn't
be out here. Many'df them are
family men. Their 6ildren go
to school like kids back In the
States."'
Recognition of their union,
the Far East Pilots Assn., as"
bargaining agents was a key
issue In the dispute between
the filers and the company.
Air America employs 451 pi.'
lots throughdut the Far East,'
Including South Vietnam, Oki;
nawa and 'Japan.
ONE PILOT said the newly
negotiated contract ? not only
gave the pilots in Laos better
pay but included such fringe
benefits as medical and life in-,
:surance, home leave, sick'
eave, a seniority system and
school. tuition for, theIr,
A.ctron_
_ iIi-
Approved For Release 2O1/03/04: CIA-RDP80.41,4:W:R0001:004600C
1-2
MI ST1 Art E I Eli C MONITOR
Approved For Release 2001/03/14kIA-RDP80-
1.1 MAR_ 7
A INTL
?
(7\ .North Viet penetranm deeper than ever.,
Laos calm n face of
. By Daniel Southeriand ..:? . : . ? .
? 7 '
. The Christian Science Monitor, . . _ e . moy-es.
,. . Vientiane, Laos
4
- ? The North ,Vietnainese troops are des-
The sleepy atmosphere in this Lao Gov. -?cribed as well-equipped, and Lao Govern-
ernment capital makes one wonder why the thent officialsAay they have brought heavier
rest of the world is making such a fues ,artillery pieces with them this time. ?
, about Laos.. . ? 1 ?
It was on a Saturday that the Plain of ? The weather also favors the Com.
Jars fell. The Prime Minister was playing munists. Last year the 'Communists had to
bridge. The Defense Ministry was closed slog through June rain and mud to take
for the weekend and no one stirred there Muong. In s year's ng Soul on th
the i western edge of the
except some tennis players,- .? . : - offensive, they .
Special correspondent of .
ai
Plain of Jars
took it toward the end of ebruary, without
The commander in chief of the Royal Lao a fight ? and with more than two months '
Army was seen in a sport shirt And slacks of good dry weather yet to go.
relaxing with friends.; ? -. ?-. *:
- . ' . ? The Communist troops move more easily
Asked About this apparent lack 4if eon.' in dry weather and iL 1,1st is now getting
cern, an American diplomat remarked that thicker and rising to .';tt-, heights, thus pro.',
the Laos have been through so many crises viding a protective cover against American '
in the past 20 years they have learned to, fighter-bomber strikes.
take them in stride. :
: ' ' ''.- "- ?.' "We had no idea they would get that far. .
There are, however, a number of reasons that fast," said one United States official '
for concern: ?.- ? ?? ? ? .' '. after ?the lightly defended Muong Soul air.
? The Communist forces, mostly North, field was abandoned., . .
Vietnamese regulars .much feared by the. If the Communists stop, where they are t'
, Lao, have already pushed to the point they;now, however, there will not be much cause ,e
' reached only by June of last year in.,the .44.,
course of their annual offensive.
? ?
Although estimates of the number of
North Vietnamese troops in Laos vary
widely from 45,000 to President _Nixon s
figure of 67,000, most sources, agree there
has been another Communist buildup since
last fall, with a new North Vietnamese
division coming into the picture. ,
, ? The North ,Vietnamese troops are des.'
cribed as well-equipped, and Lao Govern-
ment officials.say they have brought heavier
'.artillery pieces with them this time. ?
? The weather also favors the Com-
munists. Last year the Communists had to
slog through June rain and mud to take
,Muong Soul on the western edge of the
? Plain of Jars. In this yea's offensive, they lien off, the plain of Jars," said one source.
'took it toward the end of F cbruary, without "The idea was to hit them with the B-52's as a.
a fight ? and with more than two months .warning before they committed themselves irre-
,
of good dry weather yet to go. ? vocably to using the' Plain of Jars as a springboard
? The Communist forces, mostly North' for further attacks, he said.
'? Vietnamese regulars .much feared by the ? There are indications, however, that the Commu-
.'.Lao, have already pushed to the point they nists might ignore' the warning. The evidence at the
reached only by June of last year in ,the 'moment is that they are regrouping and moving
course of their annual offensive. Isupplies up to the western edge of the Plain of Jars .
Although estimates of the number of I in order to prepare for the second phase of their.
North Vietnamese troops in Laos vary offensive.
widely from 45,000 to President Nixon's ...If the Communists are determined to advance,
figure of 67,000, most sources agree there 'American bombing, including further pa strikes,
has been another Commtmist buildup since can slew them, but not stop them: Only inflinirInutsk;
or concern.
By taking the Plain of Jars, they merely
recovered territory they had previously held
for five years.
The Lao Government forces never in-'
tended.to make a strong stand either on the
plain or at Muong Soul, and this helps ac-
count for the light casualties they received
during their recent retreats.
The American B-52 raids near the Plain
of Jars? the first in Laos outside the Ho
Chi Minh Trail area?were intended as a
warning to the North Vietnamese, not as
an attempt to stop their advance across the
plain, according to informed sources in
Saleon.
"The decision to use the B-52's ..%vas taken by
President Nixon atter military authorities had writ.
last fail, with a new North ' Vietnamese est do that.
' division einirrfliritvid picture
c Fkel
Approved ease 001./03/04 :CIA:I.R.9-1;78-0:01601R000700050001-2
continued
STATI NTL
March APpnyed For ReaRegaltRACeiRoilly212?pRAIN1R00 - S3431
Citizen's Housing and Planning Council;
Mr. Carlson is an economist for F. W.
Dodge Co. They explain their strategy of
-cross-commitment in an intriguing essay
in the Public Interest?winter 1968.
Cross-commitment is the policy of de-
signing two programs which aim at dif-
ferent goals, but which interact in such
a way that each promotes the achieve-
ment of the other program's goal,
Mr. Starr and Mr. Carlson want to
combine a clean waters program with an
attack on poverty. This Is how it would
work in n program to eliminate combined
sewer systems in major cities.
Combined sewer systems are systems
that unite storm and sanitary sewers
?
into a single system. Heavy rains often
cause discharge of considerable raw sew-
age in water that is not processed by a
- treatment plant. Thus we could cut down
on water pollution in and around cities
if we could separate combined sewer sys-
tems into separate storm and sanitary
systems.
This would be a clear environmental
blessing to everyone. It would cost a great
deal and Mr. Starr and Mr. Carlson
argue that this cost could be a blessing
in disguise. They penetrate the disguise
with an argument I will explain.
It is common now to separate sani-
tary and storm sewers in new subdivi-
sions. But it might cost $30 billion to
separate them in older urban areas.
Sample estimates are that it would cost
$160 per resident in Washington, D.C.;
$215 in Milwaukee; and $280 in Concord,
N.H.
Mr. Starr and Mr. Carlson look upon
this expense as a possible instance of
crosscommitment between the wars
against poverty and pollution. They
speak somewhat jokingly about "the eco-
nomic beauty of sewers" but the point
they are making 1; vr? -lions and what ?
they say deserves qi2. .:!:z at length:
Of all the major types of construction
activity, the one that requires one of the
highest proportions of unskilled labor hi the
placement of sewage lines. Labor Department
studies indicate that common laborers ac-
count for over 40 percent of all on-site man-
hours involved in the construction of sew-
age lines. And on-site wages normally ac-
count for between one-fifth and one-fourth.
of the dollar value of a typical sewage-line
contract. Adjusting for the fact that wage
rates paid to laborers would be somewhat
below the average for all employees on the---'
job, the decision to undertake only eie
modest $30 billion expense of complete se 1-
oration of sanitary and storm sewers would
result In direct wage payments of around
$2.5 billion to unskilled laborers. At an as-
sumed annual wage of $5,000, this could
generate half a million man-yearn of em-
ployment, That's enough to provide jobs of
one year's duration for three-fourths of all
males in the nation who arc currently un-
employed for five weeks or more.
The point is: Aside from the tremendout
benefits that such an undertaking would
have In improving the nation's water re-
sources, it could also be a formidable tool
in any program bent on eradicating poverty.
penditures for construction in thin area,
coupled with an n?!Glve recruitment program
of the tin..F+, -nnloved, is a very effi-
cient nire,,, a lot of people tfo
work in a sci.,.?,1;dy short space of time.
Mr. President, I feel compelled to add
that while this material is used for the
sake of illustrating the idea of cross-com-
mitment, I must say personally that the
one statement that $30 billion would be
a modest expense somewhat cools me
off as a member of tbr, Committee on
Appropriations. But It illuntrates one
thing in this entire en; .:innental prob-
lem and that is that we are not going
to solve these problems without spending
a lot of money.
Mr. President, whether Mr. Starr and
Mr. Carlson are correct on this particu-
lar matter is a question that could only.
be settled by extensive and intensive in-
vestigation. But one thing is clear.
Their idea of cross-commitment is in-
genious and intelligent. It should be
, examined by all of us as we prepare to
embark on large-scale expenditures for
environment improvement.
Our resources are limited. Our taxes
are high. Our needs are many. Thus, if
we can kill two birds with one stone?by
attacking two problems or even more
than two problems with one appropria-
tion?we should do so.
Further, as wi . seek ways to implement
the strategy a cross-commitment we will
be alert to the existence of hidden en-
vironment policies, as well as to hidden
policies in poverty, transportation, and
many other areas.
Actually, we are already prepared to
do this. The Cabinet Committee on the
Environment, 'created in 1969, is coordi-
nating departmental activities affecting
the environment. This group should help
us to be aware of hidden environment
policies.
This will encourage clear thinking
about environment problems and will
enable us to get maximum mileage from
our resources..
This, particularly in view of meager dam-
age done by our bombing. American tax-
payers should know that the average cost,
of every airplane destroyed was $2 million
and the average cost of every helicopter
was $250,000.
This total destruction exceeds $7.275 ?
billion.
Recently in Laos newsmen who eluded /
our CIA operatives and walked nearly 10
miles through jungle trails observed
American fighting men wearing civilian
clothes. Even more important, they wit-
nessed our 11-52's flying from bases' in ,
Laos at 1-minute intervals, Since 1965
our bombers In Laos have hurled a great-
er tonnage of bombs than were hurled on
North Vietnam throughout the entire Pe-
riod we were bombing north of the 17th
parallel. It is estimated that our gigantic
11-52's have not only bombed the Ho Chi
Minh Trail in Laos which extends from
North Vietnam along the border of Cam-
bodia and Laos, but we have bombed
areas in Laos more than 200 miles dis-
tant from the Ho Chi Minh Trail. On
these bombing missions which are said to
approximate 6,000, our casualties, mostly
in airmen killed and missing in combat,
are more than 400. In addition approxi-
mately 300 have been wounded in Laos.
In October 1965 when I was in that un-
derdeveloped country for nearly 10 days
our warplanes were disguised. In 1962
and in previous years we had guaranteed
the neutrality of Laos. Regardless of that,
when I was in every area of this under-
developed country for several days in
1068 traveling by helicopter throughout
the entire length and breadth of Laos I
observed then that our warplanes were -
no longer disguised as / had observed in
1965. We had violated an agreement to
maintain Laos as a neutral country in
1965, so we disguised our planes at that
time. However, we were openly interven-
ing in a civil war in that unhappy in-
hospitable land. Furthermore, literally
hundreds of CIA operatives were all over
the place, calling the shots and conduct-
ing the war that we were waging.
_
TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE
MORNING BUSINESS.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Under the previous order the Sen-
ate will proceed now to the considera-
tion of routine morning business.
Roughly twenty-five cents of every dollar'
spent on sewer lines or treatment plants
goes for direct wage payments. But, more
important, almost half of these wages go to
unskilled or semi-skilled employees. If
putting people to work and the value of the
work experience is recognised se a necessary
lint step in acquiring Job skills, theta exl
'VIETNAM REPORT
Mr, YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President,
Americans should know that from Janu-
ary 1961 to March 1, 1970, in North Viet-
nam, South Vietnam, and Laos approxi-
mately 3,200 American warplanes have
been destroyed and that during this
same period more than 3,500 American
helicopters have been destroyed.
Most of these were shot down by enemy
action in and over South Vietnam: Some
were destroyed on the ground by mortar
fire. In the course of the bombing of
North Vietnam many of our planes were
destroyed by enemy fire before President
Johnson stopped bombing north of the
17th parallel. -
The results of our bombing targets in
North Vietnam did not Justify the losses
of airmen and destruction Of OW planes,.
ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN N. .
MITCHELL'S PROPOSAL OUTRA-
GEOUS AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, on
reading the first page of the Washing-
ton Post of March 10, I was astonished
to learn that John N. Mitchell, the At-
torney General of the United States.
stated that he would ask Congress to
permit courts to order fingerprints, voice
prints, blood tests, and other Identifi-
cation checks of suspects even before
they are formally accused of any offense.
No doubt the Attorney General of the
United States was a very skilled lawyer.
but his specialty as a partner in the law
firm of Nixon, Mudge, Rose, Guthrie,
Alexander, and Mitchell, up until the
time of his appointment as Attorney
General, was passing on the merits of
. municipal bonds and tax-exempt bonds..
It is evident to me, as former chief
. prosecuting attorney of Cuyahoga
' County, Ohio, and as a lawyer who prac-
ticed law for more than 40. years in the
Amite of Ohio, the Va. courts, and the
courts .of neighboring States. that At-
Approved For Release 2001103/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Approved For Release 2001/03/%469lkirP80-016
The Senate met at 9:30 o'clock a.m.
and was called to order by Hon. JAMES
B. ALLEN, R Senator from the State of
Alabama.
The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward
L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following
prayer:
0 Thou, who bast been our dwelling
place in all generations, help us to treat
this world as our Father's house wherein
Thy family dwells. Deliver us frn9t fear
of making this earth our home. ye us
wisdom this day and every day to create
a dwelling where all may come and go
with equity and justice. Help us so to
order our lives that this Nation and the
whole world may be an abode fit for Thy
children to dwell in safety and in peace.
Let goodness and mercy abide with us
here that we may abide with Thee for-
ever.
In Thy holy name we pray. Amen.
DESIGNATION OF ACTING PRESI-
DENT PRO TEMPORE
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Clerk
will read a communication to the Senate.
The assistant legislative clerk read
the following letter:
U.S. SENATE,
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,
Washington, D.C., March 11, 1970.
To the Senate:
Being temporarily absent from the Senate,
I appoint Hon. JAMES B. ALLEN, ft Senator
from the State of Alabama, to perform the
duties of the Chair during my absence,
ftwitAso B. RUSSELL,
President pro tempore.
Mr. ALLEN thereupon took the chair
as Acting President pro tempore,
THE JOURNAL
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
' unanimous consent that the reading of.
the Journal of the proceedings of Tues-
day, March 10, 1970, be dispensed with.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING
SENATE SESSION
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that all committees
be authorized to meet during the session
of the Senate today.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT TO
TOMORROW AT 10 AM.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that when the Sen.
ate completes its business today, it stand
in adjournment until 10 o'clock tcmor.'
row morning.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem.
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Senate
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 11, 1970
ORDER FOR RE6OGNITI(V pr SEN-
ATOR SdHWEikER, TO 11k MOW
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that tomorrow, im-
mediately after the prayer, the distin-
guished Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr.
SCHWEIKER) be recognized for not to
exceed 30 minutes.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. In accordance with the previous
order, the Senator from Ohio (Mr.
Yonne) is recognized for not to exceed
5 minutes.
'IS. SECRET WAR IN LAOS MUST
END
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President,
President Nixon ended a long adminis-
tration silence about Laos last Friday by
announcing that the United States has
1,040 ground forces in Laos, has lost 400
planes there, and has suffered approxi-
mately 300 casualties. That statement is,
at best, a very conservative estimate of
our involvement in Laos. At worst, it rep-
resents a massive effort by officials of
the Defense Establishment of the United
States to deceive the American people.
That deception must not be allowed to
continue. It is most unfortunate that
President Nixon is escalating and ex-
panding our involvement in a civil war in
Vietnam by intensifying our fighting on
the ground in Laos and bombing areas
in Laos, sometimes 200 miles, and more,
from the Ho Chi Minh trail. The Pathet
Lao, seeking national liberation in Laos,
have been fighting for 20 years, first
against the French seeking to maintain
their lush Indo-Chinese empire and now
against the American CIA and air an
ground forces waging a war of aggression
seeking to continue the policies of the
French in violation of the Geneva agree-
ment, which we approved, to neutralize
Laos as a neutral barrier nation.
President Nixon has announced that
he is withdrawing combat troops from
Vietnam on the basis of a secret time-
table. Whatever may be the President's,
plan?and that plan is still his secret?.
our withdrawal has clearly been too slow.
Now it is obvious that even our gradual
disengagement is not a reality. What is
really happening is a reengagement in
Laos with new titles and different uni-
forms.
At present we are waging an air war
on a tremendous scale in Laos. U.S.
planes, including 11-52's, are cUrrently
hurling more than 16,000 tons of bombs
a month onto Laos. Without doubt, our
bombing of North Vietnam, which con-
siderably exceeded the bombing in World
War II in both the Pacific and Euro-
pean areas, has not ceased as we had
been told. 'that bombing has sbnplibeen
shifted'?as have some of our ground
forces?across the border into Laos.
Much of our recent bombing has been
in the Plain of Jars, in areas more than
200 miles away from the Ho Chi Minh
Trail. Therefore, that bombing could
have nothing to do with infiltration from
North Vietnam.
In October 106511 spent approximately
10 days in Laos, and again in 1068 / was
in every area of Laos, traveling to many
places by helicopter in that landlocked
country. By the way, Laos was the most
underdeveloped country I have been in.
and I have been in a great many. Laos is
not worth the life of even one American
youngster. I had learned from previous
visits in Laos and Vietnam that they
have a way of directing so-called VIP's
over certain areas. I learned in a short
tune to get away from escort officers, say
I was looking for Ohio GI's, and get on
my own. With my eyes open, and with a
lot of energy throughout the day, and
sometimes at night, I tried my best to get
away from the restrictions and from the ?
travel programs stipulated by the top
brass in Saigon. Less than 2 weeks ago.
three American newspapermen did the
same thing as I did, on a much larger
scale. They walked 8 miles through
the jungle without informing anyone of
their intention and reached an airfield
staffed by a small army of American sol-
diers dressed as civilians. They observed
U.S. 11-52 planes taking off from this
airfield at the rate of one per minute
loaded with tons of bombs.
Mr. President, the United States has
lost more than 400 airplanes and many
helicopters shot down over Laos or de-
stroyed on the ground by Pathet Lao
fire, Many airmen have been killed or
re missing?some, no doubt, being held
as prisoners of war.
S' The intervention of this country into
the civil war in Laos, a civil war which
has continued for more than 20 years,
has been achieved without any congres-
sional authority whatever. The discred-
ited Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 1964 gives
no authority to pursue military adven-
tures not directly related to the war in
Vietnam; our bombing of northern and
central Laos clearly has no relation to
the Vietnam conflict.
In fact, U.S. military activity in Laos
is in direct violation of the National
Commitments Resolution which requires
specific congressional approval for every
new engagement of American troops
abroad. It is also contrary to the recent
, amendment to the defense appropria-
tion bill prohibiting use of funds for U.S.
ground combat troops in Laos or Thai-
land.
President Nixon attempted to make our
conduct of the war in Laos as much a
secret as. his plan for ending the war
in Vietnam, which he told about while
a candidate for President. He tried to
83435
I.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04.: CIA-RD080-01601R006700050001-2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01600VAT6050001-2
tarNYTON, PA.
PRESS s: JuURNAL
MAR 1 1 1970
WEEKLY - 10,964
Ilin311711117111111111111M
?
. . ..-
IITERINIIIIMIlfillM1111111M11111=111111111111NIIIIIIIIITS101111111111111111111011111111111111110111111111111111N1111101111MMIHITIV
NEWS REPORT FROM WASHINGTON
WASHINGTON, DC.?The North
Vietnamese offensive in Laos may or
may not be a challenge to President
Richard Nixon and a test of is an-
nounced new policy of lessening,
U.S. ?participation in Asian wars.
' This country has not been wholely
under the control of its government
very much of the time since the 1960
Geneva accord declared it neutral.
The Communists have held the east-
ern part of the country for many,
uninterrupted years. That is the
area which includes the Ho Chi
Ming trail.-
But last year a CIA organized and
equipped army antrfrogovernment
forces push the Reds out of the
,
Plaine des James, where they had
been in control since 1964. The
recent North Vietnamese. offensive
retook the plain; if military opera-
tions continue and the enemy seeks
to overthrow the government and
capture the capital ,arid the rest of
he country Mr. Nixon would be
very much on the spot.
For the war in Laos is part a the
war in Vietnam. The three 'Presi-
dents preceding MT. Nixon were
aware of this and the late President
Eisenhower, who would not com-
mit U.S. soldiers to Vietnam, was
ready to fight to keep the Commun-
ists from taking Laos. But Congress
is nervous over any U.S.( involve-
ment in Laos, fearing it might es-
calate.
The President knows the Ameri-
can people axe in no mood for such
a turn of events but he also :feels he
can't allow the enemy to take the
country, which would almost surely
place ?a stamp of failure on the
Nixon Doctrine. That is why, for
the first tinie, U.S.: heavy bombers
went into action over he plain
recently.
This prompted a warning from
Moscow, perhaps stemming from a
fear of counter U.S. escalation.
Washington meanwhile let it be
known, even though various mem-
bers of Congress were speaking out
against any U.S. participation in the
struggle, that it considered the situa-
tion very serious.
And it would be ahnost impossible
for the President to do nothing if
the enemy sought to take over the
country completely. This is because
the next step would almost surely be
penetration of Thailand, whose bor-
der adjoins the western Laetian bor-
der now under governerant control.
The U.S. has no treaty obligations
with Laos but does with Thailand,
and has bases and men stationed in
that country. If .the enemy offens-
sive, then, continues, end Thailand
appears to be, the ultimate goal, Mr.
Nixon will be under very heavy
pressure to react. The only ques-
tion is how and when, bemuse of
the lack of enthusiasm in both Con-
gresa and among the Walk in gen-
end.,
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Approved For Release 20,0111621,1*Dcbtage30-01601R00 TATINTL -
04 a_ t c-7
Credibility on Laos
. 1 . ...5,
Following an embarrassing slip when
it decided to "set forth the record" on
Laos last week. the White House has or-
dered all casualties in the air and on the
ground in Laos will be listed separately
from Vietnam war casualties. That's a
step in the right direction.
But does this really prove what Press
Secretary Ronald Ziegler says it proves
?an "intention to keep the American
people fully informed"?
? Last- week in his report, President
Nixon gave what he described as "a
precise description of our current ac-
tivities in Laos.'it': ?
? I
.contained the much discussed
statement that "no American Stationed
in Laos has ever been killed in ground
combat operations." A press report of
Captain Joseph Busifs death in combat
promptly came to light. Mr. Nixon, it
turned out, had not known about that.
.The blunder was compounded by a
White House spoltesmin, in a semantic
twist; attempting to show that the cap-
? ? .
?tain had died in"b5h le action," not ?
? aOW
"ground COM15at operations."
The White Hoses further disclosed
.that 26 civilians had died in Laos, some
also in "hostile action." The ring of can-
, llor first, sounded l?y" the Nixon, report
Was swallowed 4p ,m,,tlieiqui0f these
revelations.
The "precise description," moreover,
sheds no light on news dispatches about
Central Intelligence Agency operatives
working under the cover of the Agency
for International Development. (Stories
like that are not likely to help AID much
around the world, are they?) ?
? Nor, as Senator Symington reminds
us,, has the Government revealed any.
thing but the barest total of air casual-
ties, a much larger figure than for those
on the ground.' ?
It would seem, then, that there is a
? way to go officially in "fully informing"
the American people on Laos under that
-reservation "consistent with national se.
Curity:' ' ? ? '
.110.ft
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
STATINTL
. PORTLAND.
__Ap.prav lease '2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0
ORE.
OREGONIAN
- 245,132
S ? 407,136
MAR 1 1 1970
I.
Victories give Han
.
CANBERRA ? With the fall of
Muong Soul to the North Vietnamese
forces in Laos, the only real question
now is how far Hanoi wants to push its,
offensive.
Gen. Vang Pao's clandestine force of
guerrillas was at its lowest ebb 'when, ,
by a stroke of good fortune and great
daring, the Mco
leader took the ini-
tiative on the Plain
t of Jars last year.
That victory
there raised the ?
morale of his men
to the point where
they thought that
' they were capable
of taking on the
North Vietnamese
- regulars in set-
' . price battles. WARNER
Suddenly, the task
of the American Green Berets and the
CIA,...W4.5_130t to encourage them to
'fight but to restrain them from de-
, straying themselves by attempting an
impossible defense against the advanc-
ing North Vietnamese divisions.
Vang Pao reluctantly agreed but
, only after extracting promises of
? American air support, which he and
' other Laotian leaders hoped would
, stop the North Vietnamese in their
; tracks when they reached open coun-
try on the Plain of Jars. The Ameri-
cans knew better, but if they wanted
to keep Vang Pao intact and still with
some capability to harass the North
Vietnamese lines of communication,
there was nothing else they could do
but try.
Now they have tried. It seems Cer-
tain that they have inflicted heavy ca.'
sualties on the northerners and equal-'
:1.
???A :?'0
, v
11 free s han
BY DENIS WARNER
ly certain that they have delayed their As things stand now, no effective ,
advance. But they have not succeeded : action is likely, or conceivable, to re-
in holding the Plain of Jars, or Muong verse the situation in Laos, or even to 1
Soul, where the Royal Lao Air Force
restore assurances of its neutrality.
had a close support base, and there is
now nothing to stop a quick advance The 1962 Geneva Agreement was not , 1
to the junction of the Luang Prabang- worth the paper it was written on and 1
Vientiane roads. a return to the conference table would' ?
In fact, there is nothing in Laos be as fruitless now as it was then.
capable of stopping two North Vietna- The Thai forces are frequently ac- ?
mese divisions from going almost any- '. . I
where they want. North Vietnam did . cusea of meddling in the Laotian sit- ?
not launch the current offensive until uation and, the reports are no doubt I
it had made sure that the land and . accurate enough; but the Thais are 1
'water communications within Laos also becoming extended by the still .1
were no longer safe for the use of low-level but now quite widespread in- 1
government forces ot supporters. surgency M their own country. 1
The Royal Lao Army, as distinct SEATO is a dead duck, and the ";
from Gen. Vang Pao's guerrillas, it .
stretched quite thin in? the preserva- United States, which alone possesses 1
? tion of security in ?and immediately 'the means, is not going to burn its
beyond the towns In the Mekong Val- fingers by intervening in Laos beyond
Icy. Its reserves are few and cannot . the present level of its CIA, Green
be expanded without adding to the Beret and air support.
risks for towns like Pakse which came ,This is the reality of the situation I
under mortar and rocket attack early, and it is as obvious to those in control 1
In February.
klanoi as Its to President Nixon.
In all the area west of Luang ,
Prabang, for example, there are only
a couple of companies of Lao troops
and a guerrilla base. Most of the coun-
try adjoining the Thai border here is
freely used by those who want to sup-
ply the guerrillas engaged with the
Thai government forces in the north-
ern provinces of Thailand.
The area south and west of Pakse is
also of great Concern to Bangkok. A1
mixed force of North Vietnamese,
Pathet Lao, Thai and Red Khmer has'l
taken possession of the stretch of Lao-
tian territory to the west of the.
Mekong, with the obvious intention of? '?
increasing insurgency 'action in etst-'
? ern 'Thailand. ? ? - ? "
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80,01601R000700050001-2
ST. nun::
Approved For Release 20011/piN195:11A7RDP80-0I6
r
Questions St. Louisan
n All,CIA In Laos
1,i, By WILLIA1V1 K. WYANT JR.
1 A Washington Correspondent of
1 ' tho Post-Dispatch
, WASHINGTON, March 11 ?
Senator J. William Fulbright
/ . (Dem.), Arkansas, questioned
\,/ Robert H. Nooter of St. Louis
,
i today about reports that the ,
\,
, American economic assistance
mission in Laos was being used
as a front for the Central In-
telligence Agency. .
Nooter appeared before Fut-
' bright's Foreign Relations Corn-
N. ,. mittee as a preliminary to his
I I ? a ? Senate confirmatien as the
Agency for International Devel-
.4. Opment's assistant admlnistra-
t? tor for Vietnam.
'. . He Was asked by Fulbright
), to comment on a news story
. ?i that appeared in ?? yesterday's'
Washington Post. It reported
that the AID mission in Laos
Was being used as a cover for
.' CIA agents engaged in clan-.
destine operations against the
FCommunist enemy. .
f` He explained that his instruc-
tions were that . questions re-
,Alating to the intelligence cern-
9 munity were not .to be con-
firmed or 'denied in a public
session but could be gone into
at a closed session of the com-
mittee.
.1/4(
:4' "There are enough problems of program, Nooter said the
0,
? ., with AID without it being a' Agency for International ' De."
. :
front for the CIA, Fulbright velopment had tried to control
' said. The Arkansas Senator? ."i'r,,,,? rt programs of the type
' said one of his objectives was "Y
. used in Laos and Vietnam as.
ti to try to keep Laos from tie- .
mucli as possible. .
veloping into another Vietnam
' - Promises Statement
"by osmosis." . .
:
Nooter would not comment.
STATINTL
Persons and had encountered ,
nothing to support the allega-
tion in the news story.
Fulbright said that in his ex-0
perience with the situation In I
Southeast Asia he had found,.
that newspaper men have' been:0
much more accurate than th
Government."
In response to other questions"
from Fulbright , and . Senator':
Clifford P. Case (Rep.),. New
Jersey, Nooter said the Ameri-
can economic assistance pro-
gram for Laos totaled about,
$50,000,000 in fiscal 1970. He
said AID had about 350 em-;
,ployes in Laos, a country of f
3,000,000 persons.
The American funds for'Laoci
the St. Louisan explained, are
,used for economic develop-s
'ment, agriculture projects,:.
? health measures lied relief for:
war, refugees, as 'well as for.,
' American participation lana in-,
::ternational effort to help stabil.'
' ize the Laotian economy.
'Nooter said the International.;
Fund, to which the United
? States contributes 70 per cent)
and Japan, Britain, France and
Australia lesser amounts, runs.
at a level of about $23,000,000.1
It is used to finance the coun-
try's import requirements. '
When Fulbright said corrup-
tion is inevitable in that kind
j Nooter's new post involves "I Icnow it is difficult," Ful-
him in Vietnam but since 1968 bright said. Nooter agreed to
he has been AID's deputy as., supply the. cemmittee with a
0;
if, sistant administrator for East written statement for private
c
, Asia with duties relating to consumption on the CIA ques-
..,tion.
h,
eCounti01111Kic
oreazistthaencephiinlippLinaoess:
Fulbright insisted that if the
Indonesia and Thailand. . CIA story had been untrue
k ? Los Angeles Report Nooter would have denounced
Persisting, Fulbright . asked it as such.
'i;,INIooter whether it was true, as "If it is true, it is only an-
s that we are in over
?
fi reported in a news story in the . other sign
Los Angeles Times, that intelli- our hdds," said Fulbright, a
igence agents posing as foreign 'chief critic of the Vietnam war.
aid personnel in Laos had at . The. reception given Nooter
, times served as ground- con-,., at the hearing was friendly. His
i trotters for aircraft. -'exchange with Fulbright was in
1 ' "To the ? best of my knowl- a quiet, conversational tone.
. edge, that is .not true," Nooter, Fulbright' indicated that, he .
replied: He said he had been to ,would go into the CIA-Laos re- .
. ...
Approved F drkgetgigg 1615thiliet14606"'iiiilt4:5:6:1 R000700050001-2
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160
ST. PAUL, MINN.
PIONEER PRESS
14 ? 104,387
S ? 223,806
MAR.1 ?1 1970
Raiforiais
More Light on Laos
The public is beginning to learn more
:about United States military activities
and involvements in Laos, and that is a
most desirable development.
The more the people knoW about this
situation, the less likelihood there will be
of creeping escalation which might lead
to another Vietnam quagmire.
Despite secrecy by the military, the
State Department, and the Ce ? Intel-
ligeng.a.,Agency, American new-,?rre-
spondents in recent weeks managed to
report enough facts. so that the Nixon
; Administration was persuaded to adopt
a more candid and forthright attitude on
; public information.
The President's statement from his
' Key Biscayne headquarters eliminated
some of the governmental hypocrisy
which for so long had shielded Laos ma-
neuverings from public scrutiny. His re-
port is subject to differing interpreta-
tions, but at least it went part way in
giving Americans information they are
entitled to have.
It also leaves numerous questions Un-
answered.. Nixon said, "We have no
plans for introducing combat forces into
Laos." He said it is his goal "to reduce
' American involvement in Laos." But on
the other hand he stated that "the level's
i of our assistance have risen in response
to the growth of North Vietnamese corn- ?
bat activities."
Does this mean that further expan-
sion of North Vietnam activities will
;bring on more American escalation?
And if so, to what extent? There are no
"present plans" for American combat
; forces (although U.S. war planes are
flying 400 sorties a day into ?Laos) but
what about future use of combat and
supportive forces? The President has?
, left these matters deliberately vague.
' Meanwhile, the Administration has
invited the Soviet Union to cooperate in
seeking to calm down the Laos situation,
something Moscow may or May not be .
Inclined to do. The, Communist Pathet
lin leadership: has put out a vague pro-
posal for negotiations with the neutralist
Laos government headed by Souvanna
Phouma. The Pathet Lao is headed by
Phouma's half brother. Possibly some
results may come from this interchange,;
no one knows.
The fact is that the United States is
caught in a bind in Laos. North Vietnam
has the manpower to take more Laos
territory if it desires, which could lead
?to a threat against Thailand. Or Hanoi
could keep up its 'pressure for the pun
pose of pushing its demands for a neu-
tralist government in South Vietnam.
Nixon inherited this situation from
past American administrations. As far
back as December 31, 1960, then PresV.
dent Eisenhower said, "We cannot let
Laos fall to the Communists even if we
have to fight." President Kennedy in
1961 added: "Laos is far away from
America, but the world is small. . . The
security of all Southeast Asia will be en,
dangered if Laos loses its neutral indei
pendence."
The American public's views about
ho- w far the United States can or should
go in trying to decide what Asians do in
that part of the world and how they set-
tle their quarrels among themselves
have changed since 1960 and 1961, Idea
of American omnipotence and infallibili-
ty have changed.
Senate Majority Leader Mike Mans.
field gave recognition to this in his pro-
posal that the United States now limit its
military activities in Laos to policing the
Ho Chi Minh trail by bomber interdic-
tion of supplies going into South Viet.'
nam. That would definitely downgrade,
i the Plain of Jars operations. 1
This suggests that what happens in
the rest of Laos, away from the no Chi
4Vfinh trail, should no longer be consid,
ered a life and death matter of Ameri,
can policy. A decision on this issue has
not been announced by the Nixon Admin. ?
istration. But it is-a decision which ma
have to be made, regardless of the politi
cal diffipulties involved, ? Y: '
. - ;sa
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R0
UTICA, N.Y.
PRESS
? 2E082
..MAR 1
STATI NTL
Han i's *Hers fo Sp Figiding
In LOOS eand Vidnarn Encouraging
1 l? Are the North Vietnamese showing signs ? '
, of wanting peace in Vietnam and Laos?
;Their latest moves in this direction could ???
be just another propaganda effort, but
;there. is. enough substance to, suggest that.:.,
;.a....major peace effort could be M the mak-
?
g.
? ? ? - . ?
; 'u,?THE OFFER TO. CALL ? a halt to the ?
fighting in Laos has been given consider- ?
f
able publicity, and the Laotian government
' appears to be .anxious.to do most anything
at will stop the fighting. , Our involvement involvement there is highlY:ques-
tionable, with the ,2A.. ....offering combat x
I
support without congressional approval or '
Alit public's knowledge. Now we have:::
also extended our South Vietnamese forees
itti provide aid combat assistance. . ?', ;,
;"..More important, but less publicized, is,:; ?
the report from. Daniel DeLuce,?of the As.4.?
i iodated Press, that the North Vietnamese
? .
, told him they', Were willing to agree to a
ceasefire in Vietnam, if we would, make'
public a total troop withdrawal plan.
Normally, this:Tight be considered. an- ,'?.?,;
other of 'many: similar proposals that ? al-it,' 1
;ways seem to have strings attached. , But ? ?
? this One appears so shilpielud dirpet;thet
'it suggests the North Vietnamese might
have allowed DeLuce's visit so they could ;
present a true ceasefire plan. ?
? ? ? ?
: IT MIGHT BE SAID that such a pro...)
posal could have been made at the Paris .411
talks, but Hanoi might have felt it would ? .4 ?
; lose face if it, made such an important pro- ,1
posal in Paris, after it has refused to talk
; without atop-level replacement for Henry
Cabot Lodge.
?'"If the United States will agree to car-
..iry out such a Withdrawal, discussions can;.
..be held and a date agreed on for comple-
tion of the withdrawal," DeLuce quoted a';,
'Hanoi spokesman as saying. ? .
' ''Conditions will be assured that all for-
? eign troops will be able to leave South ;
%.Vietnam in perfect safety and without ;??????;
harm." ?
Assuming that the two offers are bona 1
, fide, it would suggest that Hanoi has' rec-
ognized that we are not giving up easily in
either country and that they might do bet-
ler by _talking. ' ? .
? ? , ? ? ? ? .
?
THE OPPORTUNITY appears to be
. t,here for us to exploit,,and hopefully. we
will .49 scp. withoft delay., , ' . ;?
?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04.: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
WASHINGTON
Approved For Release 2004/61gOritIA-RDPMar
11 MAR 1970
? _. ? ?
sses gems pogoce eirribigh cm If
By STAN CARTER
Washington, March 10
t.;(NEws Bureau)?The State
State Department gave a
cautious blessing today to
!. peace talks between Prince
1-- Souvanna Phounta; the neu-
tralist premier of LAOS, and
his Communist half-brether,
..Prince Souphanouvong. ? -
i
But officials made clear' that
1 the United States would not'
! agree to any Laotian settlement
. that did not include withdrawal
' of the estimated 67,000 North
Vietnamese troops in the country.
1 The petagon disclosed these ad-
(
I.ditional bits of information about
t?American activities in Laos: ?
'y ? Although Laos has not been
, designated a combat zone,' Amer,
lean military personnel stationed
- . :11ave n receiving
month in "hostile fire pay " since receive certain hazardous duty
benefits.'
These benefits prekimably also
are paid?ta niers) htimdred CIA
agents engaged ?fn 'clandestine
Jan. 1, 1966.
? Capt. Jiseph K. Bush *Jr., an
assistant ,army attache who was
killed in fight with North Viet-
?
?
nista in Laos. It is an open secret.
\,:v Laos, that agents posing as
.embers of the U.S. Civilian Aid.,
Mission's rural development
dlvi-
don recruit and train ,pro-govli
trollA MrfiEist!
namese soldiers in Laos on Feb. nnArationions comm.
"TrA
10, 1969, was posthumously a. '
warded the Silver Star for gal-,
lantry in action but, awarding of
the citation was not made public
at the time.
e On the night of Feb. '17-18,
there was a ?B.62 raid .agairist
concentrations of North Vietnam-
ese troops and supplies in the
Plain of Jars in Laos. Previously,;
13.62 raids on Laos have.- been ?
centered on the Ho Ohl
trail, flea rthe Vietnam border.',
In addition to the "hostile fire"
for the' '228 Military personnel
now in Laos', Pentagon renresen.;
tative Jerry W. Friedheim? said:
q am also Informed that State
Departmei....L. ji......iinet:.pereo re Laos,
?
Approved For Release 2001/08/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160
SUN 111E7)
? 5.4 5 , 5 7 0
S ? 7 1.2 , 1.75
MAR 9 1970
The Laos squeeze
President Nixon has been caught in a , Mi'. Nixon is *slip 7:11:7 lit:.),e...4., .in his
squeeze in Lao.?., and the squeeze, rath- room' forpalitif,-.:a1'.maneuver in Laos.
er than easing as 'a, censapienceof his -: He has pledged no widening of the war
i long statement last week on Laos, may in Southeast Asia.'He faces an aroused
in fact be tightened. Congress which demands to know the
The Defense Department contributed whole truth about Laos and the evi-
to the pressure by failing to tell the dence is thw not even Mr. Nixon knows
President the ? truth about Laos. Mr. the Whole truth. Furthermore, Mr. Nix-
Nixon said, on Friday, that no member ? on has i.t.k,1?,-1 Russia and Britain to help
of the U.S. military forces had been restore the 1962 Geneva Agreement on
killed in ground fighting in Laos when l.nos which lyt as all foreign soldiers,
in fact there had been such a death from Laotian soil,
more than a year ago. The United States is in violaft,-,e of
If Mr. Nixon. has been uninformed that agreement, as is. North Vietnam.
about Laos it is time he remedied that which has 67,000 troops in Laos. It is
! situation. He could begin by matching -,- possible that ,Russia could respond to
what responsible reporters have been..:Mr.. Nixon's request by.demanding the
/Laos?especially about the military ad-;-. - getting onkof Laos Completely. Iris not.
writing about the U.S. involvement in. ,???',. United States Show its good faith by
'visors on the 'scene, the CIA financing ,:::: jikelY:(1),Eli -R110a: Would , make such a
and operation of a?.natiVe'aliily and-its,.:,:j....dentanC of., .NortifjVietnara. Hanoi.
operation of i.two; airlines.=?with..what::,;-?,Might '. turn ' t.c) :Russia's )?,1.1y.a4 Red,_
the Defense Department '.has :to say.-J1,'..-,China.,?fer Support,.,--.'''..,.:-;
,"..flie sight of an ? American PreSide0:7;;,,T.he Laos, affair is 4 SeV.qrq and 6arly,
embarrassed before the world- because: :I''''test of Mr:. NiXereideelared low-profile-
:of a 'lack of information is demeaning 7; ..foreign?policy:He-Can meet that test by
;- The indigenous Communists of Laos, .%;, getting all the information that it, is his -
the Pathet Lao, have ' put 'anotheright to bct7.i:' 'e front 0*.Defeni3e Depart-.,
:squeeze on Mr. Nixon. The-Patbet,Lao ',,: men t 'and -,,,pre7empting that - depart.: '
have unveiled a "peace plan" foriaos..7.;:ment's- self assumed prerogative for
'fhe plan calls for immediaW with.. telling only What if wants to tell?even
drawal of the United States froth Lao, I to:a.President. ? _
and Thailand, the formation of a coati-, ':. ,.., So long as the pefense Department- ?
.. . 0
tion government.and.the eventual elec- ' fails, to tell what is going on, so long as
tion of a: neutralist government, Hanoi- : the CIA can do the same thing, both
has been pushing similar demands for , are in effect 'making-1,1.S. fore,ign pot
South Vietnam which the United States ,icy,--,and riot til,p function, of. et
bas
refused to accept in pare ? ther,- . .. ?-i
_...._...-..,.-
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
S 3328
STATI NTL
Approved For Malagain/tat-al:MN 601R
and interaction between people, in North
and South America. After- all; I tinder-
standing conies from knowing about
problems and attempting to resolve
them.
One of the important proc!rnms in
which Alabamians particir: ' the
Partners of the Alliance -1,4 Ala-
bama is one of 40 States joined in a citi-
zen-to-citizen program now operating in
17 Latin American countries. It is
logi-
cal that people in Alabama are playing
an important role in the partners be-
cause of our nearness to Central and
South America.
Last May, in Salt Lake City, Utah, del-
egates to the fourth inter-American
conference of the Partners .of the Alli-
ance selected Guatemala as the site for ?
their next conference to be held in No-
vember of this year. We are especially
happy with this selection because of the
fact Alabama is joined in a strong part-
nership program with Guatemala. Nu-
merous small projects have been imple-
mented because of the involvement of
Alabama citizens in the partnership with
Guatemala. Sell-help is the key to the
partners program and the people of Ala-
bama have shown a willingness to re-
spond to self-help on the part of their
partners. Thousands of ties are being
established throughout the hemisphe:re
under this program. It is therefore one
of the more important efforts in estab-
lishing better relations and understand-
ing among the peoples of. the Americas.
Last month, two outstanding citizens
from Guatemala visited Alabama to dis-
cuss plans for the partners conference
to be held later this year in Guatemala.
-The visitors were Bra. Mariflor de Solis
and Hector Sanchez-Latour who spoke to
service organizations in the State.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that an article from the Birming-
ham News relating to the visitors and the
plans for the partners conference be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
PARTNERS PROGRAM Is PEOPLE?BRIDGS TO
BETTER UNDERSTANDING
(By Pat McGuire)
"Help your brother across, and you will
' find that your own boat has reached the
shore."
This old Hindu proverb, read by Mrs.
Elizabeth Home, president of the Quota Club
of Birmingham, exemplified the spirit of the
program president at a joint meeting of
women's service clubs hosted by the Quota
Club Monday at the Downtown Club.
Alabama's participation in the Paftnera of
the Alliance program was discussed by John
W. Bloomer, managing editor of The Birm-
ingham News and member of the Alabama
executive committee of the Guatemala-Ala-.
bama Partners of the Alliance.
"Alabama is on the doorstep of Central
and South America," Bloomer said. "We are
building a stronger, more effective bridge
with the Latin American countries through
- the Partners program than through any big
government program. This concept involves
people, and the more people involved, the
more understanding there is."
About 40 states are involved In the pro-
gram, associated in a partner relationship
with 40 Latin republics or sub-divisions.
Committees of individual citizens are our.
rattly carrying out beneficial project* lit
education, public health, business and com-
merce and agriculture.
Bloomer told of visiting a Guatemalan
farmer who had raised and editcated five
children, and of his pri,Ir 111,1 children.
"This man started out nr, Aerate porter
and ended up as president of a 100-man farm
cooperative, but the biggest thing was his
pride in his children and their futures. In
him I saw the same thing that I would see in
a farmer in Alabama. Ith-r,',? there is the story
of Guatemala and 11,-. ran help. The
best thing about the pr-1 ram IS that be-
cause of people in Alabama, people in Guate-
mala can have a better life."
Introducing Senora Marillor Solis, mere-
Lary general, Federminn of Partners of the
Alliance for Cenir and Panama,
anmamadrie,
Bloomer said, "F-1,
an effective na possi-
ble."
"I felt from thi,,,cinning there was a
certain affinity for Alabama in Guatemala,"
Senora SollS said, "and now it has developed
Into a love affair."
Senora Solis feels very strongly about the
people to people concept. "This is a pro-
gram which I would call an investment In
human relations. We are extremely fortu-
nate in having you as a partner. we hope
sincerely that we can return what you have
Invested in us."1
A community development program in
Guatemala was cited by Senora Solis as an
example of the help Alabama has given in
teaching the people various aspecta of pub-
lic health, agriculture and home economics.
She mentioned the possibility of a teain
from Samford University working In Guate-
mala for a six-week period.
Hector Sanchez-Latour, president of the
Guatemala Partners organization, was intro-
duced by Senora Solis AS "one of the finest
minds in our country."
Sanchez-Latour 4.Io invitation to the
women at the meeting to be present at Fifth trations" for our presence in Laos but
Inter-American Conference of the Partnerb
of the Alliance to be held In Guatemala falls to recognize that it is folly to let
Nov. 0-12. "We would like to have a hundred the policies of the past dictate our future.
Alabamians there!" he said. The conference He says we increased our combat air
is being organized by the Guatemala-Ala- operations in Laos only when the North
'barna Partners of the Alliance. Vietnamese increased their aggression.
Five service groups were represented at But the President forgets that this was
the meeting, including Altrusa, Pilot, Sonap- the same argument used to justify in-
Zonta and the sponsoring Quota Club.
A project of the Quota u creasing our role in Vietnam.
Guatemala Partners' booth at the Interne- The President justifies our involve-
tional Pair. ment in Laos by saying the Laotian Gov-
eminent asked for our help. This, of
i..1,11..NT IN LAOS course, was the same reason we were
U.S. INVOLV
given for escalating American involve-
thrown into doubt by revelations re-
garding Americans killed in Laos which
have given to Mr. Nixon his own credi-
bility gap. The President's latest release
of information about U.S. casualties in
Laos is no more than what should have
been done all along.
Most of what we know about what Is
happening in Laos comes from reporters
on the scene. They have reported Amer-
ican planes flying combat missions at
the rate of more than 200 a day in direct
support of Royal Laotian combat troops.
They hay .1 reported American soldiers
who were mustered out of the Army so
they could go on the CIA payroll as ad-
visers to Laotian troops. They have re-
ported an entire army, independent of
the Lao Government, which was recruit-
ed, trained, and equipped by the United
States. And they have reported that
President Nixon himself approved bomb-
ing raids by American B-52's on the '
Plain of Jars.
Last July, and again in November, Mr.
Nixon declared his intention to disengage
the United States from the war in Viet-
nam and to keep our fighting men out of
future conflicts of that nature. His ac-
tions with regard to Laos cast doubt on
just how he is going about avoiding any
new Vietnam-type involvements.
? I am afraid that the United States
nds today in Laos precisely where we
stood 5 years ago in Vietnam. The rhet-
oric we hear today bears a frightening
resemblance to the rhetoric which pre-
ceded the tragic escalation of U.S. in-
volvement ir ,uth Vietnam.
Mr. ? .ames "previous adminis-
Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr.
President, the situation in Laos is be- was a signatory to the SEATO agree-
coming more serious every day. It has ment, providing some framework for our
become clear that the United States is response. Laos has specifically avoided
Involved in an escalating military oper- any such mutual defense pacts.
ation there and, furthermore, that our The 1962 Geneva agreement on Laotian
involvement has been concealed from the independence, which the United States
American people. To some degree it is still was a party to, prohibits foreign mill-
being concealed. President Nixon, while tary intervention in Laos. The President
proclaiming his desire to disengage now says we are justified in violating
American fighting men from conflicts in that agreement because North Vietnam
Asia, has increased our military opera- has done so. That argument falls of its
tions in Laos. own weight; it is like saying two wrongs
I wish I could state with some certainty make a right.
precisely what that involvement now And President Nixon plays on semantic
consists of. Unfortunately, becatise of the niceties to hide the fact that American
President's policy of secrecy, I ca.nnot military men are fighting and dying in
' do so. Neither the American people nor Laos.
the Congress have had sufficient expla- The similarities to the things our Gov-
nation of the extent of this country's in- ernment said and did in Vietnam are
volvement in Laos. appalling. Already we are reading re-
The President's- much heralded state- ports of bewildered, homeless refugees
ment on the subject last Friday did very' pouring into Vientiane as they flee from
little to improve that situation. To make bombing raids by U.S. planes. Refugees
matters worse, the authenticity of what have been pouring' into Saigon for 5
the President. did say ,was , very quickly years, many of them for the same reason.
ment in Vietnam. But at least Vietnam
?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :'CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
C.
STATINTL
March ilwrim,9d For RelemaingARNA: Ems1ugmR00070
fling. In fact, as smoke is reduced through
higher temperatures of combustion, the pro-
duction of oxides of nitrogen is increased.
The technology must be developed.
We haven't oven cleaned up normal jet
engines and now we are going to have the
SST. Not only is this multi-billion dollar
airplane being subsidized by the taxpayers
with the profit to go largely into private
hands, not only are scientists concerned
about the noise pollution it will cause, but
now it also turns out the scientists fear that
the exhaust pollution it creates will never
dissipate. It will fly at a high level where
the atmosphere is basically stable. The effect,
some think, will be that its exhaust emis-
sions will generate great expanses of clouds
which will remain there indefinitely, reduc-
ing markedly the sunlight reaching the sur-.
face of the earth.
And consider this: The President, for
fiscal 1971, has asked for $276 million for the
SST?and only $106 million for the Air
Pollution Control Administration.
Solid Waste Poi/Idiom?We create trash?
cans, bottles, paper, and so forth--faster
than we can dispose of it, and we are rim-
ning out of safe places to put it. We need
to find innovative' ways to reeapture our
solid waste. We must also demand that
packagers stop making virtually indestructi-
ble containers and come up with ones that
are easily and cheaply disposed of.
The Administration position on this prob-
lem last year was interesting, to say the
least. Secretary Robert Finch of HEW testi-
fied about the critical nature of the prob-
lem during hearings on bipartisan legisla-
tion which would move toward recovery,
recycling and reuse of the resources which
today the nation burns, buries or dumps. He
made an eloquent presentation of the scope
of the problem. Then he flatly opposed
spending the money required to implement
the solutions.
In his message President Nixon also waxed
eloquent on this problem, but he did not
ask either for the necessary funds or
legislation to deal with it. Instead, he sug-
gested further study.
In Great Britain, a much poorer nation
per capita than we, the citizenry decided a
few years ago that it was tired of pollution
and began paying the price of cleaning up
its air. That price has been very dear to the
average Britain. But it is paying dividends.
Now, while thick fog still rolls over London
from the ocean, it no longer combines with
air pollution to become the kind of killer
smog for which that great city had become
notorious.
There had been no fish in the Thames
river for over a century. But the British went
to work here, too, and by 1968 some 40 dif-
ferent species had come back.
It has been done in America, as well. Last
year in the New Jersey Air Quality Region,
where a great) phalanx of chemical plants
is situated, emissions of oxides of sulfur?
the sulfur content of fuel?were down a full
50% from what they were in 1966, before
there were regulations.
We can have clean air and clean water.
This mighty technology of ours can produce
pollution abatement in the same way it
produced pollution.
What used to be lacking was the national
will to do it. Now the will is present, and
the public is willing to pay for it. And that
means that both government and private
purse strings must be loosed?now.
THE LAOTIAN SITUATION
Mr. GRIFFIN, Mr. President, recently
the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLD-
WATER) delivered a perceptive, illuminat-
ing speech on the floor of the Senate
concerning the situation in Laos. His
speech was largely overlooked by the
press at the time it was given. However,
on March 5 the Omaha World-Herald
carried a news 'story and an editorial
and I ask unanimous consent that they
be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection the items
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Omaha World-Herald, Mar. 5,
1970]
GOLDWATER TELLS TRUTH ABOUT LAOS
TROUBLES
Congressional critics of the United States
position in Laos, as well as some of the eastern
press, have not been telling "the whole truth"
about the situation, says Sen. Barry Geld-
water, R-Ariz.
Goldwater is suggesting that they read
the 1962 13-nation declaration on the neu-
trality of Laos, signers of which included the
United States and Russia, and Red China,
North Vietnam, Britain and France as well.
Goldwater pointed to a key phrase in the
declaration:
"They (the signatories) will not introduce
into the kingdom of Laos foreign troopeor
military personnel in any form whatsoever,
nor will they in any way facilitate or connive
at the Introduction of any foreign troops or
military personnel."
It was the Comuniats who breached that
agreement, the Arizona senator said.
? . REDS RESPONSIBLE
It was the Communists who breached that
across Laos, using it as a supply route for its
troops in Vietnam, Goldwater pointed out.
No American ground forces are in Laos,
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird has
said, but U.S. planes have operated there to
try to cut off the supplies going across Laos
bound for Vietnam and Red forces there.
"Lately," Goldwater told the senate, "I
have listened to some of my colleagues berate
the United States for supposed activities In
Laos and have read similar stories in the
New York Times and Washington Post.
"I have kept wondering when some of that
group would come out with the whole truth."
UNITED STATES NOT CULPRIT
Goldwater said he hadn't seen that whole
truth "so far."
He said bath Russia and Red China
"pledged themselves to respect the neutral-
ity of Laos."
"Now, he asked, "who is causing the trou-
ble in Laos and, as long as we are at it, the
trouble in South Vietnam and northwest
Thailand? The Communists, whether they be
Russian, North Vietnamese, or Red Chinese.
The United States is not the culprit . .
So I would hope that in the future that when
Senators or members of the press decide to
ascribe all the trouble in Laos to the United
States (that they point the finger at Russia,
Red China and North Vietnam and ask the
question, what are you doing upsetting the
neutrality of Laos?"
Goldwater introduced in the Congressional
Record the complete declaration of Laotian
neutrality as adopted by the 13 powers July,
23, 1902.
WE DIDN'T START IT
Barry Goldwater has pointed out some-
thing his colleagues in the Senate and every-
one else should remember as the war in Laos ?
continues:
The President, the Pentagon and the CIA
did not start the war. The Communists, par-
ticularly the North Vietnamese, are respon-
sible for it, just as they are responsible
for the war in Vietnam and the trou-
bles In Thailand and other countries Of
Southeast Asia.
Goldwater pointed out that North Vietnam,
not the United States, put a force of 50,000
DO 60,000 soldiers in Laos.
And he recalled for the senators a
1962 13-nation declaration on the neutrality
of Laos was signed by Russia, Red China and
North Vietnam as well as by the United
States.
Goldwater's words were overdue, for it has
appeared from the remarks of some sena-
tors that they thought the United States,
on its own, was trying to get another major
war going in Laos.
Sen. Mathias has warned, for example, that
"every American escalation has been met
by a North Vietnamese escalation" In Laos,
That is the kind of intellectually dishonest
blame-shifting that liberal politicians have
been practicing for years in regard to the
fighting in Vietnam.
Now Mathias appears to be trying to in-
stitute more of it in regard to Laos, talking
about American "escalation" when it Is per-
fectly clear that the Communist offensive
across the Plain of Jars and beyond was the
first step in the current intensification of
the fighting.
Sen. Cooper has repeatedly described the
fighting in Laos as "an internal war," re-
calling the attempts to pass off the conflict
in South Vietnam as a "civil war" rather
than a war of aggression launched by North
Vietnam.
If it is strictly a Laotian war, as Cooper
seems to imply, what are those 50,000 North
Vietnamese doing there? Or would Sen.
Cooper, like Hanoi, simply deny their ex-
istence?
Sen. Mike Mansfield has commented criti-
cally on the "decided enlargement of the
number of sorties flown over Laos" by Ameri-
can warplanes. He did not comment, how-
ever, on the fact that the number of air
strikes is in proportion to the increased ef-
forts by the North Vietnamese and Pathet
Lao guerrillas to take over Laos or signifi-
cant parts of it.
Sen. Gore has said that "our activity in
Laos is in violation of the Geneva agree-
ments." He has not bothered to mention who
first violated the agreements, or the magni-
tude of the Communist violations,
Said Goldwater:
"I would hope that in the future that.
When senators or members of the press de-
cide-to ascribe all the trouble in Laos to the
United States, that they point the finger
at Russia, Red China and North Vietnam
and ask the question, what are you doing
upsetting the neutrality of Laos."
We think that statement puts the Laotian
situation in a clearer and much more hon-
est perspective than some of the critical
assessments made by other senators.
Laos seems unlikely to become another
Vietnam militarily, but It easily could be-
oome one politically here at home, if the
concerned senators are not more eareful to
acknowledge the truth of Communist ag-
gression, and balance their criticisms
accordingly.
OIL IMPORTS NO SECURITY
THREAT
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the
Department of Defense othcial who is in
charge of making sure that our Armed
F ces have enough oil said yesterday
tiiat oil imports are no threat to our na-
onal security.
This statement by Barry J. Shillito,
ssistant Secretary of Defense for In-
tallations and Logistics, should put to
rest any doubts about the national secu-
rity Justifications for the oil import pro-
gram?there are none.
The only Justification that the oil in-
dustry seems to be able to put forward is
that what is good for the oil industry is
good for the national security; an idea
Approved Far Releise 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R400700050001-2
CITy
NEApproved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RTYPiblita
E - 427,270
.MAR i C 270
?4"
n 'T-34C% ri1 2f
By Martin Schram
Newsday Washington Bureau
Washington?After teetering on the .brink of a
possible credibility. gap, President Nixon reversed
policies last night and promised to reveal future
American casualties in the once-clandestine war in
Laos.
' Nixon swept away much of the secrecy that has
- cloaked the U.S. operations in Laos with his decision.
The President ordered the State Department last
night to release the names and the circumstances sur-
rounding the deaths of the six U.S. civilians killed by
hostile enemy action in Laos since he became Presi-
dent. Included were three employes of the Air
America charter airline, which has been linked by
some sources ? to the Central ?Intelligence Agency
(CIA).
Nixon also promised that in the future:
o The secretary of defense will inform the Ameri?
can public of all U.S. military aircraft losses and
. military air personnel casualties in Laos as soon as
the search-and-rescue missions have been completed.
o All casualties suffered by U.S. personnel sta-
tioned in Laos due to hostile enemyactions will also
be reported.
The Piesident's reversal of policy carne at 6 PM,
hours after White House Press Secretary Ronald
Ziegler had declined to provide newsmen with the
identities of U.S. civilian personnel casualties suf-
fered in Laos. Reporters had peppered Ziegler earlier
in the afternoon with questions aimed at the credi-
bility issue, since the White House was maintaining
, that despite the revelation. Sunday of 26 civilian
deaths and one U.S. military casualty, there had been
? no U.S. deaths in Laos in "ground combat operations."
Meanwhile, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) was
charging on Capitol Hill yesterday afternoon that
Nixon's "partial release of facts does not give an ac-
'curate picture" of U.S. involvement in Laos. Sym-
ington said: "If the American people are going to be
taxed to pay for this undisclosed war, they are en-
titled to know more about it than the administration
:.has seen fit to disclose in bits and pieces."
In announcing Nixon's new disclosure policy last
night, Ziegler said: "The purpose o this administra-
tion is to discuss completely the U.S. involvement
in Laos. These orders and this policy which the.
President is stating today clearly shows the intent
of the President to fully inform the American people
of the scope of the U.S. involvement in Laos and
to keep the American people informed of U.S.
activities in Laos ?`
Ziegler said s; It there had been six U.S: civilians
killed in Laos by hostile enemy action since Nixon
was inaugurated. Three of the dead men were cm-
nptoyeS of Air America, a charter airline believed to be
at least partly controlled by the CIA. Air America
operates officially under contract to the U.S. Agency
for International Development, the government's
foreign aid agency. The AirAmerica employes identi- ?
fied as killed were J. C. Merkel, William J. Gibbs and /
Ralph S. Davis. The State Department could not pro-
vide any home town addresses last night.
The other three fatalities were men who were
members. of the .International Voluntary Services, a
:private Peace Corps-typo organization whose mem-
hers help people in underdeveloped countries on agri-
cultural and other community projects. That organiza-
tion received $1,500,000 a year in grants from the
U.S. international development agency, according to
1937 report. The International Voluntary Services',
:Jnembers killed were: Arthur Stillman, Chandler Ed-
.: !wards and Dennis ,7\.4ummert. The names of the other.
.20- U.S. civilians, all presumably killed before Nixon
? took office, Were not disclosed.
in addition to those civilians, one U.S. military
!man also has been killed in ground action in Laos
during the Nixon administration. He was U.S. Army
'Capt. Joseph Bush, a military attache who was killed
:after returning enemy fire during a North Vietnamese
commando attack. His identity was confirmed by the
? i.\\11:ie House Sunday only after it was first revealed
by ho Los Angeles Times.
Nixon's staff had not learned. of Bush's death
? the President's. declaration in Friday's official
Laos statement that "no American stationed in Laos
.had ever been killed in ground combat operations."
Nixon also was embarrassed by an official White
House briefer who. said Friday that all American
? deaths in Laos had been caused by U.S. air opera.
tions; the White House later conceded that perhaps
27 had died in ground action since 1962.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R0
rnume.10....??????
LINCOLN, NEBR.
I JOURNAL
E ? 45,366
JOURNAL-STAR
S - 57,752
vArheri4970-
can' Losses ? in os
AR10
?
From Now on to Be Told
1, Compiled From News Wires
Washington ? Amid con-
gressional charges he is dodg-
ing demands for disclosure of
; U.S. Laotian involvement,
1 President Nixon has ordered
t the pablic release of American
' casualties and air losses as
-
they occur in the Southeast
Asian country.
, In announcing the policy
ii. change Monday night, the
White House disclosed six
' civilians were killed in Laos
last year as the result of hostile
enemy action.
f Press secretary Ronald L.
!Ziegler said the administration
twill immediately "inform the
' American public about all
' military aircraft losses and
:military air per sonnet
;casualties in Laos once search-
:and-rescue missions are cornpleted." .
1 Ziegler said this is the same
!policy followed on Vietnam
,losses. In the past, Casualties in
;Laos have been lumped with
pose of Southeast Asia aS a
elvh010.414 sh,, . ./ r m,idik ' n
bilg MXII.MtftiliNtnalli rliLi
described as having support
rather than active military
roles, three were killed by am-
bush, one was shot as he was
piloting a helicopter. And two
were killed by what the White
'House called possible hostile
fire. -
Meanwhile, the Los Angeles
Times reported Tuesday that
?Cenkal.--4ritelligence Agency
(CIA) agents posing as
. members of the agency are in-
volved in military operations in
Laos
- ?
The Times' story from Jack
Foisie in Vientiane estimated
the number of CIA agents at
several hundred. The
newspaper said their activities
include recruiting and training
pro-government guerrillas, de-
tecting enemy troop movements,
and acting as ground controllers
for aircraft.
The White House confirmed
- Sunday that Joseph K. Bush
Jr., art Army captain, was
killed in Laos Feb. 10, 1969, in
an exchange of fire with North
Vietnamese commandos. The
( administration said his death
t did not occur in combat ac-
tion.
At Temple, Tex., the widow
and parents of Bush said the
t government never tried to keep'
'secret the location of the 25-
),ear-old captain's death. ,
tatrol Bush. 24. said she had:
known "all along where Joe
was. And when he was killed,
the government made no at-
tempt, so far as I know, to keep
it quiet that he had been killed
In Laos."
\ The White House statement
came after a day of Senate
debate on U.S. involvement in
Laos.
Sen. Hugh Scott of
ennsylvania, the Republican
leader, said Democrats are
looking for a political issue in
the debate over Laos.
Sen. Alan Cranston, D-Calif.,;
said two soldiers told him;
American troops were sent Into
Laos "to pick up (U.S.) bodies
and bring them back into Viet-
nam so when they were
counted as dead they would be
counted as dead in Vietnam
and not in the Laos theater."
Sen. Stuart Symington, D-
?Mo., whose Senate Foreign'
Relations subcommittee con-
ducted a week of hearings on
Laos in October, said the ad-
ministration's "partial release
of facts does not give an ac-
curate picture."
Symington has been trying to
have the State Dept. agree td
release a censored version of
the transcript.
He told newsmen t h
transcript contained "very in-,
teresting disclosures" about -
U.S. casualties in Laos and
asked "why only ground com-
cbaastuallitrooP?s nre considered
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
STATINTL
?
Approved For Release 2001)0(8i0W:16A-RDP8
'
t:1.+1
'
' .T.ACN VOISIE ?
Ylrnos Ste0 Wrilor ,
... ? . VIEN, 'MANE - The U.S. civilian ' 'wells, build schools and Former Servicemen
\
.
AID mission in Laos is being used as teach sanitation arc some- . :many members of the
I a cover for Central Intelligence .times called upon
'to act O Annex are former Ameri
Agency agents engaged in clande-, ? forward air controllers,' it ?
s -
can servicemen who
fought in Vietnam. Often
stine operations against the Commu-. was learned.
they come from the Special
unist enemy. .%. I Within the AID mission . ,
Perces and their job in.
Ants posing as members of the ' there is some discontent Laos is about the same-'
Aeoney for International Dove-. over the military role that without the green beret.
_loin:lent mission's rural develop- ,
being forced upon them. The ,men for the Annex
ment division are recruiting and
??
are recruited aS their dis7
training orogovernment guerrillas ' "It breeds distrust of the
charge date from ser-
to fight Communists, detect enemy . people we are trying to vice comes due. Many
movelennits deep in their own tern- . helm one field worker have a desire for further
tory and to net as ground controllers sai :
. d.. "I won't say that we adventure overseas an d
- for aircraft.
?perf orm humanitarian like the high pay, triple or
The Americans involved in these
more , what they earned
- woe]: f-nary activities are members of ree of political im-
plications. I3ut 110W some when in uniform. -
the AID mission's Rural Develop-
There is the possibility.
I
men: Annex to distinguish them people think we're an
adjunct of the military." that some men have
from other rural development work-
. gained temporary leave
ers engaged in the agency's normal :Request Que,sti ned.e.',(1:0," fKorn. the armed forces r ld
functions-assistance to civilians, in It is particulael 6),barcan return to the military
remote areas. ? rassing for field . tig;er,y,i-d 1: after their contract ex-
Total Severed Hundred e sors when they ask for pires. .
I) " p 1 0 ! more money or more staff
Based on talks with in the past several years
and the request is ques- the membership in the
throughout Laos the past several
toned by an 'unknowing Anne X has remained Con-
weeks, the number of agents posing ,
bureaucrat in Washing- stant, it was learned. Only
as AID workers totals several , ton. the American air support
hundred. .
?"How can you 'ask for '.to the Royal Lao govern-
In one area there are almost 50 ? more men when you've ment forces seems to have
Americans and about half of them.'
already got 15 supervising .calated.
are listed as members of the Rural - , well-digging,?" is the due- .
:Development Annex. In Military r y .
Region II in northeast Laos, where He doesn't know that 10
mech of the fighting has occurred, e
of the well-digging experts
Aenex members are very numerous.. ,
are really CIA agents.
In the northeast, both regular and
The only strong opposi-
.gueerilla forces are under the corn-
tion to the AID mission's
:nand of a Meo tribal general, Vang change of its or
Por years the CIA has been peaceful role, however,
active in supporting Yang Pao's , from .
, comes lora a youthful STATINTL
mountain people. ,
. group of overseas workers,
Originally the activity was under members of the Interna-'
the code name of "White Star." It. , tional Volunteer Service.
now anpears that Rural Develop- ' Privately chartered, IVS
moot Annex is the successor to ' preceded the Peace Corps..
White Star. - Its members have served
Although nominally under control , with distinction in ,Viet-.
of the AID mission director, Charles ; nam and Laos.
Mann, Annex people answer only to: There are 40 WS mem-
the CIA chief in Laos. bees in Laos, and they
There is another secret organiza- .serve under an?AID mis- :
don hidden within the AID Mission sion contract. Although
-eorapound. It is called the Special they have made no formal
...-
acquirements Office. Its personnel protest, there is deep dis-
provide the supplies foe the elandes- : content and some are con-
sidering voicing their dis-
tine units.
,"./i1(1;?j;;IriliMig*OtqcOr tiMpAbs2001/03/04 : C IA-RDP80-01601 R000700050001-2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601
NEW YORK, N.Y.
POST
E 7 Ot3,130
MAR 1 0 1970
STATI NTL
The Old Road to Credibility Gap
Before President Nixon's belated
statement on the subject, many Ameri-
cans were apprehensive about the U. S. ?
liability in Laos. They still are?as
questions multiply about the reliability
of his report.
The President asserted specifically,
for examplt-,--that?"no American sta-
tioned in Laos has ever been killed in .
ground combat operations."1,Apparently
he knew at the time that 25 U. S. civil-.
ians had been slain or were missing as'
a result of "hostile action" but chose
to distinguish these casualties from any
sustained in "combat"
,
In any event' he did not mention('
them, and it was only after press re-
ports that an American Army officer'
had been killed, 13 months ago as he
vainly sought to drive off a North Viet-,;,
namese commando attack on a rear
area that the White House acknowl-
eged his death and the other casualties;
even then, lame attempts were made to
preserve the pretense that "ground-
combat operations" were not responsi-
ble. The alleged distinction can be of.,
small comfort to the victims. I
How many more casualties have I
actually been sustained? And if it is
really U. S. policy?as one diplomat
claimed yesterday in commenting onil
the Laotian government's response to
a peace-talk proposal from the Pathet
Lao?to be "all for the Laotians set- ,
tling problems among themselves," why?
has the U .S. become- steadily more
inv,olved1ThAf House has now
belatedly 'agreed t&ilgase future casu-
alty figurers in Laos. Will CIA men he Vi
te
?included in the count?
On a Muddy Track
"As long as he's a reliable horse.," one American said of Thieu, "we'll ride ,
,him. But if people think he's beginning to falter, that could cause difficulties."
?from a Washington Post story, datelined .Saigon,
* '*
That is not too felicitous an image of the South Vietnamese President,
? who behaves each day in every way, like a man on horseback himself?in the
(saddle, gripping, , a ? tight rei,hi'? refusing, -to 'dismolmt28-14 roughshedover
-
ciwAtiientsi yritf , ,x,c4 avsa
.tirgAW. off ntf Mire vrawnig,tqL.,_. - _
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: C1?-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
A z:AS.
Approved For Release2001/03/04 : CIA-RETPRA:416_01
MU: YORK, N.Y....,
POST
E ?.708,180
MAR 10 1970
52162)ED'
By a Staff Correspondent
rderis Full! L
?
WASHINGTON--The Administration today was under
orders from President Nixon to give a full accounting of all
future casualties and aircraft losses associated with Ameri-
can activities in Laos.
Stung by charges that the All this was announced late
public was not being told yesterday by Press Secretary
all it should be about U. S. Ziegler after a lengthy meet.
involvement in the ' land- ing with top White House of.
locked Asian nation, Nixon ficials at which the directive
late yesterday directed that 'was ironed out.
;
rom now on:
Said Ziegler: "These orders f .
! q All military aircraft . and this policy cilarly show
losses and military air
the intent of the President to
.
personnel casualties
inform the American people
in
Laos will be reported pub- of the scope of U. S. involve-
? licly as soon as search ment in Laos and his inten;
;
and rescue operations are tion to continue to keep the? ,
completed. These facts un- American people informed of
til today had been lumped, U. S. activities in Laos."
together with Vietnam Part of the President's or-
statistics. dee ? the immediate release
T,
Of5 DejgCd I
. Arthur Stillman and America, an airline also .r!
Dennis . Mummert, both am- ' under contract to AID but L',
bushed on Aug. 5, 1969, near , rumored to be financed .and .
' Ban Nong Keun. . controlled by the CIA. , ..
Chandler Edwards, am. i The current ap over the
' bushed on April 4,19139, at credibility of the Administra- -
? Ban Soukhouma. tion's word regarding Amer- ?
Shot to Death ' ican participation in the L6ce .
q The loss or death from
"hostile enemy action" of
any U. S. personnel sta-
tioned in Laos will also be
announced. This will cover
. advisers, trainers and lo-
gistical support enniloyes.
Casualties stemming from
action along the South Viet-
! nam-Laotian border will still . ages or hometowns of the six.
`L be carried as Vietnam casuThe. information, they.v were,
alties, however; the prod. able to assemble detailed the
'dent ruled. s ' 'deaths as follows:.
r ;ILA
of the names of the six U. S.
civilians killed in Laos during
the past year ? reached the
State Dept. so late that most
of the administrative staff
there had gone home.
As a consequence, State
Dept. spokesmen said, they
were unable to provide thefl
,. J. J C Merkel, fatally tian war came to a head in --
? wounded by a bullet on Feb.' recent weeks when the White .
House repeatedly refused to
18, 1970, while piloting a comment on news accounts '
helicopter over the Plain of . of growing U. S. involvement
Jars.
,, in the tiny kingdom.
" William I Gibbs, killed Nixon sought to allay rls-1
by hostile fire on May 13, ing suspicion by delivering a .
1969, following the crash of statement last Friday outlin- 4
the helicopter in which he ing American activities in the..
was riding near Nam Bac. area. A claim in his report j
And Ralph S. Davis, also that no Americans stationed
fatally shot on Aug. 18, 1969,., in Laos had been killed in
after the small fixed-wing combat was challenged over
aircraft he was riding in the weekend by a published
crashed southwest of the report of the death of a U. S. '
Plain of Jars. . infantry captain at the hands
The first three were mem- of North Vietnamese corn-
bers of International Volun- . mandos in Laos.
teer Services, a private group' While maintaining that the 1
carrying out a Peace Corps- President's claim still stood, .:
like function under contract the Administration apparent. :
to the Agency for Inter- ly felt compelled to demon.
. national Development. . . ? ?strata. further..its _conunitt. -i
*Worked for Airline.,- ?.1,...,,, v.mment 4 ?toP. irinforming - the
:.
The' second group of three. public. Yesterday's diredive.
'men. an , "worked ? tor ',Air, .4q1lowe_de.,.. ..?- .-,
?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
ZLRW XOR! C TIftga
Approved For Release 2001/0)3MPS:19741A-RDP80-01601
By RUSSELL BAKER
WASHINGTON, March 9?
Suddenly there is Laos out on
Page One. It is a place, judging
from the news reports, where
' a young man with no pull at
, his draft board could get killed
' unless somebody does some-
thing clever quickly, which is
always unlikely. The following
pocket guide to Laos is Intend-
ed to shed the clear light of
information on this crucial cor-
ner of the world:
vi,
. 1. What is Laos??Laos Is a
1 fertile area of opium surround-
ed by the C.I.A. It is famous
for the historic Plain of Jars,
the stalwart Meo tribesmen and
Observer: Lao,., \A- Beginners'
hand in conversation, and is
therefore recommended unless
there is a genuine old Laos
hand in the room, which will
be unlikely since there were
only three genuine ? old Laos . ing about "louse eyes" and
hands in the world as of last, 'would complain that their Pres-
January, and all of them were -light to have weightier
far gone on opium. to talk about on tele-
That Old Pagoda . vision. Nor has Prof. ? Henry
Kissinger's suggestion that the
and Laosize the war: in Laos??
The President's political ad-
visers object to Laosizing the
war. They 'believe most Ameri-
cans would think he was talk-
?
offices of one yang Paul.
(rhymes with "bang! pow!")"
the C.I.A. has rallied freedom-
loving fierce Mco tribesmen on'f,,,
the Plain of Jars. "1
9. Who is yang Pau??That's
'not the question. The real ques-:-S
tion is, who is Souphanouvong?,r1
(rhymes with "you run along"). ;
A Forgotten Quarrel
3. What about the old Moul- , Administration "de-Laos the 10. Who is Souphanouvong?..:,
mein Pagoda??The old Moul- si
mein Pagoda is too far from
Laos to have any obvious con-
uation been greeted very. ?Souphanouvong, leader of the
nthusiastically at the White Pathet Lao, is the half-brother."
