REDS IN LAOS DEMAND HALT TO BOMBING BY U.S.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 161
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 19, 1970
• Content Type: NSPR

(Th
CHICAGO TRIBUNE
Approved For Release 2001148411. tick-R8W611T61-01
eds in Laos_ Demand H lt to_;
VIENTIANE, Laos, April 17?
A major aim of communist
North Viet Nam and the Pathet
Lao in their proposals to Pre-
mier Souvanna Phouma for
' peace talks in Laos is believed
to be to try to force him to
oppose American bombing of
the Ho Chi Minh trail.
Souvanna told this reporter
In an interview that his govern-
ment had not specially author-
ized the bombing raids in the
first place and had no control
over them now.
Care Little for N. Viets
He made it clear, however,
; that he cares little for what
? happens to the North Vietnam-
ese, who refused to live up
to the 1962 Geneva accord and divisions Of 10,
leave Laos. ' the 312th and, the 316th. Vang.
'We have no objections to the Pao's troops, whose specialty
' bombing of the trail," Sou- has a 1 w a y s been surprise
? a said. ? guerrilla-like s t a b a, offered sources s.ald.
Americans h e r e say the only to k en resistance and .. . ?
1,1 I f Meanwhile yang Pao's men
on bin1' bm U. S.
BY SAMUEL JAMESON
1 . totem ?rf IWO PtI111 solocipi
tChlef of Tokyo Bureau:I
Pathet Lao Weak
However, a" Nor th Viet-
namese pullout from north
Laos would leave only the
Pathet Lao to battle Laotian
government forces and yang
Pao's Moos. Like the Viet Cong
in South Viet Nam, the Pathet
Lao have lost much of their
former strength and effective-
ness. Today they are rated as
pushovers in a straight contest
with Vang Pao's men.
That is why westerfi military
observers believe .Hanoi com-
mitted its own troops to the
current offensive.
When the North Vietnamese
began their offensive in, Jan-
uary they mobilized two full
000 men each
2,000 men of the 316th were '
are more Laotians in Thailand
committed to the probes at
Long Cheng. If Vang Pao can hold on at
than in Laos itself.
The sweep across the Plain of Long Cheng for five more
Jars cost the North Vietnamese weeks until the rainy season
few casualties because cloudy begins, the military picture will
skies h a m p e r e d American brighten considerably, observ-
bombing missions. But the ers here said.
mass evacuation of tribesmen ,. .
from the area did deprive them. Rains Stop Fighting
of a . source of forced labor The rainy- season forces all
which might have been used to fighting to stop. When the skies
bear supplies and ammunition.i clear up, yang Pao's forces are
155, . expected to hold the upper hand
At least 8,000 men of the 'because of the air support they
Committed to Supplies .
316th division in forward posi- get from the United States.
lions near Long Cheng are Last year, one military ob-
believed , to be . totally corn-1 sie. rver said, the United States
mitted to moving up supplies at bombed the North Vietnamese
this Utile. and Pathet Lao off the Plain of
Had the whole division s' truck jars" and yang Pao swept in .
at Long Cheng, the Norm ,..m,, thin, 1. likely to occur
_, behind the air support. The 1
Vietnamese could have taken "aim; IV; ?otuome'i. if Long 1
I.
*Riad sakL ..
the outpost, American military Cheng holds out, this military
United States would be em-
barrassed severely at the least
to continue bombing the Ho Chi
? Minh trail over the protests of
Souvanna. However, they see
r no signs of the Laotian prince
yielding to Hanoi on this point.
The fact that Souvanna's'
r government and Laos itself
survive on American military
and economic aid will remain
' a large factor in any talkS
which may be held with the,
Pathet Lao.
Asks for Plights
, In May, 1964, Souvanna first
asked the United States to
I' make reconnaissance flights
? over north Laos in the Plain of
Jars area. As more and more
North Vietnamese poured Into
i? Laos, Souvanna said, he asked
for more American air support.
Eventually, full scale bomb-,
. .
ing raids in support of Laotian ?
ground troops developed. When.
the weather is clear, more than
400 sorties have been flown on
some days.
Souvanna told this reporter
he already had offered to stop
the bombing in north Laos if
the North Vietnamese pulled
their troops back to the Ho Chi
lpfinh trail.. '? .
Appi:oved-Voi
moved westott the
Jars. They had seized the plain moved back into Sam Thong on
with substantial American air March 31. Reinforcements were
support only last August. .? flown into Long Cheng by. Air
Troops in Disarray ' America, the CIA's southeast
By the time yang Pao and Asia air line. Supplies continue
his force of an estimated 8,000 to come, and as each daypasses yang Pao will get
stronger.
Thai Reinforcements
Among the reported rein-
forcements was a battery of
Thai artillery men, whose num-
bers have been estimated at
between 320 and 750.
The Thai, Laotian, and
American governments have
denied this report, but all three
governments have acknowl-
edged that Thai nationals had
come to fight?as Individuals..
Thais and Laotians are re-
lated'closely by race.. culture,
and family. As Souvalitiiiold a
' press
Have Logistics Woes conferene c April 7, there
- ?
In the next few days, how-
ever,the North Vietnamese
made no attempt to occupy
Sam Thong and failed to mass
enough troops to overwhelm
Long Cheng. It soon became in-
creasingly apparent that the
Hanoi forces were having logis-..
ties proIA6ms.
I teillgence sources reported ,
,aspn26011/660.450CIA-RDP80-01 6
men got' back to their strong-
holds at Sam Thong and Long
Cheng in late February, .the
Meo troops were 'in disarray.
No one had expected the
North: Vietnamese to, 'push
beyond the Plain of jars, where
they had lost 8,000 tons of
weapons and equipment In
yang Pao's thrust last sum-
mer. For the first time
since 1962, hokvever, they
moved south of the plain.
Sam Thong was' evacuated
without a fight on March 18 and
'yang Pao dug in at Long.
Cheng.
?
had been left' ehind on the
Plain of Jars and that only,,
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ommommil
HUNTSVILLE, ALA.
TIMES
APR 1 9 19/0
E - 53,936
S - 51,808
? A Part
of the
Story
I SIX HUNDRED PAGES of se-
cret testimony on U.S. involve-
ment in Laos will be released to-
morrow by Sen. Stuart Syming-
L?
ton, D-Mo. The .senator says that
it is with regret he has agreed to
the release with about 10 per cent
of the factual information still
withheld.
* * *
The release of the testimony ac-
cumulated by Symington's Senate
subcommittee on U.S. security
commitments comes after a six-
month battle with the White
House and the State Department.
The senator declares that the bat-
tle was to obtain release of enough
of the hearings to make them
meaningful.
Sen. Symington insists, and we
agree, that it is one thing to keep
? -
STATI NTL
silent about a covert operation,
but another to keep from the
American people a war that has,.
. cost billions of dollars? and, what
is more important, American lives. ;
U.S. participation in the war in
Laos has been kept secret long
past the time when it should have
been a matter of public record.
We hope Sen. Symington con-
tinues to battle for further revela-
tion..
A, ,A, ?A,
11
A staff aide to the senator in-
forms us there are several major
areas which remain secret:
There will be no details releas-
_ ed concerning the irregular Lao
forces supported by Central Intelli-
gence Agency funds. There will
be no information about increas-
ed combat air sorties over north
em Laos. There will be no infor-
mation about U.S.-operated air
bases in Thailand from which the
U.S. flies missions over Laos.
There will be nothing said about
U.S. financing of third-country n:L-
tionals in the war in North Laos.
* *
IAnd why is. the administratiod
fighting release? Because,, as it is
quite awe, such information
would show the U.S. had violated
the 1962 Geneva Accords which
guaranteed the neutrality of Laos.
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-01:
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THE NEW YORKER
18 April 1970
STATI NTL
THE TALK OF THE TOWN
. ....cannot he affected by :':fiuman effort. health resort and those of a concentra?
Notes and Comment ' The war has iniilived ilie hour of the tion camp. We might well feel slightly
War. ' les?
1968, America hail a kind of ' mad as we wrote things, such as
N
In the Ilays when the debate was "Whereas in a health resort there arc
national debate im the Vietnam
still vigorous, opponents of the war doctors
appeared that,; -as far used to find k helpful to exnose false ! giving people medicine, here, on
war, and it a
as the debate was concerned, the dis- . claims made by the g?v0.1?1?.fit, ?,?1- the contrary, wc field armed guards
?wilting forces won a victory of sorts.
. to pi,int out ironies and contradictions' systematically murdering the inmates."
All of the political candidates for na- . We might have the same sense of ah-
tional office incorporated a good deal of ? in government policy. Tlwy useil to ',sterility as we wrote that "whereas the
the rhetoric of the peace movement in say things like "The body count is American forces are supposed to be
? their public remarks, and all of them exaggerated, and anyway a body count . building democratic political structures
: seemed persuaded that withdrawal of is no r mea
eal sure t?f success," or "The . in the villages of Vietnam, we find that
? ? or troops was the only course the next 'pacification program isn't to,?;ing as Well ,; they arc bombing the villages and shoot-
u
??President could afford to follow. The as the government..s.,:eys it i.s'," or "The ing the villagers." The disparity be-
' war was shorn of its justifications not South Vietnamese ellictionisare rigged, tween the offiCial policy and the reality
SF
only in the minds of its veteran critics and the Saigon regime is a dictatorship is flow s? great that k eippears as though
but also, somewhat surprisingly, in the and doesn't have the sopport Of its own policy is developing in accordance with
minds of its former supporters. I lie people." And finally they pieced to- a set of rules that will he responsive to
demand for military victory in Vietnam gether the ultimate irony?that we the political situation in America hut
. all hut disappeared from national poli- seemed actually to be physically de- that the actual conduct of the war is
?. tics, and the considerably slackened de- . stroying the country we were supposed' developing according to a completely
: bate centered almost exclusively on the to he saving. In the last Year or so, . separatd ?set of rules, determined by
, question of how long it should take us I however, opponents of the war have the con di t on s of unspeakable brutal-
to get out. Hawkish sentiment appeared 'found that it is inadequate to repeat ity and confusion in Vietnam itself.
to undergo an odd twist, in which these arguments. Perhaps one reason (Our soldiers in Vietnam have started
anger at critics of the war intensified . is that the gap between the official ex-? referring to the United ...States and
hut support for the war actually de- planations and the realities we are other places outside Vietnam as "the
dined. ( A rally held in Washington faced whit daily on television and in -world"?as though Vietnam were
last week in support of military victory - : the newspapers has become so stag- on another planet.) The war, which .
in Vietnam ilrew, according to police ? geringly huge and so 1/11VIIIIIS that when Row grinds on without evoking either or-
. , .estimates, only fifteen thousand pel)- one persists in making these points one much support or much new criti-.-
' pl .) And yet now, nearly two years feels almost ludicrously simpleminded.;
e.sen, or much national debate of any
.after the beginning of the 1968 cam- Also, pointing out discrepancies he- kind, .seems to have acquired an in-
paign, in a peculiar atmosphere of tween the official versions and the re- Aalle life of its own, and to have de-
mental exhaustion, in which both op- . ' ;elides seems to presume a rationality Moped in utterly . unexpected ways
poncnts and supporters of the war seem in the whole enterprise that is now re- that neither its critics nor its supporters.
to have lost their forensic stamina, tow vealed to be entirely lacking. It is as ever anticipated. Several recent news
involvement in the conflict continues though we were taken on a tour of an stories have brought this feeling home .
on almost the same scale, and even alleged health resort that turned out in to us with particular force. A number .
threatens to expand into Laos .rind - fact to he a concentration camp, and. of them have been so strange as to
Cambodia. It is as though the public , were then obliged to write A report most *defy rational COMMCM, Anti we
. had shrugged its shoulders and decided describing in great detail the specific have been trying to imagine what this
II) accept. the war as inmething that ? ,differences between the facilities of a Adniinistrat would ay wou say about them
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if we were still in the period wlwn the
government felt obligated to justify
.and rationalize the consequences of
its policies in Vietnam. What com-
ment might the Administration make,
for example, about recent reports that
the Saigon police beat up disabled ?
veterans of their own Army when
!het' attempted to demonstrate for a
rise in tlwir disability allowance (which
can be as low as IWO 4lOnar5 111011th ) ? ?
1Vliat might government officials say
about the recent United States Army
report that at least thirty-five per cent
of the combat soldiers in one hrig,ade ;
are regular IISCES of ma ? What
justifications could be offered for send-
ing a lull-stoned army into the vil-
lages of Vietnam to wield the greatest
volume of firepower that any army has
ever possessed? (Around the same
time, there has been the peculiar dis-
covery, which we mentioned recently
in these pages, that the general we .
support in Laos may be fighting in
order to gain control of a- multimillion-
dollar opium trade in the contested re-
gion.) And what arguments could be.
advanced in defense of the First Infan-
try's decision?at what turned out to be
the cost of three American casualties--
to carve a mile-and-a-half-long boule-
vard in Ow Vietnamese jungle in the
shape of its divisional insignia? Situa-
tions such as these show that the Army,
like the nation itself, now has no idea
at all of what it is supposed to be do-
ing in Vietnam. They reveal that the
war has lost even the pretense of a pur-
pose, and has become nothing more
than ? a bloody playground for our.
i idealism and our cruelty..
NW
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Approved For Release 2ffigigaliNFMAR93sfipAOrlARR
18 APR 1970
0 U.S. Is Consi ering
Arms A id ti Cam o
By Murrey 'Warder ,;),? ranee suggested on April 1,
'? 'with calculated ambiguity.
; Yesterday, the United
; States expressed interest in
exploring the Soviet move.
? The United States is un- ,
Wexhirirton Post Staff Writer
The United States is con-
sidering giving limited arms
aid to Cambodia for "self-de-
fense" to checkmate any
ithreat by Vietnamese Com-
, munist forces to overrun the
? capital of Phnom Penh, it
was learned yesterday.
; Administration strategists
, reportedly rule out any mas-
sive U.S. military aid pro-
gram to Cambodia intended
! to drive out the 40,000 to
? 60,000 North Vietnamese
, and Communist invaders in
:.that nation. Such an effort
Is regarded as far beyond
I the capacity of the 35,000-
Man Cambodian army with-
out huge foreign help.
f, Normally any U.S. mill-
taiy aid program is accom-
panied by American mill-
tary advisers. But there is
reported to be great opposi-
tion inside the Nixon admin-
istration to sending such an
advisory team to Cambodia,
' even if the decision is ?made
to send some arms and war
er a .
' No actual decision has
been reached to respond af-
firmatively to Cambodia's
, military aid request which,
the United States said on
( Thursday is being "exam-
ined," informed sources ern-
On Capitol Hill, however,
new warnings were sounded
, yesterday against any Amer-
ican involvement in Cam-
bodia. .
The international diplo;
am tic circuit is new whirl-
ring with shrouded moves
and speculation about. Cam-
bodia and the deeply inter-
'twined wars in Vietnam and
Laos. This atmosphere of
r 4
'unpredictability was intensi-,
Vied Thursday by the unex-
pected SovJet expression of
Interest in a new Indochina.
likely to make any precipi-
;
tate move under these cir-
cumstances, 'U.S. sources in?,
dicate. But what the United
, States evidently wants to
convey is that it is not slam-,
? ming the door on Cambo-
dia's aid request this week.
to do so could , encourage
the formidable force of Viet- '
,namese Communist troops
in that country td force the,
month-old government of
Premier Lon Nol to guaran-
? tee them "sanctuary" from
the war in South Vietnam.;
This is what the United
States obviously wants to
interest when he said, "It sp-
pears to be that only a new
Geneva conference could
bring about a fresh solution
, I and a relaxation of tension ,
? ' on the Indochinese penin-
la sula . . .
If the Soviet comment is ?
. "serious," one U.S. source
typically said yesterday, it
? could have "really quite ex-
traordinary implications."
' Until now, the Soviet Uni-
on, in conformity with North
Vie t n a m's position, has
.? balked at all proposals for-a/
Geneva-wide conferenct" oh:1
Indochina, or even a confer- !!
ence on Laos, as President !
Nixon has proposed. North
Vietnamese Politburo mem-
ber Le Due Tho, on leaving
? Paris last week, gave a cold 7
, shoulder to the French pro-
tion that North Vietnamese
Premier Phan Van Dong
joined Silianpuk there this
week, but other Western
sources now say the visitor. ,
p? was North Vietnamese Com- ?
munist Party Leader Le ?
, Dunn, on his way to Moscow.
via Peking. ,
Le Duan reportedly was
greeted in Peking by Chi-
, ? nese Premier Chou En-lal,
I, One !inajor international
;Iquestien pending is whether .'
ChinqL- North Vietnam and
; otherwCommunist nations
will back Sihanouk's return
t to. the Communist-held sec;
? ? tor of Cambodia. If they do,
? the ? Communist powers
might then recoup the dam-
age to their interests from ?
?
'the March 18 coup which
overthrew Sihanouk, ? by .4
conXerence ivaricp
pprove
checkmate.
U.S. analysts privately'
have expressed considerable.
doubt that the Vietnamese
Communists in Cambodia
have any intention to "can-
, quer" that nation, as Lon,
? Nol has warned. Instead.
American specialists gener- ?,?
? 'ally believe it Is the Commu-
nist objective not to ,over....
; run .Phipm Penh, but to,
? .safeguard the 'occupied. re-
gions along the Cambodian- i??
?South Vietnamese border
and to assure ? supplies to :
maintain these troops, ca-
pacity to strike into South
Vietn
?1pnysicaiiy Supporting him as
' the "legal" ruler of Cam.
? bodia.
' This *quid pose a major.
:Challenge to the western-
.. oriented' government of
,.,Premier Lou Nol.
? Britain publicly fumed
1. down yesterday . Lon Nol's
, appeal for arms aid. ?
?
.,. "It, would not be appropri-
ate for us as co-chairman ,of
the 1954 Geneva conference
on Indochina to furnish min-
.:. tary assistance, a Foreign
1 ',I. Office spokesman said.
t, Britain has "welcomed" the
'; ? "important initiative of ,
,.France" in proposing an en-
larged conference on Indo-
china, a British official said
, in Paris yesterday. But in
?, fact no one, including
' France, has said exactly
. what kind of conference is
? contemplated except that it
should recognize., as the
A limited grant of 'U.S.
hrms aid to help defend this ?
Phnom Penh region there-
1.fore probably would be in-
teMed more as a symbolic
move, than a major military
action. Even so, however, it .
could raise the risk that it
was only the "opening
wedge" of a Vietnam-type
' U.S. Involvement, raising a
, ? clamor of domestic and in-
ternational alarm.
I Deposed Cambodian
' Prince Norodom Sihanouk is
now in Peking threatening
':to return to v Cambodia
di* ivikr2Igit
??
, French said on April 1, the ,
"indivisibility" of the prob-
lems in Vietnam, Laos and
-? Cambodia. '
Spokesmen at the White.
? house and State Department
both said yesterday the Unit-,
?? ed States is "interested in
?j exploring" what "the Soviet
government may have in
mind" by Soviet Ambassador
Yakov Malik's statement in'
?,! ;New York Thursday.
the Soviet ambaisa.,
glatIA
posal, emphasizing that set- 'I
tiement of the Vietnamese!-
, problem must come first,' ?
, "as a basis" for resolving
??the overall Indochina prob-
lem.
Many U.S. experts believe ,
that Malik's sudden show of ? ? ,
Soviet interest in an Indo- ,
, china-wide conference ? must
have been cleared in advance
with North Vietnam, which
could mean a shift of posi-
tion in Hanoi.
,. Senate To Bare
. Laos. Operations . e
..; .
A' senate subcommittee i
headed by Stuart Syming- ;
ton (D-Mo.) announced it 4
.
will lift on Monday part of
the veil of secrecy on U.S. ;
_involvement in Laos. Mean- " ?
while n e w congressional ?''
!. concern welled up over 1,
Cambodia.
c
Symington told a . news I ... ?
conference yesterday that A
t? transcript of Laos hearings'
will show that the "covert
1, operation" there has cost the
t United States "billions of
'dollars, and what is more
important, American lives.? ?
Great misgivings were ex-
pressed, meanwhile, about r?
the risk of "creeping U.S.
Involvement" In Cambodia
by many participants at the
opening of a two-day Con- ?
gressional Conerence on Na-
tional Security Affairs.
It should be the duty of '
thhe Nixon administration to
? consult with the Senate For.
eign Relations 'Committee,
: parent of the Symington
throb &Mid 0403 der."' ri
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601
s AN LFANDRu, CAL.
STATINTL
NEVIS
,
14 - 0,205
APR 17 1970
f
, Twenty-nine days after a right- and he kept his country out of
? wing coup deposed Prince the bloody mess in Vietnam and
! Sihanouk as Chief of State of Laos.
:. Cambodia, the new government ' While he was out of the coun- ? ,l',,
, was appealing to any and all try?under rightwing pressure? .
nations for whatever military', seeking aid to get the foreign.
help it could get. 'troops out of his country, his , .
, It was at war with the Viet , political foes unseated him. -
1 ' Cong. ' Within two weeks the new
, It is well to recall the swift military government called for
',. sequence of events which "volunteers" to 'man an army.
followed Sihanouk's ouster?(a . And shortly thereafter, Cam-
: move which the Russians--and hodians were fighting Viet- '
7. . many Americans--believe might namese. The conflict was, only
Viet-
/..
well have been precipitated by ? two weeks old when the news
7 the CIA. _That organization, came that 100 villagers of Viet-.
, origitirafforriT41 as a super-spy n a m os e extraction were
i.: system, has gravitated into a massacred by Cambodian troops.'' ..
,
? I; policy-making paramilitary or- At first the reports said they were
,r'. ganization which operates under killed by crossfire of Cambodian
, the cloak of utter secrecy in the and Viet Cong troops, but it was
: name of "national interest." later revealed that Cambodians
i ( It has been engaging in , performed the genocide.
military operations
, in Laos, And so while the Nixon Ad-
clandestinely for a long time, ministration has been refusing to
, finally smoked' out by the recent come to realistic grips with the
,
?advances of the Pathet Lao and : Vietnamese war, it is spreading?
: North Vietnamese. to Laos, now Cambodia.
' (Senator Albert Gore, member When will the ? citizens of this
of the Senate Foreign Relations c o u n t r y demand of their
Committee, recently hinted that g 0 v e r n m e n t that it end ?
. ,
,.
t testimony from the CIA indicated the nightmare of Southeast Asia?
!, that its Laotian military role was When will our people awaken tol
,..? assumed on orders of the see our country as it is seen by
(. National Security Council. When the rest of the world?as a giant
the order was issued, no one power, meddling in the affairs
; knows except those directly in- ? of people 12,000 miles ? away,
, volved, because the National killing them, destroying their
i ?
Security Council, like the., CIA, ?crops, ruining their land with
,?
','.; operates under wraps. Its . poison chemicals?
. decisions, however, affect the The U.S. role is the outrage,
?' future of the country, for better of the century, a blight on t-r',
; or for worse). ? , ' i nation's proud history, a canccr
While Sihanouk ? ruled Cam_ , that will devour our ideals, our ..
1
. bodia, 4141 country managed to dreams, our nobility. For this
/AP PENNichMillie keaSer?0(1110344040n,CIAARDP80-41801R000700040001 -3
nr,-,-- ' ;;;:i,ni:k yietnameso.4%,-,. war -'
?
The War Spreads lie
The White House Fiddles
,?,
Approved For Release 2001/03104 :weltDRDP80-01
15 APR 1970
(Concerned about Laos? All of
a ?sudden n'iany people are?peo-
ple who have never seen or
heard of this small. Southeast
. Asian kingdom before are now
finding its , name in screaming
: newspaper headlines. President'
Nixon now is forced to admit
that. yes. there are U.S. forces
. in Laos. and news analysts now'
tell their readers that. yes.
-Laos may become a -second
Vietnam."
. If 'you had been reading the
? Daily World last year. you would
have a pretty good idea of what
was going on in Laos. long be-
fore Nixon was compelled to tell
you a small part of the truth
about U.S. involvement there.
You would have read:
May 24. 1969: the U. S. steps
up its air raids on Laos five
'times above the . previous levels:
' U.S. CIA agents in Laos are
using the U.S. AID ( Agency for
'International Development) Mis-
sion as a front for their Laotian
activities.
May 27: A "Focus on Asia"
column gives you the detailed
background on U.S. bombing of
.Laos?who. what. vhen. where
and why. %
? July 26: the .Daily World
charges that U.S. and Thai troops
are fighting the Lao Patriotic
, Front: detailed background of
the 1962 Geneva Agreement on
Laos and 1963 CIA coup there. ?
Aug. 7: another "Focus on
Asia" tioiunin tells you that the
U.S. is using two secret bases in
. northern Laos (Sam Thong and
Long Cheng i to bomb Lao libe-
? rated areas: the bases are full
,of U.S. Special Forces and Meo
, tribesmen. U.S. operation of the
Lao economy (gold and opium)
is detailed.
Aug. 13: the D.W. charges that
in the secret bases of Sam Thong
illx.n adrnis wilTat
our readers krzeuf
..????????
and Long Cheng there are 1,500
U. S. troops, whose base is at
Udorn, Thailand, and who are
members of the 46th Special
Forces unit. General yang Pao
is named as head of a 15,000
man "secret army" of Meo
tribesmen backed by the CIA.
The D.W. says there are 3,000
Thai troops at the bases too.
Sept,. 23: the D.W. says the
"secret" war in Laos is not so
secret any more, gives a detail-
ed breakdown? of U.S. military
involvement including numbers
of "military attaches" i 72 ) at
the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane.
The D.W. gives a precise list
of Air Force personnel and
equipment in Laos: 2.000 USAF
advisors. 3.5Q0. maintenance per-
sonnel, types of aircraft and
helicopters, where based and in
what numbers.
Sept. 27: The D.W. strongly
.denies President Nixon's asser-
tion that there are no U.S. forces
involved in Laos. notes that there
are thousands of U.S. military
"advisors," "attaches" and CIA
agents. using civilian Covers to
hide their actitiiities.
March 6. 1970: President Nixon
admits that there are -some"
U.S.personnel involved in Laos.
cites the total number as 1,040,
says U.S. involvement is limited
and defensive. '
March 11: Pentagon admits
U.S. military in Laos gets com-
bat pay.
March 11: story breaks that
CIA is involved in Laos. uses
U.S. AID mission as a front. has,
set up a secret. army of Meo
tribesmen based on two secret
centers. Sam Thong and Long
Cheng.
Read what President Nixon is.
going to admit tomorrow, or six
months from now, or never?
read it today in the Daily World! )
?
STATI NTL
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STATI NTL
Sihanouk hits Cam fia o dk MOSSO cre ?
which juts into South Vietnam
were only victims of -the hazard
of war." They denied reports b
U.S. newsmen that the Vietnam
ese were massacred. They assert
ed the slain Vietnamese had been
' caught in a cross-fire between
.; Cambodian soldiers and what i
termed -Vietcong" forces.
Jack Walsh. of UPI, a veteran
'of 18 months' reporting of the Vi-
etnam war, had said on the scene
in Prasaut that the victims all
?seemed to have beef!' killed at
close range within the refugee
compound after having been told
to run by the armed Cambodians.
Prince Norodom Sihanouk. in i
Radio Peking broadcast on Mon-
day accused the Lon Nol govern-
ment of massacring more than
500 since taking power. .
In Cambodia's southern Ta'keo.
r province. where 'regular army
troops ? killed 109 pro-Sihanouk
Daily World Foreign Department
i The Cambodian rulers claimed
yesterday that 90 Vietnamese ref-
ugees killed April 10 in Prasaut.
In the -Parrot's .Seak" area
. demonstrators last week. the Lon .
s Nol government charged that
y -several hundred Vietcong" in-
- vaded a military post and took
- police and army personnel pris-
oner. about 45 miles south of the
capital of Phnom Penh. More ?
t fighting was centered in Chrey
Thom. 36 miles east of the cap- ,
ital. where the Lon, Nol regime '
said ??1.000 Communists" had at-
tacked the town.
In southern Lads. the Lao Patri- '
otic Front took the town of Mu-
ong Pha lane. about 50 miles east
' of the Thai border. ?
? Muong Phalane was a *base for
the U.S. CIA's clandestine army in
Laos. ,The U.S.. through the CIA ??
and Agency for International De-
velopment IAIDI, as well as oth-
or agencies, trains, equips and di- .
rects the -Royal Lao- armed
forces, and finances the Lao mu-.'
itary budget
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YOUNGSTOWN OHIO
VINDICATOR
E 100,987
S ? 155,444
'APR 1 1970
War I-Ias Ensnaied
Newsman Tells YSU gaily
..,??, .
"Nixon has lost his.chance politically to blame :the
war on the Democrats. It is, now thoroughly his war
and he is trapped as badly as Johnson was because he
won't admit the whole thing is a mistake," Blair Clark,
associate publisher of The New York, Post, said Tues-
day at the main spring moratorium activity at Youngs-
town State University.