House. of Prince Souvanna Phouma? '
nection, though what the C.I.A 6. What will the United (doesn't rhyme with anything),',
. may be up to there cannot, States do if the capital of Laos who is the neutralist ruler of,
of course, be 'officially dis- falls to the enemy??That de- ' Laos and a good guy. Souphan-'.';
cussed, as the U. S. Govern- ' pends upon who the enemy is, ouvong got mad at his half- ;
rnent never officially discusses and upon which capital he cap- ? brother a long time ago and
a rainy season which, if it were
. C.I.A.
to fall into Communist hands,: activities, even in old tures. There are ' two capitals; went out into the elephant. ,
pagodas. they are Luang Prabang and ' grass beyond the Plain of Jars'
might well upset the delicate
balance of dominoes now pre-
i
4. Where were we??we were Vientiane. No one is certain yet' to form the Pathet Lao.
vailing between the Mekong ? 41
about to learn 'how to pro- how many enemies there are. , 11. What did he get mad
*
and the Irrawaddy. nounce "Laos." If you can pro- At last count there were Chi- "about??No one remembers?any
??
nounce the French article "la" .. nese Communists building a more. Old Thai hands say there -
, Sounding Like an Old Hand and the German preposition ? road in the north, North Viet- 'are rumors along the klongs,i
, Y namese extending a skirmish of Bangkok that they had al
' 2. Who is the Irrawaddy?? "aus" you are well on the wa
? The Irrawaddy is not a who, to success; say, very quickly, line through the middle, and political argument in 1948.
but a what; or, to be precise, a? "la" and "aus," and you have Pathet Lao (rhymes with "pot- with Souphanouvong supporting"
;. river in Burma, a location so it. If your only language is Eng.*" ted cow") digging a ditch in. Thomas E. Dewey and Souvan-o,
remote from Laos that it has lish, and you can say "louse," the south. , rut Phouma favoring Mutt
absolutely no bearing at all on you will have it as clearly as 7. Let's go back to the old ? Truman, but it may have been's
the Laotian situation, whatevet'. most people in the State De- ? Moulmein Pagoda?Absolutely ! the other way around. '-? ?s'
' that may be. Use of the phrase:, Partment. ., notl Now quit whining and pay 12. Is this some kind of joke?",
'? "between the Mekong and the s 5. HavineVietnamized the . attention. .. ' - ' ?Not unless you are one OS
Irrawaddy" may, however,make ...war in, Vietnam, will President :. , ,8. 'Where 'does the' ,C.I.A."? those Iuckt, people who calm .
,t you sound like . au- old Laos ? ? Nixon' be logically. oonsistent.!.` come in??Through . thei;good ''! die laughing.. ( ''''. - ? .- ' - il74
,. 0.. (.1.'404,1 4 , 44..4`, 4 4.. 4044,44,144614.4*$ v ..4;6;44;:kattl'I ? p
I I
Approved For Release?2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2 ?
?
Approved For Releaai6bfigibela1AbP80-01601R
1 0 MAR 1970
CIA Agents Pose
As Laos Aid Men,
Report Claims
Los Angeles ? (AP) ? CIA
agents poising as member of
the Agency for International De-
yelopment are involved in mili-
tary operations against Commu-
nists in Laso, the Los Angeles
Times reported yesterday.
A dispatch from Vientiane es-
timated the number of such
agents at several hundred. It
said they, recruit and train pro-
govehnment guerillas, detect
Communist troop movements
, and act as groun controllers for
aircraft.
The story said the agents
pose as members of AID's Rural
Development Annex to distin-
guish*them from other rural de-
velopment workers, doing the
agency's normal job of helping
civilians in remote areas.:
. ,
STATI NTL
J"
Approved For Release 2001/03/04-: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
STATINTL
ApprovediNK RsAlpase 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0007
TIMES MAR 10 1970-'1
LI - 04 2
S - 102,574
(
President Nixon's Report on Laos
May Not Hint at Depth of Involvement
Bowing to pressure from the public at the cost , or depth of our activities
and ,from Congress, President Nixon within the country. Various other re-
bas given the nation a rundown on the ports have referred to the presence of
situation in Laos, our involvement Green Berets and .Cjnlral Intelligence
'there, and future prospects for that , ..4469,Lic eratives; Newsweek ma
part ,of strife-riddled Southeast Asia. azit1said the current cost of our :
While he stressed that we have no operations in Laos., is $300 million a
ground combat troops in Laos?and , year.
"no plans for introducing" them?there It beggars belief that we coul d,
Is, overall, little that is reassuring in carry on extensive counter-insurgency 1
:his report, and much that is disquiet- and combat support within a country
lug. without becoming entangled in its po-i
. Not that Mr. Nixon sought particu- litical and economic structure. But the;
flarly to lull the public by his statement. President, by citing a figure of 1,040;
He made quite clear that the situation Americans "employed" by us in Laos,
in Laos is precarious for the Lao gov- and stressing that all we do there is
ernment, that it is the Communist by government request, seems to imply:!
forces, especially from North Vietnam, that our involvement is superficial and
4
who have brought about the present could be quickly ended. It seems
peril by consistent violations of the 1962 obvious that it could not.
neutralization agre-gments, and that Mr. Nixon spoke to the point when
Laos matters because it is d part 'of the he placed our. Lao' activities in the
entire muddled picture in Southeast context of the Vietnam war and the
'Asia and affects our war?and peace? . defense Of the Geneva agreements. But
'efforts in yietnam. there is little reassurance in this,
Still, we think that the President either. Our war efforts have produced
' glossed over some details in the Lao- a stalemate that can last only as long
lien situation that would suggest how ,as we remain in Southeast Asia ' in ,
deeply we have already become in- , force; we have not nianaged anything ;
:volved there. It is all very well to in -Paris toward a peace that would'
'speak of the Laotians "settling prob- allow our safe, orderly v-v-ithdrawal.
,lems among themselves," as did a U.S. "Vietnarnization" works to prolong the,
diplomatic spokesman in the wake of a' war, .not settle it.
, Communist Lao peace feeler Monday; Finally, the Geneva :agreements ,
whether we would readily stand aside cannot be meaningful as' long as the
for the chance this might happen is,an-, U.S. is the only Western. nation niter-
other question. , ested in seeing them kept. The question
'As one illustration of the apparent is not whether the Communists are a
gaps between the President's words bunch of dirty birds, who cheat on
and the existing situation, Mr. Nixon ; treaties; of course they are. The ques-
- acknowledged that we have been and tion is how far we should go ? and 's
are furnishing air support to Royal Lao how much more of our blood and j
forces, but he said nothing about t)ie treasure we should invest -- in trying I
extent of that support. The gist of wide- to keep them hone'st (especially since
spread reports is that it is massive; our own hands are not altogether clean
,Sen. Harry F. Byrd Jr. said on the Sen-. in respecting Indochina treaties). 'I
ate floor last week that "It is a fact The fact is that there no longer is
. . that the' U.S. had dropped more,, any graceful exit for us from Southeast
bombs (in Laos) than it has on North Asia's combat theater, and little hope'
Vietnam." News sources say that we that we can leave behind anything that
? have lost at , least 100 pilots on Such will endure. If Vietnam has been- a ;
missions. , ? bitter experience, Laos looks like a -
For another illustration, while he, disaster area., We 'ought to avoid any
spoke of Ahp.
ARPitiWgarnlarg 0,14:11/0/01filidfA-RprIF604R001Y71006)50001-2
9 9
? eepe an re oub e political efforts
Royal Laos, the President did not, hint to find means of extricAting ourselves ,1
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01
SAN ANTONIO, TEX.
NEWS
E - 61,290
MAR I 0 1970
President's best weapon
on Laos affair is candor
President Nixon has been put in an awkward
position by a bit of Pentagon semantics.
Last Friday, in his statement on Laos, the Pres-
ident said flatly that "no American stationed in Laos
has ever been killed in ground combat operations."
It has since become known that 27 American
?including an Army captain?have died as a result
- of "hostile action" on the ground in Laos. The other- .
26 were civilian's, one a dependent of a civilian. Pre-
sumably most of them were CIA men, who have
trained the Laotian army.
A White House spokesman said Nixon did not
know of the captain's death when he made his state-,
ment. The spokesman, however, stuck with the
"hostile action" definition, saying the captain died
in an enemy attack behind the lines and thus was:,
not in a "ground combat operations." He would not
discuss the other deaths due to "hostile action."
The Army captain apparently presumed he was;
- in combat. He shot and killed one Communist at-
tacker before he was gunned down. The matter of
definition is moot for him and the other 26.
The President's efforts to clarify the American
involvement in Laos have been damaged by these
belated disclosures. The attempt to stick by the orig-
inal statement by playing with words only makes
,matters worse. We cannot buY the distillation be; ,
tween hostile action_ and combat operations., If out
JI/-kIIINIL
people are close enough to the Reds to be killed by
them, they are in combat.
We hope the President is upset with the Penta-
gon word game. This episode leads us to wonder what
else he had riot been told before he made his state-
ment on Laos. We assume he is busy finding out all
he needs to know and will tell the public when he'
does. '
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
)????
v;tT1TITCIVI
Approved For Release 200100Y0IffelA-RDP80-01601
0 MAR 1970
'Plug 'creditability g'a
agiclerrLc
STATINTL
s driscllosures
, By TED KNAP
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer
President Nixon put In effect today a policy
of fuller disclosures of U. S. air and ground
casualties in Laos la an effort to head off a
credibility crisis and convince the public that
Americans are not engaged in ground combat
there.
? In the midst of rising controversy over how
and how many Americans have died in Laos,
1White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Zieg-
ler announced last night the President had
.ordered that:
. ? The secretary of defense inform the
'American public about all losses of military
aircraft and their personnel over Laos after
the usual search-and-rescue operations are
completed.
? Any U. S. civilian, or military casualties
' resulting front hostile enemy ground action in
; Laos will be repotted publicly.
, These have not been reported in the past
except as an undisclosed part of U. S.? casual-
ties in South Vietnam.
Mr. Ziegler said the new policy "clearly'
shows the intent of the President to Inform the
'American people of the scope of U. S. involve-
ment in Laos, and his Intention to continue to
. keep the American people informed of U. S.
activities in Laos." ,
RELEASE NAMES
In line with that, the President ordered the
, State Department to release the names of six
civilians killed in Laos as a result of hostile
action since he became President in January,
1969.
Mr. Ziegler said three were killed by am-
bush, one by a bullet while piloting a helicop-
ter and two by hostile fire. A seventh Ameri-
can killed in Laos in 1969 was Capt. Joseph
? Bush,,..shot While returning fire duriug North
AN.A.L ? ?ii?A A -A f.4.,04-.6.4.?;*
Vietnamese commando raid on a Laotian Artil- 1
lery command post where he was serving as ?
military adviser.
The state department identified the ambush -
victims as Arthur Stillman and Dennis Mum-
mert. killed Aug. 5, 1969, and Chandler Ed- ?
wards, killed April 24, 1969. All three were
listed as employed by International Voluntary
Services, identified by the State Department '
as a private refugee relief and community de- '
velopment organization under contract to the ,
U. S. Agency for International Development
(AID).
J. C. Merkel was hit Feb. 18, 1970, while
piloting a helicopter; William J. Gibbs-died
May 13, 1969, in the crash of a helicopter hit
by hostile fire, and Ralph S. Davis died Aug.
19. 1969. in the crash of a light plane hitby
ground fire. Mr. Merkel, Mr. Gibbs and Mr.
Davis were listed as pilots for Air America,-
the charter service employed by AID and the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Next of kin were not Identified Immediately. '
It was over those casualties, and about 20
others that had occurred between 1962 and
1008, that the White House became enthroned
In a credibility controversy over the weekend.
?
Mr. Nixon had said in his report to the na-
tion Friday that "no American stationed in
Laos has ever been killed in ground combat ,
operations." Two days later, after newspapers I
had reported Capt. Bush's death, the White
House said that Capt. Bush and 26 civilians
had been killed or were missing as a result of
'hostile action" on the ground in Laos since
1962. The White House ins.sted they were not
? killed "in ground combat operations."
400 LINKED TO VIETNAM
? White House sources said the controversy
grew out of 'proportion to the relatively small ,
number of ground casualties. The White House
, had freely reported that nearly 400 Americans
had died, were missing or had been captured
In the air war over Laos, chiefly while bomb-
ing North Vietnamese troops and supplies
along the Ho Chi Minh Trail into South Viet-
nam.
Mr. Ziegler .said U. S. casualties resulting
, front "protective reaction missions" along the I
I border between ? Laos and South Vietnam will 1
i continue to be reported as part of the Vietnam
!war toll. because those activities are directly
Ve/atgd to that war.. ' ? ???
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 t CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/441AADP80-016
0 LiAa 1370
'
'
? ?
? ? !' ??e.'
? ?
t ? '"zt
? (- ??? ; ; Z _
)
tt:
0 ^1
, ?
?.? .ak
0 "The President has 011 ('IT(
I hat any casualties that reeult
frien hostile enemy actions of
personnel sled ioned in Lao::
will be reported. This refers fe
advisers, personnel involved in
? training and logistical support."
Ziegler said during 1969 ?
since the Nixon administration
. took office ? there tier? six
?civilians stationed in Laos in a
? supporting role who were killed
as a result of hostile action, lie
said the names of the six would
be released by the State Depart-
ment. ? ?
Two hours later, the Stale De-
partment disclosed the names of
the six men, three of whom were
identified as Air America pilots
and three as'membeira, of Inter-
national Voluntary Services.
They were Arthur Stillman
and Dennis Mummert, of IVS,
killed on Aug.. 5, 1939, in an
enemy ambush near Ban Nong
Heim: Chandler Edwards, of
IVS, killed in an enemy ambush
on April 24, 1939, at Ban Souk-
houma ; J. C. Merkel, Air
America pilot, killed Feb. 18,
when a sniper bullet struck his
helicopter over the Plain of
Jars.
William J. Gibbs, Air Ameri-
can pilot, !tilled near Nam Bac
on May 13, 1939, when his heli-
copter was struck by hostile
ground fire and crashed; and
Ralph S. Davis, Air America pi-
lot, killed on Aug. 19, 1939, when
the small fixed-wing plane he
was flying was struck by hostile
ground fire and crashed in the?
southwest part of the Plain of'
Jars
Air America is a contract
company which often has been
described as a covert operation-
al arm of the Central Intern-
acne? Agency. WS is a Peace
Corps-type organization general-
ly thought to have no connection
By JO07T GeLE.1lft7
sa;;;;dr1Vv:
',-??::'(- f. Nixon leis erder,ed the secrataries of stet:: and
defer .- i'a"otv a new peVey of reeertiee publicly all Americanpareeee2: c ' ''': ?.: ies aa. 1 ?,11'or:',11.1.eys in. I.,:...i.,1.
. a, ? ,:;.? ...oti,,. 0,, Lizqoa ? announced last night ? peri hilly
t. tel. e: ie l :..oy teat .ias shrouded U.S. operations
ie et : aieeiiceet eaia le iedem since le32.
i aom eetv ea, ;i a Unitea i
will report ptese leel ens- , 27 Listed an Lost
T n
"` 10'''''''' )" ''''')') I Zieeler node Itnown the new
at.s. seme tvay that ato,??-i "
?
ins dim J1) eelensed on the Viet- PolicY aftor "'II unusual elelaY 01.
nam war. nearly 21/2 hours in the regular a
- 0.ee ei"..licial referrea to the pan. White Ilouse news briefine.
Peesicieet's new poliey 011 L1:1:1 The lid was partially hued by
::?f "1.'1 iii5C1601?0," it iS ,, , ? ? , t? ?, -,or
lietee,,er, in, W.: S a.da Clear the aummistra ion its.,..1. C?LI.
taaase sec . the weekend wlien the, White
tare ;eleeele: L. Zieeler once House admitted that one U.S.
ee.eln eti,1 he could jive no dol- Army officer died and 23 isancri-
L7'': ?II 11""rmt.'11 t''''. thlit" can civilians were killed . 'or
cd ateett is spandiag in Laos
? ... .a... e any
missing in Laos due to "hostile
and di 3 ? .4 .1 ' ' ';' ?
ground action."
? change ie C.es repsece ? But the administration still
Dlostrd by Peleriglit : heal to the fine semiinatic point
i
to there is a cliffeeeliee lee-
Tee \aeite House statemeutt tw.:;en "hostile ground action"
came sfier a day oi Seente de-I an-ii American combat action.
bat:: C. U.S. invoiv-Lment in ale White House still insists
.....,: ,,h, .7!. no....i.... 1?0/ 10.
"C) that no American has ever been
D-....r.e, chairmen of the Fereagn killed in Laos during secure: ac-
Relations Committee, accused
the administration of "an awful
loI ef dueitieg and c.iodging in
Las.''
rtepub:lieriii Leader laugh Scottl
of Pateseivania said Democrats I
are leetang fee a political issue
in I?1;C- cleeate ever Laos.
Sen. Smart Symiree:on, D-Mo.,
I
said the echniaistratiea "is re-
leasieg bits and piccos of infor-
mation ei. Laos Which do not
glea an ea:a:eat? picture of the
wee tee ,:tse.e."
.l.,e. t.7"411 Cranston, D-Calif.,
aeld a. men:: of Ara erieaes had
tale tee: ,e.,:et weae eeat into o "Ile is directing the secretary
Leta.; Icon: faaiali Vtetaarn with of defense effective immediately d
ore,eea to n..y they had gotten to inform the American public
lost if ti%,:i were captlired. about all aircraft losses and mil- 1
'..C.ie 2res...lent:'s Cecision to re- itary air personnel casualties in e
Laos once the search and rescue
10050 inerc information 2.p. missions are comelete. In the h
p:areal to be a reaction to a
r:sieg ercseendo ef press inquir-
ar.d Senate attacks on the
, U.S. ii;yolvement in Leos. '
1 In she past, information about
}the US. role in Laos has been
: hei.;dlei72 a mici the ti:Mtost, possi-
; I-,:.- ?:or,,..irity, and all U.S. casual-
II; _ '.;,;;;%; 1..ave beim lumped
with i!:(,:x? in Southeast Asia as a
waole.
tion and that no ,golind combat
forces are stationed in Laos.
Nixon said in a statement re-'
leased Friday that 1,0-10
cans were stationed in Las in
a noncombat role. He said no
Americans stationed there had
ever been killed in ground com-
bat operations.
Ziegler said., last night, the I
purpose of the administration isi
to discuss completely the U.S.
tole in Laos and told reporters
the President is ordering the fel-
lowing procedures:
with U.S. intelligence opera-I
Lions.
Ziegler said that in addition to
these six men, one military offi-
cer, Army Capt. Joseph Bush,
ecribed as a military attache
at the embassy in Laos, was
tilled in February 1969 in an
xchange of fire with North Viet-
namese commandos. His death
ad been publicly confirmed by
the White House on Sunday.
In Temple, Tex., the widow
and parents of Bush said the
government never tried to keep
secret the location of the
25-year-old captain's death, the
Associated Press reported. ?
Carol Bush, 24, said she had
now "all along where Joe
as. ,And when he was killed tho
past, these losses have been part
of the Southeast Asia report.
o "Casualties resulting from
protective reaction missions
along the South Vietnam and
Laotian border and involving
U.S. personnel conducting opera-
tions in South Vietnam will con-I
tinue to be reported as a part of
the South Vietnam casualties I
, gov rn rae e
Ise far as I kntete to keea ee:e
that he had beer. Itir Lel in Leee.'
Ziegler :10:f.: the ecreeat or.
, this policy which e:le Prceeeeet
is stating today elearle eleewe
the Intent of the Pre:ea?et in
inform the American pesple
the scope of U.S. involvement
in Laos and his intention to keep .
the people informed of U.S. ac-
tivities in Laos."
It was disclosed over the
weekend by the adminiateation
that aircraft losses Le. Laos, Le-
eluding helicopters, have been
on the order of 400; It is abe
known that the number of Amer-
ican personnel missing or dead
in Laos since 1932 is about 400,
although these casualties have
been included in the Southeast
Asia casualty ? reports. nese
were air casualties.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01
STATI NTL
ASHVILLE., N:C.
CITIZEN
? 4'7,151
s 617.1-768
P 9 1
97
Curtain Still Covers
he Fighting In Laos ;
What worries most Americans
; about Laos, we think, is , that the
whole operation is so secretive as far
las U. S. participation is concerned.
Newsmen are barred from the bat-
tle areas, visitors are forbidden at the
ig U. S. base at Longch?eng,,and the
nlormation that is released continues
to insist that no U. S. ground troops
tare involved.
f. That may be technically true; the
American soldiers in Laos have been
detached from the Army's Special
Forces and assigned temporarily to
the Central ? Intelligence Agency,
Which run's the base and, we suspect,
.; the war.
t If that is accurate,.it is clearly in
"violation of the agreement that estab-
lished Laos as a neutral country.
President Nixon's Friday defense
? of the policy was timely and welcome
but it was incomplete. What is our
' purpose, other than the curbing of
infiltration from North Vietnam; what
is our long-range goal?
The truth is, Americans are sick
i. of frustrating wars in Asia. They have
learned that wars can be started, as
was the one in South Vietnam, by the
assignment of a handful of advisors.
They don't want a repeat perform-.
-ance in Laos.
T. D. Allman' of the . I44ir York
? Times?one of three reporters who
made an unauthorized trip to Leng-:
cheng recently (and was subsequent-I
? ?ly ordered out)?reports U., S. mili-', ?
tary men, in civilian clothing, riding!,
1 in open jeeps and carrying M-16 ri-
fles and handguns.
"The fact that they are tempoL,'
rarifly CI!,," says Allman,?"allows the!
U. S. government to say that it has
no soldiers fighting in Laos: But
?Americans supply, finance, direct!
and sometimes even participate in the
? fighting against- the Path?et Lao and'i
the North Vietnamese around the
plain."
The U. 8. activities plainly violatei
.,the 1962 Geneva accords . on Laos,
which forbid foreign military inter-
vention.
.1
We are not "kooks" on the sub-;
??ject; Laos may turn out to be a false
alarm and the United States may notl
be inextricably involved. But we don't
want the situation to reach the dan-
ger point, and certainly not by Ad-
ministrative decision. If the U. S. is:
ever again faced With the prospect of?
war, big or little, let the Congress de-1
? cid?e the degree of threat and !let the, ,
' Congress make a declaration.
? We blundered into Vietnam; we
don't want to stumble into a worse
situation in Laos.- We are sick of-
?
ng

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04$Ti141140P80-0
BOSTON, MASS. .
I GLOBE
toThLI - 237,967
S - 566,377
i MAR 9 1970
Pull Out of S.E. Asia Entirely, Says Mansfield I
By Darius Jhabvala
Globe Staff
WASHINGTON ? Sen-
ate Majority leader Mike
' :1VIansfield urged again yes-
terday a complete United
States withdrawal from
Southeast Asia since "our
- wider interests are not af-
. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.),
fected in any way."
? ? i chairman of the Senate
I: Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, on NBC's "Meet The
also claimed that President
Press" that he fears Viet-
:report to the nation on the
? Nixon did not give a full i
namization will lead to in-
definite war in Vietnam
' U.S. involvement in Laos,{ and Laos.
Particularly "the clandes-;
..\/
l the help of the CIA." cerned with " . . . the
Fulbright said he is con-
tine war being waged with; '
! basic policy of Vietnamiza-
?
The intentions of the ad-
ministration's response,
d Mansfield said, are "in
? keeping with the Guam
doctrine." Then he pointed
out that "we have gone be-
yond that by the use of ad-
- visers and of planes."
- At the same time Sen
i.'
: tion -- the prolongation of
"I think we should with-
I- the war in Vietnam and
draw from Southeast Asia, Laos indefinitely."?
'lock, stock and barrel, in- ?
1._ _ . Seri. Mansfield expressed
-- e
? eluding our bases. I do not doubt that the North Viet- ;
. see our wider interests inamese and the Pathet Lao, I
there affected in any way," !forces would advance fur- 1
, Mansfield said on CBS- !tiler south from the Plain .)
TV's "Face the Nation? of Jars which they cap- 1
program. j tured late last month from '
, i, the government forces. '
. On Laos, he insisted, as -) In any case, he said, the :
he did on the Senate floor independence of Laos "is ,
early last week, "We are not worth American
up to our necks . . . be- troops" and therefore "we
cause we've sent in aid,
We've sent in air' power.
We haven't sent in foot sol-
diers yet I don't think
we will ? whereas in Viet-
nam, I think we're in over
our heads."
The President's state-
Ment, issued in Key Bis-
cayne last Friday, he said,
"is frank. But I don't con-
sider it full by any means.
' "We are following the
same pattern there as in
,Vietnam. First, aid, then
'logistic support, then air
,intoLaw. .s. A.?
'power and then GIs --"I
don't think the GIs will go
?should get out of Laos." m
i However, Mansfield sug i
,?. gested support for the con
' tinuing 'air interdictions o ,
1 North Vietnam's supplies \
to South Vietnam via the ,4
,Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos. 1
? .1
, Vietnamization ' program
On the adminstrations'si
, ?
he said it "hold out prom,
1 Ise but I havfis my doubt
about about it." ';'..*: ? : . \ ' ? .
? ? ? ?
"The Only answer in
South Vietnam is a coali-
tion government," he de-
clared. ?
He also urged President
Nixon to appoint "someone,'
with stature" to the peace'.-
? talks in Paris in wake of'
the resignation .of Henry;
Cabot Loclge. *. ? .
"They (the Communist
side) won jvithany-,'
?
one with a lower rank. So
what do we have to lobe by
putting someone, o;
'tut?" he asked.. - ? "" ?
. '01
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : QIA-RDF'80-01601R000700050001-2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 ; CIA-RDP80-0.
CHICAGO, ILL.
NEWS
E 461,357
OR 9 1970
Nixon Laos
hints
paper

,
Lescala i?ion
' By Keyes Beech
Daily News Foreign Service
- VIENTIANE ? By going on stake
STATINTL
?
which God knows nobody
wants.
"Of course there is a third
way out. That is to pull up
I h Communists
1 record with details of U.S. sup- I have Laos. I don't think that's
'*port to Laotian Prime Minister 1 in our national interest.'
Souvanna Phouma's govern-
ment, President Nixon may . IN THE VIEW. of allied ob-
; have escalated what was an in- ' s e r v e r a the American in-
volvement into a commitment. c volvement has paid reasonable
! The President was careful to dividends at bargain basement
state there were no American :!! prices. n
, ground combat troops in Laos .4 , Here we have succeeded in
: and he had "no plans" to corn- ,,!' organizing a guerrilla force
: mit them. .that?so far?has more than
BUT THE thrust of the Pres-
'I'l held its own against the North
,
, ?
lident's statement was that he '%
Vietnamese. For once the
Is not going to let Laos go to
Communists find themselves in
'
the Communists. And if Hanoi '; the uncomfortable position of
,
chooses to accept that chal-
-. fighting a conventional war
lenge, Mr. Nixon may be
against unconvenponal forces
: ;:
; forced to make the agonizing ? ? the reverse image of South
1 choice of whether to commit 0,
? Vietnam..,
' U.S. troops or let Laos go. ? How much longer our guer- i
"Let's grant the sincerity of1 rillas ? mainly the Meo moun-
S e n a t o r s Fulbright, Sym- 'i,i, tam n tribesmen ? can hold out
ington, McGovern and others ,. under the current North Viet-
who are crincerned about ou6 namese buildup i is another
Involvement here," said an ii, matter. That is why American
American diplomat. "We don't ' air power is so vital.
want American ground troops ! Unquestionably, Thailand-
here any more than they j based American fighter-bomb
do. "The trouble is that there 'I ers have played a major, if not
Is an extreme reaction against `'f decisive, role in the stepped-up '
,
Vietnam. What they suggest is ;;war.
'that we drop everything. we I? '
1
.1' anticipated offensive against '
0 Gen. yang Pao's Meo forces. '
' The war is being run mainly '
by the CIA ? just. ,as it has
.been for-the last 10 years ?
,with the assistance of a motley ?
. collection of regular Army and 71
Air Force officers and ex-mili-
tary types whb like what they
are doing.
Of the slightly more than
2,000 . Americans here, about
1,100 are directly or indirectly
on the U.S. payroll. Of this.,
number about 600 are actively ,
engaged in the war. This num- ?
ber includes fewer than 200
CIA men, 75 Army "attaches," ',I v
150 Air Force "attaches" and a
3 0-m a n ' military advisory
group disguised as a "require-.'
crews of the so-called "CIA
It also includes pilots and ?,
ments office."
airlines" ? Air America and
Continental Airlines. The pilots
average about $25,000 a year ?
and, in their view, more than
earn it.
IN ATTEMPTING to justify
t h e American involvement,
'
U.S. officials point out that
only 26 Americans have been:1
killed in Laos since 1962. This
figure obviously does not in-
chide American airmen lost
over the Ho Chi Minh trail.
Even so, is Laos worth' that,
'much? Most. Americans,
think vo. But the deeisirsi is not ,r1
, 1 ?
EVEN HEAVIER U.S. air
are doing here. The other ex-.1
strikes will be required if ,the
treme is conventional mtary, ?
interventio9,,.a? ja, ,,vietnamv4iNerth Vietnamese. mount an.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
??1-?
CHIC
NEWS
w,oyEg.For Release 2001/03/04519WW80
E 461.'357
kg,R 9 Irn
CripeCTITDrillfrty
JI-
OH
By William J. Eaton
' Of .Our Washington Bureau
? WASHINGTON ? The White.
House has revived concern
about a credibility gap over
, the "secret war" in Laos by its
'belated confirmation that an
Army captain was killed in a
battle with North Vietnamese
commandos early in 1969.
President Nixon said flatly
in a Laotian "white paper" on
Friday that "no American sta-
tioned in Laos has ever been
killed in ground combat oper-
ations."
4. Deputy press secretary Ger-
ald L. Warren insists that the
' ? death of Capt. Joseph Bush
was not a result of ground
? combat.
BUSH, WHO was listed as an
assistant military? attache in
' the U.S. embassy but served
as a military adviser to the
Royal Lao Army near the
! Plain of Jars, fired his M-16
' rifle at the North Vietnamese
attackers.
A copyrighted story in the
Los Angeles Times said he
killed one raider before Corn-
j munist bullets nearly cut him
? in half.
Yet the White House insisted
this was not "ground combat
operations" because the Red.
attack occurred about 10 miles
from the main battle area.
but
acted to protect other
Americans in the compound,
Warren said.
THE PRESIDENT was not
aware of Bush's death when be'
made the statement that no
American stationed in Laos
had been killed in ground corn;
bat, Warren said.
A White House official also
acknowledged for the first
time that 26 American civil-
ians have been killed or are
missing as the result of "hos-
tile actions" in Laos.
These actions may have in-
cluded Communist ambushes
and long-range artillery at-
tacks, he added. Some of these
"civilians" ? most apparently
employed by the Central In-
telligence Agency (q6,10- ?
also may have been sail, after
enemy fire downed U.S. heli-
copters engaged in the Laotian
fighting.
Mr. Nixon's statement ?
and the on-the-record and
background statements by
White House officials ? may
give Democrats in Congress an
opportunity to attack the Nixon
' administration's credibility:
A White House official ?
who declined to 'be quoted by
name ? said Friday that no
American military adviser to
the Laotian armed forces had
been killed in ground combat.
itteiratle=
were missing, as a mutt ot
MS. bombing and air-support
v missions of Laotian' forces
since the war in Laos resumed
? about seven years ago.
Less than 50 of this total, the
official said, were civilians em-
ployed by the U.S. government
or by companies under contract
? to the U.S. government. The
' phrases are regarded in Wash-,
ington as euphemisms for the
CIA?which is widely acknowl-
edged to be the American'
, 'agency responsible for the "se-
. cret 'war". in , the' huidloc.ked
#1111 do
i1
,
t;
4DP80-01601R000700050001-2
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2009t04:X1W-RDP80-01
47 MAR 1970
Nixon admits Yank died'...'.'
1,n hostile action in Laos
By Tom Littlewood
Sun-Times Correspondent ,
MIAMI?The White House admitted official-
.: ly Sunday that an American Army officer was
i?? killed by North Vietnamese commandos last
t. year on the Plain of Jars in Laos.
t But Gerald L. Warren. deputy news secre-
? tary, insisted President Nixon had not been
informed of the incident and was not 'deceii-
ing the American people last Friday whet he
?7- .
Story of U.S. captain's death.
Page 4.
White house made a rut:lice!: of "agency
' .records.." According to his version, Capt.'?
'"ush was in his quarters hi a command post
?:npound when the North Vietnamese cornti
mandos attacked.
Defending others In the compound, Capt.!!?:
'!.) Bush "exposed himself to pnemy tire and was it
"killed," the. 'deputy news Secretary related.
,IThe captain did fire back before being hit,
\l!,/arren. said. ?
_Because. the American was. defending othj
his death was the result of "hostile ac-?
tind net "ground combat operations" In
e sense that the President used. the. term,.?
arren explained.
L. . ? 1 Reporters were informed by White House i
.---- :. ?
,'. issued a policy statement reporting that no -: lources that 25 American eivillans?have been,
_ ? -
! American stationed in Laos has ever been 1
killed in ground combat operations.
Mr. Nixon's spokesman said the statement,
jir still stood. Warren considered it. importanV.
i;
%. that the mtlitary attache, or adviser, Capt. -:
l':? Joseph Bush, exchanged shots with the enemy.,
% "In a Laotian compound .10 miles behind what.
e.; he described as the "expected line ,of?ecinw..?
f'? bat."
*
(' Guerrilla warfare throughout South Viet-
nam and neighboring Laos has not been char-',.
rA.:acterized by normally defined lines ' of cont.,.
"bat. ? ? .
10.
0:' Capt. Bush's death on Feb. 10,% 190, was
. .
',..disclosed Sunday in a story by free lance,
1,
j writer Don A. Schanche in a . Los Angeles ?'...
i? Times story appearing' on Page, 4 of this ,
-.edition.
Warren was questioned about the credibility...,
l; implications of the Bush story Shortly before.
the President concluded a restful weekend at .
,his Key Biscayne (Fla.) home and ,flew back' 17.
i to Washington Sunday. ? '
After, the. story, appearecV.,.VItr.ran.?
1, 10 ...le., v"..14...s ? .? ?
, killed .or missleg In Laos because of am-
bushes, long-range 'artillery attacks, and oth-
er hostile action. Most or these are assumed
agents of the Central Intelligence Agency act-
ing in the guise of tellilliff
Capt. Mush flies becomes the first U.S.
ground combet soldier whose death in Laos Is
. recognized. ?
.? A ?high administration official, elaborating
lon. Mr. Nixon's Laos statement Friday, ex-:
:.pittirted that approximately 400 American air=.
men had been killed or reported, missing in
...Laos operations; but none in ground combat.
ater, it ? W118 said that the 400' figure included.
',..sOmething.less than 50 civilians.,
',The administration efficialiwho' endeavored .1
LA0/1 statoMont Would not boAdontlflok..:1,-,i'...;;;
....la interpret 'the 'meaning of the -President's,.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: C1A-RDP80-01601R0007000'50001-2
fie-N
Uji
STATINTL
Approved For ReleasedKRIMMOR54 MADR4DP80-016
9 mar 1970
ces
-? By Marilyn Berg,cr i was secretary of state and his brother ? The U.S. started arming and train-
Istews:tay Diplomatic Correspondent ; Allen headed the CIA, the agency had, mg the IVIco tribesmen as early as
-
? The popular image of the CIA oper-j a relatively free hand, and in Laos, it ,1960.. Yet it was the recent disclo .-.u re .
' ative usually comes straight from the'did a lot' ""'''n thangather intelligence that the U.S. was arming the Meos,
' movies: a slightly soiled trench coat, a ' and recruit local agents.
. that helped trigger the current uproar
unsettled country. In an effort to dis. of the 1,040 Americans admitted to be '
For years now, the Central Intelli- pel the apathy, dissension and lack of -working in Laos scene reportedly are '
wilco Agency has played a covert role
- -- --- - .omi nunist Lao, the CIA ap
C parently' The army is headed by Maj. Gen.-
; o r g a n i z a t i o n among the non- with the tribal army. .
tough ?tribesmen with a particular
: turned-up collar, sunglasses. But in It .was in 1957 that the agency grudge against the North Vietnamese,
Laos, at least, the reality is apt to be started exerting noticeable influence on
fellow in a sport shirt. the political affairs of that perennially,' against U.S. activities in Laos. Many .
i
less James Bond and more a clean-cut
i
.. in the twilight war of Laos. (Some call 'helped organize the Committee for the Vang Pao, a Laotian military COM-,..
?
it a nonwar in a noncountry.) 1116 ?tnander . In northeastern Laos who.
For ;Defense of National InterestS. :
) , years, the agency's undercover activity ;committee described itself as a mass
his people in line by force of .
7. has been known, but its role has '..patriotic organization, rather than a keeps
''. somewhat changed. political party, which favored civil .leadership and also by having one wife
In the more free-wheeling days,
- .
:service reforms and a 7'hard" linei for each of the four tribal areas. The
; there was the chance to set up strong- gi'l glinst the Communist Ilatli.et Lao. wicos ?have been successful in their
'
battles beyond any expectation and.. .
The o m in u n is t a considered .its have. become a significant ,thorn in the..
fill up money bags to buy votes. But members "lackeys" to American inter-';side of Hanoi. It is believed that the.?
now, the CIA, through its agents in , ests, and it appeared that the organiza-;North Vietnamese have made elimina- ,
'their sport shirts, apparently is 'train-.1:. tion's dependence on the CIA ulti- 'tion of yang Pao and his tribesmen)
jag and equipping an army of Meo -Tnateli lent some truth to that. . !one of the goals in their current Lao-4
tribesmen. ...
The committee laecame the step.' tian offensive.
men, polarize political forces and even Th C
?
1. The fact that the "spies," or
"spooks" as they are semi-affection- ?
was so closely tied to the CIA that he he CIA and how it grew in Laos is,::
ladder for a future Laotian leader who
.ately called in government lingo, are : n an ironic way, almost-a success:,
involved in training an army, a job.... was known to its agents as "our boy.".; story which runs from the error of:
that might be expected to fall to the .
PhOutni was, by all reports, a patriot! trying to set up a western-type army' ,
...'That leader was Phouini Nosavan.
' Pentagon, is not entirely sinister,. Ever .;.. . with a military strong man in Phoumi :
since the signing of the Geneva accords.
country, but he was not above accept... Nosavan to the arming of a highly able
h.; who genuinely sought to develop the ,
i. ing huge sums from ?a foreign power.: guerrilla warrior,. Vang Po. What is'.
ii,,?:Phounii was so valuable that the CIA happening in Laos now, one informed :.
in 1962, the U.S. has sought to main."..
thin the fiction that it is abiding by the''.'
rules, and that means keeping out' i'iource said,. 'is what. should 'have..15cen*
American troops. The last four Presi-1
?. rigged the 1960 election in his favor:1 .40ne in Yiet.treh.?:.,.... it.:31 , %tr-'.ai-J.-Gi"?1'
_
If Laotian politica were confused,:'
dents felt that the accords, which the; ? .
there was something of a match within'
U.S. accuses Hanoi 'of being the first to, ''.
. the American cliploinatie community:. .
:violate, could best be restored pearances, at least, were observed. i f . ap.!.L
1 in Laos. The ambassador was never .,
.., ,. .'
Those within the government who;
sure that 'he was in charge of his Own
?
are sympathetic to that view are mission, and in many cases. was Sure
'
that he was not. The CIA was forever,';, -
,41eeply concerned about the current; .
for greater activism. Its rigents'?'., ..
congressional uproar over U.S. in-1 pushing
"free-wheeled it," in the words of oiari
.volvenient in Laos. They say that con-I '
gressional leaders, as well as tiro, informed source, ? ncl.''..engineer'e'd a,?!...
members of the Senate and House coup. And then another one six
committees dealing with the CIA months later.
armed services and appropriations'
11
have known for years what was going;
on in Laos. They say that the activity,
was funneled through the CIA not to'.
keep it secret from the- American;
people but rather' to preserve the
necessary facade - for ' international:
diplomacy. '
Of course, it was not only for tlidi?
sake of appearances that the CIA did!
'the job in the old days. In the Dulles-'
?mato. ors. when John loster:Dulles1
.;
Pheumi had begun to count on the
CIA, which had chosen him (NOT .
vanna Phouma. But just when Phoumi
really needed help, the CIA began feel-
ing a clampdown ordered by President',
..Kennedy because .of the Bay of Pigs
fiasco., In Laos, where Winthrop Brown*
;was ambassador, the CIA was forced
:4o argue its cases through. channels:,
..Pfflcials say that. the' reins have been. .
t:ght over shwa, ?
?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80' 01601R000700050001-2
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R0
-
HONOLULU , HAWAII
STAR-BULLETIN
E 115,698
S - 166,171
MAR 9 1970
Credibility, and Laos
Almost from the beginning of our involvement in Southi
, Vietnam, the Johnson administration suffered from ac red- about 400 over the six years,-including 193 individuals pre-
ibility gap. Partly it could not be helped; the military com-i sumed captured or listed as missing.
manders of a nation at war do not telegraph their punches. I Furthermore, said Mr. Nixon, and these are his words,
. But it resulted also in large part because of President he has "no plans for introducing ground combat forces into
, Johnson's penchant for secrecy and because he did not Laos."
take Congress into his confidence. This resort to technicalities of language in an effort to
This latter lack was perhaps most productive of all in stay within the framework of fact may in the end set the,
stretching the gap so far as the general public was con- same kind of trap for Mr. Nixon as his predecessor set for
cerned. Even some members of Congress who voted for himself. If what we are doing in Laos is the concern of the
the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, preeminently among American peoiale ? and of course it is ? why are Amen-
them Sen. J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, chairman of can newsmen barred from entering the combat zones? /
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, claimed they had The American involvement, the CJA,'.5., army of merd-
? been duped. naries hired to fight the Communist Pathet Lao and now,
Since leaving office Johnson has claimed that the.reason I
he asked for the Resolution, which authorized him to take
all steps necessary to prevent "aggression," was that he,
feared a declaration of war might project Red China into
the conflict. He has pointed out that certain treaties
tween China and North Vietnam might have automatically{
made China a. combatant, whether it wished to be or not.;
But, taking the former President at his word, the fact re-i
mains that the country as a whole did not realize the ex-,
?
tent to which it had been committed until it had become an
, South Vietnat,n? That
is the question that the President,
accomplished fact. Then the din of protest rose louder and
louder
p lost the presidential election. ooner or later, must
arty answer. ,
presumably, the invading North Vietnamese, who are sup-
posed to have 67,000 troops in the country, has been going
on for a long time. But under the terms of the Geneva
agreement we were not supposed to be there, so it was not
admitted in Washington, that we were.
In his message Mr. ,Nixon appealed to the Soviet Union
to use its good offices with Hanoi to refrain from aggravat-
ing the situation. The record of such appeals with respect
to South Vietnam is such that we can hardly rely on the
Russians to help us now. Are we or are we not going to
fight to save
louder until finally Johnson was forced from office and his Laos from the Communists, as we did in
It would seem that, with his predecessor's disaster so' ? .
freshly before him, and because of his own undisputed sa-
gacity, President Nixon would take all steps necessary to
avoid a credibility gap of his own with respect to Laos. Yet 1
in some respects the Laos situation is worse than Vietnam I
was in the beginning, some five years ago.
In a 3,000-word statement issued Friday, Mr. Nixon said
reports that Americans are engaged in ground fighting and
that increased U.S. air combat in Laos is escalating that
conflict are "grossly inaccurate." Yet the fact is that, re-
gardless of the degree of fighting or escalation, the Presi-
dent was officially confirming for the first time what has
been an open secret for months ? that Americans are
fighting in Laos. ?
In a further obvious contradiction, Mr. Nixon declared
that, as evidence that Americans are not "directly" in-
volved in combat operations, "no American stationed
ixi
Laos has ever been killed" in six years. by the enemy.
But at the same time the White House confirmed that
American- casualties in the air _over, Laos have risen to
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80,-016
LOS AN1/4117.LES, CAL.
fruEs
STATI NTL
- Q4 4,782.
S - 1,2,556
MA 01C70
WAR IN THE LAND OF UNANpRY
, Since gainin.g inAiependence in 1953, Laos : States continued within the framework of
has sought only. oeurity. A writer anew.. the Geneva Agreement to supply military
' called the gentle, friendly Laotians "the ? equipment and supplies . . . and reconnais-
world's last unangry men." . ': Bence flights."
I Unfortunately, the country was given a But there was more. U.S. advisers were
front-row, center seat in Southeast Asia: . sent into Laos. The Central Intelligence
: Laos borders China, North and South .. Agency financed the establishment of a
1 Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma. . mercenary army of Meo tribesmen and set
iDespite international agreements signed in. .j up headquarters in Long Cheng.
; Geneva in 1954 and in 1962 which pro- 1 The Pentagon claims there are only 1,040
, claimed its neutrality, Laos is now the site of ' U.S. government employes living in Laos,
i a war involving the United States and North 1 and asserts that none are Military personnel.
f
, Vietnam. But many others commute (from Thailand) , v?
: Who is violating the Geneva accords, . .and CIA men and former Green Berets have ?
i North Vietnam or the United States? The been seen in action advising Laotian 1
i answer, most observers agree, is both? commanders. Sen. Robert C. Byrd (D-W.
I although both deny it. '' Va.) recently said he had heard reports "that
The Geneva accord of 1962 was signed by IAmerican advisers are all but running the.
OA countries, including the United States -Laotian forces."
and North Vietnam. (The United States did
? Newspapermen who slipped in unnoticed:'
,
; not sign the 1954 agreement.) to the CIA ,base at Long Cheng reported. ki
The treaty stipulated the terms under .
seeing ?arme Americans in civilian clothes.. V
1i which the three-member International Con- ;
. Even if the United States has no combat,
troops in Laos, the presence of these'
. advisers is a violatioft, since the accord
- specifies that the ban on "foreign military
trol Commission (Canada, India and Poland)
i would enforce and observe the withdrawal
of "foreign military personnel" from Laos.
, The United States pulled out its advisers
? before the October, 1962, deadline. More personnel;" includes "members of .foreign
than a month later, the ICC reported that military missions, foreign military advisers,
only 40 North Vietnamese troops had filed , technicians, observers . . . and foreign
civilians."
The U.S. bombing raids are :also a
violation. They have two functions: In:
southeastern Laos, to hinder infiltration by
North Vietnam into South Vietnam, And in
northeastern Laos, to aid Laotian ,-?troops.
North Vietnam now has 67,000 troops in the
country, according to the Pentagon, and has
taken over most of the fighting from the
?Pathet Laos. . ?
For years, the United States. would not',
admit that it was bombing inside Laos. In
December, President Nixon admitted-, that
the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos was being hit,
but only, he said, to strengthen the Position,
? past its checkpoint. Others slipped out
secretly. But in all, an estimated 10,000 were
left behind, a clear violation.
The Geneva Agreement also established a
tripartite government, representing factions
of the right, left and center. Neutralist
Prince Souvanna Phouma headed the
envernment.
t' Within two years, it fell apart when-thel
four left-wing Pathet Lao representatives
withdrew. Soon, the Pathet Lao guerrillas, ?
backed by North Vietnamese troops, at-
tacked government-held positions.
The Pathet Laos were experienced fight-
ers. having battled right-wing Laotian forces
(financed Ivy the United States) throughout of U.S. troops in South Vietnam. ,
,the late 1950s. The Geneva Agreement of
1962, Bernard Fall wrote, "left Laos as
divided as ever . . . but with the key
difference that the pro-Communist Laotian
forces were 20 times larger and much better ?
trained and equipped than in 1059."
? tered the country first.
The rebels soon captured the Plain of Jars ' Two wrongs have not made a right in Laos.,
' The United States justifies its aid 9n thea
grounds that Premier Souvanna tequestedi
the help. Souvanna, himself, said last week
that U.S. assistance was not a violation'
because the North Vietnamese troops en-, '
and threatened to cut off the administrative I But they have helped make a war.
capital of Vientiane from the royal capital of - ? ? .-STEVEI HARVNYI
4,a
Luhang Prabang.
In the spring of 1964, a State Department, ;
/bulletin says, Souvanna requested "addition-
?al US. military assistance,* and,uthe United,
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
STATINTL
Approved For Release 20.01/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700
MIAMI, FLA.
NEWS
E ? 93,538
?000..MAR 1970
6/6 Americans in Laos.
Shades of Vietnam!
President Nixon's weekend
statement on Laos went only a
short way toward answering the
nation's growing concern that -
we are headed for another.
Vietnam.
Even h i s appeal to the
I eading nations of the 1962
Geneva conference, Britain and
the Soviet Union, for assistance
in settling the Laotian problem
did not go the whole route. A
number of concerned U.S.
Senators, including Majority
Le oder Mike Mansfield, had
urged that the 14-nation
conference be re-convened, but
the President's request fell short
of that proposal.
The f a c t? is that the 1962
accords have been broken freely
by both North Vietnam and the
United States. Still, our bombing
of t h e Ho Chi Minh trail,
through which North Vietnam
infiltrates troops, and about'
IVR.. Nixon made SO much
? in his statement, is not really at
issue in the current debate.
The trail has been bombed
f o r years, for good military
reason, and without serious
complaint from the Senate.
,The issue is the extent of our
involvement in the Plain of Jars
operation, for example, and in r
protecting the existing Laotian
government. There ,seems little
doubt, from eyewitness reports,
that 41a.C.11....ik rather heavIl
involved and that our airplanes
are being used extensively.
Nor did the President address
himself to: another challenge
posed in the Senate, which was.
to s tate his authority for '
conducting military operations
in Laos.
Mr. Nixon sounded less than
candid in the carefully worded,
sentences he used to sum up- our'
military presence. He said there
are no "American ground com-
bat troops" in Lags, and that we
have no plans for intioducing
"ground combat troops." He said
the number of Americans "direct-
ly employed" by the U.S. Gov-'
rnent is 616.
It is chilling to recall that in
1959, there were only 692
American "military advisers" in
South Vietnam. In 1962, when
P r,e sident Kennedy was
questioned about his plans to
increase that number to 4,000,
he replied that although we were
increasing our . assistance,.. "we
have not sent combat troops in
the generally understood sense
Of, gutt '
What t h e public wants to
know today is our overall policy
regarding Laos. Aside from our
obvious interest in the Ho Chi
Minh trail, why are we operating
there and how deeply are we
committed to assist the Laotian
government? ,
We had hoped for a better
explanation of those larger
questions than we got from Mr.
ixon this' weekend.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01001R000700050001-2
NEWS mac
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/041.4aRROP80-01601R000 -
THE WAR IN VIETNAM
Agsoeinted Prose
The Laos Scenario
Edgar Buell slept in his dust-soiled
clothes every night last week in Sam
Thong. Up there on the southwestern
rim of the Plain of Jars in Laos, Buell
cannot go to bed sure that war won't
suddenly land on his doorstep. "I've
been run out nineteen times before," he
explained. A stoic 57-year-old U.S. AID
worker, "Pop" Buell has devoted the
past ten years to getting American relief
shipments to a region that switches own-
ership between the Communist Pathet
Lao and the U.S.-backed Royal Laotian
Government with the coming of just
about every dry season and the begin-
ning of each monsoon.
For the moment, the tumbledown out-
post at Sam Thong and its dirt airstrip
were still a score of miles away from the
vanguard of a Communist strike force of
some 6,000 North Vietnamese regulars.
But the Plain of jars itself had already
fallen. And despite a heavy pounding
by the U.S. Air Force, including B-52
strategic bombers, the swiftness of the
determined Communist advance had
thrown the Laotian Government's forces
into a rout.
What was even more unsettling was
that the North Vietnamese who seized
the plain kept right on rolling. Muong
Soul, 25 miles west of the plain, was
quickly overrun, giving the Communists
control of Highway 7, the country's main
east-west artery. Probing forces also cap-
tured the saw-toothed ridge of Phou
Kout, which has been dubbed Steel
Mountain by the Pathet Lao because
it has been bombed and shelled so often.
And Pathet Lao skirmishers in front of
the main North Vietnamese force were
spotted preparing for an attack on Long
Chieng, the not-so-secret, CIA-financed
elandestinApplidVekiltRtgrsRe lease.
A.oclated Preng
Wounded Mco soldier (left) and leveled Plain of Jars: Will the rules change?
Yet not even a flood of reports of seri-
ous government defeats succeeded in
arousing Vientiane, the torpid little ad-
ministrative capital of Laos. And al-
though Laotian Premier Souvanna Phou-
ma held a Cabinet meeting last week, the
commander in chief of the Royal Army,
Gen. Ouan Ratikhoun, disported him-
self on a tennis court. "The only time the
war comes to Vientiane," yawned an In-
dian trader, "is when the Bangkok news-
papers conic in on the afternoon plane."
Rules: Drowsy Vientiane may be
right. This is because warfare in Laos
has always been conducted in accord-
ance with rigid rules. Thus, if the Com-
munists follow their well-thumbed sce-
nario for dry-season offensives, they will
soon call a halt to regroup and resupply
their men. Then, by the customary
shooting script, the government should
counterattack soon after the monsoon
rains fall in June. Customarily, North
Vietnamese capture only the territory
they feel they need to protect the Ho
Chi Minh Trail to South Vietnam. It is
conceded that Hanoi, with 48,000 men
in Laos, could quickly take over the en-
tire country?but does not do so to avoid
provoking a U.S. military response.
To the Nixon Administration, such an
equation of forces can only prompt wor-
ries that the Communists might have de-
veloped a new scenario that does not in-
clude halting their offensive. "If the
Communists try to keep going, it be-
comes another ball game," a high official
in Washington warned. "And they are
about at that point right now."
That the U.S. is already deeply in-
volved militarily in Laos is, by now, no
secret. Despite official protestations re-
peated last week by Defense Secretary
Melvin Laird, the U.S. lost still more
credibility when newsmen managed to
penetrate Long Chiang H anditTo.41 at ? e /RAW 2.5aGkAaRF
601R000700050001-2
lation of the 1962 Geneva agreements on:
Laos which bar the presence of foreign
fighting men. But then, U.S. denials are
not intended to fool the other side, be-
cause the Communists, who violate the
same agreements on a massive scale, are
not going to complain.
The Administration's refusal to come
clean is, however, stirring up trouble in
the U.S., where an angry Senate last
week protested that the President was
exceeding his constitutional authority by
double-talking the U.S. into another war
in Asia. "Laos has become an arena
? for the repetition of the mistakes of our
? Vietnamese involvement," charged Mary-
land's GOP freshman Sen. Charles McC.
Mathias Jr. And another Republican,
Sen. John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky,
may have set the Senate on a collision'
course with the White House by promising
amendments blocking all funds for Laos
?a measure that the majority of senators
may very well approve.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0
NEW YORK POST
9 Mar 19/0
Krim n a)711
atih,Erro Ex2et [
By WARREN HOGE ,
N.Y. Post Correspondent
\WASHINGTON ? The
credibility of President
Nixon's word and the
vaunted efficiency of his
staff have been shaken by
the disclosures of facts at
odds with his weekend
explanation of U. S. in-
volvement in Laos.
The White House said
t oday the President's
claim that no Americans
stationed in Laos had ever
been killed in ground
combat operations still'
stood, but Administration
spokesmen were obliged?
. to turn semantic tricks to
keep it on its feet.
Confirming a story in
the? Los Angeles Times
yesterday, press spokes-
man Gerald Warren said a
U.S. military adviser,
Capt. Joseph Bush, had
, been killed in Laos by
,North Vietnamese corn-
,mandos in an assault on a
command post in Febru-
. try, 1969.
But, Warren said, his
, death did not constitute a
combat fatality because it
' occurred 10 miles behind
"a line of combat."
? Bush, he continued, died
from "hostile action," as
opposed to combat. Bush had
; grabbed a weapon and was
defending t h e compound
command center against in-
vaders at the time he was
killed, a defensive act that
the White House argued
differed from the kind of
aggressive act the word
"combat" connotes.
Warren, the deputy White
House press secretary, was
. standing in for Ronald Zieg-
,ler, who was in the Baha-
nouse telephone encouraging
reporters .to come to Key
Biscayne to cover the Presi-
dent's Laos statement, issued
by the Winter White House
Friday.
A large number of report-
ers responded to the bid and
flew down to Florida with
the President Thursday
night. They were on hand
Friday for the statement. But
they were also on hand yes-
terday for the fumbling
aftermath.
Warren made no effort to
conceal the White House dis-
tress. The news story detail-
ing the circumstances of
Bush's death was brought to
the Administration's atten-
tion In the early hours yes-
terday,' and "a number of
people" were contacted, he
said.
A thorough check of all
records of American person.
nel in Laos was ordered. It
turned up the account of
Capt. Bush's death and docu-
mentation of the deaths
"from hostile action" of 24
civilian American officials
and one American dependent
since July, 1962, Warren said.
He listed ambushes, heli-
copter crashes and long-range
artillery fire as among the
hostile actions that might
have accounted for their
deaths. He would not say if
any of the 25 had been asso-
? elated with the CIA, the U.
governmental arm reported'
to be deeply involved in the
Laotian conflict.
. Nixon knew of the 25 cases
at the time he made his Laos
statement, Warren said. But
the Chief Executive appar-
ently did not consider their
deaths the result of "ground
combat operations."'
Nixon, however, did not
,
know of . Capt. Bush's death
until yesterday's newspaper
account, Warren saict.
staff procedUre so highly
touted by Administration
spokesmen founared on that
one.
mas il)rAPPVGAYedeftir. RNMARZWAgil9i
s 0 C IA-,RDP80-01601 R000700050001-2
Ziegler had spent most of
STATINTL
' back. In earlier episodes, the no,. support a war t a wa
1President's aides have failed not fully explained to them.
to: ? There is evidence, however,
(IDIscover the extensive that the Administration has
I
been humbled by ? the latest
Clement Haynsworth be- experience. Asked if the
financial dealings of Judge
fore sending his name up white House was satisfied
' to the Oval Office as a can- now that it had researched
didate for the Supremo ' and revealed all, Warren re-
Court.
, plied wearily, "I cannot stand
tj Warn him that the inn-' '
'up here and flatly say there
guage of his orignal re- .:.are no more eases."
w
nf Lai nrec ddlido nn to f cl egaerrin; cover
,1 ? agents called toxins, which.
which ' make up a large
part of the U. S. bacterb.
?logical warfare arsenal.
el Tell him that the newly
. vocal consumer constitu.
ency would not stand for
a part-time representative
like Good Houskeepltig's
Willie Mae Rogers, Nixon's
first choice for the new
post now occupied full-,
time by Mrs. Viriginia
Knauer. ? ?
4] Uncover in advance the
white supremacy speech
and her racially motiv-
ated actions of his current
Supreme Court nominee,
Judge G. Harrold Carswell.
q Sound out Capitol Hill'
critics of the Administras
tion's designated draft di-
rector, Charles DiBona Who
was dropped from consicl. '
ation after several key
senators objected to him.
redibility Damaged
The latest oversight has
caught the President square
on his credibility, a particu-
larly vulnerable spot.
Throughout the campaign,
Nixon scored' former Presi-
. dent Johnson for not leveling
.with the people and in his
, most recent statement on
I Vietnam, Nixon declared that
I the American imaple.shOuld
,,,? .ik.? ..kl,111
?
?
t
Thursday on the. White
???11,
?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601
???????- - ? --.?????
SAN FRANCISCO,
1 CHRONICLE
I U - 430,233
AR 19/0
Movco Li 0 0??????????????????????44.~##Nt,
I;
The ar Changes
Remains the Same'
ITN THE SUMMER OF 199 the candidate Rich-1
ard Nixon sensed the Vietnam war. was a lost.;;
cause which had already ruined a President, and
..began cautiously to talk about ending it.
He said he had a plan, but he prudently didn't,.?
; expound it. He was versed in the endless verdicts of it
history that wars are easier to
start than to end. The American
people were also getting this idea,.
and they were willing to give
'Nixon a chance, since his Oppo?
7nent was too little and too late
with a like promise. ?
On taking office, Mr. Nixon dis-.
covered the war contained unfOre=
seen problems, but he rode a wave. '1
of suspended judgment while he probed the option,i
? as we like to say. '
- The national demand for a solution and thei
President's only partly discloSed solution, almost.
collided during the demonstrations last fall, but like
a highway sideswipe which misses, the President
I:righted the machine with. some token withdrawals:
His phrase-makers hit on two rather lirnp concepts
in extenuation' of delay, Called the silent majorityj
and Vietnamization.
* * * 1
LTHE FIRST PRESUM n
ED a .mass 'support of the
Nixon Vietnam plan which was too shy to talk':
..about it, and the second was .a self-dissolving con,'-'
cept; that is, it offered no solid promise of a Solution,1
rand time was bound to erode it. ? , .
?
STATI NTL
? . 1 ?
?THE QUALIFICATION is i m po rtant bemuse,
. .1 though the word "peace" is still. current, neither!
the President nor anyone else can establi-th that;
American disengagement would bring "peace' . to+
southeast c. Asia. - ' r . ?? .4 ? ? ?
? r
For warsr as they proceed, whelp problems In.
t,
. violence which remain after ,the -original war is shi.W
'down. The problems emerge at war's end, or in a'
year or two, and we have all ,seep it, and are seeing it,
1. in the Mideast today. . i
, ?s
One of the problems now' bedeviljng Mr. Nixon 1
I lies in Laos, a feudal kingdom adjacent to the Viet-!
. names. The North Vietnamese are taking advantage
of geography to. infiltrate Laos as a hedge against
whatever may occur during continued Americant .
withdrawals.
, The Central I elligence Agency 'follows Its
bent in fomenta ' i and In committing Americati
forces in Laos, thus making "policy" which Mr. Nix-
on Was scheduled to discuss over the week-end. Buti
no 'matter what "policy" the President has enunciat- i
.1 ed, the Laos problem remains for him and for all of,
j us immense, since the CIA, and not he, controls it. '
j Mr: Nixon cannot treat it with candor. t '
..:
i. Candor is not a byproduct of faraway wars of 1
J adventure, in which a Nation With a bad conscience-
doesn't know what it's doing, or how what it does::;
may involve 'it further; In the aggregate, such blinit
I'dabblings' in history are at least as pernicious to the'
human,conditiOn as naked aggressibn. :' : " ??.'...1'.? '.,.:.? 1
6 ,,, ' ii,,,,:.$4,ifi,t,,,,,;.i.-..intrat..rt.n.: ? L.....'S.iZti,:....M.--,iftu. '
444,4:1:6, 411.i.4?4,,re? ,, 4.' i; ?:. Miri roll 0 1 QP7
" C.'' ' ? ..; ?jiA
Yet during the winter Washington .oliservers '
thought the President bore a charmed life ? the
antiwar aelivitists appeared: to have lost steam.:
r Whatever plans the President had went 1 heir routine
; way, and congressional critics were unable to mar-
shal a united front. Senator Muskie might complain
:...that at the Nixon rate of withdrawal the war' would
go on for years, but both , the President and the
!.doubters managed to juggle unresolved idea i? **hi
had little. bearing on the' physical issuO:Of f!..v.ar
peace (Or the Arnericans):.
: *. ON4
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 .: CIMRDP80,01601R000700050001-2
TIME
Approved For Release 2001/03/0411ACIAZAWAY6
THE WORLD
Laos: Deeper Into the Other " a r
DELENTLESSIN, almost at will,
Communist North Vietnamese and
nutlet Lao troops advanced last week
against Laotian government forces. As
they swept forward, concern mounted
among U.S. officials. On Capitol Hill,
? critics of the U.S. involvement in South-
east Asia protested that Washington
seemed to be plunging deeper into .Laos
just as it was pulling back from Viet
-Nam?though of course the U.S. com-
mitment in Viet Nam is incomparably
larger. The Administration denied the
charges. but the evidence appeared to
confirm them (see box following page):
Familiar Pattern. U.S. support, how-
ever, proved inadequate last week. Fresh
from their easy victories on the Plain
of Jars, the Communists took Meng.
Khouang, then moved south and east to- ?
ward the government position at Muong
Soui. When Communist guns neutral-
ized Muong Soui's airstrip, making re.-.
inforcement impossible, the 100-man
government garrison pulled out under
cover of darkness.
Few observers in the sleepy little gov-
ernment 'capital of Vientiane had ex-
pected, the/Plain, which has changed
?--"N hands 'repeatedly for years, to be ltield
In the 'face of a determined Communist
-Mtack. There was good reason for their
;pessimism. Hanoi has 50,000 troops in
Laos, some 16,000 around the Plain,
,T,,,,:t.;47;"1s7.77r7Tr.voli'ine-
?
V
? ^V:;;
and the Pathet Lao have another 50,000;
the government, by contrast, has a to-
tal of 63,000 regulars and another 10,000
Meo guerrillas under General Vang Pao. ;
What alarmed U.S. officials was the
possibility that this time the Communist
forces might not be satisfied with the
usual gains, ln the past, the war has
had a special, almost ritualistic quality,
with Communist and government forces
swapping occupancy of the Plain of
Jars and refraining from probing deep-
er into territory generally conceded to .
the foe. Now, however, there is eon-
tern that the Communists might change
the natureh ? war by changing the
old seesaw pattern. They could do so
by moving west and cutting the road
link between Vientiane and the royal
capital of Luangprabang, or by driving
south against a pair of other targets.
A Look at Long Cheng. These were
Sam Thong, headquarters for the U.S.
aid operation in northern Laos, and
Long Cheng, a top-secret, CIA-supporte
base for guerrilla operations against the
Communists. Sam Thong, which serves
as a center for refugee assistance as
well as standard aid programs, has oc-
casionally been opened to news-
men. Long Chang, however, remained
sealed until last week, when TIME
Stringer Timothy Allman, a LIFE corres
pondent, and a French reporter paid
NIHON DINPA NEWS
gc
%?.
'14'' 1.4re
an unauthorized visit. Allman's report:
After strolling 15 kilometers along
the U.S.-built dirt road that links Sam
Thong and Long Cheng, the three of
us were picked up by a Jeepload
of Meo troopers and driven the rest of
the way to CIA-land. They assumed, of
course, that we were agency men?no
one else is allowed in. The first sight in
Long Cheng was encouraging: a bar-
bershop with a sign reading "Welcome."
Five years ago, the valley was de-
serted; now American money and of-
ficials have created a town of 40,000
people dedicated to war. We saw Amer-
icans in civilian clothes working on air-
craft engines, taxiing unmarked T-28
fighter-bombers up :and down the run-
way and teaching Asians the art of en-
gine maintenance. Although Asians
?presumably Laotians and Thais?fly
the T-28s, Americans fly rescue hel-
icopters bearing U.S. markings, one of
which always has its rotors turning in
readiness for a rescue mission. As we
watched, U.S. aircraft took off and land-
ed at 60-second intervals.
At last we were discovered. An an-
gry Laotian colonel ordered us into his
Jeep. Soon afterward a khaki-clad CIA
man appeared, seized the French cor-
respondent's notebooks, then left to
? make arrangements for our departure.
Finally, a light aircraft arrived bearing
177,77.777.7...777-7777-=-70
. I)
OM /OA 0.4 i
R u.s 7'1
?
Ltiongpiabtuig.?.? ?
PMt gwittor 1
iw OF?
t ?
Munng SO.).671????
:111
ssibl.vimx/:..t1PAx.i.rng KI:1;;;A:?
11,3,7H6X. L5n:g Ch?L g
Viertend.
,---..., .,
r-? -i ) ? ?-e?
[? !!").?"0".......:^1:.
zr.r.......- '16 ,
i:'Ywve. `
1:'^''.?-,' . ','".: ..; ?n: ''
? /?..k."2
01)
EATHETA.A0 TROOPS WITH BAZOOKAS
Approve gmf Osisases 2GANIN8404Ins. C IA-RD P80-01601
Vicnt ane
.". .
, r ? 5
' v )
"' r, i A
. "?"':,. Nakhon
Phi:morn, 1.
-THAI
es,. AND
.:' .S. 8.42"
, .
raids .
Ubon =*77
v.)
Bangkok
\ ? nj kt
tiveifonvegeefoii-f,
06ritsnued
-1)
Approved For Release 2004M1 ;ICCIA-RDP80-0160
DAIL
MAR1970
i
STATI NTL
Shadiford'Laos 'debate',
t I,
.4 A
1
!"
PRESIDENT NIXON'S state- Sen. Mansfield and Sen. Fulbright share the i
meat on Laos has fueled new ,' view that peace never will return to Southeast 1
debate about American in. ' Asia until American military forces leave.
volvement in the wars in Viet- ?
Sen. Mansfieldargues the entire area ---.,
na.m and Laos.
..0 ' Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand ? '
It has provided Administra- ? should be neutralized. Ile contends it must be,'.
lion critics with another open- , done thru the Paris conference to which he
Ing to question Its credibility, . thinks President Nixon 'should send a high- 1
and to demand that the United . ranking representative.
States should "withdraw from ,.: Sen. Fulbright's version of extricating the-1,
,
??.?...,? . . all of Southeast Asia lock,. 'United States: ,
, stock and barrel, including bases." 'i
' "I think the presence of the United States
That statement was made In a week-end
v (Southeast Asia) is the greatest incitement to 1
,:. television appearance (CBS's Face the Nation) . e
the difficulties that afflict that part of the '
I ,s. by Senate Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield ,..4 'world . . . If the United States should ever ?I
',of Montana, who has played a major role in
I ? .:r.remove Its presence, I think these people could'
recent weeks in warning about America a I
n- ? "sort out their difficulties. ?
, ilia army of Mao tribesmen in Laos. ,
'' "They did It for a couple of thousand years , , !t. I
. Sen. Mansfield said "we are up to our , before the United States ever appeared on the, /
. t necks" in Laos and "over our heads" In Viet- ,- scene. And when we intruded into that area,?,:'
, nam. -.
, ? . ' essthe French were getting out In 1954 ?-? I.,...
. 'He was joined in his concern about Southeast 1. Think we simply prolonged the war which.,
's Asia by another long-standing critic of the . started out as a colonial war and then it civil r,
'.. Vietnam War'? Chairman J. William Ful-;': war and 'now we are involved and It Is really:'
I 'bright, 'b-Ark., of the Senate Foreign Relations % an international war."'
. Committee ? on NBC's Meet the Press pro--, ,? Both senators' were skeptical about Mr. Nix-,
'. gram. . ,.. on's Vietnamization program. Sen. Fulbrighti, ?
-'.. Sen. Fulbright said the President did not,,. argues it Is "a basic policy. ... (for) the Ira!
. ./vgive all the facts 'on Laos, especially 'about the .'.,Iongation of the war In Vietnam and Laos in-
heavy [,.. heavy Involvement of. the CIA which i organ-'...definitely.". e
. , .
1 ' Ized, trained, equipped and commanded ?':. Neither Sens. Mansfield nor Fulbright ex- ;
i-with "an enormous outlay of funds that do not.. pects American troops to be withdrawn over.::
appear in any appropriation bill" ? the guer.,' night, but both think they should come home ,.
., rilla army of Meo tribesmen In Laos. :? faster than now planned. A questioner remind.
t... 10 -
, 1.100TH senators made It clear that they, and' .'. ed Sen. Fulbright that President Johnson had.'
,?? offered to get out within six months after the
others of the same view, would continue to % war stopped and 'asked the senator: Can you i
' lnsist upon the public release of testimony se. .. offer them (the communists) anything better.
P 'Than that?" .?'
cretly given the Senate Foreign Relations sub-,
., committees on Laos. Secretary of State Wil----, Sen. Fulbright",* whom Mr. Johnson has bit. .
?ham P. Rogers thus far has refused to release ,:terly. criticized. in his recent TV appearances,f1
,
i anything except a version so 'censored thart:,,:? cesponded: "1 don't think President johnson's1
Ix,
. i?sub-committee 'Chairman - Stuart Sytuingtunit 'statement .hatFniuch'creigbillty, eltherabroad?.
kp-IvIo4 'chargeklt vrould,11,1141,14%,14.41:a; , .4r4iguatj.iii'4,-;,,,,,,,..4.1..t.a..,
k tok.
r.
* *
Approved For Release 201/03/04 : CIA-Rb080-01'601R00070005O001-2
Approved For Release 2001/8g84 1.u6i'A_RDp80-0i-aNci
9 MAP 1970
CD ? . hi
b..!?'i w""'",44.--1.::..'ae.a.a.7..:.4.....-....63;-, da.",.....04.163.11.1,..4.4. 1
"I have no response for you on that," he
i
'replied. 1
-, President Nixon was embroiled in his first '.: Mr. Nixon had said Friday there ? are no
,serous credibility problem today by insisting '.:'American ground combat troops in Laos and:
I th-t 27, Amerleans killed or missing "in hostile 'he had "no plans" to introduce any. ? ? }
lac,ion" ,on.:the ground in Laos were not killed '. He had reported that there were 1,040 Amer-'
1,
"i ?,n?rUnd combat operations.
.- . . leans in Laos, 320 of whom are engaged hal
. eO? ?
os? t was something Mr. Nixon had tried hard - military advisory or military training of Lao-,
to avoid, contending as he had that a credibill-. , tan government forces. The White House said;
tY gap had led to the political downfall of for- '. 22.3 of the 320 are military personnel.
sner President Lyndon B. Johnson. ? . ?, ' ? A White House spokesman also told news-
White House confirmation yesterday that ?': men Friday that nearly 400 Americans were
Americans had, indeed, been killed in ground killed or missing in the air war over. Laos,
action in the war in Laos seemed to invite ?chiefly` Interdicting North .Vietnamese move-
doubts about other parts of Mr. Nixon's FridaY 1 .- ment.-Or &ceps and ' supplies on the ' Ho Chi,
report to the nation on Laos. - "' '' ? Minh trail into South Vietnam. The spokesman.
-- "No American stationed in Laos has ever ',had said no American adviser had been killed..
been killed in ground combat operations," the l'z .
? , ,,..,,,, The White. House refesed to say today how'
- President stated in that report.,?
By TED KNAP
ScrIpps?tioword Stcrtf Writer
. , By the next night, newspapers were report-. many, if any, of the 25 civilian victims of hos-
'tile action had been former U.S. military per.,
' ing that U.S. infantry Capt. Joseph Bush had , sonnel employed by the CIA in what for six
? been killed by enemy machine gunfire Feb. 11, . ', -?
? 1969, during a North Vietnamese raid on a r years had been a clandestine:operation.
4. Laotian command post at the edge of the plain ;,-,, . Mr: Warren said he could not state positively
- 14,- that to other American in military sprvice.oth--
Report on the growing debate over Laos on t:., er. than Capt.. Bush had been killed. on , old'
, ---
- Page 19. ,growid i L but that a thoro check,indieak"
ladkavsiti thettr 4,iit*:: -,-? , \ o' "'''
. 4...irooeti.
i
11
of Jars. Capt. Bush had been an adviser to the
Royal Lao ant .ery which had been shelling ? .
communist troap concentrations in that corn-..
.bat area in northern Laos. .
Deputy' Mite House Press Secretary Gerald
L. Warren described the action yesterday:
? "Capt. Bush was in his quarters in a com-
pound 10 miles to the rear of the expected line-
' of contact with the enemy when NorthViet-A
narnese commandos attacked the compound. '1
'l-le took action immediately to attempt*
protect other persons in the compound, and by:,
taking such action he exposed himslet to ene-
sny fire and was killed."
Mr. War) en confirmed that Capt. ,Bush's:.
?quarters were in the Laotian command post -1
anci that he fired his own weapon during the.
attack. Mr. Warren said Capt. Bush was,
killed in "hostile action."
In answer to newsmen's questions, the
'White House said 26 other Americans had
: been killed or are missing in hostile action in
, Laos. A spokesman said 25 were civilians and 9
. one was a dependent. .
The spokesman, who cannot be identified un-,
der the ground rules imposed by the White '!1
House, said they were the victims of such ac-
tions as enemy ambushes, artillery fire and.;
land mines. ? , ?
The spokesman insisted, however, they were.
. nob victims of "ground combat operations,".:.
. according to the White House definition. He
-did not explain the distinction. ? ?
7 Mr. Warren said the President had not:4
? known of Capt. Bush's death when he issued
his extensive report on Laos, but he said the .;
-President had been informed about the 26.i
civilians killed or missing in hostile action.
"Is the ? president disturbed that this, has
;raai:c;dilt;L' b141?ParliCIP WO 2001/03/04 ::CIA-IRDP80-01601R00070000001-2
STATI NTL
Approved Fpr Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R0
SIVNGT014, D.C.
liuttNII04,1a. OBSERVER
I caw 553,605
MAR 9 i.970
Mr. Nixon's Explanation
1 An Accounting Fails to Choke Off Laos Criticism,
1,. FROM WASHINGTON, D.C. tiane, the Laotian administrative capital. _ Laos at the request of the Laotian govern-.
f f No American combat troops are In -???? The President said American air at- .. ment. "Our increasing involvement in ,
' Laos and there's no intention of sending . tacks were primarily aimed at keeping, Vietnam started with just that kind of air t
any in. f North Vietnamese war material' from clt support," he said. Sen. John Sherman i
That's the essence of President Nixon's reaching South Vietnam over the Ho Chi Cooper called for the immediate with- !
declaration last week of U.S. Policy in Minh Trail through Laos. He said addi- drawal of all American civilian and mill- ,
Laos. The unusual 3,000-word statement tional missions were being flown to assist tary personnel "engaged in air strikes or i
was prompted by rising congressional the Laotian army against Laotian-Com-
any other combat activity" in Laos. The
criticism, questions, fears, and politicking' munist and North Vietnamese troops. Kentucky Republican said he feared their
i
over the course of U.S. actions in the Corn-These missions were flown at the re. presence in Laos would lead to greater .
munist-threatened kingdom in Southeast quest of the Laotian government, and thej
American involvement.