"The prospects of the war in
all of Indo-China are terribly
omninous," he said, "and the
war definitely is spreading to
other countries like Cambodia
and Laos."
"The evidence of the 'spread-
ing war," he said, "lies in the
fact that our hand, partaicularly
the Central Intelligence Agency,
has been active , in both coun-
tries. The language in which we
discuss the war is getting more
and more' bellicose.. Nobody
talks anymore about anything
but the enemy, whereas Dean
Rusk used to call them the other
side." , ?
"I feel there is ,a growing at-
mossiketbk.? ?
country," he said, "so much so
that a meeting like this one may
actually be dangerous in ,a few
months,
"This repression is led by
(Vice President Spiro) Agnew
and the threat of the liberty ot
the press and people who dis-
agree with government policy,"
he said. '
While seemingly touching all
the bases, Clark referred to the
moon shot as an investment of
billions of dollars in the mili-
tary-industrial complex.
' He said, "We must thin
whether this whole program
the right way of investing bil-
lions of dollars. It is a perfect
trial complex selling ;ifs policies i
to the governincht." -
Clark, former campaign man-
ager for Eugene McCarthy and i
vice president of CBS N, was ..)
introduced by the Rev. Burton
Cantrell.
His a,ppearance was spon-
sored by the YSU Community of
Concern and Youngstown Chap-
ter of SANE, both organizations
?am.
seeking to end the war in Viet-
4
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UTICA, N.Y
PRESS
:
U? 28,782
APR 14 1970
Goodell Again Presses Nixon orililla
Senator Charles Goodell is carrying his he has had amazing success, winning
t
I , Independence still further in saying he ?.. popular support 'and his party's endorse-
would have "grave questions about sup- ;., ment. Perhaps Mr. Nixon will announce a
( port" for President Nixon in 1972, if the ' - speed-up of troop withdrawals 'Thursday:
r. Vietnam war is intensified. .' night, further enhancing. Mr. GoodeIrs
L . According to the most recent Gallup ' po,sitinri. i 4'
,, , 7.' ..;
, . !I
Poll, Mr. Goodell has considerable public ,,,: ,
A speed-up would be most ? welcome i
: support for his anti-escalation stand. For . ,? : ..:t.
, news lot: the puhlici as well as Mr. Gnodeu43
, the first time, the poll showed that less 11,...,..tii4..,:iiiiijj.iii?Liki.t..,j.,,._...A /
than half of the voters support the Presi-. ? , 4,
1. dent's handling of the war. The public,:.
!, support for Mr. Nixon's de-escalation plan
I has been eroding gradually since last fall.
, .
,,. ,
L. ' ? ? ?
r THE PENTAGON HAS now announced ?'
nthat the latest troop withdrawal 'has been'..,,,
\
completed ahead of schedule, but we still
,have more than 400,000 troops In Vietnam. .i
j: In recent weeks, the war has escalated,
not only in South Vietnam but also Laos
and Cambodia, raising questions of our..
helping
1 helping out In the latter two countries.
i
:p
Our military also has reportedly urged ,,i
:Mr. Nixon to delay further troop with- A
drawals, pending a clarification of the
Communists' intentions.
. I
There has also been the temptation for
i us to expand our operations into Cambodia:,
' and to beef up our ,L14.4forts in Laos. ,.1
i;Fortunately, the White House appears to 2,4'
i
be playing it cool on both questions. 7:
In light of the new situation, a
, peace demonstration this week, and the 1 :(
''.growing lack of support the President's
., ?
war strategy, Mr. Nixon is likely to seek If,1
'...
.to bolster his position when he addresses .,',i
i the public on the war this Thursday night-1
,
? ?
,
MR. GOODELL MAY BE foolhardy' in
t 17, attacking his own party's, President in thfq'
Nuest...f4P.c40.*3x..,t#Aci:fatii
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HOUSTON, TEX.
POST APR 1 3 1970
14 - 289,395
r 322.761
roouna-ut
at is "'.a
in aos, in
TT'
. . . I was intrigued by the patent in-
congruity of . . . "Can we learn from his-
.tory?" (By. Carl T. Rowan, Post April 1).
'; A valid predicate was laid when Rowan
stated little beknown facts, such as: ?
"Dulles prevailed . . . to make Laos a . . .
? 'bastion against Communism,' so the U.S.
poured in some $300 million by 1960 . . . to
? build a Royal Laotian Army of 25,000 men that
would be a carbon copy of the U.S. Army.
". . . the U.S. maneuvered to oust Souvanna
and replace him with . . . Phoumi Nosavan,
? who was hustled back to Laos from Paris by
'CIA operatives. . .
".. . So he (President Kennedy) .. . worked
out a compromise that restored Souvanna to
?the premiership of a coalition government
Now for the incongruity.
?
L; "SOUVANNA, FACED with . , . an OB-
VIOUS EFFORT BY NORTH VIETNAM TO
r, OVERWHELM his country, turned out to be
.!., anything but the PRO-RED PATSY (emphasis
(added) . . .
!t, Who do we, as Americans, think we are?
a
t;,We funnel $300 million ($1.50 for every man,
g woman and child in the U.S.) into Laos, to
i? make a CARBON COPY of the U.S. Army,
I then we not only maneuver to oust Souvanna,
'i Laos' premier, but are presumptious enough
1.
to provide his replacement. Not satisfied, we
'i restore Souvanna, whom we have ousted pre-
viously, to premier.
..,
By what right, privilege or power do we en-
il r
ter into a country, try to stamp a "carbon copy" of our Army on their Army, (which can ifikl..
tt
, be used against the people as well as for , ?
?...., ,,,??t_., ..?,....i...L:?,.......0......4.i...b4.,
, Prince Samna* name Wawa...004
them); oust, replace, and re-oust the replace- .
'1-?
, ment premier with the premier we originally,
. ..
,i ousted?
?
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EDITORIALS
The Third Indo-China War
? CIA-RDP80-01
STATI NTL
have been tossed indirectly?perhaps through That I,
It is the nature of governments to deceive. In the; intermediaries. (We know that Thai troops have been
perspective of its two-century existence, the govern-'fighting on the American side in Laos, and that the
ment of the United States is no, worse than others. In! Thai satraps are unexcelled in intrigue.)
fact, in its early history, its candor was considerably
better than the average. Now, however, it appears to
be making up for lost time. Mr. Nixon may plead,
plausibly enough, that Vietnam is not his war. He
did, however, undertake to get us out of it. The plain
fact is that the war is being extended, and so far Mr.
Nixon has done nothing to prevent its spread. On the
contrary, his policy of Vietnamization is dragging us
deeper into the Indo-Chinese quagmire. Unless he
takes forthright action to arrest this trend, it will be
difficult to avoid the suspicion that he is not averse
to developments that will enable him to keep mas-
sive American military power in Asia, and that re-
cent events have been largely of our making.
Of course, that is not the official scenario. Official-
So now the Vietcong and North Vietnamese who
have been using the Cambodian sanctuary are caught
in a squeeze between, on the east, the South Viet-
namese, aided by reinforced American detachments I
close to the border and by American gunships firing
into Cambodia, and on the west, such forces as the '1
new government of Cambodia can muster. From the
standpoint of the Pentagon and the CIA it is a muchi,/
more agreeable situation than when Prince Sihanouk
held the reins. It is worth noting, also, that General
Westmoreland has long advocated military action
against Cambodia.
Can our Southeast Asian allies act in matters of
such importance without American approval and!
some kind of commitment that, If the gamble turns
ly, we were taken by surprise when the coup ousted against them, Uncle Sam will not let them go down
Prince Sihanouk; we are now waiting for the dust to the' drain? The Carnbodians say they are not asking
settle, and perhaps hoping for events to take a turn for American military help now. They do not say
that might redound to our advantage. There is a sug- they will not ask tomorrow.
gestion that Sihanouk was overthrown because the What has happened took considerable rigging. Did
enemy is losing, is being pushed back, and that this the President know about it? Did he want to know ,
accounts for the turn to the right in Cambodia which, about it? How much control has Mr. Kissinger got '
over operations in the field? Does even General
Abrams know exactly what goes on while he runs
the war from a desk in Saigon and With an occasion-
al visit to the numerous fronts for which he, or the
CIA, is responsible?
In the news these latest developments are referred ,
low level. The CIA upset that balance by egging on to as the second Indo-China war. The count seems
its mercenaries, deployed with the aid of American.:short. First there was the war in Which the French
"advisers." The enemy retaliated and seized a ma- . Jot the flower of their officer corps and got the coup )
jor piece of the Plain of Jars,. Did the CIA plan it
that way? They may have been as innocent as un-
born babes, but that is not their usual role. Anyhow,
it happened; and it now appears that Laos is in dire
though nominally neutralist,,had been giving shelter
to some 40,000 to 60,000 North Vietnamese or Viet-
cong troops.
That scenario warrants scrutiny. It begins in Laos,
where there was a tacit standstill with the enemy.
r It was incomplete, to be sure, but fighting was at a
de grace at Dienbienphu. Then there was the secon
Indo?China war, engineered mainly by Lyndon B.
Johnson, and which proved his political nemesis.
Now we have the third war. Will it rescue Mr. Nixon
straits?another domino is in danger of falling. There politically, or ruin him? He must be thinking hard.;
is one difference, however, from the earlier domino his risks are not small.
game: the public does not seem to be concerned. It
does not demand that we "save" Laos; it would rath-
er that we got out of Southeast Asia, and the sooner
the better, as long as we retain , some shreds of
superpower dignity.
The illicit scenario continues with the coup in Cam-
bodia. Whoever pulled the strings, the result was
very much to the liking of the Pentagon and the
CIA, and perhaps of an Administration bent on keep-
ing a big, sprawling foothold in Asia. (See Michael
Klare: "The Great South Asian War," The Nation,
March 9.) It passes understanding that Prince Siha-
nouk's rivals should have acted so boldly, unless they
had substantial covert backing It may be assumed
that the CIA no longer delivers sledgehammer blows,
as in 1953 when Mosspaegh as elimlnaj
Whatever 4ptPMiqIl t
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STATINTL
WANTED: SOLDIERS OF FORTUNE
U.S. officials maintain they will send no ground
troops into Laos or Cambodia?but civilian mer-
cenaries appear to be something else again. CIA
agents in Saigon are actively recruiting both
American and non-American civilians there?
construction men, U.S. Government employees,
men who have left the Army but can't quite bring
themselves to leave the war?to lead raiding par-
ties of Meo tribesmen against the North Vietnam-
ese in Laos. One such offer last week included a
salary of $1,000 a week and a week's vacation in ,
Taiwan for every four weeks in the field. Pros- '
pective employees are asked to submit resumes
in Bangkok, where there is less chance of unwel-
come publicity than in Saigon.
THE END OF THE SIHANOUK TRAIL '
Sihanoukville, the port in southern Cambodia
that funneled supplies to the Communists in
South Vietnam along the "Sihanouk Trail," has
been entirely closed by the new regime in Phnom
Penh. But from the Communist point of view,
this is not a particularly heavy blow. Intelligence
reports indicate that no new Communist supplies
had arrived in the port for the past year and that
Prince Sihanouk had held on to earlier shipments- ,
in order to dribble them out to Communist forces
for political leverage.
ROK-U.S.S.R.: FADING ENMITY?
The Republic of Korea has invited the Soviet Un-,
ion to send delegates to the Asian Development-..i.
Bank's convention in Seoul this month. This is
the friendliest gesture the South Koreans have
made to the Russians, longtime patrons of the
rival North Korean regime, in twenty years. With ?
North Korea drawing closer to China and the
United States talking about reducing or with- -
drawing its 55,000-man garrison in South Korea,
Seoul is apparently looking for new friends
wherever it can find them.
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STATI NTL
Hanoi Troops Hammer A rea
f US. Aid Base in Laos
By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star
VIENTIANE ?Fighting
flared again in North Laos over
the weekend, reliable sources
said today, when more than 500
North Vietnamese infantrymen
assaulted government positions
around battered Sam Thong.
North Vietnamese troops cap-
tured government positions west
and north of Sam Thong, the
major U.S. support base, 75
miles northeast of here, but
failed to penetrate the base it-
self.
Twenty-seven North Vietnam-
ese bodies were found. Casual-
ties from the defending Men
guerrilla forces were described
as "moderate."
However, Lao army ambul-
ances, one driven by an Ameri-
can, were passing constantly be-
American aircraft, and the Vien-
tiane military hospital.
Thirty-one more North Viet-
namese were killed in other
fighting around Sam Thong this
weekend. Eight were killed
when a patrol penetrated within
1,000 yards of Sam Thong's air-
strip. Eight more died in a Meo
ambush near Sam Thong and
15 were said to have been killed
by U.S. air strikes against
North Vietnamese troops on
route 4 east of Sam Thong.
The weekend fighting follows
the pattern of North Vietnamese
light probes and infantry at-
tacks against weaker govern-
ment positions.
American and Moo command-
ers based in Long Chien, south
of Sam Thong, were countering
this , by airlifting troops from
,tweeo Vientiane airport where hilltop to hilltop, keeping 'the
I 'casualties were unloaded from North Vietnamese baffled... vii
I... AI ? 172i. 1140114l.:...1:',4 .1)14i ,4;%
These troops were carried by
light aircraft flown by American
civilians working for Air Ameri-
ca, which has the Central Intelli-
gence Agency as one of its cus-
tomers. The Americans were
coming under fire. .
This morning three 122mm
rockets landed within 100 yards
of the Long Chien airstrip which .
the Americans use.
In other fighting in Laos, '
North Vietnamese troops for the ,
fourth consecutive day hit Bou- .
alorn, the last government guer- ?
rilla outpost in government
hands north of the Plain of Jars.
Laotians were pushed from .
one mountaintop position when ?
they said they ran out of ammu-
nition and water. This Lao unit
suffered ntr Casualties.
In South 'Laos, Communist
troops overcan the Tang VeL
guerrilla position west of the Ho
Chi Minh Trail. The North Viet-
namese retreated this morning '
after U.S. air strikes which the
Lao estimated after retaking
the position cost SO North Viet-
namese casualties, mostly
wounded.. :
. . ? . ? ', ? .. ?
.?.:
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11 April 70
STATI NTL
THE TALK OF THE TOWN
:Notes and Comment
Representative 'rummy is in the
middle of a hard campaign, and this is,
if course, campaign oratory. It so hap- ?
pens, though, that his adviser on South-
east Asian affairs is Professor John T. ?/
McAlister, Jr., of the ?Voitilrow Wil-
son School of Public and International
Affairs, at Princeton, who is the author
of "Viet-Nam: The Origins of keen-
Imhof" and is probably the must mi. ?
nent scholar in the Southeast Asian
field. Suspecting that it was on his au-
thority that the candidate made these
extraordinary assertions, we checked
with the Professor and found that this'.
was indeed the case. He would, he said, 4
swear to the truth of them in any fa-
rum. The next move, we should think;
_impldile up to Senator Fulbright.
N March 24th, Representative ? r
John V. Tunney, a CaliforniA ?
Democrat who seeks his party's
. nomination for United States senator,
addressed the Wilshire Chamber of
Commerce in Los Angeles and made
some charges about our involvement in
Laos that have not, as far as we have
been able to learn, previously been
made. We yield the floor to the con.
, grvitstrum:
1,.
We are today engaged in at secret
war in Laos, a tribal war in which the
? C.I.A. has committed the United States
; to support a faction of Men tribesmen,
? led by General Vang Pao, whose sole
; objective is to dominate other factions of
this opium-producing Men tribe through-
out Northern Laos. The C.I.A. has in-
volved us in this covert (operation; which
is being fought around the Plain of Jars, ?
more than one thousand miles away from
the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Adminis-
tration has deliberately veiled in secrecy .
our deepening involvement in ao opium
.. tribal war which has the potential to
- engulf all of Southeast Asia in a full-
fledged conflict which would have global
; repercussions....On grounds of moral
indignation, as a defender of democracy, ;
we have unwittingly allowed ourselves to
become involved in a situation which, to
the Meo tribesman or Laotian warlord,
has very little to do with his major cash
crop?opium. For this tribal war has, as
. one of its prizes, an area capable of pro-
ducing, on an annual basis, four to 'ten ?
' tors of marketable opium. This is equal
to from two to six million dollars in Lao-
tian currency. Relined as heroin and sold ?
on the streets of Los Angeles, it would
bring nearly nine hundred million dol-4,
? Jars. ... The clandestine yet official opera-
tiors of the United States government
, could be aiding and abetting herointraf-
fic here at home. ? 1
?
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BLOOMSBURG, PA.
PRESS ? !
APRt 0 1970.
- 11,115
h.Rope.Tune
VVENTS' IN ,Southeast ? ,Asia have Involved, but personnel does not show
made this, 'a time for 'tight rope ' 1,yp on either Embassy or Aid payrolls.
walking in 'Washington if we are ,to Planes bombing supply lines are
avoid increased militar,y involvement .`based r.outside Laos, but of ) the
? 1
there: Both in our, capital and 'in ' Americans employed under
gov-
Moscow caution 'is :evident. ernment contracts, 200 are pilots and
;?? . Tension . there:' has heightened 't,j100 ground employes working -for the
,because of internal conflict in, r.,two ? ,
Cambodia, for Communist pressure on At a time When we are attempting
the: Cambodians has increased since ,:.to reduce our forces, in Vietnam,. it
the Ouster. of Prince Sihanouk and ?, i would be foolhardy, 1.0 get ,Mixed up
, ?the new premier to the ,,uncertain situations prevailing
consolidate power.. Outside ' pressurof 'both Law and, Cambodia..?-
apparently can do' little to restorei.:
1.
stability and:mightinvolve More risks.I.,
'than benefits for this country.
Complicating ? the situation is the.
: bombing of supply lines within
'which have been - used with little
impediment by the. North Vietnamese,i'
to furnish .support to Suerrillas in
South Vietnam,
Secrecy shrouds the American role
? In Laos; but the personnel there is
sufficiently .large , to 'constitute a
t: clanger. A month. ago President' Nixon
i said the number was 616, With an
additional 424 employed on contract
;.to the government or contractors. The;
; civilians perform what amounts to:
`military functions under; auspices of
the 'U.S. Embassy, the Agency. 4gency..,,forklk7
'International.,:)Development,i,
conwanies under. charter tojho latter
America and Continental
? Service's. More than 200 Air Force and !I
Army attaches,.. regular lri,J
4? officers, serve as .advisers In 'the fieldh
and 114 aerial observers and ,qotters?
:for bombing or artillery, zniislOris.' thel
sentr4?.Ditglligence.,Apyic,T,c,a1p7:13,.; ti
'f ?
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10 AP11.19
N. Viet Troops Find No. 1 Enemy
Samuel Jameson. chief of Altho, the Mco general has ported a n oiher American!
" THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE'S broadcast appeals urging his bombing raid on North Viet- I ?
?namesc positions had been
conducted from bases in Thai-
land. Clauds of haze, however,
have curtailed the raids on silver neckbands. It was their
most days since the beginning way of keeping their wealth in
of the year. a land without banks and
Elsewhere at Landing Site 37 savings accounts.
a new market was thriving. The Meo are a dramatic
contrast to the Montagnaid hill
tribes of neighboring Viet Nam.
Whereas the Montagnards are
dark skinned, the Meo look
almost like Chinese. Unlike the
Montagnards,
Bodily cleanliness and sanita-
tion also appear to be greater
concern for the Meo than for
than for the Montagnard.
The adaptability and relative
sophistication of the Meo, as
seen at Landing Site 37, helped
explain why the North Viet-
namese have singled out their
troops and their leader, Gen.
yang Pao, as the major target
of the current offensive.
Fighting recently has
slackened off but western mili-
tary observers predict new
attacks will occur.
Not a True Match
The Mco, however, are not
fighting for Laos, a politichl
entity which exists more on
maps than it does in the hearts
of the people who live within its
?????,' Tokyo bureau, is presently people to come back to am
touring southeast Asia to Thong, the Meos at Landing
" report on the changing mill- Site 37 showed no signs of,
?,
tar) situation there. Today's leaving their new found home.
article tells of the fight being Robert MeClymonds, 51, of
? 1,? aged by the Meo guerrilla Walton, Kas., said 1,000 new
The New York Review of Booko
Approved For Release 2001?Ogal: 6W-RDP?MIRMIRO
0 7.)6ter Dale Coo
LI?9 Iknzona, airad. the
Laos: The Story Nixon Won't Tell
? :,
8TATINTL STATJNTL
Peter Dale Scott 'Although the present war in Laos the then Premier Prince Souvanna
dates back to 1959, the Presidcnl'Sl Phouma, received more votes than any
President Nixon cannot expect peace statement is totally silent about the other candidate.)
In Vietnam while escalating the warmn 1959-61 period. This is understandable, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in A Thou
Laos. His Key Biscayne statement on.since virtually every independent ob- stand Days, has recorded the response
Laos of March 6 itself draws attention server has condemned the subversive
of the US to the election:
to the connection between the two
activities in Laos of the CIA and other
conflicts, which has since been under- Washington decided to install a
con
US agencies during the period when
lined by. Vice President Agnew, In reliably pro-Western regime. CIA
._.. Mr. Nixon was Vice President. A spooks put in their appearance, set
reality the so-called "Vietnandiation"
RAND. Corporation report on Laos ? up a Committee for the Defense
Vietnam was balanced by a sharp concluded, for example, that in 1959 . of National Interest (CDNI) and
in 1969 of the ground war in South
' brought back from France as es
escalation of the US air war in Laos,' it was not the pro-Communist Pathetl:
chief an. energetic, ambitious and
beyond the range of Inquisitive TV; Lao but the right-wing Sananikone devious officer named Phoumi No-
camera teams. This escalation is now government (which had been installed !' savan. Prince Souvanna, who had '
rationalized (though not admitted) by by US intrigue and was counseled by . shown himself an honest and re-
the President's statement on Laos, US iaisers) that "precipitated the spected if impulsive leader, was
v.hich puts forth a grossly misleading final crisis which led to war in Laos." '. forced out of office lby a wit
' .. holding of US aid and CIA encour-
,history of North Vietnamese 'persist- This "final crisis" followed a probe . .
ent subversion" and "invasion." . by a government patrol into the small :.? agement of a parliamentary crisis,
allegedly through the use of
4
' This story was put together long
before the present administration.
Many of its allegations were supplied
years ago by US intelligence sources,
who had a stake in misrepresenting the
Laotian war which they had themselves
largely helped to create. The statement
must however be answered, since it is
at least as misleading as the intelligence
reports of North-Vietnamese and Chin-
ese aggression in South Vietnam, which
preceded our air war in that country.
Of course, the escalation in the long
run will involve two sides, and some
day historians can analyze the whole
involvement in Laos of Thailand, the
Philippines, South Vietnam, North
Vietnam, the United States, Taiwan,
and China.
It has been not North Vietnam but the and were permitted to participate in actions deflected the Pathet Lao from
' It is important, however, to see that ?
United States, and more particularly its elections for specially created seats in the role of political opposition into a
apparatus of civil and military Intel- ,the National Assembly. In this election military insurgency for which it was
ligence agencies, which has been con- the Pathet Lao and their allies (the poorly prepared, and hence it was
sistently guilty of the initial subversion party of left-leaning neutralist Quinim forced increasingly to depend on North
of whatever order has been established :Pholsena) obtained 32 percent of the Vietnamese support. (By 1969 this
in Laos through international agree- ,
'votes and thirteen of the twenty-one included regular units of the North
'ments. Thus the President's statement., contested seats, showing that they had :Vietnamese army.)
., grown considerably in popularity in: in August 719'59 the government
,?,/ indubitable . CIA and US sir (otos; , meets. (Prince Souphanouvong, , itself received a large increase in US
should be examined in the Rini 017 the four years since the 1954 Agree- ,
the military support by claiming, falsely,
activities that he wholly leaves out. i ii,Pathet Leo leader and half-brother of that who' been invaded.. by a North
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 .
but sensitive disputed area of Huong bribes) ... a veteran politician
Lap on the North Vietnamese border?, . named Phoumi Sananikone look
which had been governed as part of his place.
Vietnam in the days of the French..
When the patrol was, predictably, , The Pathet Lao were then excluded
fired upon, the government charged from the new Cabinet approved on
the North Vietnamese with frontier August 18. 1958..
incursions and claimed that this was .
related to a planned insurrection by: ,... , .
the Pathet Lao. It then obtained a vote In may 1959 one 'Pathet Lao bat-
of emergency powers from the Assem- talion refused, understandably, to be
.bly, and soon ordered the two remain- assimilated under the new right-wing
lug battalions of the Pallid Lao to be government, and it decamped to a
Integrated forthwith into the national valley on the North Vietnamese bog-
army. der. The Sananikone government then
The Pathet Lao hail previously lin declared that i the Pathet Lao had
November 1957) apeed to this Werra- committed an act of open rebellion
lion, as part of a political settlement in and that only a military solution
hich they received two Cabinet posts appeared possible. It thus by its own
Approved For Release 2Ciffiffaide RDP80-01
9 APR 1970
Laos Hearing!
Records Set 1
For Release
By the Associated Press
Sen. Stuart Symington says
agreement has been reached
with the Nixon administration to
release after five months of ne-
gotiations the transcript of
closed door hearings on Laos.
Symington, chairmn of the
Foreign Relations subcommittee,
on natiOnal commitments, told
the Senate yesterday the record
to be released?within two
, weeks?is a "sanitized version."
He said it deals in part "with
the dangers of past administra-
tion policy in Laos which permit-
ted military involvement and es-
calation to be wrapped in official
secrecy, and thus to grow with-
out the benefit of proper public
discussion."
"Those of us who have worked
to t have that secrecy dropped?
as it was with the President's
March 6 statement on Laos?
hope the unhappy lesson of Laos
secrecy will not be lost on this
administration as it designs its
policy toward Cambodia," the
Missouri Democrat said.
Symington aides said about 10
percent of the transcript has
been deleted. At one point, they
Said, the administration sought
to delete 60 percent.
Besides Los, four more tran-
scripts remain to be issued, on!
'Thailan d, Taiwan, Japan. ,
Okinawa, and 1Core!k.,
?
STATI NTL
:
,
,
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r-
OlUCKOCi 'Mint=
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601
8 APR 1970 STATINTL
1Laos Head Tells Views to Tribune
Samuel Jameson, chief of tha
Tokyo bureau of Tip; Ctn-
. CAGO TRIBUNE, IS in south-
east Asia to study the widen-
ing military and political
situation there. The following
is the first of several articles.
BY SAMUEL JANIESON
I [Chief of Tokyo Bureau)
ICAlcege Tribune Press Service]
VIENTIANE, Laos, April 7?
Premier Souvanna Phouma of
Loos said for the first time in
Ian exclusive interview here
!today that he had not autho-
lrized and did not control
;American bombing raids on the
!Il'o Chi Minh trail in southern
Laos.t..
? The 68-year-old prince said,
however, that he did not object
, to such raids.
, "No, we do not control them
(the bombing raids on the Ho
:Chi Minh trail)," he said. "How
,could we control them? The
only way to control them would
be to prohibit American planes
; from flying over Laos. Even
; then, if planes came in from
I the sea, how could we stop
them? How could we even know
they were bombing? There are
no villages in the area. The
area is all mountains end
Jungles."
Explains His Position
Souvanna made his come
merits in the course of a
detailed explanation of how he
originally asked the United
States to start serial missions
over northern Laos, an area
unaffected by the Ho CM Minh
trail.
"There is no written agree-
ment (giving the United States
permission to bomb northern
Laos). It is an oral agree-
ment," be said.
He said it ass concluded In
May, 1964, when communist
Pathet Lao and North Vietna-
mese troops attacked the forces ?
of Kong Le, then the leader of
the neutralist army, In the
Plain fo Jars. Souvanna said he
asked his half brother, Prince
Souphanouvong, titular head of
the Pathet Lao to stop the
fighting. Souphimouvong re-
fused, claiming that the battle
Involved only neutralist forces
fighting among .themselves, not
Pathet Lao or North Vietna-
mese.
Asks for Ilelp
When the plain fell, Souvannu
said he decided to ask for help.
The prince said he made two
requests to the United States.
One was for arms and ammuni-
tion for the neutralist army,
which bad run out of ammuni-
tion for its Russian-made weap-
ons. The other was for Ameri-
can reconnaissance flights over
roads from North Viet Nam
Into northern Laos. ?
Nothing in the ..,agreement
covered the Ho Chi Minh trail,
he indicated. The roads covered
by the agreement are in
northern , Laos and are not
connected with the Ho Chi Minh
trail farthd eouth in the Laos
panhandle.
The step-up in American
bombing in northern Laos to
full-fledged tactical bombing
missions totaling more than 400
a day occurred according to
Laotian requests, he said.
Souvanna said specific re-
quests int bombing missions
are made by Laos government
guerrillas or regular army
troops in the field. They are
relayed by radio to communi-
cation planes in the air and
from there to air bases.
Souvanna did not mention it but
the bins to which he referred
am In Thailand. ,
The premier said he had told
the North Vietnamese ambas-
sador in ?Vientiane that Laos
would call off the American
bombing raids in northern Laos
if the North Vietnamese with'
drew to the Ho Chi Minh trail
or back to North VietNam.
"Then it would be up to
North Vietnamese and the
Americans to make an agree-
ment covering the bombing of
the Ho Chi Minh trail. That is
not our affair," he said.
The leader also defended the
secrecy which has shrouded
American air support of Lao-
tian army units. "The North
Vietnamese are still coming
into Laos but they refuse to
admit it. Why should we tell the
public in order. to let the
Communists know what we are
doing?" he said. .? ?,
He added that foreign. jour-
nalists were prohibited from
visiting frontline Laotian units
because Lao commanders were
"too busy" to care for their
needs.
Admits Thais Helping
Earlier at a press conference
given for newsmen visiting with
H. Ross Perot, Texas billion.
ire, Souvanna acknowledged
that Thai nationals were fight-
ing in Laos. He denied; how-
ever, that any units of the Thai
armed forces are in Laos.
There are more Loatians in
Thailand than in Laos and
some of these have come to
fight in Laos as individuals, he
said.
Ile reiterated declarations
that he would not ask the
,United States to send ground
combat troops to Laos , but,
emphasized that continuedl
American military and eco- ?
nomic support is essential.
"We are fighting for our
survival. The United States
must understand we can do
nothing without its help," he
8a id.
He also said he would send a
reply to a five-point Pathet Lao
peace proposal in two or three !
days.
Denies POW Information
In another development Mrs.
Dorothy Bodden of 5707 Walnut
av.,
Downers Grove, met the
Pathet Lao representative in
Vientiane, Sot Petrasi. He otld
Mrs. Bodden he had no infor-
mation c oncerning her son,
army sgt. Timothy Roy Bod-
den, 27. The son has been listed
as missing for more than 3
years. Four othe wives of
missing service inn accom-
panied her.
All of the womeY requests
were rejeted with a pat
statement that nothing could b
accomplished until the United
States Mops Its bombing of
Laos.
However, the Pathet Lao
representative did tell the
women that about 100 of 1,200
Americans shot down over Laos
were .alive and being held in
caves and camps near the
places where they were shop ,
down. ? .
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?1
Approved For Release 2001MVAPINDIA-RDP80-0
8 APR 1970 ?
STATI NTL
U.S. building roads in Nepal
KATHMANDU"? The U.S. Agency for International Development
(AID), recently identified as the CIA "front" for operations in Laos
and Thailand, is busily engaged in building a road in Nepal, the strate-
gically-located Himalayan kingdom between India and the People's
Republic of China.
The road starts in western Nepal, on the Indian border at Dhangar-
hi. and will eventually tie in with another road to be built to Jumla, 100
miles to the north. A third road is planned, which will link Pokhara, in
central Nepal, with the Mushtang enclave about 90 miles to the north.
Pokhara is already connected by road with a network that extends south
to the border with India: The Indian government, with Nepalese agree-
ment. maintains reconaissanee teams on the northern Nepalese frontier
with China. .
?
?
7
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Vai 'S Li IA
Approved For Release 2001/03/04.; CIA-RDP80-016
8 APR 1970 STATINTL
Laotians Repel
Hanoi Troops
By liAMM'Y ARBUCKLE
Spedal to The Star
VIENTIANE?North Vietnam-
ese forces attacked Ban Na Lao,
a village near Paksane in east.
central Laos, at dawn today.
illeven Communists were killed
vhen a Lao "Spooky" gunship
woke up the attack.
. Three Lao government sol-
Hers were wounded.
At he key? guerrilla base of
Long Chien, meantime, a mas-
sive American logistics effort
was underway, sources report-
ed.
Communists Were reported to
be firing occasional rocket shells
Into the base, where at least 38
' Americans are aiding the logis-
tics effort. Twenty shells were
fired into the base this morning,
hitting houses and causing cas-
ualties.
Light aircraft and helicopters
belonging to Air America, the
ClAtchartered line, are landing
almost every minute and are
ferrying troops and ammunition
to outposts around Long Chien.
One American helicopter,?
?
which was 'carrying its load of
ammunition slung on a net un-
derneath--dropped the load when
the net broke.
Four thousand of Long Chien's
40000 Meo tribesmen have,
moved back into the town they
fled last month, but many Mco
soldiers are staying with their
families in the surrounding hills.
Thai infantry and artillery
men dressed in unmarked fa-
tigues were said to be the main
factor in the stiffening town de-
fense at Long Chien. .
American jets today knocked
out a 120Anillimeter mortar
%Weil had been harassing gov-
ernment forces sweeping out
from Tam Bleung, 12 miles
north of Long Chien headquar?
tors of Mee Gen. Vani Pao. _
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STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R00
?
?
REP(..)ai-LP,
- 41). 5112
S 53,5is
APR '7 1970
Neutralism Gone
The overthrow of cambodia's
!Prince Norodom Sihanouk has done
at least one thing: It has destroyed
I the myth of neutralism in Southeast
Asia.
Ever since the Geneva accords of
! 1962, which provided for the neutral-
ism of Laos and Cambodia, neutral-
ism has led an uneasy life. North
Vietnam supported the Pathet Lao in
Laos, and the United States support-
' ed the Vientiane regime through the
CIA...In Cambodia, wily Prince Si-
ttrilink tried to buy neutralism by
winking at the use of a part of his
country for the movement of North I
Vietnamese troops and supplies into
South Vietnam. He also tried to play
Hanoi against Peking and Moscow.
Now in exile, alternatively in Mos- I
cow and Peking, Prince Sihanouk has
begun his bid for a return to power.? I
The result may be a civil war. North
Vietnam may, indeed, end up with
control of Laos and Cambodia, a na-
tionalist dream of centuries.
So much for neutralism in a bitter-
rly divided world. Maybe the late John
Foster Dulles was right when he arT,
Lgued that neutraliam wait immoral.-A
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NEWSWEEK
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 ? CIA-Rg4-61rdi101R0
6 APR Igiu
AIR AMERICA: ANYTHING GOES
t doesn't pipe Mantovani into its cabins,
I dress stewardesses in colorful Puccis
or serve boctif bourguignon on any of its
flights. And yet Air America is one of the
largest U.S. airlines, ranking behind Na-
tional and ahead of Northeast in the
number of its planes and personnel. Air
America can afford to be indifferent to
the extras provided by other airlines be-
cause it has only one customer to please
?the United States Government?for
which it performs a wide variety of
services connected with the American
military involvement in Southeast Asia.
As a rule, these services go unpublicized.
lecently, however, Air America came
into the spotlight when it flew several
hundred Thai troops into Laos to help
the CIA-sponsored secret army" of Gen.
Vang Pao defend the outpost of Long
Cheng from Communist attack.
Although in practical terms it is an op-
erating arm of the CIA, Air America is
owned by a private aviation-investment
concern called Pacific Corp. Its managing
director and chief executive, a large, af-
fable man named George Doole Jr.,
laughs heartily when questioned about
dealings with intelligence organizations
?but hedges his answer. "I don't' know
all of our customers' private business and
relations," he said last week. "So help me,
that's a fact." But while that may be
so, Air America's motto, "Anything, Any-
time, Anywhere?Professionally, sug-
gests the company plays by rather free-
? wheeling rules.
"I guess we carry about everything
except bombs under our wings," says Air
America Saigon manager E.J. Theisen,
And In fact, the range of the company's
activities almost lives up to its motto. CIA
agents working in the Phoenix program?
a campaign to ferret out Viet Cong op-
eratives in South Vietnam?fly Air Ameri-
ca when they need to move a high-level
prisoner. Green Berets use the airline to
carry supplies to NIontagnard mercenar-
ies. And according to Theisen, even the
U.S.'s supersecret Special Operations
Group in Saigon, which works almost ex-
clusively behind enemy lines, relies on
Air America for some of its transport
needs within South Vietnam.
Contracl: At present, though, the bulk
of the line's work is in Laos, where it
drops tons of rice to Mco tribesmen un-
der a contract with the Agency for Inter-
national Development, carries troops to
the front and evacuates refugees. But
when it comes to discussing operations
behind Pathet Lao lines, only miles from
the North Vietnamese border, Vientiane
manager James Cunningham Jr. is not
giving away any secrets. 'We operate on
a you-call, we-haul basis," he said. "We
don't go into details."
For its varied operations, Air America
uses a fleet of some 150 planes?mostly
unmarked twin-engine Volpar Beech-
crafts and Swiss-built Pilatus Porters.
Its 600 pilots, many of them Vietnam
veterans, make as much as $25,000 a
year?and earn every penny of it. Under
all kinds of weather?and oaken under fire
as well?they fly into remote jungle air-
strips no bigger than football fields and
wear thick gold bracelets, which thy
can barter for food and Medicine in case
of forced landings in remote regions. But
in spite of the risks they take, the pilots
are rarely the daredevil Steve Canyons
one might expect. "They're in it for the
money, comments one old Asian hand.
"These guys all read Barron's for stock-
market tips.
3"
e? ? ? ? .4
Ap ? roved For Release 209.1/9?/(4 ? GIA-RIF8021601R0007000 0001-3
vacua ion ign 1mus: au ea, weru1
STATI NTL
?
Approved For Release 2001/03491pFROoRDPset0A9MIF
THE WAR IN VIETNAM
"7747-717-7777.7t?7'17"!?""i7rr","?.',r
" ? y en,
k
'
' ..?
'41; .5t
?
'6-11tIr -
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;
.
?
NIMM thonina N?wil
Asian tinderbox: Cambodian leaders parade as Red envoy arrives in Laos
Indochina: The Calm Before the Storm?
a land where he was once slavishly
adored, Prince Norodom Sihanouk s
name was suddenly mud. The cabal that
overthrew the Cambodian Chief of State
two weeks ago diligently set about de-
stroying his reputation in the hope of
heading off any popular outcry for his
return. Newspapers ran obscene cartoons
of Sihanouk and his wife, Monique, and
the same radio announcers who had sung
his praises so extravagantly a short time
ago now vied in berating him. Pictures of
Sihanouk and his mother, Queen Siso-
wath Kossamak, were ripped from walls
all over the country, and there was talk
of abolishing the monarchy. As a special
gesture in honor of the coup, Phnom
Peoh's Sihanouk Street was renamed
"March 18, 1970, 1 p.m. Street."
To those who kid feared that the
Cambodian coup might trigger a wider
war in Indochina, these activities seemed
reassuringly parochial. "At this point,"
said a junior diplomat in Saigon, "the so-
called 'Indochina war' is the greatest
non-event in history." But later., events
took a more ominous turn. In Cambodia,
pro-Sihanouk rioters forced the govern-
ment to call up reserves, and there were
unconfirmed reports that Viet Cong
troops were moving toward Phnom Penh.
In Laos, the Communists appeared to be
massing for another attack. And in South
? Vietnam, the government took advantage
of the Cambodian coup by attacking ene-
? my forces across the border. In short, it
seemed much too early to write off the
PiNnbill05 geirtaigkedscit
' attack on the key government outpost at ?
. Long Cheng did not materialize, and it
looked as though the North Vietnams()
and their local allies, the Pathet Lao, had
stalled after taking 'nearby Sam Thong.
But the Laotians were not yet out of the
woods. "The North Vietnamese appar-
ently tried to take both Sam Thong and
Long Cheng in a rush," said an official
foreign observer. "It only worked half-
way, and now they are regrouping for a
massive, more conventional assault on
Long Cheng." No one had much faith
that the force of Meo tribesmen defend-
ing 'Long Cheng could hold out for long,-
and there were fresh reports last week
that transport planes laid on by the CIA
(box) had carried several hundred Thai
soldiers in as reinforcements. (Thailand
denied that it had any regulars in Laos,.
but officials conceded that "volunteers"
might have joined the fray,) This trans-
fusion, however, was no sure-fire cure.
"Sending the Thais up there is not liko
having a Panzer division defend the
place," said one U.S. military man. "The
Thais spook as badly as the Laotians,"
Unavailing Efforts: Diplomacy failed
to ease the crisis. President Nixon sent a
strong note to Soviet Premier Aleksei
Kosygin asking Moscow' to reconvene the
1962 Geneva Conference on Laos, of
which it is co-chairman, in order to stop
the fighting. But most observers gave that
effort little chance for success. Another
letter was sent by messenger from the
Pathet Lao's titular leader, Prince Sou-
phanouvong, to his half-brother, Laotian
Premier Souvanna Phouma. The "peace
20" gCntiVii0 01061Y3164161
If the outlook was disturbing in Laos,
ft was even more disheartening in Cam-'
Wis. One of the principal aims of thy
'new regime is to expel North Vietnam- ,
ese and Viet Cong troops from their
sanctuaries along the border with South '
Vietnam. But the triumvirs in Phnom
Penh?the Prime Minister, Lt. Gen. Lon
Nol, Deputy Prime Minister Prince Siso-
wath Sink Matak and Chief of State
Chen Heng?wisely decided that their
best chance for survival was to follow
the neutralist path that Sihanouk trod
nimbly for many years. Accordingly,
,they asked the Soviet Union and Britain, ;
the co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Con-
ference on Indochina, to do the job for
them by restoring the International Con-
trol Commission that had been set up by
the conference partly to police Cambo- ,
dian neutrality (Sihanouk sent the coin- !
mission packing in 1909 as an economy
measure). The new leaders also tried to '
maintain working relations with Column-
Dist diplomats in the hope that the North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops could
be negotiated oil Cambodian soil. And ?
Lon Nol's government even held onto the
Columbia Eagle, the hijacked American -
munitions ship, for fear that by releas-
ing the vessel it might appear to favor
the U.S.
But Lon Nol seemed to be having 1
trouble balancing on the tightrope. It
was unlikely that the Communists could -
be persuaded to lend a hand, for Hanoi,
Moscow and Peking were all convinced ;
that the new regime in Phnom Penh was
leaning toward the West. For one thing, 1
I ? ail 1,9 clamp down on
hist military sup-
plies through the Cambodian port of
Sihanoukville?continuing a process be.
STATINTL
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6 APR 1970 ?
Mounting Uneasiness
S a new regime sought to consolidate
its hold on Cambodia last week,
portraits of Prince Norodom Sihanouk
were hurriedly removed in government
offices and shops throughout the cap-
ital of .Phnom-Penh. While the deposed
chief of state was gone, however, it
was clear that he was not forgotten. In
a Phnom-Penh hotel, a visitor asked
for one of the Sihanouk portraits as a
Souvenir. "Oh no," replied a clerk. "We
are saving it. Nothing is sure. We may
have to put it back up."
A mood of uneasiness and uncertainty
prevailed in Cambodia and in neigh-
AP
LON NOL IN PHNOM-PENH
New chapter in a turbulent history.
boring Laos as well. In Peking, Si-
hanouk called for a war of liberation
against the "traitors and renegades" who
had seized power in Phnom-Penh. From
Hanoi came pledges of "total support"
for Sihanouk, and North Vietnamese
Premier Pham Van Dong hurried to Pe-
king to confer with the deposed prince.
In Phnom-Penh, both the North Viet-
namese and the Vict Cong closed their
embassies, a move short of outright dip-
lomatic rupture but suggestive of trou-
ble to come.
Late in the week it came. Pro-Si-
hanouk riots erupted north of Phnom-
Penh, and two National Assembly dep-
uties who had voted to depose Siha-
nouk were reportedly slashed to death.
To keep the demonstrations from
spreading to the capital, the government
sent tanks to seal off roads leading to
Phnom-Penh; closed Pochentong Air-
port and imposed a 6 p.m.-to-6 a.m. cur-
few. More ominously, Acting Head of
in Southeast Asia
State Cheng Heng charged that Viet
Cong forces on Cambodian soil "have
begun actions against the Cambodian
people and our soldiers" near the bor-
der, and Prince Sink Matak warned
that an attack by thousands of Com-
munist troops "could not be ruled out."
There were reports that several thousand
Communist troops had entered the coun-
try to foment trouble, and the new gov-
ernment called up its reserves and asked
all veterans to report for duty: Mean-
while, in Laos, rampaging Communist
forces were less than 1 miles away
from the key CIA base at Long Cheng.
A new chapter in the turbulent history
of Indochina was unfolding, and few
cared to predict whether it was the pref-
ace to a wider war.
Down to Size. Styling itself a "gov-
ernment of salvation," the regime of
General Lon Nol, the Premier, and
Prince Sink Matak, the Deputy Pre-
mier, moved to persuade Cambodia of
the rightness of its rule. In meetings
with major national groups?leading
Buddhist bonzes, district chiefs, students
and members of Sihanouk's own po-
litical movement, the Sangkum?the ,
new leaders explained their actions in de-
tail and stressed the economic difficulties
and moral corruption of recent years.
Key Sihanouk backers were jailed.
Still, one Western diplomat suggested
that if Sihanouk were to turn up at
the airport tomorrow, "the guards, in-
stead of arresting him, would probably
prostrate themselves before him." To
cut Sihanouk down to size, the gov-
ernment began waging an intensive prop-
aganda campaign. The local press, which.
had previously referred to him as a god
prince, mocked him savagely and his
half-Italian wife Princess Monique even
more. Some newspapers ran composite
photos of her head on anonymous nude
bodies in obscene poses. The prince's
popularity, however, remained a trou-
blesome factor.
An Army Affair. An equally serious
difficulty was the Communist Vietnam-
ese military presence. Before Sihanouk's
fall, Lon Nd l called on the Communists
to evacuate their Cambodian sanctuaries
immediately. That demand was not em-
phasized publicly after the 'takeover.
Nonetheless, Sink Matak told TIME
Correspondent Burton Pines in Phnom-
Penh that getting rid of the Communist
forces remained a primary goal. "We de-
mand that they immediately leave our
territory," the prince said. "Sihanouk vi-
olated his own?and our?proclaimed
policy of neutralism by permitting the
Vietnamese foreigners to stay inside
Cambodia. We cannot tolerate it. We
have every expectation that this matter
can be solved peacefully. If not, it will
become an affair for our army."
If last week's border clashes were to
develop into an all-out war between
Cambodia's 37,00(1-man army and the
better-armed, better-organized Commu-
nist troops, a slaughter would probably
ensue. Cambodia could call on the Amer-
icans and South Vietnamese, but that'?
would almost certainly plunge the coun-
try?like Laos?inextricably into the ag-
onizing morass of the Viet Nam War.
"In no case would I envisage asking
any of our neighbors?Thailand, Laos,
up'
VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN LEAVES CAMBODIA
Fresh fears of a wider war.
South Viet Nam?for assistance," Sir-
1k Matak told Pines. "To ask others to
help us militarily would destroy the in-
dependence and neutrality that are the
preconditions of our small nation's ex-
istence." U.S. jets strafed Communist
positions in Cambodia. It was the fifth
time this year that the U.S. has ad-
mitted to air raids over Cambodia.
Coup Rumors, In Laos, the question
was how far the six battalions of North
Vietnamese troops that were probing
Laotian defenses around Long Cheng in-
tended to go. Would they overrun the
base and keep moving right to the plains '
just north of Vientiane? A major push
seemed several days off at least, but
U.S. advisers and government defenders
prepared a fallback position at Ban Son,
20 miles south of the base. Meanwhile,
U.S. warplanes continued to bombCom-
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munist supply routes across northern ;
Laos. Despite U.S. estimates that the
air attacks have inflicted 20% casualties
on Communist units, the bombing has
failed to stem the tide of supplies.
Though a new Communist Pa thet Lao
peace plan was delivered to Prince Sou- '
vanna Phounta, the neutralist but West-
ern-leaning Premier of Laos, he de-
cided to defer a decision until the Cam-
bodian situation settles down. In any
case, the prospect that anything solid
? may emerge from the Pathet Lao plan
is slight. As a precondition, the Com-
munists insist that American planes halt
their bombing in Laos. U.S. officials .
have indicated that the bombing will
not stop, even at Souvanna' s request.
As Secretary of State William Rogers
noted last week: "If North Viet Nam:
continues to use the Ho Chi Minh Trail
as a principal supply route to South
Viet Nam, obviously we would not be !
in a position to stop."
Souvanna may be encountering some
difficulty himself, from the right as well
as the left. Rumors of a possible right- ,
wing coup were once again afloat in I
Vientiane. As for the left, Souvanna
said that Hanoi hoped to capitalize on
the coup in Cambodia by solidifying its ;
hold on Laos while everybody's atten-
tion was directed elsewhere. "North Viet
Nam," said Souvanna, "has a desire
for hegemony in this area."
Tempting Target. That seems true
enough. There is little doubt ?that Ha-
noi and Washington alike are deeply,
worried about what may happen next
in the area. A broadening of the war
could place enormous strains. on Ha-
noi's resources, but the North Vietnam-
ese may be tempted to strike if their
sanctuaries arc seriously endangered..
The U.S., on. the other hand, may be
tempted to remove once and for all the
border sanctuaries that have enabled,
Hanoi- to prolong the war.
? Unless the U.S. is willing to take the
chance of widening the war, however,
? it might be wiser to settle for smaller
gains. One possibility Would be for the
U.S. to discourage Cambodia from mil-
itary action against the Communists,
but to encourage Ate new regime to cur-
tail their supplies. If Washington were
to seek any more dramatic profit from,
the current turmoil, it might risk throw-
ing away the hope of a long-term po-
litical settlement in exchange for a short-
term military advantage.
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TI I 1,T
AppwoyegletFor Release 2001/03/04 : ClAtIWynk1601
GAZETTE & DAILY
? LI ? 37,175
1070
CONSPIRACY??.?? ?
, .
Let ,ns assume that there -are those ?i?
The history of the U.S. intervention . who believe this will work; no better.:
in Vietnam is filled with unanswered now than it did before ? ? and that
questions, the biggest one being how what is required is not the Nixon'
f, we got into it in the first place. , instead, of What he seems to
Arthur Goldberg, Ambassador to t be doing. How better to countermand:
the United Nations, in the Johnson- Ahe troop withdrawal order of the-.:
- Administration, says that it was 'all a Nixa n Administration than by
mistake, from the beginning on creating what can be described as the ?
t through. Not a conspiracy, he says,, necessity not for leSs U.S. forces but
merely a mistake, a tragic one. ' for more?
it Maybe. Why, though, would he The present picture in Laos and
mention "conspiracy" in his remarks Cambodia,,,.surely suggests a buildup.
on a recent television "Meet The toward this kind of emergency. Who is-.
Press" show. Could. it be that, the constructing the buildup? In charge in.
l events underway in Laos and Laos, we know from recent news-1
Cambodia, raising as they do. more reports obtained with great difficulty,
; mysterious ,questions, prompt ? is the U.S. Central Intelligence.
thoughts coming under the heading of Agency, the ?c1,4?.. a sup`er secret
"conspiracy?" . ? . service accountable for its funds and
, There is a clear line extending back operations to. no one but. itself; as.
from at least 1950 ? probably before , Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and:
? of U.S. intervention in the poisibly johns:on found out. The
post-world-war-two situation in -Icharices. are- 'Strang that the hand of
southeast Asia, in -the area which used the CIA wilrbe found to have .been
; to be called French Indochina. (That decisive - in CambOdia-in the right-Wing',
t former colonial territory now consists ,military 'Caup.Which'-depoSed the
of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.) ,tCatril#M4h- le4clet,'"Prinee'
! In 1950, with therrench embarked ? -
upon an effort to maintain a form of...
Control over their pre-war possession,
U. S. advisors arrived from Korea and
i the Philippines to teach-. guerrilla
!- warfare to French 'officers. At about _
the same time there beganra
,
suostantial program of U.S. military
aid to the French.
t Four years later the French had had .1
I? it in Vietnam. But not so the U.S.
Between 1954: and 1956 the United
States military presence in Vietnam
replaced the previous French'.
; presence. Little .by little ?? the
complete story -remains to be told ?..
- the role of this presence changed from
-training mission to combat support to-
combat replacement, in the number of.
a half million troops. . .
The Nixon policy; as far as can be
determined, is-- to attempt to reverse
, this process-. To 'change the US.
military role, that is, back to what it
! was nine or ten years ago.- To I
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STATI NTL
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CHAR L.T.Sleat, VA,rm
GAZETTE- r
M - 63,294
GAZETT1. -MAIL
S - 106,775
?
4.3 nan..
1
r : ??
L The great danger of ' United".,,Thia 40',.'4:-It'Pe .q. Yx-raii'lemart.
. ,
'.States ' Involvement in Laos ? ,:that.'.inuat,'net be allOWed ,t.o? oon0,
:which? the Nixon administration i, tireie',;:??fer, it will Serve tu';,46?tro,Y,..,
has gone to such pains to keep ''viii.4te:Var ii$0,?:,*111: this.?:?country.,
secret ? is that it ultimately will ...c:Ma'ii,N AVG ? t?-'1414 1,P.'?',arcnd
"get us entangled in another Viet. ;;,:the:;',world,, through 'the' edOnornic
nm-type war in Southeast Asia. l,!,eff6,143 of the .r?-?AgeheY j.OV.:??rat'ar"
And, certainly, we already, : have t'Ait atii)nal ;Development' :';;-,','..''.? ? ,?
a a k
:more than we can handle with the iE??!, Indeed* ' a presidential
mess in Vietnam. v,force.appointed to *takes cOmpre-.
' But there is nother aspect that '? hensive revievi of past U. S. elk.'
can be severely damaging to this programs and chart new directions'
country. That is our clandestine for the 1970s specifically recora.-?,';
operations in which we apparently mended on March 8. a completeo,'
, are carrying out our cloak-and- -. separation of military and econora.,,,::?
I dagger maneuvers in Laos under ' ic aid. . . , ; ?.'''? , ' , 1eni
.. ._ "
' cover of the Agency for Interna- :' The 16-member panel, beaded bY,??',
tional Development (AID).
former:(Bank of America President
,, 1
The --Associated Press reported Rudolph A. Peteraon, urged. thati;
a' fews days ago that Anri_can all types of "security' assistance".?!.
civilians based in Laos '"perforni including military as8i8tance ? and '
what' amounts to military , fnne.: sales ? be combined in one legisia-
tions under auspice?:af the I3., S. tive act, separate from economic
Embassy, the Agency for Interna- aid, with the State Department ,
tional Development and two com- ,. exercising "firm pellei Oldanee"'?
;panies under charter to AID?Air
-. '' Over -military programs.
;America and Continental Air Ser*::: .,'.. ,The purpose of the AID program
? :ices, Inc." ,. , , ;??:? ' :,' ., is to provide needed economic as-
The ?best available information, ? sistance in underdeveloped cowl-
1 /Said this report, Is that as Tilli-TO , tries, and in the process win some
as 10,0,,Pt4I.pet3ounq1 are operating 'friends for America, which it sure
In Laos under cover 'of AID or the, ly :needs; :We can be sure that
,U.S:' Embassy, ? whilk; other. CIA. 'neither objective will be achieved
!.?ageatzt are said to 911:11'4ti7,..in 007 ,by misusing the Agency for In-
r bia4;':,31.4e4niTig. Weil are not_ca;r1V - ill ternationaj Development as an
II ried::on either, bass: N
Pr:' , ', ', i '
? . . - ' ? .',.. ., e : ly . , .:, ? ,;,... e ,al cover for CIA activities.
?rolls.:?"'i ; ' .. sY7-i-??-k,,',????-????v!".Y,:!,' i ; .This can only serve to make all of
." SiOtele:antir;' 4Ill'officlials,,will
,..?? or efforts, however humanitarianeither'confir that their in nor deny '
. , 4414 fames they may he,,,,a4e.pec; t
1, Organization, 18':?-?4 cover., for ,CIA; ,
?_ "(key" 44 the wericL i
,
operations:, This' it is C e tri s "tii Ma '. , ' ' " ? ? , ', ' "' ? ' '
corrieS doo,:to.!beirig a centessli,*;
,,,that' AID is iPrOstituting, itacil';byj
providinF'PV. ,P1t, for our. ini1.14ry !
; PeY140141; tl4ttF46.tn41/14'1111;;I:',A ?
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!r?
?
cLFvFoPtapKoNRA3Forlelease 2001/03/04.: 61A-RDP80.01601R0
PLAIN DEALER STATINTL
? 409,414
S kini',42 1970
Blames Public ,Gullibilit
7 , the CIA and Pentagon, is expanding the
V
Now our federal government, pushed by
SoutheasrAsian war into Cambodia, Laos,
and Thailand, the American people shoukt
be reminded of the following:
When Richard Nixon was vice presh;
'dent, on April 17, 1954, he addressed news.
paper editors at Washington in what was
supposed to be an "off the record" talk. He
tried to torpedo the Geneva Peace confer-,
ence, then about to begin, by saying: "If, to
avoid further Communist expansion in Asia
and Indochina we must take the risk now by
? putting our boys in, I think the executive
has to take the politically unpopular step to
'do it."