? Asia. - , level of the air attacks "has been in- Senate critics of the Laotian involve-
The Chief Executive acknowledged that creased only as the number of North Viet- ment were almost as upset at the secrecy.
American air attacks in Laos had been namese In Laos and the level of their ag- -' which hitherto surrounded it as they were,
expanded to help counter the Communists. gression has increased," Mr. Nixon said. over the fighting itself. They have been
It was official confirmation of well-pub- The number of North Vietnamese in Laos campaigning since autumn for the Admin-
licized fact. ?-'has grown by 13,000 in the past year, he istration to make public the contents of:
The President's statement said parts ?. noted. ' briefings on Laos it had given privately
of Laos were now occupied by 67,000 North `. Mr. Nixon said he hoped Britain and: to senators.
Vietnamese, compared with 1,040 Arneri- . Russia might be able to help restore peace ' . The secret briefings contained little
Ccans in the whole country. It said 646 of in Laos by rounding up assistance from that had not been reported from other
these Americans were engaged in military the other 12 countries that signed a 1962 sources in ?the press: accounts of Amer-
or logistics activities, agreement that was supposed to ensure lean air raids in support of Laotian forces '
No Americans have been killed in Laos the neutrality and independence of Laos.' that are paid, armed, transported, and
In combat operations on the ground, Mr. But he said settling the war would mostly 1 - sometimes controlled by American mill-,
Nixon said. A high White House official "require realism and reasonableness from tary advisers assigned to the Central In-1
followed the statement with an explana- Hanoi." ? telligence Agency IglI)cio,. This involv
ledge for a long
? tion that about 400 Americans had been The President's statement, issued from ment was common
killed or were missing in the air war. Pre- Key Biscayne, Fla., where he was stay- time, and the secrecy surrounding it was
vious official statements about Laos had ing over the week end, failed to tamp apparently meant to spare Laotian Prime
reported that 193 airmen were missing, down congressional criticism of his Lao; Minister Souvanna Phouma from embar-
and conceded a military role inside the tian policy. Sen. Jacob Javits, New York rassment over these violations of the
country only to the 70 Americans on the Republican, said he was concerned about 1962 agreement.
. staff of the U.S. military, attache in Vien- the United States supplying air' cover, to Souvanna Phouma seemed unembar-'
. . ? mwaft.f4.6.14.0..suitatarastistweroasksza, ..1...,2aoss rassed however. He
'week that "the entire ctold newsmen last will become
Communist" without the American air
raids. "I think the United States should
agree to increase the aid we have re-'
ceived and which we need," he said. '
The outcry over Laos began last month'
when Communist forces chased Laotian
troops and their American advisers from'
the Plain of Jars in northern Laos. No
significant fighting was reported in ,the
kingdom last week, though the war in.
, words continued unabated here half the
-
worktav!ay.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
THE WASHI110.`Uti
Approved For Release 200160Wg11A-RDP80-01601R000703tRibkii-2
CIA ole in L
Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.)
said yesterday that he was sur-
prised to learn Oen% secret
estimony of large .unbudgeted
American spending and the
extent of Central Intelligence
Agency involvement in Laos.
The chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee
appeared ' on the NBC televi-
sion program, "Meet 'the
Press." , He referred to testi-
mony given a subcommittee
headed by Sen. Stuart Syming-
ton (D-Mo.), which several sen
-
Mors haVe urged be made pub-
lic. ?
Senate Majority Leadei
Mike Mansfield (D-Mont) said
on the CBS program, "Face
the Nation," he believed there
was s a good possibility of
reaching agreement with the
Nixon administration to , re-
lease part of the transcript.
President Nixon has said the
United States has 1,040 per-
sonnel on the ground in Laos
assisting Laotian forces in?the
fight against North Vietnam
ese troops. 'A number of sena-
tors fear Laos could become
another Vietnam-war, which
os Is Cite
began with a few American
advisers present.
Both Mansfield and Ful-
bright, longtime critics of the
Vietnam war, said American
personnel should be with-
drawn from Laos, but that the
United States should continue
to try to block Ho. CM Minh
trail , supply routes in Laos
leading from North ,Vietitain
to South Vietnam.. :
Mansfield said he did not
believe the independence of
Laos was worth loss of Ameri-
can.lives. He said he believed
the President would not send
ground forces into Laos.. .
Both Mansfield and Ful-
bright said the Vietnamization
policy of. turning the war over
to South Vietnam would not
end the fighting. This cab' be
done only by a diplomatic set-
tlement, they said. Mansfield
urged that a high ranking ne-
gotiator, be sent to the Paris
peace talks on Vietnam to re-
place Henry Cabot Lodge, who
resigned three months ago.
Meanwhile, Sett Charles
McC. Mathias (R-111d.), said the
enemy 'probably could take
over Laos if It wished and
. ,?. ?
: -
?
?
there is little President Nixon's.
could do about it.
Mathias said In a television.'
interview on WMAL-TV that",
the North Vietnamese have 50,-,
000 troops in Laos. He said:,
"They have the options in .;
Laos. That's a variable over 4,
which we have no control, and
with an army of that sizerif it
were'- released,? I suspect that
they could take. the
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
THE WASHINGTON POO:
Approved For Release 2001k11#419.781A-R-53-081-041A0
, .
o
Kaloilg
By Jack Fokie
t" \t: ; ? Los Anseles Times
here the Tt,ar I egins,irtaos
,p ? f
.atrii. la
? KALONG, Laos, March 8 ?, This ,is
It may be the base camp for 'ere described by authorities
as volunteers, b u t It w as
learned that the unit includes'
bdth impressed, villagers and
Communist Pathet Lao de-
serters. . ?
The troops are armed with
tjie best U.S. rifle, but at the
oment their favorite weep.'
on was a slingshot. They were
launching rocks ? to stun liz-
ards in the trees. ? ?
Married men with families
live in straw hootches on two
sides of the perimeter, with
their fighting positions out-
side their doors. The single)
men live in more rustic huts.1
The lack of a woman's touch'
is apparent.
The perimeter defense is a,
mix of modern American wea-
seven man special guerrilla
units that go on long-range pa-
trols to hideouts from which
I -where the war in central Laos begins. ,
.they can visually obs
?,1 Here in barren scrubland there is a my movements on the Ho Chi e?
erve en
rustic fort the size of a football field. hi-
?Minh Trail.
side its defenses live 150 government . ?
These elite units are re-
cruited, trained and support-
ed by men of the U.S. Centrakj
Intelligence Agehcy who, in
many cases, are in Laos dis-
guised as U.S. AID mission
civilian employees.
These government guerril-
las, as a sign of pride, wear
a distinctive insignia when in
the rear area. One such in-
signia was seen on. a Lao
soldier here. The presence of
elaborate radio equipment in-
side the fort also strengthens
the possibility . of its secret
i
mission.
t' militia men, 10 wives, 28 children, one .
water buffalo, 13 chickens, four pigs and -,.,..
- .?
?t
- a caged dwarf deer.
s. Three miles to the east is the nearest
..outpost of the North Vietnamese army. ??,).
e ?
L ?Twenty miles to the east is a main trail .2.;
1.-?
,-'.of the infiltration route the ,enemy .uses,;;:l
C?to reach South Vietnam.? . .
.. ? Despite the proximity of the foe and 3
5k,-the constant patrolling by . both sides, ??,?..,,
' there has been little contact recently. ',:ii
latest action, the fort commander.,.-...
11 ,.said, was two months ago when one of .`? ?
e .his patrols was ambushed. There were,
.government casualties, but the officer....
"declined to say how many. .
,!..?,' So this is not like the war farther .'?' pons and age-old means of
N2. north that is making headlines. Here the' , '; ,._. protection. There is barbed
r' o (king forces 'appear to be like t.wo ? :::;11.? The U.S. presence : is .here'lWire, but also roles of share.'', -
ened bamboo stakes... There)
are trip wires- for night i1-1 ?
lumination, hut also tin eansl
r to fight for awhile. Such arran.gements,,,,ithe .Lao staff officer sai&i, .. _..... .. - ? ?? ? -
that will rattle If the enemyi
;.4 j And the ammunition . comes ibreaches . the wire. There are
in Laos. ??? ? , . ? ...,.;
are not unknown
There .R. the .possibillty?th4,.:.
boxers circling and feinting, waiting or ,
jn other ways. An army offi-
1.1, an opening. And perhaps the rival cem7,...?1 cer visits the camp period'.
? manders have a tacit understanding not.,,,?^,. cony "to hear our problems,"
Kajong,.? directly' from the Unite clinilns to he detonated elec- .
clespite its languid appeoraneeviigveCk!i,,,: StateS. Mortar shells in cases.
?
- bear markings indicating theitrically but also homemade
,.
were produced. last year; ibooby traps.
For most4troops here, to4 The unit in the camp is ,
day was a day for sleep, alheadquarters company of
bath at a stream two milesiVolunteer 'Bettallan 33. ,Four;
'a w a y, and scrounging for other companies of the same'
food to supplement their rice battalion are in similar corn-
diet. ? pounds nearby...
One young trooper had al There is supporting artillery
snare attached to a long pole at another location and allied'
and was trying to catch crick- airpower can be ov'erhead
ets. Another soldier was feed - within 30 minutes, according
Ing the deer he had 'trapped, to the staff officer. If under
fattening it for a feast. night attack,' the troops have
'hloat of the Militia men are filled beer cans with oil and
boyish-looking and several ad), will light them to point the
ted to beinconly isCrheylway to the helicopter landing
'2,/,',.4110.4-hielget43w)..16a414?414''area if ,reinforcements be-
come necessary. ?
r
As we left by helicopter in'
,mid-afternOon, a bamboo gong
twas being beaten in the camp.
fit was time for the men of
Kalong to foregoitheir honie-
Oaking tasks' and .get hack to
tastok:4414:,14,
? Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
'Approved For Release 2001/fifOrtiMeDNIV-01601
9 MAR 1970
tenuane? ? s Stirred Little
4
y Increased Pace if ar
By Laurence Stern
., .
The only visible scars here
.1. Waphincton Post, !Wotan Service ? ? of the war are the pathetic
* VIENTIANE, Laos, March 8?The war .') refugees of the bombing in the
'that has caused a new pitch of political combat zones who have been
?concern in Washington is being shrugged i.resettled in Vientiane after
'at here with a languor that befits the 1 losing homes and loved ones
capital's Asian-Gallic tradition. , -, to the bombs, shrapnel and
, i ?
A banner beside the swimming pool Lure. :
I at the Lang Xuan Hotel, chief encamp.: '1i, President Nixon's statement
?ment of the jpornalistic legion that has,, 'on Laos did little to alter the
'landed here I ese past two weeks,, pro.; sense of dela vu. in Vientiane
'claims a "grand soiree de gala for the. 'or to raise .any .new expecta-
yrofit of the Laotianchildren and ? vie- .tions for settlement of the war
'Urns of the war." , , - 'that . has ground a see-saw
i The event is "under the high patron- , course through this primitive
'age of his excellency Prince Souvanna', country for more than two
IPhouma," and two International Rotary Idecades.
;Club flags dangle from each side of the ,t Forgetting the ethnic, tribal
. , I... ,
;bartner. ? ,I and personalistic ? nuances,
I Beside the shaded outdoor bar' where.' which could fill books, the is-
Lowenbratt and citron presse are scrved,'..1;sue5 as seen from Vientiane
,there is another sign warning children ')can be stated in stark form.
,not to play violently around the pool. '..!i North Vietnamese and Pa.
I. The war, which is centered about 50','.thet Lao objectives in the cur-
miles to the north, has also given a sharp'''. rent offensive seem to be
'boost to the bar and car,hire businesses.' .threefold: '
, . .
as well as the taxi girls and other .forms -If ? A halt in the American
of night life, such as they are. ' . ? ,.'''bombings along ,lhe H9 Chi
I'
f It is not tar-fetched, as one resident ii!Minh Trail and its Communist
philosopher put it; to assert that the. two;: staging areas in the northeast.
principal sources of national, income at'. '40 Establishment of a coati-
ths
e moment .are,,.,Opium . and ''PrCIW-.44401:i tion government in Vientiane,
.F.L'aph .tolls....1'1:',''.'- .. ', -,;?44442,1?.46potaillodaoe. that the Communists consider
' ? ?.*; ' ' ?$:' ? :gf., ?' ,i:' ''.?
friendlier .to their Interests
both in Laos and South Viet-
nam.
? Restoration of territorial
' boundaries of control that Cor-
respond roughly to the 1961
battle lines, toward which the
Communists are now driving.
Nothing in the President's
, message on Laos intimated
that the Nixon administration
is prepared to make conces-
sions in any of these direc-
tions.
Similarly, Prince Souvanna
Phouma's statement :,FridaY
that he has no objections ,to:
North Vietnamese use, of 'the'
Ho Chi Minh Trail through
'Laos,.' is viewed as more condil...
iatory on thesurfacr than .1tLis
In Aubstanelif
* ?
I It is the American military
command in Saigon and not
Souvanna who controls the
massive bombing runs over
the trail that the North Viet-
namese want stopped.
In asking the North Viet-
name,se to desist from their
dry-season offensive in ex-
change for his averting his
eyes' from the infiltration, the
Laotian premier would seem
to be asking.for something in
exchange for nothing, as expe-
rienced 'observers here see it.
And so the prospect, at least
as it looks from here, is for
more of the same within the
limited framework in which
the Laotian war has ebbed
and flowed through the years.
Last summer the CIA-organ-
ized government army of Gen.
yang. Pao surged further into
Communist territory, both in'
the Plain of Jars and toward,
the infiltration corridor, than
ever in the past six years. The
tempo of American bombing
in Laos also escalated beyond
any previous level. ,
Now, the North Vietnamese)
counter offensive is expected
to go beyond any point
that the Communists
have reached in Laos since
1961, though it will probably,
halt 'well short of the capital.
1 And so, in ?the privately ex-
pressed view of American offi-
cials and veteran diplomatic
observers from other coun-
tries that joined in the 1962
'Geneva accords, there is no
immediate prospect for dimi-
nution of the U.S. role in the
long-festering Laotian war.
Curiously, President Nixan's
figures for the number, of
Americans ?either in the direct
employ of the U.S. govern-
ment or working under ,cen-
tract' here p-r, 1,040 ? is about
25 per cent higher than the'
number. of 830 given, by VS.
"officials in Vientiane' untilibe
dat pefore
STATI NTL
Another number in the.
President's statement that
caused some puzzlement here
was the 67,000 troops that he
said Hanoi has introduced into:.
Laos, Until then the highest.
number given by any Ameri-
can spokesman in Vientiane
for the North Vietnamese
presence was 50,000.
.Perhaps the most arresting
symbol of at least the short-;
range ? American posture in.
Laos can be found in an AID,
compound four miles from the
center of town.
There a $50,000 Olimpic.,
sized swimming pool is'
being built for U.S. govern.1
znent families. It is expectIcli
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : C,IA-RDP80-01601R000700050001L2
THE WASHINGTON POST
Approved For Release 2001/03/Of fAftliNfIDPVAIMO
a , .
rtleiry-Go-Itound
?
Soviet Spy All wed I Remain in
By Jack Anderson
A Soviet intelligence ageht,
caught in a serious act of espi-
onage, has been permitted to
remain in the United States.
He is Oleg D. Kalugin, for-
merly a Tass news correspond-
ent, now second secretary at
the Soviet Embassy, who be-
came entangled in a web of es-
pionage and romance.
His undercover activities in
this country are known to the
FBI. But only the State De-
partment knows the reason he
is still here. Other spies
caught in the act have been
declared persona non grata
and have h? en given 48 hours
to leave thi country.
The handsome, lotharian
Kalugin took over from a fel-
low spy, Nikolai Kapsov, who
had been cultivating a Greek
Immigrant for undercover
work in the United States.
The immigrant, John Mak-
ris, had worked for a time as a
United Nations intern and,.
eventually, had ventured into
business. He was having a
rough time keeping out of the
red.
To the Russians, Makrls
seemed A good prospect for re-
cruitment as an agent, and Ka-
lugin moved in to close the,
deal. Assuming the name "vie-
. tor ' Kraknikovich,"; ' he , cow
? /
tacted Makris. Kalugin ex-
plained he was a friend of Ni-
kolai's and wanted to help
Makris with his business yen-,
tures.
Cloak mul Dagger
Over the next two years, Ka-
lugin paid Makris $12,000. Fol-
lowing elaborate rendezvous
plans and ever on the lookout
for FBI agents, the pair met in
hotel lobbies, restaurants, a
Greenwich Village bookstore
arid at various spots in the
Bronx:
They discussed a number of
plans. First, Makris was to in-
filtrate anti-Castro groups in
New York and ? Nicaragua.
Later he was to move to Wash-
ington and set up a business
as a front, then travel around
the country -as a ? "bagman,"
distributing money to Soviet
agents.
But one by one, each neW
conspiracy fell apart out of
confusion and exaggerated
caution. ? ;;
At one point, Kalugin 'in-
structed Makris to cultivate a
secretary in the FBI's Manhat-
tan office. Kalugin wanted in-
formation on FBI surveillance
procedures. Specifically, he
wanted to know what cars the
FBI agents drove and ;where
they were garaged. ?
When Maltris had won the
girl's confidence, the plan building' go about their bug.'
called for Kalugin 'to appear. ness in a routine manner.
He would romance the lady They know nothing of the spy
while his wife tended the who resides within,
home fires in their apartment .But for those few who know
Kalugin also offered Makris the truth about Oleg Kalugin,
$15,000 to plant his own Amer. there is a vague feeling of
lean girlfriend inside the State being watched.
e
Department. The girl agreed,
applied for a job and was in-
terviewed. '
Russian Romeo
There was only one hitch in
Kalugin's quasi-bigamous op-
erations: Makris and both
girls were working under FBI
direction.
When the affair had gone
far enough, the U.S. told the
Soviets to keep their Russian
Romeo on a tighter leash.
Strangely, however, be was
not asked to leave ti country.
He resides today in a non-
descript apartment building
just four blocks inside the Dis-
trict of Columbia line. It is an
unnoticeable location, a thor-
oughly middle-class habitat in
a thoroughly middle-class
neighborhood.
Intelligence Notes
A secret staff study, now on ,
President Nixon's desk, claims !:
that Israel can hold her own
against the Arab threat with-
out more planes from the
United States . . . At the same 'I
time, intelligence ? reports
warn that Russia is Preparing
to send Egypt advanced jet
fighters) fighter-bombers, anti- 1 ?
aircraft artillery and missiles,
and the latest electronic-detec-
tion equipment. .
The B-52 strike against the
North Vietnamese on the 1
Plain of Jars was urged by G. 1,
MeMurtrie Godley, the Ameri-
can Ambassador to Laos. Be-
cause this was an escalation of ) ?
the Laotian war, President ?
Nixon personally made the de-
eision after consulting with i
the National Security Council.',
Kalugin , comes and goes The big B-52s were ordered to I
without hindrance, swallowed blast' the North Vietnamese.1.!
up in the bustle of big-city field headquarters.' But the .
life. He and his wife, said one bombing, apparently, didn't :
neighbor, "keep very much to even slow the assault ;upon the ;t
themselves.", Residents and strategic; plain. ;
visitors:, the apartment 10..1M,11eu-iscqu'rt
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
? 9
3
WASIIMTON POST
Approved For Release 2001 Iglaft 19?1A-RDP8s0T-0A1TTF
:U.S. Admits
eath, Denies
? ,t
Combat Role
S
41 ?
I Warren said official records.
By Don Irwin.1
? report that: "Capt. Bush, on
Los Aosoles Times
t , .
The 26- persons in 'addition,4;
to Bush listed as . killed.
Through enemy actions were;;
KEY BISCAYNE Fia., the night of the incident,
,
was slid to have been Included in,.
..March 8?The White House in his quarters in a compound ose _.:.
:,1 the fi"ure of 200 persons ,
: confirmed today that a U.S 10 miles to the rear of the ex...,I1, wdahy deaths officials said Fri- ?
pected line of contact" with ,; not iti, ground combat. The in-p'had occurred in Laos but
Army captain was killed by i
- Laos in February, 1069, but de- 6" . ?
' I
'.; hostile action on the ground in ,,,.e enemy dleation at that time was that
. ,
'
!.nied that the death resulted d the result o
r,
" from "ground combat opera-
:Cons."
Gerald L. Warren, deputy
1
-, White House press secretary,
.said. a thorough check of
: agency records verified a Los
: Angeles Times story that
? ,I
' Capt. Joseph K. Bush Jr. had enemy fire and was killed."
been killed by enemy fire at a "He was engaged in military, ',; ?
When North Vietnameseal aat or accidents Ln air)
commandos attacked the corn- ,? comb,
.1planes or helicopters.
iitook action immediately to.,.,
? i No occasion arose to put cli-'
Ted questions about' the Bush,
pound, Warren said, Bush,l, '
try to protect the others in the...4 case to Mr. Nixon. The Presi-'
compound and, by taking such": ,Clent ended a three dlay worlt
fte
action, exposed himself to II ing weekentl here. this ' a ..
' noon and pew back. to .yile
command post behind front, operations; he was a military.'
,. lines but said Bush was not'Warren said. '4
!attache," "Did he.
',then in a "combat operation."
'
At the same time, an admin. 'fire a gun?" asked a newsmaripci
le .
, istration source disclosed that referring to a statement itther..!
i.26 other Americans-25 civil-: Times account that Bush ha$:14
'ians and one dependent of a killed a : North Vietnamesp,' $
;1.civilian?had died in Laos.,with his M-18 rifle before he--,i
" e
'from what was described as , ,
lwas killed by automatic weap?T1
; hostile action. Warren said he
did not know whether there ons fire. ' ?
?
are more cases like Bush's but "When he was attacked, he
!that "there may he." ' took action," Warren replied
"Ile tired a gun to iirotect the *t
others in the compound... in4.'?
our definition of combat, he
was protecting persons under
attack." ?
' Warren refused to disc?pss t
on the record the number of
other Americans who had died";
through -"enemy action" that
$ A newsman asked whether
'President Nixon did not feat
?
; that he had created a credibil-
ity gap with his assertion Fri-
day in his statement' on Laos
that "no American stationed
In Laos has ever been killed in
I ground combat operations." .
c, "I have no response for you
.on that," Warren replied.
Warren said that Mr. Nixon was not "combat." , H
i had not known when he issued
3 his statement that an Army of- The figure of 26 was pro-.1
ficer was included with 26 ci;?duced toy ,
White House'bi
. .)
, vilians among Americans sources, narrowing down an
r whose deaths were ascribed by estimate of fewer than 50 that j
c the Pentagon to hostile action was supplied to newsmen Prises
r but nOt to combat. The Presi-
dent did know that such day. while all except Bush...,
..
; deaths had occurred, Warren were civilians, the sources
$ said. , . said, some may have died ims
. ? -
. On whether Bush's case wasi in ground Incidents. f ..
I known to officials who helpedlHostile action is c
, il
j prepare Mr. Nixon's state- construed. .
,
i ment, Warren noted that hel to cover casualties in circum ,
. had said that "the records stances other than direct com.sr,i
'were thoroughly checked" but
,went no further.
Warren said it-was assumed
ifrom available records that
Bush, whom he described as a
military attache, was stationed
in Laos. Even so, he main-
bat, including ambushes, lonit-lt
range artillery fire and mines.'
Twenty-five of these vIctimsyil
were described as U.S. civilian
offibials or civilian employees,
of . government contractorsit;
tamed, the President's state- Sources were unable 'to statel
whether any were militaiyl.
personnel who had resigned,''
datCarntiea
operA prObiedaRDireFb81
k ow whether Bush ,had
-77-%1Central Intel. " ligenqp AgeWl.',1111,
amen Xeceiving.c0104P01.:4-4e '" '''? '"
ment on casualties in Laos
, was correct because Bush was
Pinot killed in ground combat
80-01601R000700050001-2
?
BosToN .Atiminveg; Release 2001/03/04:.: C6V-KCIPJ8111_70160
i'
; GLOBE.: ? i
1.1 - 237,967
S 566 , 377.
MAR 8 19/0
r
President strives to. void
IBy Matthew V. Stormni. over L
i L.,. ? .... 0 ill 0 11 I. it,
'Globe Staff . '. ere imilii,_
,_._ , Wh'te House press secre-
UNPOPULAR THOUGHT
f KEY BISCAYNE, Fla. ? net be involved in a fur- I tary Ronald L. Ziegler was
A book written last year by ther discussion of these. cencountering a barrage of ? A tacit admission that
k /Joseph C. Goulden on the I daily questions concerning
ps is, '
!I the U.S. has increased its '
' 1964 Gulf of Tonkin inci- Last week new re- reports that U.S. civilian
, under the in-
apparently Cenakal_Intelli-, combat in ?Laos in response
dent made the case that the tense ressure of
i Johnson administration ports from ecLaoshes from and ques- to the North Vietnamese. r
'stated a phony attack by Con- ,gence Aeency,people, were
All of these statements, ,
t tioni ng spe,
I
gress, the President decid- in7oTlied in ground combat North Vietnamese gun- , even in the paraphrasing;
ed more information would operations, I required by the ground-:
!boats to provide ' a vehicle . A , .
for increased U.S. combat I On Wednesday Ziegler l' rules, w e r e potentially;
be in the public interest ? ,,.
was indicating that there troublesome politically for
i ? Vietnam. and no doubt in his own. .
the administration. 1
Goulden called the book He issued a 1300-word I were no plans for a presi- ,
, "Truth Is the First Casual- , statement giving a "precise . dential statement on Laos, So was the President's.,;
statement that 320 US.
description of our current I at least through the week- , :
military men and civilians ,
' Richard M. Nixon indi- activities in Laos." It in- ;lend, but Thursday morning .
', . ?i
are serving as military ad- l
? ; cated here this weekend eluded a concession that air ; the press secretary called' visers (and the more pre-
the extent of his concern strikes have been made by White House correspon-:
` that such a book not be e U.S. in defense of Lao- dents, urging .that if they .1.cise disclosure at the brief-
C: th written about his adminis ing that-the civilians total 1,_,
- tian forces in the north, the ' were not planning to ac-;\'
7
' here they should reconsid- , '
. 92 men).
I The impression is left i
I tration. most direct admission top company' the , President :
: In Laos there has been . date that the US. violates
:that virtually all the civil- i
no question about the role. 'the 1962 Geneva Accords: er.
1 in response to the viola-' When , the statement' ians are CIA. personnel, not
of the North Vietnamese.
sweeping I tions by the North Viet- came, it was a comprehen..' particularly a popular .4?,
' Th h been'
I sive one. And a briefing! thought in domestic?politie I
;powerfully across Inamese. ,
1 ' that followed was respon-: cal circles. i
t northern Plaines des , The President made a, sive to virtually all que's-'? Much of this resembles"
-- - - ----? .1 somewhat self-conscious ?
the early days of U.S. in-:,
tons from newsmen. The'
? NEWS ANALYSIS - point ' of saying he could,. ..._, volvement in Vietnam. But;
? ''' , have revealed these facts briefing was conducted by administration officials,
?
. _..presidential aides under '
, even while admitting that
rearlier without causing a ground rules that they not.
,the Communists probably
Jarres, threatening the ex- I political problem for him- I be quoted directly and be can overrun Laos, tell
1 1
:istence of the neutralist self. He said that the mill- referred to only as "White:,
,
newsmen it is not likely ..
government of Prime Min- tary activities in Laos had House officials."the President would
' ?
"ister Souvanna Phouma. been initiated by the Ken- , This is standard proce- ,
.1 IC, that
. change his announced in-
nedy and Johnson admin- dure for briefings which I ,
1' .
? The question in Laos has istrations and only contin- provide background for ', 1 tention not to introduce
'
? been: What is the U.S. ued by his administration. ? presidential statements. ' ; ground combat troops, into,.
I
But of course any Presi- ; 1 ,` that country. ' ? ,
doing? President Nixon Among the items cove , ,!
- ident would prefer not to : : This is a military' and
.had never denied that ered in the briefing were: to
.
diplomatic problem t h at
detail a military involve- i
!Americans might be in-1 !! ? A tacit admission that 'I
volved beyond the degree. ment when it could remain the air strikes in the north' :. still faces President Nixon ,
. out of the public eye. That . ,,,with potential political-
which he publicly admitted ? violate the Geneva accords.
would apply no matter ? Relatively precise fig-.? k ,danger. ? ;
? bombing of the Ho Chi .
. Mirth Trail, air reconnais- -
who initiated the involve- ures on casualties 'among 1., . But what he appears to
-i????:sance in the north and log- rnent. . *U.S. airmen in Laos, about ',, , '.
,istical support for Laotian ? 200 killed over six years ; ,:. have attempted in Florida'
ground troops.
4, season in Laos produced a ?
: and an equal number cap-
. _ ??? making truth the first cal;'
is weekend
this is to avoid
...1 ..w...14".6.-' ''. .
But once the current d
nt ry i
CURRENT ACTIVITIES '.
? renewed Communist offen- . tured or alluAng. , - .. , t4 ualtv. , , ' - ? . ..,......z.....0.,
? '
.. ; sive, the ' public ? by 1 -, .'',.lee -eu-
-','..14,'"'
' .?.' w.ve 114,..IMAli s' -.* '---- w',
,
. 1
meant; of ii Vietnam-shyi
The President alluded in , Congress ,--k began: raising 0
the past to "some other ac- I ,
tivities" inAppramediEdeftWitNis:4400.140344 :, C IA-..RDP80-01601 R000709050001 -2
,the public, interest ;would.] ,
,
r0 DAILY
SUV-- III LES STAT I NT
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R
8 MAR 1970
By Ian Wright
r Special from the Manchester Guardian
I: VIENTIANE, Laos ? As wheeling buzzards,
{ traditionally signify the coming demise of a'
traveler, so the descent of the world's press
..
scerna
i
I
ts--elf more village
; - f..,
? I on Vientiane invariably precedes new reports
Fortunately Vientiane i
It is far ,from proved that last June, when
that Laos is on its last legs. than capital city, is the In- t,place to encour-
But it has been happening at least annually] age hysteria. On the i! -eninttrilsts at 'Yang Pao's fortunes were at a low ebb, the ,
r years and still With us.
This year it was the inevitable fall of the
, Plain of Jars 10 days ago that caused the
furor. Word pictures were painted of thou-
sands of Communists in tanks and lorries ,
;
dragging heavy artillery pouring toward the about a reconvening of the Geneva conference venture without too serious losses. The evae-
strategic plain. But the truth is less dramat- on Laos ? there is a basic pessimism that uatioris of the last month culminating in tbe"
, ic: In the final stages of the taking of the 'nothing can be done until the Vietnam war Is pull-out from the Plain of Jars were orderly
i
(Xieng Khouang airfield no more than four settled. . ard well planned. Some diplomatic sources
hundred North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao! The Laotians would tdearly like to detach
,
here suggest that Washington had as much to
troops were involved. their civil war from, ereater Conflict and do vyith them as did the advancing North Viet- ,
It looks as if the Americans and the Royal they believe, rightly :milk, that it could be
f, Lao government have certainly withdrawn soon settled. But unfortunately, thanks to U.S.
Gen. Vang Pao's men as the Communists ap- , policy during the last nine months, they have ??
proached. become more seriously embroiled than ever'
"They are much more valuable than ter- before.
ritory" remarked an American official. : It seems to ,have begun soon after the
IWhen Muong Soul fell late last month, part- F bombing of North Vietnam ended. The U.S.
for 12 happily Laos is
tacked Xieng noir rip the prime Communists were going to break the rules of.
minister played brit,,, usual and few !what passes for warfare in Laos and were ,
people slept less secure In their beds. planning to take over the country.
In spite of the diplomatic moves Prince Happily: the Americans seemed to have
Souvanna Phouma has premised ? he speaks::: managed to extract Vang Pao from his ad- /
narnese hordes. 1
The Nixon administration is facing increas-
Ing embarrassment over its Laos policy. The i
Vang Tao adventure together with the une- ;
difying spectacle of the hundreds of tons of I
American) bombs which fall on unwarlike
Laos every day is more a reflection of the _I
, ly through an error of timing, hardly a shotAir Force and Navy spa acity and;
stalemate in Vietnam than of the realities f
had re cap
{ was fired, as plans for an American troop pullout from , here. . 4
:
I As things stand militarily, this civil war is South Vietnam proceeded, the bombing of : Certainly -the United States has a corn- i
( back where it was last June. The male differ- North Vietnamese supply routes ? the Ho Chi j mitment Os have the other signatories) to
, ence is that the North Vietnamese have three Minh trails ? running through Eastern Laos',{ prop up Laos, but these sorts of actions are
'months of dry weather ahead of them and no increased. . 1 tearing the country apart.
; one knows what they intend to do.
' They appear to have three main possl- ? REACTING TO FEARS that the North Viet- i IN AWAY Laos is the Achilles heel of both
t
be to harass Vang Pao in his headquarters at namese were also "going for broke" In the the Americans and the No
Laotian civil war the Americans also greatly , While the battle in the South goes on, net-
rth Vietnamese.
bilities of attack. The most attractive would
! Long Gheng and even try to take_ it; they
} could move, south toward Paksane on the Me-
i kong River cutting their country in two, or
they may choose to march west to occupy old
' positions at yang Vieng on the road between
i Vientiane and the royal capital Luang Pra-
, bang.
I MOVES IN ANY of these directions would
begin to confirm the worst American fears.
But most diplomats here, nurtured on the
.4 long-held theory that there must always be a
{ balance in Laos, doubt that the North Viet-
namese will take any big risks. They may
simply stay guarding the approaches to the
. Plain and restock with supplies they lost to
Vang Pao last September.
Of course, Pathet Lao and North Vietnam-
ese activity will' go on In other parts of the
t country, most of which is in their hands any-
way. The government controls the towns
? along the Mekong and often even the roads
which link them. In many ways It is a classi-.
cal Maoist situation with the Pathet Lao pros-
. 1;._ti.zilg In
Attiffile0013-PtiWkePatie
.1:47?11,1 "
stepped up bombing in northern Laos.
They now argue that these fears were real
and that last June it looked as if Vang Pao
and his so-called secret army ?.4g,k.train
er is going to agree te neutralization and
here always will be the temptation to deal a
stealthy blow. Neither ride, is willingly going ,
to reduce its options, and American action in.
and always the main shield against the Nort the last nine months suggests the Nixon ad-;
? Vietnamese ? was on the point of being de- .1 ministration has been using them to the full
, stroyed. The Americans reacted with more ' ? perhaps unwisely.
? bombing and an unprecedented series of at- 1, Vietnamization offers no letup to Laos el.
tacks by Vang Pao across the Plain of Jars int. ther: As more Americans pull out of the
September followed by probing of the trails in 7, South the bombing will have to continue.
I the southeast with elements of the Royal Lao The Laotians, one of the most gentle people
{ Army. .{ on Earth, will remain hopelessly caught in
This offensive, which has led to the, present the middle. Unlike the Vietnamese they have
? Lao withdrawals and, excitement in the press,4: no ideological stake in the war and both Lao-
la now represented as very much a military' tian sides contend that without the North Viet-
affair thought up by Vang Pao. American off I..' namese or without the American presence
cials privately claim that it was "to buy time they could settle their differences.
with territory" but others, perhaps more forth-, ? The Laotians will continue to suffer as they
right, admit "any time you want to stir up have for centuries because of their geograph-,
the North Vietnamese, start advancing on the , ical position locked between Chinese. Viet-
trail or across the Plain of Jars. ? 1 namese, and the rest of Indochina.
The net result now seems to be an escala- I Prince Souvanna Phouma will no doubt con-.
Ition that has infuriated the North Vietnamese tinue to call on the Great Powers, becoming
WVICi1
i-4?1
sio I
)6,dY
Jar-like figure rag-
tg=16 ..
, ,? I* can never control-
11
'
CITTC,'.,.0 DAILY , STATINTL
Approved For Release 201M644s: CIA-RDP80-01601
fl mAP 197)
"Itkali), MN* WW1
VIENTIANE, Laos Everyone in Vien-
tiane, from the Russian ambassador to the
mama-san of the legendary White Rose,
knows what the Americans are doing here?
arming, training, supplying, transporting and
directing approximately 70,000 Laotian troops
in a war which threatens to get out of hand.
Nevertheless, U.S. officials here do things
like allowing Gen. yang Pao to declare
recently, before a sizable contingent of vis-
iting journalists, that his Meo forces fight
with antiquated weapons, inadequate commu-
nications and inconsequential American sup-
port.
As he was speaking, American F-4 Phan-
tom jets roared, overhead, several American
observation planes were parked nearby and
three cargo-laden American transport' planes
landed in quick succession at his official Sam
Thong base.
After denying he even received indirect
? U.S. military . support, yang Pao calmly
s climbed into an unmarked American helicop-
ter, guarded by Laotian troops carrying
! American-made M-16 automatic rifles, and
was flown back to his secret Long Cheng
headquarters by a three-man American crew.
I
yang Pao and official verbiage notwith-
1 standing, American involvement in the Lao-
tian conflict takes the following principal
i- rifts: in addition to 75 military advisers Ust-
.the Central 'activities supervised by
} ed as embassy "attaches," about 300 men are
employed in a variety of clandestine military
, In-
telligence Agency. Although technically civil-
ians, many CIA agents, in Laos are former
i
Special Forces soldiers recruited because of
!' 4 military expertise and Vietvrn experience.
THESE EX-GREEN BERETS train *ern-
ment troops, assist wide-range reconnais-
sance teams and plan guerrilla and psy.
chological warfare operations. They wear
combat fatigues and work out of three main
camps, where they administer rigorous traln-:
,
Ing in jungle warfare, guerrilla tactics, conk'
munlcations handling and weapcsmx.
The CIA also maintains and largely controls
Vang Pao's army of approximately 15,000 full-
;4Ime troops.
Official instructions to the contrary, CIA
personnel occasionally accompany these
forces on combat forays. More than 20 agents
have been killed in Laos.
"These guys are tigers," says an American
personally acquainted with many CIA agents
In Laos. "They're tough, intelligent guys ,who
know how to handle themselves. They're not
afraid to mix it up Dein the jungle."
PeThaps, but what happens .wheir a 'tittie..
war threatens to escalate into a huge ugly one
like Vietnam?
"-A top embassy official in Vientiane argia:s:
\ "There is no chance of turning this intu moth-
ler Vietnam. We know the mistakes' made in
? 1Vietnam and we have no intention of rflpoitt-
*g. them. Hanoi understands our, position,
"here. We seek no wider warp":
Trmarii_nund. famtliaa,
The American is, a civilian engineer who
r5Nbefriended ninny agents while helping 'to build.
?
(airstrips on several of.their remote outposts.
"(hey came to Laos because they were fed-,
up. with having their hands tied in Vietnam,"
be says. "Here they're doing things the way ?
they want to and getting better pay for it asi
? tiscs:11."
The CIA mission chief in 'Laos is Lawrence')
Devlin, listed as a "political officer" in the'
.U.S. Embassy. Unlike most political of fic'ers,
however, Devlin flatly refuses to see' report-
ers,
CARGO AND MILITARY supplies a44_.
Well .as personnel 0-4 are ferried thrOughout?';
Laos by Air America and Continental: Air Ser-
vices, private charter firma under contract toi
the; U.S. government.; They are butter known -
as the "CIA Airlines," and most of their .p1lots'.1.
are ex-Air Force officers. , ?
Another form of American air service in
Laos constitutes the most , direct U.S.. in-
volvement in the fighting. Under the 'euphe-,,;
mism of "armed .reconnaissance11. flights,
? .
Thailand-based American jcts and bombers'
have mounted aerial' bombardments equal to:
the pounding taken by North Vietnam prior to,'
? the bombing halt in 1968.
, U.S. pFF1CIAL$ here stress that 'American,
, money: and manpower expenditures in Laos;
are minuscule compared-to those in Vietnam.
Washington ,is 'spending about $30 billion id,
Vietnam and has lost almost 40,000 service4
pen there. Less than 200 U.S. personnel
.postly airmen ? have been killed In, Laos.
A small conflict fought by volunteers may
Approved For Release 2
P 1 Or
ni ' -2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R
DF:V/Ei: , COLO.
POST
E - 252,199
- *z4i1,155. ,
Of 0
No (atal:,,iii.lcu;e Cjrr
'
TT IS difficult to be optimistic about President
Nixon's appeal to Britain and the Soviet
Union for help in dealing with the situation
in Laos. .
The two nations are cochairmen of the 1962
. Geneva accord, guaranteeing Laotian neutrality.
But that accord has been repeatedly abridged
by a number of partles, including the United
States; and it does not stir any deep reverence
in Southeast Asia. ..
Britain has no appreciable influence either in
Vientiane or Hanoi; and though the Soviet
Union has influence in Hanoi, it is unlikely to
exercise it in a way that will be helpful to the
American position.
The best hope for a stabilization of the situa-
tion in Laos lies, not in Angio-Soviet interven-
tion, but in the restraint which Hanoi might
consider it in its own interests to exercise.
There is little doubt that Communist troops
could push on, if Hanoi wanted them to, beyond
the Plaine des Jarres to the royal capital of
Luang Prabang or the administrative capital
of Vientiane. .
But there would be no advantage for the
Communists in seizing those cities and toppling
the neutralist government of Souvanna Phou-
ma; and the disadvantages would 1.;:,. numerous.
Apart from the lengthened supply and com-
munication lines and the danger of attack from
Thailand, the move into western Laos would
be unpopular in Southeast Asia and would
lose Hanoi some friends.
The Communists, .in any case, have never
pushed much beyond the Plaine des Jarres
before, and they may decide to stay put now.
Their course of action, in any case, is not
- . ..___ . .
likely
likely to be altered by action from London or
Moscow.
President Nixon's statement on the Laotian
situation was, on the whole, unsatisfying. It
contained a number of assertions which were
correct in themselves but which gave a mis-
leading rather than an accurate picture of the
situation.
The President acknowledged for the first
time that the United States has been flying
combat support missions in Laos. But he made
no mention of the special army of Meo tribes-
men, which has been organized, paid, supplied,
guided and masterminded by the United States,
through its Central Intelligence Agency.
It was that army, with transportationand
combat support from U. S. planes, which seized
the Plaine des Jares from the Communists late
last summer, at a time when the United States
was saying very little about the Geneva agree-
ment and the principle of neutrality.
r-,Tro report on Laos without describing the
1 costly and extensive efforts of the CIA in
that country is to leave out the largest part of
the story.
It is also small comfort for the President'
to report that "no American stationed in Laos
has ever been killed in ground combat opera-
tions" when there have been nearly 400 casual-
ties in the air war and 400 planes have been
lost.
We are pleased to have the President say::
that he is not planning any escalation of the
war in Laos. We' would be even more pleased!
if he would announce a deescalation, both inl
our official and unofficial activities in thati
country.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
STATINTL
LOS ANGS:h:;.:.; TILIES
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 ? CIA-RDP80-01601R0
TOP SECRET CASUALTY (1) MAR '17o
:1 . can army captain was',
. , .?.t. Communis stronghoid oa,
. ,
, . presence
...' ' the plain. Another Ameri.a,
? s attached to the
; lion, whose Thai batt..':
rile, ' .S. Officer, Was -Kiiied .. Laos also was top secret.' :
011 Feb. 11, Bush and his ' :
. sergeant helped coordins`.
? ate ground action involv-
ing Thai artillery, Amen-'
can air power and Lao
; . . ? infantrymen a g a i n s t a.:.
BY DON. A SCHANCHE Communist force that was,..?
? dug in on a? road a few?,?, -
miles east of Muong SOLII..;*.-
. Army adviser to the Royal Army of .r., Don A. Schanche; a free-lance. After the day's action, the".
Laos, was killed by North Vietna-. ! write!. who visits Laos frequently, two retired to their own. '
. was living among the embattled Meo barbed-wire compound at..
a . mese soldiers in ground combat at , . '
tribesmen there last winter, prepar. the Muong Soul military,'.'.
' Muong Soul, on the western edge of -. ing his book, "Mister Pop: The Ad. headquarters.. The: That
the Plain of Jars, on Feb. 11, ,1969 1 'ventures of a Peaceful Man in a artillerymen 'and their:ad-
.:
?
' viser
,Before he was almost cut in half by.; I ;Small War" whieh will be published were blvouacked'orf ?
's.
e n e my automatic :weapons fir eo.:'?bY David McKay Co. on April 13. He a hill about 20: minutes'.
k ? ? ? ?? ?
_ ,was formerly managing editor of the
;Bush, a light-haired, ?crew-cut infan wal away. i ; ;
; Saturday :Eveng Post, editor-In- Lightly GUarded'.'
I try Officer, killed one Communist , ? in
;Soldier. . ; '..:'chief, of Holiday, military editor or , As the story wai recon-:
I was spending the night in a Lars
Life, and an International News structed the',next day by: ?
: ',
refugee village about 30 miles south : ' Service war correspondent in Korea. ; sgt. "Smokes'. and,, other.
of Muong Soul on the night BushA few.
days aftcr the fatal rnilitarY !survivors who. included 12.
?
'died. Had I not been on hand early - ?actien recounted here, he was oral U.S. Air Force radar tech-?'
? 'the ? next,. .morning when Bush's :'.dCred by the U.S. EmbassY in Viensmicians and a .11'SAID sup-s,
'assistant, a Negro sergeant who was ? ? ;.: tiane to Jeave the battle area, and ply specialist; named Bob
,the-. fenced eorn- ;
f
called "Smokes" was evacuated for ,;embassy officials refused, on grounds parshaii.
" treatment of abullet wound in the : . of Secrecy to discuss the affair or to ; pound was only lightly i
;: acknowledge officially the death of ;guarded by four ? Lao so!.
right shoulder, I would never have
?
. learned of the incident. The U.S, ;slier& It contained a long
;.:Csaptaha:BusA? . . .
'Embassy in Vientiane immediately ..1,s.
. declared the captain's brave' death .:'! alltIllintiln Alla wood htu.
! top secret and has not confirmed it .'s . Bush and the SO to 100 ? used by Bush mid timokc:;
I qualersand
to this day. : other U.S. Army men who . ;.15 tiler living
! President Nixon's statement that, ' worked mien the (111)10. 1 !radio center. 'Nearby was '
* "no American stationed in Laos has ,..' r, mak. cover of "assistant ;another, smaller' ..altunin-
:ever been killed in ground combat :! ' military attaches" as unit ;um hut occupied by Par- .
. operations," therefore, .is incorrect.',"- ?: advisers to?the Lao army, ;f41m11- .and near tluit an
AY squad tent had been
? Bush's death was not the only.,?? were definite lien I erected only the day he-
ground combat fatality' in.. Laos.. A ."S ground combat -
fore to house the Air
. half-dozen young Americans, work-, ,'-,' ?
. was in northeast winter isms Force men. Immediately
,
s ing for the U.S. Agency for Interna- - , ' I during ch utside of .the compound
of the
tional Development, (USAID) and ; . . t of 1069. muAt the time, the i
. :International Voluntary Services, . I P,eyal Lao :1,rsity and the was the thatch4.overcd ;
: native house of the local
have been killed. in ambushes bys4 i CIA - supported clandes
, Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese!' 1 tine army of Meo tribes- military commander, a ;
'soldiers since the Geneva accords of ; I men under Maj. Gen. Vang Lao colonel. '
The midnight attackswas 1
-;1962. One of them, Don Sjustrom of ? 1 Pao, hod suffered severe a- smoothly executed coin- ,
' Seattle, Wash., was shot in the head 'setbacks throup,hout :the mando raid by a force of ?
during a North Vietnamese raid on a ?. I northeast 110Vi11CPS of Sam from 30 to 40 North Viet-
Lao, Army base called Nha Kang, ''Nena and Xian"nnu ang' 31 a m e's c soldiers armed '
I' They were engaged in
? north of the ' Plain of Jars, in . with Soviet -made 23 - au ,
' January, 106S.. ? !light holding actions, with. I rockets and AK-47 aut
tthe support of U.S. Air o- 4
Sjustrom, carrying a loaded shot- I Force and Navy fighter-
: the
rifles. The first tar- 1
? get was e Lao colonel's
- I
? gun for protection, was cut. down as '. ? z,bombers, at mountain ba7 house, which collapsed in
he tried to dash from the hut in .. s ses a u r rO u n d i n g the ' flames after a North Viet. 1
? which the had been . sleeping to a : ? .
plain.strategic
. ..natitese tossed a ? hand l
i'.
? nearby radio shack to call for help. s . Thal Airlift grenade into an opervwin-
' As a refugee relief 'worker for ,dow. ? I
? USAID, he was not 'technically a? At Main &ad, where
t
combatant, but he .did tie. in corn.. i? - ?
? Bush was attached to a Infant. Wounded I
;'Lao army unit made up of The explosion left the ;
bat on the ground.: : . i . ;. ....) . ? , "..., . former neutralist soldiers::, colonel and his wife with? ;
r, ? ":':a battalioa' of Royal Thai '?flesh wounds and ripped i
? ? artillery had been ,airlifted,,,' away the entire left but- ,
Approved For Release 2001tila4aho ...Allighigraitattitot01 -2
? .
En Barde, With Reds.. in Laos
? . s'D 1970, Los Angeles TIM'S
Capt. Joseph Bush, an American
?
n brit. .1 Tin !'.'"
Lon Angeles Times STATINTL
Approved For Release 2nkekarCIA-RDP80-01601R000
..WAR IN 11 E LAND, OF UNANGRY Mrir
The Pentagon claims there are only 1,040
Since gaining independence in 1933, Laos U.S. government employes living in Laos,
and asserts that none are military personnel.
and CIA men and former Green Berets , have
But many others commute (from Thailand)
been seen in action advising Laotian ?
commanders. Sen. Robert C. 'Byrd (D-W
has eought only obscurity. 4-'1. writer once
called the gentle, friendly Laotians "the
world's last unangry men." .
? Unfortunately, the country was given a
front-row, center seat in Southeast Asia:
1,aos borders China. North and South L . :Va.) recently said he had heard reports "that,
? Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma.
Despite international agreements signed in ?..',.' ? .
Geneva in 1954 and in 1962 which pro- 1 Americen advisers are all but ,rUnning the'
claimed its neutrality, Laos is now the site of . :;.,,.Laotian forces."
?;', 'base at Long Cheng reported '
la'pernien who slipped in unnoticed
IP 14(/
seeing ailed Americans in civilian clothes.
-*/? Even if the United States has no combat
.? troops in Laos, the presence of these'.
' The Geneva accord of 1962 was signed by . . advisers is a violation, since the.ac.cord ?
14 countries. including the United States ...?specifies that the ban on "foreign military,.,
personnel," includes "members of foreign ,
military missions, foreign military advisers, ?
??? technicians, observers . . . and foreign'-
. civilians." ? ..
The U.S. bombing ? raids are also a ?
vieietion. They have two functions: in ,
- - s-s ern Laos, to hinder infiltration by
he United States pulled out its advisers . nk 'V ietnam into South Vietnam, and in :
?before the October, 1962, deadline. More ' northeastern Laos, to aid Laotian troops..
than a month later, the ICC reported that . North 'Vietnam now has 67,000 troops in the'
.
ionly 40 North Vietnamese troops had filed
, country, according to the Pentagon, and has!
. (past its checkpoint. Others slipped out taken over most of the fighting from the.
:secretly. But in all, an estimated 10,000 were Pathet Laos. ? ? ? ,
c,......,,, left behind, a clear violation.
The Geneva Agreement also established a
tripartite government, representing factions
, of the right, lefts and center,. Neutralist
? Prince S o si v a n n a Phouma headed t h e
government.
- Within two years, It fell apart when the
' four left-wing Pathet Lao representatives
withdrew. Soon, the Pathet Lao guerrillas,
a war involving the United States and North
Vietnam. . s to the I
Who 13 violating the Geneva accords,
North Vietnam or the United States? The
AllSWC1', 1110A observers agree, is both?
although both den' it. .
?-????,1
and North Victnain. (The United States did
not sign the 1954 agreement.)
The treaty stipulated the terms under
which the three-member International Con-
trol Commission (Canada, India and Poland)
would enforce and observe the withdrawal
of "foreign military personnel" from Laos.
? backed by North Vietnamese troops, at-
tacked government-held positions. .
The Pathet Laos were experienced fight-.
ers, having battled right-wing Laotian forces
(financed by the United States) throughout ? c.
the late 1950s. The Geneva Agreement of j s.
1962, Bernard Fall wrote, "left Laos as
divided as ever ... . but with the key
? difference that the pro-Communist Laotian "
forces were?20 times larger and much better
trained and equipped than in 1959."
The rebels soon captured the Plain of Jars 1
and threatened to cut. off the administrative
capital of Vientiane from the royal capital of I
Lubang Prabang. -
In the spring of 1064, a State Department .,
bulletin says, Souvanna requested "addition-
al US. military assistance, and the United ?
States continued within the framework of
the Geneva Agreement to supply military e
equipment and supplies s . . and reconnais-
6ance
But there was more. 'U.S. advisers were
sent into Laos. The Central Intelligence '
Agency financed the establishment of a
mercenary army of Meo tribesmen and. set
up headquarters in Long Cheng. ,
For years, the United States would not
admit that it was bombing inside Laos. In
December, President Nixon admitted that
the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos was being hits!
but only, he said, to strengthen the positionl
of U.S. troops in South Vietnam.
The United States justifies its aid on the
grounds that Premier Souvanna requested
the help. Souvanna, himself, said last week ?
that U.S. assistance was not a violation
because the North 'Vietnamese troops en-
tered the country first. ?
Two wrongs have not made a right in Laos.
fut they, have helped Flake a war. ? ? ?
i? ? ? ? ? ?STEVE HARVEY'
'es
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
1\1E17 1;01iii: 111.14;14
Approved For Release 200WilgoCIA-RDP80-091TIMIWCIO
present offensive was made-;"
...-..--i Vietnamese 'promised little. The : many months ago. 4
C) 1. ,. ? aging Hanoi in Laos, has been
. ,i, . Soviet Union, while not encour-
1. ' Sources with access to intelli-
Nixon i
; gence estimates now believe that!
' reluctant to oppose operations , the North' Vietnamese thought' 0
'
Tries
to the Chinese for help. The
,
. there because Hanoi would turn , they could move with impunity.,%
ijThey saW the United States try.:1
'
Russians are anxious not to see,
I
?ing to disengage in Vietnam.1
DiPlOnlaCV an expansion of Chinese influ-
Moreover, they were lulled by.
I ... . ene, either in North Vietnam or I.-
?, five years of desultory resistance.
i -
'J
ti On Laos .. . in Laos.
The President's statement was
-
/
,
i
, ;, from Laotian Government forces..
.
an effort to divert the steady I
1 No Negotiations
. ! 1
criticism that has peppere), the Sources aware of policy dee!. .1 '
, Administration from Capitol Hill.j . elons here said that the Adminis-4
. . It tried to put the onus for the i ,: tration could see no passibility of,
: WASHINGTON ? The North 'present tension in Laos on the negotiating with Hanoi on Viet-.
Vietnamese
Vietnamese and their Pathet Lao North Vietnamese. . slam if the North Vietnamese to- "7 '
; allies produced the first impor- In a largely historical review I. .tally broke the Geneva accords ill
%tent., indication last week that of the American involvement Laos. The United States, they
; their ,offensive in Laos is intend- ' there, the President disclosed f said, could also not permit Laos .
7ze,d---to force the United States', little that had not been known to become a safe haven for North 1
'Me politicalconcessions there? ;before. ? The American objective i Vietnamese operations In Viet. i
f. and perhaps in Vietnam. From I In the landlocked country, the ',nem or infiltration into Thailand.'i -
f Hanoi, the Pathet Lao informa- - President said, was to "save ' Hence, the clandestine army oil'
.tion bureau issued a nee-point ; American and allied lives in General yang Pao, which is
'. statement Friday demanding, in ,I North Vietnam which are threat- nanced by the C.I.A., was in.' V' ?
k essence, that the United States . ened by the continual infiltration structed to blunt the North Viet.' '
? Cwithdraw from Laos completely of North Vietnamese troops and namese offensive, but not to go..4
t and that a new coalition govern- 'supplies along the Ho Chi Minh' beyond the five-year pattern of
? ment be established under Pathet 'trail.?' seasonal offensiv,es.
i Lao domination. ; He stressed the earch fcr , General Van Pao, the former 4
I. The Pathet Lao proposal was ' place throughout Indochina but ' French army sergeant, caught the t
l
, similar to those that have been I nowhere did he contend that , 'North Vietnamese off guard. See-`,,
imade by Hanoi and the Vietcong Laos itself is vital to United . .Ing a chance to break the backj
0 in the conflict in Vietnam?and States national interests.
en-
that the United States has found"'
Among the notable omissions ,couraged by his C.I.A. advisers, 't
? of the North Vietnamese, and '41
/unacceptable. But in Laos, Wash- I from the President's statement', he struck out westward across
,ington's bargaining position is 'i was a full , explanation of rhow)
t. the Plaine of Janes with the sup.
-. markedly weaker. Congressional the' present confrontation with '; send of American air transport
,opposition to deeper American
involvement in Laos, and pledges-
\ the North' Vietnamese came 1
i about or what the Administra-,- . -
1 kW bombing.
The general, an aggressive Meo,
? - 1 .
by the Administration that the 1 tion would do if it found the'
I Mountaineer and not a assive
United States will not commit diplomatic channel , to resolve! P /
i Lao flatlander, overextended hisl
itself to a w; ler war in Souths, the cenflict closed
was evidence here lasti . I forces but wanted to hang onto'j
east Asia, lim.t President Nixon's , There,
. 'his conquered territory. That's.*
loom for maneuver,week that the tension was pro-1 i -
where he miscalculated. The ,
' At almost the same time that . '[yoked through miscalculations;
,North' - Vietnamese, however,"i.
the Pathet Lao spoke up in Ha- massed their forces to retake the ,?: '
noi, President Nixon issued n 'by the North Vietnamese on one
3,000 word statement on Laos iside and, on the other by the,1 plain and route the clandestine j
' army. That brought the decision,
from Key Biscayne, Fla. That , clandestine army of Maj. Gem', ''-'
i -after some delay, to bring in the.
. Vang Pao and his American, ad."
American B-62 bombers in an eV-
statement, in the view of Wash.,
.ington observers, was primarily ?visert from the Central Intern. -. '
;; ',tempt to slow .the North Viet.'
an effort by the Administration I
. gence Agency. .
I namese ground advance.
,to retrieve something from the' The President noted that the ., .,
li
"military and political reverses 1North Vietnamese had built pp 1 i'
- The result, authoritative sources
th here said,
has suffered in Laos?and e ;
, their forces in Laos to 67,000 , here said, 'was to' put the North
?
!1. 4
'political lasses it has sustained I men, far larger than ever before. , ;Vietnamese in a dominent pos1-
' : 1
at home?over the last few 'ttr hose soldiers, mostly in main.':; ton to overrun 'all of Laos at
I.'
?weeks. , , iterre divisions, have been better will. The official newspaper in,
-
1 ;
, Mr. Nixon revealed a new dip. ?1 equipped and better armed with -1 7 Hanoi called the sweep of the:
f1
i
$lomatle effort to stabilize the tanks and heavy artillery Plaine of Jarres a 'brilliant vic.
?and ,,'
. , ;
situation through appeals to the '1
;Wave been backed by more bL 1 tory" and called for a march to ti
e
Soviet Union and Britain, co. I ligerent propaganda?than ,in ,unified Laos and the overthrowi.
, lof "the clique of traitors," mean- ,
chairmen of the Geneva Confer- i '
earlier campaigns.
1 Ina the Government of, Premier
... ence of 1963 that agreed to the . , Last 'spring, the North Viet- I; ---- ,....,_
,accords providing for peace, 'nu- 11 niunese pushed. farther across -'1iDul7aRna.Phourna- ;i: , - ''. '
; trality, and independence , for ,the Plaine des .larres 'than, in i,11,44alltleilARD VAILLORAt
? 4
;Laos. ,.previous, offensives, leacling au-,??: ?
?. .1
on past experience, asking the thoritlative SCAMS bore ,to coo.1
134118414.M., MAUI ..the '..ZiOrtia!,:'iftW4/?Allt..14.1091140.4.40t4,.
' Approved For Release 2001/63/04 :.CIA-RDP60.-01601 R000700050001-2 ..
. . .
STATI NTL
Approved For Releasp..?).9pitto,/S4,;:pl?PA-RDP80-01601R0
MAR 1970
Laos Raids Feed Flames of War,
-Soviet Press Says; Laird J?ded
14.
,?
//
Moscow?(UN)?The Soviet
prtss warned yesterday that
U. S. air raids in Laos "are
feeding the flames of war in
Southeast Asia."
There was no Moscow re-
sponse to President Nixon's
plea for Russian help in scal-
ing down the fighting.
An article in the weekly news-
'Paper of the Soviet Journalists
Union, Life Abroad, derided
Defense Secretaiy Melvin R.
Laird for reportedly saying that
U. S. air operations in Laos
were necessary because of
Laos' proximity to North and
South Vietnam.
It said Laird "thus wants one
crime directed against peace
and security to justify others."
Expansion Charged
"Pacts show that Washing-
to 's present course in south-
east Asia as well as in the Far
East and the Pacific is aimed
at extending U. S. expansion in
key, locations of this wide re-
gion," the Moscow newspaper
said.
. .
It charged that the United
States was "seeking to stran-
gle the patriotic forces in
Laos" and said American pol-
icy "keeps a whole army of
Pentagon and CIA adviser
there in violation of the Ge-
neva agreements."
"Since there is no end in
sight to the Vietnam war,
American military may turn the
entire Southeast Asia region
into an area of aggression,"
the newspaper said.
Pravda Plays Up Dissent
Pravda, the official -news-
paper of the Soviet Communist
Party, gave prominent display
to Washington reports citing
criticism of U. S. moves in Laos
by Sens. George McGovern (D-
SD) and J. William Fulbright
(D-Ark).
The Sovet Union has special
diplomatic responsibility and
authority in Laos in its capacity
as co-chairman, with Britain,
Of the 1962 Geneva Conference
which sought to establish Laos
as a neutral state.
In his policy statement Friday
President Nixon said he had
asked both British Prime Min-
ister Harold Wilson and Soviet
Premier Alexei N. Kosygin to
open diplomatic channels aim-
ed at ending the war in Laos.
Diplomatic sources in London
aid yesterday that Wilson was
studying the ? letter over the
weekend.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
tit
TINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-016 A
ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST-DISPATCH
E 345,675
S ? 581,591
MAR 8 1970
Laos An
,
iThiIr ?? I JL
r"-cit
,
Thc stafement on Laos President Nixon was achieve a settlement 'of the War in 1,9etnam.
forced by congressional pressure to issue was vAll(V.it _has fail.ed,tO.'echireere settlerrient, net .
aimed at 'calming fears that while ostensibly because of Tianoyntrettelf:eneo aS wi are con-
windingedown the war in Vietnam we may be stantly being toldi"butlxesically beenele in
sliding into an equally evil war in Laos.' Tte- Adreiliiistretion,:itaa'ne.. tried for '''a' se',.t.:?,ereent
gardless of Mr. Nixon's assurance that no on e.'ier.re'elletid terme.'
ground troops.. will be sent into 'Laos?some'- ? For menyrnonths.nove the ,signals have. been
? thing that was said about Vietnam, too, at one dlying to indicate that Hanoi arid the'NLIe'Would
time?the real issue is broader than that. The,e 13-eree.eptive tO-riebargain whie.h?-eet'up a LC"
question is why we should be in Laos at alL pOear coalition' goveenment 'etot,''Controlled. by
Clearly AmericanSedon't want ground troope. 01 'ConimuiH5: fowl: w hi (*Maintained
sent in fiut why should they tolerate a policy:, eseliaration bets een puth encleiv.ortl-e-1.71etrreeo.
which allows the CIA to run a secret war fer-at'lea.et Acne years, vzitil the eeiee'le them-
. .
inercenateelreopS, Which' calls upon U.S. bomb-. ,',. eie!IVee :by. election decided what to '1(5 1111011t It.
etc to fly as many Missions as were once flown..,,, kjertsonahle, coMprohise Pr P1
against North Vietnam, which enlists air pow -: :"..orieewhichieittained'our anneunced goal a 'self;
er from Navy carriers, which depends upon. 'dctelloination, but: the ITixorl'Arhninieteeition.
American ilitary "advisers" (just like the ride:" Nvill:ilat-Op'disoiss iteIn.stenele'tite talka'
visers who preeeded combat troops into Viet- '-''haVe '.heeneconSIS'iteritly .46preeiate4 en-ed. sold.
nam) whether in or out of uniform? If it is a reliancs' for '.vimilinee {Intel the ,eesr..'ben been
mistake to commit combat troops to Ieiese it ' ;.'reposed 4n 'n Vietnetnization 1:urograre'whichtis
is also a mistake to commit all t has a, othericebeund to ,mean ineintaining th i Ameeie ,n,pres-
military resources, and it should be the goat). ,c.riclefor'.ye.are to cc no,if not -forever.' ?
of American policy to liquidate the comenite. ", Li .the 3Z Geineva 'agre.einentSOn
nient as rapidly as possible. Peesident; prorierly redepted atieutre:i-
The reason this has not been done is, that zetiort al ;a: p;:?.optere'gp?Al.' of Ainerieare: policy
the war in Laos is indissolubly linked te the there The.,V3.2..agreemente, did.noteSticle
war in Vietnam, by geography if by nothing- t cauee?wee'clid not ..go''forther', and. acc reee nett-
else. To end our involvement in Laos it ls'neC- tral.:.zatieir.'aS'the,propereqbjeetivd:ili..Vieltnarn;
essary to end our involvement in Vietnam, end.i'InSfeael,:eve';e'es,Cield tbe. Ware and :.made the ,
the simple, truth is ,that a decision to do tbie continpeCitiv,Olvernent,':of Laos; inethe war in
has never been made by the .Nixon Adminis- eyitable. , Mr. Nixon'se'appeel.e4o; Russia anei
tration. ? . Britain to:help:restore 'peace in 'Laos is rather'
On the contrary, the Administration's policy fatuouse neither the IluSsians not the British
of Vietnamization is intended to achieve thee: hey? Arotipe 'fighting in ? S,otiillettet.' Asia. The
same goals?that is, themilitary defeat of the 'Ainericaiii i'eliduld"firit get out of Vietnam to,
Viet Cong and the imposition of the Thieuelie:".:..Aake'.etiteli an apt'al credible
government' on the people .of South Vietnan Today there e311 no doubt that the Anieri-
--Ahat we sought to achieve by direct engagee, 0.1-1"poxi neutralization as the
1!meat in warfare. Not pniil our policy makers e:objective. Vietnam If the Nixon. Adminis-
,
adopt different goals can a .genuine disengage ''!'"tratieniwould''suPPorteit; instead' of dereandin
reent be expected, and not' until the Vietnam ";: continued .15.,4.,,Inilitary preeence in Vouth-
l'', war is ended can t:ie Laos war :be onC16d,:;::-.'.!:.i7',!4.:,ArA.,,W4.1;`:,V:ky,k7f,,jiip,i1.1.,'Ikar could ha jeeetticti,
What is going on in Laos,?Cren, is a dire:et? wouIcl Firn
reflection of the AdMiniStro.tion's, failure' etoee'?,plyotliSappear,,,
?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :,CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
ST. LOUTS, MO I
pook_m9x,EltiPor Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160
STATINTL
E ? 345,675
S ? 531,591
lqiAR 19.141
(Th
dministration Cites Anew.,
Laos's Importance To U.S.
By R ICI IA D DUDIVIAN 1:: 0"stop, he said, "those who support a truly the line is that Laos is important because'
neutral Laos will have to consider their
Chief Washington Correspondent what's going on there is integrally related ?
of he Post-Dispatch i response.
rto the war in Vietnam.
In the standard mix of deference to el-
WASHINGTON, March 7 ?,.! ; lies, prudence about American involve-
? AFTER YEARS of explaining" ment and assertion of American power,
. .1%! lie sa'd? .
t that ? Laos is unimportant, the`:. "dila.. response will be made in close
t United States Government has ''.,.t to-operation with our allmieesnatn We
will
o
d the
back to the line that what es of the Laotian govern ?
'happens there is vital to U.S. in.'!' or any other situation; but I know that
t terests. q every American will want his country to
.fI?
I..* Ever since the Geneva Agreement of ? honor its obligations to the point that
.,be provoked, trapped or drawn into this
AS FOR prudence, the AdministrationN,
line is that the U.S. involvement is a mod-
est one and that it has been increased.
only in response to escalation by the ;
Communist side. The use of B-52 heavy.'
bombers in the fighting for the Plain of
Jars is described as very limited and',
symbolic, as contrasted with the satura-.;
tion bombing of the Ho Chi Minh trail in ;
?
southern Laos.
. 1962, which was intended to neutralize the C , freedom and security of the free world: A notable omission In what amounted to /
F tiny landlocked country and put it under a and ourselves may be achieved." la presidential white paper on Laos was i
coalition government, Laos has lapsed ?? This time around, Government officials any mention of the number of American .
into the relative obscurity of a third-class .! all over town are busy briefing members' !military men assigned to the war there, .
f?
of Congress and reporters once more on but based across the Mekong in Thailand:.
Ii trouble spot.
?
importanc
. the e of. Laos. News dispatehrs from Laos suggest that
Every year since then, the Communist '
PRESIDENT R i c h a r d M. Nixon put , there is an element of subterfuge in the
I
side in the, endemic civil war has pressed ' ?
f forward toward the Mekong River, which, .?
3 some of their interpretation on the public repeated denials by the President that 1
! ' divides Laos and Thailand, in a dry-sea-v, , there are no U.S. combat ground troops.
record in a statement yesterday from the
l in the country. 'three r e p o r t e r s who.
son offensive that always could have tak-:1 Florida White House and admitted for the
, e over the whole country but never did. , walked about 10 miles to the secret U.S.
I first time that U.S. support forces have,
Every year, in the wet summer months, 1 : ppo 'base at Long Chen.; last week reported:
the Royal Lao Army and an auxiliary '
army of mercenaries operatedbythe;
iV Central Intelligence Agency have pushed:.
1.,. the Cowmenist:;ferrer=rtoward China..
' and North- Vietnam. These government of-.
f e n s i v e s, likewise, usually could have;
-gone farther than they did. 1
I., Casualties have been few in this per-i)
l'ennial tidal movement across the jungles)
and plains of the Laotian Piedmont Each
side faded back before the other's offen-
sives. Neither waited for the other side's
troops to 'get close enough to see the
e whites of their eyes.
p A nineteenth century' gag about Vienna ,
was reapplied to Laos: "The situation is t:
hopeless, but it's not serious."
been flying combat support missions in, that American military advisers and train-
? northern Laos. ers there were mostly former Green Berets
' He added a note of diplomatic drama who had been transferred temporarily to.
, by appealing publicly to the British and the CIA as civilian contract employes.
Soviet cochairmen of the 1962 Geneva . Mr. Nixon's assertion'that he has no in-:
Conference to help restore the agreement Atention of putting U.S. ground forces in
on Laotian neutrality. , 'Laos echoed what other officials had been?
. .,
Privately, the official word already had ? saying for a week to reassure anxious
been that the enemy advance in Laos pre- ,Senators. Actually, the sending of U.S.,
sented "a very tough situation." And a ;ground combat troops to either Laos or'
high Administration official had told Sen- 'Thailand is prohibited?by an amendment'
ator J. William Fulbright (Dem.), Arkan- 'to the Military Appropriations Act, which ,
sas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela-:was adopted overwhelmingly and which] '
t Ions Committee, that the situation in Mr. Nixon said later he approved.
Laos now was more serious than that in 1 .
Vietnam. , IF THE Communist offensive has rurr,
The consistent key of this orchestration:. its course, the crisis is over. If it contin-,
I was one.of prudent concern, with empha-,, ties, the Administration's view is that the.
-q. THE LAST TIME Laos was elevated to ,i' ' ,sis on prudence. 'enemy objective niay be to open a newt
' Concern over the importance of the cri-'' froht because of its supposed difficulties;
p a first-class trouble spot was in 1961 when . t
a s s was expressed in a peculiarly round- i,in carrying on the war in Vietnam. i
i it was the first international crisis to con-1 . I d ?
i'' front the late President John F. Kennedy. , 1 about way. Government officials no longer e1 An additional possibility, officials say,:
. is that Hanoi seeks to blackjack the Lao
Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower had discussed I want to talk about Vietnam as being im- , -,
..! Laos at length and in grave terms in their A i
. 1 , po , e annotklice
rtant be cause the dl
p an Is to tian governmeneinto halting U.S. bomb'',
; preinaugural talk. !I 1 withdraw. gradually. Certainly. no on n .. Ing attacks on the Ho Chi Minh trail. The.
/ Barely ii. month after taking office, Mr. ?,
Kennedy stood before three maps at a , ; ,.., . ?,. ' ? ? ? ,?? , ? .. ,? 1 ? , .. ;; .,-, . , . .tremely effective, although the infiltrationi
wants to naii.Laol important hi itself. But j Pentagon insists that these raids are ex-.
?
. press conference on March 23, 1961, and 1 .".4.4. "1",s1-iw-s.,4,-st.1614:-',-.14!s:-+ ? on men and supplies continues. i
6
(?N.. I' pointed out how the Red tide had flooded'i
? ;
_. I. across much of the country. i
r President Kennedy called for an end of
'. "the' present armed attacks by external's!
4 il sUpported Communists." If they ilid'notl
. Still another possible enemy objective-
. acknowledged by Administration ?Melia,
Actkadr up a new surge of antiwar senti.!
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80=Q1601R000706Mialal-2
Approved For Release,200411004 POIMAIMK1
PARADE
8 Mar 1970
1,0 7,71-
FalliTES EVEC!Al.
EDITED by LLOYD SHEARER?
BECAUSE or VOLUME Or MAIL RECEIVED. PAM:* BEICIBEIS IT CANNOT ANSWER QUERIES ABOUT MIS COLUMN.
,t?.:i . _..... . _ _ _ _
.7.;.' Laos. The U.S. is spending
,
Few men-* countless millions year after .:;1
:1.'W 'Itaii' 114. ? . in gov- . year to prevent the Pathet Lao ,1
.%.-
ernment, however high or ex-
,alted their positions, have the:.
.str-ngth of Character to admit
, publicly, "I goofed."
The result is almost always
,,..,
P;. 1). coverup of their wrong deal-.
::?;'sions and a denial of access to
V information revealing the
' . t th
? ru .
Their refusal to tell the
truth is generally rationalized
on the grounds of "national, '
security."
f
r. It is possible that the
American public has learned
more about the war in Southeast
'Asia from the press and TV ,
than from all the agencies of
:government combined.
For example, what has the
Government told the people
-'about the war in Laos? Very
little, except that we have
committed no ground troops
there.
From the press, however, we
learn that U.S. advisers are
'running the Laotian army. U.S:
helicopters are ferrying Lao-,
tian troops. U.S. planes are
providing air support for the.
Royal Laotian army which is
fighting the Communists. U.S.
bombers from Thailand and
'Okinawa are bombing the Ho Chi
Minh Trail in Laos day after A
day. The U.S. Air Force has '
- lost more than 100 flyers overl
7. Laos. The U.S. is paying the
salaries of thousands of mer-
cenaries :fightina'for,us in. . atd
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
the Communist guerrilla move- -11
ment, from winning in Laos. The ,
- involvement of our CIA in Laos -
is deep, wide, and intense. .,
In 1960 the late President
Kennedy said of ;ads that we
should, stay out, that it is t
."the wrong war at, the wrong ?
. ? *
?
!place and at the wrong time."1
,'Times have changed, and per-'i
haps our intervention in LaosA
;.',is 'necessary to protect our
;-.western flank in Vietnam. -.1
If that is the case, cer- 1
;tainly the war-paying public,
'despite the protests of the
?
U.S. State Department, should
be told at least some truth of lm--
:the American -fighting.role
Jeop. What it is,'how much lt
c1o0s, what ip happening there
who put us in1ao, why, and
,
?
TIJE WASIII;;GTON POST STATINT
Approved For Release 2001finflignIA-RDP80-01601R00
?
? By Stanley Karttoto
.
Wiiphingtori Pop( Foreign Service
?IJONG KONG?Historians striving ,f?
A.-1- to understand America centuries
'hence may well be baffled by a nation ?
ithAt was able to land men on the moon ,
:with pinpoint precision yet could stum-
. !hie myopically into a situation as ob-
scure as the latest crisis in Laos.
The untidy tale of U.S. involvement',
th Laos over the past 15 years has been ,
?story of illusory objectives and
opsy-turvy tactics that should really':
"be described in novel form to be be-
1.evable. The origin of this commitment.
:was the attempt by the Eisenhower ,
dministration to transform a delight-
.tnlly primitive country 'into an "anti-
ommunist bastion."
The purpose was to set up a buffer.
:between Red China and Thailand, the
eystone of the U.S. defense system .
At? Southeast Asia, but it failed to yet,-
)3gnize that Laos, still slumbering in
'Medieval happiness, was unprepared
o participate in the Cold War. As A
!consequence, its pristine society was
Iti/srupted.
Moreover,*-
with the escalation of the'?
Onflict in neighboring Vietnam, Laos
3rcame an adjacent battlefield--with '
ime significant difference. The differ.??