Word leaked out the following day of
what Nixon had said. The story was pub-
lished. Americans should note that this is
the same man who, since entering the
White House, has been assuring the people
"all we are interested in is to see the Viet-
namese get the right of self-determination."
That right was, thwarted when the late
John Foster Dulles led the drive that pre.e
vented the free elections in Vietnam sped=
lied at Geneva. The CIA and Pentagon ap=
plauded. Since then, a succession of ;federal
administrations has convinced our people
we had to go there and invade Asia orthe
Vietnamese, with no bombers or Navy,'
would come over and attack us. Some 50,000
of our men have died in combat or of frog.;
cal diseases because of our gullibility:
wanted?
this really what the "silent majority!)
JACK CLOWSER ???,;
1516 Bidwell Avenue,.;;,, ' ' ? 1
L. Roc]QRjverAl4fAki#
for
Expansion of Vietnam
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Approved For Release 29N/RolreaSIRIP80701601
5 APR in STATINTL
-Trigre'r-77-71
, Sy DON SCHANCHE
THE STRONGEST FORCE he-
hind the headlines in the strange,
secret war of the CIA-supported
? Meo guerillas in Laos is a 57-year-
old retired Indiana farmer whose
? bizarre career as humanitarian,
battle tactician afid homespun
philosopher combines the qualities
? of Albert Schweitzer, Lawrence of
OS+
Ism lord, are on the run. The Didianan
' fled under Communist fire just a few
days ago from his refugee headquarters
and supply base at Sam Thong, a pro-
vincial capital he founded seven years
ago on a high mountain plateau 16 miles
south of the Plaine des arres. ,
1THE MEO GENERAL, who calls Buell
"any father" and occasionally ignores his
, CIA advisers to follow the old farmer'
Iadvice, is fighting to save his own_head-
, quarters 19 miles away. It is an &malty
"new" town called Long Tiang and it has
f during -a bloody, three-day enemy at-11
I tack. Once, he personally trained and led 4
a Meo commando demolition team that
I blew up 30 kilometers of the Commu-
nists' main supply highway from Hanoi I
'.to the Plaine des Jams, stalling .the k
enemy's war in Laos for a prec ous six
! months. ?
I On another occasion, Buell advanced
.1 with a guerrilla patrol to the fenceline 4,
of the Pathet Lao's main headquarters .
Win Sam Neua city, close to the North
Vietnamese border. After helping to re-
connoiter the stronghold. he caught ;
? pneumonia on the long trek back to his ?
\ been swollen to the proportions of an
Arabia and Will Rogers.
' He is Edgar (Pop) Bud,
area 1 ifs
..
,..equipment and men from the CIA, th
. . . Air Force and the Army of Thai-
' coordinator for the U.S. geney land.
O. for International Development in 1.. When I first visited Long Tim
?..?1 iNorthennt Lnon and key figura in thiiinilit years ago, it was an abandoned
'the long struggle against the Com- ellvtittny grAry in the
in a howbir de-
f rnunist Pathet Lao. The primitive taw the Meo strongehlolgiulladaatinysear, le://1!
Meo tribesmen think of him as a ? the (second largest city in Laos, bigger
than the royal capital of Luang Pra-
' demi-god. His close friendship bang and almost as large as the petit!,
[with their mysterious chieftain cal capital, Vientianet
,Maj. Gen. Vang Pao has often' Communist capture of these two f
own base camp and almost died.
Twenty times in the last 10 years 4
Into the darkened jungle to escape Com-
tnunist attacks against villages in which I
lie was sleeping, and each time he has
led thousands of terrified refugees out
with him. On one nicht alone, early in
tho Wm!. he trawl 11,0a0 Meo and Lao .
people from elaug ter by leading them
away from a pursuing enemy force. For
these actions and his unstinting humani-
tarian work among Laotian and Meo war.
?refugees, King Savang Vatthana of Luba;
awarded him the highest decoration a
foreigner can receive, the Order of a
mountain bases in the crazy-quilt little Million Elephants, The Meo have given ,
.;
ri suburb b a vast infusion of uell has been forced to flee under fire
!turned the course of the war and
'influenced American policy in that
war-torn little country.
The aging Hoosier, a plain and
'homely man even by Grant Wood
war will bee disaster comparable, on him divine status and call him Tan
Laos' small scale, to what the American Pop," which means "Mister Sent Prom
command in Vietnam would face if Above?'
1 .
Deming and Saigon were to be seized by &tell has had one near-fatal heart at- '
the Viet Cong. tack in the Laos mmintains and suffers
Ironically, all Buell and Yang Pao
ttloTitt of ovnieariTaiamoiiteh hafgrosumrvirveecgrloinuf.-.:,.
e4ver sought was a period of peace in
,atandards, has lived with the IVIeo
i in the mountains around the famed ' ' the mountains and an opportunity to in- mountain plane crashes and has been, ?
. Plaine des Jarres since 1981. He has led 1 itegrato the beeltward 'Me? into the social Ineadrere
I/labile bf :Um:. What' has happened .in-1, ifeirtealsmtsetendaw,11
embroiled in a 10-year war in which; and seriously injured several times in 1
American involvement has grown from:
a .few bags of rice, riven by Pop Buell crashes of the small courier planes be .1
and Ed ar Buell use to hop around the
kirufnotlred1.047aenagrs,Pyaeot,
Pthem in victory, rallied them in defeat, ?
'founded their first schools and hospitals, stead is that both have become tragical! :on th SY harkdOitisleen shot twice
performed emergency surgery, Including
30 amputations, and taught them a crude
'but efficient "new" kind of 19th century
agnculture. to eo war re tweet; n 9 a os mountains of northeast Laos.
t"If I can get 'em from a thousand last-ditch stand involving hundreds o
, years behind the rest of the world to American fighter bombers, more than a Both are tireless wdrkers. It is rare I
k to find either putting in less than an 18-
only 70 or 80 years behind," Buell said, ?' billion dollars worth of munitions,A hun- 1
hour day. "I was always of the opinion
"they're that much better off, ain't i tired-odd U.S. Army unit advisers and '.
, they?" ' dozens of CIA counter-insurgency that I' ought to do a little bit extra after ,i
In his devotion to the welfare of the., perts. ex- I did my day's work," said Buell. "It's
When President Nixon minimizes.
"he
vlei.t4le bit that sells America to these)
half million Met) and Lao refugees un- I
der his care, Buell frequently boils over, , American involvement in ground combat ii
he fates of Laos and American in-
with irritation at American bureaucrats '?\. in Laos, he obviously hasn't been told tends in that country have been inter-'
and diplomats who resist his demands'', about Pop Buell, just as he reportedly twined since the two small men (each is ' -
for short-cuts in speeding "PA"' le* was not told about the death of Army 6'4") first met in a native restaurant In'
ghe displaced people. His deep friend- '' Captain Joseph Bush in combat at Muong the village of Lhat Homing, just south '
I ships not only with Gen. Yang Pao and 1
consternation of the White House, a
Soul, Laos, which I reported, to the of the PlaMe des Jams in 1980, They"
i, Souvanna Phouma and dozens of other weeks ago, ter sealed a personal pact that night which.
has often overshadowed the policies of'
' other Meo leaders, but with Premier
Laotian leaders, including King Savang , ? both the Laotian government and the it
i Vatthana himself, has made even high , United States.
Buell then was a volunteer agrieul- 1
I cross sword
State Department officials reluctant to ? rfoti
Fitygetvqd Fohr IRlea
d
4,
't ?
AsiteiZeirgAtact:irtimputin fug *65 t
w. A1.4
A,8 11. ue I an le close ago i his presence alone was credited with , servirenis a private pears ram JIM
tirieno, Yang Pao, a tough tribal leader MUMS TOttather a pitifully weak defen-,,suit malty under matted ,to maul
Iwito ralci like #44.1149004-04.11a0-4,;,09 ?tom jit aiplaes'.,oalled.,NaJAMI4
laW.X0RX nia$
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a Ar1970
o Indochina:
The Players
Don't Seem
Stire What
To Do Next
.offe'r' :to exchange a peace in
, western Laos for a halt in the ?
bombing of their supply routes
in eastern Laos is rejected out
' . of hand in Washington.
?
Mr. Rogers also reiterated'
i . American involvement in Laos. precipice at 30 miles an hour
riding in a car ? heading' for 'a"
Ithe promise not to enlarge the
North Vietnam would saddeyn - than
a tahte 8nOemwilepsolawnyhoaulir.:tGarant Grant-:
Though its total conquest b
, .:while,, a new regime struggles ., boring Thailand, it could not be ?:its due, I am still unwilling tot
In jittery Cambodia, mean- ,Washington ,and frighten neigh-
, '?to cansblidate the overthrow of .: defended by a war-weary na. adorn the lesser folly with the
:?name of wisdom." .
?
; Prince- Sihanouk and to avert tion yearning to get its forces
At best, the Senator argued,
The Prince's successors reiter- p
resumably, the Secretary of 1 iptunicshya rporolitciesto iknee!sa'i'igoounr
,civil strife with his followers. off the Asian mainland.
ato his vows of neutrality, but I! State also offered a cautious Hstaggering around the ring for
h.'account of the Administration's! a few years longer" so that the
!Ahoy. possess neither the milt-
Aary strength nor the diplomatic
. belief that the tide of battle is
Administration can avo
"
id the
leverage to compel the North
Vietnamese to leave their ommu kind of political settlement that
g -
I turning a ainst the
C
nists in South Vietnam. For it has called "defeat and hurmli-
. ,tory , " reasons that no one can fully ation"?namely a coalition re-
WASHINGTON?That war Just: The South Vietnamese and
. .
*ill not go away. 'SOTO, of their American military ;1 that no one wishes to defined. communist advance in Asia.
, , understand and to an extent ;gime. But instead of deterring
? ? In 'the last week the North advisers are itching for an invi- ' : the "Vietnamization" and "pat-i Mr. Fulbright added, the United ?
i country's Interests but to re- ? American troop withdrawals insisted, amounted to' "madness'
. Vietnamese struck briefly, though . tatiori. fa cross the border into 1,: ification" programs are said to States has now actually stimu-
:..
by no 'means feebly, in a first , 4tall)Poclia?not to defend that ! ,be progressing well, so that. ,lated it. The nation's course, he.
spring spasm of offensive. The
'' '1. .
?
bodia left everyone wondering. 'Cambodian coup they have ar- about 225,000 by mid-1971. The escalatiOn of the, ritetork In
. jousting in Laos continued incon- ' ?ileve the military pressure, on. , can probably be accelerated: on so grand a sealer '
elusively. The confusion in Cam-1 :themselves. Twice since ? the,. this year toward the goal of .? That in itself .was a major:
' The Paris talks droned on mono- fiangea.for such an invitation in I present troop level. in Vietnam ?washington. . . , ? ? - , 1 ' ?"
' tonously. The French offered a ',priy,atp.;.negotiations along the ! is 450,000. III. ."._.`"z44Ak?FiCANKEk,'
propesal, vaguely. And under the. frontier. But Washington and Success in "Vietnamization" ,:;3?,,; .20.-"iiA,''''1. .26.th -, ..: ... rx
... weight of it all, the uneasy truce .PnoMpenh are plainly fright- '
? Is also still held to be the only
e . on, the home front collapsed. Vetted by such free lance exef- '-. way of forcing Hanoi to nego- ?
,? "It ' simply does not matter 'cises in escalation and. last " tiate for a peace settlement
t' very much for the United, week demanded that they be ?I' throughout Indochina. What Iv-
o - States;??in cold, unadorned stra-: stopped, at least for the time : % peared to be a. proposal by
tegic' ' terms, who rules the, being. ' .France for another large inter-
States of Indochina," said Sena-; Dreams of dramatic change . national conference to arrange
tor 1... William Fulbright in a, in the military balance in such a settlement found little
scornful attack on the nation's . Southeast Asia persist in some interest in Washington. But the
policy" in Southeast Asia. American luarters- -if the troop ., proposal was not rejected,
' And though no one answered ? withdrawals could only be slow partly because it was not un-
*him in public, the Administra- , enough, if the Cambodian sane- '..clerstood and partly because it
' tioies ' reply was self-evident: It ,: tuary could be harassed or de- ' ,was not clear whether Hanoi
, does not matter very much who :stroyed, if, the home front,'? had been sounded out before.
' rules North Vietnam, Laos or woUld hold firm . economically , But the prevailing view in the
-,
Cambodia; but after all that has And politically, if the' President Administration is that the pres-
'? been invested, it still matters meant what he said, about not .ent Paris talks could come .to
I very much who rules South Accepting "defeat:";If.. . . , life on a mometies notice If
? ' Vietnam. ? 'North Vietnam were ever inter-
-
. . ? , :,.. But the prevailing Adminis-
, The North Vietnamese have' tration position, as outlined to ,,ested in meeting the minimum'
, occupied eastern Laos to pro- a restive' Senate Foreign Rela- ,' 'American condition for a "self-.
tect their supply route into:. ,. tions, Committee by , Secretary determined" -- and ? 'presumably
-- South,. Vietnam. They are en- ...? of State William P. Rogers, . non-Communist?regime. in Sal-
tamped , in eastern Cambodia last week, seems to have been I Bon.
to -keep Saigon and the Mekong much more modest. ? , , Vietnamization was seen In
Delta . region under constant ? He said the United States, ? wholly different terms, how-
threat., They are advancing In: had no intention of involving i 'ever, by Senator Vulbright. It is
i western Laos to prove that.they 1 ? itself in Cambodia, either mili- ,.better than escalation, he Said;
i cannot be defeated even when', tarily or diplomatically. Though. ,'in 'a long speech that signaled
'. they are stymied inside South' the new regime there enjoys ,': the end of. his patience and pri-
, Vietnam. They mount a periodic 1 Washington's tacit support, it is ' ' Irate. 'truce with Mr.' ROgers.1
, "But I welcome it only, in .the'
sense 'that '4,' would , rather.' W'
' attack in South Vietnam to, em-
phasize their menacing presence
while the Americans try slowly i
to depart. out of the Indochina war and.
. . still give less aid and comfort;
,
Laos Deadlock to Hanoi than in Prince Si-
'The "neutral" Laotians resist hanouk's day, so much the bet-I
as best they can, with the help ter. If it gets into trouble; and,
.. of a C.I.A.-run army, some Thai seeks American help,' 4 Willi
troops and American air born- I 'probably be refused.,.''
,
bardmenLs. The. American ap. ' , ? ? ., ? ,. . vii. ' +' '.
? go' unh V afar lease 2001 /03/04.:'t
? recognized as weak and essen-
tially impotent against the
North Vietnamese. If It can stay,
peals paatker istarg 'Promise Rated. fAl?
king. The' North ' VIetnamette!
DP80-01601R000700040001-3
STATINTL 4.4._XPRK.2,1104
Approved F&TKilliiige 2001/03/04: CIA-RD
5 APR 1970
Air America's Civilian Facade .
Gives It Latitude in East Asia.
By RICHARD HALLORAN
syttal tA Th. . other Government agencies con-
WASHINGTON, April 4?As' trolled and secure transport. On
the American-supported clan- the economic side, commercial
destine army went on the at. :work enables the company to
tack in Laos again this week, Il!eaerf mg
its large fildeleet. busy when
pilots of a flamboyant airline P The outfit exudes an air of
called Air America took to the Oriental adventure out of Mil-
skies once again to ' move ton Caniff's comic strip "Terry
and the Pirates." It has the
troops, provide supplies and
flamboyance of the late Lieut.
evacuate wounded. Gen. Claire L. Chennault's war-
Air America is a flight charter time Flying Tigers, from which
company that, like the clan- it is descended. Working for Air
estine army, is widely consid-
red to be the servant of the
United States Central Intelli-
gence Agency.
With its assorted fleet of 167
&Craft, Air America performs
diverse missions across East
Asia from Korea to Indonesia.
It is believed to be a major, link
for the C.I.A's extensive activi-
ties throughout Asia.
Air America parachutes Meo
tribesmen and other secret
'agents behind North Vietnamese
lines in Laos, trains mechanics
for the aviation division of the
national police in Thailand,
hauls American aid cargo for
the Agency for International
Development in South Vietnam, and the latest in single-engine
'ferries United States Air Force and twin-engine utility planes.
men from Okinawa to Japan Air America also borrows Air
and South Korea, and dispatches , Force planes.
The line's headquarters in,
Intelligence flights from Taiwan 'Washington looks much like',
'along the coast of Communist Ithe offices of other medium-'
China. size businesses?conservatively
The company also transports dressed executives, miniskirted
secretaries, bits of Asian art on
helicopters from France and
Italy for assembly in Southeast
the twealelsn,daaretededcishh-eofresTegeer car-
Asia, flies prospectors looking P The chief executive of Air
for copper and geologists America is George A. Dooie Jr.
searching for oil in Indonesia, la low-key 60-year-old business-
man who holds a master's de-
gree from the School of Busi-
ness Administration at Harvard.
Before joining Air America in
1953 he was the chief pilot for
Pan American and pioneered
trans-Atlantic air routes before
World War II. '
In Asia the general manager
Is Hugh L. Grundy, 55, who is
described by acquaintances as
a quiet, shy man. He too is an
alumnus of Pan American, hav-
ing been an engineer with the
line before the war and then
having served In China. His
headquarters is in Taipei,
Taiwan. ,
The CIA: evidently has at
least two channels into Air
tmericalieliiiroutthi the her old-
au-Mates, the other 'through
charter arrangements under the
guise .of contracts with A.I.
Gleanings from those contracts,
which have been made available
to The New York Times, show
the extent of the operations.
The C.I.A. declines to com-
ment on this subject, and A.I.D.
officials refuse to discuss in-
telligence operations.
Mr. Doole, in an Interview,
brushed the matter aside. "If
'someone out there' is behind
all this," he said, "we don't
know about it."
Incorporated in Delaware
The parent company of Air
America demands the resource- A.merica is the Pacific Corpor
ful skill' of the bush pilots who Ition, which was incorporate
have explored the unknown in Delaware in 1950 with
beaches of northern Canada, the 1610,000. Mr. Doole said the
South American highlands and ohar,es were privately held,
Africa. mostly by the five members of
Those who have seen Air the board of directors. The cor-
America's pilots on the job in poration and its subsidiaries
Asia say they have a sense of employ about 9,300 people.
dedication and duty. They take The Pacific Corporation owns
more than routine risks and 100 er cent of Air America,
some have gone down in Asian
jungles, not to be seen again.
Asian Art on the Walls
Most of the company's air-
craft, like those of regular air-
lines, -carry its name, though
some are unmarked. The fleet
includes long-haul jets, the C-46
and C-47 propeller craft that
were the workhorses of World
War II, a variety of helicopters
which is also a Delaware cor-
poration founded in 1950. The
Samuel A. Walker, chairman
Un owns 125 aircraft and ;
of the Pacific Corporation, is a
managing partner of Joseph
Walker & Sons, a New York
banking house. He is also a di-
rector of Air America.
Pilots Are Greatest Asset
The chairman of Air America
and Air Asia is Adm. Felix B.
Stump, who was commander in
chief of United States forces
i the Pacific from 1953 to
59. Mr. Doole holds the titles
of president of the Pacific Cor-
poration and chief executive of
Air America and Air Asia.
' Robert G. Goelet, William A.
Read and Arthur B. Richardson
are'directors Of all three com-
panies. Mr. Goclet has exten-
sive holdings in New York real
estate, Mr. Read is a retired
member of the investment
house of Dillon, Road & Co.,
and Mr. Richardson was for-
merly president of Chese-
brough-Pond's.
Air America's greatest assets
are its pilots, mostly Americans
but including some Chinese and
Thais.
"We hire the same pilots that
Pan American and United hire,"
Mr.. Doole said, "except that
Ours are -a bit more . experi-
enced."
He shied from the te "bush
"We're all one family," Mr.
Doole said. "You can't tell one
from the other. We tie them
together with contracts and,
don't even keep separate books'
except for tax purposes."
? Air America and its affiliatesl
appear to be self-sustaining
l
operations in that they are paid!
by A.I.D. and commercial cli-
ents for their work. Because,
more than 50 per cent of it is,
done under Government cow'
tract, it, is impossible to say
whether the line makes a prof-
it in the commercial sense.
oreover, its financial transac-
tions and earnings, are unavail-
able because the Pacific Corpo-
ration, being closely held, does
not have to report them pub-
licly.
? The boards of directors of
ithe companies are closely tied
together. Most of the directors
serve on several boards, which
are made up of reputable busi-
nessmen chosen to give the en-1
tire complex respectability and
and provides pilots for commer-
cial airlines such as Air Viet-
nam and Thai Airways and
for China Airlines, which is 'on
Taiwan. ? .
Air America's civilian facade
permits the United States to do
things that would otherwise be
'Impossible or, at least, political-
ly embarrassing. The 1962 Ge-
neva accords, for instance,spro-
hibit foreign military aircraft in
Laos but they say nothing about
civilian planes. The facade also
averts public attention in coun-
tries such as Japan that are
sensitive to the American mili-
tary presence.
Then too, intelligence services
the world over have aiwa
pr.
used b waidcpar
en es the ,C.I.A.., an
leases 42 more. It employs
about 4,700 people, some 400
of them pilots, and has bases
in . Okinawa, Taiwan, South
Vietnam, Thailand and Laos.
Air America, in turn owns 99
per cent of Air Asia, which was
set up on Taiwan in 1955. Air-
Asia claims the finest aircraft
maintenance and repair facility
In Asia, at Tainan.
In addition, the Pacific Cor-
poration 'owns 40 per cent of
Civil Air Transport, incorporat
ed under Chinese Nationalist
law on Taiwan. it was founded
in 1946 by General Chenaatilt,
the United States air comman-
der in China during World War
II ? who 'died in 1958, and is
mined by many of the pilots
ho flew with the Flying
Tigers against Japan during the
war. -
Civil Air Transport, known
as C.A.T., which originally func-
tioned as a regular airline as
well as carrying out clandestine
missions, is also generally be-
lieved to have been operated
and partly financed by United
States intelligence agencies. Air
America took over C.A.T. in
1950.
When the Chinese National-
ists wanted to establish a Chi-
nese-run airline, C.A.T. had to
get out of the passenger busi-
ness. Most of its other, opera-
tions have since been absorbed
by Air America but it still flies
some special missions.
There is also a separate op-
3rating division of Air America
aSic Engeriat
n
Continued
? IN, 00040001-3
?
DAILY 170110
Approved For Release 2001/6300:1926A-RDP80-01601
CU 'S i:aroopz in Lao
mazy:slurred baze
. Daily World Foreign Department -
When "Royal Lao" forces and U.S. CIA mercenaries recaptured the northern
Laos base of Sam Thong earlier this week. they looted it to such an extent that
U.S. newsmen described it yesterday as "a shambles." U.S. officials said that "local
employees" attempting to stop the looting were forced away at gun-point by the
rZmPsThong, 75 mil'es north .of? '. Edgar M. "Pop" Buell, the ''' The mercenaries, who receive
the Lao capital of Vientiane. is U.S. agent who allegedly runs $6 a month as Thai soldiers.
a major CIA base for the clan- , "refugee operations' at Sam were reportedly offered $250 7
? destine army of General yang Thong. was described yesterday apiece by the CIA to defend the
Pao. a 15.000-man force made up , by U:S, newsmen as "so mad he "free world" atSam Thong. .
of IVIto tribesmen and led by ' couldn't talk. There were almost Rene Andrie. editor-in-chief of .
U.S. and Thai "advisors." tears in his eyes." The merce- "L'Humanite," the French Com-
US.. planes had bombed Sam naries removed ' cots. furniture munist Party newspaper, wrote
Thong day and night and the and mattresses from the U.S... yesterday that the pro-U.S. mili- ,
CIA had airlifted battalions of hospital and "walked off with tary coup in Cambodia on March
? Thai mercenaries to retake the anything portable," according to ? 18 -forms one link in a chain of V
base.
?\
? UPI correspondent. ICOlor. ? CIA activities.
In the West German weekly
magazine. "Stern," the political
analyst, Sebastian Haffner wrote
today: "The coup in Cambodia
was staged by the U.S. CIA. The?
slogans and methods by means
of which the government of
Prince Norodom Sihanouk was
overthrown in Cambodia coincide
in every detail With the notor-
-, low CIA style."
f
?
In Cambodia.. the new military
regime proclaimed today that
? "calm has now been restored."
, It said that tourists and foreign ?
visitors are again welcome.
There ?was no immediate re-
.sponsi fiiim Saigon, whose troops
? had made a heavy armored visit '
"in Cambodia last week:
- At least 119 Cambodians were
? known to have been slain by
Cambodian army troops and po-
lice during pro-Sihanouk demon-
trations in the last two weeks. '
The new. regime of General Lon'.
' Not has issued a demand that
all the country's provinces pledge
Yallegianee to the new government
but fewer than half have done so. ?
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3
REPUBLIDIC
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000
4 APR 1970 STATINTL
Thieu
Plus Two
I
? '
by 1110 Editors
Partly in consequence of CIA skulduggery, the war in Southeast
Asia has expanded. It is no longer a Vietnamese conflict with Ameri-
, can intervention, and side effects in adjoining areas. As in 1953, Laos
and Cambodia again are directly involved, and China may be. In a
sense, both Indo-China and Mr. Nixon have come full circle in 17.
years. In 1953, the French were becoming hopelessly trapped in a ,
?.1. costly, unwinnable colonial war. The way out that was suggested,
. ? by no less than the French prime minister, Joseph Laniel, was settle-
ment through international negotiation, with China as one of the '
negotiators. Vice President Richard Nixon was sternly opposed, and ?
on November 4, 1953 he brashly lectured the French (who were the
di:t ?
ones fighting and dying in Indo-China): "It is impossible to lay down
arms until victory is completely won." The finger of duty and destiny
pointed to the expulsion of Communists from Southeast Asia. The
? . French, however, were fast losing interest in any such enterprise,
? 1,?;? with or without American assistance. Vice President Nixon never.
r theless kept repeating that the United States'could settle for nothing;
'? les., than "victory!" could not afford "another retreat" in Asia. In his , ?
. view, the US shad "lost" China to the Communists four years earlier
and now was threatened with the "loss" of Indo-China as well. The
c: tide must be stemmed. If the French could not carry on alone, Amen'.
!?;. can troops ought to get into the fight. Or so it seemed to Nixon in ?
2953, at a time when we had just, begun to extricate ourselves from
a war in Korea that had cost 33,629 American battle deaths.
In the upshot, there was an international conference about Indo.
? f! China, and China did participate in the Geneva agreement. But that
the US did not, at that stage, become direCtly engaged militarily in ....;
Southeast Asia Is not something Mr. Nixon can claim credit for.. On
the contrary, he did his utmost to push events the other way. He
I, was overruled by President Eisenhower, advised by the Army Chief ?
I of Staff, General Matthew B. 'Ridgway. Ridgway investigated what
l?
American intervention would mean, concluded it would .entail far
1???
greater American losses than had been incurred irt Korea and said
f. so to the National Security Council. That encouraged Eisenhower to
. ?
_
trust hie hunch against going to war in Indo-China, a hunch. that
became conviction when the French .stronghold a Dienbienpha. fell
on May 7, 19y4. Last-week the government of francs anotaied For a?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001antinued
Approved For Release 2001/9WAIA-RDP80-016
STATI NTL
13h3 Losn]uilitorin (g? ung owings
by HUGH D.S. GREENWAY
A Tsme?Life correspondent covering the war On
Southwest Asia since March 1967. Greenway
has spent many months of his time in Laos.
VIENTIANE
Sam Thong has fallen. The North Vietnamese
are in the town. The American bungalows
around the airstrip, until just a few days ago
the headquarters for U.S. aid and refugee
/
relief, are now only burned-out ruins. Long
V
Cheng, which holds the secret CIA base, the
usfiElltor`fin Lnos
of the Geneva accords. And, U.S. officials ar-
gue privately, a clandestine operation doesn't
risk prestige in case of setbacks, and is thus
less likely to commit the U.S. to Vietnam-scale
involvement. Aside from the fact that most
Am:ricars linJ the idea of a secret war ab-
horrent, the lack of reliable information has
headquarters of General Vang Pao's clandes- f. led to gross exaggeration of the U.S. role inl
tine army and the center for the entire Amer- Laos. President Nixon's recent speech was
.
jean-Laotian effort in northern Laos, may meant to take the wind out Of some or the ex- I
soon be next. aggerations, but unfortunately the President I
The Americans at Sam Thong have been was less than totally candid. While he admit-
evacuated to the south. Thousands of civilians.. ted the bombing of Laos, he did not mention
?Mco tribesmen, wearing elaborate wrought- the CIA operation or the full role or the Amer- ' .
ilver necklaces and carrying their handmade. ican advisers in the Laotian war. The Presi-
flintlock muskets?arc trudging south with all dent's estimate or North Vietnamese troop
their belongings on their backs. The silver air- strength in Laos was at least 17,000 higher than
planes of Air America, the CIA contract air- the highest reliable estimate in Vientiane, in- ?
i ?