,elice was that while the United States
as openly engaged in Vietnam, suc-
I.,essive administrations in Washington ,.
'strenuously sought to camouflage U.S. '
iltilitary activities in Laos.
,E??
Mutual Fiction
r
44 been to conceal the fact that the
mericans have been as guilty as the'
;communists of violating the 1962 Gen- ?
ieva agreement which guaranteed Lao-
neutrality. That Hanoi never with-
'thew Its legions from Laos after sign- ,
.Ing the Geneva accord is common
nowledge. An estimated 50,000 North
;Iyietnamese troops comprise the main .
kCommunist force in the country, and,-
?
1h etc are three or four Red Chinese
,battalions in northern Laos to protect ,
:coolies building roads.
;.'.'And since the Communists adam-
,1 ntiy refuse to admit their presence, '
he United States has felt compelled
deny that Central Intelligence,
.?
HE IDEA BEHIND this fiction has
? charter from Air America and Conti-
nental Air Services. '
The United States has also denied ,
that It equips and finances Thal troops, .
Who handle artillery, communications
and other assignments for which Lao- '
Han soldiers lack the skill, as well as
Philippine and Chinese Nationalist ;
technicians, '
,
Shrouded in secrecy as well for a .
long time were the U.S. bombings of
Communist infiltration routes along .
the. Ho Chi Minh Trail in the Laotian
panhandle, even though these "armed
- reconnaissance flights," as they were
,euphemistically termed, exceeded in in.
tensity the American air raids. on ,
North Vietnam that were halted In
late 1968.
Within recent weeks, a new dimen-
sion in dissimulation has been reached,
In the Nixon administration's insist-
ence, in the face of reliable evidence,. ,.
that s areo e ng employed to,.
support the Mem, who are fighting
funsuccessfully,to defend the Plain of ' '
'Jars north of Vientiane, the Laotian
capital.
Though the chances are probably'
remote that Laos will turn into
"another Vietnam," as Sen. J. W. Fut..:
bright and other administration critics 1,
predict, President Nixon is now con-
fronted by two challenges that have
arisen out of the Laotian mess. First,
if he determines that Prince Souvanna
Phouma's government is threatened
by the present Communist offensive,
the President may feel obliged to un-.1!;
dertake some kind of action to pre.
; Serve the status' quo. His options ap- ?
?
. nowever.
On the one hand, he cannot easily ,
enlist Soviet assistance in persuading
Hanoi to exercise restraint, since the '
North Vietnamese regularly blackmail .
the Kremlin by leaning toward Peking ,
whenever Russian advice displeases ?
them. Nor can Mr. Nixon strike a
menacing pose?as President Kennedy
did when he sent U.S. Marines into
northern Thailand in early 1961?with-
out appearing to contradict his own .."
doctrine of adopting a lower silhouette ,
In world affears.
His best move for the 'moment,
therefore, may be simply to watch ant '?
wait and hope that the Communists
Intend to push no further than to'
&Agency specialists train, 'advise 'and occupy areas . of Laos that they pre- .
tpo' metim ,
WippiledetiL=0147101n.. eZMININ
r I ...on 1.11 444,4,0V4i4 1.40ha41?4:41A., 644...6.4..44,, .4m
over the entire country is that they
6
'have refrained from moving against',
Thakhek, Paksane and Attopeu, south.
ern towns they could capture with. ,
ease.
' ?
In a statement on Friday, morever, ;
they issued a five-point proposal
clearly indicating that their objective
.is a political rather than a military
solution to the Laotian problem ,
based, of course, an their own terms.
A Medieval Anachronism
1
rrillE TEMPTATION to believe al-
J.
most anything about Laos is
comprehensible, since the little king-
dom has remained a fairyland despite
external pressures to bring it into the'
20th century. Its population of about
three million is composed of valley,
Laotians ethnically akin to the Thais,
and a crazy quilt of mountain tribes
like the Meos, Yam and Lobos. Unti1!
a generation ago, when a French
official penciled in ita national bor-
ders, the country was divided into
separate, virtually feudal kingdoms.
The art of politics in Laos, there-'
Fore, is essentially a matter of deals
and accommodations between regional'
clans and Interlocking families, and,
the notion of ideology is as alien as a'.
railroad train. The Prime Minister,;
Souvanna Phouma, is the half-brothcr*.
of the Communist Pathet Lao leader,
Prince Souphanouvong, and both are?
cousins of King Savang Vatthana. The,1
mother of a former prime minister,
Prince Somsanith, is Souvanna Phou-
ma's half-sister. Somsanith is married ?
to another of Souvanna's sisters??.?:
thus making him his own mother's
brother-in-law.
So it is that any government in
Laos is a collection of brothers, uncles,
cousins and relations by marriage,
and their primary function is less to
govern than to preserve the internal ,
balance of power.
In the late 1940s, rebuffed in their.,
appeals for U.S. help against France,
a few nationalist-minded Laotians
Like Souphanouvong gained, the as-, ?
sistance of Ho Chi Minh's Vietminh' .
In organizing the Pathet Lao. And in+ ''
1954, the North Vietnamese managed.
at the Geneva conference to acquire
effective control, of . the northern.
most Laotian -provinces of Phongsaly
414tir6rAttindo 1-22. 44
m'otti
?
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01 -2
AESANY, GA.
, HERALD
E -
S - 3ty bd8
MAR 7 197Q
WHAT'S HAPPENING IN LAOS?
f i ' ? - .
Despite the protestations of the Yet, surely, the issue is not so which s not Communist-controlled
in
American Government to the on-
!much American 'air power in Laos, 'a highly-splintered political condition.
; c
and its operational techniques, but'. Even Even so, Laos, like Vietnam, may
American personnel power, in the
'trary, it would appear that the United not prove ultimately to be a question
States is becoming deeply, perhaps
form of "advisers" or whatever, or
'inextricably, involved in the fighting covertly-employed Green Beret forces
in Laos. President Nixon, who on6e or even Centralintelligence Agenc
professional soldiers or adventurers
earlier in his Administration declared ,pr
.he did not think "the public interest for hire. According to growing re-
would be served by any further dis- ports filtering back from the fast-
icussion" of Laos, now has found it nesses of jungle and plain, more and
,more crew-cut types are being seen
necessary to issue a lengthy position
leverywhere among the Laos and the , .
:paper denying the presence of U. 5
.1' ,
,he proposed to end that war, and WI
, Maos who in turn must be distin- ,
"ground combat" forces there. 'do so on some honorable terms that
guished from the North Vietnamese
Secretary of Defense Melvin.Laird:
who are, beyond any disputation, run- he did not specify..
has pledged solemnly that the Presi7 e are now withdrawing ? slow-, '
fling roughshod over much of the i
ident of course will go to the Congress. IIy ? from Vietnam. Are Nye, now
? geography of Laos. ? ?
Yerhaps some of the reports are 'escalating swiftly in Laos? The Pres-
thefor authority if he contemplates any
fanciful, but others doubtless have a 'ident surely was well advised to deny,
change in the military involvement of
measure of validity. And what the 1 such reports in speaking to his coun-,
United States in Laos, although . ?
,that in itself is strictly limited. As ', trymen. Otherwise, he might soon'
? ' ?
Secretary Laird spelled it out just the
situation sums to is something straight have been peering 'across Lyndon'
' 1
other day, "The President has said i out of Terry and the Pirates, although ;Johnson's credibility gap that cost the
that we are using United States airthe,Prestdency.
we have not as yet detected the machi- 1T.exan
rights. Rather, it mar hinge.
eventually on what the American peo-
ple will support in the way of a for-;
eign policy that continues to stick'
fingers into the leaking dikes of
,
Southeast Asia. They do not, clearly,,
like the war in Vietnam. They votedi
for Richard M. Nixon chiefly becausel
nations of a ,slinky Dragon Lady who ,
power as far as the interdiction of
supplies and material coming into is. wowing the bOys back at the can-
Vietnam are concerned: q
teen (provided this concept has .sur-
"Thevived the old Conrad novels.) mission of 'air power, as far \
'
as Laos is concerned, on the Ho Chi Yet Laos, like Vietnam, may not
,
Minh trail, has been handled by the be an entity unto itself. It is all of a:
'
President of the United States and we piece. The Geneva Agreements have
!
have used it in connection with the been abrogated quite cynically by the
'
war in Vietnam. We have of course Communists, and while that circum-
flown reconnaissance missions over '
stance does not justify a compensating
.
Laos on a continuing basis. These re-" abrogation by 'the United States, at
.
connaissance missions have been ac-
least it makes the American effort
ore understandable. With the en-:
complished by armed escort. The im
!e
President has made it clear the mis-
my using Laos as a sanctuary and as
a logistical lifeline, this country has'
sion of our air power as far as the
,
war in Vietnam, and that is all that every right to attack him, and most
'
LI. care t say on it a_this time."' particularlysm'
e he attacks that
1
Approved-for '
Release 200th/bar/Otte CLIAtiRDE48041001 R000700050001-2
44
MN.
Approved For Release 2001100/04rretA-RDP80-
7 MAR 1970
'Cost 01 'Secret' War
Is Secret W
This is the second of two
articles exnminIng the
growth of United States In.
in Laos.
BY a.aalES YUENGElt
AND FltEsi
IChicate Tobuile Press SerrIcrl
Washington, March 6-113r
some estimates, the United
States is 250 million dollars a
yt r, or more, in Laos. Only a
few men in the government
know the exact figure, and
they're not telling.
But a look at a few statistics
that have emerged helps to
clarify the extent of American
involvement in the landlocked
southeast Asian nation.
For instance, the United
States spent 5,0 million dollars
in' Laos i last -year in economic
aid. &portion of this amount-7
otafeMillion?went for "refugee
icf."
Means Population Moves
This meant moving the popu-
lation out of areas threatened
by North Vietnamese and
Pathet Lao troops, providing
them with food, clothing, and
medicine, and resettling them
in areas considered safe.
More specifically, it meant
moving them from the stra-
tegic Plain of Jars, which the
Communists recently recap-
tured. They had lost it last fall
in a surprise offensive, heavily
backed by American planes,
that marked a sharp upsurge in
United States military activity.
On the question of military
aid, which constitutes In fa
the largest amount of Ameri-
can help, an army spokesman
said it's gettir more sophisti-
cated all the thee.
Ships M-16 Rifles
Once it went mainly for
trucks, communications equip-
ment, and support materials.
Now the Nixon administration
Is shipping M-16 rifles there. ?
"And you can bet the first to
get them will be Vang Pao's
people," said the army source.
Pao is the doughty, charis-
matic leader of the_aaga0 Mc,
tribesmen who aWgiU.VUM
?,7 "Vr(
{laawL Yei
.s?
royal Laotian government's
best fighting force. The way the
United States is helping him
' illustrates the basic change in
the nature of the Laotian
conflict.
For many years the Wes
fought a guerrilla conflict with
communist troops in northeast-
ern Laos. It was a see-saw war,
with rainy-season military in-
-activity followed by dry-season
offensives by Communists ' in-
tent on expanding their network
of supply lines along the Ho Chi
Minh trail into South Viet Nam..
250 Sorties Daily .
The guerrilla aspects remain,
but for the last year or so, the
Laotians have been assisted by
American air sorties?esti-
mated at around 260 a day now
in the Plain of Jars alone?that
have drawn outcries from
congressmen who are worried
about the prospects of "another
Viet Nam."
The tactical strikes in north-
east Laos were an open secret
even before Nixon's admission
in Florida today that "combat
support missions" to aid Lao.
tian forces were being flown.
However, the President , re-
frained from listing their full
extent?an omission which may
bring renewed congressional
charges that the administration
should reveal more details.
The Pentagon says that In
October of 196G, the last month
before bombing of North Viet
Nain was halted, American
planes droppNI 122.000 tons of
. bombs in southeast Asia. .
Boinlei Fall on Laos
The bombing figure for Janu-
. ary of ,this year was 117,000
tons. The assmnption is that
bombs once dropped on. North
Viet Nam, are now. falling on
Laos.
What this adds up to is that
the grim reality of superpower
politics no longer permits the
romantic reference to Laos as
"the land of the million ele-
phants and the white parasol."'
Rather, it has been put into
strategic perspective as a buf-
fro PAP to I e6aise14110 NM
STATINTL
in Laoo
5-I1PrS ""
U,J 0
chi g
North Viet Nana and Itea
China,' blocking communist, ac-
cess to Thailand on the south,
Burma to the 'west, and the
remainder of southeast Asia. .
An Annual F.vent
Every spring in recent years
the Communists have regeined.
control over the Plain of Jars,
with its command of the routes
to Luang Prabang, the royal
capital, and Vieellane, the
Laotian administrative capital
A n administration efficial
says the unknown factor today
is whether the Communists,
having lost the Plain of Jars
once, will be content " with
regaining it, or if they \all seek
to push farther into Laos. ? ?
American officials guess that
the North Vietnamese and i
Pathet Lao forces will remain !
where they are, with the
possible 'exception of a few 1
forays beyond their lines for
propaganda purposes.
See Nothing to Gain
"For nine years they've been
coming up to the spot where
they are now," the official said.
"They haven't gone farther yet,
and they don't have anything to
gain by taking all of Laos."
Informed sources say the
Communists are reestablishing
the supply lines to North Viet
Nara that were broken last fall.
It is believed they would find
Laos a nuisance to administer
because of its lack of national
identity, and that a take-over
there would divert communist
energies from the main goal of
maintaining pressure on South
Viet Nam.
In any event, Sen. J. W.
Fulbright ED., Ark.], who is
among the most vociferous
critics of United States involve-
ment in Viet Nam, quotes "high
administration officials" a s
having said that "Laos is even
more important than Viet
Nam."
Fulbright would not identify]
the officials, but his ,comment
came shoetIV after testimony
by :Richard Helms, director
the central intelli ence agency,
lativeriA 804011061
Lions committee. ", .. ?
?0 anti :en k ""'
1'
.covernment officiala mein- 1
tain strenuously that no paral-
lel can be drawn between
involvement in Laos today and
American attivitiert in Viet
Nam before the war " in. that
area became a het one.
' They insist that the advisers,
reputedly paid by the CIA, are
simply advising. The advisers
[now called attaches by the
American Vovernmentl in the
early days in Viet Nam, they
explain, werii in on the actual
fighting.
A Partisan Target.
The 'Laos involvement is
being made a partisan target
by the same senators who were
in ? the vanguard.? of congres-
sional doves who opposed the
Viet Nara war, Ms said.
Fulbright said he is "scared
to death." Sen. Mike Mansfield
ED., Mont.] said the United
States is in Laos. "up to its
neck." Sere. George -McGovern
[D.,' - S. Di called for a' special
closed Senate session to evalu-
ate the Laotian involvement.
Matter of Credibility "
The growing criticism on
.Capitol hi 11 'suggests _ that
Democrats want to make Laos
the basis for a credibility gap
in the Republican administra-
tion.
But McGovern' has said that .
Congress?for failure ? to keep ;
an eye on Laos?"clocsn't have:
clean hands," either. .
' Congressmen report that so !
far they have not received a i
significant amount of mail '
from constituents who are '
worried about Laos.
Violation of Accords .
- Government officials do con-
cede privately that to disclose
the total amount the United
States spends in Laos would be
tantamount to an admission
that this country?for whatever
reason?has, ? like Hanoi, vio-
lated the 1962 accords establish-
ing Laotian neutrality.
Statements about American
aid by Nixon, Defense Secre-
tary Melvin Laird, and other
high officials always are care-
fully accompaniedbyre-
mieders that the Communists
have clearly violated the ac-
?s, and that the aid is in
i esponse to requests by the
neutralist p r i in e minister,
1 Souvanna Phouma.
R000700050001-2
Approved For ReleagniffitioSiti2VGIVRIDR80-01601
MAR 1970 STATINTL
--Nixon's hands lied politically
"s?
?
11 '
t?
. u. . on s o 10.08..
i? . , ... .. ? .....
..,..
? "i!.:.
. ? And last weex Inc, Leinoerats in the Sen-,
r , ' The Christian Science Monitor ? . . . t... ? ? ..,.;,, '. -
% .? ,,
%. ? .. . By Joseph C liarsch , ,:t,' . .4 3.
, ,. ,.. , rsate, were ,industrious , at reminding hiM' of ? . ,.,?,, t' . ? , .
?/ . . Special correspondent of . ?
., ?"'?'.' this fact; Some .Rept#11,cans . were',?also i? ? ? .
.L Involved.' . t
f, . , .
Washington,:,4
' r'?'' ' ' ' ' :' ' ? ?
.. ?
k ? This capital was braced for a 'second "Tet "Reds back Laos :figh t
? ? offensive" .in Vietnam in February, but in.
stead it got an offensive in Laos In March?, .t.tvj .; T. ? ...,; ? Page.
and. the alternative is proving fully as
trouhlesome and perhaps even more ? ? . .
i
cult to manage. i. Thus when the NorthVietnamese fielded a
? Indeed, Hanoi's strategy. is providing an? io,..., substantial force capable not only of taking,.
, other example of how. a Small country can '?vr.the Plain of .Jars but, also of pushing 'well,
a beyond if it chooses, they were moving'
'
,
.. maneuver around the bulk of a much larger' '.
'. country.. ? ..1,4 ' against Mr. Nixon's weakness, not his,.
.. .
The general situation is as follows: . i. strength. Strength.
? ? ?
.; There was still ample American ground .4'? He is hobbled by the politicalsituation at ?:`,
'Istrength in Vietnam in February to cope ' ;4,bome from answering the new threat with,:
twith another Tet offensive, in spite a troop ,, ,.. anything more than bombs; and bombing in.;
11Withdrawals to- date. And there still is ' :'. Southeast Asia has never yet proved to
_
..... ~which Hanoi .' , liable to launch at any time ' ',1;.,'. ? The strategy of the Hanoi operation is Ob-
during
:?ciuring the sp, inglin! Vietnam itself. . k..vioui and markedly effective.. It th a' clear ..
? ? ,
: There also may be enough. strength in the , ?,?? 'and Impressive answer to: the Nixon
,Army of South Vietnam to deal with what.,: l'?,.? strategy. . ? . , % ?
?.?,. , .
? ? : :r.'!?? Mr. Nikon . has been withdrawing from",
'r ,.,!? Vietnam at a ,pace which be hoped wOuld,'-'
,
!".-::?give? Saigon time to get ready to. take over,,,,':
the main task of defending itself.
I;larnple strength to handle any ground effort : ;?.1'.;? be very effective. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
. . ? .?.!
may come, after; ?True, this is n debatable
The chances that this strategy may work ';
have been improving. As they have
'jproposition. However, official Washington 1.;
proved, the need for a compromise settle.,: :t
,'increasingly - believes that the armies of
ment at the Paris peace talks has declined.':.;':
Saigon may make the grade after all.
But the 'capacity 'of. Washington, and its The fact is that Washington is not now ??;
seeking a compromise settlement, because
'clients, ?to cope with new Hanoi initiative !;'4{.'.*
it now thinks it can get what it wants in Viet.' 1
In Laos is quite another matter. The Lao.
,
tians all along have exhibited a remarkable ;.;..nam without paying a price at the Paris,':
bprga
disinterest :in fighting. And Washington is What Mr.' ining table..,. Nixon wants ' . : in Vietnam is
blocked by the existing political situation in
the United States from doing very much to. ;'. survival of a non-Communist regime in,Viet4'
nam at least through November of 1972..And
,counter any new Hanoi initiative in Laos.
iof course if the, Thieu regime can survive,.
' Last Nov. 3 in his nationwide address on ? .1
that long It has a respectable 'chance' 9f sur
:Vietnam,' President Nixon won the 'consent . ? ? ' ? ' ? '
,
of his countrymen to pursue disengagement Iv Ving longer
from the Vietnam war by gradual , ...So as reports from Saigon to the President' -
But the' tacit compact between President .have, grown more confident. he has been
,;?and people requires (A) that he deescalate' Un-der less need to seek a comprornise in'
lithe. Vietnam war, and, (B) avoid any new' Paris. The only compromise which would
'wars like Vietnam. , interest Hanoi would be one which provided.
? It is a clear part of this tacit compact,: for a coalition government in Saigon.
? well understood by everyone in politics 'in:. ..Washington is. not now interested in r'this ?city, that Mr. Nixon must not 'get him.' 'coalition government in Saigon. Hence,?
, self ,caught in another war deep in the jun., there is nothing to talk about in Paris. .
;glea of Asia if he, wants to enjoy the corn.: j.*Jilut this was a situation which was getting,
,aparative freedom of ..maneuyer 'or steadily worse for Hanoi. Nowl we lee ,the
-,I.been his since Nov. 3.... " ? ? .7 ? drawer. they have worked out.
?
continupe
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDI180-01601R000700050001-2
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160
! OTI.TO
PLAIN DEALER
N ? 409,41.4
! S 54 , u.32
MAR 727i)
In r4v,
: preside:lc Ni&on's appeal to the so
Upioa , and Great l3ritain to help res
Peace in Laos 'under terms of the 194 G
va accords is understandable.
The Vietnam conflict is .spilling o
Labs provides a convenient corridor (the
Chi Minh Trail) for North Vietnam to s
men and supplies southward. Laos itse
slrife-toin American intervention in Laos,
planned ,oi not; may be forced as,self-pro-
teetion..
advance of that event, Mr. Nixon
. .
yesterday asked for other nations to in-
tercE.,de. to remove the, appearance of uni-
lateral action which has marked the United
States presence in Southeast. Asia.
? But there were, other reasons, more
pressing, for the 'Presilent's message from
'.1..
Key .scayne.
viet years, 0 gap bth
tore the public.
ie.
un largely by Mn, N.i.%on
ver.
from . the ath.ni!-jstra'.icn. of ?resident jG.;11-
Ho son, Johs-1,:fin's presl...2:ntial. years the
end .public developed a great to
Jog words words from high ol;ic',:ls and militrry:
if is experts who p:-0(:ct.7.r1. victory and
S i I of troops fr(ym
Vietnam. Instead, there were 'escalation.
and more.easuaRjes.
?
?
Mr.' Nixon, trying to buek this distrust,.:
has ,-;ct up timetables for gra:lual.withdraw-,
al of Specific numbers of troops consistent
with the safety of. Ainulez,n forces, has
pledged Vietlianzation or the ',;var as well
as keeping Con,9`re5s informed anti-seeking ;
congressional help in future decisions.
The end run through Laos by the men of;
-t
Hanoi now compJeates the picture. It has
been revealed that oricdri intervention 1'
."at the rec:uost of the Royal Laotian gov-
eminent g., ...or Mr. Nixon at
least has be,gun.
Whether the Americans .involved there
are. civilians, soldiers or CrLeii .Berets
wo7hinrj for the Central'intc.-nce Agency
'(CIA), the point is plain. The ..Tnited States
nave to mahe a decision soon. Congres;
' better be prepared, to get farLer involveIa d
Laos to protect the phased withdrawal
;mill Vietnam or to ;...lbandon cotjd
be-
COIL1O a loam gan1e.
, ColT.;,...es4 must be z.-1Int to the possibility
it. will Lave td determine sbon its position on
There have been indications of th
is
Dse Secretary Melvin-Lai.Jd'and Score
tarp of Sat William Rogers have 2,-,Teare
before ? s:-.deet ? committees of Congress to
on Laos. Perhaps zignificantly, .
even- affinricd. 'pacifist as Senate
Majorit.:, Leader MC1L 1 1 Mans meld
cv
pros :ed measure at the manner of thesa
prus,,ntzl ions if not the entire, content.
1 ie adrainistraticn, in the interest of .
net been able to "icy-
hii :e Ar near 110r;:e then pos!.;ioly
it had;.,no so mith the i'eople's ::?Tprcsenta-
tiv.1:a
91 :he leastel. the licadacl,cs in iT
ington has been the eredi.y gap in ree
It's only a long chane that any then
nations, aj help pull this nation's chestnuts :
out . of tho fire by agreeing with Mr .:Nixon:
o.guarantee the.neutrality of Laos
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
AP PiPt-rA tro9.6
ItEWS
STATINTL
pep e 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0
? ? 83,477
S 101,081
MAR 7 19711
The Laotian tar, baby.
The American people, as has become
routine in Asian matters, are being
soothed with weasel words about Laos,
the tiny country next door to Vietnam.
Secretary Laird assures us that there
are no U. S. "ground combat troops"
there, and no plans to, send them without
congressional consultation. It only remains
for Mr. Nixon to tell us, as Lyndon John-
son told us in 1964, "I am not going to
send American boys to do what Asian
boys ought to do for themselves."
But these familiar reassurances are
themselves frightening. They smack of the
reassurances that heralded Vietnam, and it
is no wonder that Senator Fulbright is
"scared to death" when he hears them. So
are we.
They always begin, these unconstitu-
tional wars, when the brain trusters at State
or Defense get it into their heads that
even in the age of ICBM an inconsequen-
tial little Asian country is, as they say,
"vital to American security." ("High offi-
cials," according to Mr. Fulbright, have
confided to his committee that Laos is
"even more important than Vietnam,"
which assumes that Vietnam was impor-
jtant in the first place.)
. In Laos, a war that comes and goes with
the seasons, it is the.24's puppet army ,
against the Pathet Lao, who are in turn
backed by the North Vietnamese. Last
year, the CIA's minions captured the Plain
of Jars, but turn about is fair play, it
seems, and this year the Pathet Lao has
captured it ? so that this year, for the
first time in the history of the Laotian
war, American B-52s are bombing supply
lines in northern Laos as well as the Ho
Chi Minh trail, which they have pounded
' to small effect for years.
It is neither confirmed nor denied in
Washington, but the U. S. is suspected of
paying for a 30,000 man "secret army",
fighting for the Laotian government, and
is it to be supposed that they are not well'
attended by U. S. "advisers"?
As far as world-wide military and diplo-
matic policy go, there may be plausible
reasons for being thus involved in Laos,
although as was the case in the early
stages in Vietnam the government knows
best and refuses to consult the people of ?''
which it is theoretically the servant.
For our part, we suggest that Laos is
not worth the bones of a single American.
We suggest that Laos is leading us unwill-
ingly into another Vietnam. And we sug-
gest, moreover, that an administration that
A P Crafitiglirrf"e2E1611/78/64 :
.,yeyne.mbers_ the _Vietnam`
scenario. First come the "advisers"; then
come the bombings to protect the "advis-
ers" and their advisees; then, as at Pleiku
barracks, comes a terroristic provocation.
The President and his advisers respond, as
Johnson and Bundy and McNamara re-
sponded to the Pleiku incident, by step-
ping up the bombing. Then you get a big
incident like the Gulf of Tonkin which is
seized as an excuse for sending the Mar-
ines. And then our fists are stuck in the
tar baby for good; or as James Reston
once put it, the fly has caught the flypa-
per.
This fateful spiral could be more beara-
ble to contemplate if there were any sign
that our expenditure of over $100 billion
and 40,000 American lives in Vietnam had
there (as opposed to Thieu and Ky, who i
bolstered a decent, democratic regime
1
'jail their critics without trial and shut
down critical newspapers), or had even
stabilized the military-political situation
so that the U. S. could withdraw with the
sense of a job well done.
But the key point just now is the
smiling evasions of ?Mr. Laird. We are
being taken for a ride and have no way of
getting to the brake. As Rep. Allard Low-
enstein told a Guilford College audience 4
the other night,, this country does not
relish' wars about which it is hot consulted
and to which It does not consent. The '
Vietnam war,lor that very reason, came -
close to tearing this country apart two ,
years ago; it utterly destroyed Lyndon i
Johnson and a Laotian facsimile will de-
stroy Richard Nixon in the same way.
Mr. Nixon's failure thus far to "end" the
Vietnam war, as he solemnly pledged,'
needs only the added touch of a similar
new war on the Asian mainland to touch
off a major domestic explosion. Mr. Nix-
on asked for time; he has had, a year and
two months. He asked the war's critics to r
be patient and the patience is remarkable, 4
although it has produced no evidence to
support the Johnson-Nixon-Agnew theory,
that it is the critics, and not the war-
makers, who prolong the war.
So we fully share the fears of Senator ,
Fulbright about the ,secret maneuvers in
Laos, not only dreading a second war on
the Asian mainland but dreading what a
secqnd go-round of deceitful executive
warmaking can do to this country. Amer--
can patience with this kind of sly leader-
ship is not inexhaustible, and the'tpresent
silence should not be interpreted by Mr.
Nixon as consent. When the reckoning
glRtrottliVrketitirt Opuo o o 1-2
itay t e wrat of, a peop a ? ce
deceived.
, LONG 13Filr.'.1i . CAL,
pai..ss _tc,:peRea For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0
? STPc1INITI_;. ?
E - 1 10,623
' S - 149,331
1379._ ?_. ..?. ? .
.CRA.NSTON KEYNOTES -CDC .1i'VEN'l .. . "
cis War Escalatiow
........, Burton said "We've got
By BOB HOUSER ? ?? ' The "dirty ? work" Of. .; ? . He said Nixon's gradual, to start thinking about the
American-paid incarenar- withdrawal plan . and thel ?distribution of wealth. You
Political Editor
Lies- and of civilian pllots? 1 unprecedented attack on, "won't solve violence until
hire
Iv/
FnEsNo .S. . ::,d by thpSIA_and Al'Jim mass media" M
' are.two. you solve economic ogul-
- U Sen '
to fl mercenaries-and !Oevices the President iS ties. We should take a
Alan Cranston charged T
! here Friday night America , supplies amend Laos is !using to dampen criticism!. hard look at 'possible na-1
finaneing a secret and -.easily covered up, the -sen-?: I of the Vietnam wat.? ,, 4, . ..,tionalization of the oil in-
is. - : ?:.:, , , ,. ,... dustry. Oil is taken from .
escalating war in 1,110S and . ator said., Planes., shots.'
that President Nixon is ? down ? aro lost in "bad .)- SENATOR Cr an s to n the ground and.the ground -
" weather c O n d I t i o n s".; ?.! urged getting all American ,?belongs to all of:.us, not, to
"copying the Communists t,
:in violation of the Geneva , whether friendly villages ". troops . out of Vietnam, as, just lefew.":
;::,.. Ile said , the route to
accords. ? , are hit "or v;hether worn- ! rapidly' as can be accotre.,
, ?
Keynoting a three-day ? en and children in un- phshed with their safety. In ,Demneratic Party success
? ?I 1.1 are , mi id, and by an an- ' :includes registration of the:
candidate endorsing con-
v to dth
ea, nobody nounced timetable,. not .8 7lionr, the. elderly :and' the
ention of the California burned i
, u
Democratic Council, Cran- who conts Will ever see secret 'one, - ? . .: . e. :,...: .
... disadvantaged plus con- I
the results-and since no- ' -? "A secret tireastde ? is i 'l,vincing the middle class of '
? ston said there are clear
.. sips the Laos escalation WO' knows,' nobody need,' not a ti. metal:11,e aq air. le iS .14.,,the hoodwinking Gov. Ron-
.; __' - ___-_,_-__ :a? device for. an ?aciv;viNio- "..!,ald Reagan is giving them.
- parallels the Vietnam es...;!..?.!1?Fe..", .._
tration to claim credit foe
calation of 1964, thus'. illus7 i er. "Laos is, ho t a
6-r - - c"- the things it does,' and to t?r - CONGRESSMAN John? ..
.trating a Nixon Adminis- ! venient plac.e., for ow. rni- hide from the public all ;'.'Nr, Tunrey of Riverside, a :
tration "double risk policy ,-; . not leagua. MetternicitsI' r
that it isn't doing, or could ,..?.11-style:i moderate in -
that could keen 'American ei defend E.kkeir ism self-de- be doing faster." ' ? '-this liberal dere told newsel '
s."......) troops in Southeast, Asia ?1,,?;,,,,d c.,,,,,,,tks di- 0, 1
for years." : - : ------- - ---v -, - - Ir The scenario, said Cran- ,,,men he seeks the CDC en-, .
national ine!..rest:, '.
sten, said. . . stein, "Is alarming. The 'Ydorsemerit for his ' U.S. 1,
:
... THE AIR war over Laos , CRANSTON hit LOOS 'war goes on in Vietnam Senate candidacy. because has jumped from 4.500 .. .;.,/frirtrio I and in Laos. The kind, of ..,,a candidate 'for statewide
Ambassador G. n
?
thinking 'which caused it la.; office must make! an ap-
American sorties per 1 Godley for stieling and ar- one administration (Piesi- , peal , to all fart ioes ef the
month during the time we . resting newsmen who re-..
were bombing North Viet- .T.,,,,, nri xrno nh. dent Johnson's) now per- ? ?DernocratiV ? P..rty and I
nam to between 12,500 to ted' - 1------n ----?' mates the, new adminis- "feel my candidacy repre- i
1.000 per month now, operations oat of Laos.1 tration and . the end'is not seats the wain stream.
5
'The secrecy of this dirty,. , i sight". . ?
Cranston said. He did not: little war has probably ? givi . Taisnee acknowledged ?
reveal the Source of the 'i en Ambassador Godley th He said the Nixon Aci... that Me CDC, over the past
figures. :Meilen that he P. ministration "is not telling . 'coni ' ears.. has demon- ?
.g.. Mercenaries equipped. . a Itomee
it. the way It is when. it 1'i
j4 It's no Wonder, streeet.'t Out it is more lib- .
../...a.....a -,nrt nal(' by Amer- says no American military 1;
??,tben. that hen speaks more:ere than the party as a i
jeans are Moo 'tribesmen; '?.)ike Pontius Pilate than?aw gaged 1 I
personnel . have' been en-,. ri.ole., He said that win- '
7 commanded by Lao offi4, American official. That is: . . combat on the. ?" ti i n g , CDC ' endorsement
vers, according to Cran ground in Laos."
l'?:the kind of ,inentality that ? ' '.h.would indicate 'the organi- .
stun. "The Administration :.'eet, us into the. bou ea, i CDC', ' President 'John ....zation Is interested in his ,
has between 13 (mit) and' quagmire,' : in ??the ' - th ? '''' Burton'. a San Francisco ;.. program and platform and :
, 40,060 of them on the pay): prst place.' , : ,. assemblyman, ; who made. : in having a winner against -
rull,' he said. ? The ,Nixon. Ad:nit-Lista,'
, : ;!the convention an Open one: Republican' incumbent
. "Oddly. we are copying.",-.110n,,,'':Craniton, . charged, by ?" Inviting',: Democratic -'..George Murphy. His more.,
i the Communists in this afef, still mistakenly seeks vie- they
delegates whether or not -.4. liberal ? primary opponent .,.,?
are. CDC affiliated,"..: .Rep. ?.',George Brown,, of ..,;.... _
: the Geneva accords but, fear," he said,,,, "is that -,that the
"MY , Wiped out any intimation .4;
, !.'Monterey Park, is favored
,
fa'- . They are violating '..,:;-tory In . Vietnam. ,
greup might be i,' to , ? win ' 'CDC., support: ...at I
won't admit that we are , come just another way el , ;
7-- . - moderating in its posture. ?:'.: plague! flog sesident:i"hA
they won't admit it. So we :, 1Vietnamixation' ? ha he-
.
violating the accords ei- -paying foreign troops te:: - ?
: . ... ,
IN A NEWS conference,"
. ther. The last thing 1 ex-' ,fight a : war wp Want .
; .ptTited to 'catch Richard.: 'fought -. '. .. King 'Geer:741 be said, CDC is not self-1
, Nixon doing was copying'. d 1 1 . consci.ou"s:oVer being':
: the Commupists,"- : said aid Nixon Will.
I"- Less-am - . ',' ...-: Ai"' 'called, ', controversial : be-, I
.. 1:00-14, '.'cause .'.CDC, normally hast
. Cratiston.:- A ? ?., ' - .*, '' ! -fr.r. Yletnamesp.!' "'"::'.1:". -Ina prOlIDELW.o.be,r4t,.64 ?
AfiprOVed-Por Release '2001 A-Ktir zfl ? . R0007,00050001-2 ..
?
,
Nation
Approved For Release 20011/1a/94 if0A-RDP80-01601
STATI NTL
TILE GREAT:47')OUTEI sionArz WAra
MICHAEL KLARE
Mr., Mare. a staff member of the North American Congress
on Latin America, is completing a book on counterinsurgency
planning in the United States.
At the end of World War II, the United States and
its allies in Western Europe agreed to sanction the
re-establishment of one another's spheres of influence
in Asia. The United States, having conquered Japan,
To gain a world-historical perspective on the war in ???? was to be dominant in the western Pacific (China,
Vietnam, one must see it as but one episode in a , Japan, the Philippines, etc.); France would remain
Great South Asian War that began almost immedi- in Indo-China, ana Britain in the Indian .Ocean area
ately after World War II, and can be expected to (India, Burma, Malaya, Singapore, etc.):. The Allies
continue into the 1970s, if not well beyond them. The also apportioned responsibility for the maintenance
of a defense perimeter, corresponding their cola
th lf f Asia
t? Great War has already encompassed the Indo-Chi
nese War of Independence (1946-54), the guerrilla
' war in Malaya (1948-60), intermittent warfare in
continuin ) guerrilla skirmishes in Thailand!
. nial holdings, which encircled the eas
from Korea to Kashmir, and pledged' to assist one
another 'if any point on the perimeter came under)
attack This "gentleman's agreement" wass
Malaysia and Indonesia. Combatants in these con- ? soon put to the test, for the restoration of colonial
(continuing), and other armed struggles in Burma, ,
filets have included, in addition to troops of the con- regimes in South Asia (revoking wartime promises
. . d endence) produced guerrilla warfare'
tries named, the armies of Great Britain,
France, -
Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Nationalist
, China and, of course, the United States.
These episodes constitute a common war not only would have been unprofitable ( urm
'because they occupy overlapping zones in a single the capacity of the home economy (Indonesia). But
. in Southeast Asia proper, the colonialists were pre-
' t -
throughout the region. Several countries won their:
independence this way, where continued occupation
beyond
theatre of war but also because they spring trom
common cause: the determination of the advanced
industrial nations of the West (led by the United
States) to intensify their control over the destinies of
the underdeveloped lands of Asia. The Western pres-
ence in South Asia is naturally a military and eco-
? nomic challenge to Communist China, whose real or
imagined influence has been a factor in each of
these struggles. But it is not the threat of Chinese
, bellicosity that lends unity to all these episodes; it
is rather the determination of the region's indigenous
.peoples to secure a future that will be free of foreign
control. Because the nations of South Asia are frozen ..
in a state of underdeveloprnent, and because nation- '
al boundaries (which, more often than not, were .
form to ethnic distribution, these conflicts often take - funds (the total U.S. contributions to the French
established by European powers) do not always
the form of "insurgencies"?i.e., local struggles military struggle in Indo-China amounted to $2.6 bil-.
against centralized authority?and the response to lion, or 80 per cent of the cost of the War).
. them has been a succession of "counterinsurgen- Despite this help, the Viet Minh 11'04at Dienbien;
cies." Although the doctrine of counterinsurgency phu, and the French army withdrexv from Southeast,
was originally formulated to substitute a strategy Asia, leaving a substantial militaryeTacuum at the
of "limited warfare" for the obsolete strategies of mid-point of the Asian defense perimeter. The United
"all-out" (i.e., nuclear) warfare, in South Asia coun- , ? States?which until this. time had considered South-,
terinsurgency threatens' to become unlimited in, its east Asia to be of secondary importance to its Pacific.
.duration. ,> 1.territorierr?qpickly moved in, The FrenciLeokordal
pared to engage in protracted countergue
gles to maintain their control of the area's resources.
In Malaya it took Britain (with the aid of Australia
and Gurkha tribesmen) twelve years to force the last
remnants of the Malayan Races Liberation Army
across the border into Thailand. In Indo-China, '
France faced an even more formidable foe. In 1950,
confronted with a deteriorating military situation in
Vietnam and growing discontent at home, France
! 'appealed to the United States to honor its commit-
ment and help prevent a breach of the Asian defense,
perimeter. Although the United States had already;
deployed its troops in South Korea to protect the .
?northern flank of the perimeter, it nevertheless
agreed to supply France with arms and badly needed
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP,80.01601R000700050001-2 -"1:45.1"1.a
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0)1-2
'1
? IFNI YORK, N.Y.
POST
E ? 708,180
\
MO 7 1970
An Unresponsive 'Clarification'
According to President Nixon, it is _
!*' false to charge that the U. S. is escala-
ting the war in Laos; North Vietnam is ...
1
to blame. It is wrong to suggest that
the Air Force operates independently
f over Laos; the bombers fly missions ?
only on request of the Royal Laotian
I government.
These. are among the assertions'
; made by Mr. Nixon in his statement,.
on Laos yesterday. They echo most of
his public declarations on Vietnam. But
they do not constitute, or even begin to
describe, a practical policy for peace in ?
either nation. ?
' In some of its sections, the Pres,
ident's "explanation" relies more on le-,
r
galistia language, than on the whole
...
i
truth. The families of the U. S. air 1
crewmen lost in the war, for example, ,
will hardly be solaced? by the report ?
that "no American stationed in Laos
has ever been killed in ground combat."
But perhaps more fundamentally,
the President continues to maintain
that the interests of the Royal Laotian
government and the still more imperi-
ous South Vietnamese government are
also those of the U. S. government.
And in that context, as American i ,
pilots and CIA "advisers" support the 1.\/
?Laotian rgitiM the Thieu regime in
Saigon ruthlessly jails its political foes,
the President's expressed hope that "a
genuine quest for- peace In Indochina
can now begin!, his a futile, reminiscent
mind.
?44,..--;.o.-1.:/......... ,
1111111.4111111,?
Att'
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Approved For Release 2001/8V0Fiba*P80-Q,119-11NR_O7
MAR 1970
Text of Statement ?Is-4edjoy President Nixon:
.
on U.S. Policy and Activity/in Laps
?.
KEY BISCAYNE, Fla., March, 6 (UPI)?Following is the text of
r a statement by President Nixon today on the history and present nature,
of United States involvement in Laos:
In light of the increasingly massive'
presence of North Vietnamese troops 1
I ?
have written letters today to British ,
i and their recent offensiv e ifiLaes, I 1 A. The 1962 Accords -'posed by the Communists. In approving' the 1962 arrangements, the Kennedy..'
l Prime Minister Wilson and Soviet Pre-'' When we came into office, this Ad..' '
i '
? Administration in effect accepted the
? ministration found ahighly precarious' basic formulation which had been ad-
, rnier Kosygin asking their helping in re ministration
storing the 1962 Geneva agreements for r, situation in Laos. Its basic legal frame-, vanced by North Vietnam and the So- '
1 'that country.
What We Found
Work had been established by the 1962!
viet Union for a Laotian political set-
t accords entered into by the Kennedy
'Administration. . , Before the in was dry on the 1962'
r . As co-chairmen of that conference, 1 if
a the United 'Kingdom and the Soviet' . . . l Geneva documents, and despite the fact
Union have particular responsibilitieis ' , , that they embodied most of its own,
Laos has been a battleground for:, post
I for seeing that its provisions are hon- of the past 20 years. In 1949 '4 be- .i' proposals, North Vietnam started violat-
) ore& My letters note- the persistent i came a semi-independent state within' ing them. IN -compliance with the ac-
i cords and their current offensives; sup- I 1 cords, the 666 Atherican who had been
r North Vietnamese violations of the ac- I the French Union. The Pathet Lao Corn?-
. munists rebelled against the Government ?
I assisting the Royal Lao Government
port the Laotian Prime Minister's own withdrew hnder I.C.C. supervision. In
6, current appeal to ? the' ca-chairmen for in the early Ninteen-fif ties, and fight- i contrast, the North Vietnamese passed
t
tlement.
01
consultations; urg9 the T:1-chairmen to ing continued until the 1954 Geneva set- only a token 40 men through I.C.C.
work with other Signatories of the Gen- tlements ended the Indochina war. Laos checkpoints and left over 6,000 troops ,
eve accords; and pledge full United a that time became an independent in the country.
States cooperation.neutral state. The indigenous Commun. A steadily growing number. of North
? Hanoi's most recent military build-up ists, the Pthet Lao, nevertheless retained Vietnamese troops have remained there
.in Laos has been particularly escalatory. 'control of the two northern provinces. ever since, in flagrant violation of the
!, They have poured over 13,000 addition-, Since then, this small country has been Geneva accords. They climbed to about
* al troops into Laos during the past few_ the victim of persistent subversion and ? 33,000 in mid-1967, 46,000 in mid-1968 ,
??' months, raising their total in Laos to - finally invasion by the North Vietnames and 55,000 in mid-1969. Today they are
over 67,000. Thirty North Vietnamese:,. In May, 1961, negotiations for a Lao- . at an all-time high of some 67,000 men.'
battalions from regular division units tan settlement opened in Geneva, with ? These are not advisors or tchnicians
1: participated in the current campaign in t Governor Harriman as the chief Ameri- ? or attaches. They are line units of the
the Plain of Jars with tanks, armored;
cars and long-range artillery. The in?
dignous Laotian Communists, the Pathet.
Lao, are playing an insignificant role.
North Vietnam's military escalation in
& Laos has intensified public discussion in
this country. The purpose of this state-,
merit is to set forth the record of what
we found in January. 1969,? and the: .of negotiations, 14 nations signed the ? ? of men and supplies for the war in-
policy of this Administration since thati
? Geneva accords providing for the neu- .? i? South Vietnam.
.
, . tralization of Laos. Other signatories be- ? The political arrangements for a three-
''-?" ? '""-- ''" sides the United States included the
day government survived only until Ap-.,
Soviet Union, communist China, North ?, ril, 1963, when the Pathet Lao Corn;
the Southeast Asian` nations most di-
'IVietnam, the United Kingdom, France, munist leaders departed from the cap-
.
rectly involved and the members of the?
? i?
ital and left their cabinet posts vacant. International Control Commission,' Can-.' Fighting soon resumed and since then'
ada, India and Poland. there have been cycles of Communist
offensives and Royal Laotian Govern-
These accords came on month after, m'rrit counteroffensives. The enemy forc-
' the three contending forces within Laos es have been led and dominated through.
,a
agreement on' the details of ? out by the North Vietnamese. In ,a coalition government composed of the .1 cent years Hanoi has provided the great,
re-
three major political factions and head- '1
ed by the neutralist, Prince Souvanna
, majority of Communist troops in Laos.
Phouma. North Vitnam claimed that it?'/, ' North Vietnam appears to have? two
favored a coalition' government. Both aims in Laos. The first Is to insure its
North Vietnam and the Soviet Union'!, aillity to use Laos as a supply route
backed Prince Souvanna for his new,. , for North Vietnamese forces. in South'
o Vietnam. Tho second is towe aken and-
, post. The .present Government f Laos'.
can ' negootiator. During the course of : North Vietnamese Army conductinn ope
those long neogitations fighting con- ? .; aggression againsta neighborthat poses
'firmed and the Communists made fur- ' ?, no threat to Hanoi.
ther advances. Faced ith a potential. . / addition, since 1964, over a half?
threat to Thailand, President Kennedy,' million North Vietnamese troops have.
ordered 5,000 marines to that country crossed the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" in
In May, 1962. Laos to invade South Vietnam. This ine
FINally, in July, 1962, after 14'months
: filtration route provides the great bulk
Approved For ReleaSehhittAMOtt:t1A**aet I.
subvert the Royal Lao Government ---
- 1 3fkillaM000,400042rging
COntinu ed,
Approved For Release 200V13404 IMMIRDP80-
7 MAR IWO
STATI NTL
Nixon Expected to Fill
,v.)tate Department Post
.
, By RICHARD HALLORAN ;
speeleil to The New York Tiple3 I
WASHINGTON, March 6 ? Rejects a Prophet: The Life ofi
Authoritative sources in the Senator D. M. Key," about
Administration report ' that Tennessee Senator who fought;
against racial politics in the,
President Nixon intends to South in the 1870's. !The pref-i
name David M. Abshire as As- ace of the book was by the late!
sistant Secretary of State for Ralph McGill, editor of The
Congressional relations. Atlanta Constitution and widely,
Mr. Abshire, 43 years old, Is regarded as a Southern liberal.
now executive director of the Mr. Abshire will succeed!
Center for Strategic and Inter. William B. Macomer Jr. whoa
national Studies at George- was promoted to Deputy Under,
town University here. , Secretary! of State for Ad-
i
The Congressional relations ministration in October. ;
post is among the most sensi- Harlow Called Sponsor '
!
tive in Washington. The Assis-
tant secretary is among the key Mr. Abshire, who met Mr.,
officials charged with obtaining Nixon when Mr. Nixon was in.
Congressional support for the Congress, was, reported to'.
Administration's foreign policy, have been recommended for
At the Georgetown Center, the Congressional relations .
Mr. Abshire has directed a post by Bryce Harlow, Courf-'
wide range of research pro- selor to the President and gen-i
jects in foreign . affairs over erally considered the top man,
the last nine years. Earlier, he on the White House staff.
served on the staff of the ' Mr. Abshire, who was borni
House Republican Policy Corn. in Chattanooga, was graduated'
mittee. He also was a . consul- from the Military Academy at
tent on foreign policy at the West Point in ' 1951. He served
last three Republican national in the Korean war but resigned.
conventions. from the Army to take grad-,
uate work at Georgetown in
Rightist Label is Denied - 1955. He received his.doctor-J
Sources close to Mr. Abshire, ate in history and government
whose. appointment has ' been in 1959. i
rumored for several weeks, From 1958 to 1960, he.
took pains to describe him as was staff director of a studyl
a moderate conservatime. He on American strategy and:
has been portrayed in some re- strength under Representative'
ports as a right-wing extremist. Gerald Ford, the Michigan Re-! !
The sources pointed to Mr. publican who is now the minor.' ?
Abshire's speeches and writing ity leader. I
as evidence of his , political , During 1961 and 1962, Mr.i
views. He has urged a gradual Abshire was director of 'special
but not precipitate withdrawal projects at the American En-
from Vietnam and a reduction terprise Institute. He then went;
of American forces ? abroad In to the Georgetown center, the,
an orderly manner. chairman of which is . Adm.
Mr.
, Mr. ,Abshire, as also writtenArlei h A Burke fornier. Chid
a booliziatd.:?..........The .south.42...m.......iaadjo.a.aiava1 Operation. ,
..
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
PZ1ADL
?i ,i.'.j..?141,1,.41:.1.44
Approved For Release 2001/1469ilocIA-RDP80-0
STATI NTL
rf44.7,? !1
c41 gf
tLY r, tax kli'd?r\A
By LAWRENCE M. O'ROURKE
, 0/ The Bulletin Stajf
Miami?The picture of Amer-
ican presence m Laos sketched
by President Nixon yesterday
left unanswered a basic ques-
tion: Where do we go from
? here? .
.'Th
? ?
?
Or put another way: Is Laos
,Nixon Text on Page 2
(1;3> Gilt ?
review of. the last six years of Peace .and neutrality of Laos] The President, avoiding pre-
U. S. involvement. Mr. Nixon was an, effort to broaden the, dictions or threats of U. S. es-
stressed throughout that he is Participants and open the dia. calation to match Communist
continuing policies first estab- 'log beyond Laos, the United activities, nevertheless tied in
lished? by the Kennedy and States rind North Vietnam. I, this country's policies to those
Johnson Administratiens. ? ? ?
Overall, as portrayed by Mr.
Nixon, the extent of U. S. in-
volvement now in Laos is small.
There are only 616 Americans
directly employed by the' U. S.
Government in Laos. Some 320
Americans are military advisers
or instructors to Roy/al Laotian
units. Of the 320, there are 228
military personnel and 92 civil-
ians, probably employes of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
There .are no U. Sr. ground
combat troops in Laos; he said,
there have been none there
since the 1962 Geneva accords
declaring Laos neutral, and
there have, been fewer than 300
Americans, all airmen, killed as
the critics of the Administra-1 pa rt of the Laotian fighting in
tion's policy toward Laos. the past six years.
ment was largely. it The statistics cover i period
?
going to turn into another..Viet-
nam?
Neither the President not.
White House officials who met
with newsmen here Would deal
directly with those questions.
Small Involvement ? . ?
The 4,000-word statement on
Laos issued by Mr. Nixon from
his winter White House at Key
Biscayne will not likely quiet
? -- -- ----&-- .in which fin. the most part there
was 'very little> Communist ac-
tivity in Leas. It was only in
the past few months, as Mr.
Nixon pointed out, that the
North Vietramese government
began sending combai troops
into battle in'sizable numbers
In ,LaoS. .! ? ' ?
Some 30 North Vietnamese
'battalions from' regular divi-
l'sions joined in the current cam-
'paign, in the Plain of ' Jais re-
gion, the critical military area
of ' Laos. It was ?the* fighting
over the. Plain ?of Jars' which
largely instigated the criticism
,and questioning in' Congress
%which led to yesterday's presi-
dential' statement. ? . ..../
. t .
Effort to Widen Scope
Mr. Nixofi's statement was
? unequivocally a call for a stand- Avoids Pre4lctloss ?
still by the Communists. His .--- - ? ---- --477"---?4
Iappeal ?; to' Russia ' and Great
Britain. signatories to the Gen- 1
eye accords. 't.o wqr.k for the
But the question remains: What
if Hanoi continues to ? pump
men and supplies into Laos, if
the, Communists' continue to ad-
vance militarily, if Russia and
Great Britain cannot?or will
not?bring about progress to-
ward peace and neutrality In
Laos, what then? ?". .
A White House official said
that under no circumstances
would the United 'States use
,combat, forces in Laos without
A ? -
oasking first for Senate ap-
proval.
Open-Ended Commitment
The official wet asked what
the United States will dp If
Hanoi continues to, escalate the
? ?
ware.
H
replied that the Nixon Ad-
ministration is very much
aware of the concern that the
United States might slide into
a Vietnam-like situation. *
The official said that the Unit-
ed States is not going to slide
into an open-ended commitment,
like the one in Vietnam, without
carefully controlling and asses-
sing each step along the way.
But it would not serve the na-
tional interest, the official said,
for the Administration to give a'
flat description of what it would
not do in circumstances that
have not yet arisen.
The Administration believes it
has been careful up to now and
will continue to be so, the of-
ficial said. But he also main-
tained that peace in Vietnam
and Sotuheast Asia will be af-
fected by ,developments. ? ? ?
I of the Communists.
He said that be authorized,
U. S. air combat missions ?
against the North Vietnamese
and Laotian Communists in Laos
only after they stepped. up theiri
military offensive and' at the;
request of Prince Souvanna'
Phouma, the Laotian prime min-
ister.
U. S. air 'operations current-
ly consist, the President said, of
bombing the lio Chi Minh Trail
as it runs through Laos; bomb-
ing and strafing in support of
Royal Laotian troops, and fly-
ing reconnaissance over north-
ern Laos.
"The level of our air oper-
ations has been increased only
, as the number of North Vietna-
mese in Laos and the level of
their aggression has iecreased,"
Mr. Nixon said.
Appeal to Communists
A White House official, asked
If the Administration is not put-
ting itself at the mercy of the
'Communists by allowing the
Communists to set the extent of
U. S. involvement, said that the
fashionable answer is no.
But that is nonsense, the ? of-
ficial went on. Of course, he
said, the United States will be
affected by what the Commu-
nists do, and to that extent,.thir
country is at their mercy.,.,,
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000706050001-2
SAN ANTONIu, TEX.
Approved For Rt145?es2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP8O-01 601 P1ikflflfl1 .9
EXPRESS ?NFWS
- 78,032
S - 117,132
ALL .7 1,97C
:Nixon on Laos:
'Room for Doubts
President Nixon finally made a
.' public statement an America's involve-
ment in Laos. His words contained
r. some good news and some bad news.
The good news:
0 We have no ground troops
there and will not send any.
0 He is asking Russia and Great
Britain, the nations responsible for
maintaining the 1962 accords on Laos,
to help restore peace.
We are not escalating the war
there.
? The bad news:
O North Vietnam has sent 13,000
more ground combat troops into Laos,
bringing the total to 67,000.
O Americans are flying combat 4
support missions for Laotian forces.
O These missions are flown "only
when requested by the Laotian gov-
ernment."
0 This means that Americans are'
in
in combat, and on orders of Laotians.
The President did not say if we have
reserved the right to refuse such mis-
sions.
President Nixon said only 616 U.S.
government employes are in Laos. A )
White House official added that only.
1
228 of these are military men. Pre-
sumably most of the others are CIA I
? men who train, direct and pay rwemi
::Laotian army, but the President did
not touch on that.
It is good that the President final-
ly spoke up on Laos, even if it did
lake ? months of prodding by various A
;;senators. It is good to know that he
has no intention of expanding our in-
, ?
volvement. But he did say the level
r:-.-of U.S. air operation had increased in
response to increased North Viet
, -
witsuo(ixoli
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 ? CIA-RDP80-01601
7 MAR1H70
The Truth About Laos
President Nixon's explicit description
esterday of the nature and scope of .
Imerican involvement in Lass will do -
ittle to quiet his congressional critics. ' ?
But that is because Fulbright, Mc-
Govern, Symington & Co. seemingly are
more interested in the reassertion of .
Senate prerogatives in the field of for-'
.eign affairs than they are with the reali- ? ,
ties of the situation in Southeast Asia. .,
The extent of the American involve-
ment in Laos has been one of the ,
worst-kept "secrets" in the histories of ?
war or diplomacy. On September 23 in .
:these columns we noted that not more
:than a couple of thousand U.S. govern-
.. ment personnel?military, paramilitary
or CIA?are involved" in that small but
, strategic mountain kingdom. Yesterday,
the Pr esident said the precise
?-number?including all contract person-
''nel?is 1,040. In contrast, according to
.the President, the North Vietnamese
now have 67,000 regular troops in Laos.
?,:
We stated on September 28 that
(..,"some 97 U.S. airmen have been lost
.1-over Laos," adding that it is doubtful if .
: "more than 200 American lives have
been lost" there "over the past decade.
-Yesterday, the President said that no .,.'
American has been killed in ? ground
,:.
combat operations in Laos.
1 -
The President's critics cannot have it
both ways. They cannot protest bitterly
...
_because American ground troops are . '
`'. committed in large numbers in Vietnam
;and complain equally stridently when ?'
, ..,:this is not so in Laos, which means that,
%Saotion regulars and 'regulars must re-
? ICeive air and logistical support, Unless'
they propose that we do nothing at all in
Laos, thus endangering the lives of
thousands of Americans in Vietnam.
In short, we find no fault with pres-
ent American policy in Laos, which the
President rightly describes as request-
ed, limitbd, supportive and defensive. We
only wish he had made his statement
.sooner; and we await with extreme in-
terest?although we are not holding our
breath?a similarly detailed statement
from Hanoi describing the extent of its
involvement and goals in Laos.
Where do we go from here? The Pres-
ident said yesterday that he has "no ?
plans for introducing ground combat '
troops Into Laos," despite the deteriora-
? tion of the situation there in recent days.
That is sensible and right.
Yet it is clear that the North Viet-
namese and their Pathet Lao auxiliaries
must be kept clear of the Mekong Valley
to preserve the remnants of Lao inde-
pendence and territorial integrity (guar- ,
? anteed by the U.S. in the Geneva accords
of 1962), to prevent a serious deteriora-
tion in the situation in Vietnam, and to
? prevent a clash between the North Vet-'
namese and the Thais, tci whom we have
, treaty commitments.
If that means more air and logistical
, support?even more advisers?we sup- '
? port such temporary measures. If all our
wars cost as little American blood, we
would be fortunate. And if the Presi-
dent's critics are concerned about the
? , escalation of the "secret" war, they ??
ought to "tell it to Hanoi": It is the
North .Vietnamese, ultimately, who will,
decide how much of a war it is to be. ?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
s?
Approved For Releate V1964483104441A-RDP80-01601 RgivAitpripoo -2
7 MAR 12.73
CROSBY S. NOYES
Nixon Facing 'Basic end
The current congressional
uproar about our "secret war"
In Laos is largely a reflection
of the improved situation in
our non-secret war in Viet-
Danl.
In Vietnam, things are grad-
ually coming under control.
President Nixon's program of
"Vietnamization" seems to be
working better than even its
architects dared hope. The
fact that almost all of the
news out of Saignn in recent
. days has centered on the trial ?
of an accused Communist
sympathizer is a promising in-
dicator that the fighting is
? winding down.
In Laos. on the other hand,
it is winding up, though on a
far smaller scale. And so it is
only natural that critics of our
commitments in Asia who pro-
fess to believe that the Presi-
dent is anxious to get us in-
volved in another war there
should suddenly rediscover.
Laos as a cause of primary
; concern.
Still, with all due respect to
, Senate Majority Leader Mike '
Mansfield, It is not really true
that %a are already "up to our
necks
in the war in Law
CoMpared to V
more like up to our
And that also is
likely to slay. Dc=;1-.
cries of alarm, it is almost
unthinkable that there ever
will be a massive American
presence in Laos. ?
We shall continue, no doubt,
to supply arms and equipment.
to the Royal Lao forces as
long as there are any left. The
CIA will continue to support
and advise the dwindling num-
ber of Mco tribesmen who
have been fighting a delaying
guerrilla action against the.
advancing Communists.
Bombing missions from Thai-.
lard and South Vietnam
against North Vietnamese reg-
ulars in Laos may go on. Nix-
on in his policy talk yesterday
said Hanoi had 67,000 combat
troops in Laos.
There is some danger, how-
ever, that these efforts will not
be enough. The possibility of a
general collapse of resistance
by forces loyal to the govern-
ment in Vientiane certainly
cannot be ruled out. If that;
should happen, the Commu-
nists might find themselves in
. control of the whole country
. .aty,
even U that ib mot their prea-1,
ent
..7icatel -Choice in Laos
The North Vietnamese have,
in fact, some legal basis for
coveting kl03. Ironic a Ily
enough, the French, in the late
19th century, revived an oid
claim that all of the land east
of the Mekong River belonged
to Vietnam. The claim con-
ceivably could be revived
pow to justify what would be,
in reality the military con-
uest of the country. ?
Diplomatic moves to save
the situation are unlikely to be
of much help. Souvanna Phou-
ma, the Laotian premier, has
been calling for a revival of
the 1962 conference of 14 na-?
-
tions which "guaranteed" the
neutrality of Laos and set up a ,
coalition government of right-.
ists, neutralists and Commu-
nists in Vientiane. Mansfield
has suggested that the scope
of the conference could be ex-
panded to include all of South-
east Asia.
What was possible in 1962, "
however, seems improbable
today. Among the 14 nations
that met in Geneva that year
were Russia and China, who.
no longer see eye to eye on
most roblems. Neither are:
1
. ,
i am a m
?State/ likely to find them.:
selves in agreement on the fu-
ture of Laos.
Even if resistance in Lana
, should collapse, It i3 most im.
probable that Nixon would
throw U.S. forces into the vac-
uum, as President John F.
? Kennedy came close to doing
in 1962. The far stronger possi-
bility is that Thailand would
see a Communist takeover
; there as a direct threat to its
!security and take military ac-
tion on its own.
?, What could then result
. would be an international war
between Thailand and North
:1 Vietnam, with the unhappy
, Laos in the position of the ham
in the sandwich. This, needless
' to say, hardly would represent
? an improvement in the situa-
tion from anyone's point of
view.
Nixon, in short, is up against
one of those "basic and deli-.
cate" choices that he spoke of
in his recent foreign policy
statement. "If. we limit our
? own involvement in the inter-
est of encouraging local self-
' reliance," he wrote, "and the
? threat turns out to have been
'more serious than we had ?
judged, we will only have cre-
? ated still more dangerous
choices."
' And indeed, in the case of
Laos, that's about the size of
:it. The United States has an
interest in preventing a new
international war in Southeast .
!Asia that should be clear
enough to all members of the
Congress. If we can do this
within the scope of the limited ?
; effort being made in Laos to-
day, we can consider our.
'selves very fortunate indeed.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Washington Star
Approved For ReleaseT2iitrfib31/Fe: iteTATiNib-01601
Nixori Caries
Role ii Laos,
Deferals Policy
a Star Staff Writer ?
KEY BISCA Y. N E, Fla.--
Public pressure spurred by Sen-
ate critics has forced from Pres-
ident Nixon the first offieial'de-
:scription of what the United
States has been doing for six
years to help neutral Laos com-
bat Communist aggression from
North Vietnam.
A "precise description" in a
presidential statement yester-
day ,afternoon of what he termed
limited, requested, supportive
and defensive aid acknowledged
that American warplanes ."fly_
combat support missions for
!Laotion forces."
The President said he conclud-
ed that "our national, interest
will be served by putting the
subject into perspective through
a precise description of our cur-
rent activities in Laos."
He emphasized that all the
United States has done and is
doing in Laos is in response to
"flagrant violations" of the Ge-
neva accords by North Vietnam
that began "before the ink was
dry" on the 1962 neutrality
agreements.
North Viet Troops
Instead of withdrawing all its
armed forces from Laos in keep-
ing with the accords, the North
Vietnamese left more than 6,000
troops in the country, Nixon
said, while all the 666 Americans
who had been assisting the royal
Lao government were pulled
out.
Steadily growing over the
years, the number of North Viet-
namese armed forces in Laos
climbed to about 33,000 in
mid-1967, 46,000 in mid-1968 and
1, It also listed military advisory. 55,000 in mid-1969. More came in
and training aid and logistics during the last months of 1969..
;support, by a total of 643 Ameri-, and in January this year to
.can military and civilian person- ? bring the total now to an
riel on the ground in Laos. Offi- time high of some 67,000 men,
cials put the total of U.S, mili- the President related.
tary personnel in Laos at 228. By contrast, he said, the total
1 Nixon said he had not consid- 'number of Americans directly
,ered it in the national interest to: employed by the U.S. govern-
disclose details of the American: ment in Laos stands now at 616.
!role because it might hinder ef-: In addition, there are 424 Amen-
forts to get North Vietnam to cans employed on contract to
honor its pledge in the 1962 Ge- the government or to govern-
)neva accords to respect the neu-'iment contractors.
trality of Laos. ? , :! Of these 1,040 Americans, Nix-
' on said the total number, mili-
Change of Mind tary and civilian, engaged in a
He changed his mind becati4: military advisory or military
of intense public speculation and training capacity is 320. Logistic
"grossly inaccurate" reports "to personnel number 323. Officials
the effect that the United States
said these 323 are almost entire-
involvement in Laos has sub-
ly civilian contract personnel.
stantially increased in violation CIA Personnel
'of the Geneva accords, that
Neither the President nor his
American ground forces are 'en-
aide, who provided some addi-
; gaged in combat in Laos and
tional facts ' in briefing news-
that our air activity has had men, broke down the figures to
the.effeet of escalating the con-,
show how many of the Ameri-
: fliet," he said.. cans helping the Laotian forces
Things got to the point, a key are employed by the Centr
presidential aide said, ' where Intelligence Agency.
Nixon had to judge between the The implication is that at lea e
impact of continued official se- the difference between the total
ereey on the confidence of. of 320 Americans engaged in
Americans in their government, military advising and training,
and the international impact of and the total of 228 military per-
telling more about what is going sonnel?or some 92?are CIA
Things -got to the point, a key. personnel.
'presidential :Ode said, where. The President reaffirmed that
NV- en had ,to judge between the "there are no American ground
impact or-continued official se- combat troops in Laos," and
cre on the confidence of there are no plans for sending
'ericans in their government, any.
and the international impact of Indicating that the Americans
'telling more about what is going engaged in advisory, training
on in Laos. , and logistic t; ?
Approved For Release/Oval-id/04o:
part hi. combat operations, he
said "no American stationed in
Laos has ever been killed in
ground combat operations,"
Hi
Peace "Highest Priority"
Declaring that "peace re-
mains the highest priority of this
administration," the President
said he ho es a
s aide said that during the peace"P "genuine quest
some six years of American air forc., " in both Laos and
operations over Laos a total of South Vietnam can now begin.
less than 400 airmen have been
killed or reported missing in ac-
tion.
For Laos, he said, the uest
will require the efforts o the
cochairman of the 1962 Geneva
Conference ? the Soviet Union
Use of Bombers and Great Britain ? and the
This aide said presidential au- other signatory countries.
thority is necessary for the use He said he sent letters yester-
of big 13-52 American bombers in day to British Prime Minister
support of Laotian forces fight- Harold Wilson and Soviet Pre-,
ing the Communist invaders in mier Alexei Kosygin "asking
the vicinity of the Plain of Jars their help in restoring the 1962
? and has been granted only Geneva agreements" for Laos'
neutrality, independence and in-
tegrity.
The Geneva accords on Laos
grew out of a concerted effort to
resolve a 1961 crisis brought on
by what Nixon called "open ag-
gression" against Laos by North
Vietnam.
Nixon recalled that the late
President John F. Kennedy said
in March 1961 that "the security
of Southeast Asia will be endan-
gered if Laos loses its independ-
ence."
Negotiations for a Laotian set-
tlement opened in Geneva in
May 1961. Fourteen months lat-
er, in July 1962, the agreements
for the neutralization' of Laos,
under a coalition government
headed by Souvanna Phouma,
were reached. laoth North Viet-
nam and the Soviet Union
backed Souvanna Phouma at the
time.
Record of Fighting
once. Other support missions are
flown by fighter-bombers.
He emphasized that there has
been just one 13-52 raid in north-
ern Laos ? as distinct from
bombing of the Ho Chi Minh
Trail to interdict the flow of
North Vietnamese men and sup-
plies into South Vietnam.
During the Communist buildup
for the recent offensive that
swept over the Plain of Jars, he
said, the President constantly
rejected proposals to use the
B-52.9 against tempting targets
because he did not want to pro-
vide possible provocation for the
attack on the Laotian defenders
that came anyway. .
Despite the "flagrant viola-
tions" of the Geneva accords cit-
ed by the President; he risked
Communist charges' that the
United States is violating those
accords by disclosing as much
detail as he did in his statement
yesterday. North Vietnam, with
67,000 troops in Laos, never has
admitted having anybody there.
But he was not admitting vio-
lation,
U.S. Attitude
The presidential briefing aide
was asked specifically if Nixon's
statement was an admission
that the United States also had
violated the Geneva agreements
in response to Communist viola-
tions
The aide replied to this effect:
There is no judicial m
proe Johnson responded to re-
that determines what you
e,ests to meet North Vietnam-
entitleda; to do after violation by use escalation of the fighting by
the other side. Our position is
that the Laotian government is
entitled to ask help in self-
defense. Our view is that the
Reciting some history to make
the point that Laos is an inherit-
ed problem for him, Nixon said
fighting resumed in 1963 and has
continued since, with forces op-
posing the government being led
and dominated throughout by
the North Vietnamese.
President Kennedy started
providing American aid in the
form of supplies and munitions .
at Laotian request in 1963.
In May 1964, President Lyndon .
increasing U.S. training and lo-
gistic support. At the same time,
the United States "began flying
certain interdictory missions
Geneva agreements are still vol- against invaders who were vio-
id. We want them restored. All lating Lao neutrality."
our activities are at the request Nixon's briefing aide made the
of the government headed by point that the total number of
Prince Souvanna Phouma that U.S. personnel in Laos has re-
was installed by North Vietnam mained constant since his ad-
and the Soviet Union. They have ministration came into office.
been in response to North Viet- Ile said there is no plan to in-
namese violations, and at the crease it.
request of the Laotian govern- The aide said he did believe it
ment. would be in the national interest
CIA:RDP80-01601 R000700050001 -2
continued
Approved For Release 2001/03/04:: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
S COPY
Available
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
ea.
to sly cApEgVFisillt Ftfar Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
United States will or will not do
in response to further escalation
of the conflict by the North Viet-
namese.
lie emphasized, however, that
under no circumstances will the
President send ground combat
troops into Laos without asking
congressional approval first.
And he said he does not believe
this is likely.
?
-
4
vel v,tr+4,4
,44.*6.44
Air America C-123 cargo planes land supplies at
?United Press International
from the Plain of Jars in Laos, while work onl
the Sam Thong air strip, 20 . miles southwest ?the strip is still in progress. .
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
?
2
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160111111111110-2
WAYCR1SS, GA.
JOURNAL liERALD
E ? 10,326
MAR :7. 1970
,-taiatawaamawiemaamiamAMS VaLnitaMEOWASOMIMPUTANAMIV"'
U. S. Involved In Laos?
I Despite disclaimers by the Nixon
administration, is the U. S. getting
' too deeply involved in the conflict
) in Laos?
? Some members of Congress
think so 'and there is, indeed, .con-
siderable evidence of a pattern sim-
Tar to that of our Vietnam exper-
:ience.
The Nixon administration says
:we are not going to ,get involved
in the war other than to :lend air
support to non-Communist Lao-
tians.
But U. S. television audiences
: have seen. evidence of.,,,L,4Aiumenct
intelligence operations in Laos and
-there have been numerous recent
incidents of U. S. aircraft apparent-
ly operating in support of Royal
, Laotian forces.
Laos, of course, is right next door
to Vietnam and the country through
which the Ho Chi Minh Trail, a
'major Communist supply line, pass-
es. ?
lit ?Is not., bard to see how., two
AWANirdeMeiiiia
wars could easily become mixed
up. Indeed, a lot of hair-splitting is
required by the U. S. command to
determine whether our aircraft are
pursuing Viet Cong forces or, in'
fact, are facing at times the Pathet
Lao, the Reds Who are hand in
glove with the North Vietnamese. 1
Laos was a problem fo,r the U. S.
even before we became so deeply)
involved in Vietnam. Like Vietnam,
it is a divided country and efforts
to form a coalition government
have not been notably successful.
The country has from two to
three million inhabitants, no paved
roads, no railroads and two-thirds,
of it is a mountainous jungle.
Our military involvement in such)
a land would, to put it mildly, be,
most distasteful.
The Nixon administration is'
aware of this fact and there is rea-
son to believe every effort will be,
made to draw the line somewhere.,
But the situation is fraught with
danger.
IMMO.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
,.;1,1/',1' t )4 '1' t
Cirrrl r T
;;I:,;?;?? x!!:.;;; STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-
? ?
tt
6 MAR 1970
77,,,77;747.1-7.r.-1177,77r,"
War in Laos
strange con
By Raymond R. Coffey
Laotians call their country "The Kingdom
of the Million Elephants and the Royal White
Parasol."
And that unlikely name is no more unlikely
than everything else about the mountainous,
thickly jungled Southeast Asian land where
the United States finds itself deeply involved
In a long-running war that some fear may?
become another Vietnam. , ?
To start with, Laos is not really a country;. .
' it is more the whimsical creation of old')
French colonial map makers.
It has two capitals, the royal capital at Luang Prabang, where the king resides 1
thorough obscurity, and the administrative
capital at Vientiane. But the whole country :1
has only one high school and the courses are 1.
taught in French. ?
THE PRINCIPAL INDUSTRIES 7,
traffic, gold smuggling and official op-
tion, the last made possible and profitable
..mainly by the hundreds of millions of U.S. 3
dollars poured into Laos in the last 12 years' .
or so.
, The native Communist Pathet Lao, along ,
with the North Vietnamese, are one of the ;
r forces engaged in the war against the govern-),,
' China.
Th n4
? :?,?? , e head of government, the prime ml n4,
. ister, Is Prince Souvanna Phouma..The nom
.. nal head of the Pathet Lao is none other thani
his half-brother, Prince Souphanouvong. .
But the man the United States is betting
most of its chips on in the straggle for Laos is
a major general named yang, Pao, a member
of the minority Meo tribe, who has half a
dozen wives, used to be a sergeant in the
French colonial army, and has been treated ,
. by his American sponsors to a trip .to Dis-
neyland, and back. .
--Vang Pao heads a "clandestine" army of
about. 40,000 men, which Is financed and
trained by the Central Intelligence Agency ,
and 1 TT T -. ' being supported by U.S. Air Firce ,
,ads.. .
'1
BUT PERHAPS THE unlikeliest thing of all,
about the Laotians, who have been engaged in,
a nonstop war for well over a decade now, Is
that they are, surely, one of the world's twit
warlike people. .
, The idea of killing each other has absolutely'
no appeal to these incredibly easygoing, live-
and-let-live people.
? An American military adviser once re-s
marked that being a company'conimander iii
the Royal Laotian Army was like being a'
a.
leyball and watching movies made in Red:
,--. scoutmaster in the United States, "except that
' the Boy Scouts are a lot more bloodthirsty.".
Anda Green Beret master sergeant in Viet-,
aimed high, deliberately missing, when they;
fired their carbines in combat. They ex-; '
pected, . of course, that the enemy would re..i
Raymond R. Coffey, national : turn the courtesy.
correspondent of The Daily " : BEFORE GOING INTO Combat, the Green ,?
News, has covered the war Beret said, the soldiers, who like all Laotians !
In Vietnam and other major put great . trust in 'assorted spirits, would 1
stories in Southeast Asia.. Ernake,srnall clay figures of Buddha' and then ,i
This clear report on the, !take potshots at them until they missed one. '?
Kingdom of the Million Me, ! They would then wear the one they missee
phants is an important prim' 'around their neck as a' good luck :omen. ,
er on what may become a
new Vietnam. i situation . in 'which there is aow fear that .theli
' United States. may' find :14elt .Nvith ., another
I
YM letna on It. hands.
; But these same Pathet Lao maintain a ao?''''.4.,'''-liki,".'ora".4'0,';,'.4,1,?' ',I.,',...4.,,,%i,x',,,?a'". ',...il4,4"1' 1,4'4?;?,1',,, itil,?14, ?
. small headquarters compound In the capital at', 1 ,
Vientiane %here h sman detachment of sol-:
t'diers on guaggicaaaMifickgrieNnirg0..20.01 /03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000700050001112; mime
Li 94owea .11,1 the, lenient, playhig,,SA
Al.