I'line, are flying in low over the jungle-covered ' eluding the estimates of the Americans them- .
hills and limestone outcroppings, so ironically selves. His denial that there. have been any
reminiscent of placid classical Chinese land- American combat deaths in Laos was.quickly ,
scape paintings, to drop 100-pound bags of proven false as well. 4
rice to feed the fleeing Meos. Laos is an improbable place for the U.S.
The annual North Vietnamese dry-season ?or anybody, for that matter?to become in-*, '
offensive is in its seventh week and already the . volved. Except for a brier moment of glory in i
troops from the northeast have penetrated the 14th Century, when Lan Xang (the King- i
deeper than in previous years, bloodying the dom of the Million Elephants) held sway over
nose of the dispirited Royal Laotian army and . what is now Laos as well as parts of Thailand
dealing the government's morale and Prestige ' and Cambodia, Laos has been a prisoner of ge-
a heavy blow. ography, fought over and plundered repeat-
For years the Laotian war ran on in the , edly by its more powerful neighbors. The coun- '
wings of the larger Vietnam theater, with nci- 'try as now constituted dates only from 1946
thcr side pushing the other too hard. In the last 4hen the French assembled three kingdoms ,
two years the pendulum of war in Laos has :tinder their control and called it the Kingdom ,
been swinging harder and wider, and each wet- of Laos. Today there arc fewer than three mil.
, season dry-season offensive has mounted a lit. Ilion people in the entire country, two million ,
tIe higher than before. There are two months of or them in government-controlled areas near
dry season left. The fear now in both Washing- ? the mekone.
ton and Vientiane is that, this time, the North F Perhaps losing so often and being subjugat-
Vietnamese might be tempted to push on into eel by so many masters does something to a'
the Mekong River valley?which would upset race, for the Lao answer has been to drop out.
the balance of power in Indochina. If they did,, They are among the most charming people in
it might put the Nixon Doctrine of limited in- Asia?and the most otherworldly and least
volvemcnt in Asia to its severest test. martial as well. Consequently, Lao troops have
There are several reasons why the U.S. pres- , sometimes fired over the heads of the enemy'
ence in icabmvwer obit fid Jan
0040001-3
it is a vtoTadortillVeltraiaan 61,,, tft4516,sers.
'1.411111Q
North Vietnamese -Presence, Most olf(tfrreVgb,'
STATINTL
Vatai1.1?.0:0.1i STAIR,
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDW811:016.0
3 APR 1970 oiAliNIL
PARTIAL TEXT OF FULBRIGHT SPEECH
'Myth of internationall Communist.
? This is a partial text of ?Me myth of them all: the myth j Southeast Asia, much less pos-.
Sen. Fulbright's speech in the of the international Commu- A ing any kind of threat to the
administration's policies in Just like the walking catfish, :1i United States
. . l . . .
It should not be necessary to. Conspirac
Senate yesterday on the Nixon nist conspiracy. . . .
Southeast Asia: which gets out of a pond when add?although I suppose it
'f ?
, the water becomes uninhabita- ,, is?that I do not advocate a Stymied though not defeated
, in
I. Several years ago I made a ble and heads overland for ' Communist-dominated I n d o-
? Vietnam, the North Viet- ".
: .
; speech on the subject of "old ' more hospitable waters, the '
1 china. I merely propose to ac-'? namese have found in the pow-
myths and new realities." I conspiracy myth is both mo- ccpt it, if it arises from the
.: er vacuum of Laos an opportu-
.!
'
.8vrnocaoubrula fIrayn of
a I ndt6hc
e. ?
; recently re-read it and was ,, bile and indestructible. Dis- ? local power situation, as some-' 11tirlayge to gic turn
; surprised at how tame it ;credited in one locale, it soon thing unwelcome but tolerable,
. seemed in retrospect. Some of . turns up in another, sustained and most emphatically not ' ade ago, they may have come
' u '
' the "new realities' of 1904 still here and there by a kernel of worth the extravagant costs of p with a variation on the
, .
' seem pertinent, but others I truth, not enough to validate a war like the one we are now "domino" theory: something
!
? have, ripened into cliches, the myth but more than fighting.... Nit might be called the"skip-a-domino" theory. With ;
?; while a few, which once had enough to secure its grip on
validity, have passed into the the minds of leaders whose Victnamization represents a
, the Vietnamese domino mo, .
..; realm of old mythology. ? ? . education in communism be- change in tactics from the
mentarily glued down, the ,
Today, for a start, I should . gan ? and ended ? with Sta- Johnson policy but not a .
Communists may simply have ,
!like to discuss some of the , , rin . . , . , change in the objective, which
decided to go on to the next ?
misconceptions which seem to, . We are fighting a double is to preserve some kind of
American military foothold, one, where Souvapna Phou-
.
,obtain in our policy in South- ' 'shadow in Indochina ? the either directly or by proxy, in 1. mals ,army of Meo tribesmen
, east Asia. . . . , shadow of the international a alien sphere of influence. is hardly a moteli for the
..! The old myth of internation- Communist conspiracy and thewelcome t
. North Vietnamese, even with
, al politics ? that it was the shadow of the old, obsolete, . , I he change: Viet... .
jibe support of an indetermi-
; private preserve of sovereigns mindless game of power poll- namization is better than esca-
, nat
I and their ministers and none 'tics. Armed with weapons that lation, but I welcome it only in e number of CIA soldiers,
the sense that I would rather an unrevealed number of im-
,-- of the people's business ? has ? have given war a new dimen- : :ported Thais, and an appar-
, given way to a new myth: that ?: sion of horror, and adorned be riding in a car heading for \
; politics is life and everything with the sham morality of ide- ? a precipice at thirty miles an 'ently great number of B52's to:
1
? political is highly consequen- ?logical conflict, the struggle hour than at eighty miles an pound the Communist supply
?lines. . I
1 tial ? not just: for those who for power and influence has hour. If I wally had my ' ?
make their living by politics ' taken on a deadly, new intensi- car at,' all... . . Like the cicala- , tion of the North Vietnamese
choice I wouldn't be in that ? I doubt that it is the inten-'
i
1 hut for everybody, every- ? ty at exactly the time when it 1 to sweep through Laos and'
'where. Every issue is now a ? has lost much of the meaning tion which preceded it, Viet-
. then have a go at the next
'"critical" issue; every threat ' it once had. . . . namization is still an unsound .
i a "grave" one; and I doubt if , The second myth, well- policy, aimed at an unne "domino," which would be?ces- ' ?
:
,
? there is a square inch left on ' established after five years of sarv - an dprobably unattaina- 'tThailand. I think it more likelyi
,
' that they are pressing their
! the face of the earth that ,? futile warfare, is that we could ble objective....
I
'someone does not regard as .* do anything about it if it did The President still has time. -advantage in Lens to compen-.
t for the stalemate in Viet-
'. strateg,ic. . . ." ? matter ? anything worth ', to prevent an American defeat . sate ,
;? nam and to demonstrate the
V The master myth of Viet- , doing, that is. . . . . but not a lot of time. For 'all'
, . . .,
i nam is the greatly inflated im- . Puny as it is by great power "the fan -I futility of Vietnamization.
cy sophistries that have I Events in Laos are showing up
? . portance which has been at- standards, North Vietnam is kbeen concocted about it, Viet.: I , Vietnamization for a kind of
tached to it. From the stand- the paramount power in Indo- 3
' namization is -not strengthen- , p o lit i c a 1 Maginot Line?
"point of American security china. In unadorned strategic ?ing our hand; like any redue- , difficult to assault head on,
' d interests the central fact terms, it is "their" part of the' tion in military forces, it is but why bother when you can;
; about Indochina is that it does world in exactly the same way ? :weakening our hand, and our . walk around it?
, not matter very much who ? except on a much more 1
, . . . The startling aspect of I
' rules in those small and back- modest scale ? that Eastern ' enemies are not such mental
? defectives that they can be the situation in Laos is our,
i ward lands. . . . What it all Europe is Russia's part of the , ! virtual helplessness. Caught in
comes down to is that, if all world and Latin America is ?
kidded into believing 'other-
't a dilemma between its instinct,
, other things were equal ? as ours. : . . ;
for fighting communism wher-
; indeed they are not ? it might We ought in a way to wel- : By mid-1971, when American
, ever it appears and the be a convenience to the United come North Vietnam's preem- forces are scheduled ,,to be
i. straints imposed by public and.
re-
States to have the countries of inence in Indochina, because, ' down to about 225,000 men, it
'Indochina ruled by non- while North Vietnam has may well be too late. ? . ,
Communist leaders. For this shown itself strong enough to The myth of Vietnamization :'congressional opinion, the ad-
ministration is reduced to hop.
hypothetical advantage we dominate Indochina if left is thrown into sharp relief by ' loll for the best in Laos. . . , ,
have already spent Over 40,000 ' alone by outside powers, it has the deterioration o the anti- .. In Cambodia as in Laos the,
lives and $100 billion. also shown' itself willing and Communist military position '?, initiative lie,s with the Comrnu-;
0 so colossally the importance of- tion. At the same time North bodia. 'These events point up 17 ,
How have we come to inflate , able to resist Chinese domino- in Laos and the coup in Cam- I ninth. ; , . -.
Indochina to our own security? ' Vietnam is far too small a the futility of our Vietnamese
r?-????? -......
1 It is not my!purpose to taunt,
. - 4
The answer lies in that boom; power ? to have any serious strategy in a conflict which is,
est, hardiest, most indestructi- hope of. conquering 11 of, not confined to Vietnam but in,
? ? ' ' fact encompasses, All, pi illitp-if!
. ,
;,china.. ,??
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NOTES
?""vr-",-"""r"-,* ???7?????
Cambodia's Importance
The recent revolution In Cambodia and What is really happening In this Part of
the fighting in Laos are of ?great import- the world is a change of scene. The war in
,.; once to the war in Vietnam. Cambodia's :?Sout?h Vietnam' is declining in violence and
'f? new government might possibly close down?:.;the climax in Laos and Cambodia is op-
[the port of Siharoukville to the commu-: prtioching. The showdown had to come,
r? nists, through .which about one-third of ihe.? for South Vietnam's security is affected by
i supplies to enemy in Vietnam are thoughti events in both countries. (Alt three formerly
,
i to poss. (It is Cambodia's'only deep wateCycomprised French Indochci.)
( harbor.) ? ' ..... , , .
1 . '.. ?Nixon Administrotion; though hogtied ;
far as the use of US tro'o s is concern-
., Washington ii waiting hopefully for that .. as " P .. .,
.,?ed, perhaps rightly 40, by congress and ?
i closure and this Is probably ,why the U.S. .
. public opinion, is doing its best to wage an!
f.Navy was refused permission to board.
.effective war against the communists in
i the ammunition ship Columbia Eagle, with; ,
; Laos (and to some extent in Cambodia) '.-
its load of U.S. Iambi, recently, after the
i
?? with only the Air Force and the C.I.A. Un. .?
r Navy had already issued the orders and ? ..
.'dercover work in Cambodia seerns?to hovel
i, the cruiser Oklahoma City 'was: about to
. :?-. ? ,.
i, enter Sihanoukville harbor. ' '.', , ?
? . ? paid off recently and Thai troops are fight.
' Ing in Laos, with U.S. logistical and ,intelli.,1 .
The fighting In Laos is of grave import- ge?nce support.. . .
: once because .If. the. communists take the ' Most experts agree the situation .in *South
, entire country, 'Thailand will be directly ? Vietnam is vastly-improved. If Cambodia is .
?
threatened The United States is ,committed . made secure and at least the Western half
Thailand's ailand'm defense:, that is why U.S. '. of Laos (bordering Thailand) is safeguard.
planes have been ferrying Thai troops to .,.ed or, secured,:without. :the .,ase. of .US.
Laos and the C.Iqsk. has been doing ,oil -it ,troops, 'mach will hav,e, been accomplished.
can. working withiLaotionlribesmen,:?;::,1):-!,i' bltsthe Nixon 'A.kilministrOtiOn::.:,.,..!'t.,:...,
'1, ....i.:, - ? ,-,-.- -,,,,,i),;4.14.?....01414.1.4a.u.664-tdoak4Li.2AAaw.:44:4vc;41:44.4611$414:4 - 1:14?114.4.
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CIA 'Air Force'
NEW YORK ? The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has both its ? I
own private army in Laos and an "Air Force." Newsweek reports that
\ Air America, one of the largest U.S. companies, is an arm of the CIA.
It is nominally owned by a private concern, Pacific Corporation, which v
Is only a front for the CIA operation. The force now ha's about 150 ?
transport planes and employs about 600 pilots,. many veterans of the
Vietnamese war. ? ?
The planes are used to carry prIoners of war, move troops; rein-
forcements, ammunition and supplies. ,
I.,
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Approved For Release 20efitIRCA$1:5384110111811R
?
Letters to the Editor ?
The War in Laos
SIR: It was with great interest that I read your
editorial, "The Laotian War." For over a year Associ-
ated Press reporter Tammy Arbuckle has presented in-
depth articles concerning Laos. He has done an out-
standing and accurate job.
If any of the Senators and commentators now cry-
ing out has bothered to read The Star, they would real-
ize that the press and the American public have not
been misinformed or kept in the dark about the "un-
declared war" in Laos. Thank you for presenting an ob-
jective picture of the developments in this Southeast
Asian country.
' J. V. Martin.
* * * *
SIR: Any intelligent, thoughtful person who will take
the time to read the full text of President Nixon's,,
statement on Laos must wonder why certain so-called
? "liberal" Senators, who are screaming about the 'alleged:
Involvement of the United States in Laos, do not scream.
about the 67,000 North Vietnamese troops who have
invaded and are occupying that unfortunate country in
flagrant violation of the Geneva . agreements to which':
North Vietnam is a party. :.;
Are these Senators straining to do everything possi-,1
ble to embarrass and discredit the United States and to
give aid and comfort to the enemy? If so, why? '
Walter Wyatt.
* * * *
SIR: Hopefully your policies, editorial and news, '
concerning the recent excitement over our defensive
activity in Laos will recognize your readers' basic ,
intelligence and desire for quality journalism. In this
regard it would be :comforting and helpful to read why
?
the Communists are actually invading, how many.
treaties they have disregarded in this case and why, the',
degree of Russian aid and direction and what encourage-
ment Hanoi might receive and expect from inaccurate.
,reporting and misleading conclusions?
Barbara Estridge.
Editor's Note: Mr. Wyatt (letter above) answers
,Miss Estridge's question concerning broken treaties.'
We can only assume that the Communists are invading
to impose a Communist government on Laos by force.,
* * *
7.nt. .,:.-ients on Laos attributed to Senator,
Stepnen Try-mg of Co, if true, are deplorable and,.
certainly indicative of a few elected officials who make
use of their office to create ill will between the United
States and one of its allies. Referring to Laos as ".
the most undeveloped nation in the world and not woith
the life of one American" only dees a great disservice
to the United States and the people .and government of '
Laos. ?
To my knowledge Senator Young has never visited
Laos; therefore I question his qualification to speak on
the subject from the floor of the Senate in an obvious
attempt to influence national policy. While Senator:
Young professes his personal interest in "writing-off";
Laos, nine nations, including the United States, are
actively engaged in providing support of development
projects In Laos that will favorably affect most of that'l
area of Southeast Asia. ? i
Australia, Canada, Denmark:, France, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Thailand and, the United
States have invested $30 million in construction Of the'
Nam Ngum Dam just north of Vientiane. An additional'
$1 billion is being considered for construction of the Pa.
Meng Dam. Both are part of the Mekong River develop"
meat program. Surely this is acceptable evidence of'
world interest in assisting Laos to develop a natural re=
source beneficial to a large population of &utWastAslaw
With the exception of Vietnam-, there are more
,American civilians assigned to the mission in Laos than
anywhere else in the world. Most are engaged in provid-
?ing development assistance, not CIA-agent activities as
alleged by the Senator. The possibility of loss of life is ?
,always present while working in an area of active
Insurgency. People are killed every day right here in the
District of Columbia.
The Pathet Lao and Hanoi will make excellent use of
'the Senator's comments in their travels through the vil-
lages and in their press releases and radio broadcasts.
- ? Reader.
? * * * * ?
. SIR: Our treatment of Laos has been a mixture of
?chicanery and poltroonery ever since President Kennedy
,decided our position in that country was "untenable"
, (April 1961). We had advised and persuaded Laos in
1954-55 to come under the umbrella of SEATO. The Lao-
tian representatives then said: "We are a small weak
people and all the Communists have to do to get in our
country is walk across an imaginary line. You are the
most powerful nation in the world, but you are 10,000
:miles away." We assured them that they would be pro-
tected but that they would have to eschew Communism
and throw the Pathet Lao out of their government.'
Kennedy,
i Kennedy, after deciding that our position in Laos
was untenable, agreed to the urging of the UN, and
particularly the Communist powers therein, that there
.should be a "troika" government in that country. "Trot?
ka," as many know, is a Russian word meaning a 3.
horse team. In the case of Laos it was meant to stand
? for the re-entry in the government of the Communists
along with the other two parties already represented. In
other words, he agreed? that the Laotians should take
back the very Communist Pathet Lao we had required
that they put out. When the representaives of Laos in a
, meeting with ours at Bangkok were faced with this de-
mand, they asked how we squared our demand with our
' position in 1965. The answer was to the effect that they
, were dealing with the Eisenhower administration in
1965 and that it was the Kennedy administration. '
We put the Laotians on the spot and we are obligat-
ed to protect them from Communists, specifically North
Vietnam. Our honor is at stake?as it is in South Viet-
nam. There is only one possible just way out of the
problem and that is to win the 'War in Vietnam and
Laos. It could have been won lodgi ago, and it will have
I to be won now or in the future if our word and our fu-
ture means anything at all. We cannot sidestep the real
Issue forever. And, it can be won very quickly by in-
vading North Vietnam and destroying Haiphong.
' Clarkson 4. Beall. ?
Fulton', Md.
? * * *
SIR: I would like to ask one question. How can
anyone accuse the Nixon administration of having se-
cretly, or otherwise, involved the United States on such
a large scale in Laos in a mere 14 months? We all know.
that we have been committed in that country for many
,. years, not only to aid .111,0 peoplp ot Laos but tO suppctrt
our troops in Vietnattt; 1. 4
& liailidasartsa:
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L1 Li 43
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LL C&I Li LI CD]
Daily World Foreign Department
A U.S. Navy jet shot down a MIG-21 interceptor on Saturday over the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam, the U.S. command in Saigon revealed yesterday. It was the first
DRV plane downed since the "bomb-halt" announced by ex-President Lyndon Johnson
on Nov. 1, 1968, and represents one of .the most serious attempts at escalating the
Vietnam war since that date.
A Radio Hanoi broadcast on
Tuesday stated that DRV anti-
aircraft gunners shot down a U.S.
RF-4-C photo-reconnaissance over
-DRV air space on Monday. The
RF-4-C is the spy version. of the
"Phantom" jet fighter-bomber.
The U.S. spokesman said the
U.S. Navy "Phantom" jet was es-
corting reconnaissance planes
when it shot down the MIG-21.
The action was said to have oc-
curred over Thanh Ilea, 125 miles
north of the Demilitarized Zone,
It was admitted there were no
reports that the MIG-21 had fired
on the U.S. planes, and reporters
quickly asked how the U.S. knew
the MIG-21 was "attacking."
Students in Saigon on a protest
strike against the March 27 jail-
ing of 40 fellow-students grew to
33,000 yesterday. The lead in the
strike was taken by the 6,000 stu-
dents of Saigon's ,Medical Insti-
tute, who were then followed by
university students in Hue, Dalat
and Can Tho. The strike leaders
sent a letter to Saigon President-
Nguyen Van Thieu declaring,
"Our struggle is not an isolated
one. We are supported by many
other strata in the population."
They warned Thieu that they
would call for a general strike.
In Laos, General Vang Pao,
head of the U.S, CIA's clande
tine army of Meo tribesmen.
claimed yesterday in a radio
broadcast his troops had retaken
Sam Thong, 80 miles north of the
capital of Vientiane.
Sam Thong, an important CIA
air base and supply depot in
northern Laos. had been taken
March 18 by the Lao Patriotic
Front.
U.S. sources in Vientiane said
the U.S. had made round-the-clock
air strikes on Sam Thong ever
?since it was captured by the LPF.
They believed LPF troops were ?
only pulling back to higher ground.
The Lao parliament in Vienti-
ane urged Prince Souvanna Phou-
ma, the premier, to open negotia-
tions with the LPF on the basis
of the LPF five-point peace plan.
It added, however, that the peace
negotiations must begin "without
conditions.". The LPF had de-
manded as a preliminary condi-
tion that the [LS. halt its bomb-
ing.
U N development
At the United Nations in New
York. Secretary-General U Thant.
after a meeting with Cambodian
charge d'affaires, Or Kosalak.
promised to "take a look into the
matter" of Cambodia. The new
military regime in Cambodia has
charged that DRV and ?Viet-
cong" troops are violating its
soil.
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STATI NTL
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Nar
'V
By John I'. Wallach
WashiActon Bureau
WASHINGTON- ? Ameri-
can involvement in Laos be-
gan inconspicuously in the
spring of 1946 in a remote
province of Thailand. ,
An American office of Stra-
tegic Services veteran
named James Thompson
called on the Governor of
Thailand's Nong Khai prov-
ince. "Come upstairs," the The Geneva accords parti-
; governor said, "I have a Lao honed Vietnam, barred Laos
prince you might like to and Cambodia. from military
meet." -I alliances, prohibited foreign
The governor's guest was Il'bases on their soil, called for
Prince Souphanouvong, then ?! the removal of all Viet Minh
a leader of the newly-formed and French troops from Laos
:Laotian independence move- and called for the withdrawal
n ent and now head of the of the Pathet Lao to the two
Communist Pathet Lao. Sou- Northern Laotian provinces.
phanouvong asked Thompson . The Geneva accords pro.;
1 for pledges of U.S. support vided for the Laotian govern-
against the French colonial- ment to administer these
ists who were re-establishing provinces in - collaboration
their control over Laos after with the Pathet Lao. Less
the Japanese surrender. than a year after the accords
- The same spring, ,another were signed, fighting broke
meeting look place in Paris.: out between Communists and
? between Ho Chi Minh, who - government troops in the
Communist-held provinces.
Some La oti an leaders,
among them Souvanna Phou-
ma, the half-brother of Sou-
IOW ot at ay,
--Dipl Snafus
moved in from neighboring
Yunnan province.
With the deterioration o
the French po sit io n, the
Western powers convened ii
April, 1954, an internationa
conference in. Geneva, also
attended by North Vietnam
and Communist China, to ne-
gotiate an armistice in Indo-
china.
this govern ni e n t,was
eclipsed. .. , Meanwhile, Gen. Phourni
From that point, the U.S. established rival headrivar-
f pros once in Laos grew hers, w li e r e he reportedly.
again turned to the CIA
0
pport Finally, in Dece
In 1955, North Vietnam be-
i gan to infiltrate large num- i su.
b ? f ops o their. Pathet
bfoerrc, forces, a ..filnhosutm vi ielnetril a nieii,s
1
.Lao allies, and the U.S. be-
gan training the royal Lao-
tian army. A year later,
: Prince S o u van ii a Phouma
took over the government.
In a matter of months, he mg to reconvene the Geneva
was able to get his brother to conference, Hanoi infiltrated ,
,
' integration of the Communist. eral concurrence that Laos
troops into the north. A gen- ]
? agree to a ceasefire, the re-
and drove Souvanna Phouma
up to the Plain of Jars to join
his communist half-brother.
Wrong War
While the U.S. was press-'?
had* jest be his anti-
French resistance movement
(Viet Minh) in neighboring
Vietnam, and America offi-
cials. .phanouvong, had urged the i
President Harry Truman 1Geneva parties to set up a-,
refused to commit Money, or coalition instead of dividing
arms to, the fight against the the country in two.
French, and months lat-'
or, in the winter of 1946, the
bitter Indochina war began.
It ended eight years later,;
after the siege of Dien Bien:
Phu, the French stronghold'
in North Vietnam, by ITo Chi'
Minim's forces who had
turned to Russia and Com-
munist China for help.
Partition
By that time, Viet Minh
troops had invaded Laos, and
joined Souphanouvong's *Pa-
that Lao, and a Chinese foree
*5
.?
?
? Dulles Stand
By this time, however,
President Eisenhower's Sec-
retary of State, John Foster
Dulles, had decided to. back
an anti-communist govern-
merit in Vientiane, the Lao-
tian capital, . and Souvanna
Phouma,. later to 'take ,oyer
?4 ? V
govermnent. The U.S. contin- was the wrong war in them
provinces,, and to a coalition
ued to support Souvanna, wrong place at the wrong
Pho u ma. . . time led to the 1962 Geneva
The Central Intelligence Conference, at which 14 na-
Agency is thought to have ns agreed to guarantee]
otian neutrality,-
surfaced for the first time in,,
December, 1959, by persuad-,
ing Gen, Phourni Nosavan, a !
right-wing nationalist, to ,1
stage a coup against then I!
. prime minister Pholuni San- 4
anikone.
But the UN, in the name of 1
restoring the Geneva ac-.1
cords, stepped in, and plans
were made for general elec. ,1
lions in which. Pathet
candidates 1
seats in the Naliohal Assern,...4;
bly, were won by supporters.
of Gen. Phoumi. ?
Once again, ch,irges,o.C.C.144.4
interference surfaced. A.?
month after the elections, 1-
Prince Souphanouvong
caped from prison4 and re-4
turned north. The new gcw.cii
ernment lasted eight months.
An An unknown pitratrooper
aptain named Kong Le led a I
oup d'etat and returned Soul,/
alma Phouma to,power. '
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LLLLCSE
VEZEINki'vc?
For the inside story of
American involvement in Laos
read MISTER POP. Edgar "Pop" Buell
Edgar Buell, whom the Pao tribesmen call "Mister
Pop," has been in Laos for the past nine years, and
he's still there. The first-hand story hc to tell
about the C.I.A.'s role in Laos is an eye opener. Don
Schanche (who broke the Laos story in-ttce news) let
Pop Buell tell it all
At all
bookstores
$7.95
Zle ZZA/21
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1
OUR INVOLVEMENT IN LAO
By Robert Shaplen
HE debate over Laos, almost as intense if not as bitter as
the Vietnam debate, has done more than clarify the nature
of the American involvement in that patchwork kingdom'
which has played a secondary but significant role in the Vietnam
war while also engaging in its own struggle to survive as a
unitary nation. The Senate's dual actions in prohibiting the use
of ground combat troops in both Laos and Thailand, and in
curbing the right of the President to make a "national commit-
ment" to any country without prior Congressional approval,
have temporarily satisfied the common determination to avoid
"another Vietnam." But the fundamental problem of how
American policy should be made and conducted in Southeast
Asia has only begun to be reexamined.
The broad outlines of our future policy in Asia were given by
President Nixon during his Asian trip last year, most fully at his
preliminary stopover in Guam, but much remains hazy about
the nature of our current commitments and responsibilities there.
The President and other administration officials in speeches
and press conferences since then have reemphasized that, in line
with reducing "our involvement and our presence" around the
world, as Mr. Nixon put it in his State of the Union Message,
the nations of Southeast Asia will henceforth nave to bear the
main burden of defending themselves against all but the most
flagrant?including nuclear?forms of aggression. Still unclear .
and requiring further reappraisal are such substantive matters
as the prerogatives of the Executive and the Departments of
State and Defense to make agreements or pledges short of treaties
with foreign countries without "the advice and consent" of the
Senate.
What must be gone into thoroughly, moreover, are such com-
plicated and specific questions as the advisability and legitimacy
of using certain methods, especially clandestine ones, to achieve
limited purposes. This includes the question of what sort of
assistance the Central Intelligence Agency or any other intelli-
gence branch of the government can or should give to nations
engaged in counterinsurgency campaigns?or wars within or even
beyond their borders. Also involved is the peaceful role that the
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Why Defend Laos?
"I ,
? By STEPHEN AMititt)SE i
T AOS is a country of less at all. The war in South Viet- I
t 4-4 than three million people, ' nain will not be affected by i
most of whom either smuggle anything that, happens in Laos; 1
. gold or grow and process op- the bombings will go on even if 1
ium for a living. It is one of the the Communists occupy all!
t, most isolated regions of the Laos and take over the govern-
world. To get from one place to ment. . I
I. another in Laos is almost im- Why, then, do we v ste mili-1
w' possible. By itself, Laos has ?tory effort by suppc ling the
l
'
`C absolutely no importance to Laotians with theSIA and air
anyone except the Laotians. , . missions around the Plaine des
?Yet Laos now stands next to' Jarres, which is hundreds of
' the Middle East and Vietnam ., miles away from the Trail?
1 as the most dangerous tinder. Why is Nixon faced with the (
box in the world. So important agonizing decision on introduc-;
., has it become that the United big ground combat elements?!
' States has actually decreased Primarily, one fears, not bei
ts air offensive in Vietnam in cause of any inherently impor-;
tont strategic reasons, butt
ohms in Laos. The CIA runs a
rather as a result of a long-1
' ',
iIorder to carry on combat oper-
private army in Laos (typical- term, insidious Process .of rhe4
? ly, a rather ineffective one), torical escalation. "We gok
American soldiers have been ahead treating 'this little pis-
killed on the ground, and the sant country as if it 1t:re Rus-', .
Pentagon is undoubtedly pre. sia and China put together,".'
,
i% paring contingency plans for Senator Fulbright once corn-4
the introduction of major corn- plained with respect to North!
' bat units. 1 -, Vietnam. Dean Rusk .compared
Why all this activity? that tiny country to Nazi Ger-1
Supposedly because ' of the ninny ad nauseam, and the t
l.strategie importance of Laos. former Secretary of State, used I
l,The Ho Chi Minh Trail pro- to talk of the importance of;
; vides infiltration routes for the maintaining the sovereignty;
1 introduction of NVA troops into and freetiorn of Laos as if he ,
t South Vietnam, which justifies 'were defending Canada or Mex4
American involvement in Laos. ' ico from foreign invasion. "I
I,Or does it?' . .
' All this nonsense about soy-
Secretary of Defense Laird ereignty and freedom loving
k said in a press conference on peoples has gotten us into deep'
,.1$4arch 19 that even if the Com-. troubles in the past. It threat-
k munists took over the govern- .ens to do so in the future. The:
tment of Laos and then demand- important facts about Laos are;
4 ed that we halt the bombing, that it does not matter to any,
i, the Pentagon intended to con- outsider who rules there, and
i.,
?I', tinue the air offensive. Since that it borders on China. In
1 the Ho Chi Minh Trail is little 1950 we learned, or at least ohe
Y more than a jungle Oath, and? hopes that we learned, that the
ii since It is impossible to move Chinese react with a certain
'. Iarge forces into the area, hostility when American G.I.'s
t., much less support them once approach their border. Surely ,
I
there, it is perfectly obvious no one, not even in the Penta-
that we have no intention of gon, wants a ground war with
slopping the infiltration by oc- the Chinese ,over anything,
? '4.cupying southeastern Laos. We much less Laos. Before we
Iwill simply continue to chase blunder on in defense of Lao-4
; the will-o'-the-wisp of attempt- ian sovereignty ,and get our-.
to stop the Infiltration by ?, selves into a war with China, it
dropping big bombs from B-523 is imperative that the adminis-,
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' Vientiane' makes no difference. what purpose, ? ..l. - . :.....j .
_ .
STATINTL STATINTL
ma rat /Fs,p5s3y8d For Relemagfbli(a: etkcapnymil R000
Mons on September 25, 1961. He warned
that South Vietnam was under attack
by forces infiltrated through Laos.
Furthermore, on November 6, 1961, we
publicly confirmed reports from Laos
that Soviet transport planes were de-
livering military supplies to the south-
ern Lao air base of Tchepone which
had been in Pallid Lao hands for
months, after being captured by the
Communist cadre.
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STATINTL
SCHFNECTADY, N.Y.
Approved For Re asusseettle1/03/04 : CIA-780-01601
1,1 _55,934 ,
ioftvav- (k-7 (2_1
No Esca
The citizen is pretty much In the ,
'dark so far as war in Cambodia : is:
, concerned because . few. persons knew,:
? what .is going on behind the scenes.),
That has been true of the War in Yiet
nam and the war in Laos.
- The citizen knows what the Whit
' House is saying and knows What the
' various competing politicians and gen-
? orals are saying in, Cambodia. In short,
the public knows what's on the:.'surface.
But what is not known is what is going,
on in secrecy?what ' is being done,
for example,. by the CIA. ? Are we ,,i ?,/r
. getting into deeper troub16'withciut,
realizing it? No one knows , but the
few who , are directly involved. The
': President himself could be deceived.:.
The one thing that is ? Certain ..is
that our people will not be happy about
any escalation of war in Cambodia. If
. our citizens were enthusiastic about,';
: the war in Vietnam it could easily bie;,,
-.argued that we should be waging an
'..,. aLlal -ooslt bwe caaritsi C
on: foatmobi coadni lap 1 (ase ow, ?co% at cla
1 i 1
60;000 North Vietnamese troops have
been using the border jungles of Cam!
?? bodia for years as sanctuaries ;from:
4: Which, to . strike ; against ,: American
i
'.,foreeS n South, Vietnam ; , ;
The situation is, iit.a sense, stinger
to that, during the Korean war when
the UN fortes, were. fighting with one
'''..hand.. tied ' !behind their back 'because
:.,they, '.refrained from sending bombers
across the line into, China, Where the
. . , . ,
Onnese : ' WOKO: ,. enjoying . sanctuary. .
pne. difference is that -had We gone
into China we would have taken on
:;;prieT:of. the , biggest :and ;Perhaps the
,:??,ntost. stubborn nation in ..the world.).
.:.,'? f..Thei' only people who ,want ? us to,
...escalate war in Cambodia and Laos are
those, who believe that no matter how
ve g6 about ii; we mist,. at all costs,
ecisiVely. . defeat Communists,: where-
'ever :they rear, their: heads .in .1South-:
Veast -:ASia.;:' If what is imperative is
:'...Aniericani .military victory, 1.0;'. South-
east 'Asia- then we should' be ?waging
:Jullscale JAVar in Cambodia, Laos and?
every other country in 'which, there
!fire - Communist factions that . Might
,!constitute a' threat.
But, .very few American ? Citizens
?Want' to, pull out of ' war in Vietnam
..7.',only ;to . get deeper.' and ,deeper into
.;. war in 'Cambodia or`Laos:?:It is ? hoped'
that President Nixon is making ..that,
polnt, iclear to any and all persons in
I API i
.;b01A, 4c1 ?10o.:::4'. ' ,
co,.
:,,.,..22!;;Ld oi,,,, .2' .1'
Approved For Rele
1R000700040001-3
IME
-711 STATINTL
Approved For Release 20031Thtek1PCIA-RDP80-01601
THE WORLD
DANGER AND OPPORTUNITY IN INDOCHINA
THROUGH the anguished years of
the Viet Nam War. Cambodia and
Laos have been strictly sideshows. Cam-
bodia has almost entirely escaped the
storm of steel that so far has cost the
lives of an estimated 610.000 North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops, 175,-
000 South Vietnamese troops. and more
than 42.000 Americans?not to mention
some 300,000 Vietnamese civilians. The
conflict in Laos, though bloody enough,
has not approached the scale of the.
war in Viet Nam. Now the situation is
suddenly changing. Events in Laos and
called for?and got?help from U.S..
and South Vietnamese forces. With the
war continuing in South Viet Nam and
with the North wrestling with the grave
problems that have grown out of the con-
flict, all four states of Indochina were
on the boil at the same time (see map).
Privileged Sanctuaries
For some time, Laos and Cambodia'
have served as massive conduits for the
flow of men and supplies from North
Viet Nam to the southern battlegrounds.
There is, of course, the spidery Ho Chi
cm n Cambodia arc the "Parrot's Beak"
and the "Angel's Wing," where five Com-
munist regiments operating in the Me-
kong Delta "float in and out," as a
U.S. source puts it. Farther north in
Cambodia is the "Fishhook," only 70
miles from Saigon, which is the haven
for two full divisions as well as Viet
Cong headquarters. It is no exaggeration
to say that the existence of these sanc-
tuaries has virtually precluded a mil-
itary solution to the Viet Nam War. In
fact, General Creighton Abrams, the
U.S. commander in South Viet Nam,
HELICOPTERS NEAR CAMBODIAN BORDER LAOTIAN
Changing the whole thrust of the war.
Minh Trail, threading into South Viet
Nam from more than half a dozen
points in Laos and Cambodia. There is
also the Cambodian port of Sihanouk-
ville, through which, according to sonic
estimates, the Communists get fully 80%
of their ? supplies for the war in the
lower half of South Viet Nam, Much
of the mat6riel is brought in aboard Chi-
nese and Soviet freighters and moved
north over first-class roads (including
one built with U.S. aid) by a fleet of
some 500 canvas-covered lorries op- .?
crated by the Chinese firm of Hak Ly.
Even more important is the use of
Cambodia and Laos as privileged base.
areas for Communist troops. North Viet-
namese and Viet Cong hospitals, stip- .
ply dumps, rest camps and training areas ?
are scattered throughout eastern Cam-
bodia. A 2,300-man headquarters for
the. joint North Vietnamese-Viet Cong '
effort in the South lies in a complex of
huts beneath a triple canopy of jungle.?
Some of the sanctuaries bear pictur-
Cambodia last week may well prove to
be a watershed in the protracted Vict
Nam War. Indeed, they could change
the whole thrust of the war.
For the first time since the Geneva ac-
cords of 1962 brought an equivocal
peace to Laos, Communist troops moved
south in force from the Plain of Jars.
They seized one key base that had been
cld by the Laotians with U.S. support
and menaced another that serves as the
center of CIA operations in the coun-
try. The onslaught made it clear that
the North Vietnamese could overrun
all of Laos at will; what was agoniz-
ingly unclear was just how far they in-
tended to go. ,
Developments in neighboring Cam-
bodia were equally unsettling. In Phnom-
Penh, anti-Communists led by Premier
General Lon Nol and Deputy Premier
Prince Sisowath Sink Matak deposed
Prince Norodom Sihanouk as chief of
state and ordered North Vietnamese and
Viet Cong troops out of Cambodia. In
a number
munist t
?1 lilt
ilsVeitstAdvittbiape
COMMUNISTS IN SOVIET ARMORED CAR
MaratsgtriMeNig6
has said that if they were eliminated
the war would be over within a year.
In recent months, increasing allied
successes in South Viet Nam have
forced the Communists to lean more
than ever on the Cambodian and Lao-
tian sanctuaries. Cambodia in particular
noted an upsurge in activity as the al-
lies pressed toward the western frontiers
of South Viet Nam. Phnom-Penh, for
example, reported 200 attacks by Com-
munist troops on Cambodian outposts
in the past few months. In Laos, U.S. in-
telligence sources note that Hanoi has
sent in one ? fresh 9,000-man division
and fully reinforced another in recent
months for its current offensive.
Promise and Peril
. To policymakers in the U.S., the Cam-
bodian and Laotian crises present a tan-
talizing mixture of promise and peril.
Should the U.S. go to Cambodia's aid
if asked, providing supplies or men in
the hope of wiping out the sanctuaries
moo ItT.S. were to
"Mr pouring in
11:1,6
continued
- Approved For Release 2001/03/04 ? CIA-RDPB0-01601R000700040001-3 ?
Kept non m
in tile spotlight notn at nome aoized. A year ago, during a tour of
Cambodia's northeast provinces, Siha-
nouk saw for himself the extent of Com-
munist occupation, Subsequently, the
prince said that he had had enough of
the Communist intruders. So had many
of his countrymen.
Inevitably, American and South -Viet-
namese troops were guilty of incursions
as well, though not for protracted pe-
riods, Last December, Cainhcidia's Unit-
ed -Nations Ambassador, Huot Sampoth,.
appealed for an end to "this war of ex-
termination" in which, he said, more
than 300 Cambodians had been killed
and 700 wounded by U.S. and...South
Vietnamese forces. There was little, how-
ever; that Cambodia could do except
complain: its scantily equipped 40,000-
man armed forces could not adequately
patrol Cambodia's ill-defined, 575-mile
more troops n opening yet ano er
front, or by intensifying its thrust in
Laos. This, coming at a point when the
U.S. is attempting to disengage from
the Indochinese quagmire, could prove
politically as well as militarily disastrous.
The U.S. effort to disengage, in fact,
may well have contributed to Much of
the current turmoil.
If Washington faces difficult decisions
over the next several weeks, however,
so does Hanoi. Can North Viet Nam
stand calmly by and see its supply lines
to the South endangered? Should the
Communists seize all of .Laos, and risk
massive U.S. bombing as well as at-
tack by a Thai army that is unlikely to.
feel comfortable with Communist forc-
es just across the Mekong River? With
problems of these dimensions suddenly
looming, the next few months are bound
? to be crucial for Southeast Asia.
The common denominator in the cur-
? rent turmoil is the North Vietnamese in-
fantryman, and his presence in sizable .
numbers in supposedly neutral lands.,
Hanoi's forces long ago took on the bur-
den of the Laos campaign from the in-
/
ffectual, home-grown Pathet Lao. Nei-
ther the frangible Laotian regulars nor ?
the lightly armed, CIA-backed Meo
guerrillas of Laotian General Vang Pao
have been able to withstand them. In
Cambodia, it was North Viet Nam's
freewheeling use of Cambodian ter-
ritory that finally precipitated Sihanouk's ?
ouster. With the U.S. withdrawal
,?. under way, Sihanouk grew increasingly
alarmed that the presence of so many .
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong sol-
diers would encourage Cambodia's own
Communists, the Khmer Rouge, to act
more boldly. For all his diplomatic dex-
terity, however, the ebullient prince had
found it impossible to persuade his un-
welcome guests to leave, and power
was seized by men who may try hard- ?
cr. Of course, many observers familiar
with the Byzantine workings of Siha-
nouk's mind suspect that he may have ?
engineered the whole thing as a way of
pressuring Moscow and Peking to talk
the intruders into leaving. But most an-
alysts suspect that this time no dis-
sembling was involved.
In the Spotlight
Dissatisfaction with Sihanouk has
sprung from several sources. Foreign
policy intrigues the mercurial prince
and so does education, but economic pol-
icy, which is vital to Cambodia's wel-
fare, simply bores him. There were ru-
mors that the prince's relatives had prof-
ited enormously from government con-
tacts. After Sihanouk was deposed, his.
wife, attractive Princess Monique, was
attacked for alleged profiteering. Even
Queen Kossomak, Sihanouk's mother,
was the subject of ugly speculation on
the same count. "The pretext was that
Sihanouk was not doing enough against
the Vietnamese," said a young Cam-
bodian businessman. "The real reason
was that we were all tired of him." .
It was SitArFOreUediFjaptiagtlea
?
and abroad. in the early '60s, the prince
concluded that the U.S. would never
be able to defeat the Vietnamese Com-
munists. Accordingly, he began disen-
gaging , from the U.S. and ingratiating
himself with the Soviet Union and,
more important, China. In late 1963, Si-
hanouk ordered U.S. aid officials out
of the country, and 18 months later he
broke off relations completely.
After Lyndon Johnson's decision to
halt the bombing of North Viet Nam, Si-
hanouk began swinging back toward -
the U.S. "The American presence helps
Cambodia indirectly by maintaining the
balance of power in the arca," he said.
"If the U.S. pulls out of the region,
the weight of China will be too great
for the small countries of SOutheast
Asia to bear. They will all become
atti
Pathet Lao Control??????+,....
PLA
Lu?-?*anrabang* \ OF JARS
Moung Souls?,.74Xie!ls Ithotrang
Sam Thong47.?ACheng (CIA HO).
L A ?\S
55,000 in Royal Laotian Army
5,000-10,000 Mao Tribesmen
Vientiane
? Worn
1,040 Americans in LAOS
incl. 320 military advisers
and 323 logistical personnel
HAI L
A N.,
126,000 in Thai forces
43,800 9.5. personnel
KarApproved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3
frontier with Viet Nam. A typical tech-
nique was to send a single Cambodian
trooper, mounted on a motorcycle, to
the site of a border violation. The sol-
dier would race up to the invading
troops, wave a Cambodian flag at them
and try to persuade them to leave. It is
a tribute to Cambodian bravado that
the tactic sometimes worked.
Energizing the Economy
Last summer Sihanouk made the two
men who eventually overthrew him, the
principal figures in a "movement of sal-
vation" designed to energize Cambodia's
stagnant cconomy. Both had been key of-
ficials for some time. Lon Nol is a
quiet, pragmatic 56-year-old general who
. has been Cambodia's best-known anti-
Communist for many years. He be-
came head of the national police in
' 1951 and entered the army in 1952, tak-
ing part in operations against the Viet
Minh invaders until the end of the
French war in Indochina. Three years
after joining the army, he became its
chief of staff, and in 1966 was elected
Premier. He resigned the following year.
after suffering injuries in an auto ac-
cident, but returned to the government
in 1968 as Defense Minister. In mid-'69,
when Lon Nol was again elected Pre-
mier, he demanded?and got?substan-
tial powers from Sihanouk.
Prince Sink Matak, 56, who helped
Lon Not depose Sihanouk, is the scion
of the Sisowath branch of the royal fam-
ily (Sihanouk is of the Norodom
branch). A more colorful figure than
Lon No, he could emerge as Cambodia's
real ncw leader. Though he has prac-
tically made a career out of publicly op-
posing Sihanouk on major issues, his
unquestioned ability has all but guar-
anteed him a succession of important
government posts. With Lou No, he
has long fought Sihanouk's policy of tol-
erating the Communist border presence,
but he has struggled hardest to free the
economy of oppressive government con-
trols and corruption.
Familiar Gambit ? - .
Last January, with domestic conflicts
developing over economic reforms and
?
the issue of the Vietnamese troops, Si-
hanouk decided to depart for France.
It was a familiar gambit?leave at a
Lime when trouble is brewing, come
back after the situation has worsened,
point out how inefficient the temporary
chieftains have been and then create a .
flurry of activity that resembles a so-
lution. This time, however. Sihanouk's
absence simply gave Lon Nol and Si-
rik Matak time to plot. ?
In February, the governors of Cam-
bodia's 19 provinces met in Phnom-
Penh. As they reported, one by one,
, on thcir problems, it slowly became ap-
parent that unrest extended over most
. of the nation?and that the chief
source of the trouble was the North Viet-.
1 narnese presence. Lon Nol and Sink'
oggitiotg atioretaing had to
Cockpit of Conflict
? ITTLE besides geography links the
L four countries that make up mod-
ern-day Indochina?Cambodia, Laos,
North and South Viet Nam. For 20
centuries, neither foreign conquerors
nor home-grown dynasts have ever
managed to persuade the peoples of
the verdant, fertile peninsula to col-
lect themselves into a single nation.
Indeed, long before the present strug-
gle engulfed them, their differences
had led to a history of prolonged
and tangled conflicts.
The most constant influence on
the area's life, of course, has been
China, where the forebears of most
present-day Indochinese lived before
migrating south centuries before .
Christ. On all too many occasions, -
the Heavenly Emperors to the North .
sent their representatives?sometimes '
soldiers, more often messengers de-
manding tribute. The feudal village,
with its population of tax-paying
peasants and aristocratic protectors,
grew out of that practice, and is still
the basic political unit in much of In-
dochina. The Chinese presence was
strongest in Viet Nam, which was
more or less a colony for nearly
1,000 years; its ancient name in Chi-
nese, Annam, literally means. "the
pacified South."
?
The second great culture to reach
Indochina was that of ancient India,
brought by sailors and traders. Along
with their commerce, the Indians car-
ried their culture?the religion of
Buddha, works of art, the concept
of a god-king. The unique fusion of
Indo-Asian culture that resulted
reached its greatest heights in Cam-
bodia, the seat of the once-mighty
Khmer Empire. Between the 9th and
the 14th centuries, the Khmers con-
quered all of Southeast Asia, from
the Mekong Delta in Viet Nam to?
Burma on the Bay of Bengal, back-
ing up their rule by building an elab-
orate set of canals and reservoirs
and making rice a stable crop. They
also left behind one of the archi-
tectural wonders of the world: the col-
onnaded temple of Angkor Wat.
Laos,' the Land of the Million El-
ephants and the White Parasol, man-
aged to conquer the northern reach-
es of the Khmer Empire in the 14th
century. That accomplishment led to
Laos' one brief period of expansion.
Before long, however, both Laos and
the Khmers were caught in the dead-
ly vise of war between Slain (now. .
Thailand) and Annam (now Viet
Nam). The enmities between Indo-
china's present-day neighbors stem
in no small part from these wars,
which reduced Laos to a tiny moun-
tain kingdom, robbed Cambodia of
the rich Mekong Deka (Cochin Chi-
Arprnvpri Fnr RAIPaRA
na) and created, for the first time in
history, a vigorous unity in Viet Nam
between the South (Annam) and
North (Tonkin).
France landed its first military ex-' '
pcdition in Viet Nam in 1858, os-
tensibly to protect missionaries who
were being put to death by the Viet-
namese Emperor for teaching Chris-
tianity. Soon the French objective
was to colonize rather than Chris-
tianize, and by 1883 Paris had es- '
tablished a "protectorate" in Cam- ?
bodia and occupied all of Viet Nam; .
in 1899, it placed a rasident
su-
pirieur in Vientiane. Economically,
the French were unabashed parasites.
As one report of the time put it: "Co-
lonial production must be limited to ? '
supplying the mother country with.
raw materials."
?
Politically, the French were not
so much oppressive as inept. Ad-
ministrators often knew next to noth-
ing about the land and people in
their charge, and few were in office ?
long enough to learn; between1
..892
and 1930, Paris dispatched 23.,gov-
ernors-general to Hanoi. Outside. the'
major cities of Viet Nam, French sec-.,-
ondary schools were almost noncx- ?
istent; by 1939, Phnom-Penh's only
school beyond the primary level had ?
graduated a grand total of four
students.
Resistance groups flourished al- :
most from the start. Ho Chi Minh,
who Was to wage the most protract-
ed and successful struggle against ?
the French, was forced to leave school
in 1910 for anti-French opinions.
The Japanese occupation of Indo-
china during World War II swept
away the myth that the white man
was indestructible. Before long, that
dramatic discovery led to a place
and turning point called Dienbicnphu.
Engulfed in the miseries of war
for 25 years?or longer?Indochina's
newly independent people have not
yet recaptured an identity with their
past. Few Vietnamese, North or
South, can find much reflected glo-
ry in the elegant red-and-gold lac-
quered panels of Hua's imperial. city.
Laotians, living in, the shadow of
the war next door and amid the grow-
ing misery of the one in their own
front yard, take small comfort in
the ancient Buddhist temples of
Luangprabang. To a certain extent,
Cambodians could relive the triumphs
of the Khmers in the resounding rhet-
oric of Prince Norodom Sihanouk,
who at least kept the kingdom in-
dependent. Clearly, if the past some-
times seems impossibly remote and
unreal to Indochina's long-suffering
peoples, that is the result of an all
too real present.
9nniinam4: CIA-RDP80-01
P,
seriousness
continued
3
Approved For Release 201/04/04 CIA,TRpP80 01
of the situation to both the wandering mier hou he to' ambot ran
Sihanouk and the North Vietnamese.
To this end, they organized mass dem-
onstrations. first in Svay Kieng province,
site of the Fishhook sanctuary, then
three days later in the capital. Thou-
sands of civil servants, students and sol-
diers in civilian clothes joined in. Many
of the placards they carried had been , ?
printed on government presses. The
. North Vietnamese and N.L.F. embassies
were sacked. Though the demonstrations
? were sparked by the army, there was
enough spontaneous participation to in-
dicate a high level of popular hatred
for the North Vietnamese. It was then,
that the anti-Sihanouk forces seriously
began to consider ousting the prince.
Object Lesson
Other factors helped crystallize their
feelings. The continuing disintegration
in Laos, for instance, was an object les-
son in the perils of a large North Viet-
namese troop presence. In addition, ex-
ploratory post-riot talks with the af-
fronted North Vietnamese in Phnom-
Penh got nowhere. The Communist
diplomats brushed aside the rights or
wrongs of their military presence; they
were only interested in reparations and
a public apology for their ruined em-
bassies. At that point Sihanouk weighed
in with a cable warning of Soviet un-
hanpiness with the demonstrations and
indicating that he had no plans to get
tough with Hanoi's representatives. Lon
Nol and Sink Matak decided that the
time had come to shut the door on the re-
turning prince. The National Assembly
and the Council of the Kingdom re-
moved Sihanouk as head of state and
named Assembly Speaker Cheng Heng
as his acting successor.
The first sign that Sihanouk might
have lost control came when air con-
trollers at Phnom-Penh's Pochentong
Airport began to turn away incoming air-
liners. A Burma Airways plane, whose
passengers included a U.S. Coast Guard
officer en route to Cambodia to nego-
tiate the return of the hijacked Co-
lumbia Eagle (see THE NATION), was
in its approach pattern when it was
waved off. A few hours later, a gov-
ernment communiqu?nnounced: "In
view of the political crisis created in re-
cent days by the chief of state, Prince Si-
hanouk, and in conformity with the
constitution, the National Assembly and
the Council of the Kingdom have unan-
imously agreed to withdraw confidence
in Prince Sihanouk." The coup had a
distinctive Cambodian flavor. Some of
the tanks drawn up around public build-
ings in the capital had white kerchiefs
over their gun muzzles, and scores of sol-
diers were seen snoozing on the grass,
many without shoes.
,students at Vnukovo II Airport that he
might establish an exile government in
Moscow or Peking. Earlier, he bad sent
off a cable to his mother quoting Ko-
sygin as having said: "If the extreme
right continues to strike foul blows on
our allies, war is inevitable between
Cambodia and Viet Nam."
Back in Phnom-Penh, Lon Nol and
Sink Matak had been doing their best
to make Kosygin's allies uncomfortable.
They sent pro forma notes of apology
to the North Vietnamese and the Viet
Cong for the damage to their embas-
sies but at the same time handed the
Communists an ultimatum: all of their
troops must be out within three days.
It was an impossible demand, and
Cambodia's new leaders made no move
to enforce it. In fact, they made a
point of announcing that Cambodia
AP
6911N9TP9? Pq 11 I siaying with
the Premier and the balance joining
the Pathet Lao. Pathet Lao ministers in
Vientiane, rightfully fearing assassina-
tion, fled to the Plain of Jars in 1963
and formed a rump government. The
right wing made a bid to seize full
power in 1964. At that time, the U.S.
dropped its backing of the rightists and
swung its support to Souvanna. The
idea of tripartite rule was dead.
Unsettling Element
For the next five years, the strategical-
ly located Plain of Jars remained in
Communist hands; most of the fighting
in that period occurred around the pe-
riphery of the plain, and the Communists
went no farther south. Last fall Vang
Pao's CIA-backed army, aided by heavy
U.S. air support, succeeded in driving
the Communist forces from the plain.
AA VII
Impossible Ultimatum
Sihanouk heard of his overthrow
from Soviet Premier Alcksei Kosygin
in Moscow. At first he took the news
calmly. Aim hours laterjust Ilefore fly-
ing off Appstavs-0 thier Release
.4...i i? ,?
CHENG HENG - LON NOL SIRIK MATAK
Enough spontaneity to indicate the popular hatred.
would maintain its traditional policy of ' Five weeks ago, reinforced North Viet-
neutrality and nonalignment. U.S. sourc- namcse and Pathet Lao troops reoccu-
es in Saigon reported some increase in pied the plain?and this time they_decid-
the number of .enemy troops crossing ed to go farther. After pausing to resup-
into South Viet Nam about the time ? ply, the Communists moved southeast.
the ultimatum expired, but the Viet ? Late last week government forces aban-
Cong and North Vietnamese are still es- doned Sam Thong to the Communists,
timated to have close to 40,000 men in ..' and North Vietnamese troops were re.
Cambodia. ? ported on the verge of attacking the CIA
center at Long Cheng.
Coming Unstuck With the government forces in se-
While Cambodia's new leadership ' riot's trouble, Vientiane sent in rein-
moved to consolidate its hold, the mili- ' forcements, including a number of ex-
tary situation in Laos continued to ii is- tremely young conscripts. Unexpectedly, .
rv/
integrate. That was not altogether star- several hundred Thai mercenaries were -
tling; ever since, the establishment of a airlifted into Long Cheng by Air Amer-
neutralist tripartite government in Laos lea, the CIA's Asian airline.' This marked .,
as a result of the Geneva accords of ? the first time that Thai participation in
1962, news from there had generally the Laos war had been officially ac-
been gloomy. Under the accords, the knowledged by .the U.S.?though Thai
country's three major parties?the Neo artillery units and pilots arc known to
Lao Bak Xat (Communist), the Neutral- have fought in Laos on several pre-
ists und:r Souvanna Phouma, and the vious occasions. It was a turn of events
right wing under General Phoumi Nosa- that intensely displeased doves in Wash-
van?were to work together in a single ington. "It's too bad," said Senate For-
government. Souvanna held the balance eign Relations Committee Chairman '
of power as Premier, and Cabinet posts J.W. ? Fulbrignt. "It's a very unsettling
were shared by all three groups. . . element." .
This solution began to come unstuck ? As the Communist pressure mounted,
Wag as soon as it was icced to- a Pathet Lao emissary flew into Vien-
el t0)3i044setAkREIFIU3104h1-604ER006716100400?0-Or Souvanna
continue:1R
Approved For Release
Phouma. It was assumed that the mes-
sage included a proposal calling for a
conference of Laotian political factions
on the question of a settlement, and
for an end to U.S. bombing in Laos.