_
And ?that 'le the kind of place arid . kind - of.1
Approved For Release 2061T/54TITerATRDP80-0160
6 MAR 1970 STATINTL
'Laos 'Secret War' Stirs Fear
of Second Viet Nam for
This is the first of two articles on the ex 'Nixon has acicnowledged Americi n planes Also the United States does
tent and nature of our involvement in the war -
,are bombing the ho Chi Minh trail in southern :- ? have military men stationed in
4 Laos in an attempt to slow the pace of sup- ? Laos who in effect function as
.. plies and, replacements from North Viet Nam -, advisers to the royal Laotian
In Laos and how that involvement grew. .
BY FRED FARRAR and JAMES YUENGER' army and air force. into South Viet Nam. This Was at a press ,
? Washington, March 5?As ' the Nixon ad ' conference last December 15. But he ended up Forbidden by Accords
'ministration proceeds with its announced,:.bY saying: ? . ? ,.. But the Geneva accords of
policy of pulling the majority of American,::'
I don't think the public interest, would be :: 1962, which were supposed to
L
troops out ? of Viet am, there is increasind.';,: served by any further discussion. make Laos a neutral buffer
concern here that the United States acl discussion." make
a press conference lak Sept. 15 he said:. state between North Viet Nam
and Red China on the north
. . , ...l.4.the United States is. "Providing logistical
is he'-:
ing toward another Viet Nam in the strategic ? and Thailand on the south,
forbids of Laos.
port and some training". for the soya! Laos.
. forbids the introductionoutohi
government to keep it from falling under outside military forces into
?
This concern is not only 'over whether the:7f ?
Laos.
c.c ommunist domination. He ,
United States is getting into another Viet So these American service-
- ; .added: "We do have aerial '
Nam in Laos, but also whether ths adminis-' men are officially? listed as
reconnaissance; we do perhaps
tration:--or any administration?can get the attaches to the An_lrican ern-
'have some other activities. I ,'
bassy in Vientiane/the admin.
United States involved in a war without the ? Won't discuss those other activ-
expressed concent of theSoagress, ' ities at this time." istrative capital of Lan%
The state department's
. 'As pieced together from a
Tribesmen Aided by U. S. foreign service list issued this
month lists only eight military
attaches as being attached to
the embassy, but published
reports from Laos say the
figure is closer to 100.
The state department also
says that the United States
government has only about 500
Americans In Laos. But again,
reports from Laos put the
figure at approximately 1,000.
The cover story of listing
advisers as military attaches is
so transparent that in the
I. Pentagon the so-called attaches
says that the United States
government has only about 500
Americans In Laos. But again,
reports from Laos put the
figure at approximately 1,000.
The cover story of listing
advisers as military attaches is
'so transparent that in the
Pentagon the so-called attaches
are often openly referred to as
advisers.
As late as last Feb. 26 Laird '
referred to. "our advisors"
in Laos while talking to news-
men. The department later
explained that Laird really
meant to say attaches.
The c cntr al intelligence
'ngency responds with its usual
"no comment" when asked
about its reported support and
direction of the Meo force and
i its employment of either for-
mer or current Green Berets to
work with the Meos.
But, as far as is known, it
hasn't been assuring newsmen
ugloglarclibution
?0-oreti rit7r1
This. concern began to mount last Septeni..,
ber when a pro-government force of about
15.000 Meo tribesmen, with the help of United;
? States fighter-bombers based in Thailand,.
eaputred the strategic Plain orJars in north-4
ern Laos for tme first time in four 'years: i
It continued to mount in the last few weeks
when communist forces re-took the plain
despite increased pressure from the American*,
fighter-bombers plus the first use so far of
'giant B-52 bombers in northern Laos. '
? The B-52s reportedly were used for only ,
two days and then called off when they failed ?
? to halt the enemy drive.
The result was a series of charges, many
of them coming from members of the Senate
foreign relations committee, that the ad-
-ministration is running and escalating a secret .
?
war in Laos without letting the people of
this country know. what is going 'on there
and without consulting Congress.
There also were charges, based mainly on
what the critics say are published reports
;from Laos, that the Meo force is paid, trained;
advised, and supplied by the central intelli-
gence agency. ,
And depending on what report is being
'quoted, the CIA is using. special forces Cor
Green Beret] troops on detached, duty and
!'wearing civilian clothes from the army or
former special forces men recruited espe-
icially for the job.
, Answers Not Easy to Learn
variety of sources, this is a
review of what the United
States is doing in Laos.
' It has been an open secret for
years that American planes
,flying from Thailand and else-
where have been making air
Strikes against North Viet-
namese and Pathet Lao (the
, Laotian equivalent of the Viet
Cong) troops and fortifications
In the areas they hold in
n ar thern and northeastern
Laos.
The cover story is that these
are armed reconnaissance Ws-
.sions flown at the request of
? the royal Laotian government.
But they are in effect tactical
air strikes made in support of
, government forces.
103 Flyers Missing
, These strikes, along with air
strikes on the ho Chi Minh trail
In Laos, have not been made
' Without losses; Since Jan. 1,
. 1961, a total of 193 air force,
navy and marine flyers have
been listed as Missing in action
over Laos.
In recent weeks, Informed
. sources say, American aircraft
have been flying from 450 to 500
i? sorties a day over Laos.
? ? But these are approximately
; equally divided between sorties
against the Ho Chi Minh
trail?which therefore must be
Those are the charges, and charges are counted as part of the war in
.relatively easy to come by. But what actually, Viet Nam?and the rest of
'does American. Involvement in Laos amount] j, Laos. .
? The daagriingt a901/03I04: CIA-RDP80-01601
to?
??mainly because of the refusal of the admin.;
. istration to go beyond ge,peralitics. President
RO
?
-27
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 ? CIA-RDJP,80,70.1601R
S 3126 CONGRESSIONAL RECbR ? SEINALie
House and Senate during which the differing
views of both the majority and minority of
the Task Force will be considered and I in-
vite your attention again to the separate and
opposing views which were included in the
Task Force report.
Sincerely,
CLIFFORD P. HANSEN,
U.S. Senator.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
Pore. The Senate will now proceed to the
transaction of routine morning business,.
with statements limited to 3 minutes.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may proceed
for 5 minutes.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem
re. Without objection, it is so ordered.
r__Wt
G. MeMURTRIE GODLEY?AMBAS-
SADOR OR PROCONSUL Di LAOS
Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. President, last
month an Associated Press story with a
Vientiane, Laos, dateline reported on the
activities. n Laos of three American
newsmen; and also gave a statement,
purportedly made by U.S. Ambassador
to aos, Q. McMurtrie Godley, that "the.
American Mission has lost any intereSt
In helPing out the press whatsoever be-
g... ie of what happened this afternoon."
ask unanimous consent that this
newsstory of last February 24 be in-
serted at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the news
article was ordered to be printed in the
RECoRD, as follows;
LAOTIANS ARREST TIIREE NEWSMEN
Commitments Abroad of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, I have had
with the Secretary of State in connec-
tion with the desire of the subcommittee
to hear Ambassador Godley. I ask
unanimous consent that a letter from
me of February 25 to the Secretary of
State, also a letter from me to him a Week
later, March 2, plus the Secretary's reply
of March 4, plus my reply of March 5 to
that letter, be inserted at this point in
the RECORD.
There being no objection, the letters
were ordered to be printed in the REC-
ORD, as follows: .
SURCOMMITTEE ON 73.5. Scoot=
AGREEMENT AND COMMITMENTS
ABROAD
February 25, 1970.
1{011. WILL/AM P. ROGERS,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR Mn. SECRETARY: Its view of recent
press reports of serious fighting in Laos, and
the difficulties which have been reported by
press representatives in Laos in ascertaining
the facts, we request that Ambassador G.
McMurtrie Godley be directed to return to
Washington as soon as possible ' to appear
before the Subcommittee on United States
Security Agreements and Commitments
Abroad.
Sincerely yours,
STUART SYMINGTON,
Chairman.
?
Mniicn 2, 1970.
,VIENTIANE, LAOS.--Laotimi army troops
today arrested :three Western newsmen who
made their' way unannounced to the gov-
ernment base at Long Chong. They were
later released to a U.S. Embassy official.
G. McMurtrie Godley, the U.S. ambassa-,
dor to Vientiane, said in a statement that
"the American mission has lost any inter-
est in helping out the press whatsoever be-
cause of what happened this afternoon." He
did not elaborate.
The newsmen arrested were John Saar of
Life magazine, Max Colff alt, of Agency
France Press, and Timothy Allman, a part-
time employe for the New York Times and
Bangkok Post.
Newsmen attempting to cover the fast-
breaking developments in Laos have been
forced to rely largely on American mission
sources for their information, and on the
mission for taw, iportation to battle areas.
The U.S. mission has been reluctant to
Intercede with the Laotian government to
help newsmen visit areas where fighting is
going on.
Saar, Colffait and Allman were among a
group of newsmen who last week made
visit to Sam Thong, a supply and medical
center southwest of the Plain of Jars. They
had chartered an Air America transport plane
with the consent of the U.S. Embassy and
the Laotian government.
The three newsmen were last seen walk-
ing along a road leading to Long Cheng,
headquarters for Gen. yang Pa.o, 15 miles
away.
yang commands Laotian forces in the
area.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, yes-
terday the State Department released
a summary of some correspondence
that, as chairman of the Subcommit-
tee on U.S. Security Agreements and
Hon. WILLIAM P. ROGERS, "
Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On February 25 we re-
quested that Ambassador Godley appear at
his earliest convenience before the Subcom-
mittee on United States Security Agreements
and Commitments Abroad of the Foreign
Relations Committee.
Would you kindly let us know when we
can expect his appearance.
Sincerely,
ley will not be availab c for some time,
because it would seem that it is in the
public interest for him to appear before
the subcommittee as soon as possible.
If our fighting is to continue in Laos,
however, I can understand why there is
no desire to return the Ambassador, be-
cause when I was last in Laos, some 21/2
years ago, the Ambassador at that time,
in addition to his normal State Depart-
ment functions, was not only directly
supervising the extensive military and
nonmilitary activities of the various -
U.S. intelligence agencies in that coun-
try, but was also directing the time,
place, and nature of all other U.S. mili-
tary activities against North Laos.
In passing, although traveling on offi-
cial business as a member of both the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
the Senate Armed Services Committee,
even then I was not fully informed of
some of our military activities, at the
time of this visit or on previous visits:
and only learned of these activities as a
result of sworn testimony before the
subcommittee in question during hear-
ings held last October.
I did learn, however, that at that time
? the Ambassador was also acting as chief
of staff Of U.S. military efforts in the
northern part of that country; and if
that is what he is doing now, and because
. recently there has been heavy escalation -
of U.S. participation in this northern
Laos war, I can understand why there
is some resistance to bringing him back
at this time.
I would hope, however, that as soon as
possible . we can find out more about
just what is going on in that country;
and Ambassador Godley?based on his
duties, perhaps it would be better to call
him Proconsul Godley?is obviously the
best person to supply that information.
k ? id to the importance of
STUART SYMINGTON. As bac gioui
,
? this request is an article in the press this
Washington, March 4, 1970.
TNE SECRETARY Or STATE, morning, which article says that Prince
Souvanna Phouma of Laos is apparently
Chairman, Subcommittee on U.S. Security now following the sanctuary policy of
Hon. STUART SYMINGTON,
Agreements and Cormitrnents Abroad, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia; this in
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. that he is now offering to the military
Senate. forces of North Vietnam free access to
DEAR STU: I have received your letter of the Ho Chi Minh trails that are supply-
February 25th requesting that Ambassador Ing the enemy in South Vietnam; this
Godley be brought hack to appear before offer provided the North Vietnamese de-
ity Agreements and Commitments Abroad. sist in their offensive action against
your Subcommittee on United States Secur-
I am sure you will understand that because Northern Laos.
of the serious situation presently existing in I ask unanimous consent that this
Laos, it is not possible to say at this time article this morning in the Washington
exactly when Ambassador Godley w111 be Post, entitled "Laos Offers Hanoi Trail
feasible for him to return to this.ceuntrY, we Use if it Quits Rest of Country" be in-
available. As soon as the situation makes it
will arrange to have him do so and ho win serted at this point:in the REcORD.
of course be prepared to appear before your There being no objection, the article
Subcommittee at that time, was ordered to be printed in the ,EC-
With best personal regards,
Sincerely,
Wuwavt P. ROGERS.
?
MARCH 5, 1970.
Hon. WILLIAM P. ROGERS, ? VIENTIANE, March 6.?Prime - Minister
Secretary of State. Department of State, Prince Souvanna Phouma reiterated today
Washington, D.C. he would tolerate North Vietnamese use of
DEAR BILL: Acknowledging your note of the Ho Chi Minh trail through southern Laos
March 4 re Ambassador Godley, could you if the North Vietnamese would withdraw
let us know when we can expect him? We from the rest of the country.
are anxious to have him as soon as possible. "I told the ambassador from North Viet-
Warm regards. nam last year that we will accept the use
Sincerely, of the trail by North Vietnamese troops with
STUART SymnIsroisr. the condition that those troops withdrew
from the important regions of Laos," he
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I told a news conference.
regret that apparently Ambassador God- souvanna's renewal of the Offer comes al-
ORD, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, Mar. 6, 19701
? LAOS OFFERS HANOI TRAIL USE IF IT QUITS
REST OF COUNTRY
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0007000500011-2
March 6, 1970
i
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE
:
S 3127;
most on the eve of an expected White House Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the dis- this body as well as in, the other body
announcement this week shedding now light tinguished Senator from Idaho, one of where he served long and well that no

on the U.S. role in Laos, where the main the wisest of all members of the Foreign one knows more about the history of/
U.S. involvement is in blocking the North Relations Committee. He is muchtoo
Vietnamese supply route to South Vietnam
over the No Chi Minh Trail. The renewal kmd m . . what he says with respect to my.
offer also comes as the Laotian government activities, I would say that he, as well
is under increased military pressure from as two distinguished Senators I see on
the North Vietnamese. the floor this morning, the able majority
When he first made the offer, Hanoi re- leader and the able senior Senator from
jected it because he would not invoke his Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), have had at
authority to tell the Americans to stop least as much to do with the bringing
bombing the trail. He said publicly that
he had told the North Vietnamese that what ' out this problem.
went happened around the trail was be- I have not necessarily criticized what
tween them and the Americans. was going on in Laos, from the stand-
The Premier said: '"rhe Ho Chi Minh Trail, point of whether it is right, OT whether
after all, runs across the deserted part of it is wrong. I have my opinions, but I do
our country. What we would like to see is not know. What I do know, however, as
that the North Vietnamese will not come to the able Senator from Idaho has so ably
destroy our towns, villages and economy." pointed out, is that this is the first undis-
Prince Souvanna was asked if American air
raids over Laos constituted a violation of closed war, to the best of his or my
the 1062 Geneva agreement. He replied. "No. knowledge, we have ever fought with the
You must distinguished between two military forces of the United States; and
things?cause and effect. The cause is the our military forces are just as much air
North Vietnamese interference in Laos. and sea as they are ground.
"After 1962, there was no withdrawal of Therefore, the primary thrust of what
North Vietnamese troops, and I asked for I have been trying to do, and, what is
American intervention only in may, 1064, more important, what the .subcommittee
neutralist forces in the Plain of Jars. Re- which I have the honor to chair has
after the North Vietnamese had attacked the
move the Cause and the effect will disappear, been trying to do, is to get the facts be-
withdraw the North Vietnamese troops and fore the people. In this connection, We.
the bombing will stop." are only following the recommendation
Asked if American planes would also atop of President Nixon presented in the first
bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail, he paragraph a his televised speech last
what was Indochina and the Far East,
than does he. I am grateful that he
emphasizes the fact we are all trying
not to criticize necessarily what is go- '
ing on, but to find out what is going en,
policies, programs, and actions that have
to do with lives of young Americans and
the treasure of all of us.
Mr. M.ANSPIELD. May I express my
thanks to the distinguished Senator
from Missouri and say that the sugges-
tions which have been made should
react, in my opinion, to the benefit of
the administration. I am well aware of
the fact that the President did not start
this war. He inherited it and, he is sad-
died with it. I am hopeful, when he has
made his statement, and an accord can
be reached between the State Depart-
ment and the distinguished Senator
from Missouri, that the fires which are
rapidly spreading will at least be
damped as a result.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. - -
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I as-
sociate myself with the comments of
the distinguished Senator from Missouri .
this morning. I would hope that out of
cannot say. That is a matter for the Amen- November 3. I ask unanimous consent these disclosures, or out of further con-
cans to decide." that the first paragraph of that address tact with the Defense Department,
the fall of the Plain of Jars dramatic because be inserted at this point in the RECORD. ' among other things we might, Obtain any
Prince Souvanna said ho did not consider
this was only a return to the situation of There being no objection, the para- new definitions of what constitutes a
five years ago when the North Vietnamese graph was ordered to be printed in the "combatant" or a "military action."
first overran the plain. RECORD, ELS follows: There has been a great deal of ens-
He said, however, "This offensive is differ- I believe that one of the reasons for the mission, both in the public press and
ent by virtue of the use of tanks, of new deep division about Vietnam is that many otherwise, that we have people in civilian
model artillery ..." But, he added, "no rant- Americans have lost confidence in what the clothes operating in a military capacity.
w ter what will happen, we remain confident Government has told them about our policy. If we have some new definitions as
in facing the danger." The American people cannot and should not
dc-
The Premier said he would not accept aid ? be asked to support a policy which involves to what constitutes involvement, pending upon the kind of clothes that
.
in the form of foreign troops to fight against the overriding issues of war and peace unless
the North Vietnamese. "We want to limit the ye know the truth about that policy. people wear, I think we ought to get
th
invasion and we don't want other foreignthat clearly understood as well.
troops other than the North Vietnamese Mr. MANSFIELD.. Mr. President, I So I hope the Senator will press for-
who are already here," ho said, wish to associate myself with the re- ward as he has been doing, not only
marks of the distinguished Senator from to obtain full disclosure of the facts,
Senator yield? Missouri, who has been doing an out- . but for any new definitions being ap-
Mr. CHURCH.- Mr. President, will the
standing job, in executive ' session, in plied today that are not in the con-
Mr SYMINGTON. I am glad to yield ' to lay the facts before the corn- . ventional or familiar form of the dell-
to my able and distinguished colleague
from Idaho.
Mr. CHURCH.. Mr. President, I want
to commend the Senator from Missouri
for his persistent efforts to get the facts
concerning the nature and extent of the
American involvement in Laos. During
my lifetime, this country has fought two
undeclared wars. This is the first time
it has fought an undisclosed war.
The American people are entitled to
have all of the facts, and to have them
now. If the President does make a
gull disclosure this weekend, I think
much of the credit will go to the Sena-
tor from Missouri and to other members
of the Foreign Relations Committee who
have been insisting that the cloak of.
secrecy be removed from our involvement
in the combat in Laos, and that the
American people have a complete and
full statement given them concerning
the f acts.
I think the Senator renders a great
service to the country, and I simply want
to associate myself with his effort and
commend him for what hOis doing.
tryiimg mittee, at least, and, hopefully, the Sen- nitions as we have known them, as to
ate and the American people, In terms what constitutes "military involve-
of just what our involvement is in the , ment," and what might constitute "CIA
arc all the way from Thailand to Korea involvement."
in the north, with a number of coun- The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
tries in between. pore. The time allotted to the Senator
I am glad to note by press accounts from Montana has expired.
that there is a good possibility that the Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask unanimous
administration will make a statement consent to proceed for 3 additional mm-
on Laos very shortly; and I am very utes.
hopeful that an accord can be reached The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
between the distinguished chairman of pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
the Symington subcommittee and the ?
State Department, which will bring ?
about a release of at least as much of DR. MENNINGER FAVORS LOWER
the hearings?slid without violating se- ING THE VOTING AGE TO 18
Cill'ity?which have been held -up by the Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, Dr.
State Department and which have been W. Walter Menninger is the .youngest
held in a state of limbo for 5 months member and the only psychiatrist on the
up to this day. 13-member National Commis,sion on the
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will Causes and Prevention of Violence. This
the Senator yield? . Commission was appointed by President
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. Johnson in June of 1968. Its report was
Mr. SYMINGTON. I appreciate the mado in December 1969.
remarks of the distinguished majority Da Menninger is the third generation
leader. It is universally recognized in member of the famous Topeka psychiat-
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
STATI NTL
1726 ApprovedONURi
Enr Ral
ggftV-RP119,NRID -CJAAPB?Pir KliN9070601116 1970
[theta the stet:car:11 changes in the econ-
omy and the barriers in the way of con.
smilers and email businossmen who would
contribute to movino us closer to a free
enterprise cal:to:11y.
We are caught up in the greatest merger
wave in history. The result is that in MOB,
the 100 lorgeet oorporations controlled as-
sets equal to those of the 200 top companies
' in 1950?anti of the top 1,000 com-
panies in 1041. The top 200 companies
now control GO percent of all manufaoturing
meets. The distenteful democratic and social
-Implications of this increasing concentration
of economic power, to me, are self-evident.
The impact on competition is still being ex-
aillined end line-by-line, the book of expert- each merger involving companies o
once is being wriaen. size should be examined. To dO so will re- majority has become quite weal.
But one fact is clear; increasingly the quire adequate funding for the antitrust For example, In the past 18 months, the
competition which does exist centers on agencies?something they have not had In Anitrust Subcommittee has received some
C 000 letters of complaint on auto repair
anteening a marketplace full of viable, and solvee is a permanent, independent ormfesmer
honestly competing competitors.
organization with branches in local corn-
The concentration wave 1115Int be halted murales'.
by prohibiting all mergers that may sub- My proem:ad in Vole area La to ceaahlieh 4 ?
stantially lessen competition?be it in a federally thririsered, intlepondent corvine-
market, the nation, or the world. tion, the Independent GooLumer CotmerAl.
In 1008, there were 102 ftequieltions of The Council would have three furicalorei;
companies having assets of $10 million or to represent co:lemma-re' economic intereeto
more?these would be the companies in the before governmental aeenele.3; difeserninete
middle strata, which normally would be via product information, and to noa as the um-
n.ble competitors with the promise of growth. budeman for complaints figalnot government
Eighty-nine of those acquisitions were not and mediator for product and service corn-
even casually looked at by either the Federal plaints againet bus:Meas.
Trade Commission or the Department of Mr. Chairman, we hear a lot toda7 about
Justice. Yet they were the mergers most the "silent majority." Maybe my rnalipile
likely to hamper competition. In my book ceraeans different types of comenuniquee
President's,but I think the silent
such things its product differentiation or
the clever ad?rather than to delivering the
best quality at the best price, the hallmark
of a competitive system. In fact, I some-
times get the feeling in listening to testi-
mony before the subcommittee that price
competition has been moved over to the list
of characteristics of "destructive conmeti-
Lion" by many businessmen.
It is small wonder that the phenomena of
the '00s?consumerism?came about.
Consumerism?like all revolutions?is
merely the lava flowing from a volcano of.
frustration.
Consumers who sought to make the ''best
buy" in supermarkets. department stores,
. discount houses, and such were frustrated
in not having the proper information to make
a rational judgment. Consumers who made
purchases were frustrated in attempts to get
complaints adjusted. Consumers who bought
warrantied products were frustrated by the
Inadequacy of service. Consumers who re-
sponded to clever ads and bought the prod-
ucts were frustrated to find they didn't get
what the ad had led them to believe they
would.
And beneath it all, was the suspicion that
. when X-dollars were spent, X-dollars worth
?
of product wasn't received.
In other words, consumers may have been
the flint to detect that this indeed is not a
free enterprise economy. For instead of the
buyer being king. he does not?and cannot?
make his commands be acted on. At first this
, awareness was a personal?and a quiet?
thing. For consumers, I suspect, were a bit
embarrassed to admit that they were not
able to cope with the challenge of spending
their money wisely.
But gradually awareness grew that the ex-
perience was not unique?but universal.
Further, introduction of suclabills as Truth
in Lending and Truth in Packaging gave
birth to hope that it was, after all, possible
for the little man to fight the big corpora-
tions. President Kennedy gave them new
spirit when he declared that consumers had
rights.
Congress?at least the Democratic por-
tion?ever since has been trying to deliver
protection for those rights John Kennedy
has
the post.
Also, carefuly study must be made of exist- problems alone. One rule of thumb eetimate
lug concentration to determine where it is is that those letters represent sixralillon un-
hampering competition to the disadvantage' happy car owners.
of consumers. If in fact there ever was a silent majority
Competitive impact must be considered it was merely because they got tired of yell-
not only when matters are being studied by ins into the wind. But the winds are change
the antitrust agencies but each time another jug?and they are carrying the voices of con-
government agency moves?be it the FCC, 'turners loud and clear to Congeal.
the ICC, the FDA or even the State Depart- What those voices say is: We want a
ment. (The latter agency we learned during chance to got our money's worth.
our investigation had a significant role in It seems a reasonable request bo me and
aiding the quinine cartel in cornering the one we should be committed to doing all in
world market in the drug.) our power to answer.
The offensive team would be made up o
both government and the plibliC?CliVICICCI REMARKS 01" U.S. SENATOR ISAIMISON A.
into consumers and competitors. When the WILLIAMS, JE., FEDILUAIIT 25, 1970
antitrust laws were enacted m the best means I welcome this opportunity to testify be-
ar protecting a competitive system, Congress fore the Committee on National Prioritim of
saw the importance of private enforcement, the Democratic Policy Council end com-
mend the Committee for its efforts to eval-
uate the pressing national problems.
At the outset lot mo suggest that any
eveluation of our national problems and any
recommendations that may flow from these
hearings must be rooted in two simple, de-
clarative sentences from our Nation's birth
certificate:
"Wo hold these truths to be self evident,
that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights, that among these are
life, liberty and the pursuit of happinees.
That to secure these rights, governments
aro Instituted among men, deriving their
just powers from the consent of the
governed."
As we all recall, the Declaration of inde-
pendence has two more structural segments.
First, it discusses the need for revolution;
and secondly, it recites the litany of abuses
attributed to George III of Great Britain.
I do not advocate revolution and I believe
that it is not in the Nation's interest to
devote time and energy to the fixing of
blame on the present administration. Nor do.
I believe we can afford merely to stake out
sound political positions for 1970 and 1072,
as a. supplement to government actions. Rec-
ognizing that government neither could?
nor should?be the policeman in every com-
mercial outlet, It encouraged those citizens
hurt by unfair or anticompetitive actions to
sue for relief. Treble damage provisions were
included in the antitrust laws as the carrot
on the stick to encourage such suits as well
as to provide a deterrent to would-be ylo-
lators.
Unfortunately, private enforcement has
been a disappointment.
This is partly because an antitrust suit is
an expensive proposition?discovery costs
alone can run $100,000 in an average suit?
and the burdens of proof are extremely hard
for a private plaintiff to bear.
Obviously, government must ease the path
somewhat if it expects assistance from the
public bringing such suits.
Several bills which would do this are now
pending in Congress?and I urge your dedi-
cation to their enactment.
Of most significant impact no . doubt
would be action to make it easier to bring
Class action suits?either on behalf of busi-
nessmen or consumers commonly injured.
My proposal in this area is to open up en-
forcement of section 5 of the Federal Trade , Rather, we must find workable &cautions to
Act?which flatly prohibits all unfair or de- the problems that exist now, whether they
ceptive acts in commerce?to private class
were created by the current administration,
action suits, by both businessmen and con- ? or whether they are the legacy of our Par-
ty's years In power.
spelled out. The progress not been
easy . . . nor has there been enough. And let us at least be candid with our-
sumers.
But I think the ball is rolling and will Two other bills now before the Senate Anti-
ielvee?the military-industrial coo:mica was
trust and Monopoly Subommittee represent - ' - -
not created on January 20,1960.
continue to roll,
the basic philosophy?that private actions
Our national problems are many and va-
However. I'm concerned that we may be-
aro to be encouraged. These would make
come so busy with mopping up the lava and lied. They include:
section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act a part
building fences to contain it, that we will of the Clayton Act so businessmen could sue Vietnam;
not got to the more important job of tear- -
for sales at unreasonably low cost. The other National Security;
frustration. could
spending;
ing clown the volcano of frustratlo
could,make a judge treat a nolo contendere
Domestic priorities and the domestic
It is to this demolition job that I call for
plea in a government case the same as a
dedication from the Democratic party today, guilty plea when considering an ensuing pri- budget;
? at is needed, I think, is an offensive veto action. This could alleviate the feces- . The economy and taxes including burden
What -
and defensive team approach. sity for the private plaintiff repenting the some state and local taxes;
The defensive role is government's. expensive invosUlgatory work already done by . Urban problems, race relations and law
First, If we are to enjoy tho free enter- the government. and order; and
prise system ln a form as close to perfection The other typo of help govorrunont must Civil rights and call hhortloti
as humanly possible, government must two give if consumers are to be able to help chip . Road the newspapers for the hut weal
the antitrust .laws to their fullest in guar- away at that volcano of frustration them. our national problems scream out at us.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RD1480-01601R000700050001-2
I 5
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R0
March 6, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE
Firms num Sunsinrrs
American taxpayers pour $4.5 billion an-
* nually into farm sitb.slitlea that do not work,
and it's about Sine Congress sees the light
alld Starts phasing out tbe Inoue rn.
Over the weekend Senator Charles McC.
Mathias celled the five-year-old program a
dismal failure and recommended that the
billions poured into it be used instead for
education, medical research, medical care
and other prei,sing needs.
Many Washington County farmers elisn.p-
-% prove of the program under which prices re-
ceived on such commodities as wheat, corn,
feed grains and cotton, have not provided
adequate incomes.
The futility of the subsidy program is illus-
? trated by the fact that the GO per cent of
agriculture not covered by goverrunent pro-
gmuns, such as production of cattle, hogs,
eggs, fruit and vegetables, is Intter off as far
as farm income Is concerned.
Thera is no reason for the farmers or
taxpayers to be happy with the costly sub-
sidies. It ACCIII9 rICIIC1.1101.18 to pay farmers for
riot growing certain crops?or at least out
down on production?when there is so much
hunger in many parts of the United States
........antLeisewhere in the world.
1
?
n.????????
THE LAOS CONFLICT
Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, on Feb-
ruary 6, 1065-2 days before the United
States started bombing North Vietnam?
I first spoke out against the deepening
American involvement in Southeast
Asia. At that time only 267 of our young
men had been killed there; our total
forces numbered only 21,000. And we had
spent all of $4 billion in military and
economic aid to South Vietnam during
the entire 10 years preceding my speech.
I said then that the American peo-
ple were confused about our commit-
ment. I observed that the Vietnamese
people "wonder where we stand." I
pointed out that the councils of our own
Government were divided and uncertain.
Above all, I cautioned the President
not to proceed by stealth and subterfuge
along whatever path he had chosen for
. us in Vietnam. I pleaded with him, in-
stead, to give a clear direction to our pol-
icy so that the American people and
their elected representatives in Congress
could make some judgment on the course
we were asked to follow.
Today those words have a bitter and.
ominous ring. Five years and 1 month
after they were uttered, I and a handful
of my colleagues in the Senate feel com-
pelled to say them again?this time sub-
stituting "Laos" for "Vietnam."
? Five years and 1 month later the 267
young Americans have become almost
50,000, the $4 billion have become $110
-billion, the troop commitment of 21,000
has gone over the half million mark and
is now only slightly below it. The Na-
tion stands divided, large numbers of our
youth are bitterly alienated, and a poten-
tially great President has been driven
from office. And the terrible question that
hangs over us now is?is a new set of
leaders preparing to take us down yet
another blood-soaked jungle path in our
cell-appointed role of world policeman?
On November 3 of last year, President
Nixon said, "The American people can-
not and should not be staked to support a
policy which involves the overriding is-
sues of war and peace unless they know
the truth about the policy."
Yet war without policy, and policy
without truth characterizes our activities
in Laos today. Presi -1-at Nixon is, of
course, not responsilS for our initial
involvement in Laos, bii! 1,s must bear the
responsibility for his tu1 a. aistration's at-
tempts to obscure and confuse the facls;
of our involvement.
More than 4 months ago, a subcommit-
tee of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee conducted hearings on Laos, but
the State Department has not allowed
the hearing transcript to be released to
the public. The State Department has,
however, leaked favorable reports to
preferred columnists.
The Pentagon has refused point blank
to allow reporters to talk even off the
record on the subject of either North.
Vietnamese or American involvement in
the Laos war. In Laos, American officials
have refused to cooperate with reporters
or discuss our involvement there. In fact,
three reporters were arrested for trying
to investigate a secret American base in
Laos. After their arrest, the Ambassador
to Laos said the American mission had
lost any interest in helping out the press
. whatsoever.
This is hardly the action of an admin-
istration that believes that the public
should know the truth about its policy.
Members of the Senate are in the
ludicrous position of hoping that some
enterprising reporter will tell us what is
going on.
I will attempt to describe the Laos sit-
uation as best I can. Laos is a sort of
wine-bottle-shaped country sharing a
long common boundary with Vietnam. It
is about the size of the State of Oregon,
with a population of that of the District
of Columbia. Up to 1954, it was ruled by.
foreign powers and since then it has been
beset by strife. The present Government
is headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma
and he is opposed by his half-brother
Prince Souphanovong. For many years
the battle has raged back and forth, with
neither side gaining a decisive advantage.
Much of the fighting for the Government
has been done by an independent army
of Meo tribesmen, who are neither Lao-
tian nor Vietnamese, commanded by a
local warlord and paid for and equipped
by the CIA. Because of the continuous
fighting about a third of the population
has been killed, wounded, or driven from
their homes. Last summer the stalemate
was suddenly broken When the Meo
tribesmen, encouraged by their American
advisers, staged a strong attack which
swept the Pathet Lao from the Plain of
Jars for the first time in 4 or 5 years.
Everyone expected the Pathet Lao to re-
capture the Plain of Jars and in the last
weeks, they have staged their successful
counterattack. At this time no one knows
if the Pathet Lao and their North Viet-
namese allies will stop their offensive on
the Plain of Jars, as they have in the
past, or will push forward against the
cities of Vientiane and Luang Prabang
and on to the border of Thailand.
Over the years American involvement
has steadily increased. We are now Bar-
ing from 200 to 400 sorties against Lao-
tian positions every day. We have droP-
pod more bombs on Laos than on North
Vietnam. 'Unknown numbers a American
CIA operatives and Green -Beret para-
S31(1
military groups, probably teas than 5,00r), i ?
aro presently in Laos. We are spending ,
from $200 to $300 million annually in
military aid for Laos. And almoi,t 2e0
.Americans, mostly flyers, have died in
this conflict. From the known facts, it is
clear that while the Vietnam struggle
is allegedly being Vietnamized, the Lao-
tian struggle is being "Americanized."
It is clear that even after our experience .
In Vietnam, we are getting further in-
volved in an Asian country without the
knowledge of the public, without the
consent of Congress, and indeed in direct
violation of the expressed intent of Con-
gress.
' It is argued by high administration
officials that to discuss our involvement,
in Laos would be to acknowledge our
violation of the Geneva Accord of 1062.
Our violation, however, responded to the
clear and repeated violations of the Ac-
cord by. the North Vietnamese.
Frankly, I worry more about the unin-
formed American opinion than unfavor-
able world opinion. What profits us if we
win the propaganda war abroad but lose
freedom at home? Let us stop worrying
what foreigners think of us and start
worrying what we think of ourselves.
Frankly, I believe some high administra-
tion officials fear not adverse world
opinion but critical American opinion.
There is a creeping 'elitism in our Gov-
ernment, a feeling that only the bureau-
crats are competent to make foreign
policy decisions. They seem to believe
that the American public is too unin-
formed, too uneducated, to appreciate
and appraise the various considerations_
necessary in the formation of foreign
policy. History has shown, however, that
decisions made in secret by small groups,
have little likelihood of success. I also
believe that some bureaucrats think that
Americans are unwilling to sacrifice. But
Americans have made necessary sacri-
fices in the past, and they are willing to
do so again in the future.
The question is not our willingness to
sacrifice but our willingness to be de-
ceived. The question isnot support of our
President?we all support the President
In times of trouble?but faith in our
Government.
The resemblance between the impend-
ing danger in Laos and our past predica-
ment in Vietnam is unmistakable.
Are we going to allow ourselves to
make the same mistakes again?
Are we going to again send young men
to die without a clear idea of why?
? I very much fear if the American peo-
ple do not speak out, the Nation's fate,
will be decided without them.
Besides public awareness and public
participation in whatever decision is
made, I shall urge the U.S. Senate to
take the following steps: First, we should
demand the full disclosure of the recent
hearings on the situation in Laos. As
Senator SYMINGTON noted, most of this
information has already been reported in
the papers. With the release of the testi-
mony, there should also be a full dis-
closure of our involvement and purposes
In Laos. Second, if a full disclosure of
our involvement and purposes in Laos
is net possible, then the U.S. Senate
ould convene in secret session to deter-
ine what is the proper course for this
(,Approved For Release 2001103/04: CfA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
..........I.*....1???IYI??1?OA*I *OM
p,e,..romr.ri.orr.r.trylrft"mrq""T"*"..""":"cr"'"17,"Irt?Irr.7:een.
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP8G-016
Fl1Pcm(A, CAL.
: TIMES
1 ? 12,1.22
E ? 17,101.
S 16,1.07
MAR 6 1VCI
ebate Off,
ESC Says
jng "debate" came to his
3, CIA at Bay lattention whenfirst he saw a po'ster
iiabout it on Monday afternoon.
ARCATA ? Central Intelli- He said that he called the CIA
'genee Agencvacruiters ;;office in San Francisco that
'canceled employment inter- ?I evening and the next morning
views scheduled for yesterday Ilto check on ?the matter. "They
at Humboldt State College ,Isaid they definitely had made
.
But college officials said the mo arrangements for a debate,"
. cancellation had little or in Travis continued. "The recruit-
connection with a previously- er called back later Tuesday
publicized "debate" supposed ;and canceled," he went on.
to take place yesterday be-
"They have a standard pro-
!
l'
tween the recruiters. and mem-
eedure," Travis added. "They
hers of an anti-war group at ? don't come whenever a dem-
the college.
'?onstration is planned or if they
?
A sparse audience was on !hear of any chance of one."
, hand at I p.m.. when a spokes- According to Travis, the re-
ma. n for the debate's sponsor, icruiter would have canceled
the Student Mobilization Corn
his trip anyway,' because of a
mace. (SMC) announced
that limited number of sign-ups. He
the CIA had "chickened our." said that a CIA representative
The event was supposed to take
will contact the individual stu-
place in front of the Sequoia dents who did sign ,up for in-
Theatre. terviews.
College officials said that The interviews were to be
neither they nor the CIA knew with women interested in "sec-
anything about the purported retarial" positions, Travis said.
debate other than what they A similar incident resulted in
had seen on SMC posters.
cancellation of CIA interviews
?
Just Worm! at Humboldt State last year.
Frank Onstine, a student The SMC posters denounced
who said he was 'a spokesman the CIA as "the interlocking
for the SMC, admitted that the hidden machinery that carries
CIA had not been formally hi. out the policies of the United
vited to debate. "Our
;nada. States in the Cold War."
.
?
mations were the only invita-
"The CIA has been working
tion extended. We thought they overtime to panic the U.S. pub-
were widely-enough distributed lie into supporting a massive
so that they got the word." escalation of U.S. Involvement
Dave Travis, HSC:..placeinent In Laos," the flyer, continued',
said that the impend.
!
., ?
O.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-016011R000700050001-2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160
FORT WORTH, TEX.
PRESS
E ? 49.759
S 1540
31v 1970
?
N\151K4on
Laos
7.
ST,ATINTL
By TED KNAP
serippe.newsra start writer
KEY BISCAYNE, Fla.?President Nixon, '
under increasing pressure to lift the veil of
secrecy, put the finishing touches today on a
statement explaining what the United States
is doing in Laos and why.
Nixon flew to his vacation home here last ?
night with Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, his chief '
foreign policy adviser, after the White House
alerted several Washington news bureaus that
a statement on Laos would be made this week-
end, probably late today.
Sen. George S. McGovern, D., S.D., refer-
ring to press reports about B-52 bombings and
the presence of U.S. personnel on the ground,
said yesterday the United States is "engaged
in a secret war" in Laos. Senate foreign rela-
tions committee chairman J. William Ful-
bright, D., Ark., also has been pressing for
full disclosure of U.S. involvement in the
kingdom bordering both North and South Viet-
nam.
U.S. PARAMILITARY personnel, report-
ly operating under the Cen.421,,JukeWgence
Agency, have been in Laos for several years.
It has been Nixon administration policy?just
? as it was with former President Lyndon B.
Johnson?not to acknowledge publicly that they
were there.
These operations have been Clandestine
;? ? because Laos is defined as "neutral" by terms ?
of the 1962 Geneva Accords, which forbid out-
side forces to intervene. But fear that Laos '
may become another Vietnam is forcing a '
more complete official explanation.
NIXON? WILL contend, as Johnson did, thatl .
the U.S. presence has been forced by the
massive intervention of North Vietnamese .
troops. Nixon said earlier this year that 50,000 :
North Vietnamese troops were In Laos.
?
"Our activities there are solely for the
purpose of seeing that the Laotian government
(forces) . . . are not overwhelmed by the
North Vietnamese and other Communist
forces,"
forces," he said at his Jan. 30 press confer-
ence. He added that these activities are "atfy
their request," referring to the Laotian goy- 7
ernment.
The President has insisted that no Amer- ?
lean "ground combat troops" are involved in
Laos and that B-52 bombings are aimed at
interdicting North Vietnamese troop and sup- ?
ply movements down the Ho Chi Minh Trail/.'
which crosses Laptiph, territory oTititk way,
outh Vietnam. ?
And Nixon Nov. '3 said the American peo-
ple should not be asked to support a war
about which they had not been fully informed.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
0
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-
\NEW YORK, N.Y.
POST
E - 708,].80
MA R 6 1970
id
Nixon
021 Lc?s
STATI NTL
DJ. S:' is more lieaVity -
:-?committed than. the Ad-
ministration has revealed,
and the repeated White
1 House ref usal t s o e1 abo-
1
By WARREN HOGE ., rate on the earlier ex-
planation have fed this
'N.Y. Post Correspondent .
suspicion.
KEY
KEY BISCAYNE, Fla. 7' !
1, Critics have noted that
?The White House was
. the President in his No- \
0 ,
? preparing to break its si- Vember address to the na- 1
:lence today over U.S. hi- ton on Vietnam said that
volvement in Laos with an Americans could not and
I: Administration statement - Sho uld not support a war
k outlining American activ- ? effort that was not fully.
1 ity in the area.
texplained to them.
fr The declaration was ex- i :
pected to stress that the ; "We are flirting dangerous-
ly with a new Vietnam," Sen.
1: U. S. is not slipping into 1, McGovern (D-S. D.) charged
1 another Vietnam situa- 1: on Capitol Hill yesterday
i tion, a fear which has be- li while sen. F uibrigig, said his
.:
Foreign
was em
Relationplatiitsk a rc
omsmeittehe.
weeks with reports of in-
' come widespread in recent 1 le
Ig new look at the U. S. role
7 creasing Anierican particrn in Laos.
,.ipation in the widening Said McGovern: "I contend
t Laotian conflict. that the Adin!nistration is
? coveringmilifta
the facts of a
Throughout the pa s toperation in
on the situation other iLyaocsos the lives of scores of
bloodyhat has already secret-
American bombing crews and
month, the White House ?
has refused to comment
1' than to reiterate Presi- American aircraft.' . '?
The Administration is fac-;
l? dentt. Nixon's claim during
Inn severe test of its cred-
his press conference last ibility, and the upcoming ex-
- month that no combat planation will be an effort to
troops are engaged in restore confidence in the gov-
ernment's word.
How ?much of the clande-
stineeh American ilitary, ORO:
ration the .A iniStrapon ;is
prepared. to dmit is 'uncer-
-The CIA operating ?two
. Accounts from the war j, '7":?''''r,----'?
',. qq:.; t11414fM? ';.AV.i,
Approved For Release 2001/0*8.4
'airlines and providing other
extensive euuport to Meo
tribesmen battling the . Corn-
mUnist Pathet Lao and North
Vietnamese regulars in the
land-locked Asian nation. '
7 Complicating the Admin-
istration's task Ls its aware-
ness that if it ' confesses
everything it is doing in
Laos it will be admitting
ns 1
violations of the Geneva ac-
cord of ,1962 guaranteeing
' Laotian neutrality.,
Other Signers
.- Other signatories to that
document, including North
Vietnam, Communist China
and the Soviet Union, could
exploit .such a confession to
' justify formal intervention
of their own into the Laotian
w a r, the Administration
fears. .
In announcing the White
House intention to give the
public a fuller accounting of '
U. S. involvement in Laos,
'press secretary Ziegler said
Nixon himself would not per- ,
. ' sonally deliver the statement.
or participate in any brief- ?
' Mg. He made it clear, how-.
. ever, that whatever was
' tione carried the full author-.
Jay of the Chief Executive. :..
, The President flew here ,
from Washington last night 1
for a long weekend at his
Bayside home. His 'departure'
was delayed for more than
an hour when a firing pin in
;one of ,thy Air Force On en-,
ine,s,ilad to lie ep.lacied.,The
resident stayed aboard While
the srepalr. was ,reade.- -4--?-' ?
6,....0, ...0*.ded.,..........;,:i.-
Laos and that American
air activity is confined to
. reconnaissance flights
and bombing raids along
the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
?
' ?
CIA-RDP80-01_601R000700050001-2
AM; YOLK" 7104
STATINT
?Approved For Release 2001/Q31641:1171A-RDP80-01601
RED FORCE IN LAOS
IN STRONG POSITION
Has 3 Months Before Rain
, Blocks Roads ? White.
? Hotise to Give Details
' By HENRY KA1V1M '
special to The New York Times
' 1:7IENTIANE, Laos, March 5
?With about three months of
dry weather ahead, the North
Vietnamese were holding the
same ground in Laos today that
they occupied last year at the
4'end of their annual dry-
;
;season offensive. This puts the
Communist forces in a strong
position.
? The beginning of the rainy
season, which makes the supply
routes impassable, normally
marks the retreat of Commu-
nist troops front some of the
ground that they have gained.
1 [In Washington, the White
I House said that the Admini-
stration would disclose some
information this weekend on
the situation in Laos.]
$ The North Vietnamese and
loosely organized and said, by
Government and American
sources to be of lesser effec-
tiveness.
Approximately the same num,
her of enemy troops, similarly [initiative is conceded to Hanoi,
divided, are reported in the and the question is how far
southern panhandle region, but Hanoi wants to push.
the war there is not affected Optimists in the present con-
by the seasonal seesaw. The text say that Hanoi's goals
Communist objective in south-
ern Laos is to safeguard the have not changed. The goals
complex
are, in this view, to take all
Ho Chi Minh trail, a
the territory that the Commu-
of jungle and mountain paths
along which North Vietnam nists and neutralists' held at
moves men and supplies to the the time of the Geneva accord
of 1962, which proclaimed a
south in circumvention of the
demilitarized zone astride the neutral Laos under a coalition
border of North Vietnam and government. ?
The neutralists have split
South Vietnam.
The United States Air Force since then, and the Commu-
is making a maximum effort nists have left the Government.
to prevent the enemy from In the optimistic view, the
marshaling men and supplies Communists would halt on the
f 1962 line, declare that the
or a renewed offensive as
speedily as its forces ?regained true neutralists are on their
side and demand a new three
-
the Plaine des Jarres. The recap-
ture, while fully expected, oc- sided government under Com-
curred against almost no cf- munist domination.
The pessimists?theyfective opposition on the include
ground, which may account for sectors of the American estab-
lishment?contend that Hanoi
some of the sense of panic
has the power to fo further and
felt abroad. may use if for the sake of
Hoped to. Slow Advance turning the war in Laos and in
American officials had hoped Vietnam in their favor.
that the advance would be ? They believe that the Corn.
slowed, without great sacrifices munists may push their mill-
of Government troops, by delay. tary advantage to the point of
leg actions that would force presenting Premier Souvanna
the enemy to mass for attacks, Phouma with an ultimatum to
This would have offered targets order the Americans to halt
for the continuous raids by uni. bombing in Laos?carried out
However, there is no hope of
defeating the Communists from
the air and little faith in the
power of the Laotian forces to
withstand a major attack, The
United States planes based in
'their Pathet Lao allies are paus- Thailand and on carriers and by
,ing to allow their logistic sup- the small but active Royal Lao-
tian Air Force flying converted
World War H trainers carrying'
bombs and rockets.
Maj. Gen. Van Pao, com-
mander of Government forces
on the Plaine des Jarres as'
well as of the clandestine army
--guerrillas trained, equipped,
supplied, advised, transported
'port to be built up before ex-
ploiting their recent recapture
of the Plaine des James for
'further offensive actions. At
'the same time, Laotian and
,American officials try to antic-
ipate where the Communists
will strike and, more impor-
clandestinely since 1964 under
the guise of armed reconnais-
sance with the right to return
fire if attacked?or face the
advance of Communist troops
beyond the old neutralist line
into the Vientiane Plain to the
Mekong River.
A bombing halt would allow
the North Vietnamese the un-
impeded use of the Ho Chi
Minh trail, on which they now
and paid by the United States se perhaps as much as a
,tantlY, how far they intend to through the CentraLIntellIgcnce.jtiUarter of the supplies they
go. I Agency?had been persuaded move southward. This would
"
However the excitement over to adopt this strategy over hid Take it possible for them to
the situation in Laos has not wishes to try to hold the, 'divert to aggressive use the
ye plain. , t spread to Laos. ? troops that now guard the
While the press of the world The holding,, actions failed to' trail.
and the most respected liberal cleVelop partcularly at Gen- The result would be inter-
voices in the United States
Senate predict imminent egos-.
trophe, Vientiane, the admin-
istrative capital, and Luang Pra-
!bang, the royal capital, appear
las drowsy as they did after
lthe signal military successes of,
;Government forces last Sep.:
'tember. panic to the clandestine army
The North Vietnamese have defenders. Similarly, Muong
about 25,000 troops in north-1 Soul, the westernmost point of
ern Laos, consisting of two the Communists' advance last
;infantry divisions, a number year, was abandoned in quick
'of unattached combat units and order.
isupporting troops. They have United States planes are con-
cral Vang pao's forward headl national embarrassment to the
quarters, at an old French air- United States and a serious
port code named Lima Lima. blow to the American. nego-
His perimeter forces of regular tiating position at the Paris
troops broke and fled under peace talks.
fire of 122-mm. rockets and the ' Whatever the eventual politi
sight of two to four Soviet- cal goals, military sources ex..;
built tanks, and spread their pect the Communists to strike, .
a determined blow at General:
yang Pao's irregulars. These
troops are the best fighting,
force .on the r?overnment side.
With the help ? of the United
States Air Force, they achieved
the surprise victory last year
on the Plaine des .ares' which
had been held for five years
by the Communistsi
The most painful blow that I,
could he dealt to the general,
the chief of the Meo mountain ;
tribe, would be the capture of
Long Cheng, his headquarters
and the Meo capital southwest
of the plain.
The loss of this secret, partly
American-staffed base, in the
view of knowledgeable Ameri-
can officials, might be fatal td
the effectiveness of the most
able general and fighters on,
the Government side.
Other likely Comunist ob
jectives are throught to be a
drive westward from Muong
Soui along Route 7, which leads
from North Vietnam through'
the Plaine des Jarres to a junc-
tion with Route 13, the north-.
south highway linking Vientiane,
and Luang Prabang.
- ?
The capture of the hill poSi-
tion of Sala Phoukhoun, where
the roads meet 30 miles west of
Muong Soul, would place the,
Communists in a position to
threaten either capital. Another
likely objective is Vangvieng,
the headquarters of the pro-
Government neutralists. ?
Communist forays in the re-
gion of Paksane in recent days
have raised the threat of a
drive on the city on the Mekong
border with Thailand, severing
northern Laos from the pan-
handle region.
In the absence of solid indi-
cations of Hanoi's aims and in a
possible effort to discourage
North Vietnam from setting its
sights higher than in the past,
United States officials here and
in Saigon have left unchal-
lenged a report that on at least.
one occasion B-52's, the biggest,
American bombers. have 'been;
used in northern lAos.
'more rockets and bigger artil-
:lery than before. They are
ibacked by about the same num.,
Pathet ilA41 trooPINAMIre
eentrating bombs and rockets
On the major supply routes.
The hope is to thus delay the
enemy offensive tor, two. to
Approved For R6Tbrges ti6416tibr:'61A-RDP80-01601R0007009501304141nueri
I= T.13s
Approved For Release 2001AiReiggiA-RDETATIm
A RI
'Secret' U.S.-Run Base Deep in Laos Seems Placid
:i l? :
ku!,-
By T. D. ALLIVIAN
.., ., . Special to The Vew York Timts
, VIENTIANE, Laos, March 5?
?Dcspite Government setbacks in
?recent fighting, the big base
at Long Cheng run by the
United States for the clendes-
tine army in Laos appears
placid except for a buzz of
rAmerican activity around the
)landing field.
j??:. Long Cheng Is just southwest
;of the Plaine des Jarres from
..:which Laotian Government
troops were driven last month
.,..%find it is the center of opea-
.1
tions of the United States mill-
..tary and the Central Intelli-
jgence Agency in, northeastern
Laos.
? With 40,000 people, it is one
...of the largest Laotian settle-
Priments. But its existence is sup-
"...posed to be secret, so it appears
eatin few maps, and no regular
airlines stop there.
,-i,i No journalist has been al-
lv;lowed to visit Long Cheng. Last
,wweek, however, three journal-
ists?Max Coiffait of Agence
t..France-Prosse, John Saar of
..!'Llfe magazine and this corre-
i . spondent ? walked to Long
-Cheng to report on the United
?:,States air, logistic and Weill-
/ Ilgence activities there. '
t': 4,,I.The hill costumes of. the Meo
' 'ttribesmen contrasted with the
jeeps and carrying M-16 rifles
and pistols. These young
Americans are mostly ex-Green
Berets, hired on C.I.A. contrac
to advise and train Laotian
troops.
The (fact that they are tem-
porarily C.I.A. personnel and
no longer connected with their
Army units allows the United
States Govern;meht to say that
it has no soldiers fighting in
Laos.
The town of Long Cheng is
almost brand new and every-
thing there has been flown in
by United States aircraft. The
most permanent-looking build-
ings were a glassed-in Laotian
officers club and the scores of
C.I.A. buildings, identifiable by
their windowless walls with
projecting air conditioners and
roof aerials.
The center is home for about
50 Americans who supply,
plan, finance, direct and some-
times even participate in the
fighting against the Pathet Lao
and North Vietnamese around
the plain.
Since the United States ac-
tivities violate the 1962 Geneva
accords on Laos, which forbid
foreign military intervention,
Long Cheng is off limits to all
but United States ,and Laotian
officials' who have special per-
ivilian clothes of United 4tates mission.: from Jhe,C.I.A. an
taiallitary ;snen,.. riding In ;.openirom Maj. 'Gen. 'Vans' Pao, the
r 1.rairmaammosiorermironismii0+0.41"""
Laotian military commander in
N rtheastern Laos.
The three journalists' visit to
,ong Chen was neither author-
ized nor anticipated. But they
were able to reach it by walk-
ing about 15 miles from Sam-
thong through a number of
Government checkpoints and
then wandered freely about the
town for nearly two hours be-
fore being discovered and corn'
pelted to leave.
Well-Equipped Airfield
The airfield at Long Cheng
small but very well equipped,
with a paved all-weather run-
way about 3,000 feet long com-
plete with landing lights.
Sheltered in a ,parking area
carved out of the hillside were
half a dozen United States
transport planes, including 33-
passenger Caribous, although
the Longcheng field can ac-
commodate larger transports.
Also in the parking area were
10 Short Take-off and Lending
(STOL) aircraft, the lifeline for
dozens of isolated Government
enclaves in northeastern Laos.
Their American pilots?mostly
civilian employes of Air Amer-
ica and Continental Air serv-
ices?ferry soldiers, arms and
supplies to battle zones.
Farther down the runway
were a dozen or more un-
marked T-28 single-engine pro-
peller bombers that are flown
on bombing missions by Meo
tribesmen and ,Laotian pilots.
But everything else regarding
the T-28 's is done by Ameri-
cans. We saw members of the
? United States Air force repair-
? 'Ang engines, loading bombs,and
rockets, instructing Laotian pi-
lots and taxiing the planes up
and down the runway.
Near the T-28's were
three American reconnaissance
planes, flown by United States
pilots from Long Chong Lnd
used to mark targets for the
United States jet bombers.
Rescue Helicopters Stand-By
At the end of rhe paved run-
way were three Jolly Green Gi-
ant rescue helicopters. Their
presence is believed to be one
of the reasons the United
States tries to keep Long
Cheng secret. The Jolly Green
Giants are regarded as proof:
that the United States bombs. ,
not just the Ho Chi Minh Trail
but northeastern Laos as well.
Their crews are always on
stand-by to rescue downed'
United States bomber pilots, of
which about a dozen are pre-,
sumed killed in Laos each'
month. The Jolly Green Giants;
were largely unarmed, though
their crews wore United States
Air Force flight uniforms.
The three journalists watched
the traffic at Long Chana's air-
field for about an hour, and cal-
culated that a United States
plane landed or took off every
minute. United States helicop-
ters and airplanes were in hold-
ing pattern above ilie valley,
waiting to land.
There appear to be more ra-
dio antennas in Long Cheng
than trees. The radio network
connects Long Cheng with
agents all over northeast Laos,
many of them Meo forward air
guides who direct United States
bombers to their targets,.,...
?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Lce"rl.i'11?g*: v C '
BtafeVn?
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/M814 EPA-RDP80-01601R0
, ,,titinn 'of the Vietnam expel- ?
.,Bulletin News 'Analysis , .ence. ? .
Many congressmen?especial-
Ni IVOri s Laos AProblem. view at the unwillinenese of the
? also disturbed it what they,
ly members of the Senate?nre
/
. '. Administration to let the Lepie-
Whether .to Be Frank icitsivringrfirawriitichPar= the
111e;
By RICHARD FRANK
Bulletin Washington Bureau
Washington?The White House,
under increasingly critical con-
gressional pressure, has decid-
ed to break its long silence and
United States to International
supplying it , with equipment, enursee of action.
training and combat advisory
One Dispute
missions staffed by ? military
men now on civilian status and A particular Irritant I. the un-
reportedly assigned and ft-, ublished transcript of several
nanced by the Central. Intel i ' days ni closed-door hearings on
gence Agency. 'Laos before a foreign relations
subcommittee studying U. S.
ce
tell the public about the Amen - ? -- _._ .
.-A
-inerican bombers, openly
can role in the not-so-secret war engaged in bombing the Ho Chi
m
in Laos. Minh Trail along the southeast-
A statement by President Nix- e edge , of Laos, have, also
on is expected in the next few been used against ?North Viet-
days. It will, for the first time? 'names? troops operating in
give the Official Administration:north central Laos against Lao.
position on thn war in the tiny.:tian government troops'. , ? '
landlocked ?Southeast Asia ?American _fighter-timbers
; ,
respon e to questions a
Laos, but declined to go into de-
tail on U. 'S. involvement there,
On Sept. 26, he said the U. S.
was previding logistical support
end training for the neutrallet
government of Prince Souvanna
Phouma "In order to avoid Lane
falling under. Communist domi-
nation."
He said that the "U. S. also
flew reconnaissance fliehts over
Lam and engaged in "some oth-
er activities"which he would not
discuss. '
Mr. Nixon denied- that there
were any American combat
troops In I.aos, and there is no
Commitments abroad. , eviden that this is the case.
except for the reports that CIA
'OctoberThose, and the transcript .
advisers are'active In the field. '
hearings were held last was!
routinely submitted to the State On Dec. 8, the President said -
Department for the '
"sanitizing" the nen* of this country "are
process performed to eliminate
,
entitled tn know everything that
testimony whose publication
they rinssibly can with regard to
would he damaging to national' "v involvement of the United
Potosi; abroad."
kingdom which shares a bor- .
?
ii
Vietnam. .
' the A Refusal
:der with both North and South 'Tn.almed by Committee members say
American pilots
, have been flying in close sup- 'transcript was returned with so, I , ? : ?
many deletions that to publish' Itnt, ?then., after confirming
public.
it in that form would mislead the fa..1.,
,,aicung ._ the Ho Chi Minh
tho United States was "in-
Four months of negotiations rail through Laos, he said,
between committee staff .1"bevond 'that, I don't think the
ployes and the State Depeamrt....rhlic interest would be screed.
ment have narrowed down the'. Pny further discussion." .
disputed parts of the hearings NI his-most recent press con-
transcript, but the differences fr....r.rice: on Jan,: 30, the. Pres.
transcript,
so substantial that the . noted thnt North' Vietnam
print the , ..
rine 50,000 troops in Laos,
committee refuses to
transcript In its present 'can- eilv _ threatening the sur-i
trivail of Laos," and said Amer-' i
sored version.. . . Ion activities in' tnat cduntry I
were "solely for the purpose of!.
ment (was) not overwhelmed byl.
seeing that the Laotian govern-
the North Vietnamese and other! .
Communist. forces."
In his 40.000-word, book.:
length foreign policy report to
Congress last month, Mr. NUcen .
devoted only part of one sen- '
tence to Laos, linking it to the
war In Vietnam. .
He said the U. S. was seek-:
ing, through negotiations with
the North' Vietnamese, to
achieve "a compromise settle-
ment which would assure the
self-determination of the South' -
Vietnamese people and would
also ensure the continued nett-,
trality of Laos." .
port of Laotian troops in the
: The President's decision to
discuss the U. S. Involvement Plain of Jars, in the north-cen-
i in Laos indicates that he has hal sector of the kingdom, an
resolved the dilemma he
active battleground 'seven hun-
in- .
herited when he took office and: dred ? miles away from the
which he has perpetbated dur- routes used by North Vietna-
ing the past thirteen months. mese infiltrators into South
' The evidence, from newsmen- Vietnam'
in Laos and from congressional
sources with access to unpub-
ished data on the war, is that
the United States and North
Vietnam have each been in
clear violation of the 1962 Gen-
eva accords which established
the official neutrality of Laos.
The Chokes
Thus Mr. Nixon has two basic
choices:
?He can admit to the world
? ?An estimeted 150 American
?civilian airmen are missing,
'captured or dead In Laos since
,ithe Geneva accords of July,
11962. established the official neu-
trality of Laos. :
Under the GeneVa accords,
both the bombing and the mill-
tary assistance offered by the
U. S. is illegal. All that . the
.American Government has of-
ficially admitted is the massive
'bombing of the Ho Chi Minh
pail, intended to "interdict" the
Infiltration from North Vietnarn
through the southeast corner of
Laos and into South Vietnam.
- ? ?
that his country has violated
an international agreement to
which it is one of the parties.
?Or he can withhold some of
the most damaging facts and
'find that his Administration's
credibility has been placed in
serious doubt.
A less-than-frank ' statement
by the President might also
seem to signify that the U. S.
is far more deeply involved in
Laos than the. evidence which
so far has been revealed would
Indicate. .
What h Known
What is 'known, officially or
unofficially, about tho American
role in Laos is this:
U. S. is spending more
than $200 million a year to sup-
port the royal Laotian...array!.
The Pressures
I The President has been 'under
particular pressure from con-
,
gressional doves and sonic
hawks to speak out on Laos and
dispel the growing feeling that
the war there could engulf his
Administration -as the Vietnam
war overwhelmed the regime of
Lyndon B. Johnson.
Secretary of State William P.
Rogers spent more than two
hours with members of the Sen-
ate Foreign flotations Commit?
tee earlier this, week, but appar-
'ently failed to eliminate all the
!ears% that the U S.., involve.
, itienkAnAtu,reighti be? repis
r
The Issue '
Some who have had access to
the hearing record say there
is very little in it which has
not already appeared in the
press, either in the form of pub-
lic statements by members of
Congress or the Administration
or through news reports from
Laos and Washington.
Others who have read it say
it offers evidence that the U. S.
involvement in the Laotian war
has secretly and significantly.
escalated.
There is no necessary contra-
diction in these two views, since
those who say America has be-
come more deeply involved also
acknowledge that much of the
evidence has previously been
published.
'Their primary concern, they
sav,. Is that Congress Is being
left out of important foreign
policy decisione in this area.
Nixon's Cominents
At his last% three '''televlsed
_PM! cOlgerelice-Ot..0)..
1
Created in 1949
Laos, which did not 'exist as
a separate country until 1949,,
when France gave it its inde-
pendence, is clearly a. part of,
the over-alt ' Indochina. battle-
field. ?, ?
' its less than three" million'
people. livein a moimtainous ?
Approved For Rdlease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
oontinued
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0
RivFRSIIM, , CAL.
ENTERPRISE
- 41,683
MAR 6 1970
And now Laos
r
Rep. L. Mendel Rivers, head
, of the House Armed Services
?Committee and , confidant of
the military, has denied the U.S.
is getting into a Vietnam-like
. commitment in Laos: "Anyone
who says we are just doesn't?
know the facts."
Perhaps. But what, then, are
, the facts? That is the essence of
the complaint, for the informa-
tion which the public gets comes
in driblets.
The worst kept secret of the
little war is the heavy participa-
tion of the .L1.4?..and military
advisers. The air war has been
, busier, and by extrapolating U.S.
Command figures, it is a safe bet?
; that 300 planes and 100 airmen' ?
1.;. But. the totalAdministration -1
'effort thus far has been to try to
improve its public-relations im-
age on Laos. ,No one has come
up with a satisfactory way of
doing that short of telling all,
which is viewed in some quarters
as a horrendous idea. 1
James Reston reminded us
the other day that Mr. Nixon, in
his notable November speech on
Vietnam, said: "The American
people cannot and should not be
asked to support a policy which
involves the ovvrriding issues of
war and peace unless they know
the Irlith about that policy."-
_ True. in Vietnam, true i
Laos;.',.;At
1, were lost in neighboring Laos I
r last year.
As fears have mounted, more
and more officials have stepped
, forward to defend the U.S. role,
, without saying what that role is.
Theirs is an unspoken plea to
"trust us," a particular South,
east Asia road that has been
'gone down before to everlasting
regret.
Secretary of State William
`Rogers has been more effective 4
by talking to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and promis-
ing that it will be consulted in ?
advance of any increased U.S. in-
volvement. This may, still criti-./1
;:eism for a time, as the p,ersua-
Ave M. ,Rogers ,has .doe .befFet 4
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601
GIAO,TAT
ro*,n7V1 -
Kr03 1970
PUMPED-UP LAOS ISSUE...
The fighting in tiny Laos, where North Viet- Administration. Some Senators are honestly
-
nam is thrusting sporadic attacks on the weak fearftil. we are under hazard: of having Ante
Laotians, has undoubtedly been stepped up. And military feet burned again,' ,
United States air bombing, mainly linen Com- Besides sincerity among -some Congress-
rnunist .forces and supplies traveling the Ho Chi- men, there' is the political, "possibility that
Minh trail toward South Vietnam, has been compuisiVely partisan Democrats resent the
increased. fact Mr. Nixon has relegated the Viet issue
But the fright-mongering charges that the tiimbo hy-14- Vietnantization program at,e
President and the Pentagon are escalating gradual troop. pullout.
Laos warfare into "another Vietnam" have Every year at this time the North Vietnarn, e -
about as much foundation as a straw man in have loosed offensives in Laos, taking the Plain
a hurricane. , of Jars and beefing up protection of the Ho Chi,:
Richard Nikon has made it clear he intends IVIinh highway' into South 'Vietnam. As regular-
to shrink commitments involving United ly as clockwork, the Laotians have won back
States arms. Why would he be withdrawing the plain. Whether they can this year or wheth-
American troops from Vietnam if he sought, er Reds now intend to take over all Laos by
or would tolerate, "another Vietnam" in force has caused some worry in Washington ?
Southeast Asia? not a great deal. .?
Neither the President nor his Administration * *
is about to invite a new Indo-China conflict Laos is a plot of real estate no bigger than
surreptitiously. The idea that Washington may Oregon and with a population of about 3 mil-
be sneaking the American people into another lion. Its only strategic value is the Ho highway
Asian war has all the look of -a oumpedaap for Hanoi troops and supplies. Because the
poltergeist. ""!..United States has been heavily bombing this ,
* * *
reinforcement route, cries of "escalation" have,
Defense Secretary Melvin Laird has said am- been raised. Americans have, however, been ':
equivocally the enifed States- has no ground bombing the Ho Chi Minh supply r9ad steadily
forces in Laos. The tenor of his statement in- for years. The only real hazard' that might be-
dicates there is no intention whatever of send- raised by a Red grab of Laos would be the
ing troops into that little state. ,Communist armed threat- Thailand. This
If the situation should change drastically, not immediate and could likely be staved- off. 412
he said the President and defense establish-
,* * * 411
ment would consult with Congress before ,?
A roundup of opinion among Washinge4
making any further decision.
, analysts by the Wall Street Journal conclu,(As
?
Why then, has,a furor, largely inspired by
the. Laos problem is not at 'all likely to mush-
Senate foes of virtually every Viet policy, sud-
denly been raised in Congress over the usual room into another Vietnam, even threaten such,
? - b ?
winter offensive of Red' Vietnamese In a og '
,.,And over reports some CIA agents and. Green:,j'' New war over Laos is not wanted 'by the
Berets are tutoring Laotian, Soldiers in 'defense ? Administration, nor apparently by the Viet Corn.
incidentally with miniscule results? ',Munists.
One reason is because Viet watchers in ? ;;.The- thoracic uproar over .a Laotian military
capital are understandably' suspicious of any', -,,,,,,40tista, Involving us and Reds in Southeast Asia,
? military operations In the Vietnain theater appears no . more than .4.; AMOY bubble in a
after the credibility- gap .during: the -Jobtison.:.i;11'.: brief lawge headlines.' "
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Approved For Release 200MITA-RDP8&-METAIR
6 MAR 1970
Laos explanation readied
. By Scripps-Howard Nowspapers , These operations have been clandestine be-
KEYcause Laos is defined as "neutral" by terms of
BISCAYNE, Fla., March 6 ?.President
Nixon, under increasing pressure to lift the ' the 1962 Geneva accords, which forbid outside :
t'. veil of secrecy, put the finishing touches today
,on a statement explaining what the U.S. is
doing in Laos and why.
Mr. Nixon flew to his vacation home here
last night with Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, his?
chief foreign policy adviser, after the White
House alerted several Washington news
this weekend, probably late today. that the U.S. presence has been forced by the 1
forces to intervene. But fear that Laos may ,
become another Vietnam is forcing a more
complete official explanation.
Mr. Nixon Nov. 3 said the American people I
should not be asked to support a war about .
which they had not been fully 'informed.
:: reaus that a statement on Laos would be made Mr. Nixon will contend, as Mr. Johnson did,
massive intervention of North Vietnamese :
f; Sen. George S. McGovern, D-S.D., referring troops. Mr. Nixon said earlier this year that
? to press reports about B52 bombings and the -
presence of U.S. personnel on the ground, said ., 50,000 North Vietnamese troops were in Laos.
yesterday the U.S. is "engaged in a secret' "Our activities there are solely for the pun,
t war" in Laos. Senate Foreign Relations Corn- pose of seeing that the Laotian government
mittee Chairman J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., (forces) ... are not overwhelmed by North
also has been pressing for full disclosure of Vietnamese and other communist forces," he
U.S. involvement in the kingdom bordering = said at his Jan. 30 press conference. He added
.i Vietnam.
that these activities are "at their request,"
U.S. paramilitary personnel, reportedly op- ' referring to the Laotian government.
erating under the CIA have been in Laos for Mr. Nixon has Insisted, however, in response
several years. It has been Nixon Administra- to_criticism, that U.S.-involvement in Laos has
? tion policy "? just as it was with former Presi ? -
s' dent Lyndon B . Johnson ? n
ot toacknowledge
.not increased since, he became 'President 43.
they were there. .1.1. ?
publicly that months ago...
V; 4
riot
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
STATINTL
41,1\LAR6
Approved For Release 2001/0m04 .a -RDP80-01601R00
meeting with the Senate For-
Willie House
Statement
Due on Laos
By Murrey Marder
woolirsion Pont Staff Writer
The White House is expect-
ed to Issue a statement, prob-
ably today, on Americah
volvement in the semi-secret
war In Laos in an attempt to
quell domestic alarm about
escalating warfare in South.:
?east Asia.
?
There is open concern in.,
'side the administration that'
suspicions about clandestine
warfare in Laos can shatter'
the relative American calm?
about U.S. strategy in adjoin.1
Ing South Vietnam. General.
!zed denials that there is any,
current administration inten.'
tion to send American ground
troops into Laos have failed.
to head off congressional ap.'
prehensions.
White House Press Secre.? '
' tary Ronald L. Ziegler / said: .
'yesterday that "we have been
considering this matter and'
there is a very good posslialli-
ty that we will have some ad- '
ditional information to give,'
you this weekend."
President Nixon left Washol
ington last night by jet for
1 , :
a three-day weekend at Key
Biscayne, Fla. He was ac
companied by his principal..
aides, including Henry A.
Kissinger, his national securi..,
ty adviser.
What is expected is a 1
White House statement on : /
Laos with a press briefing for '
newsmen.
The Nixon administration
is expected to tell only part .
of the facts about the full
U.S. role in the Laotian war '
because the conflict directly
involves the Central Intelli- I
!tivities in such a situation
never' are officially disclosed. !
genee Agency, whose detailed!
ac
..I 1..
President Nixon, as Presi-
dents Johnson rind Kennedy
before him, is operating on
the principle that any one-
, sided disclosure of covert tie-
: tivitics in Laos would put the
:United Slates nt a major dip-
lomatie disadvantage and Mo
damage the, prospects for halt.
lug the Laotian conflict. ,
The Internal argument lins
been that North Vietnam
11CVCP admitted that it failed
to comply with the 1002 Gen-
eva agreement to pull its
troops out of Laos, hut instead
greatly increased them. U.S.
military support, training, aid
air power was then requested
clandestinely by Laotian Pre-
? mier Souvanna Phouma to
preserve his neutral regime.
This has put both sides, for
? some years, in actual violation
of the Geneva neutrality ac-
. cords. But whoever admitted
it officially would put himself
on the spot. President Nixon
publicly tried to hold that line
as recently as his Jan. 30
press conference. Since then,
? however, a rolling North Viet-
namese.led offensive in Laos,
, reportedly with 15,000 new
troops added to the 40,000 to
50.000 Hanoi soldiers there,
? has escalated U.S. alarm
about "another Vietnam," put-
ting presaure on, the White,
House to speak out.
President Nixon in the re-
cent past has acknowledged
that U.S. air power has been
engaged in "interdicting" the
flow of North Vietnamese in-
filtrators across Laos into
South Vietnam. The United
States has said very little offl-
cially, however, about its role
in the other war in Laos, for
control of Laos itself.
Now, U.S. strategists them-
selves are wondering whether ;
the Communists plan either to
intensify the level of warfare'
in Laos to checkmate U.S.
strategy in Vietnam, or to try
to gain enough control in Laos
to force the United States to
halt the bombing of the w-
eaned Ho Chl Minh infiltra-
tion trails. The latter has been
a longtime Hanoi objective. ,
s TuesclaY_in&.- private
eign Relations Coinmittee,
Secretary of State William P.
Rogers sought to case senato-
rial fears that the United
States is contemplating send.
ing ground troops into Laos if
the situation worsens.
? Administration and congrea.,
sional tources yesterday both
denied published reports that
Rogers gave the committee a
binding, assurance that the
Nixon administration never
will do so.
It is impoasible to give any
such absolute guarantee, ad-
ministration sources said.
What Rogers did tell the com-
mittee, sources In both
branches of government said,
was that the administration
has no current plans to send
any ground combat troops into
Laos and would consult with
Congress in advance if such
an emergency should arise.
,Rogers also notified Sen.
Stuart Symington (D-Mo.),
chairman of a Foreign Rela-
tions subcommittee that ha
investigated U.S. involvement
In Laos, that the "serious situ-
ation , presently existing in
Laos" makes it impractical for.
Ambassador G. MeMurtie
Godley to return to Washing-
ton to testify. When feasible,
said Rogers, that will be ar-
ranged.' ,
The Symington subcommit-
tee has clashed with the ad-
ministration for months over
security censorship and re-
lease of the) record of its
closed hearings on Laos.
Senate Majority Leader
Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) told
newsmen yesterday that he be.
Wyss President Nixon la eon.
sidering a report to the Amer'.
can people that will be "hell:).
ful" on this count, too. ?
Mansfield, said he Is en-
couraged to hope that more
facts about U.S. activities In
Laos will he released. Other-
wise, he said, "The people'
Will become more and more
suspicious and the situation
will become more difficult."
.Mansfield maid, "We are up to,
'our neck in Laos and .over
our head In Vietnam."
Sen. George McGovern
(H-S.0.) renewed his charges
yesterday that In Laos "we
are flirting dangerously with
a new Vietnam.
? "The administration is vio-
lating the Geneva settlement
of 1962 by interfering mili-
tarily in Laos," McGovern
told the National Newspaper
Association in the Senate
auditorium. McGovern said,
"I firmly believe we are at
war in Laos on a dangerous
s ale," and "the Nixon ad-
inistration is guilty of deli-
berate deceit" in its explana-
tions about that war.
Sen. Harry F. Byrd (D-
W.Va.) told the Senate, "Un-
der no foreseeable circum-
stances must we become in-
volved In another ground war
in Asia." Byrd said a state-
ment this week by Premier
Souvanna Phouma. suggests
"that he may be becoming
desperate and is seeking wid-
er and more comprehensive
support ' from the United
States". .;? . ? ? 1.: ..?"