In the past, Souvanna has countered
such proposals by insisting that North
Vietnamese troops first be withdrawn
from his country; this time, in the face
of the North Vietnamese advance to-
ward Long Cheng, there was a faint
chance that Souvanna might agree to
talks with the Pathet Lao (which is led
by his half brother Prince Souphanou-
vong). Despite the increased pressure,
Vientiane remained ' characteristically
tranquil. Even the news of Sihanouk's
overthrow failed to stir much of a re-
action. Most attention was focused on
the flamboyant wedding of Souvanna
Phouma's son to a Thai model, an event
attended by smiling representatives of
Western and Communist powers.
A Smile from Thieu
The parallel crises in Indochina
evoked strikingly cautious comments.
Where Cambodia was concerned, of-
ficials were wary of pronouncements be-
cause no one could firmly count Si-
hanouk out for good. Given his pop-
ular support and his penchant for the
surprise initiative, Sihanouk may well
remain an important factor in Cam-
bodian politics for some time to come.
To be sure, he was not giving up with-
out a fight. In Peking, he charged that
his removal had been "absolutely il-
legal" and demanded a referendum
under neutral supervision. Both Moscow
and Peking emphasized that they still
considered Sihanouk to be Cambodia's
chief of state. In Washington, Cam-
bodia's stability is considered essential
to peace in Southeast Asia.
For that reason, a ranking White
House official said: "We're not going
to take any action that could foul us
2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-016
up. We're playing it cool." In Saigon,
where Sihanouk has long been con-
sidered a Communist dupe, there Was un-
disguised pleasure. South Viet Nam's
President .Nguyen Van Thicu had just
finished telling a group of Asian news-
men, "We can be friendly with a neu-
tral ,,country, but 'neutral' does not Mean
being in complicity with the enemy,"
when an aide handed him the news of Si-
hanouk's downfall. Thicu broke into a
broad grin.
Hanoi's response Was, naturally, less
enthusiastic. North Vietnamese successes.
in Laos seemed to be offset by the un-
certain situation in Cambodia. Without
a guaranteed border sanctuary, Com-
munist forces could expect severe dif-
ficulties, particularly if Cambodian forc-
es started acting in conjunction with
allied troops. Would North Viet Nam
fight to keep the sanctuary? That may
- not be necessary. In any case, for the
time being Hanoi appears to be keep-
ing the fighting in South Viet Nam at
a -low level. Ho Chi Minh's death last
September may well be the reason. Sir
Robert Scott, former British Commis-
sioner General for Southeast Asia, notes
in Foreign A (lairs that the new leaders
in Haribi "do not now feel the,siime ur-
gency.to translate Ho's vision into re-
ality in his lifetime." Adds Scott: "There
is no purpose to be served by shedding
too much blood to win what they ex-
pect to win anyway."
Plus and Minus
.. In terms of the Viet Nam conflict,
last week's-developments appear to leave
Washington with one questionable plus
?Cambodia?and one probable minus
?Laos. Whatever may happen in Laos,
the U.S, is extremely unlikely to use
ground troops?as Senator Fulbright in-
formbil the world last week by releas-
.ing secret testimony by Secretary of
State William Rogers. Rogers said that
AP NIHON DENPA NEWS
01 R000700040001 -3
the Nixon Administration had "no pres-
ent plans" to send GIs to Laos even if
Communist troops threatened to overrun
it. Nonetheless, Defense Secretary Mel-
vin Laird indicated that the U.S. would
probably continue to bomb the Ho Chi
Minh Trail. Cambodia could be a plus
?over the short run, at least?provided
the situation does not degenerate into an-
archy and prompt a panicky Hanoi to
mount a full-scale invasion. (Sihanouk
was useful in that he kept Cambodia sta-
ble. If the new regime swings vio-
lently anti-Communist, there could be
serious trouble.) Hanoi, too, had a
mixed week, with a definite plus in
Laos all but outweighed by a possible.
minus in Cambodia. The survival of
the sanctuary in Cambodia is now in
question; supplies coming through Si-
hanoukville reportedly have been
slowed, and some Communist troops
may soon begin to feel the pinch of
hunger.
One positive factor for everybody
would be a multinational peace con-
ference whose aim would be a set-
tlement embracing all of Indochina. The
Soviets have opposed reconvening the
14 nation Geneva parley until the U.S.
stops its bombing in Laos; the dangers
posed by Sihanouk's departure from
the scene could persuade them to drop
their opposition. Hanoi, with its lifeline
in Cambodia endangered, now has more
reason to come to the bargaining table.
? A more remote possibility is that the
Communist Chinese. whose foreign pol-
icy is no longer distorted by the lunatic
frenzies of the Cultural Revolution:
? might be persuaded to join. Last week's
demonstration of Indochina's chronic in-
? stability may eventually prove persuasive
enough to bring all the nations con-
cerned to the bargaining table. Nothing,
in all likelihood, could do more to please
Norodom Sihanouk, or Souvanna Phou-
ma, or Richard Nixon.
il ;.'7"'"
.7.,?,...a., x.,;
e .,..
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BOYISH LAOTIAN GOVERNMENT DEFENDERS NEAR HO CHI MINH TRAIL
),r. -.4
tao
YOUTHFUL PATHET LAO SOLDIERS IN PLAIN OF JARS AREA
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VA\
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RAFANOM01 Fita
BILLTNIS , MONT.
GAZETTE
MAR 29 1 970
Li ? 42,441
I S '? 5 4,232
Vietnam Is a CorAnumg
Tragedly?Pvilitte Mansfield
m the
?eastern provinces of Cambodia
' clear over the northern frontier
to the provincecs of Cambodia
. clear over the northern frontier
to the province of Batdambang
on the Thai frontier.
"What will happen now may
well mean that the Chinese will
? support Sihanouk. He may line
up with the people who used to
? be his enemies?the Viet Cong
and the North Vietnamese.
"It might well be a new ball-
game as far as Cambodia is con-
cerned.
' "As far awe are concerned, I '
?don't think we ought to send in
iany troops or offer any aid but
stay clear of it completely.
STATI NTL
1, By ROGER HAWTHORNE
Gazette Staff Writer
"It will be a near miracle" II'
: American troops are withdrawn
i from Southeast Asia within the
, . next 15-20 months, U. S. Senate
i Majority Leader Mike Mansfield
: says.
"I wish it would happen. I
wish they could be gotten out
sooner because I think becoming
Involved in Vietnam was a mis- i
aos
, take and a continuing tragedy," .1 "The North Vietnamese, ac-
the Montana Senator says, with . cording to the President, have
1 obvious emotion in his voice. 67,000 troops. The Pathet Lao
Mansfield says he doubts i have 15,000-20,000,1 understand.
American troops will be with- I ' "Last year the Senate passed
. I Helms (director of the CIA) b land unless it was with Congxes- 1.4re have a pretty good
idea what the situation is there.
fore us so
"We do not intend to become Phouma sent to Souvanna Phou-
drawn on any large scale be- the Cooper-Church resolution
cause of developments in Cam- . i which forbade the use of U.S. .
bodia and Laos. . ? I Combat troops in Laos and Thai- -
i MANSFIELD stopped in Bil- , sional assent. ' involved CIA or otherwise, and ma and received, I believe,
lings during the Senate break for , "The administration support- the Cooper-Church amendment Wedneday, to see if they can't-
' "As far as Vietnam is con-. ' will be adhered to." : f :work. Out . some at of agree'Easter. l' ed that amendment.
cerned, the question why we 'are "I DO NOT expect that any .
?? there is one that has plagued me ground troops will be used, but .
' for many years. We shouldn't be it appears that air attacks have '
t 1
to reinforce (General) Vane ? Vietntiane. . , given more money and use its ,
? bivan- namese on the Pathet Lao's
southwestward toward
Khuoa about 40 miles. side. What is being done on our
,/ id the Royal Laotian side, is,
"That brings them within 20 , ,
I being done by American planes
miles of the Thai border.
1 from Meo tribesmen under "I HAVE approved the Presi-
dent's phased withdraw out of
Mansfield admits' that the ietnam. My only complaint is
about 8,000-10,000 labor troops Agency that it isn't fast enough.
and antiaircraft personnel Central Intelligence
guarding these roads. They have "har-cmital"InrVang-P-a" "However, the situation
i Meo Artily. "I think those con- which has developed in Laos and
not participated actively except
tads are remaining constant and Cambodia may well bring about
in defensive actions in that area 1
I have been tit, last three or four a stop to even that much with-
drawal because a situation
"We have become aware of ? might develop there that would
Amen-
that recently. . call for the attention of Ameri-
._
can personnel.
"IT IS NOT public knowledge "It would be my hope as far as
but. we have had Mr. (Richar Laos is concerned that the two
brothers, Prince Souphan-
ouvong, head of the Pathet Lao,
and Prime Minister Souvanna
1 ment.
News reports say yang Pao
as 40,000 Meo bibesmen in his
army, which is supported wholly ; "I WOULD hope that the ICC,
the CIA, with the army beat-,.the International Control Com-
mission, would be beefed up,
there. ?,,been step p_ ? ? e a
bout 40 miles "As of last Thursday, there ?
; were something on the order o
318,000 casualties in Vietnam
? alone.
, "Approximately 50,000 were
deaths, 42,000 combat deaths
and 8,000 noncombat deaths.
The rest were wounded.
T
Pao's so-called clandestine
army.
"But the North Vietnamese
and the Pathet Lao keep. on
coming.
"If they stop where they are
now, it will be a remarking of
:
"What you have in Laos is a; offices to bring about a degree__
differential between the lowland of stabilization'
Laotians and the Meo, Yaos, and; "I would hope that President
Lobos who are the highland pee-i Nixon's 'request to the United i
i)le," Mansfield says. Kingdom and the USSR, the co-
chairmen of the Geneva Conven-
"THEY DON'T get along with ? tion which set up the neutrality
"WE HAVE spent well over - the old line (during the. late
one another. of Laos in 1962, would call the
$100 billion in that war to date 1950's and early 1960's) and ? . "The Moos are carrying the Geneva conferences together to
. !
maybe it will hold for 2-3 ' most of the fighting at this time,' the end that a settlement could
and now we have the situation in
Laos which is taking more in the months until the rainy season doing the best they can, but it's be achieved. .
' not very well. "It's my belief that if there is
.
"In Cambodia, I think that the going to be peace in Laos, there
way of our resources. ends. ?.
"The Pathet Lao and the '"rhen the other side will go
North Vietnamese have id- back to the line to which they
deposing of Prince Sihanouk 1; is going to have to be peace in .
Ik , '
could turn into a tragedy. Re- Cambodia and the two Viet- ?
' vanced beyond the Plain of used to advance in other years.
gardless what we think of him
I Jars. They are within 20 miles, I . tinam's as well. ? . __.
understand, of the Royal Lao- "IT'S A terrible war in that Personally, he did keep "The only way that peace can I
tian capital of Luang Prabang. country because the Laotions Cambodia together and he .did be' ensured, I think, is to have a ! I
i "The Chinese have built a are probably the most peaceful maintain a neutrality of sorts. vi guarantee of neutrality on the 1
, road down from Muong Leo in People in the world and the "He had to confront border 1 part of the Geneva conferees for 1
Yunnan Province (in China) to world's worst fighters, activities as ' far as U.S. and , all of Indochina and Thailand as i
y
Muong Nhie. They have built an "The fighting being done is outh Vietnamese operatic, well" Mansfield sas.
ere concerned.
: extension eastward toward. Dien being dons by. the , North. Viet'.. ? He suffered .
_Alen Phu sArne 25 ndles and one
, sualties for , which We have .
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00040001-3
STATINTL
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DES !MINES, IOWA
REGISTER
? 246,841
S 511,496
,MAR 2 9 1970
Fighting for Opium
. Americans whose drug addictions are
: limited to the "normal" alcohol, to-
bacco, patent medicine and prescription
! varieties get a chill of horror at reports
! of 60 per cent marijuana use in they
. American Infantry company involved in
; the My Lai - massacre. Their spines
: tingle with horror at the word that the
, Meo tribal faction in Laos recruited by
; the U.S. central Intelligence Agency '
Onto a "clAdestine army" are less in-
terested in "fighting Communist ogres:"
( sion" than in retaining and acquiring ;
,k- opium poppy fields.
i
1 In South Vietnam and Laos, where i
) anarchy and civil war have been going
I on for years, both opium and marijuana
; are readily available and occupy about ?
' the same place in the seheme of things
1. that alcohol and tobacco do here.
Laotian opium is a special case. Gov-
ernments have been trying since Theo-;,
i dore Roosevelt's time to limit growth of ,
. opium poppies to rorld medicinal needs
, and to regulate international traffic in
'? opium and its derivatives (which include
icodeine, morphine and heroin). But in
the chaos of Laos such 'efforts are large:
ly futile
Opium is the major cash crop in the ,
Laotian highlands, among the Meos and
other tribes. In this almost' roadless :i
1 '
country, a high-value cash crop which is ,
t low in weight and bulk is an economic i
7 boon. The Meos consume some of their ,i
I,own product and think they are confer- )
ring a benefit, not harm, in selling it to
far-off lowlanders.
In the 'early days of ArrietiOah aid to
11," k!,,..*0 ,4. ottani to Imo/Loot*
- -
--.011144kit
opium dealers (who often double as roy-
al officials) from using U.S. planes to
transport their costly freight.
Air-dropped U.S. arms and supplies
??made it possible for years for many hill.
top Meo villages to retain their inde-
, pendence (and their poppy patches) in ?
spite of being surrounded by Commu- ?
nist-held. land. Now that most of these
'warrior villagers have been evacuated by
air, the Meos still retain hope of win-
ning back opium fields again, with U.S.
, arms and air support. From the Meo '
point of view, (his is all quite logical.
and upright.
The CIA and the Pentagon are willing J
to go along, on the theory that this.
"fighting for freedom." The Meo view
that the fight is for opium fields is more
- forthright and more accurate, but it!
raises the awkward question, What kind
,A..,\aluatailliniVIL,tIttuttliPtAtest
?
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0 In view of the continuing American ., for Gen. Vang Pao and his Meo guer. push on as far as they -want:
? reaction to the war in Vietnam, the rillas, the point might well have been ' This is just as far as may be needed ;
news can scarcely be said to be a bomb- made that the United States was, (Wing to get neutralist Prime 'Minister Sou. ;
vivApfewRd For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R0
REG I ST ER STATINTL
1
- 246,941
S -N1114A9(1970 . ,
How the', U.S. Callqd Its, Own
_
t
a ? ?
? in Laos;
By Diens Warner
'
T
HE BIGGEST single deterrent to a
sive in Laos always has been e uncer- 0' Foreign Relations Committee, it is high- I persuade Laos that it will soon have no .-....-$..4
, no-limits North Vietnamese offen- the , ton, and the watchdogs of the Senate . ministration has been quietly trying trl
... - -....
taint), about what American reaction *. ly improbable that any second thoughtii- .:".alternative but to do much less. It did
might be. Since the TeL offensive, when now would be of a type calculated to ,not succeed in getting the message
American optimism and send waves of G.I.s across the Mekong. across. This will be easier now, though
jr
Asia began to evaporate : In fact, the publication of Defense ...the effects are likely to be quite interest in Southeast
differ-
quickly, the deterrent, Secretary Melvin Laird's statement ent. Insteld of being coaxed to do more, ,
has been substantially ? clearly brings appreciably closer the ? the Laritians can scarcely be blamed if
- less than it used to be, end to American efforts, clandestine or thtY begin to regard the situation as
but at least it was bet. ', Yotherwise, to prevent the North Viet- , hopeless: ... .
ter than nothing. : namese forces from rolling as far as ? Under'peessure to show the state of '
Now, after months or they want through Laos. Bombing and, its mind, the Nixon Administration also .
pressure, the Senate 1 budgetary support to the Royal Lao gov- has been obliged to show Its hand, and '.
Foreign Relations !Com- : .. ernment excepted, these efforts have ,there is no easier way than this to
mit,t,ec finally ' has!, ex. ; , always been low key, as the grudging lose the poker game. Since Hanoi no
. tracted, and, i)ubliShed, ; admissions of casualties by the Nixon . longer has any reason to doubt what ?
1
the admission from the Nixon Adrninis- , , Administration have now made clear. ..: Washington has in its hand, and there'
tration that it has no plans for using ? In fact, if any agency other than the ' are now no lines that it is unsafe to
,..
,I. ground forces in Laos, even if the North CIAshad been involved in providing the cross, there seems to be no reason why
',Vietnamese overrun the entire country. , ,10Tbaerial support and military guidance . I the North Vietnamese , should not now ;
. very ......-
shellilta to help preserve,theivanna ,Phouma to settle with his Corn- '.
$ ,.."0Yal Lao government. ..! ...., -- -...0...munist half-brother -Prince Soirphariou- 1
... ,-- either to its American allies or. ,
. to Laos. But for the security of Laos 'ISO, for many,montha theliyon A.I-Ein oi.....1_,,,,__Sonphanouvong'it own terms. j
iand the whole region it would have beet :-,4'........61.4,,,,......-.... ...,?,-.?,-.....< ...,.-
:, better left unsaid, or, if the Senate For-.! '
' eign Relations Committee insisted on
i knowing all, at least kept secret.
t .
1. Memories are short these days. Only
1 20 years have passed since South Korea'
was excluded from the list of countries
that came under the shade of the Amer-..
lean defense umbrella. The North 'Co-!'
. reans accepted this as the green light
;
DEN IS
WARNER
. Denis Warner, an Australian sour-
; nalist, .has been writing about South-
east Asia for more than 25 years.
and the Truman Administration was
forced to do some quick rethinking and
A.: reacting, at the cost of Immense
amounts of blood and treasure.
! Things are very different these ,days...
The United States at the height of Its
' postwar power in 1950 had no , second,.
thoughts about moving to the defense, of
-.Korea and its more vital interests- hti
Japan. Judging by the mood of the nerA,
44 ? 044 .M6111
?
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THE WASHINGTON POST
Approved For Release 2001/01/94NAVODP8s01:0A1Tni0
..1% rerril ? 416
-;
XIII Fe/stunt. Bywilaito
"Tho CIA welcornsfxou to Laos, In
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VIL1V/i'l;?Fe USC.
"""VAR 28 1970
WEEKLY 11,000
Mack Alliance 6a-r-ges-fedeicil?
crimes in car bombing
STATINTL
The following statement was
issued March 12 by the Black
1 Liberation Alliance is Chica-
go, Robert Lucas, chairman..
We charge the Federal Go-
vernment with the crime of wan-
! tonly murdering our two bro-
thers, Ralph Featherstone and
(apparently) William "Che"
Paine.
We suspect, although we may
never be able to prove it, that p.
agents of the Federal Govern-
ment were directly involved,
probably because they thought
[ that Brother Rap was in the
car. This is the way that the
I CIA has operated all over the
Timm- World, from the Congo
?'to Laos, from Ghana to Viet-
nam U they are in the way,
people of color and their lea-
ders are mysteriously blown
to bits, with even less thought
.than if they were boulders bloc-'
t king a road or trees blocking
1- a view.
But directly involved or not,
' . the Federal Government is res-
ponsible for initiating the chain
of events that has now resulted
In this heinous crime against
, Black people. Just as the Mayor
of Memphis, Tennessee, creat-
ed the political climate of vio-
:lence and hysteria which led to 3. That the FBI, the CIA and
t . the wanton murder of Dr. King ,
in the spring of 1968, the Fe- ;
deral Government today, with
Its repressive legislation! tivists and that the Permanent
? against Movement activists, Subcommittee on Investigation
?, ,. such as the "Rap Brown" Anti- of the Committee on Govern-
" ? .Riot Act and the Anti-Conspi- ment Operations of the U.S.Se-
, racy Act, and its bringing to , nate, whose extensive and pub-
trial of Movement activists on lished hearings have revealed
? the basis of this repressive le-, ' only a small part of what is
gislation, has now created-the contained in these dossiers, be
political climate of violence and immediately disbanded: ,
' hysteria which has led to the 4. That whatever. agent .pro-
,
pact for the judicial process,
c,
incited to riot and murder, and terrorism charged against Mo-
unleashed the most reactionary ?
vement activists, the charges'
forces in the nation.
By sending in agent provoca-
teurs to Movement organiza-
1osed to be invo1ved in acts o f
be brought instead against these
agents and the official agencies
' employing them, for conspiring
.4 to violate the civil rights of
tions, as in the notorious elle- citizens.
ged plot by RAM to blow up WE CALL UPON THE BLACK
the Statue of Liberty, it has de- ? COMMUNITY AND ALL DE- 1
liberately instigated and sought CENT CITIZENS ACROSS THE
to provoke freedom fighters to
NATION TO SUPPORT THESE !
acts of terrorism which only ?
4.- DEMANDS WHICH ARE NECE- ;
end in their imprisonment or,
SSARY TO CLEAR UP THE t
death., CALCULATED CONFUSION
THE TIME HAS COME TO1 BETWEEN POLITICAL OPPO?
TAKE SOME SIGNIFICANT.t
SITION AND CRIME, WITH )
STEPS TO BRING A HALT TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT IS
THIS VIOLENCE AND UNEND- SEEKING TO DESTROY THE
ING INCITEMENT TO VIO- I MOVEMENT
LENCE BY THE GOVERN-
- 1
' At the same time we call upon
MENT. TO THIS'END WE DE i
MAND: ,I ; Black organizations to appoint
1. That the Federal Govern-. their own legislative commit-
ment itself take the initiative . .; tees to determine the guilty par- ties to this murder and we - I.
de-
Immediately to move the dis 1
.. i mand that the Justice Depart- 1
missal of all charges against ? ment and all other officials on
IL Rap Brown as well as against I every level cooperate with this i, ?
all other political defendants, i Committee, giving it the right,',
Black and White, who have been i to subpoena persons and docu- ,
charged under the Anti-Riot, . meats and granting it access
Anti-Conspiracy Acts and si- ; to all files and information re- J
milar repressive legislation.. iated to this and similar crim-
2. That step be taken imme- es.
diately to repeal the Anti-Riot In particular, we urge Move-1
and Anti-Conspiracy Acts. inent peopy to reflect upon the ?
police departments across the
country., immediately destroy
their dossiers on Movement ac-
need, for new forms of organi-
zations which will minimize
? tore opportunities for the enemy:,
to waste our brothers and sin- 1
ters.
?? We cannot continue to lose our
Medgars, our Malcolms our
? Martins, our Fredstour,;larks,
. our Ralphs and our, Ches.
Dan Mdridge
James Boggs
; William Strickland'
Robert Lucas, s'7? ?
John Watson.'
? voeateure bare been oraredis-A mike
f. wanton murder of these two de-
! dic.ated, hard-working unsung.:
fighters for human freedom. i
' For the ,last many years it is ?
the Federal Government itself,
which has been responsible for
r the growing chaos and disorder ;
; in and around the courts. By its I
deliberate efforts to muddy-up
' the fundamental distinctionbet-
' ween lat Itbvettitiorailit lease 2001/03/04 : dIA-RDP80-01.601R000700040001-3
t crimp, At fostered disres.
Approved For Release M1iOadg43beleaRPTAQ-10$0111
28 mar 19T0
Approv
WATCHING
THE WORLD
with FRANK J. GARDNER
An ounce of prevention?
A CLOAK-AND-DAGGER operation off the West Coast of Africa has :
the offshore oil industry agog.
In what is perhaps the first instance of underwater sabotage of
a mobile drilling rig, some rascal tried to sink the Kenting I jackup
off the Ivory Coast. That's the rig that's destined for the Gulf of
Suez to drill a most controversial wildcat for Israel's Oil Routes
Ltd. next to Egypt's El Morgan oil field (ow, Feb. 9, p. 37).
As usual in such incidents, very little is known of the who,
? why, when, or where of the attack.
For several weeks. the Kenting I had been undergoing repairs
in Dakar, Senegal. It was damaged in a severe winter storm while
crossing the Atlantic from eastern Canada.
Apparently, while rounding the African hump, something went
awry, and the rig was towed into shallow water at the port of Abidjan,
Ivory Coast, for a checkover.
There, it's reported, frogmen under cover of darkness tied four
explosive charges to the rig's hull, at or near the water line. The
four blasts failed to penetrate the double hull, however, and none '
of the crew was injured. There was, of course, some damage to the
. unit's legs.
WHODUNIT? That's the big question now.
I.
Well, there are lots of possibilities. First off, one would suspect
the Egyptians, but Abidjan is 2,800 miles from Cairo (crow-style),
? and it's doubtful Egyptian intelligence is that far-flung these days.
Someone aboard the rig? We prefer this one, for there was just
a little too much coincidence in the sudden detour, to Abidjan and ;
the almost immediate sabotage of the rig. Someone onshore must ,
have heard from someone offshore that. the Kenting would put in at ,
Abidjan. Or was some kind of hanky-panky on board,..the rig ,
responsible for the need to go into pore?
The industry buzzes with theories, of course. One, described by
the offshore press as "way out," holds that it was the work of the
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. That figures, for the CIA habitually i.
gets the blame for whatever happens anywhere. --
? Still, three governments involved?the U.S., Canada, and Britain?
are known to fear that Israel's sinking a wildcat off the west coast ,
of the Sinai Peninsula could well set off an inferno in the Middle
? East. And so, the speculation goes, as an ounce of prevention, any
one of them may have concluded that it would be better to sacrifice ?
a $2.8-million rig than to risk another war.
Or perhaps the whole thing is simply a matter of predestination. ?
The Kenting 1,-a new rig, has yet to drill a hole. It failed its first
assignment in Lake Eric when its legs sank into the lake floor. It
was heavily damaged in the Atlantic storm. It's been condemned by
ed F
opfte4e4isen20041163/64rfee FPf- ftie i'MI116716 040 0 0 1-3
now the sabotage.
?
Approved For Release 20641M/15CitIA-RDK36--M1R
27 MAR 1970
0
ODI:(7) r2'
7:17_ LoD
0 ?
Co:
? ? Daily World Foreign Department
U.S. planes made heavy air strikes on Cambodian territory last Tuesday, the
U.S. military command in Saigon revealed yesterday. The . U.S. jet fighter-bomber
raids were ordered on what the U.S. command described as "enemy firing posi-
tions" in Cambodia "with unknown results." The air strikes followed B-52 bombing
attacks all along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border.
The U.S. raids were the first
reported since the ouster of
Prince Norodom Sihanouk by An
anti-Communist military groiip'
headed by General Lon Nol. '
The U.S. command yesterday
also reported the second heavi-
est U.S. casualties of this year
in fighting in South Vietnam.
Last week, 110 Americans were
killed and 864 wounded; Saigon
forces lost 398 killed and 902
wounded.
In continuing fighting in Laos,
U.S. planes. made repeated air
strikes in tactical support of a
"Royal Lao" army drive to try
to win back territory lost to the
Lao Patriotic Front. LPF troops
were reported to be dug in on a
ridge three miles north of the
big U.S. base in northern Laos
at Long Cheng.
The governrnent of Thailand
yesterday requested the recon-
vening of the 1962 Geneva Con-
ference on Laos. The Thai For-
eign Ministry accused the .De-
mocratic Republic of Vietnam
of sending troops into Laos but
continues to deny U.S. news re-
ports that thousands of Thai
troops are fighting there on the
U.S. side. A United Press Inter-
national report yesterday stated
that "specially-trained tribesmen
from Thailand" were airlifted
into Long Cheng by "Air Amer-
ica," the CIA-operated airline in
Southeast Asia.
The DRV and the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of
South Vietnam recalled their
diplomatic representatives from
Phnom Penh, Cambodian capital,
for "consultations," and it was
announced that diplomats from
all socialist countries will meet
in the Polish Embassy in Phnom
Penh it a farewell party for the
.DRV and PRG representatives. ,
- Ark 00V4i71 Fefic l*Wage )2 0 0 1 /0 3/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3
Saigon delegate, Nguyen
Phong, offered to release
Xuan
what
TOTAL DEAD
he said were 343 "North Viet-
namese" prisoners of war "with
no strings attached" and said he
hoped the DRV would accept
them. Saigon has never offered
to release any of the estimated
25,000 National Liberation Front
prisoner of war status.
In Long Binh, South Vietnam,,
U.S. Army lieutenant James B.
Duffy, 22 admitted yesterday he
had killed a Vietnamese prison-
er.
He told a military tribunal he
had radioed his company com-
mander that the Vietnamese had
been "shot while trying to es-
cape."
"In war, people are going to
get killed," Duffy said. "This
major told me I was to kill and
not bring back prisoners. I con-
sidered it part of the war."
STATINTL
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27 MAR 1970
4
Sonora:, and marijuana
druo CII ianions spiked
WASHINGTON ? "A majority
of those shooting were marijuana
smokers but not all the marijuana
smokers were shooting."
That was how Sen. Thomas J.