STATINTL
=
iIicJl
Approved For Release 2001/0WWI9ZIA-RDP80-016
Wiite House Plans
,.Staternent on Laos
. Senate Pressure
Stirs Nixon Action
By GARNETT D. HORNER Maintains Silence
Star Staff Writer The U.S. government has re-
KEY BISCAY iNE, Fla.? :mained silent about news re-
President Nixon s rFady to. ports of 7352 bombing missions in
make public now some informa- the vicinity of the Plain of Jars,
tion he has tried to keep secret recently overrun by North Viet-
about how deeply the United namese ground combat troops,
States is involved in helping! and of Americans out of uni-
Laos combat Communist invad-i form working with the Royal
ers from North Vietnam. Laotian forces on the ground.
The new information was ex-I The Nixon administration has
pected to be released by thel been under pressure, primarily
winter White House soon, prob- _
from members of the Senate
.: Indications were that the in- Foreign Relations Committee, to
formation made public would be make public more detailed infer-
substantially that which has mation about the extent of U.S.
been provided to congressional involvement. Democrats kept
committees in executive session up that pressure in the Senate
during recent weeks by Seere- yesterday.
? tary of State William P. Rogers There is good reason for say:
? and Defense Secretary Melvin'; lag, officially, as little as possi-
R. Laird, 11 ble shout the U.S. role in Laos.
The whole Laotian Lssue?what ' The little Southeast Asian coun-
the United States should do try is officially neutral. The 1962
there and how much should be Geneva accords, signed by the
told the American people and United States, North Vietnam,1
the world about it?is an inherit- Communist China and the Soviet'
ed one for Nixon. .Union guarantee the neutrality'
The problem of what to do of Laos and forbid foreign troop
about Laos dates back to at least intervention. 1
1082 when the late President
Jblm F. Kennedyi tried to put it Requested by Premier ' reporters who had not planned
\on the. shelf with the accords Whatever the United States is , to make the trip hastily signed.
reached at Geneva for a neutral- doing
has been requested by up for the White House press
, Laotian Premier So u v a n n a plane.
list Laos. Phouma, who said a few days Ziegler made clear that the
1 Nixon does not see the present ago American air support was expected new information on
issue as one of "admitting" this, the only thing keeping his coun- U.S. activity in Laos would not
or that regarding U.S. activity. try from falling to North Viet- 0=0. kom the President person.
namese aggression. itily. ? r,'4 .L.2-:;,? '..;!.. -.4, ',, ' i 1 '..
4. 4.4%." ' tmalt411.;.1 V %.6?A 4 i ,Y.T1 ka
'Rather, he sees it as a question
I ...No evidence has developed to
.of meeting U.S. obligations con- (impute statements by Nixon and
ening preservation' of the neu- others that no U.S. ground coin-
4trality of Laos, with the mini- bat military forces are in Laos.
mum possible risk of American But reports of ground activity
mar. In Southeast Asia.
cans, presumably CIA person-
All Nixon has admitted off 'nel, coupled with demands from
i-'senators that the full story be
cially so far is that U.S. bomblol, d, havotendod to stir sus.
ers are attempting to interdic picion . ..
Cilia SOPOis ati"
North VietaBlriese reinfor
meats and supplies movin ,
ably some time today.
policy in Laos have said noth-
lbig, however, about violations
of the accords by North Viet.'
nam or its two divisions in Laos.
There has been considerable
soul-searching within the admin-
istration about the risk of saying
anything more publicly about
U.S. activity in Laos.
Daily Questioning
The issue apparently was re-
solved within the last 36 hours or
so. Until yesterday, White House
Press Secretary Ronald L. Zie-
gler would say under almost
daily questioning, that he could
add nothing to what Nixon had
said in his press conferences
about Laos.
But yesterday ' Ziegler told
newsmen there was a "good pos-
sibility" of "additional informa.
tion" about U.S. involvement in
Laos being provided them here
this weekend.
Nixon flew to his winter home
beside Biscayne Bay last night
for a long weekend of work and
relaxation.
After Ziegler's advice yester-
day afternoon, a dozen or so
L of nonuniformed Ameri-
involvement in another ground
along the Ho CM Minh tra ?
throughto Soutb Vietuanti
I.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: C1A-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2 ?
?
STATI NTL
CHICAGO TRIBUNE
kX Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601
5 MAR 1970
Ch rg es Laos Mac
Market Money Deals
BY FRED FARRAR
!Chicago Tribune Press Serricel
Washington.. March 4?Sen.
' Abraham Ribicoff ID.. Conn. 1,
' charged toda Y that black
, market currency manipulations
' have spread from Viet Nam to
; Laos and American pilots are
1.
I involved. .
' Ribicoff made the charge as
1
. his Senate permanent Investi-
gations subcommittee reopened
' hearings into the misuse of
! noncommissioned officers club
!funds and black market cur-
? rency dealings in Viet Nam.
: Ribicoff did not elaborate on
. the currency black market in
Laos, except In say that the
kip. the basic Laotian unit of
:currency, is involved and
'profits from the transactions
have been funneled into bank
' accounts in the United States.
I Operated by CIA
1 He also did not specify
, whether he ? was talking about
4 military or civilian pilots. Two
private air lines operated by
' the central intelligence agency
use civilian pilots to 'fly supply
' and other mission thruout
' much of Laos. .
Ribicoff's allegations came
.after Secretary of the Army
Stanley Resor disclosed in a
statement to the subcommittee
that the army's continuing
investigation of club fund ir-
regularities have uncovered "a
few additional incidents , of
possible misconduct apparently
unrelated to the incidents high-
lighted in your hearings."
Declines to Tell Details
, S ubcommittee investigators
I were the first to uncover.
1 evidence of irregularities in the
i use of club funds. Last fall the
1 subcommittee held extensive
I public hearings on that matter
1 and on black market currency
I manipulations In Viet Nam by
? Sen. Abraham Ribicoff
American military men and
civilians there.
? Resor declined to give details
of the new cases in today's
public session because, he said,
of "the possibility of criminal,
actions in these cases."
Resor also said that two .
army use by various police
retired Maj. Gen. Carl Turner,
former army provost marshal,,
have been completed and "in'
accordance with an agreement
with the department of justice,
copies have been made availa-
ble to the internal revenue
service." 1
Turner'. allegedly sold fire-
arms he had been given for
army ues by various police
departments, including C h I.,
cago's.
Could Mean Single Trial
Resor said that information '
turned over to the justice
department about five present
and former army sergeants
who formed a company to sell
supplies to &mice clubs "could
result in a singletrial of all Ave
?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
CITICLGO TRIBUNE
Approved For Release 20061WM79CIA-RDP80-01601
q. S. AM AT
,LAOS HOVE.
IN7T, `ALIATOR
wiLli `4.4\111'4 aa
teterriotte from yersterdrir's late edillonoi
Washington, March 3 MI ?
Sen' J. J William Fulbright [D.,
1
1 Ark.] said today that "high
officials of the administration"
' have told members of his Sen.
STATI NTL
Invited Red Offensive ?
"It also seems clear," he
said, "that we invited the re-
cent Communist offensive in
the Plain of Jars by encourag-
ing an AniCriCan trained,
equipped, and directed Laotian
army to seize this area last Sep-
tember, thus unsettling a more
or less stable military line that
ate foreign relations commit- ??liad existed for several years.
tee that "Laos is even more
, important than. Viet Nam."
? "The fact that high officials
of the administration think this
scares me to death," Fulbright
told the Senate. "It suggests an
ominous and dangerous future
for the United States In that,
remote country."
His comments came in the
middle of a speech he placed
In the Congressional Record
after delivering only the first
and last paragraphs because
of time limitations.
He Joins McGovern
It came after he joined in
a call by Sen. George Mc-
? Govern [D., S. D.] for a secret
Senate session on Laos.
The Senate's senior Repub-
lican, George D. Aiken [Vt.],
said he does not share the
concern of many senators that
Laos could turn into another
Viet Nam. ?
Fulbright asked: "If Viet
Nam was important enough to
justify the commitment of half
a million American troops, then
in this view how many more
could justifiably be committed
to Laos, which is one of the
few worse places than Viet
Nam to fight a war?"
? May Have to Decide
He said the United States
"may soon havp to decide
whether to go all the way in
Laos?that is, to make it an-
other Viet Nam?or to get out."
"There is growing evidence
that the CIA [central intelli-
gence agency] and American
military personnel--apparently
in civilian garb?are directing
Laotian military ' operations,"
he said.
Secretary of Defense Melvin
Laird, talking to reporters, said
there has been no buildup of
United States manpower?either
civilian or military?in Laos.
Laird was asked about Mc-
Govern's statement that there
"has been more and more
American airpower, 'American
advisers, and CIA operatives"
In Laos. .
"I can categorically state
there has been no buildup of
Individuals whether civilians or
military on the ground in Laos
or within the; country," he said.
Aiken was asked after a com-
mittee hearing on United States
military aid program In Viet
Nam if he thought Laos might
'become a new Viet Nam. His
reply: "No."
"If it did," Aiken told re-
porters, "it would create such
an upheaval in this country"
that any good resulting from a
tweviatetes_stand_would
a-For Kele se 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Tone Is Critical ?
On the Senate floor, the tone
continued to be critical of the
Nixon administration, with
three Democratic senators ?
M cGo v-e r n, Fulbright, and
Stuart Symington' of Missouri?
on the attack.
"In spite of the painful les-
sons'of Viet Nam, we are going
down the same road in Laos,
and we are doing it in secret,"
McGovern said.
McGovern, one of the earliest
Senate critics of the Viet Nam ,
war, said United States B-52
and tactical bombingraids over
Laos "are comparable to or
greater than the raids over
North Viet Nam;at their heavi-
est."
, J
S3074
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP81041601R0
arc ; 970 .
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? sELNA:i .11
forces for peace in Vietnam "will enter Into
talks to set up a provisional coalition gov-
ernment. . . ." Seemingly Hanoi expects the
latter to happen; It does not have to be ne-
gotiated at Paris.
What might all this mean?
1. For the first time Hanoi has told us how
to meet the "total and unconditional with-
drawal" requirement?by announcing it
publicly.
2. Tho key to the announcement is the
certainty that by a specified date all of our
troops will be withdrawn. ?
3. While Hanoi says six months, this could
be rend as ii bargaining gambit. Xuan Thuy
said that the U.S. "must accept the principle
of withdrawal, then put it into practice," and
that some U.S. forces could remain in South
'Vietnam even as late as the elections to he
conducted by the provisional coalition gov-
ernment.
4. Hanoi's "total and unconditional" phrase
remains, raising the question as to what we
might get In return for our withdrawal
nouncement. Hanoi backed away from tl s
same phrase in October, 1968. When o
stopped the bombing, Hanoi accepted the
condition that the Government of South
Vietnam be seated in Paris along with the
National Liberation Front as part of a your-
side-our-side arrangement. We also assumed
and had reason to believe that Hanoi under-
stood that it should "not take advantage" of
our bombing cessation by shelling major
cities and by abusing the DMZ. To a degree,
Hanoi has lived up to our assumption of "no
advantage."
? This past experience is suggestive of what
we could ask from Hanoi now. Politically, we
might extract the condition that Hanoi and
the N.L.F. agree to talk with the Govern-
ment of Vietnam about political settlement.
Militarily, we could give Hanoi to understand
that we expect its forces in the South to be
reduced accordingly, the level of military
activity to decline, and require the return of
all American POW's.
This proposal is not inconsistent with
President Nixon's speech of May: "Peace on
paper is not as important as peace in fact,"
We should not consider the Paris peace
talks a forgotten chapter of the war. Presi-
dent Nixon's objective of free self-determi-
nation and Hanoi's objective of full U.S.
withdrawal are not mutually exclusive.
LESLIE H. GEM
ALEXANDRIA, Vs., January 22, 1970.
NOTE.?The writer, former Acting Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy
Planning and Arms Control, worked on the
Paris negotiations.)
[From the New York Times, Feb. 1, 10703
PARIS PEACE OPENING
the U.S., further reduce the level of military
activity and return all American POW's.
President Nixon last May said: "If North
Vietnam wants to insist that It has no
forces In South Vietnam, we will no longer
debate the point?provided that Its forces
cease to be there, and that we have reliable
assurance that they will not return."
But, while asking questions about some
of Hanoi's shifts of position, the Nixon Ad-
ministration has refused to make any new
proposals. It insists that It has already made
so many concessions that the next offer
must come from the other side.
If Mr. Gelb is right, North Vietnam has
now conceded several points. The return
of Politburo member Le Duo The to Paris
from Hanoi Friday makes this a etrategic
moment to attempt to revitalize the nego-
tiations. Hanoi's reaction to the Gelb pro-
posal, If It were now advanced In Paris,
would quickly reveal whether this can be
done.
?
'"4. high Peniegon official of the Johnson
ai.d early Nixon Administrations, who worked
on the secret Paris negotiations on Viet-
rirn, believes the North Vietnamese may now
oh trying to tell the United States how to
break the deadlock In the pence telke,
The aid ft In Ilanol'e position described In
today's letter to the editor from Keehn II.
Clelb, former Acting Deputy Assistant Were-
tory of Defense for Policy Cleaning and Anna
Control, seems to provide an opportunity for
the United States to employ again a device
- similar to that used in 1908 to get the ne-
gotiations going in the first place. Mr. Gelb's
suggestion is that the United States Inforn1
Hanoi and Moscow privately that It will pub-
hely announce a terminal date for with-
drawal of all its troops If it can also an-
nounce that it assumes and has reason to
believe the other side will comply with two
conditions. These are: first that Hanoi and
the National Liberation Front will' promptly
enter Into negotiations with the Saigon Gov-
ernment for a political settlement and sec-
ond, that North Vietnam will withdraw its
forces from the South at the same rate as
- ? .
THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES IN LAOS
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, the time for
candor about the deepening involvement
of the United States in Laos has ob-
viously arrived. The American people
have a right to a public accounting from
the administration. They have a right to
an official explanation of what we are
doing there and why. They have a right
to know what the intentions of the ad-
ministration are. They have a right to
know what the actual military situation
in Laos is.
Certainly there have been some alarm-
ing reports in the press. We .are told that
hundreds of American warplanes are
providing direct air Support to a guer-
rilla army raised and financed by the
CIA.. This is all taking place in an
around the Plain of Jars, scores of miles
from the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail
where our bombing raids are said to be
necessary to hinder North Vietnamese
infiltration in South Vietnam.
I need not remind the Senate that our
present tragic and seemingly endless in-
volvement in South Vietnam began with
intervention on a somewhat smaller scale
than now seems to be the case in Laos.
One clear lesson we should have drawn
from Vietnam is that an increase in our
own involvement leads inevitably to a
similar increase by the other side. What
will we do then?
' We must ask ourselves just how vital
are our interests in Laos and how much
in lives and money we are willing to pay
to preserve them. But we cannot answer
these questions no long as the pertinent
facts are kept behind a shield of official
secrecy,
In short, Mr. President, the public and
the Senate badly need a public statement
of administration policy,
lowed by only 2 days the far-reaching
message of President Nixon on the en-
tire subject of the environment. Secre-
tary Hardin's response to the President's
challenge to all of us to summon "our
energy, our ingenuity, and our con-
science in a cause as fundamental as life
itself" was directly to the point.
Both the American farmer and the
U.S. Department of Agriculture have
been engaged for decades in practices
which enrich and protect our environ-
ment.
Since the dust bowl days of the 1930'8,
Secretary Hardin pointed out, more than
two million individual farmers, ranch-
ers, communities, and other land users
have voluntarily signed cooperative
agreements to put conservation plans
Into effect?plans that involve three-
quarters of a billion acres of land.
Yet, as the Secretary correctly ob-
served, new technology has presented
new problems affecting environmental
quality. He cited the Department's de-
termination to help solve these problems
and outlined the policy objectives it is
following to reach early solutions.
I believe the Secretary's speech merits
the attention of all who are concerned
with the agricultural aspects of envi-
ronmental quality and I ask unanimous
consent that it be placed in the RECORD.
? There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
? RECORD, as follows:
ADDRESS DT SECRETARY OT AGRICULTURE
?
ROLE OF AGRICULTURE IN IMPROV-
ING THE ENVIRONMENT
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, Secretary
of Agriculture Clifford M. Hardin, ad-
dressing the National Farm Institute search for villains. For the most part, the
in Des Moines on February 13, described ;Iroanionagtted;IgkOf 430711 environmentmenno Itashisst not
the important role of agriculture in irn. the inevitable by-product either of advanc.
? proving our environment. Lug technology or of growing population. It
The ? Secretary's significant address results not so much from choices made, ea
'Wait particularly timely in that it fol. from choices neglected; not from malign In-
'
Cutrrottri M. HARDIN
It may be concldence that we are meeting
on Abraham Lincoln's birthday?but it Is
altogether fitting and proper. The Admin-
istration of our sixteenth President left sig-
? nificant marks on agriculture?for it was
during those years that three lasting pieces
of legislation ca.me into being?the Morrill
Act providing for the Land-Grant Colleges
and Universities, the Act creating the United
States Department of Agriculture, and the
Homestead Act. Together they set the pat-
tern for American agriculture. The Home-
? stead Act resulted in the settling of half a
continent and placed the management of our
? basic soil and water resources in the hands
of independent free-hold farmers.
The lgth century brought progress and it
brought exploitation. The century began with
a patent for the first cast iron plow; it ended
with the invention of the gasoline engine
and the automobile.
? Today we are very much aware that our
technological advances which have done so
' much for us and for the world also are ser- .
Windy offending and polluting our environ- ?
ment. The alarm has been sounded, and just
the day before yesterday, Preeldent Nixon '
emit to the Congress a comprehensive 37.
point program, embracing 23 major legisla-
tive proposals and 14 new measures being '
t ken by administrative notion or Executive
rder.
In view of the rising public concern and
against the backdrop of the President's new
? Initiatives, it Is imperative that those of us
with agricultural responsibilities re-think
and re-assess the special role of agriculture.
As the President said in his message, "The
fight against pollution, however, is not a
Approved Far Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01501R000700050001-2
STATI NTL
4-'ma rch ip p596ed For RelectrActeasyRW: Rek&BP.3 gmA9AR000
Ed Pullinitt, a retiree, who hnsn't "stepped
out of the house" since his only son, Eddie,
was killed .Tnn. II, during' a night sweep by
the Viet Cong. 111011MB the "extra sorrow in
this little community."
The (lend soldier's mother was near col-
lapse Monday.
"We just got the Inst letter from ray son
today," she said in n quavering voice,
They were pleased that Rep. V. II. Odom,
a Democrat from Wagoner, is calling heavy
war losses from Coweta to the attention of
Oklahoma's congressional delegation "to see
if something can be done" about the dis-
proportionate number of Vietnam casualties
from the town.
Seven young Cowetnns have been killed
there?three from the high SCh001 ClaS13 of
1067. Two members of that class were killed
in the past 60 days.
The dead are Frankle Faught, Dallas Per-
ryman, Dilly Carver, Grover Boston, Philip
Sanders, Donald Bloat and Pulliam.
Jerry Zachary, junior high principal and
high school counselor, said there were 37
boys in the class of '67. Fourteen members
Of the class went to Vietnam, 11 of them
survive.
In writing to Senators Fred Harris and
Henry Bellmon and Rep. Ed Edmondson,
Odom said:
"Surely this small community has already
given more than Its share of these fine young
men in this conflict. The people there think
these men should be scattered out in some
other branch of service with the possibility
, of losing fewer in the future."
' Odom became interested in Coweta'e casu-
alty price, Zachary said when Bob Hatfield,
father of one of the boys still in Vietnam,
called on him to see if something couldn't
be done.
"He came to school and wanted a list of
those still there to see if they couldn't be
' scattered out because they were all in a
bunch," Zachary said.
It is possible that Broken Arrow may want
to make a similar request. In December
Broken Arrow unveiled a memorial to seven
native sons lost in Vietnam. Its population
is 12,200.
Honored by a granite marker in Broken
Arrow arc Sammy Jones Jr., Walter C. Black,
? Jr., James W. Pendergrass, John Etobert
(Bud) Gainer, Paul David Lucas, Gary' Keith
Barnett, and Kenneth Dean Rankin.
"I suppose we've paid no higher price than
many others have-40,000 other U.S. homes
? 'have been invaded," Pulliam said, "and yet
we hope it is possible to do something about
the wanton loss of life.
"I guess it (Coweta) has one of the highest
casualty lists. It is terrible in one small town.
? I know It Is terrible when you lose an only
son?one you've built your world around,"
Pulliam said.
"Every time we turn around we become
more aware of it (the war loss)," Zachary
said. About a week after Pulliam was killed
word came of the death of Donald Bloat.
- Several weeks before Pulliam died in the VO
attack Cowetans learned of the death of Sgt,
Philip B. Sanders. All three young men had
? been in the class of '67.
Bloat stepped on n land mine. Sanders, first
reported missing in action in May, died with-
out ever, seeing his 6-month-old daughter.
LAOS
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that a statement I
made today before the National News-
paper Association be printed at this point
in the RECORD followed by an editorial,
"And Now Laos." which appeared In the
March 1, 11170, issue of the New Re.
publican.
? :Y '
There being no objection, the state-
ment and editorial were ordered to be
printed in the RECORD, as follows:
TIIE SECRET WAR IN LAOS
(Statement by Senator GEORGE MCGOVERN)
I charge again today that the Nixon Ad-
ministration is misleading the American
people in waging a secret war in Laos.
We are flirting dangerously with a new
Vietnam.
The Administration is violating the Geneva
settlement of 1902 by interfering militarily
In Laos.
In addition to providing military, and CIA
ground personnel, we are sending American
bombers against Laos at a rate of 500 mis-
sions a day. I was on daily operations as a
pilot in World War II over some of the most
strategic targets in Europe with bomb loads
that did not approach what we are now
dropping on little Laos.
Secretary of Defense Laird speaking for
the Nixon Administration has replied to my
basic contention by cleverly denying that we
have increased the number of military and
CIA personnel on the ground.
The Nixon Administration is guilty of de-
liberate deceit in that ibply. It ignores the.
fact that we are using B-528 and tactical
bombers to blast not only the trails in east-
ern Lees but the Northeastern section of
Laos around the Plaine des Jarres.
Furthermore, the Administration should
explain why we have ground personnel op-
erating in conjunction with the Laotian
army. They should explain why we are vio-
lating the Geneva commitment of 1982. They
should explain why we are participating in
another Vietnam-type involvement.
I was astounded to learn from the Chair-
man of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee that Administration witnesses have
told his committee that our policymakers are
now more concerned about holding the line
in Laos than in Vietnam.
Are we about to sacrifice snore young
Americans in another war in Southeast Asia?
Have we learned nothing from the long years
of bloodshed and blunders in Vietnam?
I contend that the Administration is cover-
ing up the facts of a bloody military opera-
tion in Laos that has already secretly cost
the lives of scores of American bombing crews
and 'American aircraft.
The Administration is violating Article
Section 8 of the Constitution which places
in the Congress the power to declare war.
The Administration is deceiving the Arneria
can people and their elected representatives
in the Congress. The Administration Is be-
traying our international commitment in
waging a secret war after pledging with other
nations in 1902 that we would not intervene
militarily in Laos.
I demand as a citizen and as a Senator of
the United States that the President inform
the Congress and the Nation what we are
doing in Laos.
I am convinced that any kind of American
military involvement in Laos, as in Vietnam,
is n dreadful mistake.
nut the primary questions ere these:
To what extent are we involved militarily
In Laos? What is the reason for our Involve.'
anent and why have the Congress and the
American people not had this information
given to them? For seven years I have done
my best to stop the war in Vietnam. I am
terribly distressed that that war, drags on.
But what I cannot tolerate and will not
tolerate is the thought that we would even
consider going down this same bloody path
again in still another Southeast Asian nation.
I refuse to accept this prospect. and I want
the Administration to know that I will con-
tinue to protest with all my strength until
the President either fully and satisfactorily
explains the war. In Laos or fully ends It.,
That explanation have come long
ago. I demand It now. Given an hone .t State-
ment of what we are doing, I believe the
American people will demand that we etop
wasting the blood and treasure of this great
country In another hopeless military opera-
tion in the jungles of MIR.
I firmly believe we are at war In- Lao.) on a
dangerous scale., Let the President tell us
that and tell un 'why and then let the Con-
gress and the American people make a judg-
ment as to whether we want to declare war
in Laos or call it off, but for God's sake and
for the sake of our children and our troubled
nation let us not drift Into another Vietnam
without even knowing what we are doing,
(From the New Republic, Mar. 7, 19701
Alto Now LAOS
' The funeral urns that give the Plain of
Jars its name is a somber reminder that
American military entrapment in Laos is just
what we don't need, especially when the
Administration Is patently failing to Mann-
age at reasonable speed from Vietnam. For
months now, US planes including B-52s have
been laying thick carpets of explosives on
eastern Laos. In September, very heavy Amer-
ican bombing of the Plain of Jars enabled
Laotian government forces to capture areas
the Pathet Lao had held for six or seven
years. On February 10, unnamed officials in
Washington were assuring reporters that the
intensive bombing?the current rate is over :
10,000 tons monthly?had "substantially im-
proved" the military situation of the Laotian
government. Almost immediately, the Laotian
government troops had to fall back and the
Plain seems to have been lost again to the
Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese allies.
This country has lost at least 100 aircraft
and their air crews apparently for nothing.
Laotian government troops are unable to pre-
vent the Pathet Lao and the North Viet-
namese from recapturing the Plain of Jars;
they loot control of it in September only
because tho sudden American air assault
took them off guard. Since at least 1064, the
two sides in the Laotian civil war have an-
nually gained a little ground on the Plain
and lost a little ground, see-saw fashion,
without the overall position changing. (The
civil war itself has been going on for 20
years.) But there was never any doubt that
if they wished, the 40.000 North Vietnamese
who are illegally in Laos could proceed on
from the Plain to conquer the whole coun-
try. They did not choose to, for their real
interest and the reason for their presence Is
not to overrun the country and toss out the
royal Laotian government, it is to protect
the network of trails in eastern Laos by
which North Vietnam supplies and replen-
ishes its forces in South Vietnam. The W-
hited American attempt to make the Laotian
government a present of the Plain has no
relevance to the Ho Chi Minh trails, which
enter Laos from North Vietnam southeast
of it. Our forces have nevertheless jumped
into the thick of the Laotian fighting. Amer-
ican military "instructors" in command of
American-armed Meo tribesmen have been
thrown in on the side of the Laotian govern-
ment troops, against the Mallet Lao and the
North Vietnamese. All this is taking place
under a thick cloud of official silence or dis-
claimers. In an anguished letter to Senator
Frank Church, an air.. force pilot in Laos
wrote: "Why is it, Senator, that the Ameria
can public is not permitted to know what's
going on in Laos, and the extent of American
sacrifice there? American planes are lost
every day (and' dozens of our airmen are
killed or missing each week. Yet not a word
to our people." The young mai protested
that his comrades were dying in "a futile.
hopeless( and nameless contest.K Last week.
American tionespondenta In Lac p attempted
'to reek through the speoreey. They managed
!
Approved For Release 2001/03/04:: "PIA-RDP8M1601.R060700050001-2
? V:
Approved For Release 20
o is Secret.
-War Rde
Feasilb]e?
Public Wary of
'No-Viet' Claim.
By 1Villiam AleGaffin
Wes Moines Tribum,Chicago
Div News Service)
? WASHINGTON, D.C. ? The
administration is deeply trou-
bled over the credibility prob-
lem that has arisen from its
clandestine military operations
in Laos.
It is ,now wrestling with a
dilemma, a key element of
which is whether it is feasible,
after the American public's
painful memories of the Bay of
Pigs and Vietnam, to conduct a
war in secret.
Officials insist privately
? that the policy being followed
in Laos will not produce "nn,.
other Vietnam." They say the
administration Is so deter-
mined this will not happen
that it would not send U.S.
combat troops into Laos even
if Communist forces were
about to overrun the country.
But it's difficUlt to convince
the American public of this in
view of some of the things now
going on there.
? Officials do not deny, in pri-
vate,- that -the Central In-
telligence Agency
News 'Analyss
ales two air lines in Laos.
These are used to supply a
army of Men tribesmen orgai
ized, financed and directed by
I CIA agents.
, They contend, however, that \
, U.S. Ambassador George M.
Godley is in firm control of the
situation. The State Department I
is kept fully, informed, they
say, and there is no danger QV
the CIA blundering into another I
Bay of Pigs fiasco.-
B-'52 Bombings
The 91ficials also admit, in
private, that U.S. B-52 bombers
have been attacking North Viet-
namese and Pathet Lao forces
; on the Plain orJars. There also
have been repeated bombing -
! sorties carried out by smaller.
planes in support of the CIA
"army". and the Royal Laotian.,
forces.
Administration officials are ,
well aware that press dis-
' patches from: Laos reporting
the stepped-tip bontbing raids,
and the CIA activities have
' heightened the ,American pub-1
'lie's fears and suspicions. ,
Officially, however, Defense
Secretary Melvin K. Laird
and others have given eva-
sive answers in 'public. The
reason is that if the adminis-
tration admitted what it was
doing, it would be an admis-
sion that it was violating the
1952 Geneva accord.
it could point out .that it was
only doing this because tho
Communists also are doing It
and, in fact, had been the first
to violate the accord. It has
avoided any such admissions,-
however, for fear it might re- ?
-suit in a very difficult diplo-
matic situation:- ? ,
It could, conceivably; force
the Soviet Union to intervene
and also open the way for
Hanoi and other countries, who
signed the Geneva accord, to
bring pressures.
Red Offensive
The Unit ed States has
Stepped up the bombing of em-
my forces on the Plain of Jars
beca use, officials say, the'
North Vietnamese are con-
ducting an Offensive with 50,000..1
troops and some heavy equip-
ment. This is 15,000 more
troops than they had in the
ountry before.
The officials note that the
United Stbtes is active in Laos '
only because of its impor-
tance in relation to South
Victnom. The North Vietnam-
:, ? .
, ? '
???
STATI NTL
0-0
?..
butIVI..l ii
?
ese use the Ilo Chi Minh Trait
through Laos as a main route
for sending troops and sup.'
.plies to South ,Vietnam.
The United States publicly.
admits it-has been bombing thej
trail to slow up the infiltration.,
It also haS, been secretly pro-
viding military help to the Roy-
al Laotian forces to try to
make sure that a government
friendly to the United States
MAIM In power.
The officials insist, however,
that the Americans killed in ac-
tion ? mainly Air Force pilots
? and the number of Ameri-
cans involved in leadership po-
salons,, as military advisers
and CIA agents, is very small.
Political Storm
The officials appear to feel
that some of the critical sena-
tors are only raising a storm
about Laos for political pur-
poses. They credit others, how-
ever, with ?a sincere intent to
keep the United States out of
another Vietnam-type war.
The officials say that if a
clean breast could be made
of the U.S. operation in Laos,
the public would be un-
pressed by the small number
of personnel involved.
A debate "in the adminis-
tration now is whether it would
not be 'possible to tell the public
more of what is going on rather
than risk a deepening of the
'credibility gap with all the po-
liticV implications it Involves.
L, (copyrlot,,t,1970), ,
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000170005C)001-2
CAL. ? .
NEVIS
MAR 5 1970
E - 5,693
1' 77, ?
secrecy in. 'Laos -
. ,
Having intervened in Vietnam at .a terrible
cost of their young men's blood, the American
people watch uneasily as part of the secrecy
? thal, conceals the American role in nearby Laos
torn away.
,
Only glimpses of the American commitment
in-Laos have reached the public, just enough to
create widespread wariness and suspicion about,
what is happening there. -
The few American correspondents who have
been able to get near the combat areas of Laos
have sent back reports of activities by the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency that go beyond the role ,
in which most people envisage
The CIA is running a civilian airline in Laos
called Air America, with which it supports an
army of Laotian irregulars. According to eye-
witness reports, the line uses C-123 and Caribou
transport planes "borrowed" from the U.S. Air '
Force. Their Air Force markings have been:
painted over.
Correspondents have been forbidden to visit
secret bases, but have sent back reports th$
Americans in civilian clothes, including former'
Green Berets, seem to be sharing in tbe fight-
- - ? .
Military and other governmental spokes-
, men in Washington sidestep questions about
these reports. President Nixon, like Presidents
Johnson and Kennedy before him, is saying as
little as possible,about Laos.
The Laotian-fighting is tied to the Vietnani
war, because the North 'Vietnamese in complete
disregard for Laotian, sovereignty bring supplies
to/the Vietnamese front down the Ho Chi Minh
i trail.? American air power attacks that supply
line, as a protection for U.S. and South Viet- .1
Pamege troops. That role is openly admitted 'and
easily justified:
But how much more are we doing? How 1
1 far is our government ready to go in support of 1
the North
the Laotian government? A commitment to use
American forces in defense of Laos if 1
'Vietnamese chose to attempt conquest of that,,,
country would draw bitter opposition here. 1
1\ti? The American people are entitled to a frank I
report. Until they receive it, they understand-
i '1* lopliiRoktiolvs from Laos with distrsst
--
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
LOS 11:1,L21.J.L.0
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 ?
muR
STATI NTL
-rgDP80-01601R00
Seneor:s to Be Advised of Any'
,U.S. Dui'f.icluTo i Laos---Fullbzieht
J ?
Rogers Gives This Assurance During Secret 5ession.,
, .
of Foreign Relations Committee, Chairman Reports
. , .. ? ....
BY DON IRWIN
l'Imes Slall Witte . .
. WASHINGTON ? Secretary ? of ? . %inky urgent review. The Adminls;.: -
State William P. Rogers has prom- (ration appeared to be caught in a .
' ised the , Senate Foreign Relations ...squeeze between the mounting ores-
Committee that it will be consulted ...sure for an authoritative statement
' in advance about any increase in ..-,on- U.S. involvement -in Laos and a
' .1.7.S. involvement in Laos, Sen.. .1.. :desire to r e t a In freedom of
William Fulbright (D-Ark.) : said maneuver in a' fluid situation that is -.
.?
Wednesday.' ? ' ' - ?'-
Fulbright, the committee citair-, inextricably linked w i th Oa. is the lack of dlear in sufficient detail to ease ,
! at a two-hour secret session on (he
!boring Vietnam. , intelligence in' Washing- ? ..some of the concern of
_ . . _
. man, said Rogers gave the itieurance '', the U.S. effort in neigh- ..1
? Laotian situation Tuesday. . ten on the intentions of I: Senate Majority Leader
Fulbright. termed the meeting . .
' '' ? '.il . There are strong indica-
in Washingtonthat ' 'the North Vietnamese for- ? Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.),
satisfactory. 'He now feels the Seri- ? ces 'in Laos, officials say. a Foreign Relations Corn-.
. the Administration h a s '.
.. grave new decision on Laos?which '
the outcome of the war in 1 volvement would .be af-
ineked the fate of .Laos to The degree of U.S. in- mittee member.
"I was very pleased with
.. ate will .not be. asked to affirm any
: some senators have -Ywarned can
? South Vietnam. The Ho ' fected if the estimated the free-wheeling discus- i
become "another Vietnam"--under
Ch' Minh Trail which the ' -0 000 North Vietnamese . .
sion," Mansfield said. "The
ilasty pressure like that in which .iI.
North Vietnamese use' to ' atro'ops in Laos were to secretary was quite re- ;-
, passed the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolu-
supply their forces in the attempt to advance their sponsive, made a very .
-. . . .? ! south runs through east- present lines, good impression and I
'. tion of the Vietnam war. think the meeting wats ,
'? tion enabling the unchecked escala- i
. - ern Laos and the United Beyond general conflr-
? Opportunity for Discussion ? ?
States has been bombing 'nation of reports of inten- , very worthwhile."
' "The main' thrust of the secretarYie that area for years. ? rsive bombing operations Rogers was invited to
testimony," Fulbright , said, "was Now, officials fear, the . in support of Royal Laoti- the C a pi t o 1, Fulbright
: that before anything is done in the . collapse of the American- 1 an forces and bombing ofsaid, as _ the result of i
'way of escalation' of 'our in'volye- \ backed neutralist govern- 1!supply lines along the Ho 'e on versa tions art-mg
ment, we ? in ' the Senate will be ment in Laos might se- Chi Minh Trail the Admi- Foreign Relations Cora-
'advised and have an opportunity to riously endanger Amen- .:niStration has followed the mittee members last Sa-
discuss it." ? can operations against the .' policy of secrecy about turday. Fulbright said he
. The session grew out of ., mounting trail. ' Am e r Jean activities in . relayed their c o n c e r n
concern in the committee and , Laos Is considered so Laos which it inherited ' about Laos to Rogers at a
;scope and implications of the still- Vietnam that the so-called -,' meeting on Monday and
elsewhere in . Congress , about the ? closely tied with South ' .. from Its predecessors.
secret U.S. involvement in the war "Nixon poctrine" through Used by Critics ; 0--
' that the secretary agreed
" against North Vietnamese troops which Asians are supposed It is argued that official 'I then to appear at . 7,1e:.-
that have invaded Laos and oecu- ? to take primary responsi- .'
? ' merit would be used by was kept secret at Ro-ers'
admission of U.S. involve- 1 day's informal session. It
? re uest?until the facet of
. the meeting was-disclose
Wednesday at ? a , State
Department prone' :odd-
1,
I. I.. ?
.?
, welt: earlier aria more
, blatant. It is ? generally
recognized that the Royal
Laotian army is advised
a nd supported clandes-
tinely by the Central Intel-
ligence Agency.
1. Restoration of the Gene-
va accords to insure the,
.actual neutralization of
! territory which North
Vietnam has used freely 1.4
.1/
seen by U.S. officials as an ,
Important step tow am d
!- achievement of peace in ,
Vietnam. To achieve this !
end, the Administration
? feels it must support the
Royal Laotian gover n-
? ment as the alternative to .
a Communist takeover.
Rogers apparently dis-
cussed that involvement !
pied the strategic Plain of Jars. . Way for defending
Both the White House and the selves may not be applied critics abroad to c atg
( State Department were noncommit- according to some sources'. U.S. violations of the 1962
? tal Wednesday when asked for. That could leave the way accords on the neutraliza-
comment on widespread - reports o p e n f o r an escalated ..tion of Laos.
that a top -level Administration .. American involvement in .. that
'. U.S. officials are semi-
? statement on Laotian policy is in the !Laos although officials are "U.S. tive to the possibility
making and will be issued shortly. 1 working hard to find some activities could be
The official answer in both places,i
' other selution to the prob- i construed as violations of
was that no confirmation, was avalp : icm. t the 1962 accords, even
' lable "at thistAme." . . . ? 1 . An immediate factor at- though they insist there
' The qustion .of what can be . I, are no U.S. combat. forces
ofncian7 on. 1?4" IS knoINA Ito.' 8td.., feeling a d"imti? II"" i, on the ground in Laos and
;? that North Vietnamese vi-
olations.of the accords
,t.',?Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R111111111=
STATINTL
MAR 5 19 70
m 1,11,'142 .
S 234,036
Some Chilly Forebodings
AbQut. Important Laos,
,
QEN. J. W. Fulbright's assertion . and Tathet Lao forces have been',
kJ . that "high officials of the ad- making substantial gains and the'
? ministration" have told members . reaction of military strategists in.!
of his Ser. ate committee that "Laos Saigon has been predictable. But',
is even more important than Viet- with Washington officialdom testi- -:
nam," is somethieg that carries fying that Laos is even more im- .
chilly foreboding. portant than Vietnam, Senator Ful-: .:,
The little war next door to the bright doesn't seem too' far off the
: big one in Vietnain has been going . mark when he foresees an ominous
. on for years, but for the most part -
. and dangerous tine ahead. ?
it has been an exchange of s ir-
mishes between the troops of the Secretary Laird vowed that
Royal .Lao government and the yresident Nixon would go to the
. Communist-led Pathet Lao. - Congress if there was any change ,
... conternplated in the U.S. role in
:?:* * ? * Laos: That role obviously has been
Former Secretary Of State Dean ' changed already in recent Weeks,
. Rusk onctereferred to the Laotian ? and Mr. Nixon is still not speak-
\ conflict' as'';"spooky," and it has . ing about Laos.
, been that, involving as it does Cen- . ? : The whole thing sounds suspici-
t r i s t s; fragmented neutralists, ' ously like the series of events, that
I led this country deep into the
rightists, ? Communist : guerrillas, '
quicksand of Vietnam almost be-
'Moo' tribesinee, North Vietnamese
/
fore the public was aware of:*hat
and mercenaries 'L' paid by .- the ,
' Arnericans-4-or :the CIA. if one '? Was happening.
imust belpretise., : ?--? : ' ' i,i . ,::, ,..
S 1 the Nixon administration.,
-.. Laos i'S':it' landlocked country, which by now is all too farniliar
i stretching ?long the twO Vietnams . ' with the. methods, the errors and
, and 'bordering ...alai) Red China,
1. the . evasions of the Johnson ad-
':Burma, : Thailand and Itouching , ,ininistration in wading waist deep
s'Cambocli.a.:,. lin .that - sense it is, -. :4 i
Ana: Vietnam, .has learned Some-
'.strategie,' especially sinee it opens -thing fronythe past: .
' by' . North ?Wietnam , , IA tact,. Jhe , ' - ?.. . 7:, , 7 7 ?.
,farned ' Re' 'Chi :Minh trail .rur4 ,:' ' .This country is already too deep- :
v. down thicOUlgh;Itaa?s:arid.intol ..col, t...h ;.,.:1Y
the AmeriCan'people.do not , rd'ally
involved in the Laotian wa1c, z.aid
':, ''But':'::tlie: idea of :involving,' tr.S. ' 'as, of .: tody,. much', leSs what the
4. thinking: .in ,Mashirigtbre,t,is:tabout-
Aays:::pliead,:','.'..' ''''.'',:?,, ''..:;;,. r- ''
'LtroopS ::::in. d' 'land war 'there., an
i_keeping :,?thern s .,supplied, was '. sti,",.c.;,the , .., ,
is:nightmarish: that the late Presided-.
f.Keinnedy,. who briefly conSideres411';'::'ii,h..e. re 'are: stiaiome weeks 'of the ,
'.:it, dismiSsecl it AS impossible: :.: .:,,.,,.:1, , : seasOiCin 'that 'part Of :the '
'0', '.:,..' ? ' ':' ' .` ' '''. ?_, _:' ' '' ? .' ? ' .!??:.i. world before' the' rains 'turn the tr-,..'
,,,, ' INoiNt; :and' Aince : again', though; :r:!:1,rainlinto,,rivers. ef ,mud.- Perhaps .
:',Lies :41as ' beconle a hot :?box witil'.':?Niitli ',the rainy',seasen, the ,,var in '
North Vietnamese*eVidently,.using ;??414aos will sink back into stalemate:
1.'it",in - LOS ,,as' a kintt lit flanking ,'VTliat'' riroSpect.; .,'hoViever,,-',,hardly
;'inanetiVer? to increase:pressure ?It .'?Justifies.:a. policyl,,of . silence 'on the '
'South Vietnam., The 1.1:Aas beenpait, uf the .Nixon administrat1on..
Approved rs (0,?,: 4e. i utp4.4iy. powsivi orstg itedoansibloVu- ,
_ ti ack: .wi l',. W90.,t, 1401,98s.;,,' abdut
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP8
11=71 t..Y.
! POST
E - 700,100
MAR 5 WO
r77.5)
By WILLIAM MeGAFF1N
WASHINGTON (CON) --
The Administration is deep-
ly troubled over the credibil-
ity problem that has arisen
ried out by smaller planes n .
: from the clandestine military
support of the CIA "army"
; operations It is conducting
and the Royal Laotian forces.
1 in Laos. They are well aware that
It is now wrestling with a
r dispatches from Laos
They also admit, in private, 11
that our B-52 bombers have II
' 1,
been attacking North Viet-
namese and Pathet Lao
forces on the Plain of Jars.
There also have been' re-
peated bombing sorties car-
.
' dilemma. A key element is
t:vhether it is feasible, after
, the Amerian public's painful
v
[ memories of the Bay of Pigs
'..and Vietnam, to conluct a
.; war in secret.
Officials i n s Is t priv31,4y , Officially, however, ?
, that the policy being follow- , fense Secretary Laird and
' ed in Laos will not produce ; ethers have given evasive
:. "another Vietnam." They say' answers in public. The rea-
: that the Administration is so 1 son is that if the Adminis-
.. determined this will not hap- tration admitted what it was i
? pen that it would not snui: doing, it would be an admis- I
1, U. S. combat troops into sion that it was violating the 1
Laos even if the Communist 1 1962 Geneva accord.
forese were about to overrun It could point out that It 4
'.the country. It's difficult to was only doing this because i
? convine the American public the Communists were also
. of this in view of some of ? 'doing it and, in fact, had
e thing s now going on, been the first to violate the
there. I accord. It has avoided any,
They do not deny, in priv- j such admissions, howeven
" ate, that the CIA operates I for fear it might result in a 1
:. two air EarirrTtlog. These I very difficult diplordatio sit-'
.11
: are used to supply an army nation._ , ?
1
.. of Meo tribesmen organized,
: financed and directed by CIA
; agents.
They contend, however,
i that U. S. Ambassador G.
' :McMurtrie Godley is in firm
control of the situation. The
State Dept. Is kepi fully In-
femed, they say, and there
? Is no danger of the CIA blun-
dering into another Bay of
Pigs fiasco.
' But they know it is hahl?
to convince the American
. public, of this..
yeporting the stepped-up
bombing raids and the CIA
the American public's fears 1
activities have heightened
and suspicions.
?14
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
- ? ?-??????,112TIT
Alp T1OS
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 20b416/1871): CIA-RDP80-01601
In The Nation: Waist-Deep in the Little Muddy
By TOM WICKER ? back, scored surprising sue- ado' will he completely upset, Hanoi by encouraging "thil
WASHINGTON, March 4? cesses, and in -what now can' and the net effect in Southeast
While watching the television ' be seen as an excess of zeal Asia and the United States will
film from Loris, if you sense occupied the Plaine des Jarres. be approximately the same as ..
''. that this is where you came Given the differences in the if Hanoi were to launch in
. in back about 1961, you may American andNorthVietnarhese South Vietnam another often-
be right. The Nixon Adminis- positions in Laos?theirs is sive of the magnitude and of-,
' tration appears to be involved relatively open, at the end of feet of the 1968 Tot campaign.
. in the same old game of lethal ' short supply lines, well-supplied There is no good place to
. leapfrog that carried first the with manpower in familiar stop playing lethal leapfrog,
, - Kennedy and then the Johnson. country?and since Laos has a once the game is begun, but
Administrations inexorably into direct geographical relationship Mr. Nixon's ability to strike ous matters in an over-extended
- war in Vietnam. to North Vietnamese security, back in Laos is limited. Be is foreign policy can slip out of
1, Following the 1962 Geneva . it was only a matter of time already using B-52 raids with-
the control even of the Presi.-.?
1-:.: accords on Laos, there was a 'before Hanoi struck back, which out much success, and he would dent, both in the long run and ?
?in immediate tactical matters. :
t.'f long period of relative equilib- its forces now have done. But be inhibited from putting in'
v ? zium in that remote and moun- ,. if that were all, nobody here) American ground forces both Lethal Leapfrog -. -.'..
... .,: ?'. ???
I.,. tainous kingdom, although both - would be greatly exercised. , by specific Congressional
' en-
the United States and Northactments and by public opinion. .The whole history of. the,
Vietnam were in constant viola- . He might well feel he had to
A Further Threat American involvement in SOuthu .
'..
.e? tion of the accords by keeping In fact, however, when Gen. ? maintain his "position of east Asia, moreover, suggests
tclandestine military forces (in yang Pao stuck his neck out strength" by striking back in the futility of lethal leapfrog,-.
he American case, mostly last year, it was Mr. Nixon's South Vietnam?or, if he suc-.: played at such long range, -on !
mercenaries supplied and or- chin that was left exposed. Not cumbs to the deceptive 'charms .' such disadvantageous grotind?
.,(. ganized by the C I A ) on the only was Hanoi almost certain of air power, directly against with such tenuous political:.
.0 'scene. Until last summer, they to recapture the plain; with North Vietnam.
t? mostly countered one another; combat activity reduced to a In either. case, there would
I. but then the North Vietnamese low level in South Vietnam and 'be considerable risk of arous-
4. began what seemed to the Mr. Nixon's domestic position ing the quiescent American
? Nixon Administration an omi- . improved by his troop-with- antiwar movement, which Mr.
''. nous buildup. drawal policy, Hanoi was given Nixon succeeded so well in
0.;'.'.
.;.
Now in this world one omi- ' a splendid chance to counter. . damping last Nov. 3. What
nous buildup begets another, What its Laotian offensive would follow such an arousal?
-... because the faith of statesmen threatens as a result, it is As inevitably as the night the
p, is always placed, no matter how- , feared here, is a move beyond. ,day, another strong appeal to
1.; mindlessly, in what they in? the Plaine des Janes, perhaps' the patriotic tendency, of Amer-
' evitably call "positions of i. even to the border of Thailand. ? Jeans to support the President
enemy" to fight on. " ? ,
Mr. Nixon did' not create this
situation; he inherited the Laos'
position from previous Admin- ?
istrations, and it is entrely pos-
sible that Gen. yang Pao's un-, ;
wise offensive last year went
beyond what Washington in-'
.tended. But that only tends .to
show the extent to which seri-
support; anything we can' do,'
they can do better, or at least'.
match.
And how many more times'
can a President appeal to Amer-
icans to support him blindly sci.'?
he can take unspecified action?
In pursuit of unstated interests?:
Indeed, the most "aid and corn;
fort to the enemy" may
? given by those who resist a,
negotiated settlement of give-i!
and-take in Southeast Asia and
' strength." In. this instance, ? If that proves to be the case, and the flag, together with dire, ' rely instead on positions. of
j' the C.LA.-organized mercenary .',the? uneasy equilibrium prevail- warnings that protest and (Us- strength' And recurrent rouncle,ii
;any ef. Gen; \ rang Pao'st2Azing niost,'ot:#dec.:4 pent 'play (into, the, handy oh, .'et
Likurisiiimodawke....4??4411 46.440, ,ge?. 4. ." ..1,1.1 wow. . en? row,
9
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
14.ATI XO,ux T I MU
Approved For Release 2005I MP CIA-RDP80-016
0,1
PLEDGE BY ROGERS
ON LAOS REPORTED
He Is Said to Assure Senate'
Panel U.S. Will Not Send
Ground Forces There
-------
By RICHARD HALLORAN
, Special to The New York Tinici .
STATiNTL
' WASHINGTON, March 4 ? - Mr. Mansfield said that "the
Secretary of State William P. Secretary was quite responsive,
Rogers has met with the Sen. made a very good impression
fate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee and reportedly assured it
that no American ground forces
!would be sent to Laos. .
The meeting, two hours long,
;took place yesterday and was
disclosed today by the State De-
partment. The department's
spokesman said in response to
questions that the session was
'devoted almost exclusively to
Laos. He declined to give de-
tails.
Other sources disclosed the
assurance on troops and said
Mr. Rogers had also pledged
that the United States would
not become involved in a major
war in Laos. He conceded, how-
ever, that American? air activ-
ity over Laos had been in-
:creased as the Communist-led
Pathet Lao rebels and' their
'North Vietnamese allies moved
:forward on the ground, the that the Administration was
sources added. ,restrained by diplomatic Pi tions.. con-
sidera Any official ad-
, Yesterday, Senator J. W. Fu mission of the American role
'bright, the committee chair- in Laos, they said, = would
man, ' said that. he had been jeopardize efforts to return to
,"scared to death" by a senior the Geneva Accords of 1962.
Administration official's con- which provide for the neutrality
and independence of Laos. '
and I think the meeting was
worthwhile." The Senator has
been a critic of the Adminis-
tration's policy on Laos.
Yesterday's meeting, hastily
arranged by Mr. Fulbright and
Mr. Rogers on Monday, re-
flected an increasing concern
with the Laotian problem here.
The director of Central Intelli-
gence, Richard Helms, testific
liefore the committee earlier
this week
Administration sources said
today that the Administration
recognizes that President Nixon
could lose much of the public
support he has gained from
his plans to withdraw from
South Vietnam if the situation
in Laos became critical. They
indicated that the Administra-
tion was considering moves to
publicize some of the American
involment there to head
off 'charges of misleading the
public.
The sources said, however,
tention that Laos was more im-
portant to the United States
ithan South Vietnam.
The Senator , ,declined to
name the official. State Depart-
ment sources said that it was
not Mr. Rogers. Senator- Mike
Mansfield, the majority leader,
said today that he was pleased
with .the free-wheeling discus-
rqlon on LaolvIthl.Mr. Rogers ?
ArgistetdaYria'.14(.44;'..340.4 '
At the White House, Ronald
L. Ziegler, the press secretary,
again declined to answer a se-
ries of questions on Laos.
Meanwhile, Congressional
sources indicated that some of
the criticism over Laos had
been politically motivated. even
4t ji
though there has been genuine
fear of, a wider war in southeast
Asia., ,I.C1; .1., ?iiii?me4$4ie.....i?Z . -
The sources said that mem.!
hers had been demanding that'
the Administration disclose'
more of the American involve-
mcnt in Laos on the principle
that such action should not be/
undertaken without the consent;
of Congress. This was seen as
part of a growing effort by
Congress to assert itself in the
making of foreign policy.
n addition, several of the
nators who have been out-
spoken will be up for re-elec-
tion next fall. These include
Senators Mansfield, Democrat
of Montana, Albert Gores Dem- ?
ocrat of Tennessee, and Stuart tot.
symington, Democrat of Mit
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDPATAT81401111111111M
RIVF13SIDE, CAL.
'PRESS
E - 34,764
PRF.sF ;NThRPflISE
S - 78 , 343
MAR 5 19711
nd now Laos
Rep. L. Mendel Rivers, James Reston reminded usRivers, head
othe House Armed Services
the other day that Mr. Nixon, in
_
his notable November speech on ,
Committee and confidant of
Vietnam, said: "The American '
the military, has denied the U.S.
commitment in Laos: Anyone
asked to support a policy which
"
who says, we are just doesn't
know the facts."
PerhapS. But what, then, are
people cannot and'should not be ;
is getting into a Vietnam-like
involves the overriding issues of
war and peace unless they know
he truth about that policy."
the facts? That is the essence of True in Vietnam true
the complaint, for the informa- -
tion which the public gets comes
in driblets.
The worst kept secret of the;
little war is the heavy participa-;
? tion of the IA and military
advisers. The air w has been;,
busier, and by extrapolating
Command figures, it is a safe bet
that 300 planes and 100 airmen,l
were lost in neighboring Laos
last year.
I
As fears have mounted, more
and more officials have stepped
, forward to defend the U.S. role, 1
I without saying what that role 'is.1
!Theirs is an unspoken plea to ,
"trust us," a particular South- i
' east Asia road that has been
gone down before to everlasting'
regret. '
Secretary' of State William 1
,Rogers has been more effective
by talking to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and promis-
ing that it will be consulted in i
, advance of any increased U.S. in- I
, volvement. 'This may still criti- j
i cism for a time, ,as the persua-
sive Mr. Rogers has done before. I
But the total Administration '
effort thus far has been to try to
, improve its public-relations im-
age on Laos. No one has come '
up with a satisfactory way of
doing that short of telling all,
which is viewed in some quarters1
as a horrendous idea. : ' - ?'' %
_.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RD
SAN FPANCISCo, CAL.
CHRONICLE
LI - 430.233
M A 5 ,1970
.11? Wiraphote
SOLJVAN NA PFiOUMA
A "duty to protect Laos"
Air Strikes
Vital, Laos
Premier Says
Vientiane
Laos would he , taken;
over by! North Vietnam if 1
United ;Sates air strikes :
werP ,baited, says Prince ,
Souvanna Phoum a, the ?
Laotian premier. -
"It is the duty of the Unit-
ed Slates to protect us be-
caiise, like other nations
which signed the Geneva ac-
(lords, it must assure the in-
&prudence, territorial integ-
illy and neutrality of Laos,".
he said: .
Souvanna made the corn-
rort in an interview with the
Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, a transcript of ? which
was. released by the Laos
government Tuesday.
Souvanna denied , any
knowledge of U.S. 13-52 raids
in Laos and refused to com-
ment on the activities of the
/U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency in Laos. ------4
Asked about the extent of
U.S. military involvement in
Laos, Souvanna said: 'When
the need is felt, we ask for
? supplies. We also ask for
American air intervention to
Watch the infiltration routes
and bomb.the invaders."
He said that without U.S.
Mr support "the entire coun-
try will become Communist
? the entire country will be
taken over by the North Viet-
namese."
He said he has asked for
more American aid, mainly
rifles, to replace obsolete
'ones now used by the Laotian
army.
? Asked what aid he would
like from the United States,
Souvanna replied: "I hope
Washington . . . will finally
take into consideration the
proposal I made to President
Nixon last October."
This proposal concerned
the application of Article
Four, of the I.?62 'Geneva ac-
cords on Laos which banned
foreign troops from the coun
try. .
Aseociate4 Preps
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601111
UTICA, N.Y*
PRESS
? 28,782
MAR 5 1970
Ws Time to Clarify Our La,ts Stand,
nd Ifs Doubtful We nt More War
"Laos is not worth the life of a single
'Kansas farm boy,",Secretary of State Dean
:Rusk said in 1961.
7 The Laotian turmoil, which had been
',going on for years, was also' summed up
:by another Washington official, who said:
"The situation there is disastrous but,
not serious."
? ? ?
_E IN OTHER WORDS, our government
iised to look on Laos as an impossible
icountry to defend, partly because its pro-
incial leaders were interested only in
ftheir own state's welfare and not the coun-
itrY's?
(:7 Now, all that ;has changed. The Central
jntelligence Agency has been helping the
;Laotians fend off the Communists in the?
iiorth, but the North Vietnamese's latest
ihrust has brought our uniformed men into
Tthe conflict, as our, bombers plaster north-,
Fern Laos with bombs.
?: Loud outcries are heard from the Seri-
:
ate, stemming partly from political opposi-
tion of the Nixon administration and part-,
:4Y from the fear that we will drift into an-
Other Vietnam.
? ? ? , .
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE have appal*.
lntly decided to divert our attention from
South Vietnam, where their efforts have
largely been stymied, and either draw us
into a new war or show the world that we
are incapable of stopping their armies.
Defense Secretqw_Liiisl tells congres-
sional critics that we .do not have ground
combat troops in Laos and do not plan to,
send any.
Nevertheless, we have put ourselves in
'a very cloudy and difficult position, allow-
ing the vilaui, engage us in a civilian war,
and now our sending bombers to strike
North Vietnamese troops.
It would seem we have to step back and)!
'elarify our position. We must either fol-1
.low our withdrawal plan from Vietnam!.
, ,without deviation, or decide we are going
to expand the effort to defend Laos.
0 0 ?
IT IS DOUBTFUL that anyone in the,
Nixon Administration or many in the,
country Would be willing to take on the:
.> defense of Laos. In that case, we should
not be fighting there under the secrecy of
the CIA or with our officially secret bomb-
ing raids beyond the Ho Chi Minh trail.
? Our present Laotian position is either
going to lead us into a new war or ember.;
rass us through our failure to defeat the;
, Reds Wei don't want e_4her ' '
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RD.P80-01601R000700050001-2
WASHINGTON
. Approved For Release 20011O"tifffe1fA-RDP80-0160
5 MAR 1970
f"IN? .'11) rti) .4.7) r
L,,..41-,11jkai
? By R. II. SHACKFORD
scrIpps-Howord Staff Writer
The Nixon Administration is
increasingly uneasy as its first
?potential foreign crisis ? in
'Laos ? draws fresh criticism
almost daily at home and
,heightensuncertaintyin
Southeast Asia.
Old anti-Vietnam war pres-
sures in the United States,
which President Nixon suc-
cessfully dampened at the end
of last year, are being revived
as a result of the war in Laos.
Uncertainty about Commu-
nist objective sin Laos is
creating nervousness thruout
? Southeast Asia, especially in
Thailand, and inhibiting the
Nixon Administration's ability
to point yith assurance at its
, , program of phased withdrawal
? from Vietnam.
Administration's unwill-
ingness to say anything public-.
ly about the American mili-
tary role in Laos exacerbates
Mr. Nixon's problems and cre-
ates the possibility of a credi-
bility gap.
This is most distressing to '
th? Adnilnistration, which dals
ly reminds the public that it
-
didn't -create the Laotian situ- ?
ation ? that, like Vietnam, it
, is one of the unpleasant lega-
cies from previous Adminis-
trations.
bat role in Laos ? desplte.!
many years of an American '
1 clandestine role thru the Cen-
I tral Intelligence Agency
have had no visible effect on
' the mounting criticism.
The almost daily warnings
of Senate Democratic Leader
, Mike Mansfield, Mont., about
.? the dangers in Laos and the .
statement of Senate Foreign?
:aids
STATINTL
4) IT A
ta \
frOSSINMS
? . -
? The Administration's policy',
In Laos is described this way: .
. ? To preserve for some fu-
ture use the badly battered
and, in practice, almost unre-
?
? cognizable 1962 Geneva ac-
cords that were intended to '
' Relations Committee Chai r- make Laos a neutral nation.
, t man J. William Fulhright, D- Each side claims it is willing
? Ark., that a high Administra- , to go back to them and some-'
?tion official's comments on '. day that may be the only,.
? Laos "scares me to death" answer.
, are merely the latest compli-
? A willingness to give Ha-,? 1
?' cations for the Administration noi within reason a guarantee 4.
since the Communist offensive
_that Laos will not be used as a.
recaptured the Plain of Jars.
The Administration claims it
Is unfairly 'handicapp against North Vietnam.
ed in the
military base for operations :.
.1 debate at home because it f
. ? An understandable desire,
.' ? considers it Would be kin.wise 7', in view of the difficulty of get- i
????:- t, .ting out of Vietnam, to avoid .
:1 ? to reveal American activities : - any expansion of the war in ,
:i?':in Laos. ? ? , ! Laos. But this is qualified by '?:, ?
' To do so, :. the fact that Hanoi uses a ..:i
. , ..?
? '' maintain, would make bad 1 j large area of Laos- -- thru'
, ..
matters even worse by upset- 1 1. which the Ho CM Minh Trail:
.'.ting what is at best a preca- ! I. nuns ? as a transmissionlelt. .
' rious balance in Laos. The Ad- J r for, supplying its forces .1111
ministration denies that it has I 1 'South Viotfintu.
.f
any intention of sliding into, c 'The Administration argii-
? it,. another 'Vietnam? in ' Laos '; I.: ment that it would be irra?tion-:
! I.
. :?even tho it admits the war in .,i i al for it to seek to slide wit-
Laos and the Vietnam war
tingly or unwittingly into an-,
really are parts of the same ., other Vietnam is clear. But it
: t problem. : ' is complicated by the fact that ?
'. An admission that the Unit- ' the United States does not
? f ed States is violating the 1962 ., ,. really know what Hanoi ?,
'Geneva accords -- even tho'. 1. which introduced 15,000 more:.'
'..; North Vietnam violated them ' ' troops into Laos this year ? is ,.
.'first, or rather never honored ',planning. . .
' them ? would in the eyes of.: The American view still is
?,?, the Administration d e s t r o y i ! that Hanoi probably does not
whatever fragile hope there is ! , seek conquest of all of Laos
for a reasonable? Laotian set-- : ? because of. the probable inter-
, national consequences B n't!
t this is not considered' as cer.!
1,tain.. as ? It was 'law mont4
M104 t ?:..,:,:',?,X -1,..,:?,.i.'t '..]:,4.1.04
' -. - ' ? -
; (The UPI reports these de-
velopments:
t' ? The Nixon Administration, '?
; feeling the pinch of the grow- ;
:ing credibility gap over Laos, ?
, is seriously considering mak-
ing some frank disclosures
about the situation. ?
? Congressmen who re- .4t
ceived a two-day briefing from ,
:Defense Secretary Melvin
Laird say they are convinced
President Nixon will not send
:regular ground troops into ,
, Laos ? even if that is the only
t way to save that nation from
the Reds.)
??
TOUGHEST PROBLEM
The link between the situa-
? tions in Laos and Vietnam and
. the fear that Hanoi's game in
Laos is to try to undermine
the Nixon policy of "Vietnami.
. zation" puts the President in
- the toughest spot he has occu-
?pied while in the White House.
7 Daily denials that the United
States plans any formal corn-
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
?
1111.1,illaNTON_ ST
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA..-01601
5 MAR 1Wu
o Laos gscilosures
Stor Pocy Rt
By GEORGE SHERMAN
Star Staff Writer
The Nixon administration is deep in an internal dispute over
how much more to make public on American involvement in Laos.
The State Department revealed yesterday that Secretary of
iState William P. Rogers sought to soothe Senate fears in a secret
"informal" meeting Tuesday afternoon with the Foreign Relations
Committee. He and Sen. J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., had ar-
ranged the meeting?which last -
?ed two hours?in a private talk "Don't Know Facts"
trap.
in Fulbright's office the day be- Afterwards, with Laird at his I
fore. side, committee Chairman L, Geneva Accords in Peril
But yesterday Fulbright indi- Mendel Rivers, D-S.C., said If the Nixon administration
cated he was not satisfied with those who say the United States formally admits deep military
'Rogers' explanation on Laos.jth, geting . over-involved in Laos involvement, the argument goes,
After the State Department an- 'just don't know the facts." it effectively undermines the
nounced the meeting?which Sen- But competent sources admit 1962 Geneva accords establish-
ate sources said Rogers pee_ that the administration is caught fri-
g a neutral Laos. Other signa-
viously had insisted be kept so-I in an agonizing trap over how tories, including North Vietnam,
cret?Fulbright said, "You don't i many of those facts to make Communist China and the Soviet
settle something in just one Public. They realize the enor- Union, would then have a formal
meeting." mom danger of a "credibil4,excuse for open intervention on
growing over. Laos liketheir own.
As chairman, he said he would gap"
have the Foreign, Relations 03111-
mittee press more deeply into
American in in the
Laos war.
Troop As Given
J
STATI NTL
and that the United States 151
trying to restrict both.
Inside the administration it is
argued that fuller public expo-
sure of American Laotian opera-
tions could play right into Com-
munist hands. Therein lies the
that which undermined former
President Lyndon B. Johnson's
Vietnam policy.
ror instance, the administra-
tion has not denied press reports
both here and from on the spot
about the increase in American
air activity in Laos during the
current North Vietnamese offen-
sive there in the North.
Daily Sorties Disclosed
ern contest, and half farther Vietnam any guarantees neces-
south over the Ho Chi Minh trail,
and that Nixon had approved sary that Laos will not become!
two ineffectual B52 raids?Feb. an American base for attacking
North Vietnamese troops on the It is hoped that Hanoi will not
17 and 18?against advancing?',North Vietnam.
On Sunday The Star revealed is how to restore the Geneva
continues, Hanoi would have the
legit-
imacy of the current Laotian
that it is willing to give North,
added lever to question the American military intervention.
The -United States wants to
which, ironically, officials point
out, was originally a virtual cre-
ation of the Communist side.
accords.
government, which allows
maintain that government?
push its military advantage to
oust the government of Laotian
Premier Souvanna Phouma,
since North Vietnam is currently
proposing the same kind of coa-
lition government for South Viet-
nam. Hanoi, therefore, is fight-
inging a credibllity battle of The unresolved question here
The administration has hinted
' that the war in Laos is really an
Majority Leader Mike Mans-
field, D-Mont., said, however,
that Rogers had been "quite re-
sponsive, made a very good im-
pression, and I think the meet-
ing was very worthwhile."
Mansfield indicated Rogers had
given new administration assur-
ances that Nixon's commitment
' not to put U.S. ground troops
into Laos without congressional
approval would be honored. Rog-
ers tried hard, other sources
said to counter the growing im-
pression that the United States iPlain of Jars.
is expanding the war in South.' ?
, The fear in official quarters is
east Asia.
that these reports, which also
According to congressmen
detail unofficial American advi-
Secretary of Defense Melvin 11'.
efforts on the ground in
Laird repeatedly made the same sory
Laos, are exaggerating the
points during his testimony yes-
and Tuesday before the:American involvement. The ad-
tenciay House ed services Commit-, ministration privately contends
r...#0,shos of the war IA vieular.ai
that U.S. Air Force planes are
now flying between 400 and 500
sorties daily?half in the north-
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
2?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601
BOSTON, MASS.
RECOn-AMFRICAN
I! - 439,372
ADVERTISER
S 432,963
MAR 4 19711
STATINTL
(Us. Officials Concede C/A
Aides Are-.0peratin4.. in Laos
By JOHN P. WALLACH they would release the names , . . American personnel 'assigned
. r ? s
, ' Picard American Washinqtrin nervier - of the two men in the next ., for three-to-six months tours
L
AS W II I N GTON .? Acl- i : few ?
days. - , ,of duty, or CIA men who
ministration officials private- ? The acknowledgement of ' cam mute bark and forth
, the CIA. role in Laos, an open : -Item a border village In Thai-
conceded Tuesday that'''''
. . , : land.
he C e n t r a 1 Intelligence ? .secret' for
evidence of 'the difficulty that .,;?' '' The U. S.' has attempted to ,
Agencyjc,?14 is involved in , the U.S. government is hv- cloak its activities in Laos be-
military operations in Laos 1" trig keeping confidential ta
`
he , cause the 1962 Geneva ac- T.w,
against the Communist Path-;,. nature and extent of American ?. cords, W h'i'c h provided for .,, ;.-?,,,
et Lao. ? ' involvement. . , Laotian neutrality, prohibited . - I
But the officials denied re-, In the apparent absence of, the introduction of foreign - - 1,
- ' ports that perhaps as many; ,- a uniform White House three- , troops in any capacity.
I
? as a thousand ,civilian agents.', live on what is public and,, The U. S
were helping to train the Ir-. began to train the ....-1.:
? i
"what is private, State Dept."' ?
and Defense Dept.spokesmen clandestine?army of Maj. Gen.. ?
regular army of anti-Com-,, are citino. conflicting versions .1-:-.1.T.F.ng.Paci DriGlli fil.Ciiii(le tee-
,
IL: nutrillt-Mio-liihesMelt, Tiie37;. of what , they assert is the ,h, tical air support for Laotian. .,..
;--? said that ? at most--there4 Situation. . , . o'i
' government troops when it be-, .
- are a hundred intelligenee--: T -,,f week; the Pentagon . came evident that North Viet-
= ? -I the U. S. had lost -;
, .?. This d i s c 1 o s u r e was" 'Spokesman corrected the ?,t? the. neutralist government.
agents in the beleaguered i , nam was training rebel.Pathet:
j. Asian kingdom. . ??rryleemen , since 1961. ?t.
. "' Monday a Defense' Dept.,-.::,;, Lao tribesmen 'to overthrow
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01
?
CHATTANOOGA , TENN.
T1M-ES
Lt ?
S V.? , 238,
Akli
?;.1
?01,V117,1
nvoivement:
99
4.
Sens. Gore and Fultright report increas-
ing concern over Laos after a briefing by ?
CIA .Director. Richard Helms, and there has
been general apprehension that the currently ,
successful Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese__
forces might strike south from the Plaine des:-
-
Janes. I
Sen. Mansfield, a student of Laotian af-
fairs, says the Communists "may stop short
of the cities of Vientiane and Luang Prabang;
that would be in the pattern of previous opera-
tions. Then again, they may push forward
against these two capitals and press to the
border of Thailand. However, we are both in
it?North Vietnamese anti Americans?and
we are in it up to our necks." -1
On the ground in Luang Prabang, New
York Times Correspondent Henry Kamm, re-
ported nevertheless on Monday that "the
sense of security is rooted in an implicit be-
lief that the Communists would never attack
the royal capital. The optimism is not consid-
ered naive. The Pathet Lao and the North
Vietnamese have never challenged the au- .
thorify of Xing Savang Vatthana, and well-in-
formed Laotians believe that as. long as they
seek to maintain an appearance of legitimacy
the Communists will continue to spare. this
town of 30,000."
In any case, many Americans deservedly
want to know whether, in Sen. Gore's words, -
Laos is becoming an exception to the Nixon
policy of lessened military involvement in ,
Southeast Asia. Limited extensions of air sup-
port may be necessary to protect our position
in Vietnam. But any substantial increase of -
our involvement on the ground?whether it is ,
training Meo guerrillas, flying helicopter as-
sistance missions or otherwise servicing the
spotty performance of Laotian troops does not
in our judgment have the support of the Amer.7'
ican people.
V
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
T ; ?.; 14011Y:011 STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/044 8R-1EP80-01601R0
Pentagon refuses to talk
LS. role in Laos
By George W. Ashworth efined.
Staff correspondent of The Christian Scienec Monitor L11 1
Washington
t Amid a rising furor, the Nixon administration must., N
come to grips with the question of whether it can
afford continued reticence on the difficult Issue of Laos.
Officials have stepped forward to defend the United
' States role in Laos, but they have steadfastly refused keep the Lao Government viable' and its positron tenable
to say precisely what that role Is. in the face of North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao incur-
The result is an unspoken plea to "trust us,"' but
sions. ? ?
there may have been too many difficulties over South'.
' Beyond North Vietnamese conezrn over .the U.S.,
east Asia in the past decade to make that agreeable ,
;however, sources say, is a suspected North Vietnamese
to Congress or the public at this point. .
The administration is busily trying now to figure out desire to keep the Royal Thai Army from a general
commitment to the war. It is one of the generally ac
ways to improve its public-relations image on the Laos . '
cepted beliefs here that the Thais would not allow North
. issue. But no one as yet has come up with a satisfactory :
Vietnamese troops
. answer as to how precisely to do that short of telling . to endanger the border area at the
' all, which is viewed in some quarters as a horrendous Mekong River.
. idea., ' It is considered likely that Thai forces would cross
: Suggestions are being bandied back and forth in the Mekong if there were a strong possibility the North. ..
,. ,officialdom, but there is nothing final yet. :Vietnamese were close enough to endanger it.
m0/01.
. In the Pentagon, the solution so far has been a rather One of the confusing points at this stage of U.S. in. ..
simple one: Don't discuss Laos at all. In answer to a volvement in Laos is why the B-52 strike was ordered.;
? specific ?queyy, the Pentagon reflised point-blank to; recently in the, midst of the fighting for the Plain of .
J
Oallow a reporter to talk either on or off the record Jars'. , ,
. with any official on the .subject of either American. The one-time strike was' ordered' in a 'small valley ?
or North Vietnamese involvement in the war in Laos. containing North Vietnamese headquarters and , supply
?,.. 'Knowledgeable officials, have been ? directed not to' facilities. The strike which was urged by U.S. . - -
'discuss any aspect of the situation with any member, bassador to I..- Ei-oiG-. McMurtrie Godley, did not stop
' of the press.. . ? .' North Viet occupation of the Plain of Jars, if that was
?I
a. D nn'er Point Watched? 'its intention.. . r ). .
There has been speculation that the strike?the first
It is known that the Central Intelligence Agency ? Use of B-52's in northern Laos fighting?was intended
and U.S. military advisers are substanti involved;: involved , ?
as a signal to the North Vietnamese that the U.S. and
in Laos. U.S. lighter-bombers conduct about 90 percent,! the Laotians could not be pushed too far.
of the air-support missions being flown in battles be., .
, tween the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao on one : senate pressure ,
hand and Lao irregulars and Army forces on the other.','
There are a number of reasons why the U.S. does Sources here say that if the bombing was a signal
not wish to discuss at this point the situation in Laos.'0 to the North Vietnamese not to take the Plain of Jars;
.. Perhaps the primary one. Is that full disclosure would : the bluff was called. If it was a signal not to Continue
make it rather clear that the U.S. is violating the 1062. on to the Mekong, sources say it was of dubious merit
. Geneva accord. *. in that the North Vietnamese were already undoubtedly
The North Vietnamese, of course, 'were. the initial. aware of the dangers of advancing to the Mekong.
_ 1
. violators, as they have pursued their course of attacks ' The reasons, whatever they may be, are not gen. !
against the officially neutralist government of S Prince rerany known throughout the government in that the ' oevanna Phourna, the Lao Premier, ?
'decision was made in the White House after consulta.,''
The North Vietnamese, sources believe, could at some lion with highest administration officials. 'I
? ?
point or other have taken over the country and' over- ' But the 13-52 bombing is 'really just another one of al
thrown the government, had they wished, but there long series of developments that have caused a grow..
have been no indications that they wanted to carry the ing concern in Congress. Sen. Charles McC. 'Mathiasi
fighting beyond a certain danger point, . Jr. (R) of Maryland argued, "Laos has, become- an
' Sources here are agreed that that danger point would arena for the repetition of the mistakes of our Viet.
be one at which the U.S. felt it necessary to do some? namese involvement."
thing substantially more than heretofore. . Past U.S. There has been considerable Senate pressure upon the
policy has been to increase U.S. help in an attempt to, administration to 'agree to.the release of secret testi-
' ? .t ? .4" '' II ' r
, . ? , mony taken last October by a Senate foreign relations
? - :.
' . .subcommittee on American involvement in Laos. Sen.
' !... ? .
1 Mike Mansfield (D) of Montana said failure to release
"The B-52 strike . . . did not :the report "can only raise additional question as to
. lwhat we are doing In Lao.' - ' .' ? ? "
. Sitibprliktrealck Mi. Iftrigferitifft1104 : CIA-RDP80-0-1601R0O0700050001-2'
eoitinued
of the Plain .of Jars, if that
was its intention'
I'
?
?
ilfar(AP_promad For Relea
/ -
versify connection should make it a live)
place to live.
,The II.D.C.'s major projects In New Yor
' City?the New Town on Welfare Island an
the Harlem River Park (which will provide
when completed, a combined total of 0,60
housing- units --will displace no present hotts
log. That. occonfing to Logue, Is the eissenc
of set/slide renewal In n city where lend an
honsing are scarce. The theory in that firs
you build the now housing, then you mos!
people Into it and then end only then d
you destroy or renovate the places wher
they previously lived.
An over the state that Is what U.D.C. I
doing?looking for vacant and, hopefully
publicly owned land on which to build New
Towns, Th. 0,500 new units of housing wit
not cure tne city's ills. Nor will the 4,770
other, smaller developments that the U.D.0
is planning to add to this total. But it could
be "the beginning of a chain" of develop-
ments, stretching over the next two decades
, that might substantially relieve the pressure
here. Logue does most firmly believe that
U.D.C. "can create a new pattern for devel-
opment" with New Towns and New-Towns-
in-Town like Welfare Island. "The magic
- thing about Tapiola [a New Town outside
Helsinki, Finland) is that it works.''
t. But the New Towns will not work here
Y-- unless they can attract the middle class.
" Logue Is convinced that no one will be
able to resist their obvious advantages.- But
Logue himself, who lived in the Yale Club for
? a year while selecting a place for his family
to live In New York City, lives at One East
- End Avenue. He does not live on the West
' Side, where he could easily enjoy rubbing
shoulders with members of another class.
(Similarly, he believes the flight to the sub-
urbs could be halted if the middle class
? would stay In the cities and fight for good
, ? public- schools there. But he sends his two
children to Dalton, ?sensing this abandon-
inept I inept of-'principle on the grounds that his
kids have "made plenty of sacrifices because
thir father Is a public servant, and they
entitled to compennationn.")
. One doen not criticize Logue for this be-
-;t havior. lie Is a man who has worked devilishly
; ? for success and is, perhaps, entitled to its re-
wards. The writer of this piece in an East
si Sider and a Dalton Daddy, after all. Still, If
? ' Logue will not do what he asks others to do,
? . the New Towns are in trouble?unless, as
--;; someone has suggested, George Plimpton can
?? be persuaded to move to Welfare Island
to give It some chic.
, These points, raised lat.() in the day as his
- limo threads its way through the rush-hour
? trafRc, do not ruffle Logue. He Is a tough
man who knows what he thinks he knows,
("How do you like Ed Logue?'i a lady jour-
alitm who profiled him once was asked,
- "About 80 per cent," was the reply?and
there is a hard warmth,resIstant, protective
core to the man.)
11111111111111111M1
STATINTL
deal of b
%CZ:1111440NY; Far19 4 4
his own est self when he happily re-
plies: "The tiny In tough when he leans on
k somebody." lie pauses to muse for a moment
d and wide: "Ho's an enthusiast, and I'm In
, favor of that. What tine ? country
0 needs Is more enthusiasts."-
With which the car pulla up In front of his
e building and ho bouncer' enthusiastically out
d to face the night's homework. Watching him
go one recalls n ntatement of hitt long-time
e associate, Allan Talbot, who lists his assets
o as "a sense of drama and urgency, huge
O capacity for work and a great love ,for cities,"
plus his greatest gift?"intikIng a picture of a
a puzzle."
, There Is also a statement by Arthur Drexler,
curator of architecture and design at the
I Museum of Modern Art, to weigh in the
balance: "I'd be Inclined to give him the
, benefit of the doubt. Sure, without a real
Federal commitment to the cities, something
' like UD.C. Is just a great big Band-Aid. And
, I suppose it's all very well for you and mo.
to sit back and take a historical point of
view about it and about men like Logue. But
that doesn't mean everyone should sit back
and wait for someone else to do the job.
People like Logue have to keep trying?If
only for humanitarian reasons."
On the other hand, his Impatience, his
. anger at inefficiency, his no-nonsense ability
to speak plainly, in the vernacular, about
what he's for and what he's against (con-
sider bin unfashionable admiration for an-
other doer, Robert Moses), hl s really amazing
sense of urgency about the Job at hand in the
cities, are In refreshing contrast to standard
official style these days. Just at the moment,
no matter what his critics say, it may be
more important to do something?anything-
- in the cities that is quickly visible than it is
to study h problem to death. It may even
be that plain old-fa.shioned action is more
to the point than community action, which
is often merely obstructionist, sometimes ir-
rational. The efficacy of this now political
Style cannot, at this point, be considered ob. .
jectively proved. It is, in short, an attractive
academic theory that has made a scandalous
, amount of trouble in the streets.
In any Cage, !liked about his relationship
I. to Governor Rockefeller. Logue reveals a good
LITHUANIAN INDEPENDENCE
? Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, on Febru-
ary 15, 1970, the Honorable Petras P.
Dauzvardis, Consul General of Lithuania,
addressed the Lithuanian Independence
Day commemoration meeting at the Ma-
ria High School auditorium. Lithuanian
Plaza, Chicago. He expressed the pride
of Americans of Lithuanian descent and'
of Lithuanians everywhere in the ac-
complishments of the years of Lithu-
anian independence between 1018 and
1940. He also expressed the determination
of all free peoples that Lithuania shall
one day regain her freedom, a sentiment
? which I heartily share.
I commend the Consul General's re-.
marks to my colleagues and ask that they,
be included in the RECORD.
There being no objection the address
was ordered to be printed in the RECOR
' as follows:
ADDRESS or PETRAS P. DOUZVARDIS ?
, On February 16th, Lithuania's Indepen-
dence Day, we rejoice that Lithuania had re-
gained her independence and had taken her
rightful place among other independent, sov-
ereign states. We express our gratitude and :
respect to thine who were instrumental In re-
storing independence of Lithuania.
We take joy and pride in the organization,
performance and accomplishments of the
State of Lithuania, In her rapid progress and
her commendable representation of herself In
the world. This Is confirmed by the reaction
of the free world to Lithuania's misfortune:
by the non-recognition of the Soviet Union's
seizure of Lithuania.
For this great and significant legal-political
support of Lithuania's rights, Lithuanians ex-
press their profound and sincere thanks to
the United States of America and to all free-
dom-loving end law-respecting states.
As we reiterate our appreciation .to Lithu-
ania's friends and respecters of law and jus-
tice, we denounce the enslavers of Lithuania,
the violators of agreements and international
law and disseminators of falsehoods, and tie-
mend restoration of freedom to Lithuania.
President Nixon (October 24, 1908) char-
acterized the conduct of Lithuania's enemy
and occupant as follows:
"In committing aggression against the
Hanle countries--Lithuania, Latvia and Es-
tonia?the Soviet Union violated not only
the spirit and letter otinternational law. but
offended the Standards of comnuyh human
decency."
Bearing in mind that aggression Is an In-
ternational crime, and that the Soviet Union
committed thin crime for which It in con-
demned by Its victims and the just world, as
actual victims of Soviet aggression and op-
? preesion, It In up to the Lithuanians and
others of the name fate to speak out more
loudly and forcefully and to demand a right-
ing of the wrongs Inflicted by the
to free free Lithuania and its people.
This demand Is made in accord with the
United Malone Charter and the Soviet
Union's own demand(' upon others. Here is
the latest (September 19, 1909) Soviet pro-
posal to the United Nations:
"All States-members of the United Na,-
tions have assumed under the Charter the
obligation to settle their disputes by peaceful
means, to refrain from the threat or Use of
force against the territorial or political in-
dependence of any state . . it is necessary
above all, to insure, without delay, the with-
drawal of troops from foreign territories oc-
cupied as a result of action by the armed
forces of some states and against other states
and the people defending their independence
and territorial Integrity,and to abide In
International relations by the principles of? equality, territorial inviolability
, of each State?non-Interference In internal
affairs and respect for the rights of all people
freely to choose their social system."
Shortly before that, on July 10;1969, For- .
? eign Minister of the Soviet Union Andrei
? Gromyko had stated:
"It is Impossible to keep foreign areas
seized as a result of aggression . . . they
should be returned . . . to whom they be-
long."
We are In agreement with the above-stated
? principles and expressed Ideas. Guided by
these ideas and by international law, we de-
mand that the Soviet Union abide by Its
avowedly nobel principles, solemn state-
? ,
menta and obligations, that the Soviet Union
restore Lithuania's territory to the Zahn-
anlann with all the rights net forth In the
Lithuania-soviet Peace Treaty. As long as,
the Soviet Union does not do no, It will re-
main a hypocrit, an Imperialist, the enslaver
.:of Lithuania and other states, an enemy of
freedom and justice.
SENATOR WILLIAMS URGES PRESI-
DENT TO PREVENT A REPETITION "
OF THE TRAGEDY OF VIETNAM
IN LAOS
? Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr.
President, last year the Congress clearly
and unequivocally declared America's in-
tention not to allow the war in Vietnam
to spill over into Laos. Congress barred
the use of American ground troops in
Laos and Thailand. This action, of
course, was consistent with the Geneva
accord of 1962.
It is now apparent that both North
Vietnam and the United States are vio-
lating the 1962 accord.
r ermore, It is now reported, in
? every day's newspapers, that the con-
gressional intent is being violated and
frustrated, it is reported that hundreds
of former U.S. special forces have joined
the CIA forces in Laos. Daily, B-52
sorties are now being flown over Laos,
not just to interdict shipments over the
Ho Chi Minh Trail, but to fight the bat-
tle for the Plain of Jars, to participate
in what is apparently a civil war in
northern Laos. We are spending over a
quarter of a billion dollars yearly there.
Some 200' American airmen have re..
'Approved For Release 2001/0.3/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
----- AX
pproved For release 2001/03/0A .Az
?_C.I.RDP8
DALLAS, Tr..
1 TV..1F.S
E _ 216.209
S ? 2.56,250
MAR. 4 1.97U
:Felix R. McKnight
INNliii4NONOM+Ohl, 4Y..1 1A1441.? le'N%
NixonThe
?
lemn
How Far in Laos?
4!.
It follows, said the source, that with ihe North Vietnamese a
being stunned, militarily, in Vietnam, they would turn to the 1
easier picking of Laos. It ,has been expected for years.
1)RESIDENT NIXON'S rigid stance of .silende On "So, what do you dq? Sit there with white gloves ori and let 1
I involvement in Laos has brought him nose-to- :11.. them pour throug6 and then get in position to devour Thailand?" ?i
1 nose With the first serious "credibility gap" charges i,'. The man', then suggested that "too much talking" is being .
.. that tarnished his predecessors. ,, ''. , ' .. .done about the eictremely sensitive Laotian dilemma; that "those 1
1
'? folks" 'should remain silent and let ?the President herd us through i
The people of. the United States. and a mounting the crisis. And then he admitted that "it is a critical predica- 1
,
to know if we':1inent.
,"
..,
, Military men in sizable numbers have shifted over to civilian
andolin Dios after service in Vietnam has been com-YI
'pleted. In 'r.tdVisory" capacities they have directed sabotage,
target' detection and designations and contributed greatly tp tre-
: .4 ? I
met;dous 'relief jobs for the harassed link nation. .
? number of members of Congress want
are standing on Laotian quick-
.
;. sand that could sink us into.
!I another war.
Involved in with .
;. from Vi et n a m?and getting ,
-; general public support on his ;
orderly procedure?Mr. Nixon It
now finds himself in a pre-
carious position as Laotian
fighting accelerates into What .?:,-*
;. the U.S. Pacific commander-in- ?
chief describes as "a de- .
. teriorating situation that is of
11
, But even?with the hard, indisputable fact that much of the ?
involvement' in ?Laos is geared to security for American
,i,i.forces in Vietnam and the halting of communism's sPread, there
Is 'still public uneasiness over more actual military participation
; in Asia:
*
. 4
. 1 Senate 'critics keep reminding President Nixon of hi ? Nov. 3
..1 "I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about ?
McKNIGHT Vietnam Is that many Americans have' lost confidence in what
serious concern to us . :..
'??ti the government has told them about our policy.
? ., . .
The hard-to-accept fact is.that the United States , ;i:, "The American people cannot and 'should not be asked to ?
has been involved in Laos fOr years?in the same, i: support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war
' "advisory" capacity that drew us into Vietnam. But ,A and peace unless they know the truth about that policy . .
the Those. words have brought President Nixon to his credibility i
e "advisory" status is getting tto look. more like .,;(
-1. cosis; The average citizen, and more members Of ?Congress,,,
plain warfare. . ,
,.. fearful that the United States has become too deeply enmeshed I
Infuriated members of the Senate :Foreign Rela- :,' in Laos, are asking .why his words on. Vietnam do hot now 1
?,; 1
tions Committee are' pushing ?pressure on the Nixon. -- apply to policy in Laos. ' '
' ? ? ? .1 In re s conferences and other 'public .statements, the 1
:administration to 'tell the people what'is.going on 1. ? P ?
, , than acknowledging frequent bombings of the Ho Chi Minh trail i
Senators McGovern, Mansfield, Symington, Ful- ,, --the 'North Vietnamese supply line that splits the beleaguered .
speech to the nation when he said:
? ?
: over there." ? ' President decline's to discuss what is going on in Laos other ,
i
country. .
President'Nixoh.:may soon have' to be more definitive with I
.1
nation. What' IA 'the eventual U.S. course in Laos?.
. . .?THE EDITOR
. i .
'?'' bright and Gore are screwing the vise on the Prem.. ,
' dent; moving closer to a full Senate . debate. Mc-:'.
1
i Govern warned his colleagues Tuesday, that "in spite.
:
'of the painful lessons of Vietnam, we are going dowit-.,i,..,
;:the same road in Laos?and we are :doing it. In ,.
' secret .. ,"
. * *
But one highly placed public figure, who has been an eyeball:.
?, witness to the developing crisis in Laos, observed: ? '
, "When you are playing with robbers, thieves, murderers and
..!
podiliesil croolim, you don't play under. the Marquis of Queensbury":,
, rolek. They donl obseive them, or. alit ittl,e0 of war. TheY're not :.`,
honest., , ?" , ? ? ?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RD080-01601R000700050001-2
k GARDEN CITY, N.
NEwspApproved For RIease 2001/03/04.: ClAsIN9ei160.
' E - 427,270
0 7 ft 4 1970 .
Fuibr
1
'
Combined News Services
1-committee on release of ' ''ifs on.
i Washington?Sen. J. William Ful-- U.S. activities in Laos. Th.. Pdroinis.- ' his wife lives. Merkel was from For4
Friday a Laotian
bright said yesterday that
tration's apparent reasoning, Fulbright Worth, Tex. The plane departed with-
' an OSSC68-
1
ment given him by high Nixon said, is that if Laos falls, Thailand will out ceremony. Las
administration officials. that Loos is be next. He mid officials alSo were army lieutenant, Daeng Senanikone,I
t
,even more important than Vietnam concerned that Hanoi might threaten 25, was killed when his spotter plane'
cares me to death." ' to wipe out the government of Sott- crashed near Paksane. The Laotian
I Fuibright asked: "If Vietnam was vannaas
Phouma unless he . orders pilot w
given an elaborate funeral'
'
important enough to justify the corn-
Americans to halt bombing of the Ho procession. The contrast underscores si
irnitment of half a million American : Chi Minh Trail that runs through point about the war in Laos. 'The
troops, then in this view how many i Laos, connecting the two Vietnams. young Laotian was fighting for his;
'
ore could justifiably be committed ' Fulbright's statement came after country and received a warrior's'
to Laos, which is one of the few worse,
places than Vietnam to fight a war?"
:He said that the U.S. "may soon have
:to decide whether to go all the way in
Laos?that is, to make it another
Vietnam?or to get out."
t "The fact that, high officials of the Laird also told newsmen that U.S.
-- administration think this scarel me to policy toward military support of the
death," Fulbright told the Senate. "It.. Laotian government is under 'continu-
suggests an ominous and dantreroua:i Ing review. "Whether there will be a
funeral. The American was doing a job
Secretary. of Defense Laird categoric-
ally denied there has been a U.S. ju.st as dangerous but got no recogni-'
buildup in Laos in either civilian or tion. There are at least 229 Americans'
military men. He made that statement like Merkel who have died or are miss.
before " the House Armed Services ' ing in Laos.
Committee. . In Saigon, meanwhile, South Viet-
nam mercenaries led by U.S: Green
Berets killed 49 guerrillas and seized
an arms . cache, in the Seven Sisters
Mountain area along the Cambodian
future for the United States in that ,change of policy, I would not make SISL14.411.tintrePoffieltyeatardat , -4. ?
remote country." - 'any prediction," he said. .
The Arkansas Democrat, chairman Sen. George D. Aiken of Vermont, .
of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- Ithe Senate's senior Republican and
mittee, declined to identify the offi-,1high4anking member of Fulbright's
dials. It was learned, however, that he committee, said that he doesn't share
referred to a high State Department ,the fear of many senators that Laos
'official who twice in recent weeks ?Icouldbecome another Vietnam.
imade the argument in conversation In Vientiane, informed 'Laotian
svith committee members. Richard sources said that Premier Souvanna
Helms, director of the Central Litchi- hrhouma has told .top -military corn-
Agency, was before the-TAMS
flee . Monday, but Fulbright ' gave no
rr menders . that N o r t h Vietnamesel
. ?
.1
? .
indication that Helms was the man. I ' troops appear. to be staging a major,
offensive. to win back territory held at
' Fulbright's comments were in the the time of the 1962 cease-fire.
middle of a speech - he placed in the
"Congressional Record after delivering,.
There were no reports of war action't ?
'only the first and last paragraphs be-
in Laos, but the U.S. Embassy in
Vientiane released the official obituary':
of. the first American known to have .
? been killed in the current North Viet-
namese offensive in northeast .Laos. It ,1
told of the death of Air Ameriea Capt.s/d
J. C. Merkel as he was lifting off froml, .; ?
Xieng Khouang Feb. 19 -in an? H-34."..
. supply helicopter. "At an altitude of"
400 feet, a single sniper round bit himl,
,and killed him instantly. The controls 'l
were taken over. by Capt. John Ford
, who brought the plane back ? to a:1
, government-held landing strip,"? the:
. report said. , ? ?? '
? Merkel's 'body was shipped in' lig
visiAilkomicetitsalikicnaittilx&wktilLi ,
Approved For Release 2001103/04 CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
,cause of time limitations. It came
-after he joined in a call by Sen. George
.S. McGovern (D-S.D.) for .st ;secret
?Senate session on Laos. .
i The Senate held a secret Session in
,December in considering a proposal?
later adopted?to bar American
ground combat troops from being used
?in either Laos or Thailand. That was
,before the new wave of concern over
involvement in Laos?concern
/triggered by a North Vietnamese of-
fensive, reports of stepped-up U.S.
;bombing there, and a clash between
i.the,iadministratiga,,,aPCJOInrigh*
?
IAIINIL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R0
HERALD-DISPATCH
M 52,7Aih
HINTINGTON, W.VA.
4 1970
Eciiiorids
Only Cloak-Anci-Dagu-2ri1 Men ,
Are, ?n The, Ground lin Laos
WE THINK it is likely that what , that so much resemble skirmishes if j
is taking place in Laos is neither as ' it were not for the fact that the North
dangerous as the 'peace bloc in the '
. Senate would have us believe, nor as
insignificant as the Pentagon contin-
ues to insist that it is.
Except for the bombing of supply ,
routes and strategic targets, the
American oeleration in Laos proper
is the baby of the Central Intelli- If ourienemies would respect the in-i
gence Agency ? and "baby" is s'" tegrity of Laos, Perhaps v4T woukli
not, from all reports, too tar-fetched ?too, although' the CIA might wish to
a descriptive term to fit the cast. , continue to train and subsidize:
The CIA has been helping to train , troops. who could one day be a for-!
?Laotian irregulars under the corn- midable barrier against Communist.
mand of General yang Poo, widely 1 expansion.,
reSpected as one of the few honest ?
military leaders in Southeast 'Asia. . THOSE ARE the basic facts'
Unquestionably the CIA is paying the abOut Laos insofar as they are known'
to American correspondents on the;
Vietnamese and the Viet Cong make
free use of Laotian territory.
Laos, stretching alongside the ;
two Vietnams, is wedged in bptween
Red China, Burma and Thailand and
thus its strategic menace. to Ameri-
can troops in Vietnam is very great.
wages of the young.. men, recruited ,
from the tough Mao hill tribes, who scene and to the press corps in Wash-1
ington. It is apparently true that wei
have no combat' troops in Laos. Pres-
ident Nixon has assured Congress
that he will not send ground troops to ,
compose Poo's "army."
THE REGULARILaotian army is ,
!.supposed to be neutraL while Gener-
, al Poo's army is not. But the facts , , fight in Laos without Congressional
seem to be that neither the regulars consent, and not even the peace bloc'
nor the irregulars are the kind of ,` in the Senate doubts that he will keepl
soldiers who see desperation in his word, .
-
every battle. They tend to take the But it is impossible not to doubt
that the responses being made by
Defense Secretary Melvin Laird to
questions about the American pres-
ence in Laos arc at best evasive and
at worst half-truths. '
These would be more palatable if
the help we are trying to give the
non-Communist Laotians were more
:was supposed to have a neutral
government representing both the
Communists of the north and the .
non-Communists of the south.
BUT-?-aside from what the CIA is ,
doing and has been doing for alVig
time ? we would very likely have no
, view that there will be another day
and that there is no sense in getting
killed over a little real estate.
The , . Communist forces which
continue to upset the balance of po-
. litical and military power in Laos.
are of course, breaking the Geneva
accords of 1962 under which Laos 0;
effective. But complete U.S. com-
mand of the skies in Laos has not
been enough to prevent steady incur-
sions of Communists from the north.
It is really the relative impotence o
' our intervention, rather than, the in
,
terventiOn itself that makes the situ-
Appr uveMpittReistateL260 (tamob.: 1601 IR00070005
?
01-2
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R0
a
NEW n.?ITAIN, CONN.
HERALD
E 33,321 ?, ?
MAR 4 WC
Wzaat OiL
? The news from Laos is grimly de-
pressing, and it isn't just because an
enemy offensive there has wrecked the
.last pretense of "n eu tr a ii t y" under
Geneva accords. More urgently, the ques-
.
tign of America's depth of involvement
there, and the cloak of secrecy surround-
ing that involvement, is causing conster-
nation at high levels.
? The official administration position
is that our role is limited to "military
assistance." But equally persistent in re-
cent days, from newsmen who have
.gotten close to Laos, .from Congressmen
:who are unconvinced, come stories that
our involvement ,runs to considerably
more than "assistance." There are tales
of CIA-led .operations involving plain-
:?'clothes American military personnel in
14
advisory capacities. There are allega-
tions that the bombing levels are higher
than at any time during the bombing
of North Vietnam. Two newsmen ? have
reported watching American planes take
. off on bombing runs from a Laotian
airport at the rate of one a minute for
a two-hour period.
Enemy activity in Laos has reached
dramatic new levels in recent weeks.
Simultaneously,, the persistent clamor
for more knowledge about what this
country is doing has reached such a
pitch that Probably only President Nix-
on, personally, could speak authoritative-
ly about the situation. We add our small
voice to those who are now urging the
President to address the nation on the
scope of American -activitiy in this un-
declared war.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
fl
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RC/HO-01601
N1.71 YORK, N.Y.
POST
E - 708,180
MAR 4 1974
Pete Hamill
1
STAT I NTL
L..... ... . FALLEN DOMINO.
' So now we are bombing Laos to pro-
tect South Vietnam, and tomorrow we
can. bomb Malaysia to protect Laos,
? and the day after that we can bomb
Formosa to protect Malaysia, and then
maybe we can lay one on Hiroshima
for old- times' sake, to protect Japan
:from itself, and after that we can go
right on in and demolish China and get
-it over with once and for all, gang. We
call it the domino theory. Except it's
not those bad old slant-eyed little Corn-? '
mie devils who are pushing over the
? doniinoes. It is us.
? To be an American these days, you
! really must wake up in a state some-
! where between wonder and lunacy. It is
happening all over again. No more Viet-'
. naps, the President said, and there we
e in Laos, with all those crew-cut
.overgrown boys in the CIA playing
Sean Connery, and all those bra Vb pilots
? dropping explosives from on high, and
there doesn't seem to be anything at
, all we can do about it. We now have a
Laos/Vietnam War, and there is no
? way to disguise that by announcing.
that you are bringing home 70,000 men
while you are .einiultaneously spreading
death across the Plain of Jars.
* ?
. And the spread of the war into Laos
raises some crucial questions. One: who
?in the United States government asked
our permission to spread that filthy
. war into still another country? Two:? ?
,who in the Congress is voting in favor
of appropriations for use in Laos?
Three: who gave us the right to go into.
' Laos in the first place? Four: how much
is it costing? Five. What ?military gen- ,
lus, after the lessons of Vietnam, con-
vinced Nixon that bombing can win
anythinri, or that fighting in a land-
locked country in Southeast Asia makes
any logistical sense at all?
The questions are crucial because
the lessons of Vietnam seem not yet
to have been learned by the people
who run this government. To begin
with, we know by now that we should
not be in Southeast Asia at all, We
certainly should not be bullying our
way into conflicts in which we have
no real stake. John F. Kennedy did
not think Laos was worth the con-
cern of a great power; it is still not ?
worth our coneern. There is no pos-
sible threat to the United States from
the COmmunist forces in the Pathet
Lao. There is no way that Laotians
can come storming ashore in South-.
, ern California. There isn't even a good
old-fashioned imperialist reason to 14,
there: after all, how many, tubes of
toothpaste can we sell in that ninth-
rate country?
And yet we are going in there be-
cause a group of self-serving Ameri-
can careerists wantus to go in. Laos
is the great country whore the CIA
and the Pentagon invested $300,000;000
to create a right-wing government
which was later overthrown by a 26-
year old Laotian captain, without fir-
ing a shot. Laos is the great country
whose major crop is opium (but even
the 11fafia wouldn't fight for ?squat-
ter's rights there). Its people, alter 15
years of American meddling, are 85
per cent illiterate. The money that has
beenyoured into this dume of a cowt?'
?
try could have rebuilt Brownsville,
. Bed-Stuy and Newark.
I suppose Agnew the First will soon
begin the counter-offensive. After all,
the CIA and the Pentagon were hay-
ng a nice little war in Laos until the '
reporters started blowing the whistle.
? What the hell: what's 100 planes and
300 pilots from a country that believes ,
? in teamwork?
? But even now, when the questions
are being asked, answers are not avail- ,
able. We can't 'find out how many
troops we have there, if any. We can't
find out whether we have any agree-
ments for the commitment of troops
to the Laotian government. We can't 1
, find out who orders the raids.
I would suggest that every Congress-
man who votes funds for Laos be re-, '
quired to serve in combat in that coun- I
try. I would suggest that the great
pilots who make a living bombing ; ?
those people be bought home and put ;
to work with their hands in the slums.
I would suggest that it is a little late
in the day for Nixon and Co. to get -
away with still another dose of the 5
Asian infection. The Laotian Army is
not interested in fighting against the '
Communists; in their last full-scale bat-
tle in the early 60s, the Communists
smashed them, and the two leading
_Laotian generals commandeered a jeep
and beat it to Thailand. But the im-
plications are clear: if we think enough .
of Laos to drop bombs in its defense,
then we .must think enough of Laos
to send Amerlean troons to its defense. ?
The soldiers comine? home could find
therneolves in a revolving door. Tney
mie?ht he in it now.
The Laos/Vietnam war is not going
away, ahd if you buy the Nixon public
xelations job, you can be sure that the
son you have in the first grade thi
year will end up eventually in the sli
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
e
rvw YORIC
Approved
-
Approved For Releasa?2001/03/Q4MASIIVERDP80-01601R
?
"
The H,sth i Stakes in Laos
...., ands?son
stohoanner eivnetrh the cry, rres.e aihe y
CI: ?. could, by risking a further ex-
STATINTL
tension of their supply lines
against heavy bombing, cut the
i
; U.S. Worries That Hanoi Is in Position already partitioned Laos in
To Decide Effect of Fighting on Vietnam half yet again.
If they move on, they will
. 'no doubt be subjected to an
even harder pounding 0 B-52's
By MAX FRANKEL and stiffer resistance by the
Speelkt to nit Ntw YttrIc Tants C.I.A.-run ground forces, But
WASHINGTON, March 3?For almost a decade, the offi- nificant battleground in e they could be stopped with the
1 thto-decide to make Laos a sig- military planners doubt that
te. ' dal though private judgment struggle for Vietnam. The available force and no one in
here has been that the defense Nixon Administration does not authority here believes that
of Laos, the Asian kingdom of ,regard itself as committed to Congress or the American pen-
;two and a half million people, 'defend the self-determination pie would sanction the use of
is not in itself a vital interest :or territorial integrity of Laos American ground troops to
Of the United States. as such, But it does feel itself repel the challenge.
i, Even Dean Rusk, when he vulnerable to political and psy-. So the Administration has
"was Secretary of State and be- chologicel pressures that North beeen forced to consider other
i'cire he was cast of
can generate by way counter-measures, ranging
r as a superhawk, of Laos, . from diplomatic protest to the
i News used to tell visitors Soviet Union to the re-
Analysis in 1961, during sumption of some bombing of
North Vietnam. President Nixon
has repeatedly warned that he
would take strong action if
North Vietnam attempted to
take advantage of the Amer-
ican withdrawal from the war
zone. With the accelerated
bombing of Hanoi's forces in
Laos, he has already served
notice that be regards the
fighting there as an extension
of ? the conflict itself.
\ Campaign Has Begun
crises in old Indo- In the view of some knowl-
i china, that "Laos
is not worth the life of a single
Kansas farm boy." Then, as
now, Washington admired the
leisurely Laotians and wanted
them left to their interminable
;strife. The diplomats saw no
need to rush to their defense American people) that peace in
with American troops. More Southeast Asia can be obtained
persuasively, the generals here
wanted no part of an assign-
tnent in Laos.
Having meddled throughout
.the nineteen fifties in their in-
ternal affairs, Washington final-
'dy decided in the nineteen six-
ties to let the Laotian princes
bye in fragile coalition and
pulled away with a OililY "Me
exigeable Asian diplomats and
informed members of Congress,
such pressure has already be-
gun. Though military in form,
it is believed to be political in
purpose: to persuade the United
States Government (and-or the
only through further American
compromise At the bargaining
By threatening advance in
Laos, these observers agree;
Hanoi intends ? to frighten
Laos's neighbors in South Viet-
nam and Thailand, to drama-
tize the diminishing strength of
the retreating United States
,situation -there is disastrous, forces in Southeast Asia, to re-
ibut not serious." kindle antiwar agitation inside
L
.4 It is Now a Hope the United States and thus to
drive home the point, that ne-
, -
Ile,.rd among the top men of gotiation rather thke "Viet-,
Tha,Y-' reniark can still be
thr Nixon Administration, but namization" is the only way
it
........,? out of the conflict.
it is uttered only in hope, no Just as President Nixon is
longer in jest. For the North claiming progress for "Viet-
Vietnamese did not pull away, namization" ? the process for
from Laps. They have kept turning all aspects of the war
their troops there as insurance over to Saigon forces ? Hanoi
In the War in South Vietnam, is thought to be executing a
and the fear among United grand diversion in Laos to prove
Pates officials here now is that that its forces will never ? be
aol may; decide to send them
in. contained by South Vietnamese
troops and American air power
So the Pentagon is flying
alone, and that United States
'hundreds of bombing raids withdrawal, without negotia-
C., gainst the North Vietnamese
dim'
tiered little defense force therei ??
'
will never bring peace to
1
in the region. Laos, risking the lives of
Kansas and other boys. The 1
Central Intelligence Agency I, Choice Is Hanoi's
manages a sturdy but outnum-
American officials have
? President Nixon weaves and ;urgently re-examined the situa-
tinn and concede that such a
ducks whenever the subject of
American involvement arises acturn of events Is now possible.
They are not sure that the
his news conferences. And even
i campaign has actually begun,
calm men such as Mike Mans-
ihut they recognize the choice
,?--- field, the majority leader, are
, provoked into - enber declara-Ito be entirely Hanoi's and they
' tions of alarm' ..in the floor of, are more worried than ever
the Senate. - before. )
Elements
The reason for the anxietyl
40,000 North Vietnamese
of the more than
I. not the fear that Laos may
belIeved to be in Laos
Possibilities Are Few
Some officials think that thern
North Vietnamese want to
trade off restraint in Laos for
cancellation of the R-52 raids
in South Vietnam. But either
Way, the stakes are high and
the measures available to
Washington are few.
Thus the first point of ap-:
peal is once again Moscow.
That is where President Ken-
nedy found a sympathetic
hearing in 1961 from Premier. .
Nikita S. Khrushchey, who
also did not wish to become
more deeply involved in Laos.
Between them, they ar-
ranged the 1962 Geneva ac-
cord on coalition and neutral-,
ity for Laos, but the agree-,
,ment could not withstand the
:strains of major war In Viet-
nam, The war has changed
everything, including the op-
portunities for Soviet-American
collaboration.
In stating his minimum
peace terms, President Nixon
has already firmly linked neu-
trality for Laos With self-de-
termination for the South Viet-
namese. Two weeks ago, in his
address on foreign policy, he
said the only alternative for
Hanoi to a bargain that meets
those terms would be continl
ued "Vietnamization," mean-
ing "costly sacrifices while its
bargaining power diminishes."
, Hanoi, with Moscow's bless-
ing; is obviously determined
to prove the opposite. A few
more weeks will shoW wheth-
become another Vietnam, but,
4hat HanGi WIWAIrattPnlareFfirhave2glelot"let 'e
or e ease 3/04 4giurtiViitgaittilat
00700050001-2
boLwTtU STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/044AIMRDP80-01601
Laos Propped Up by Secret Army
O l U.S.. Civilians and Servicemen?
,T This correspondent, a pare-
troop veteran, has covered
both the Vietnam war and the
"Secret IVar" in Laos. Here
he examines the role of U. S.
.orlvisers in Laos.
. By ROBERT KAYLOR
?
Vientiane, Laos ? (UPI) ? It
was early morning. A sandy-
haired young man in faded blue
; jeans and a sports shirt sat on
a bench in the Air America ter-
minal, waiting for his flight.
He looked almost like the guy
next door back in the United
States. The only giveaway were
his short haircut and his green
and black jungle boots like the
ones worn by U.S. combat
troops in Vietnam.
He said he was headed for
the airfield at Long Cheng, for.
headquarters of the
"Clandestine Army'' of Maj.
Gen. Vang Pao, and from there
back to his job in the hills of
northern Laos.
The American declined to say
just what that job was. When
? his plane was ready to leave he
said good-by, picked up a mi-
litary suitcase, and left..
? Still the Same ? .
That encounter ' took place
some months before the current
Communist offensive in Laos.
Lao military sources say that
nothing has changed in the in-
tervening months , and that
'
there are other Americans like
the one at the terminal.
They are part of a compli-
cated infrastrecture that has
been built tp prop up a Laotian
defense establishment that LaoMelcong River from Laos, and a
military complex north of bang-
kok at Lopburi, headquarters
for the Green Berets of the U.S.
Special Forces in Thailand.
Military sources say the U.S.
advisers are in a support and
training role that meets the
Nixon Administration's guide-
he of no ground troops in
Laos, but that sometimes it can
come close to combat con-
ditions..
Army Man in Copter '
For example, a U.S. Army
warrant officer flies an II-34
military helicopter based at
Udorn and belonging to Air
America, a civilian company
under contract to the U.S. Gov-
ernment..
His official job is training
Laotians to fly their own helicop-
ters. But when the tricky job of
evacuating artillery pieces
from a Laotian base in danger
of being overrun by the Com-
munists came along, it was the
warrant officer and an Ameri-
can crewman who did the flying
rather than Laotians or Air
America's pilots.
According to military sources,
Most of the ground advisory
functions are run out of Long
Cheng, with only scattered
groups of. advisers working
wfr1i volunteer units in the
uthern part of the country.
Estimated at 300
It has never been disclosed
how many such advisers there
are: An estimate of about 300
was once published. Lao milita-
ry sources described this figure
MS exaggerated.:.
When the U.S. Special TrorCes
and American officials agree
would long ago have collapsed
without their help.
Part of the infrastructure is
visible on the surface in the ca-
pital of Vientiane. Part of it,
like the American in blue jeans
and jungle boots, normally is
not visible in a country that is
technically neutral and where
U.S. military involvement is not
openly admitted.
Of a total of about 830'persons
the U.S. mission acknowledges
are employed by the U.S. Gov-
ernment in Laos, about 80 or so
are military personnel, working
for the ;IS. Army and Air
Force attache offices at the
American Embassy here.
But military sources in the
Thailand-Laos region say there
is an American advisory, train-
ing and support system going
far beyond these numbers. It
cuts across the border between
Thailand and Laos. Some of its
members have civilian status
and some are military men on
tours of temporary duty in
Laos..
Hub of System
In Laos, the hub of the sys-
tem is at Long Cheng, where
Vang Pao's army of Lao and
Thai mountain tribesmen is
known to be administred and
supervised by the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency, an organ-
ization with a passion for secr-
ecy.
In Thailand, the system
works out of several' centers.
Among them are the U.S. air
base at Udorn, about 50 miles
from Vientiane; an air base at
Nakorn Phanorn just across the
111
moved into South Vietnam in
1961 to take over a somewhat
similar program from the CIA,
they did it with about 900 men.
Military sources say that
some or the men who work with
the clandestine army have
Green Beret backgrounds.
In addition to the ground ad-
visory efforts, military sources
say there is also a sizable U.S.
Air Force contingent operating
in northern Laos on temporary
duty status from Thailand. -
These airmen support the.
U.S. air war in Laos, manning.
radar stations which ?pick out
targets and run surveillance on
North Vietnam and providing
liaison between the Lao and
U.S. air support.
"Jolly 'Green Giant" helicop-
ters and their big brothers. the
"Buffs," operate on rescue and
support missions in northern
Laos and have harboring sites
there, military sources'say.
In addition, there are the offi-
cially acknowledged civilian
contract airlines, Air America.
Inc., and Continental Air Serv-
ices, which support Lao milita-
ry forces. Air America flies un-
marked II-34 helicopters which
haul troops and ammunition
and pick up wounded.
Air America has -about 210
American employes working in
Laos and more based at Udorn,
from where the helicopters fly.
-It has Americans working at
forward communications sites
in Laos and is known to have
Thai pilots flying choppers..
Continental Air Service,
newer and smaller, acknow-
ledges about 70 U.S. employes
in Laos. Many of the contract
pilots have military back-
grounds.. . . ? ? ? ?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
J
")?
-
SIA
PHILAT%rAiplialvtd.Fdr Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RD T.1rou-ui bill
INQUIRER
- 505,173
- 913,o45
, MAR 4 .1970
.......:: . - ?.1'4'''''U;S. B-52 and tactical bomb- 'hearings, has tried unsuCcesi.
IP,-
i;,cenators
,., s 1 log raids over Laos "are COM- fully to obtain State Depart.'
? ' parable to or greater than the,
:'
i lion of the transcript. ? , /,
,Ment clearance for publics.'
' raids over North Vietnam at 1,
. 'FULL DISCUSSION
'Secret Session ''' their heaviest
. "it also seems clear," he I Fulbright, recalling the war,
said, "that we invited the re- the United States became in-
N '
cent Communist offensive In .volved' in Vietnam, said ho is
' . 4
1 1,0 n Laos Policy ' in g ' an ' American-strained, whatever the result will ?bei;
the Plain of Jars by eneourag.
equipped and directbd Laotian, that it is discussed in full..
determined that "this. time?:,
army to seize ' this area last "If ,then they made a dOci...,
1. WASHINGTON, M a r t h 3 September, thus upsetting a :don to go ,' down that : road, ,
I (AP).?Sen. George S. McGov- more or less stable military that's ,.' their privilege," the
,ern (D., S. D.). backed by line that had existed for .sev- l 1
, I
ri chairmn J. W, Fulbright (D.;
eral years.
::Ark.), 6f the Senate Foreign '
i? Relations ' Committee, called CIA PERSONNEL
.;.Tuesday for a secret Senate "There is growing evidence,
; session on U. S. operations in that 4bi?944,..thatl American
Laos. ? ;miliffiirjr personnel ? appar..:1
4 But Sen. George D. Aiken of ently in civilian garb?are di-,
,FVermont, the Senate's senior .recting Laotian military op-
i,
(?Republican, said he does not , erations," he said.
' Defense Secretary Melvini
tt . .. .
.,share the concern of many ,
. R. Laird, talking to reporters,1
tisenators that Leos could turnT said there has been no build-)
iinto 'another Vietnam. ' +inn of U. S. ? manpower ? ei-
1 TICREATE UPHEAVAL . Ither civilian or military ? in
n ' '??? ,"If ? it did," Aiken .told re-, :Laos. ,
%,....., .1 The secretary was asked
porters, it would create such ; ,
(
an upheaval in this .country" bout McGovern's statement.'
. ? .1
that any good resulting from a that there "has been more
4firm U. S. stand would be un- l!and more American 'airpower,,ft
:dermined. . ',American advisers and CIA 't
. operatives" in Lao. ? ' ,)
1 Aiken said that, in some re. "I cans. categorically state ;
spects, the shift in the focus of there has been no buildup of:
:the Southeast Asian war from 'individuals whathptecuiviliatir
ti Vietnam to Laos is ."a good itimo..0....kwatiiir
? ... ... ?n.
1;sign." He ? said it means ;or, military on the .,ground In),
'North Vietnam is getting a i` Laos or within the country,'!'
little discouraged in the South; .0
and is devoting more attention il said,
ito Laos for bargaining Our.' ,POLICY REVIEW' '
Iposes."
!,' Laird also said U. S. policy
On theSenate floor the tone :'? toward military ' support of
'
,
i continued to be. critical of the the Laotian government Is un.
?Nixon Administration, with ?? . ?
der continuing review but'
three Democratic senators?
art Symington of hlissoqi?on I change of policy, I would not,
McGovern, Fulbright ad Stu- "whether, . there will be
,the attack.
NO le
make any prediction." .
Fulbright, noting the Acl.,1
LESSON OF VIETNAM
ministration's refusal to per-1
"In spite of the painful les-
mit publication of the tram. I
sons of Vietnam," McGovern script of Senate hearings on'
asserted, "we are going down U. S. involvement in Laos,:
the same road in Laos, and we said "unless it is made pub.!
are doing it in secret." lie, I don't see any alterna-
The South Dakotan, one of tive" to the kind of secret ,
the earliest Senate,. critics of Bessie!' urged by. McGov,ern. .,
the Vietnam War and a likely Symington, chairman of the;
contender for his party's 1972 Foreign.Relations. subcommit,
1.1721!delitia1 litm,Y3,1$.V.4':.P.1.1 ' .400.1einksitoldgmo"Et'
Approved For Release 200103/64
WALL .STREET 'JOURNAL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :4diA IIATB
1 The Hidden War army" of Gen. Valle; Pan) who do fight the.
- Communists effectively, will probably continue
but not,increase. Some Pentagon aides, in fact,
n Analysts Doubt Conflict would y likefor tobudgetary Despite
trim U.S. bombing raids M Laos,
if onl reasons. occa-
? leional pressures,ta'"do something more" about
In Laos Will Escalatethe Reds in Laos, the White House (with much
I help from Defense Secretary Melvin Laird) ,
, ? ffleems determined to keep American foot sell-
'
bullets (and probably some opium) for these
troops, while massive U.S. air strikes, some-
times by B-52s, blast the jungle in hopes of dis-
rupting North Vietnamese supply lines. Little
of this is ever acknowledged publicly.
That's not all. American helicopters move
Gen. yang Pao between battles and press con-
ferences, Thailand-based U.S. jets blast
Ha-
noi's troops as they try to overrun his moun-
tain outposts (he has lost nearly 200 in the past
couple of years) and American-imported Thais,
Nationalist Chinese and Filipinos perform as-
sorted technical and military tasks in Laos.
Guessing at the Cost
There are no official statistics worth the
name about how much manpower and money,
the U.S. participation costs. Some guesses
claim that roughly 200 U.S. airmen have been
lost in Laos in recent years, and that the war
, effort costs Washington some $250 million an-
nually; the official aid figure is currently $48
, million. ,
However, the apparent objectives of all par-
ties concerned still seem to be limited, despite
the current furor about alleged "escalation."
, Consider the Communist side.
Officially, the Red troops are Pathet Lao, or
Laotian Communists nominally headed by
Prince Souphanouvong, a half-brother of Pre-
mier Souvanna Phouma. Actually, most of the
combat forces are North Vietnamese, and
Hanoi exercises tight control over all Pathet
Lao actions. Of the 14,000 troops who recently
captured the Flame des Jarres (named for an-
cient burial urns found there) some 70% are
i Into Another Vietnam . 'diem out of that country.
?And some distraught Senators and Con-
gressmen, though sincerely concerned about
They Say Neither Side Plans
Expansion; Debate Is Seen'
Aimed at Pressuring Nixon
But U.S. Involvement Is Wide
By ROBERT REATLEY
Staff Saporta>. of THU WALL STREET JOURNAL.
WASHINGTON?"Once again, we seem to
:be heading down the same tragic road of esca-
lation. ... Once again, the American Govern.
ment seems to be trying to hide from the
American people the extent of our involvement
there."
, The speaker is Sen. Frank Moss, not nor-
mally outspoken on foreign affairs, and the
'subject is Laos?more a geographic whim than
a nation?whose fragile neutrality has been
marred by gunfire' ever since the 1962 Geneva
, conference supposedly established peace. The
Utah Democrat, like many of his Capitol Hill
colleagues these days, fears the Nixon Admin.
istration may sneak this country into anothet
'frustrating Asian war (much as critics charge
the Johnson Administration did in Vietnam)
,while pretending that nothing much is really
happening.
Quite bit, in fact, is happening in Laos.
But chariceseof Laos becoming "another Viet-
nam"--tritit U.S. ground troops slogging after,
an elusive enemy?seem extremely remote to
reott analysts here, despite considerable and'
ntinuing U.S. involvement there,
No Big Battles
, Officials who worry about Laos flatly reject
predictions that big battles involving Ameri-.
cans are coming in that odd mountainous King-
dom of the Million Elephants and the Royal
White Parasol (its official title). Talks with in-
formed sources lead to these conclusions:
?The Communists, who have just recap-
tured the Plaine des Jayvee (usually labeled
"strategic") and restored battle linen roughly
to 1082 positions, have about halted their south-
westward offensive, though some small-scale
sttacke continue nearby. Instead of moving on,.
most units are resting, regrouping end trying
to mend their overextended supply lines, which
are being blasted by U.S. and Laotion planes.
, ?More important, according to U.S. ana-
lysts, Communist troops don't seem interested
in puehing much further. For political and mili-
tary reasons, Hanoi apparently has no plans to;
i,tise its 60,000 or so soldiers in Laos to over-;
throw the official government or to grab addle
Moroil chunks of real estate, even though the,
111-led troops of Laos' opium-trading, tennis-,
'playing generals probably couldn't stop them if
,they tried. 1
?Secret American sUpport, essential tol
Atakao_mountain tribeemen -atm, Eclindeatine
Ap prove a For Release
CHINA
?
Oe.
4,s
THAILAND
0 100 200
, Miles
citmvopi
Nrivoh'
said ta be North Vietnamese; Hanoi's men
comprise the fighting units while the Pathet
Lao natives serve largely as coolies.
A
Hanoi was obviously upset by Gen. yang
Pao's unexpected seizure of the plain last fall;
' huge Red arms caches were uncovered, includ-
the possibility of an escalating Laotian war, ing aging Russian tanks and trucks. Thus, aim-
may have other motives for speaking out. By pie revenge was one motive for the recent
complaining about Laos, critics of the Vietnam, Counterattack. But rather sophisticated politi-
war can revive public concern about Asian con- Cal reasons seem more important to most ana-
filets, perhaps hoping to speed troop withdraw- lysts here.
The plain is traditionally the stronghold of
team from suddenly Seeking some illusory
"neutralist" forces who form one part of the
"victory" over Saigon's foes. .iofficial tripartite government established in
.All this indicates that big-time war in Laos
1962. Rightists and Communists are the other
isn't likely. The Communists aren't seeking it,
factions. However, the neutral forces have split
the Americans want to avoid it and many era-
into "our" neutralists and "their" neutralists,
ics here don't really expect it. The current up-
with the Plaine des James campaign having
roar, for most parties concerned, is largely a
put "their" neutralists firmly in charge.
complex political and propaganda exercise di- .
Thus, if and when another peace ,conference
rected toward the iVetnam war and an even-
is held for Laos the new government could be
ala from Vietnam or at least to deter the Nixon
Wel settlement there.
This doesn't moan there is no bloody fight-
composed of American-backed Premier Sou-
ing in Laos; many bedraggled Laotian troops, vanna's men, Hanoi-dominated Communists
Hanoncontrolled "neutral" representa-
who would rather be back home at village fairs and
tives. This w.ould insure that a future govern-
without any clear idea what the shooting pursuing food and girls, are being killed daily
in all nient would be subservient to North Vietnam,
about. And yesterday the U.S. Embassyin and would make much easier a possible total
Laos confirmed that the first American known' take-over by the Reds some day.
to have died during the Plaines des Jarres Creating a Dilemma
campaign was J. C. Maerkl, a civilian hell- Other motives also seem to guide the Corn-'
copter pilot from Fort Worth, Texas, was ,munists. The Americans must "first of all, stop
killed by a sniper while flying a supply mi-using the U.S. Air Force to bomb Laotian terri-
sion there. ;tory," demanded an official North Vietnamese,
Moreover, the Nixon Administration, like foreign ministry statement last week. But
the Johnson, Kennedy and Eisenhower regimes many in Washington believe Hanoi isn't weep.
before it, has been deliberately misleadingein for its Laotian allies; it really wants a.
about the extent of U.S. involvement in Laos. '1)
It's known that the Central Intelligence Agenc
finances a "secret war" of sorts there. Ex- .Vietnam. ?
Green Berets in mufti train and sometimes ;. This thearyhends that the :Plaine "Oa 30.rree,
.command anti-Communist Laotian force's, ,n,'-iniutkan; .plua other. Redpressures, is an en,
mbing halt along the Ho Chi Minh trail,'
inch funnels men and material into South
1151117
,
a: nmegfpifirin g15.4140.66-milise drip& Souvanne. into icalle:
continu
ing off AnAlp pcdved ForoReteate
him for an en of the bombing raids would cre-
ate a dilemma for the Nixon Administration.
It could agree, making Red resupply in South
Vietnam infinitely easier, or it could reject the
appeal and bomb a friendly nation whose gov-
ernment wants a halt.
Propaganda considerations are also impor-
tant to the Communists. Hanoi has renewed
war fear in the U.S. by demonstrating that its
forces can go anywhere in Laos they desire de-
spite American-backed efforts to thwart them.
One goal is probably to pressure Mr. Nixon
into making new concessions in search Of Viet-
nam peace,
However, all these stop short of any Com-
munist attempt to take over Laos. North Viet-
nam still- pays lip service to the Geneva ac-
cords that, established the tripartite govern-
ment and declared it neutral. Presumably, Ha-
noi's leaders 'keel this oft-violated agreement
may still prove Useful some day when peace
treaties are written for both Laos and South
Vietnam.
Unpredictable Americans ?
In addition, an element of fear probably re-
tards the North Vietnamese advance in Laos;
they just don't know what the unpredictable
Americans will do next. Analysts here doubt
that Hanoi expected U.S. bombing raids follow-
ing the Gulf of Tonkin incident of 1964 or Amer-
ican troop deployments in the south a year
later. A big push in, Laos could trigger yet an-
other "irrational" American response, in their
view, even including bombing of Hanoi itself.
Also, the Comniunists may be worried about
continuation of aid from Russia. The Soviet
Union recognizes the Souvanna government
and, with the Americans, occasionally exerts
pressure to settle internal political disputes.
For Moscow, this is a rather comfortable sta-
tus quo that diminishes Communist Chineie in-
fluence. The Russians probably wouldn't cut
off their considerable arms-aid if Hanoi upset
the balance in Laos, but the North Vietnamese'
may not be entirely sure, say analysts here.
If this leaves North Vietnamese objectives
somewhat limited, the same is even more true
for the Americans.
The U.S. hope is that Laos can somehow re-
turn to obscurity, Serving mainly as a rugged,
buffer between Communist North Vietnam and
China on one side and the U.S. ally of Thailand
on the other. The country is largely a product
of whimsical French colonial mapmakers; it
has few claims to nationhood such as ethnic or
linguistic unity, or a viable economy. Smug-
gled gold and opium are the main exports; the,
Laotian finance minister some time ago told a
visitor things had improved because his col-
leagues were only stealing enough state funds
to eat and not enough to get rich (if that doubt-
ful claim was ever ,true, there has been a re-
lapse since then, according to all reports). ?
?00111031041,3:061AuRDP'801-041601R000700050001-2
'trouble, analysts say.
One example of a tactic abandoned: Thai
?
artillery units financed by the Americans
fought last year as Laotian troops, in clear via,
lation of the Geneva accords. However, they
have been removed. If Thai troops had been
captured by the Communists, a major political
uproar could have ensued. Hanoi's allies would
Aurely display such prisoners and give maxi-
mum publicity to such an obvious infraction of
the Geneva agreements?giving the U.S.
?major headache.
However, some Thais still fly Royal Laotian.
Air F'orce planes, it is claimed, and others per=
form technical tasks. For this and other rea-
sons, evert U.S. involvement is likely to con-,
tinue, And if the Communists do make some
unexpected push in Laos, a reflex reaction by
the Nixon Administration could at least tempo-
rarily enlarge the American role there.
But such a: move by the Administration isn't
considered likely, partly because Congress has,
grown so aroused about Laos. Says GOP Sen.
Charles Mathias of Maryland: "I was a mem- '
ber of Congress as we slid into Vietnam, and I.
didn't ask the questions then that I should.
have, and I can tell you that I am going to ask
them ,now."
Such hard questioning will make it difficult
for the White House to escalate in Laos even if
it wants to. The Senate yesterday afternoon?de-
voted considerable time to dire warnings about
the consequences of --U.S. actions in Laos. In a
National Press Club speech 'tomorrow, Demo-
cratic Sen.' Edmund Muskie of Maine is 'ex-
pected to attack Nixon_prtlicy.on both Vietnain'
anti LaTI
Military Credibility
Thus, the U.S. will continue to bankroll
Prince Souvanna and his government, and
Gen. Vang Pao's tribal army will continue to,
get American air support and arms, by all ac-'
counts-The justification is that this prevents a
rout by,. Hanoi and gives the Laotian regime
flame triilltdry credibility.
But it's claimed that senior officials here'
s.13 4-hard questions whenever worried hawks'
ettand "action" against the Reds in Laos.
,What will it accomplish, and where will It lead
us? thc skeptics demand: Hence the U.S.-
passes up or abandons nurp,s, that, might have
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
WASHINGTON
DAILY NEWS
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: C1/4411M90001601
Fulbright quotes 'high administration aide'
Los more vit 1 VI
J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., says a high
'official in the Nixon Administration has told
'the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Laos
is even more important to the United States
than Vietnam.
In a senate speech yesterday, Sen. Ful-
'bright, committee chairman, said it "scares
'me to death. It suggests an ominous and dan-
gerous future for us in that remote country." ,1
' Sen. Fulbright declined to identify the offi-
icials. Richard Helms, CIA director, was before
the committee Monday but Sen.. Fulbright
gave no indication Mr. Helms was the man.
In other developments involving Laos:
? Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, testi-
fying before the House Armed Services Com-
mittee, said? "I can categorically state that
there has been no buildup of individuals, f
whether civilians or military, on the ground or
within the country."
? Sen. Stephen W. Young, D-Ohio, told the
Senate that U.S. defense contractors and gen-
erals "seemed to be leading us into another '
ground and air war in Southeast Asia." Sen.
Young said Laos is "certainly not worth the '
life of one American soldier."
? The State Department gave a "no com-
ment" to reports Laotian Premier Prince Sou-
vanna Phouma has asked for increased U.S.
(air support against North Vietnamese forces
In Laos.
The State 'Department said Sept. 24 there
.were about 2,100 Americans in Laos, including
500 U.S. Government personnel; 1,300 depen-
dants; 11 Fulbright scholars, businessmen and ?
newsmen; some missionaries, and a few mem-
hers of two foundations.
't The administration's apparent reasoning,
Sen. Fulbright said, is that if Laos falls, Thai-
land will be next. Ile said officials also were
'concerned Hanoi might threaten to wipe out
i the government Of Souvanna Phouma unless
he orders Americans to halt bombing of the Ho ,
Chi Minh trail that runs thru Laos, connecting'
the two Vietnams.
If this happens, the administrftion was said
to fear, Hanoi would be free to infiltrate as
many men and supplies as needed into South
Vietnam and severely , retard U.S. troop with-
drawals.
ab Sen. Fulbright Said all this:dimiovatdatesaliev.
"fragility", of the administration's vietnarniza-
?
tion program to end gradually American parti-
cipation in the war. ' ?
The real U.S. concern, Sen. Fulbright said,
"is thefl power of mainland China, or more
accurately the extension of that power beyond
China!s borders." He said It was in the nation-
al interest to deal with Chinese "hostility" to-
ward the U.S. but "fighting wars in peripheral,
insignificant countries is certainly:riot the best
way to do this." 111PD
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
STATINTL
VA?IiiNtiTON STAR
4 ,
Approved For Release 2-001434 ;19781A-RDP80-016
U.S. aids the Key,
I Souvanna sserts
?
'
VIENTIANE, Laos (AP)-.-Laos would be taken ovet by (Monday in the far southern
North Vietnam if U.S. air strikes were halted, says Laotianlreathes of Laos near the border
Premier Souvanna Phouma. iwith South Vietnam and Ci
"It is the duty of the United States to protect us because, like bodia._ The attackers, officials
other nations which signed the Geneva accords, it must assure the said, used a flame trtTOWer aria ?
independence, territorial integr ty and neutrality of Laos," he bazookas and knocked out the :
said. post's communications shack in
Souvanna made the comment yang Pao Doesn't Attend the first salvo.
in an interview with the Colum- Souvanna and his military A report from Saigon NM, ;
bia Broadcasting System, a commanders were said to have meanwhile, that waves of car-
transcript of which was released agreed to press more noncom- r i e r -b a s e d U.S. Navy jets'
by the Lao government yester- battant soldiers into service in 'bombed the Ho Chi Minh Trail
day. the front lines to alleviate a last night and today in cantina;
Souvanna denied any know], manpower shortage. lag strikes in southern Laos.
edge of U.S. B52 raids in Laos Gen. yang Pao, whose Amen- U.S. communiques said the '
and refused to comment on the can-supported clandestine army Navy jets from carriers on Yen.
activities of the U.S. Central In- has done most of the fighting kee Station flew no missions in
telligence Agency in Laos. against the North Vietnamese Vietnam for the second time in
Asked about the extent of U.S. around the Plain of Jars, -did not three days. Official sources re-
military involvement in Laos, attend the session as is his habit ported they were all busy bomb
Souvanna said: "When the need with such high-level talks. mg instead in Laos.,
is felt, we ask for supplies.. We Van Pao's army is now corn- The Navy jets have teamed
also ask for American air inter- posed of about 6,000 people ? with Mr Force B52s in
vention to watch the infiltration many youths about 15 years of the:. gp.skii,,m*, . .. ,
age.
The general was reported to
be too busy with tactical duties
to fly to Vientiane yesterday.
There was no word on his recov-
ery from what were described
He said he had asked for more
the North Vietnamese," 1 as minor head injuries suffered
American aid, mainly rifles, ti in a plane crash Saturday.
replace obsolete ones now used 1 Lao Outposts Fall
by the Lao army. ?
We still have World War II Since the North Vietnamese'
carbines, Garand rifles and so took the Plain of Jars and
on. Yet the enemy has terrible Muong Soul, there has been a
fire power with its Al?47s,," he relative lull in the area of the
said. plain, although the Reds are
Souvanna said he would ask continuing to build up their sup..
for still more aid "if necessary." plies of food and ammunition.
, "I think the United States In southern Laos, however,
:Should agree to increase the aid Laotian military officials said
we have received and which two government outposts were
we need," he asserted, captured by the Reds?one Mon-
Souvanna said. North Vietnam day, the other early today.
had always "wanted to dominate One high-ranking o f f 4 c 1 a I
us." He said he was not afraid called tie increase of military
that Laos would become another activity in the panhandle"of
Vietnam. very great concern," perhaps a
"That's v.by I opposed the in- diversion from the Plain of Jars.
troduction of foreign troops into The camp captured this morn-
our country," he said. ing was situated 15 miles south
Government informants said, of Thakkok on the 'border with
meantime, that Souvanna told Thailand. Three Laotian army
his military commanders yester- trucks were reported destroyed,
day he thought the Communist but there were no accounts of
aim was to recapture all the,ncasualties. ,
land they held when the 1962 A delayed report said Northl
Geneva convention d e c 1 a r e d vietwipst troops had &dyed,
Laos neutral, United Press In. ,t,amatvaatav at valotam
terhationakrePorted-. ?.? a,a ?
..?i
routes and bomb the invatlers.",
He said that without U.S. air
support "the entire country will
become Communist?the entirej
country will be taken over by,
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
wk,sallitapta Witt
Approved For Release 20041M4tIA-RDP80-01 6
STATI NT
Fulbri2ht
'Scared' by
Laos Talk
Sen. J. William Fulbright,
D-Ark., says that high-ranking
Nixon administration officials
;have indicated that they consid-
er Laos even more important
,than Vietnam.
. "The fact that high officials of
1 the administration thinks this
scares me to death,' Fulbright,
chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, said yes-
terday. "It suggests an ominous
, and dangerous future for us in
that remote country."
Fulbright &lined to identify
jwhat officials he meant, but The
Associated Press reported he
was referring to a high State
Department official who twice in
recent weeks made the argu-
ment in conversation with com-
mittee members.
I"The government of the United
States may soon have to de-
cide whether to .go all the way in
Laos ? that is, to make it an-
other Vietnam ? or to get out,"
Fulbright said.
Asks 'Close Hard Look'
"If Vietnam was important
enough to justify the commit-
ment of half a million American
troops, then in their view, how
many more could justifiably be
committed in Laos, which is one
of the few worse places tha Viet-
nam to fight a war?" he said.
Calling it "wildly absurd" to
say that Laos and Vietnam, sin-
gly or together, have the capa-
bility of harming the United
States, Fulbright said that the
time has come to take '"a close
hard look" at the American in-
terest in Laos.
The Senator referred to an ar-
*le by George Sherman which
bpparedi.44510 AinclaAtglo
calling it "molt
Fullbright, who placed his state-.'
ments and The Star article in
the Congressional Record, indi-
cated he believed the story pre-
sented insights into administra-
tion views of Laos.
"For the first time, American
bombing of the Plain of Jars is
explicitly related to American
bombing of the Ho Chi Minh
Trail, but in a most curious
way," he said. ;
Cites "A Suspicion"
"On the one hand, we are told
that bombing in the north?
which, be it noted, did not pre-
vent a Communist takeover of
the Plain of Jars?has already
diverted planes from attacks on
the Ho Chi Minh trail," Ful
bright said.
"On the other, hand" he said,
"we are told that if we do not
prevent a Communist victory in
the north?presumably by more
bombing?then we will have to
stop bombing the trail anyway.
Ftirther, Fulbright said, the;
adininistration view appears to
be that if American air strikes
against the Ho Chi Minh Trail'
are stopped, then hopes for Viet.'
namization will be destroyed. ,
: ,"This confirms a suspicison
may of us have had about the
fragility .o.C.Afie policy of Vietor
uaraizatioine.mi
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
101.
CtIAPI,kEiTON, W. VA. STATINTL
GAZETTE MAR 3 10,7ri
ApprovectFA9f4MIE 2001/63Y04 : CIA-RDP8Q-01601
S - 106,775
Editorials?
There Must Be No Delay
In clearing Us Laos Role
1 West Virginia's Sen. Robert C. Byrd, ment saying "the American mission haj
the No. 3 man in the Senate's majority lost any interest in helping out the pres
leadership, was absolutely right in call- whatsoever because of what happene
? log on the government to reveal the full this afternoon."
extcnt of this country's involvement in While influential members of the Sen-
Laos?a situation that could well lead to ate?including Majority Leader Mike
? another Vietnam in Southeast Asia. Mansfield, Stuart Symington, Frank
Byrd, whose stature and conservative Church and Albert Gore, as well as
viewpoint should add to the effectiveness Republicans Charles Percy, John Sher-
of his petition, thus joins a growing man Cooper and Charles Mathias?have
group of senators?mainly liberals but been unable to break the veil of secrecy
including both Republicans and Demo- imposed by the White House, the Penta-
crats?in demanding that the Nixon ad- gon and the State Department, there Is
ministration disclose what Sen. Frank growing evidence we are getting more
Church, D-Idaho, described as a need for and more deeply involved. .
1 "the truth and the whole truth" on U.S. In the growing military activity, CIA
, activities in LaoS.
t agents directed Gen. yang Pao's opera-
So far, the administration has been so tions and U.'S. fighter-bombers based in
i secretive, evasive and misleading about Thailand bombed North Vietnamese and
1, what we're doing in Laos that Sen. Pathet Lao forces. And on Feb. 18, for
i- Albert Gore, D-Tenn., has suggested we the first time in the history of the
may be in violation of the 1962 Geneva Laotian war, U.S. B52s flying from
Agreement tuaranteeing Laos' neutrality Guam and Okinawa were reported bomb-
and a big power hands-off. ing Communist forces in the Plain of
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, Jars. The American and French news-
for example, has assured Congress that? men who got to the Long Cheng base
President Nixon would not send ground reported seeing more than 50 armed U.S.
' troops to fight in Laos 'without the con- ? personnel U.S. Air Force helicopters and
, sent of Congress.
' Yet, CIA agents, former Green Berets,
and ilTiltt'arrwa-dvisers" are falling over
? themselves in Laos, causing Sen. Charles
i Mathias Jr., R-ML, to charge that "du-
bious disguises" are being used in Laos
i and "each one subverts the constitutional
i powers of the Congress."
I "Can the reservation of warpowers to
Athe Congress be circumvented by rede-
signating soldiers as agents of the Cen-
ral Intelligence Agency or as military
advisers?" Mathias asked?and it is per-
tinent to point out that this is precisely
how we got so deeply involved in the
mess in Vietnam.
Carrying the pretense still farther,
President Nixon takes comfort in charg-
ing that a big difficulty in Vietnam is the
credibility gap of prior Democratic ad-
ministrations. The Prpsident is correct in In the face of our sad experience in
accusing his Democratic predecessors of Vietnam?and the signs Of a parallel
a credibility gap?but never has there adventure in Laos?the Nixon adminis-
been such a credibility gap as now exists tration, as Sen. Byrd suggests, owes a
in Laos. full explanation. We also should act
One thing about Vietnam is . that it promptly on Sen. Mathias' call, support- i
always has been given full news cover-. ed by Sen. Mansfield, for a reconvening '
age?by newspapers, press associations, of the 1962 Geneva Convention on Laos, 1
television, radio and the news magazineswhich produced the "neutralization" of.
??but newsmen in Laos have been sub- the country, to settle the situation. And,'
ijected to all kinds of obstacles. . as Sen. Cooper proposes, the congression-
Indeed, when three Western newsmen al prohibition against funding of any U.S.',I
made their way to the, government base ground comhat troops in either Laos or
at Long Cheng?where they reported Thailand should be extended to air, na-
rA
A pprovedVoinfrintingf*br if t 01, EV& Ii 94474119 4 0 0 01-2
imrrottleclia
.by Laotian army troops, and the 'U.S. , repetition or the mistakes of our. Viet-
ambassador W.. Yteutiene. issued.* stste,.... _nliMega.1111114valiuut?
U.S.-made planes during a two-hour stay
in the camp.
As Mathias pointed out, these activities
would appear to "clearly violate the
spirit" of two congressional actions last
year: the "National Commitments Reso-
lution" requiring specific Congressional
approval for every new engagement of
American troops abroad, and the Coop-
er-Church amendment to the Defense
Appropriations Act, which prohibits fund-
ing of any IL S. ground combat troops in
either Laos or Thailand. Also, since the
U.S. has no treaty commitments in Laos,
this also appears to be in conflict with 1
the "Nixon doctrine," which calls for a
reduced role for U. S. forces in Asia
consistent with. the keeping of our treaty
commitments.
ino
,14,1,1111'1171 1
NEWSDAY Approved ForlRelease 2001/03/04 : OMTRIDINP101601R
E - 427,270
CARDN CITY, N.Y.
MAR 3 1970
Combined News Services 1
Washington--Senate Democratic- Leader Mike 1
Mansfield (D-Mont.) charged yesterday that Amer-
ica is "up to our necks" in Laos and the presence .--
there of U.S. forces "cannot be camouflaged any
longer."
"The thine is short; the time is now to face up to
.
the implications of this worsening situation In Laos,"
/
' Mansfield said in the Senate after CIA Director
? Richard Helms testified before a closed session of the
Senate Foreign Relations (1ommittee: ?
Incredible that a 'great nation such as ours?Could be ---
waging a major Military, operation in. a foreign
country without the knowledge of either its citizens or
its Congress,"
He charged that there has been an increasing
, buildup of American airpower, advisers and CIA op.
? eratives. "Our 1,r-worm-mt.?And the Laotian govern-
ment?nas? a' deliberate policy . designed to prevent'
Mansfield's feats were echoed today by Set7 either the press or. the Congress from learning thei
?
nature and extent of American involvement in Laos,"
George S. McGovern D-S.D.), who said in a pre- he said.
ivied Senate speech, "In spite of the painful lessons
? But at least one Laotian official reportedly feels
that the U.S. involvement is too restOctetl. The News
Yor" -";mes said today that Laotian Maj. Gen. Tiaot
has complained that U.S. aerial support
has been denied his forces in northern Laos because!
the U.S. has put the area off limits to its bombers.
Sayavong and the four other commanding gen-
n- erals of the military regions in Laos have been sum.
moned to an emergency meeting today in Vientiane
by Premier Prince Souvanna Phouma, informed gov7j
ernment sources said last night. ? ?
..,.,,wered yes when asked if the situation is becoming -1
more critical in Laos, and Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D- t Across the border in South Vietnam, American B--
Ark.), said that he was "extremely apprehensive." '1,A, 52 bombers rained tons of explosives yesterday on the
? Mekong Delta's Seven Mountains region. The jets,
am going to do everything I can to try to persued..'
11, pounded staging and storage enclaves in four missionst
the zfiministration of the dangers of increased ;W.I.-
: .about eight miles from the Cambodian border. Dam-i
? age assessments were not disclosed.
I
, Elsewhere, three more American helicopters were
lost. One American Pilot was killed when a helicopter:
ferrying Korean troops developed engine trouble and
1. crashed. The two other helicopters were shot down,
but all of the crewmen were rescued, a U.S. spokes-
..man said. : ,
On the political front, Et .Vietnamese military court.
? Vietnam, we are going down the same road in ,
or, and we are doing it in secret."
McGovern challenged the administration to dis-
ose its policy in Southeast Asia, called for a full-
Senate debate, and said that the public should
? be told the nature and scope o; 'be U.S. involvement.
Others who expressed fears about tsos after lisle
g to Helms were Sen. Albert Goic I D-Tcno.),who
:;.. " Fulbright said.
Fulbright saki !-.9 did not believe that Presidolt
Nixon wants any greatef involvement. But there
danger, Fulbright said, that the U.S. will be drawn
into greater fighting.
Mansfield said, "The danger of Nir nverextuuled
corsnament in Southeast Asia needs !n coris;01-
Fred frankly and without delay. We are ty,.+1.1 in it?
North Vietnamese and Americans?and we in it
? recessed ,until tomorrow the trial of National Assem-
up to our necks. The involvement is so transparent. on
both sides as to make less than useless the effort to )31Y,man Tran Ngoc Chau on .charges. of -pro-Commu:
maintain the fiction of the (Geneva) accord or even
nist'activity after, his three attorneys; boycotted the:
to exchange charge and counter-charge of violations." ,Iiiriice.'ec,lings and two other Isiwyeriiviueed .to. lake the;
Mansfield said that a close U.S. connection with
'14416.40.414.jjAt' .41/4111:8?VLUINala
"cA . v ? ?
Laotian government forces had resulted in "a fur-
ther 'American wition' of the war in Laos . . . which
seems to be r,-,..d.ching the effort to `Vietnamize' the
hituotion-in South Vietnam. if the military--seCH:n.
goes down in Vietnam only to rise in Laos, our
situation will not have improved; it will, have wor-
.-sened," he said. Mansfield called for a new conference
of parties to the 1962 Geneve accord- and suggested
that the scope be widened. ?
McGovern, in his speech today, said, "We not only
do not know the truth about our heavy involvement
in Laos, but we are increasingly in the dark about:
what is really go;ng on in _Vicpsam._ It. abr.oluttly_
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2 4
3
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-R61340T-K6
tolIPAII, FLA.
I HERALD
MAR 3 1970
Li - 375,469
468.1.67
lip to I ur Necks'
In. Laps--Mansfield
Mik erold-WeihInefon Post Why.
WASHINGTaVY-;! Senate Majority Leader Mike Mans-
field (D., Mont.). said. Monday that the United States ,is in- ,
;,volved militarily in Laos "up to our necks" and that the pres-
ence there of American forces "cannot be Camouflaged ? any 1
i???? ? t'.? longer. , "---
:I.,'? ?II, 0 ' ..,,,,, 0 . Mansfield and other critics' V
. .
.;,. 041 4 . of the U.S. involvement in :
Southeast Asia spoke after
1' ' ?CI.4.._Director Richard Helms
irv ,."Tistified in a closed session of 1
i/- ' ? . the Senate Foreign Relations,'
? : Committee. , ?
I.' ' ' 1
;,? . ALTHOUGH HELMS was
called to testify on the need
? .;,/,*.(1*:, for expansion of the Safe-'
i''? guard anti-ballistic missile
i ? . system, many of the questions
!.: dealt with the scope of U.S.
activities in Laos, according
to senators who were present..1
Sen. Mansfield "There wals some considerable 1
i . . . 'corral involvemene discussion on it," one said. ?
Sen. Albert Gore (D , ?
Tem) said that after hearing Helms he Was "more concerned,
i. now than I was before the meeting.", Committee Chairman J.
William Fulbright (D., Ark.) said he wa.S "very .afraid we are
gradually being sucked into a new Vietnam-type war.".
F Mansfield, in his strongest statement on the shadowy .
:U.S. presence in Laos, Urged the President and Congress to -:
'Tether the "open-ended military involvement in a part of
tthe world which is not directly vital to our security." ?,
In a speech on the Senate floor, Mansfield said: .4
4 "Notwithstanding the Geneva accord of 1962, the North 4
IVietnamese are deeply, involved in this military situation. So,.
' too, is the United States. Press reports indicate that the Thais;
I
:',may also be engaged.
1 ,
`!. "THE INVOLVEMENT is so transparent on both sides as
'
Lthe.'to make less than useless the effort to maintain the fiction of .
. accord or even to exchange charge and counter-charge of '
violations. We are. both in if? North Vietnamese. and Amen-'
cansItlut-51.MitABS.20/9.111r..SPLI,Si4.
5
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
Ppown For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601
E ? 209,023
EXANITNER & CHRONICLE
S ? 648.231
UAR 3 33111
et-FT
RR? "
.4_1E01
STATI NTL
gents s,
is w, Admit
By John Wallach .
Examiner Washington Bureau
? WASHINGTON --Adminis-
/tration officials privately
V 'conceded 'today the Central
Intelligence Agency is in-
volved in military operations
in Laos against the Commu-
nist Pathet Lao.
But the officials denied re-
ports that perhaps as many
as a thousand civilian agents
were helping to train the ir-
regular army of
adti-
Communist Meo tribesmen.
They said that at the most
there are a hundred intelli-
gence agents in the belea
guered Asian kingdom.
This disclosure was
prompted by a Pentagon ad-
mission yesterday that two
civil ians were among the
regular 'U.S. military person-
nel feared dead or missing in
Laos. ; ' ?
? l?
. 2 Civilians
?
According to the American'
Embassy in Vientiane, there
are 2350 Americans in Laos
?? 833 U.S. government ern,.
ploYes and the .rest'depentl-?
ents. ,Thitt? clops not inchide
A Penfi'gon spokesman re- ma rogiat ?
fused to confirm whether the
fwo civilians, later identified
as intelligence agents, werel
originally included in the 193
airmen acknowledged last'
week as missing.
But the s p0 e s.m an dis-1
closed that one of the civil,1
ians was seen being captured:
and presumably is still alive.'
Defense Department sourceg!
said they will release thel
,names of the two men in the
next few days. ?
? T h e acknowledgement of,
the CIA role in Laos, an open1
secret for several years, is
evidence of the difficulty the
.U.S. government is having.
keeping confidential the na-
ture and extent of American
involvement.
Coalifcting Versions .
' In the apparent absence of;
a uniform White House direc-.!
tive on what is public and
what private, State and'De-
AfrOveduRdriiRleleatO 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
g
citing conflicting ver..
slow; of what they, assert is for three to six-month tours .4
(he situation. of duty, or .CIA men who '!
? ?i
Last Week, the ? Pentagon c o mm u t e back and forth
disclosed. the United :Stt?tes from a border viii a g e in
had lost 193 servicemepOnce
1961. Yesterday, . a Defense The United states has at. 'I
Department .spokesman cor- tempted to cloak its activi-:.
rected the record to reflect, ties in Laos because the 1962 ?
that loss since .1954; ? aNGeneva Accords, which pro-
three-year mistake in borne-. bided for, Laotian nentrality,-
body's figuring. prohibited the introduction of
State Department Officials foreign:Y4?9.P.8,Pb ,4Y. ca. Pa
? ek
are so concerned about fig?
ures leaking out that the Lao- ?
Thailand.
tian desk officer refuied to ?
confirm a figke use by a
senior department official in '
public testimony before a:
cpgressional subcommittee..
2350 Americans
.1. a.
?
t- ? -r? 11.." C. II - V. TrIr!7-1"
TIE VASUINGTON FOSS
3 MARIE()
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-016
Mai t s field
Cpu Laos: 'Up
To Our Necks'
By Richard Homan
wa%insinon rwit Mal f Writer
Senate Majority Leader
Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) said
yesterday that., the United
States is invol d militarily in
Laos "up to our necks" and
that the , Presence there of
American forces "cannot. be
camouflaged any longer."
? President Nixon has said
that American planes bomb
tthe Do Chi Minh Trail in
isouthern Laos but neither he
nor any other administration
official has revealed the U.S.
role in northern Laos beyond
saying there are no American
combat forces in the country.
From other sources, how-
In a speech on the Senate
floor, Mansfield said:
"Notwithstanding the Ge-
neva Accord of 1962, the North
Vietnamese are deeply in-
volved in this military sittta-
tion.
"So, too, is' the United
States. Press reports Indicate
that the Thais' may also be
engaged.
"The ,involvement ' is so
transparent on both skies as
to make less than useless the
effort to maintain the fiction
of the accord or even to ex-
change charge and counter-
charge of violations. We are
both in it?North Vietnamese
and Americans?and we are
ever, it is known that US. ?in it up .to our necks." .
military advisers have been Mansfield said that "what
with the Laos forces and that disturbs me is not only that
American aircraft have pro-. both' nations are forbidden by
vided those forces with tact-j the agreement to use forces in
ical support. . Laos but that the President
Mansfield and other critics has also made clear that he
of the U.S. involvement in does 'not desire to see U.S.
outheast Asia spoke after. forces used in Laos."
.CIA Director Richard Helms' - Mansfield said ho' has
t
- estified in a closed session , '"
I
"Ovary confidence in the Prost-
dent's intentions. Yet the pres-
t
itions Committee. the Senate Foreign Rein-
.
a
i Although Helms was called PP.,ce.,04.4. wrimmilAtary..adt.
to testify on the need for ex-
pansion of the Safeguard
'anti-ballistic missile system,
:many of the questions dealt
with the scope Of U.S. activi-
ties in Laos, according to I
:senators who were present.
"There was some considerable
discussion on it," one said.
Sen. Albert Gore (D-Tenn,) '
said that after hearing Helms?
,
he was "more concerned fowl .
than I was before the meet-
ting." Committee Chairman .J.1
'William Fulbright (D-Ark.)
said he was "very afraid we!
are gradually being sucked
Into a new Vietnam-type war."
Mansfield, in -his strongest.
statement on the shadowy
U.S. presence in Laos, urged
the President and Congress.to
"corral" the "open-ended mili-
tary involvement in a. part 'of
The world which is not directly
yital to,o4r il.c4r03'tl.. 21...,:uix.;1
STATI NTL
'visors' and others in Laos
cannot be camouflaged any
longer:" '
There are indications, he
said, that U.S. bombing in
Laos is heavier than it was in
North Vietnam "and that
there could now be as many as
20,000 sorties a.month."
He urged that the United
Sates "face up to the Implica-
tions of this worsening situa-
tion in Laos" and said the
"danger of our over-extended
commitment in Southeast Asia
needs to be considered 'frankly
and without delay."
Mansfield commended the.
proposal by Laotian Prince
Souvanna Phouma that a
meeting be called of the signa-
tories to the Geneva Accord
to work out a way to ,bring
stability to Laos.
State Department spokes-
man Robert McCloskey said
yesterday ; that the United
States would welcome infor-
mal consultations among the
14 member nations of the Ge-
neva Conference. ,
McCloskey made it dear
that, rather than a formal, con
United States had in mind in."
formal consultations which
are provided for by the agree-.
ment and which the various
signatories have used in the
past to discuss Laos.
Sen. Frank E. Moss (D-Utah
told the Senate he endorsed
Mansfield's' remarks and Sen.
Stephen M.' Young (D-Ohia'
said, "Laos is not worth th&
life of one American soldier-
. . . yet the fact is that our Ita
volvement recent :weeks,/
15.191.1k
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP50-01601R000700050001-2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04
mu
snsfiell
Seetate Majority Leader Mike
Ilansfield, deploying increasing
.military contlict in Laos, has
warned against extending U.S.
-; involvement.
"If the military seesaw goes
' down in Vietnam only to rise in
Laos, our situation will not have
improved. It will have wors-
ened," Mansfield said on the
'Senate floor yesterday.
One of a number of senators
expressing increasing concern
'over the 'sititatien in Laos, Mans-
field said that both the North
Vietnamese and Americans al-
ready. are involved "pp' to our
necks" in the Laotian conflict.
Meanwhile, Sen. J. W. Ful-
:bright, D-Ark., chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, said that he was "very
afraid we are gradually being
sucked into a new Vietnam-type
war in Laos."
Fulbright called use of U.S.
B52 bombers in Laos "certainly
an escalation of our role. He
said he plans to invite Secretary
of Defense Melvin R. Laird and
Secretary of State William P,
Rogers to testify on Laos and
the deepening situation there.
Sen. George S. McGovern,
D-S.D., called for a full-scale
'Senate debate on the situation,
and said the public should be
!told the nature and scope of the
!.U.S. involvement.
.Mansfield made his statement
V' ;Helms testified before a
closed-door session of the For-
eign Relations Committee. ?
? After listening to Helms, Sen.
LI
yes when asked if the situation
is becoming more critical in
Laos.
Mansfield, in his comments on
the Senate floor, urged support
for reconvening the 1962 Geneva
Conference that sought to guar-
antee neutrality for Laos.
Prince Souvanna Phouma of
Laos has requested that Britain
and the Soviet Union call the
1962 conference back into ses-
sion. The two nations co-chaired
the conference, which lead to
agreement by 14 nations, includ-
hig the United States and North
Vietnam, on stabilizing Laos.
Mansfield said that the scope
of such a new meeting might be
enlarged to include the situation
in all of Southeast Asia, with the
participation of other nations,
such as Cambodia and Thailand.:
"The time is short; the time is,
now to face up to the iroplica-1
tions of this worsening situationl
in Laos," Mansfield said. He as-1
serted that United States bombe
lag in Laos is reported to be
heavier than it was in North
Vietnam.
Mansfield ? said both North
Vietnam and the United States
are forbidden to use forces in
Laos. But, he said, the war.
"seems to be pouring out of
South Vietnam" into Laos and
the rest of Indochina.
Mansfield questioned h o w
deepening United States involve-
ment in Laos accorded with this
country's . "vital interest," with
the "Nixon Doctrine," which
calls for a reduction of U.S..for-
-All?atittrY.w.....11m1Y,M.W044
s
0-01601R0007000
STATI NTL
res La
,
AP)
with competing domestic priori-
ties.
"It needs to be recalled at this
time ... that the full scale U.S.
(involvement) evolved from
much s m a 110 r beginnings,"
Mansfield said. "I am sure the
President does not want that se-
quence to be repeated."
Sen. Harry F. Byrd Jr., D-Va.,
agreed with Mansfield that
"more tons of bombs" have
been dropped on Laos than on
North Vietnam. Byrd said the
American public should have
"all possible facts on the situa-
tion."
Despite efforts by senators to
secure release of a :censored
tr.4100PittA441i..0.441.
le
the administration so far has
refused to permit disclosure of
this information.
I further Senate floor com-
ment, Sen. Stephen M. Young,
D-Ohio,. called Laos "just about
the most underdeveloped coun-
try in the world." ,
"That country is certainly not
worth the life of one American
soldier," Young said, adding /
that the Central Intelligence
Agency, reported to be heavily
involved in Laos, is "a watchdog
that needs a master."
Young asserted that some of
the places bombed by B528 have
been up to 200 miles away from
the Ho Chi Minh trail, where
bombing has been . directed to
squeeze the flow of supplies to
the enemy in Vietnam: - '
Approved For Release 2991/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
?
RADIR TV pomPORTS. INC. STATI NTL
pprovea 1- or Release 2001/0,a/2eLleirvuuracw,
FOR
PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAM Capitol Hill Report
8TATINTL
STATION WRC Radio
DATE March 2, 1970 6:30 PM CITY Washington, DC
SENATE BRIEFING ON LAOS
WILLIAM LITTAUER: Central Intelligence Agency Director,
Richard Helms, held a secret meeting with members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Subcommittee. Participants in the meeting
later expressed extreme concern over the Laotian involvement.
Committee Chairman, William Fulbright, said he is very
afraid the United States is gradually being sucked into a new
Vietnam type war.
SENATOR WILLIAM FULBRIGHT: If we are determined to
disengage in Vietnam, then of course that leads to a similar
resolution in Laos. If the Vietnamization program is not designed
..,,Sopisengage in Vietnam, then. we become more deeply involved
Laos in protecting the involvement in Vietnam.
Subcommittee Chairman, Albert Gore, commented after the
meeting with Helms, he is now more concerned; and added Laos
is apparently outside the Nixon Doctrine.
Republican Representative Bradford Morse declared his
recent tour of Vietnam convinced him that the Vietnamization
??????
1
..,..6Pgriani,,E.car.,ftigam WA= 444 tailUliaRaaraltiOsIRA0117,0046000
.
CHI Ad?, ILL.
-ThiEskpproved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP
STATINTL
- 545,370
$ 712,175
MAR 2 1970
r/114":1:i
By Morton Kondracke ( If reports from other "informed sources"
Sun-Times Bureau are correct, the armed Americans in Laos are
.not "combat troops of the U.S. military," but
WASHINGTON ? "The United States has a former Army Green Berets employed by the
? small 'army' of armed Americans on the Central Intelligence Agency. They are in Lao
.ground in Laos at Long Chien, 15 miles south io "adViSe""Royal Laotian" forces in the war
of the Communist-held Plain of Jars... against the Communist Pathet Lao and in- ...a.;.`..g.4,. LI.,
? "Long Chien is an L-shaped canyon tucked an'
from North Vietnam.
away in the brush. One leg of the L holds an Then there is the matter of B-52 raids. For a
airstrip. The other leg holds a U.S. military long time, the United States did not admit
, headquarters . . .(with) American military that it was bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail,
t. barracks, all air conditioned.., the Communist supply route running through
"More than 50 Americans" were seen the southeast section of Eaos from North to
I. "some riding in Jeeps. All were armed with South Vietnam.
i M16 rifles And pistols, but dressed in civilian Now these raids are admitted, but bombing
On the 5,000 foot-long t a r m a c airstrip 1 flan -goy rn
e ment forces from overextending 4.
rclothes..
,,.
themselves, largely went by the board.". :) /
. f
;. (were) . . . aircraft bearing U.S. Air, Force i Allman wrote in September that "few non-' 'I
markings. There also were three U.S. Air I
1
Force Jolly Green Giants, the large helicop-
Laotian Vientiane observers expect these ma-
ter'st jor and unexpected victories to last" ? a pre-
Laos." N used for rescuing U.S. pilots downed over-I ,diction apparently in the process of con-
t', firmation now with Communist victories and
t. Phase of secret war In Laos 1:..the retaking of the Plain.
This is the best information now available ,
? to the U.S. public about one phase of the se- I ? The Manchester Guardian reported this
'from cret war in Laos. It certainly does not come weak that the war might escalate still further
with the United States turning the plain into a ;
It does not even come from persons who 11
the U.S. government. "freefire zone" ? an area of unrestricted :
\/
visited Long Chien, but from a reporter, Tam- -,* bombing by B-52s or planes of the CIA's Air'
' )
.my Arbuckle, who writes for the Washington ' America and Continental Air services.
' Star out of Vientiane. Aii aide to one senator on the Senate For-'4
t
eign. Relations Committee said he feared what
might happen if Communist troops ap-,
proached the Thai border, less than 100 miles
-
from the Plain of Jars. If Thai territory were ,
violated the United States might have to in-
Fri
r.1
41 rz
;
Arbuckle got the information from three
.other reporters who violated U.S.-Laotian se-
curity rules, walked 12 miles to the camp and
' were arrested for their pains. Their own re-
!ports have not yet been published in the
United States. ? ? tervene under the Southeast Asia Treaty. ,
; That is how it is with this war. Information Sen. Robert Byrd (D-W. Va.) reported last
'about it comes second or third hand, for ex- week that 25 Americans have been killed
ample, from "well-informed sources" who on the ground in Laos and 100 airmen, shot
"told Arbuckle that there are between 200 and ,, down on bombing runs, are dead or missing.
300 armed Americans in Laos. "Before these casualty figures rise fur-
No U.S. confirmation 4 ther," he said, "the American people should
This information cannot be confirmed from. 'be told the extent of our country's in-.
official U.S. government sources. Nor can it volvement in Laos."
be confirmed by members of Sen. Stuart Foreign Relations Committee sources sus-
Symington's (D-Mo.) subcommittee on U.S. pect that the Nixon administration Is trying to
commitments abroad. The Nixon adminis. ' test out "solutions", to "mistakes" it feels
tration will not let Symington release his pan- were made in Vietnam ? namely, that "sant- i
el's information. tary" air power should be relied upon rather
Nothing can be released on Long Chien or )..;.? than large numbers of ground troops and that -ft
armed Americans because the adminis.... the Public should not be told what is happen..?
tration's policy, in Defense Sec. Melvin R. I - ing for fear of arousing a controversy.;
"What they seem to be saying," said a coni-'Laird's words, is that "there are no ground
combat troops of the U.S. military in Laos at J.:-
mittee source, "Is, 'the public be damned, we
this time." professionals have things under control.' The 1
So far as is known. Laird is telling the ? problem is, is it eally under control? Does
truth' bul 14 tar' ir?nIthe L.. ground? Once start this secrecy business,'
. rum nounr Icnnw whnrct It antrIn_00 .
NMIN-RDFABOLOhleellk 0070005000datinued
truth. He isAppliqueghfion 20841011PCi4
? dRedit
. Does he even know what's going on on the
you
i" I It11.
STATI NT
Approved For ReleasR9t1Rsit94Apietacifi9Ozglgklizip0 S'2729
March 2, .1970
change our electoral voting system so
that the electoral votes in a given State,
which are based on the number of Rep-
resentatives in Congress that a State has,
be determined by congressional districts
rather than at large. The electoral votes
which represent the two Senators that
each State has must continue to be de-
termined by the total vote of a State.
At the present time a candidate for
President must get a majority of the vote ,
in a populous State or lose its entire
electoral vote. This might place a temp-
tation before candidates and political
parties to declare for plans and programs
not in the best interests of the entire
United States, but necessary in order to ?
reach a radical swing vote deemed nec-
essary to carry the State. If, on the other
hand, a populous State elects 30 or 40 or
more electors by districts, the party and
the candidate can strive to carry as many
districts as possible and obtain a sub-
stantial number of electoral votes -even
though they do not carry the entire
State. Such a procedure would not place
the temptation before the candidate to
make unwise or unrealistic promises for
fear of losing the total electoral vote in
a heavily populated States.
The election of presidential electors by
districts would also encourage the two-
party system. A candidate or a political
party could realistically make a drive to
carry a few congressional districts in a
State where they had little chance of
carrying the entire State because of past
one-party control. It could well be an
incentive for the building of a real two-
party system for every State in the
Union.
Mr. President, Mr. White's statement
that direct election of the President of
the United States is an invitation to na-
tional chaos is not an exaggeration. Why
should we make such a revolutionary
change when our present system has
worked so well and so long? Why should
we not be content with correcting our
. electoral voting system rather than junk-
ing it?
Already some people have advocated a
direct primary as a means for the parties
to choose their candidates for President.
If such a thing would happen, will an un-
limited number of candidates be allowed
to place their name on a nationwide pri-
mary ballot? Or should the number be
limited to five, 50, or 100? If there is a
limitation, who will decide what names
go on the ballot? Will the nominations
go to the candidates with the greatest
amount of money who can mount the
most massive high-powered advertising
campaign?
. It is true that the nomination of can-
didates for President by direct primary
is not before us. It will be -before us if
we make the tragic step of abolishing
our electoral voting system and turn to
the direct election of the President. We
should oppose the direct election of the
President because our present system
gives the greater protection to individual
citizens and to their liberties and in re-
ality gives the greater weight to their
expressed desire to whom should become
President.
Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. CURTIS. I am happy to yield to the direct election because I believe that
the Senator from Alabama. fully one-half of the Members of the
Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I would like Senate arc opposed to the direct system
to congratulate the distinguished Sena-
but they would be unable to agree on
tor from Nebraska on this excellent an- any substitute plan.
alysis of the problems having to do with For that reason, it seems likely to the
possible reform of our electoral college junior Senator from Alabama that there
and reform of the method of choosing will be no reform at this point. Does the
the President of the United States. Cer- Senator feel that that is a likelihood?
thinly I agree with the distinguished . Mr. CURTIS. I do. There are 34 of
Senator in his conclusion that the di- the 50 States that would be adversely
rect election is not the proper route to affected if we changed to the direct
go. I am impressed very much with his election of the President. I do not be-
statement that the route of direct dice- neve they such mandate from
tion of the President would be the begin- the people back home to lessen the
ring of the destruction of our Federal power of their sovereign States in choos-
sysern, which has worked so well for this Ing the President.
country for almost 200 years. Mr. ALLEN. The Senator's argument
Has the distinguished Senator given is that the voter in Nebraska wants to go
thought to the provision in the proposal to the polls feeling he is going to be a
that will soon be before the Senate that part of the Nebraska vote, and when the
permits a President by the direct elec- Nebraska vote is counted it will count
tion method to be chosen by a 40-per- for something because it will be repre-
cent plurality. Does the Senator think sented in the electoral vote of the State
that provision is in the public interest? of Nebraska. It will not be commingled
Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, I thank with 75 million other votes, and will be
the distinguished Senator for his corn- identified with that single State.
ment about my remarks. Mr. CURTIS. When I cast my vote in
As to the answer to the Senator's ques- Nebraska, it will not be buried under a
tion, I do not like that 40-percent pro- tombstone in Chicago.
vision. I believe, however, it tends to ob-
scure the real danger, which is the direct ?
election of the President. It is my hope ORDER OF BUSINESS
that those who advocate direct elee- The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HART
tion of the President will recall their ? in the chair). Under the previous order,
proposal, because if they insist on that the Senator from Montana is recognized
proposal there will be no reform in elec- for 15 minutes.
?toral voting. That would be unfortunate r.
because we should make at least two
reforms: First, to provide that we do LAOS
not have a system under which an elector Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
could substitute his judgment for that take the floor of the Senate at this time
of the people who voted a certain way because of the serious situation in Laos.
and who are entitled to have the elector I do so not to criticize, but, if possible,
vote that way; and second, ? the matter to be constructive, to be helpful, and to
of deciding tics. I think at the present wave a warning flag about this area
time this cannot be justified. We should which might perhaps be helpful in pre-
make some corrections there, but if venting our becoming involved too deep-
there is an insistence upon an amend- ly and in too costly a manner. When
merit to provide for the direct election speak of costly, I do not mean money
of the President going to the States there alone, but total cost, including man-
will be no reform whatever. power.
? I agree with the distinguished Senator Perhaps, the Pathet Lao and their
on the 40-percent minimum. I have North Vietnamese allies May stop the
changed some of my own thinking on offensive on the Plain of 'Jars, short of
that point in recent months because I the cities of Vientiane and Luang Pra-
felt we must concentrate on the larger bang; that would be in the pattern of
problem of the direct election system. previous operations. Then again, they
Mr. ALLEN. Is it not true that if there may push forward against these two
be fraud or corruption in the conduct capitals and press to the border of Thai-
of any election in any State, under the land. Only time will indicate what planS
present system that fraud or corruption and objectives may be involved. In any
would be sealed off into the particular event, the question of the "nonwar"
State involved, whereas, under the di- the "secret-war" or "interlude war" in-
' rect election system any fraud or cor- Laos cannot be avoided any longer. !
ruption would apply to the whole body Notwithstanding the Geneva accord of
or pool of votes of the entire country? 1962, the North Vietnamese are deeply
Mr. CURTIS. Counting the votes by involved in this military situation. So,
States, any corruption is quarantined, too, is the United States. Press reports
so to speak, and its effect limited to the indicate that the Thais may also be en-
wrong that might come in that particu- gaged. The involvement is so transparent
lar State. If it is all put into one pool on both sides as to make less than useless
there would be corruption in that pool. the effort to maintain the fiction of the
Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, the Sen- accord or even to exchange charge and
ator has made a great contribution to countercharge of violations. We are both
the debate on this subject. The fact in it?North Vietnamese and Amen-
that the Senator is opposed to the direct cans?and we are in it up to our necks.
system but would favor some other What disturbs me Is that It is not only
type of reform, I believe, foretells the that both nations are forbidden by the
defeat of the amendment providing for Geneva agreement to use forces in Laos
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
S 2742
J I kk I I IN I L
Approved For Release 201103/04; CIA-RDID.5a-.01.601R.
'CONG R P.S.SION A L 107AAJK ? bjliN
ever before. And finally, we're willing to be
judged by the results of our efforts.
Today I get special pleasure in discussing
this subject before a meeting of the Urban
League, That pleasure springs from knowl-
edge of the special, almost unique, role of
the League.
You will recall that I have dwelt on two
features that mark our approach to today's
problems. The first is moderation in style.
No florid rhetoric, no illusory promises. no
claim of heroics. The second is to point our
efforts toward results. Not to accentuate and
polarize differences, not to promote confron-
tations but rather to get things done?use-
ful, constructive things.
Now as I reflect on these approaches I be-
come aware they are In marked harmony
with approaches Used by the League over the
years. The League has always been a "doing"
organisation. The League maintains referral
and placement milts. The League provides
special counselling and community services.
And now the League operates donna of train-
ing programs, many like LEAP and Outreach
under the Department of Labor sponsorship.
So the League itself is highly "results-
oriented."
Through the years we have seen the League
? employ a reasoned, rather than a raucous,
voice. It has been strong and firm in its views
where others were merely strident. The
League knows that furor and frenzy can
never replace constructive action if real gains
are to be won.
? So I take special pleasure and extend spas
cial thanks to you for letting me discuss
these critical matters with you.
This morning I have often spoken In terms
of "problems." There is now occurring a
switch in phrasing deserving a high favor.
People increasingly refer to "problems" as
"opportunities." I like this. It has a positive
ring to it. A problem is something you try to
get out of the way. An opportunity is some-
thing you work at with zeal and inspiration.
Certainly that is how the matters I have dis-
cussed here this morning should be attacked.
I believe that Is the way the Urban League
is attacking their opportunities. I know that
is the basis-for our approach to them in the
Labor Department. As this concept spreads
among men of good will everywhere, the end
result Can only be real progress. And real
progress has become a tangible and achieva-
ble objective. Let's all work at It
Thank you.
LAOS AND VIETNAM
I ask unanimous consent that Richard
Wilson's column, entitled "Criticism Un-
likely To Sway Nixon on Laos Policy," be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
Cantons UNLIKELY To SWAY Nixos ore Laos
POLICY
(By Richard Wilson)
Another Vietnam in Laos? Well, hardly yet.
There is an important distinction between
the military operations of the Nixon admin-
istration in Laos and those in Vietnam.
If this distinction is not recognized then
It may as well be said that the President
of the United States is now and hereafter
precluded from effectively supporting the na-
tions of Southeast Asia in resisting external
aggression.
This is evidently the basic objective of
those in the United States Senate who now
are accusing the President of escalating the
war in Laos into another Vietnam.
This distinction between Vietnam and
Laos, however, is a working demonstration
of the kind of policy called for by the Nixon
Doctrine in lieu of the massive direct inter-
vention of U.S. forces in Vietnam. In Laos
we are training, equipping and advising a
clandestine native army and probably giv-
ing it air support without the direct In-
volvement in combat of American ground
? troops. That pattern undoubtedly would be.
followed in Thailand if the northern insur-
gency required it. It is the developing pat-
tern also in Vietnam, where It is called
Vietnamization.
Implicit in the gathering storm over Laos
is the basic question of the President's us-
ing these methods to preserve the political
integrity of independent governments in
Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand.
This is well understood in Congress. The
'Senate Foreign Relations Committee knows
what the Nixon administration is doing in
Laos and why it is doing it. The present
outburst arises mainly because a few news-
papermen have observed first hand what the
Foreign Relations Committee has known all
along was being done in Laos.
A visitor to Vientiane as long ago as three
years could readily see that the United States
was giving military support to the govern-
ment of Laos. There was no secret about teAl
The CIA was there. American military ad-
visers were there. They also traveled back
and forth between the American airfields In
the north of Thailand to Vientiane.
Investigators for the Foreign Relations
Committee have been supplied with a great
deal of information by State Department per-
sonnel on the operation in Laos, so much in
fact that there has been concern at the
White House over the leakage of military in-
formation that would be of benefit to the
North Vietnamese invaders.
Then why all the fuss? It arises because
this is considered the right time to under-
mine and reverse President Nixon's policy in
Southeast Asia. It finally is conning to be
realised that Nixon meant it when ho said
the United States wan not about to "bug out"
and that he intended to preserve the inde-
pendent political integrity of the nations of
Southeast Asia.
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, Columnist
Richard Wilson, writing in today's Wash-
ington Evening Star, details what he calls
"an important distinction" between U.S.
military operations in Laos and in 'Viet-
nam. That difference or distinction is
that in Laos, while we are training, equip-
ping, and advising a native army, and.
probably giving it air support, there is no
direct involvement of American ground
troops in combat. Indeed, the President
has assured Congress that none will be
sent to fight in Laos without its consent.
This is an important distinction which
does not preclude our Government's act-
ing to protect the integrity of Laos or
other threatened nations in Southeast
Thin only means that in a brief time Presi-
dent Nixon will take to the air waves again
to give a fuller explanation, hut no fuller
than is already known to the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, about what we are doing
in Laos, why It is in support of an independ-
ent government, why it protects our troops
In Vietnam and making it doubly clear, as
Secretary of Defense Laird already has, that
he hs z no intention of committing ground
combat forces.
If the President does not do this he will '
merely play Into the hands of those who sa.y
ho Is hiding his actions In the same decep-
tive way as Johnson, .
It is of even more substance that if the
President is driven off his policy in Lacon
then ho will have retreated from the aims
and objectives he has so often stated In the
Nixon Doctrine.
But there Is no present prospect that Nixon
will be driven elf his policy, certainly run long
an the North Vietnamese In In Lrution through
Lana to Vietnam continues.
One other aspect of this matter is impor-
tant. The President has assured Congress he
will not send ground troops to fight in Laos
without Congressional consent. If this assur-
ance Is to be taken literally the President
has gone a step farther than his predecessors
in recognizing congressional participation 1in
.
decisions on future military interventions.
That is not sufficient for the peaee group
In the Senate. Some of them had thought
that Nixon was moving toward a total pull-
Asia. out, regardless of the consequences, as a po-
The point which Mr. Wilson drives Mimi necessity. Now they see that this is not
home is that this policy is not news? son and Laos
thetyheobrsregifietnhtathasin committed
hmirtIthre
certainly not to the critics in Washing- a
United States to military support of existing
. ton. It is under attack, however, be- governments.
cause, to some, it appears to be a good tfixon also is being accused of duplicity and
time to undermine the President's policy of failing to hold the confidence of the Amor-
and forge a new policy of total disen- ican public by being little franker about nu
gagement. objectives than President Johnson, .
ON CRIME IN THE STREETS
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, in a
recent interview, an outstanding trial
lawyer, Edward Bennett Williams, ad-
dressed himself to the problem of crime
and the avenues for solution.
Although his remarks were made in the
context of the critical situation in the
District of Columbia, they are pertinent
and applicable to cities across the Nation
and of interest to all those concerned
with this national problem.
Mr. Williams states that our system
Is broken down in three places.
First, he asserts that the greatest de-
terrent to crime in the street is a visable
policeman and calls for more and better
paid policemen. For the quality and
quantity needed, a tnnssive Federal sub-
sidy to the cities is ii red.
Second, if punishment is to work as a
deterrent, it does not have to be severe
but it does have to be swift. When those
apprehended do get to court, the average
lawyer can keep his clients at liberty for
from 18 months to 2 years before a final
decision.
The whole criminal justice system must
be speeded up if it is going to work ef-
fectively. This too will take More funds.
ti
Finally, the prisons, instead of reha-
bilitating, have become breeding grounds
for crime.
I ask unanimous consent that the com-
plete article appearing in the Washing-
ton Post of February 28 be printed at this
point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD
as follows:
[From the Washington Post, Feb. 28, 19701
AN ATTORNEY'S Firm or TliZ DISTRICT or
COLUMBIA CRIME SITUATION
(Isiorc.?Trial attorney Edward Bennett
Williams, ono of a number of civic leaders
who have recently mot together In search of
new solutions to the problem of crime in
Washington, was asked about some of his
conclusions In a recent Interview with Joseph
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
"11
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160
LINCOLN, NEER.
STAR
? 26,553
MAR 2 270
What About Laos?
Surely nothing could be more important at
this stage of events in Southeast Asia than a
disclosure by President Nixon of U.S. involve-
Nment in Laos. If for any reason, immediate
disclosure to the public would be harmful to
national security, then at least the truth could
be told in closed congressional hearings. There
is precedent for that.
Senators of both parties are understandably
distressed that most information ? presumably
reliable, but nevertheless unofficial ? coming
out of Laos is from the news media and that
American officials concerned with U.S. ac-
tivities in the countries neighboring Vietnam
. are attempting censorship.
i/ Nothing less than potential for another
Vietnam is the fear' and the unofficial reports
substantiate that fear. .CA agents and military
advisors --. supposedly in greater numbers
proportionately than those in Vietnam under,
,the. Kennedy ommitment ? swarming
throughout the country, secretive U.S. troop
incursions across the Vietnam border, massiv
B-52 raids admitted officially only recently al
point to the growing involvement.
Republican Sen. Charles Mathias charges
that even now "U.S. military activities in that
country (Laos) clearly violate the spirit of both
the national commitments resolution ? re-
quiring specific approval for every new
engagement of American troops abroad ? and
the amendment to the defense appropriations
act prohibiting use of funds for American
ground combat troops in Laos or Thailand." "
. An airing of those activities is in order.
Congressional acts shouldn't be violated, let
alone the possibility of the American people
being hoodwinked into another Vietnam. Even
the most ardent advocate of the U.S. military
mission in Vietnam should not want a simila9
bloodletting next door.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01
MONTr'Z'Lli'RY ALA.
ADVERIISER
STATI NTL
6l,769
S ? 80?831
JAR 2 1970
The CIA's War In Laos *4`.
THE UNITED STATES is so deeply
committed in Laos it will suffer loss of
prestige, money and men regardless of
the path taken now. .
There is also the possibility that cur!.
. rent policy in Laos will lead to increased
involvement in inverse ratio to decreased
' activity in Vietnam. Senator Mathias of
Maryland pointed this out the other day.
He said that Laos was turning into "an
arena for the repetition of mistakes of
our Vietnamese involvement."
Mathias cited the character of U.S.
,aotian commitment as one of "dubious
disguises." The villain behind t h e
disguises is the Central Intelligence
/Agency, with a supporting role played by
/the Defense Department. For example,
. Mathias quoted a number of news reports
' that hundreds of former Green Berets
have been recruited by the CIA to assist
irregular groups supporting the Laotian.
'
government.
The Laotian war has been going on for
20 years, with CIA interference for about
half of that time. At least once, it has
switched sides. Prior to 1967, the CIA
supported the right - wing Prince, Boun
Gum, in his efforts to oust neutralist
Prince Souvanna Phouma. It succeeded
for a short while in 1964. In 1967, it was
.decided that maybe Souva.nna Phourna
was the better choice after all.
The dollar-green carpet of the CIA was
jerked out from under Boun Own and
laid beneath the feet of Souvanna
Phi:mina, where it has been ever since.
U.S. B-52s.stationed in Thailand regularly
bomb North Vietnamese and communist
Pathet Lao positions in Laos. U.S. sup-
plied and maintained T-28 jets stationed
_..._.... _.. ....., .... __._,,..
'
in Laos wage war against the commun-
ists.
U.S. advisers train and assist the I.
Clandestine Army, the only viable friend-
ly fighting force in Laos. U.S. funds pay ;
for the Clandestine Army, made up,
primarily of Meo tribesmen a n d
mercenary Thais, and for the Royal Lao- .
tian Army, which ;functions only as a
,palace guard.
The U.S., in short, pays for everything, :
to the tune of almost $300,000,000 an- !
nually. Everything to fight the war is I
furnished by us except troops, and there;
is creeping doubt about that.
This sordid, sub rosa mess perpetrated 4,
by 'the CIA with the apparent blessings of 1/
the Defense Department and the Nixon ,
A,dministratien places the U.S. in an '
untenable position. No matter what the
future policy is, it will be damaging.
' Should the ,U.S.. decide abruptly to pull '
out, prestige; will be lost. Should thej
decision be Made to stay and fight it out;
the nation might be bogged up to its neck
In another Vietnam War. Past experience
shows that, in this kind of thing, the U.S. ,
does not remain static, ruling out
maintaining the status quo.
There is a double tragedy in the Lao-
tian morass. The most obvious is that
secret agencies of the U.S. have been ;
allowed to lead the power and prestige of '
the nation into a Hobson's Choice. The
other is that it makes as little sense to
take a stand in Laos as it would in, say,
Madagascar.
Left alone, Laos would lapse into the
insignificance that is Its. natural state. It
Is no place for the U.S. or Americans to
be making a fight.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
1112 41))1411" ..1111;3 STATI NT
Approved For Release 2001/03/0!4 : ak-WDP80-01601R0
? AnotherWar: In the Skies Over Indoc
By HERBERT MITGANG
WASHINGTON?Fifteen years
ago Graham Greene's English
correspondent in "The Quiet
?American" strolled down Rue
Catinat toward the Saigon wa-
terfront and observed, "I could
see lamps burning where they
had disembarked the new Amer-
lean planes."
There has been one slight
, change since that thne, shortly
after the French made a dy-
'ing effort to hang onto their
colonial empire in Southeast
Asia. Rue Catinat has been re-
named Tu Do. It celebrates no
? famous victory by the ARVN,
; nor the success of the new
, American policy of Vietnamiza-
don, but only a vain touch of
independence by the Republic
of South Vietnam.
The role of American planes
in Greene's novel?which took
'place during the years of offi-
cial Washington brinkmanship
?in the 1950's?is recalled again
.because of the steoned-up air
action over Vietnam in the
weeks since Vice. President'
,Agnew's visit. And for a more
important reason now: the re-
connaissance, strafine by gun-
ships and high-altitude bomb-
ing, added together, amount
uot to de-escalation but deeper,
, involvement in all . the 'shaky..
nations that once wade up
'French .Xndochina,?,...,...;.:.
Although President Nixon's ing of this heavy ,bombing can fensives against American and
foreign affairs report to Con- be put in perspective by corn- ARVN positions.
gross last month said that "our, paring it with the 500,000 tons But the aerial incursions
tactical air and B-52 operations dropped in the Pacific Theatre have heightened the military
have been reduced by 25 per during all erne Second World dangers. This has happened: '
cent," the half-hidden air war War. When the total tonnage recently in North Vietnam?
beyond the borders of South dropped in the Pacific theater , despite the so-called bombing
Vietnam has actually widened.. Vietnam alone is added up, it - halt in the Hanoi area. Recon-
,United States Air Force, Army, exceeds by far the weight of naissance plane losses have led,:
Marine and Navy warplanes are all the bombing on every front. inevitably, to fighter escorts.
on operations from the Gulf .. against Japan and Germany. :How much combat is taking'
of Siam to the Gulf of Tonkin. Neither strafing by helicopter ' place in surface-to-air missile
Overt and Covert War gunships nor attacks by fighter- , and MIG country is not men--
bombers have been milk runs; 'tioned in official communiqu?
- Last month there was an more than 1,300 fixed-wing Subject to Interpretation .
admitted average of between planes and nearly 1,500 hell- Another phrase?Secretary
of Defense Laird's "protective
reaction"?is subject to a vari-
?ety of interprotations at the
Pentagon. "If you find out,
what it means," smiled a vev.,
eran pilot of the Vietnam skies,'
"let us know." ? He and others
surmised that it could be
,?250 and 300 sorties (one air- copters have been lost over
. craft over one target) every North and South Vietnam. Ac-
day. Not discussed openly, cidents and losses onthe ground
however, were the sorties origi- due to enemy action have ac-
. nating within Laos against the counted for another 1,600'
North Vietnamese there. The planes and 1,000 helicopters.
'B-52 bombings on the Plaine .More linportant than the bil-
/ des Jarres are acknowledged lions of dollars are the thou-
- but the lesser-known activities.. sands of casualties involved.
. '
of transports and belicoptersV. At the Pentagon, the phrase
ften heard for the use of strafing ' stretched to mean retaliatory
and bombing almost
belonging to Air America and;
anywhere in North Vietnam,'
Continental Air Services, for greater aerial firepower is
Cambodia and Laos
the Agency or Internationalv ,f, rn
Development and the Central " re-eptive attack." TrooP The familiar scenario of the'
?
concentrations have been hit Vietnam war calls up lines by.
.Intelligence Agency, also en- along the hundreds of rniles of another Englishman, Lord
tangle the United States in this . the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos . Byron, who wrote: This is
twilight war.
and on the infiltration rontes ? the patent age of new 'riven-.
' Despite the announced bomb- ,,
Ing cutback, about 100,000 tons ?,,within Cambodia. To an ex- tions/For killing bodies and
I- tent, reconnaissance . and,:, for saving souls,/A11 propa-
? of bombs are dropped in an gated with the best intentions."
, average month. B-52's .take off ' bombing . lin ? these "neutral' ., . _
? from Thailand or make the long ? oourutries ? and deep across the HERBERT MiTGANG is a mem.,
.' "round4rip flight' of , over ten ,; border of ,North .Vii!tnant have: bar ? of the editorial bard of
1.:49.40..,A00,044.4071,0 itnean!:41,14914,A0,::,PWIRGit.,Mai'W.s:91ridrie'New York Yknott.' ' ;?/1
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
r
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01
SOUTH BEND, IND.
TRIBUNE
E ? 120,288
S
Secrecy in Laos
? Having intervened in Vietnam at a
terrible cost of their young men's blood,
the American people watch uneasily as
part of the secrecy that conceals the
American role in nearby Laos is torn
away.
Only glimpses of the American com-
mitment in Laos have reached the pub-
lic, just enough to create widespread
wariness and suspicion about what is.,
happening there.
\ The few American correspondents who
have been able to get near the combat
iareas of Laos have sent back reports of
activities by the Central? Intelligence
Agency that go beyond the role in which
most people envisage theZ24.....,"
/
The CIA is running a civilian airline in
Laos called Air America, with which it
supports an army of Laotian irregulars.
According to eyewitness reports, the line
uses C-123 and Caribou transport planes
"borrowed" from the U.S. Air Force.
Their Air Force markings have been
painted over.
Correspondents have been forbidden to
visit secret bases, but have sent back
, reports that Am ericans in civilian
clothes, including former Green Berets,
seem to be sharing in the fighting.
STATI NTL
Military and other governmental
spokesmen in Washington sidestep ques-
tions about these reports. President Nix-
on, like Presidents Johnson and Kennedy
before him, is saying as little as possible
about Laos. The statements being made
in Washington are equivocal, full of se-
mantic evasions.
The Laotian fighting is tied to the
Vietnam war, because the North Viet-
namese in complete disregard for Lao-
tian sovereignty bring supplies to the
Vietnamese front down the Ho Chi Minh
trail. American air power attacks that;
supply line, as a protection for U.S. and? '
South Vietnamese troops. That role is
openly admitted and easily justified.
But how much more are we doing?
How far is the government ready to go
in support of the Laotian government led
by Premier Souvanna Phouma? A com-
mitment to use American forces in de-
, fense of Laos if the North Vietnamese
chose to attempt a full-out conquest of.
that country would draw-bitter opposi-
tion here.
, The American people are entitled to a\
frank report. Until they, receive it, they
understandably look upon news about
?
,?Laos with distrust.,
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
THE WASTIFIGTON POST
- 2 MAR 1970
. Appfoved Foelease 2001/G3/01 :EA-ROW-01681RO
..i.tIOS; lite 3a7ne ut atteu tyam
? Even the best dispatches from Laos read like ,army, and without the slightest concern for Con- ;
,
some combination of Terry and the Pirates, Graham gressional prerogatives or for the possible conse- .
Greene and Art Buchwald. Our Man of the Hour is ,quences of systematically deceiving the American :
General yang Pao who is rated by American offi-ipublic about an expanding American military inter-;
cials just behind Alexander the Great, in large part ?vention which could all too easily fail.
because by Asian military standar& he is honest, You might have thought that, having seen the ?
which is to say that when we pay him the money results of the great Vietnam shell game as con- '
for his men, the men get paid. But his men are 'ducted by the last Administration, the present one
mostly teenaged kids recruited from the tough' might have.learned something about the effect this
Meo hill tribes and built into an ;irregular army, can have on public understanding and support. But
financed, trained, supported, and largely directed no, President Nixon has decreed that he doesn't,
by the Americans (which is another way of saying think "the public interest would be served by any
(by
CIA). This supposedly secret operation is a further discussion" of Laos and that apparently is ?
secret to nobody in Laos. It was conceived as a that. The President will go to Congress ii there is"
substitute for the regular armed forces, of the any change contemplated in our military involve-
Laotian Government which is supposed to be nen-. ment in Laos, Secretary Laird has promised, and
tral, and whose army doesn't fight much, and as a this wonld be somewhat reassuring were it not for
counterweight to Communist forces, both imported the fact that our military involvement has changed,
and homegrown. Van Pao's army does fight, but significantly, and the President hasn't gone to
lately it has been doing badly in what pass for. Congress about it, at least publicly.
battles in the Laotian war but ; are really ratherli It is all too familiar, including the rationale. We
eccentric skirmishes for places like the Plain of are bound by the 1962 Geneva accords which set.
up a neutral Laotian governifient, the Administra-
Jars or Lima Lima or Muong Suoi. These are calle'di
strongholds or key towns or vital road junctions , tion argues privately, and since these accords ealled
until they change hands, which they do more or less' for the removal of all outside military forces we
regularly, at which time they turn out to be more cannot discuss what we are now doing in Laos
like tennis trophies, temporarily held, until the without acknowledging publicly and officially that
next tournament. I we are violating the accords. The theory is that
All this is played out against the backdrop of a this would then make it incumbent on the Russians
psychedelic political power struggle between frac- ; to do something in response, as a matter of pride
tured Centrists and splintered Neutralists, Rightists ,or prestige or simple geopolitics?and never mind
and crypto- Communists, which might tell yoU a that the Communists broke the Geneva agreement
great deal about the significance of the military Ifrom the day that it was signed. Even assuming
byplay if you' could somehow wrap your mind that there is something to this theory, at best it
around it, and having done that, take it seriously. would only justify a policy of silence; it can not
cf.& ,justify the sort of calculated 'dissembling engaged
..
That's the thing about Laos?it is hard to take ;in by Secretary Laird when he was asked the other
it seriously until suddenly something or somebody day on Meet the Press whether American ? B-52's
threatens to upset the delicate equilibrium and the .!were used to provide close-in support of Laotian
whole thing ceases to be a giant put-on and be-fl troops in the Plain of Jars. "This is quite far from
comes, or is made to become, a critical element in .the Ho Chi .Minh trail which the President said We'
the Vietnam equation or a test of strength and ,were boinbing to interdict supplies into South Viet-
will between us and the Russians, or perhaps us nam," the questioner continued, "Does this mean
and Hanoi. This is what is happening now, as it we have decided to take a role in the Laotian war?"
happened in 1961 and in 1964 and again last year, This is the nub of it, of course?whether we are
and it happens, of course, because we are in Vint- bombing in Southern Laos as part of the Vietnam'
nam and because Laos is next door. Wedged in be- interdiction effort, or intervening increasingly in
tween Red China, Burma, Thailand, and stretching ,tl'ie cplite \?separate Laotian civil war in the North,
alongside the two Vietnams, it is strategic, as an ,and Yin Laird's answer deserves to be set down
Infiltration from North Vietnam to the South, and 10 full:
as an opening Southward for the Communist Chi- . First, I would like to say it is not possible to use 1
nese. It is also a domino, if you accept that image, B.52's for .close-in support. Any close-in support$
ready to fall if Vietnam isn't held upright?al- would have, to be provided by tactical air and of
though as of now you could argue that it might course the Royal ,Laotian forces have tactical air
fall even if South Vietnam is held up, which could ?,,,
014 inthgeiurnoirend. stTahtee sPariersipdoewnterhaass sfaaird at shatth ew
ien taerre-
reverse the theory, and make South Vietnam the -.. diction of supplies and material coming into Viet-
next to go. In any case, we care about Laos for the tiam are concerned. The mission of air power, as
same reason we care about Vietnam, 'and that is at , far as Laos is concerned, on the Ho Chi Minh trail,
1 , has been handled by the President of the United
least understandable. . States and we have used it in connection with the
What is neither understandable nor defensible, war in Vietnam. We have of course flown recon-
in our view, is the way we give expression to our naisance mission; over Laos on a continuing bask
. In For Rifieate- 6 6 Vt6 3/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001A
o inund
care?furtistelv in clandestine.=mart of 02 I I
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: C.IA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
These reconnaissance missions have been accom-
plished by armed escort. The President has made
it clear the mission of our air power as far as the.
war in Vietnam, and that is all that I care to say on
it at this time.
While it would be too much to characterize this,
as a pack of lies, it is at least a pack of evasions,,
Irrelevancies, semantics and half-truths. B-52's have
regularly been used in Vietnam for what could'
reasonably be called "close-in" support?as wit-
ness their vaunted effectiveness at Khe Sanh. More
important, there is compelling evidence that they
were used in the recent unsuccessful defense of the ,
Plain of Jars, and this marked a significant step-upl
In our combat role in Laos. Leaving all that aside,1
it is nonsense to talk about reconnaisance flights'
with armed escorts when everybody in Laos whol
cares knows that we are flying about as many pure-
and-simple bombing missions in support of our,i
proxy army in the North as we are flying interdie)
Von missions in the South.
The simple fact is that we are deeply involved in
the Northern war, such as it is, no matter what area
'of the government pays for it, or provides the mili-
tary advisers--or what if any uniform they wear.,
And while, it is easy to laugh about that war, bei
cause it never seems to get anywhere, it is 'just as
'easy to make the case that our forces dangereitsly
disturbed a five-year equilibrium by reoccupying'
the Plain of Jars last fall, and thus inviting, its re-
capture in the last few weeks. .
: Perhaps it will stop at that. Or perhap Hanoi
has hit upon Laos as a new way of squeezing us in
?Vietnam, by raising new anxieties and fresh outcries
in this country over our whole inter-locking Asian
policy. In any case, with at least two months of dry
season ahead, none of the experts in this town are
prepared to say categorically that the Communist
forces will not now press on in Northern Laos:
towards the Mekong or the administrative. capital
:of Luang Prabang, or to predict What kind of crisis.,
:this would provoke, militarily out there; or polit1-1
'eally here at home. And that in itself is argument',
;enough for something 'better than the sanie
,
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Approved For Release 2001/03krigk-FSDR8INCFL601
RICHARD WILSON
Criticism nilikely to Sway Nllx n on. Laos Policy.
the President has committed
the United States to military
support of existing govern-
ments.
Nixon also is being accused
of duplicity and of failing to
hold the confidence of the
American public by being lit-
tle franker about his objec-
tives than President Johnson.
This only means that In a
brief time President Nixon
will take to the air waves
again to give a fuller explana-
tion, but no fuller than is al-
ready known to the Foreign
Relations Committee, about
what we are doing in Laos,
why it is in support of an inde-
pendent government, why it
protects our troops in Vietnam
and making it doubly clear, as
Secretary of Defense Laird al-.
. ready has, that he has no in- ?
: tention of committing ground
? 'combat forces.
If the President does not do
. this he will merely play into
the hands of those who say he
'is hiding his actions in the
-same deceptive way as John-
son.
. It is of even more substance
that if the President is driven
off his policy in Laos then he
1. will have retreated from the
i aims and objectives he has so
! often stated in the Nixon Doc-
trine.
But there is no present pros-
pect that Nixon will be driven
, off his policy, certainly as long
): as the North Vietnamese hint-
' tration through Laos to Viet-
nam continues.
One other aspect of this
matter is important. The Pres-
ident has assured Congress he
will not send ground troops to
fight in Laos without Congres-
sional consent. If this assur-
ance is to be taken literally
. the President has gone a step
farther than his predecessors
In recognizing congressional
i
participation n decisions on
Ititure.t military interventions.
0 0 ? ?
Another Vietnam in Laos?
Well, hardly yet. There is an
important distinction between
the military operations of the
Nixon administration in Laos
and those in Vietnam.
? If this distinction is not rec-
ognized then it may as well he
said that the President of the
United States is now and here-
after precluded from glee- '
Lively supporting the nations ?
of Southeast Asia in resisting
'external aggression.
This is evidently the basic ,
objective of those in the Unit-
ed States Senate who now are
accusing the President of esca-
lating the war in Laos into ;
another Vietnam. ?
. The distinction bet wee n.
Vietnam and Laos, however, is .."
? a working demonstration of
the kind of policy called for by '
I the Nixon Doctrine in lieu of
; the massive direct interven-
tion of U.S. forces as in Viet-
, nam. In Laos we are training,'
equipping and advising a clan- .
destine native army and prob-
ably giving it air support with- .
.out the direct involvement in
:combat of, American ground -
.troops. That pattern undoubt-"
-ear! would be followed 'in
Thailand if the northern insur-
gency required it. It is the
developing pattern also in
Vietnam, where it is called
Vietnamization. ?
Implicit in the gathering
storm over Laos is the basic
question of the President's us-
ing these methods to preserve
the political integrity of inde-
pendent governments in Laos,
Vietnam, Cambodia and Thai-
land.
This is' well understood in
Congress. The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee knows
what the Nixon administration
is doing in Laos and why it is
doing it. The present outburst
arises mainly because a few
newspapermen have observed
first hand what the Foreign
?Rela Lions Committee has
known all along was being
done in Laos. .
A visitor to Vientiane as
long ago' as three years could.
readily see that the United
States was giving military
support to the government of
Laos. There was no secret
- about it. The CIA was there.
American military advisers
were there. They also traveled
back and forth between the
?
. American airfields in the
north of Thailand to Vientiane. ?
Investigators for the Foreign
Relations Committee have
been supplied with a great
deal of information by State
Department personnel on the
operation in Laos, so much in .
fact that there has been con-
cern at the White House over
the leakage of military infor-
mation that would be of bone-
fit to the North Vietnamese
Invaders. .
Then why all the fuss? It
arises because this is consid-'
ered the right time to under-
mine and reverse President .
Nixon's policyin Southeast
i
? Asia. It finally s coming to be
realized that axon meant it
when he said the United States
was not about to "bug out" .
and that he intended to pre-
serve the independent political,
! integrity of the nations of
Southeast Asia. ,
That is not sufficient for the"
peace group in the Senate.
Some of them had thought that
id.ixon was moving toward a
total pull-out, regardless of the
consequences, as a political.
. necessity. Now they see that;
this is not so and they observe
AO..1#,INt,01404144.and,Litos:.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
LOS Aaqt,GI VMS STATINTL
LM)' Approved For Release 2001/03/041:WAZP80-
1
AV 110'S 71' 1911LP
The Plain of jars in northeastern
Laos derives its name from large
prehistoric stone pottery found on
the plateau. Last week, several U.S.
senators were asking if American
combat troops couldn't be found in
the area as well,
The Nixon Administration an-
swered no. "We have no military
forces engaged in ground combat in
Laos," Defense Secretary Melvin
Laird stated as the fighting inIted
up next, door to South Vietnam.
"There has been no basic change of
U.S. policy in Laos over the past
three years."
- ? Sen. Charles McC. Mathias Jr. (R-
"Md.), for one, .was not convinced.
"Laos has become an area for the
repetition of the mistakes of our
Vietname.3e involvement," he said.
? Mathias cited news accounts of
armed Americans in civilian clothes
advising Laotian officers, as well as
earlier reports which "indicate the
presence of hundred of ex-Green
7Serets, described as having joined
the Central Intelligence Agency in
Laos because they are 'fed up with
having their hands tied in Vietnam.'"
Sens. Stuart Symington (D-Mo,),
Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), Charles
H. Percy (R41.1.), Albert Gore (D-
Tenn.), John Sherman Cooper (1-.
Xy.) and J. William Fulbright (D-
Ark.) also criticised the Nixon
A.dministration's reluctance to dis-
cuss the war in Laos.
And not all the dissenters were
Doves. Sen. Robert. C. Byrd (D-W.
Va.) questioned the wisdom -of.
"laying American lives on the line"
in a secret war. He said -there are.'
reports "that American advisers are -
all but running the Laotian fo'rces:"
No Further Discussion
ecre War"?
c 11-----I/ N---is. /
/-' 1----"Fii, ,f...
...,....., RA 1 . .0 .........,.....,.
-i5::-,1 OF 3?;.--.,-;?.i Natant
.'-,3 IA2,3,474---...1.,.vitrama
...?:),. ..
,,,,, ....?,--,. ../.....?,,,,,......
ii..;...;::,./".'" , i\ /..:' ;,. .4..1'1 HANOI
..... _.?,.. ,...2,
.11'..;,,=?-,.., 1;r; .
rENTIANE ..,....;%,,,I. ,i, , it ,
ILA-Or31;:IP -?:. ? ::: ,
TI-U;41LAND 4-
? .....- .?.....- re, 1-9N1,,-.1,,,
7,-- .?--
-- - e.-""1; - .." :
lid Clif /if. -NcAk,:, ->L.,
MINH ,fArt. A
7P,ML VX :i / ? '
4;?:?.)14.DA NAriP .
. -.4 ".......... -
.0
CAMBODIA " t
SOUTH
. . ,?1 VIETNAM
iines Onto by riarlan Kirby
? r-or two hours they observed
.Anierican-made planes taking off at
the rate of one a minute, prestimah!
lv to support Royal Laotian troops.
Then they were spotted and hustled
off.
Dwite the U.S. support, Pallet
Lan guerrillas and North Vietna-.
rece:e troops captured both the Plain
of Jars and the key airfield-outpost,
of Muong Soul about 25 miles to the!
west.
, Jars, which has. changed hands
several times during the struggle in
Laos, is .considered important be-
cause it is the hub of the major
routes in the country and affords, a
ready approach both to the adminis-.
trative capital at Vientiane (135
miles south) and to the royal capital
and religious center at Luang Pra-
bang.
Laotian neutralist. Premier Son- :
Vanna Phouma called the loss of the ?
\\Theo asked to discuss the U.S.
r;11e. in Laos in detail, Defense and
State Department officials referred
in President Nixon's statement of '
Dec. 8, when he said, "I don't think
the public interest would be served
by any further discussion."
According to U.S. command fig-
ures. :36 Americans have been killed
In the ground war in Laos since'
le62. An American Embassy report
lists 184 American bomber crewmen
missing, an increase of almost 30.
,ince, the last report in December,
1969,
, The reports of armed American -
civilians in Laos were made by three
reporters, who left a U.S.. guided
Tom' of an area on the plain rind
lachhiked 18 miles to the long-
secret baseApproOdisFor Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
Plain of Jars "a North Vietnamese
escalation."
N. Viet Strength
' The North Vietnamese are be-
lieved to have about 20,000 men in
.'northern Laos. Another 30,000 are
? reportedly deployed in the area, of
the Ho Chi Minh trail, which is in
the southeastern ? "leg" of the coun-
try hordering North and ? South
-.- Vietnam.
One U.S. expert pointed out that
'there , are actually two wars in
progress in Laos.
First there is the battle over the.
Ho Chi Minh- trail, which is vital to
the North Vietnamese for the infil-
tration of -men and supplies?a
, battle therefore related to the
*struggle between the United States
and South Vietnam and North
Vietnam.
The second war, which is being.
Sought in northern Laos, has a
? different and older history, In An
.? area once described by a diplomat as.
,-"hopeless but not critical.'
". Today, .a? growing :number of
senators are, however, concerned
that "Vietnamization" of the war'
might some day be replaced by
"Laosization.". -? .
/17
LOS AlICLLES TIMES
Approved For Release 2001/03104 :MNAPDP80-01
Senate Showdown With
Nixon Over Laos Nears
Foreign Relations Committee Wants to
Turn Spotlight on Not-Sq-Secret War
111: JOHN U. AVERILI.
' Times 51411 Miler ?
t n e Administration. ces opposing the Commit-
WASH' NGTON ? After .1 T .
a; ing note of tlic . Pathet L North
and Nor
'five months of quiet skit' Ntepped . no warfare in Vietnamese forces now on
mishin g, t h c Senate Laos.
Symington told the - the ?Crensive in Law' -
Foreign Fzelall?1': Cm-
rnittee is approaching Senate that his subeom- Although the Adminis-
a
confrontation w i t`h t h c
Nixon Ad ministration
over the secret U.S. in-
volvement in the not-so-
secret war in Laos.
The issue is simple: 'I Tow
much should the AMOYI-
ran public be permitted to hers . . .. Senate _
, mentoing ma-
1,now about US, ectieitiee ,,,By `WeeleS end there ..,,., . ...
1 eider Mike Malv-
in the utile Southeast Asia ..?111.'Y -a--' ' w e r e s o m e Indications
field (D-Mont.) and-Sen. J.
'kingdom that borders on , w . i 1 . r a . i t (D ..that the Senate pressure 1
i t 41111 ' ti me i -
'Vietnam? ' Ark.), chairman of the . was having an impact on L
,.
; parent Foreign Relations . the Administration.
Essentialle nothing. in
the view of the Adminis- committee. "This. matter is being _
tration. Essentially every- While there may be ? taken very s c r i o u sly .
thing. in the view of a , some question as to how . throughout the executive
majority of the (ommittee. -much e f f e c t. S e n a t e. branch," a high Malin's- '
The committee, through speeches have on the Ad-' . tration source said in re- -
its subcommittee on U.S. ministration, several sena-, femme to the dispute over
security agreements - and tors feel 'President Nixon ek:arance of the Syming-
commitments abroad, feels can't ignore them without ton subcommittee Laotian
it has a fairly accurate and .a risk to his credibility. ? transcript. , "There is a ? !
comprehensive account of For instance i statement; possibility that?there will ..j
iest w h a t the U n it ed liy the President.' in hisj , be some give by the Admi-. '
*States is doing in Laos. , televised talk to the nation . nistratiOn." .
But the Administration on Vietnam last Nov. 3 has - A 1 t h ?ugh,. Symington !
is trying to keep the ac- been repeatedly recalled continues to Profess opti..c:
count suppressed. in recent days. ' mism that a satisfactory !
Clesed-Dnor Hearings ? "I believe," Mr. Nixon ? accord can be reached ;
T h e s u h e 0 mmittee. said then, "that one of the . over the transcript, his :
?bc.aded by eon. Stuart reasons for the deep OM... subcommittee has dis-
semington (p-mo.), eon. , mon about Vietnam is that. cussed options open to it if .
filleted dosed-door he;ir? ? many Americans have lost- the present impasse con- .
Ines on Laos last October, ? confidence in what the unties. ? . . ? .
.- ? ; ? ,-. i ? i ' government. has. told them
mittee had the "full story
. . . and the whole history,
of fighting in Laos."
I rillion insists there are no
U.S. ground combat forces
In Laos, there have been
Other Demands press reports of former
Demands for an Admi- Creel% Berets of the U.S.
nistration accounting on All"Y''''; Special P'"ces and
Laos were expressed by of .11."crIcan agents
other subcommittee mem- worsing as civilian wive,
sent to the T..aotian army.
STATI NTL
using subcommittee inves-
tigators as witnesses. This ,
device, through careful
questioning, could bring?
most of the information in
the still-secret transcript
? out into the open. ?
However, the subcom-
mittee's most potent wea-
pon is the Administra-
tion's awareness of ?the?
growing unhappirtess in .1
Congress, particularly in
the Senate, over U.S. mill-
v4ry hwolvernent, in Asia.
ri ? ? - Ii ? I
mats. military men and a ho u I. our policy. T h e
fellers who have an bilk American people cannot
male knowledge of what is and should not be asked to
going on. - . support, a policy which
Ever since then, the involves the overriding
'subcommittee has been issues of war and peace
*trying to get State Depart- unless they know the
in e n t clearance of t h e truth about that policy."
' hearing transcript so it Thus far, the President
can he made public. Thus has refused .? to. -discuss
far, the department has what this country is doing
' eleared only what the in Laos beyond acknow-
,subcommittee regards as lodging there has been
rel;tieely inconsequent iai bombing of that portion of
aTeets of the transcript. N?011 Vietnam's no Chi
Ti. 7 rt .1 t his re- Minh Trail that passes
. . . rope.. - ? . .'
through Laos. .
rim(' to clear the rest on , A. more likely alterna-
grounds of national sccuri- , Aerial Assistance . tive would be for _ the
. '
ty. , ! Yet there have been subcominittee to conduct
-
R cc e ntykn roillpar,
priiletease 2100146WOOPCIAAD12007.03P601R000700050001-2
began increaffif^ press
osr
'? . . . '. P . U.S. aerial assistance to.
Laotian government for- .
loulbright, in an Inlet'.
view, said one alternative
you'd be for the subcom-
in tee to publish t 11 C
transcript wit bout clea-
rance, a course recently
threatened by Mansfield.
H owever, both Ful-
bright and Mansfield said
they would be extremely -I
reluctant to take such a '
step because the subcom-
mittee needs Administra?
lion cooperation on its
upcoming inquiry in to !
U.S. commitments in
lesa 1.0
Approved For Release 2001/03/Q4m #13P80-01601R000
J.
Laos 2:
Fear Test
Of the
Nixon
Doctrine
WASHINGTON ? A flash of
anxiety over the possibility of a
crisis in Laos streaked through
Washington last week as the Ad-
ministration feared an early test
of the new Nixon Doctrine. Mem-
bers of Congress expressed con-
cern that the United States
would be engaged in a wider war
in Southeast Asia. And intelli-
gence analysts were puzzled by
North Vietnamese intentions.
The apprehension spread al-
most in direct proportion to the
speed with which th North Viet-
namese swept across the Plaine
des Jarres in central Laos. But
.there were varying degrees of
tension_ here. A skeptic, .who
'admitted he was more nervous
than a few weeks ago, none.
theless argued: "Laos has been
.going down the drain for eight
or nine years. This is nothing
different." Others took a wait
and see attitude, hoping that
the North Vietnamese didn't
really want an escalation in
Laos, Still others were alarmed;
They pointed to the build-up of
North Vietnamese forces, which
were larger than ever before,
the more belligerent tone of
Hanoi's propaganda, and the ex-
tensive use of American air
power. ? Said an official who
called himself an informed by-
stander: "I'm sick about the
whole thing."
An assessment by Admiral
John S. McCain, American com-
mander in the Pacific, was on
with which ,a State Department
spokesman said he could not
quarrel. Admiral McCain was
quoted in Saigon as having said
that the enemy "continues to
conduct the most determined ag-
gressive campaign in Laos since
the 1962. Geneva accords. The
present deteriorating situation is
of serious concern to us."
Several Senators, led by
Charles McC. Mathias Jr., Re-
publican of Maryland, were out-
spokenly critical last week of
the Administration's policy in
Laos. Senator Mathia.s charged
that the Administration was
turning Laos into "an arena for
.,'the repetition of the mistakes of
our Vietnamese involvement."
Senator Mike Mansfield, the
Democratic majority leader from
Montana, asserted that if the La-
tan conflict intensified, "all the
plans foe Vietnamization and all
else Will go down the drain, and
we will find ourselves in a most
difficult and dangerous situa-
tion."
Over the years, the North
Vietnamese have evolved three
objectives in Laos. The first and
most pressing has been to pro-
tect the Ho Chi Minh trail in
eastern Laos, down which men
and supplies move to the war
in South Vietnam. Some offi-
cials here contended that the
North Vietnamese offensive was
limited to forcing the clandestine,
American-backed army of Maj.
Gen Yang Pao in the Plaine
des Jarres region back to where
it started before last: summer's
thrust across the plain toward
the Ho Chi Minh trail.
The second and longer-range
objective has been to overthrow,
the Government of Premier Sou-
"We cannot let
Laos fall to the
? Communists even if
we have to fight."
Dwight D. Eisenhower,
Dec. 31, 1960
STATI NTL
vanna Phouma and to put into
power a regime subject to Ha-
noi's will. Other officials here
'were increasingly inclined to the
belief that the North Vietnam-
"Laos is far away
from America, but
the world is small. . .
The security of all
Southeast Asia will
be endangered if
Laos loses its neutral
independence."
John F. Kennedy,
March 23, 1961
ese now intend 'to destroy the
clandestine army, which has
been 'reportedly trained and fi-
nanced by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. The loss of the
clandestine army would put the
? North Vietnamese in a position
? to overrun all of Laos.
The third and ultimate North
? Vietnamese objective, in the view
of many officials here, has been
to establish in Laos a base for
? Infiltration and subversion into
Thailand.
By the end of the week,
sources with access to intelli-
gence estimates said they did
not know whether the North
Vietnamese would be satisfied to
stop where they were now, or
? strike on. But most analysts
agreed that the next few weeks
?or even days?would produce
a better indication of the North
Vietnamese intentions.
In the offing is the question of
whether the Administration will
adhere to the Nixon Doctrine of
not allowing the United States
to become entangled in a wider
land war in Asia, or to act to
prevent the fall of Laos on the
ground that it is vital to the se-
curity. of American interests in
South_ Vietnam and Thailand,',
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
ii WWI I I i\II1'etiN 1110
1 MAR 194
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-016
\ U.S. Officials Study i
marks About Laos
By Murrey Marder
Waehlinton Poet Staff Writer
North Vietnamese Foreign
; Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh
charged the United States
with intensifying the war in
Laos in a rare interview with
!a visiting American newsman
,that was released yesterday.
Apart from the special em-
Thasis on Laos, there were no
;immediately apparent new in.
gredlents in the interview re-
ported by Daniel DeLuce of
the Associated Press. To &into-
' matte observers what Trinh
. said looked like a very famil-
' iar restatement of Hanoi's
:terms for ending the war that
have been repeated for
months in the stalemated
Paris peace talks.
. U.S. officials will be scruti-
:razing the interview, however,
to determine if there are any
other shadings of significance
in IL ' ?
1 Trinh, by his charge that the
'United States has intensified
;the war in Laos with the use,
of "massive B52 bombings,"I
?added to a newly expanding:
:Hanoi theme which is raising ,
:questions in Washington about
Communist intentions in Laos.'
It suggests that Hanoi is'
implying that its capacity to4
keep the Laotian conflict!
,going can frustrate U.S. at-.
t)
'tempts to 'disengage from the
[4011.404,1?itri4i144.,,JM.:710
namizing' the war in South
Vietnam.
Newsman DeLuce reported
that Trinh spent a considera-
ble time discussing the report-
er's question about the possi-
bility of a standstill cease-fire
in South Vietnam. But Dc-
Lace's account did not show
that Trinh himself ever used
the term "cease-fire."
Instead, as reported, Trinh
was quoted as replying ellipti-
rally to the cease;fire question!
by saying that the Communist
side's, standard 10-point peace
plan 'provides for reaching
agreement "on revelant ques-
tions," the most important be-
ing "the withdrawal of alli
troops."
The American-South Viet.)
namese position calls for the;
withdrawal, of all nori-South3
Vietnamese forces, meaningl
the recall of North Vietnam
en as well as American and 1
0010al1e4 trclopoLia
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
TH3 WASHINGTON POST
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 tlianDP8070160
Corrup ion
In Laos Aid STATINTL
Reported
.; "
rk
%.1 I Fl I 1 1 `I I
ST. LOUIS, Feb. 28 (AP)?
Reports that corruption is si-
phoning off rice and American'
money in Laos have been,
reaching senators investiga.
fing U.S. involvement in Laos,
.the St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
said in its Sunday editions.
; An article by contributing
editor Marquis W. Childs said
.one report Indicate, Central
Intelligence Agency pay for
mercenaries in Laos was being
diverted to the pockets of re-
cruiters.
; Another involved reports,
:the newspaper said, about rice
?intended for Laotian forces,
!their families and Moo tribes-
'men?which may have ended
bp on the South Vietnamese
black market.
"Information provided by a
'foreign intelligence network
.. indicates that only a frac-,
IItion of the Laotian soldiers
iorganized by the CIA took,
,part in the defense of the
iPlain of Jars in a recent at-
tack by die North Vietnam-
lase," t h a newspaper article
said.
"Because these were merce-
naries whose pay went to vil-
lage chiefs, the conclusion of
the intelligence sour c a was
that fairly large sums were
'pocketed by the Laotian re-
cruiters rather than paid to in-
'dividuals to fight."
The article said an Ameri-
e a n officer responsible for.
.supplying rice to government
'troops told Sen. J. William
Fulbrlght (D-Ark.), "he w as
convinced that a large part Of
the thousands of tons of rice
'for the Lao forces, their ? fern-
'flies and for the Meo tribes-
men who also are part of the
? fighting force, was going into
the black market in South
Yletaahl,? the newspaper said.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
:LAB
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CW-149131380-01601R
U.S., LAOS HINDER REPORTERS
Policy p',:ocks News o War
Again, c earance 's not giv. ! sheeting, Americans disgusted , ? ;
By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Star Special Writer
never flatly refuse clearance. ! (hiring interviews.
VIENTIANE ? A policy The alternative to a journal-
But by not granting clearance, !
aimed at preventing press coy- they assure the helicopters ist covering the Lao war is to
' erage of the war in Laos, pre-' won't fly with reporters in , walk in the forest, but this pa!
! ses problems of dodging hos- '
sumably in order to hide them.
Similarly, a reporter rarely : tile tribesmen, booby traps,
?,A in e r i c a n involvement, is receives an outright etio? !mines, friendly bombing and !
being followed by Laotian and from the embassy when he re- 1 ambushes.
U.S. officials, On one such occasion, after'
quests permission to board a !
? Under the policy, reporters plane. Embassy tactics in- !narrowly missing a Comm-, ve"
elude saying that aircraft are :nist ambush which killed four
are prevented from reaching
not available" or "not going ,Laotians and walking three
the area in Laos where most to that area" or "overloaded." , days, I was detained for three ?
of the American involvement The excuses are seldom found days in open arrest and re- .
, leased only on an order from ,
is occurring, Northeastern to be true.
Another embassy tactic is to Premier Souvanna Phouma.
Military Region II.
pass the buck to the Lao de- Travel is not the only prob.
;
It is fairly easy to keep fense ministry. The ministry, .
1 lem for reporters covering the t
reporters out because of the headed by Premier Souvanna
nature of the terrain in Laos Phouma, seldom grants per- i Lao war. Even in background 1
.. mission. It says, quite accu- I briefings, U.S. officials and.'
and the lack of any transporta
rately, that the Laotians lack 1 military will not discuss ,
tion not under the control of
transport facilities. ' ; American bombing or ground i
the American Embassy. " activities.
Most of Laos consists of jun- Disappearing Americans .
"Enemy Number 1"
gle-covered mountains with Central Intelligence AgencW ?,.
few roads. What roads exist employes and American mili- These CIA people consider'
'der':
are rudimentary and virtually tary are warned that if .a!' the American public .as enemy
correspondent does show up in number one, I think even
Impassable during the mon- their area, they are to disap- worse than Hanoi," an Ameri- '
soon season between May and pear, can staffer here said. .
C! October. At other times of the. "You should have seen this The U.S. is thought by many ;!
year, the roads are subject to Place empty when they heard Americans Imre to have a
the press was coming," an good case for what is a very ,
ambush and harassment by American said while relating small U.S. involvement corn- !
pro-Communist Pathet Lao. one such incident. !pared to the large-scale inter-
Fly or Walk Lao Gen. Bounphone Mahe- vention by Hanoi. 4
parak, South Laos tactical ' Secrecy, some officials here 1
A reporter either can fly or. zone commander, said "if we fear, can only cause the U.S. 1
? walk in the jungle.To fly, he let you go somewhere, the public, unaware of the facts, 1
needs a plane or helicopter,, Americans will 'stop their op- to call for total U.S. disen- :
and planes and helicopters are'," erations till you leave. Militar- gagement. !!,
,under U. S. control even ily we cannot afford to let High-ranking Lao officials...11
though ostensibly belonging to , that happen." are aware of this and fear it
private airlines. A favorite embassy gambit could be the death knell of '
It is possible to walk, but it's when press or U.S. domestic . their 16-year-old nation. They'l
a big country. And a reporter ? political pressure becomes too 'privately say they hope Sou-
who starts out walking is often great is to organize a trip for vanna Phouma will change in4
picked up by either Laotian all the press corps, permitting formation policies. '
en, although embassy officials . with the whole system said!
J
troops or armed American ci- , only one day in the field. Meanwhile, a war goes on. :
vilians. During a press trip of this ',According to the lists of pen-
Almost all planes going to nature last week to Sam sions being paid by the Lao-,,
the combat areas are light air- Thong, close to Long Chien, tian government, it is a wae,
craft or transports belonging IL& headquarters in Military! that is Wang Laotian lives at,:
to Air America or Continental Region II, an American offi-: a rate at, ..300 a month.
Airways, private companies ' cial candidly admitted, "Some-: '' ? .?.., MOM 1...:
- V. ?ov 1 .
under simultaneous charter to, body in Vietiane asked if I .
the Central Intelligence Agen- wanted to close up my opera.:
:cy and the Agency for Interne- .tion for the day because you,
tional Development. guys were around."
Before one can board a i Ile wouldn't divulge who
plane, combat area clearance :"somebody in Vientiane" was.:
is needed from the U. S. Em- During the brief stay in Sami
bassy, and this clearance Is Thong, a voice over the inter-
not given. . corn system asked if "our visi-i
Other Charters tors are gone yet?" .,
STATI NTL
A private American compa- Jets Rerouted
ny, Bird & Son, also operates Whenever press trips are ar-
helicopters for charter, but, ranged, U.S. jets are rerouted,' ..
also says it requires "clear- ground advisers take a day off
ance from the United States and Air America carries lane.
rdbearr CrNbitiartoliVdrENSVARterattet2k9eiriOn04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2
6?
6
-1 //Approved For Release 2001/03/04: C.(A,RDF80-01601R000
ATLAS
March 1970
4trISEi SEEE :11f1 U.IMEE t1101
Does that sound familiar?
1
From FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Hong Kong
The continuing conflict in Laos sporadically produces a rash of head-
lines in the U.S. press wl.ich are quickly forgotten. Some time ago,
for instance, Senator J. W. Fulbright questioned America's ten-year
involvement in Laos, but after some fulmination the issue faded.
Arnold Abrams, a seasoned correspondent now writing for Hong
Kong's highly respected Far Eastern Economic Review, raises the
question anew with a sweeping and ominous examination of the un-
publicized battles now taking place in the Laotian underbrush. No,
U.S. officials assured Abrams, America seeks no wider war in Laos,
. . . and the writer was remindeil of other words in other places . . .
ESPITE BLITHE denials and
bland interpretations by Vien-
tiane officials, the war in Laos
may be entering a decisive phase.
U.S. Embassy officials insist--in
private?that the decade-long
struggle here is still an American
**holding operation," a lowkey ef-
fort with limited objectives. But
intensified fighting in the last
six months may have triggered
an escalatory cycle leading to an-
other face-off between Washing-
ton and Hanoi. Government forces
now wait anxiously to learn what
post-dated price tag will be put on
their late-summer offensive which
pushed the enemy off the Plain.
of Jars for the first time in five
years. However, thrusts by com-
munist forces in other areas have
to some extent dampened the
governments success.
The expected enemy thrust
could force a crucial decision on
Washington: whether or not to
Increase American involvement
In Laos when standing fast might
be tantamount to backing off. An
American plunge into another
Asian quagmire is almost un.
thinkable at present, but Richard
Nixon's willingness to concede
control of a contested country to
communist forces is equally hard
to envision. U.S. policymakers
had been hoping to avoid such a
decision by keeping this conflict
stalemated until a Vietnam settle-
ment, involving Laos, could be
reached. They managed that un-
til last June, when a turnabout
In enemy tactics drastically
changed the course of this 'War.
, Now, with no Vietnam settlement
In sight, time may be running
out on American hopes in Laos.
? Last June's enemy assault in-
volved an estimated seven North
Vietnamese battalions in a suc-
cessful four-day siege against the
? government outpost of Muong
Soul, straddling the Plain of Jars'
western edge.
Moreover, the North Vietnam-
ese didn't stop at Muong Soul.
STATI NTL
They pushed
ering road links to the royal capi-
tal and probing at Long Cheng,
northern nerve center of the CIA
and operations base for General
? yang Pao's so-called secret army.
?
The enemy's steamrolling drive
shattered the morale of govern-
ment forces and brought U.S. and
Laotian officials to the verge of
despair. In late summer the
shaken officials decided to hit
back hard. A secrecy-shrouded
counter-offensive was launched,
marked by fierce American aerial
pounding and increased Amen-
can logistical support. The goy-
; ernment won back Muong Soul, .
regained the Plain of Jars.
, Vientiane officials now try to
play down the late-summer action, ,
particularly the Americans' role.
They talk of government troops
"waltzing in" to the Plain of Jars,
? finding that the North Vietnam-
ese had abandoned it, leaving be-;
hind large amounts of supplies.
These officials have no evi?
dence to support that theory.
Moreover, when pressed in a pri?
?
o. From KAMOUJA. ProlomPorth
Approved For Release 2001/03/04': CIA-RDP80-01601R000700050001-2