Dodd summarized the testimony
March 24 of Vietnam veteran
Charles West, who was with
Company C of the First Battal-
ion of the 20th Infantry at the time
of the mass killings at Songiny of
Vietnamese civilians by U.S.
troops on March 16, 1968. West .
testified at hearings of, the Senate
Subcommittee on Juvenile Delin-
quency, and he agreed with Dodd
that that was a correct summa-
tion.
Other remarks by West, and by
Dr. Joel H. Kaplan, an Army
psychiatrist who also served in
Vietnam, take issue with cretain
illusions among drug addicts, es-
pecially those of so-called "soft"
drug users who have built up quite
an argument for using marijuana.
West said he smoked marijuana
twice, and that the second time
when he went on guard duty "it
seemed to me the vegetation was
moving. I thought it was people."?
Dr. Kaplan, who commanded
an Army neruo-psychiatric team
at Nhatrang, 'Vietnam in 1968 and
1969, said that before going to
Vietnam he did not consider mari-
juana a dangerous drug. Now,
however, after finding that 3,000
soldiers, or 70 percent of the men
his outfit saw in Its outpatient
clinic, used drugs "heavily day in
and day out," Dr. Kaplan believes
marijuana smoking "could have
contributed" to the Songmy mas-
sacre if it could be shown that the
U.S. soldiers were "chronic pot-
heads."
West said the men on the Song-
my mission had included "chronic
users" of marijuana.
"Before I went to Vietnam,"
said Dr. Kaplan, "if I had heard
someone saying what I'm saying
today, I would have laughed."
What he said was this: "Contrary
to many popular opinions held
. here in the states, the drug could
cause people to become fearful,
paranoid, extremely angry, and
led, in a number of cases, to acts
of murder, rape and aggravated
assault." ?
So much for the illusion current
in the United States that mari-
juana is an innocuous substance?
that merely makes people feel
relaxed and amiable, with height-
ened sensibilities and sexual po-
tency.
Other facts brought to light by
the testimony of West and Dr.
Kaplan give a cue to the preva-
lence of the drug cult which has
turned off so many young Ameri- ?
cans from struggling to change
society and turned them into petty
criminals, the prey of drug ped-
dlers, police informers, or pur-
poseless and pliable ciphers.
Whether the Pentagon and its
money-grubbing accomplices in
the world of high finance permit
the Senate subcommittee to probe
further and expose the real con-
spirators behind this chemical'
war against U.S. youth remains
to be seen. But the drug cult is.'
highly luc ra tive and where
there's loot to be pocketed ?
legal or illegal ? the Big Money
is sure to be there,
ft web et Intrigue, smuggling,
and black marketeering in the
countries of Indo-Chia is wide-
spread. According to I. Andronov,
A Soviet newsman writing in New
Times of March 3, 1970, this web'
includes such Free World stal-
warts as yang Pao, the CIA's
Meo mercenary leader now at-
tacking the Pathet Lao villages;
General Phoumi Nosavan, once
the CIA's chief "boy" in Laos
who now lives in Thailand; Sai-
gon's puppet vice president Nguy-
en Cao Ky, ex-chief of the Saigon
air force; Colonel Khu Due Hung,
the Siagon military attache in
Vientiane; and the chief profiteers
and black marketeers in Saigon ?*
all American's.
?Observer,
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Approved For Release 2001/6ide.?6A-RIMW1R
2 7 MAR 1970 1/4)
`Vietnamizino-' Cambodia
World opinion will hold the United 'States directly ?
responsible for any future strife involving Cambodia,
?where a pro-U.S. rightist military group has seized po-
? wer and proclaimed the ouster of Prince Norodom Si-
hanouk.
The Cambodian coup comes at a time when the
U.S. ?Central Intelligence Agency is active all over the
world: the attempt on the life of President Makarios
of Cyprus, the abortive coup against the new People's.
Republic of the Congo-Brazzaville the intensification of
the CIA "dirty war" in Laos, involving the use of U.S.
and Thai ground troops and a U.S. terrorist air bom-
bardment.
Cambodia, under Sihanouk, stood up to Washington's
empire builders and defied them. This is why the U.S.
for years tried to overthrow Sihanouk.
? Sihanouk immediately recognized the new Piov,i-
sional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam last
year as the real representative of the South Vietna-
mese people, developed -close and friendly ties with the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam and worked to end
? the war in Laos on the basis of the 1962 Geneva Agree-
ment.
This policy cost Cambodia heavily, in daily U.S.-
Saigon air raids which killed and wounded hundreds ,
of peaceful Cambodian villagers, in CIA-led armed re-3
bellions inside Cambodia, in U.S. threats to invade '
Cambodia and to crush Sihanouk with force.
Both the DRV and PRG have branded the Cambo-
dian coup a CIA operation, and there are few whO
will doubt it considering the background of the coup. ,
Sihanouk, according to U.S. news reports, is still im-
mensely popular in Cambodia and the new regime is
nervous about any attempted return he might make.
The Nixon administration's pious humbug about :
"Vietnamization" in the light of developments in Laos,
Cambodia and Thailand can now be pinned down for
what it is?"Vietnamization" means spreading the Viet-
nam war all over Southeast Asia.
If a Cambodian revolt against the millionaire pro-
U.S. General Lon Nol produces a second Vietnam in
this hitherto neutral country, Nixon and the CIA will
have to be given the full credit for that kind of ."Viet-
namization."
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3
' LOS ANGELES TIMES
Approved For Release 2001/0AMRDP80-01
Cambodia, Laos': Acid Te?t)
for the -Nixon Doctrine
STATI NTL
BY ROBERT S. ELEGANT ?
The Vietnam war has been vitally '! Weak ?Cambod'ian'forces can prith- Washington virtually invited the
'affected by outside events: The .1.ahly do little more than harass the . invasion of Laos through a Senate .
. ,
removal of Prince Nornclom Sihan- : Communist invaders. Still, halting]resolution last December and the
the.t
ouk of Cambodia and sustained .1
i. supplies . a n d co-ordinating into- ' deliberate imprecision of the Nixon
Communist drive against Laos. , ligenee could severely impede their , Doctrine. Although that imprecision'
Those events prove afresh ? the 7 operations in Vietnam ? if Cambo- , appeared desirable last ? summer, ...
obvious propositions Americans are ,dia avoids crippling civil war. ? ,unpredictable events centering on.
loath to accept: external develop- .. But. the Ho. Chi ,Minh Trail ?P Vietnam . have, once again, flung a.,
ments.deeply influence the Vietnam ..rough Laos ;, remains the key.".', challenge and offered an opportuni-
conflict; and. the corollary, the j Receding before the owerful eo .1 to the United States. :
outcome in Vietnam will directly i munist drive, Air AmPerica, the Ca. American public opinion debars
shape the future of Southeast Asia I . airline, has a I r e a d Y .withdrawn, using a few American troops to turn
and. indirectly, the rest of the world. V planes from forward bases. Uriorn in ? the tide in Laos. Yet we must"
The shifts in the equilibrium of . Thailand is likely to be the main' saoirelal:wnetaogneso,,. .
" '''tt e. the Cambodi..--
avnid a Laotian' '
'power raise an imniediate : S question: ',,.newince Thai base far essential air support. : ? debacle?and. thus movelowards a ..
. Arse thev good for Asians?and 'troops just-corriniittethlyaietnameie sue?cuk.; .1 ,,I 81.n..
...,.... ..-
Americans.? . :?cannot halt the Communist drive, --.
The answer at this stage is a ??.1-lanol can take all Laos.at will. . .
resounding "'Maybe!" The prospects The Nixon Doctrine, which. left'.'
.are almost equally balanced. The ,open the possibilitY of armed assist-.P.
new toughness toward Viet Cong' ,?' ance to Asian ?nations invaded by..."
units in Cambodia is largely ()Met by . foreign troops', is being tested. North..
the imminent threat of Communist.. :Vietnam hap invaded Labs .to pro-'. ?
. control of Laotian supply lines. 'z.'.:?tect its channel, of .reinforcement??
One feared deprivation ha s,' .:and to try. the President.. If Laos :. .
,however, been pos:poned. Prince , : falls, all rules will change. . '...!.
,Sihanouk has not ceased his brillf. . Though its effect is limited, -4
ant performance on the Asian stage.. ' bombing the trail could PreetlelahlY .
.....continue?if, requested by a govern-
* . trent In exile. But tribal ?Irregulara t
Instead, he has within four days , ,organized by the, CIA and Special.: '
:
? Denounced North Vietnamese .,Forces could no longer harass North l
. ?
,Vietnamesereplaeements effective-
.' ;
Infiltration of Cambodia and, 'later, ?
: iv
implicitly endorsed that WM110,101'1. .; J ?
.
Moreover. the ,psychological cf- 1 .
. , ..
.. ? From the unlikely platform of fects would be shattering. The".
- Peking, declared that he would not . 'United States would have demon-'
Feek to regain power and, later, raised the banner of a "national strably failed to protect its allies,
.liberation army" to regain :
? and Thailand would he wholly,
, . vulnerable to Communist infiltra-]
power
through civil war. tion?or invasion Even the anti-
, ? Finally, proclaimed a new poll- , u- ?
'Communist Cambodians might Well '
? 1 movement called "The National conclude that they had after all
t United Front of Xampuehea i[Cam- ? made the wrong move. ? ?
?
bodia)." The official abbreviation, his
statement meticulously notes, is , ? , * .
FUNK. Sihanouk is now in Peking, and ?
P, ? Though Sihanouk still commands 'i
the Chinese have staked out [Thong- .
some popular support. FUNK' is not ' .
saly in northwest Laos as an area of
. likely to topple the new regime? . .
'special influence. Washington and
.even with Viet Cong assistance.'
Cambodian, American and South P '
.
direct psychological confrontation.'
r Vietnamese troops are already co- 'eking are, therefore, met in a
.
operating against. Communist
. Peking apparently is not primarily
con-
'
..rentrations on the border, while interested in "liberating" South;
,?., Vietnam or Cambodia. But Peking is
massiv ;
',Phnom Penh can .easily turn off .-; vitally concerned to strengthen Its
e supplies now flowing to the*,
, buffer states ? Communist North
VIPs. Cong through Sianoukville.. , Vietnam and potentially Communist
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.140011. .? , ,.: ? ..
STATINTL
Approved For Release 201K/OW044GOIA-REF80-01601R00
27 MAR 2970
ouvannta
Replies to
Pathet Lao
Prom News Dispatches
VIENTIANE, March 26 ?
Laotian Premier Souvanna
Phourna today wired Prince
Souphanouvong, the head of
the Pathet Laos, complaining
of North Vietnamese "interfer-
ence" in their country.
, The telegram; viewed here
primarily as a means of call-
ing attention to the presence
of the 50,000 or more North
Vienamese troops in Laos, did
not constitute a reply to Sou-
phanouvong's five-point peace
plan, which Prince Souvanna
said in his cable "we are in
the process of studying."
"I believe North Vietnam
was aware beforehand of what
would happen in Cambodia.
That's why they started an of-
fensive, in order to put the Pa-
thet Lao in a strong position
for conversation with us."
Meanwhile, sporadic fight-'
ing continued around the CIA
base at Long Tieng, south-
west of the Plain of Jars.
Military sources said North
Vietnamese troops launched
company-sized attacks against
two government positions on
Skyline Ridge, a hill overlook-
ing the base, The sources said
both attacks were repulsed
with "very light" government
casualties.
Souvanna said, "In your let-
ter of the 22d of this month,
you have proposed that the In-
ternational Control Commis-
sion should supervise the pres-
ence of foreign troops in both
zones.
"The royal government only
knows about the interference
of North Vietnamese troops in
Laos for many years now. This
is a problem that you have
chosen not to mention either
In your five-point programs or
in other messages."
Asked in an interview
whether he thought there was
a possibility of an agreement
with the Pathet Lao, the pre-
mier said: "It is rather diffi-
cult because the given condi-
tions are considered by us as
unacceptable." He said that if
his government agreed to an
American bombing halt, it
would be a unilateral conces-
sion to the Communists.
Souvanna said the present
North Vietnamese offensive is
the beginning of "a different'
crisis" in Southeast Asia that
may have a link with develop-
ments in Cambodia and South
Vietnam.
"It is a desire for hegemony
by North Vietnam," said Sou-
vanna.
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STATINTL
Approved For ReniseaggilapiViiEqMp_pwArtoiR 1970 'A
S 4650
structionist4 that Mr. Nixon promised to
appoint when he campaigned for the Presi-
dency.
In speeches across the country., Mr. Nixon
promised to name men to the high court who
would "Interpret" the law, not "make" it.
In 11 years as a Federal District judge In
Tallahassee. Fla., and in six months as a
member of the United States Court of Ap-?
peals for the Fifth Circuit, Judge Carswell
sprinkled the lawbooks will opinions on Mat-
ters ranging from civil rights to the legality
of Florida's poultry law.
Throughout these opinions runs a con-
sistent tendency to view the law as a neutral
device for settling disputes, and not as a
force for either legal innovation or social
change.
AN IRONIC COMPARISON
An ironic byproduct of this consistency
is that Judge Carswell's judicial record Is
more conservative than that of Judge Cle-
ment F. Haynsworth Jr., who was defeated
for confirmation to the genie sent by liberal
forces that branded him as a conservative
who was "not a contemporary man of the
times?!
Judge Haynsworth was ahead of the Su,
preme Court in devising fuller review for
. state prisoners in Federal habeas corpus
proceedings, and occasionally anticipated the
high court in ruling in favor of Negroes in
civil rights cases.
An exact comparison with Judge Carswell
is difficult, as the new nominee served as a
trial judge much of the time, and most of
his opinions dealt with day-to-day issues
rather than sweeping constitutional matters.
?
But the lawbooks contain at least 25 ap-
pellate opinions he wrote when he sat, Rs Carswell ranked 23d. Her study showed that, of the subcommittee to persuade the
District judges frequently do, on the Court , of his civil rights decisions to be appealed, State Department to declassify portions
60 per cent were reversed.
of Appeals. Of the record, however, have been to no ?
These opinions reveal a jurist who hest- ? In most of these cases, Judge Carswell __ail.
tates to use judicial power unless the need avail.
..is
have had to move beyond clearly
-is clear and demanding; who finds few con-
settled precedents to rule in fever of the We want it to be clear, Mr. President,
troversies that cannot be settled by invok- ? civil rights position. When these precedents that we have never suggested the entire
Rig some settled precedent, and who rarely
have existed. He has struck down segrega- record should be published. I agree it .
finds the need to refer to the social con. tion In crisp forthright opinions. contains some material which should not ., -.
flict outside the courtroom that brought his In 1965, he declared that the barber shop be published. But it contains a great deal ? ?
cases before him.of material which should be published
in Tallahassee's Duval Hotel had to serve
Negroes under the public accommodations
ATTITUDE OF RESTRAINT. provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. if the American people are to maintain ?
This attitude of restraint has generated He brushed aside a barber's assertion that that proper confidence in their Govern-
friction only in the field of civil rights, he was not covered because 95 per cent of the .ment.
where Judge Carswell's policy of sticking with customers were local people and not guests Almost daily the press makes more
settled precedents until change came from In the hotel. "From a reading of the act It revelations?or raises more questions? ,
higher courts had the result of allowing dila- is clear," Judge Carswell observed, "that about what is going on in Laos, and in
tory school officials to delay segregation. . relative percentages of local, as compared to Thailand as it affects Laos'
An example was provided when parents of transient, customers may not be used as ell-
The Washington Star, in a dispatch
? Negro children in the Pensacola area sued to teria to determine coverage:.
break up the segregation of faculty and
by Henry S. Bradsher from "(Morn, Thai-
staffs PROSPECTS ERWHTER
In the formerly all-black school. Although
? In 1960 when Tallahassee Negroes sued to
the higher courts had not said in so many
words that faculty, as well as student, segre-
desegregate the counters, waiting rooms and
gation must end, lawyers for the Negroes
restrooms in the city-owned airport, he did
? not hesitate to order desegregation.
argued that these courts could not have
meant that the newly integrated schools ' Even though Judge Carswell's civil rights
-
record may be fully as objectionable to civil
would be staffed with all-black and all-white
... rights forces as that of Judge Haynsworth,
faculties. Judge Carswell ruled otherwise.
"The Drown cases," he wrote, referring to the new nominee's prospects for confirma-
tion seem much brighter, partly because ho
the Supreme Court's landmark gehapt de-
cisiona of 1054 and 1965, "hold that the negro-
has not antagonized organized labor as
gation of white and Negro children on the Judge Haynsworth had.
Federal District Judges rarely rule on labor
basis of race denies to Negro children equal cases, which are usually appealed from the a dispatch by Tammy Arbuckle, de-
.. protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th ..
National Labor Relations Board directly to Scribed the evacuation of Sam Thong,
Amendment to the Constitution." lie put the
i a Court of Appeals. Laos, by Air America. This story went
, word "children" in italics, and went on to
enjoin the assignment to the school of teach- comply with the minimum wage laws, he
em s who were too strict or too lenient." dissented. saying: "It is my view that the
Some civil rights lawyers who have np- injunctive power of courts should never
petered before Judge Carswell have charged invoked lightly, nor should it be converted
that his tendency to issue declaratory judg- into a mere ministerial function triggered .
ments rather than injunctions?to hand automatically upon the finding of an infrac- STATI NT
down limited desegregation orders rather tion of the law." .
than sweeping ones?was a convenient use Judge Carswell's opinions tend to be
of judicial self-restraint to cloak segregation- , bloodless documents, setting out the facts
ist sympathies. ' and the prececient,t, then briskly coming to
Leroy D. Clark, a professor of law at New a conclusion that, i.s said to be within the ..
York University, who formerly headed the precedents.
operations of the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense He is not given to broad statements of his _
and Educational Fund, Inc., In northern Flor- ' philosophy, but his creed at this point In
Ida, asserted in an interview today that Judge his career seems to have been summed up
Carswell had repeatedly delayed school cases in one statement from an opinion he wrote
by failing to rule until pressed to do so, shortly after ho became a judge in 1958:
and then by of ten Issuing decisions that wore "Established law, with its imperfections,
palpably wrong and quickly reversed. Must.rionetheless be applied s..s it is and not
"We would have a hearing and it woulcL..eon the predilections of the court."
take several months for him to rule," Mr.
Clark said. "I would have to file R motion tq
ask him 'would you please ruler?which IF) WHY THE LONG DELAY IN RELEAS-
outrageous. 4 ING THE LAOS TESTIMONY
"It was my view that of the Federal District '
judges I appeared before, Ilarrold Carswell Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, it is
was clearly the most openly and blatantly now more than 5 months since the Sub-
segregationist. He was a clever and an intern- committee of the Foreign Relations
gent man, so that when he was wrong on the Committee on U.S. Security Agreements
law it wasn't because he didn't know what and Commitments Abroad completed its
the law was?it was because he was biased." hearings on Laos.
* * ? wrote a political science dis- The record of those hearings remains
sertation in 1968 that analyzed the civil , classified top secret at the insistence of
rights decisions of the 31 Federal District the State Department. That record eon-
'judges appointed to posts in the Deep South
between 1953 and 1963. tains a great deal of information about
When she ranked the 31 judges in terms U.S. activities in Laos which the Amen-
of the number of times they had ruled In' can people should know and have a right
? favor of Negro plaintiffs' position, Judge to know. Repeated attempts on the part
land, March 15, described how the air-
war in Laos is run out of seven bases in
Thailand, sometimes with unmarked
planes.
The Washington Post on March 16,
in a dispatch by T. D. Allman from
Vientiane, reported in detail how 12
Americans were killed 2 years ago de-
fending a secret air navigation facility
at Phou Pha Thi, Laos.
The Washington Star on March 17, in
? Tom Harris the official of the American
state that these decisons and subsequent ones . ? on to say that there have been approxi-
Federation of Labor and Congress of Indus-
by the Fifth Circuit did not reach the quoin- ? mately 70 Americans in the Sam
trial Organizations who led the successful Thong-
tion of faculty desegregation. attack against Judge Haynsworth, said to- Long Chien area armed with M-16 rifles
NOT DIR.ECTLY AT ISSUE day that Judge Carswell "doesn't appear to and captured Communist AK-47 subma-
"This court can not indulge in a presump- ,have a significant record on labor eases." Ile ' .chineguris.
- tion that these Federal courts decided the said the AFL-CIO had no plans as present to . In a dispatch from Vientiane March
points of law asserted by plaintiff by infer- ? oppose him. 20, the Associated Press reported that
ence," he said, because staff members' rights The few labor opinions that Judge Cars-
were not directly at issue in those cases. well has written reflect his reticence to use two Thai battalions have been flown to
Finally, he declared, students have no
'Judicial power and his tendency not to ex-. Long Chien in U.S. civil aircraft.to help
standing to intervene in such matters; "Stu. tend the Judiciary's power. ? defend that Army base from an expected
dents herein can no more complain of injury . SOME bISSENTINO OPINIONS North Vietnamese onslaught.. ?
to themselves of the selection or assignment ? ? In one decision, when si, three-Judge Court On March 23, a story from Bangkok by
of toschers than they can bring Acton to of Appeals ordered a soft-drink company to Jack Poisie in the Washington Post de-
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DAILY WORLD
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...,
!Canabodirm dile2aSous: 03
too, bar L3)0E53C-D om, aszy
Daily World Foreign Departmcpt , ?
, The Cambodian government has advised Western diplomats that it is closing'
down the port of Sihanoukville to what it says are ships bearing arms to the "Viet-
cong" in South Vietnam. The move was announced yesterday to the diplomats in ILA
special briefing by the Cambodian Foreign Office in the capital of Phnom Penh.
A Foreign Office spokesman :encourage a U.S.-backed war " northeast of the capital of Vien-'''
also disclosed that the Embassy r.' over all of Indochina. It said the ., tiane. . .
of the Polish People's Republic '? Lon Nol government was sup- I.
Cambodian relations, Poland, to- regime nor the U.S. has offered flown into besieged Long Cheng?
have captured a Thai mercenary'.
by the CIA-operated airline "Air:.
America" Angnet, admitted that.
Lao .Patriotic Front forces'
was being closed down, but...? ported by the U.S. Central' In-:/(
denied knowing why or whether' telligence Agency.
this meant a break in Polish- , Neither the new 'Cambodian
gether with Canada and India, any evidence of 'their charges he had served under the corn,:
is a member of the International that Sihanoukville was being ' . mand of the U.S. military mis- '
Control Commission (ICC) set used for arms shipments to the sion in Vientiane. He said in '
up by the 1954 Geneva Agree- National 'Liberation Front in , January, 1968, he was sent to ,
ment to watchover Cambodia's South Vietnam. . the U.S. base at Long Cheng and
neutrality. ?.. Sihanoukville, on the Gulf of then to another base at Muong ,
General Lon Nol, the armed , Thailand, wai built in 1960 as a Ta.
forces commander and new anti- new port city for Cambodia.
Communist' premier of Cambodia: Previously, all traffic had to use He said there were 600 Thai
was reported to be on the verge the Mekong River (through South ' troops at Long Cheng under joint '
of renaming Sihanoukville and Vietnam) to reach Phnom Penh. U.S.-Thai command, and that 40.:
proclaiming a republic. ? 'The main port facilities at Siha- Thai paratroop officers serve as,
The reports. from official Cam- ? noukville ,today are a 900 foot. Lao General Vang Pao's staff,:
bodian sources, said that in a' ,'wharf reached by a 600 foot while 30 more (officially listed
few weeks Cambodia's constitu- -causeway. Ships of up to 15,000 as "interpreters") directly super-
tional monarchy would be de- 1 '.,tons ,can discharge cargoes on, vise combat operations. He also
dared abolished. The monarch?',', both sides of 'the wharf, but this Said at Long Cheng the CIA had
Queen Kossarriak?is under heavy is a rather slow process since set up a communications center
guard in Phnom Penh. Prince no cranes have been installed in for direct contact with Washing- -
Norodom Sihanouk, the Cambo- ?.?: the dock area as yet. Sihanouk- , t.'311. ? . '
than chief of state, remains in ',1 vine still remains to be linked ; The' interview 'with this Thai
Peking, where he has announced . to the interior by railroad., mercenary-. was published by ,
he will form a liberation army ,. Battles. in northern Laos con- 1 Vietnamese .News Agency of the .,
to overthrow the Lon Nol, gov- tinned yesterday around the main . Democratic Republic of Viet-'"
uomeriMICE..t ? , . ! CIA base of Long Cheng, 75 miles , nam. ' ' ? ""'"'""u".......""
Lon Nol has already suspend-
ed all civil rights provisions of ,.
, the Cambodian constitution, un-,
der the "full powers" granted
him by the National Assembly
last week. He has accused Siha-
' nouk of being a "dictator" and ,
of secretly signing an agreement
with the "Vietcong" to transship ,
arms from China across Cambo- ,
dian territory into South Viet-
nam.
Warning by Pravda
Pravda, the Soviet Communist
Party newspaper, yesterday
praised Sihanouk's policy of neu-
tralism and said any changes by
the Lon Nol government would
.?.
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Approved For Release 200WARGIV-FROVONRY111111
2 6 MAR 1 0 ?, ? ?
?Meos
oister
By T.D. Allman around Long Tieng last night
5./c1.1 to The Washinston Post and today.
VIENTIANE, March 25?
Military sources said today
When Laotian government they were optimistic that
troops reoccupied Skyline 1, a Long Tieng, menaced by five
ihill position two miles north North Vietnamese battalions
of Long Tieng, they re-estab- since the fall of Sam Thong
ilast a measure of securityast week, could be defended.
!for that important base and Some 800 Thal troops have
. &-
also for a vital U.S. telecom
been flown there to bolster
munications station nearby. fenses. Reliable sources said
The station, known as Sky- today the Thais would man ar-
line 2, provides a beacon for tillery positions.
'U.S. bombers operating in U.S. sources denied reports
northeast Laos and also serves that they were led by Ameri?
as a relay for U.S. and Laotian can Special Forces.
militart communications. Other reliable sources, how-
1 Military sources said today ever; have reported an in:
that U.S personnel had been crease in American personnel
.evacuated from Skyline 2 but at. Long Tienvas the Amen-
- automatic
that the station's
:equipment could continue to ?
function so long as periodic,
maintenance can be, per-
formed.
Early this morning, two
:North Vietnamese battalions
attacked another government
? position six miles north of
Long Tieng. The military,
sources said government
:troops withstood the attack
until dawn, when U.S. aircraft
intervened and the Commu-
ases' Security
amese troops late last week
regained Zan Hat Teu and two
nearby viliages that govern:- ,
ment troops had taken in an
American-assisted airborne op- .
eration six weeks ago.
All three villages lie on the
Mekong, about 30 miles west
of the royal capital of Luang'
Prablog. Government troops /
reportedly suffered extremely.,
heavy casualties in last week's
fighting.
Military sources said 'today,.
the apparent aim of the Com- ?
munist attacks around Bank.*
Hat Teu was to cut river, -
traffic between Luang Pra-t
bang and Ban Hood Sal, .100..,
miles upstream. . 4.1
has
cans plan the defense of the
CIA base, which is also th
headquarters for Mco General
Vang Pao's clandestine army.
The sources said they were
optimistic about Long Tieng
because of what they called its
ideal defensive position ring
of high, government-held hills
and because of the difficulty
the Communists would have
with the rough terrain and in-
tensive U.S. bombing.
Meanwhile, in northern
Laos, government troops are
reportedly continuing' to re-
treat following their loss of
three uPper Mekong Rivqr vil-
lages. ??? . . .
Pathet?Lao and North Viet.
nists withdrew.
A so-called Spooky gunship,
a propeller-driven plane heavi-
ly equipped with machine
guns and flying from a base
in Thailand also reportedly
strafed Communist positions
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Approved For Release 2001kg1/541FM-RDP?M1lpi1
2 5 MAR 1970
-1
? u- (7.51 0 Lir-7.'1] CD--J 1-2 .9D
7.7D
..Yo-poYIDo4 co-i-TS136nurm
Daily World Foreign Department .
Cambodia's new rightist military regime reacted swiftly yesterday to a Radio
Peking broadcast in which Prince Norodom Sihanouk called for formation of a
"Cambodian national-liberation army" to carry on the "struggle against the Ameri-
can imperialists" and their puppets in Cambodia. ?, .
? the "Royal Lao" government's
dian armed forces commander, On Monday, "Quan Doi Nhan
General Lon Nol, the Cambo- ? ? CIA role stressed '
genuine interest in a peaceful
who headed the coup which pro- . Dan," a Hanoi newspaper, blunt-
claimed Sihanouk's ouster. last ly stated that "the coup in Cam- settlement.
Wednesday, pushed ahead with bodia was staged with ? the par-he LPF accused President
NixonN
a purge of Sihanouk's supporters tieipation of the U.S. CIA. directly.of "escalating the
from the government, the army The Paris daily, "Combat," war in Laos to an unprecedent-
and the Sangkum party. wrote' ed degree," and warned Pre-
mier Souvanna Phouma that he
. "There is no doubt that
. Sihanouk will be tried for the White House was informed ...
'
' high treason if ',be tries to re- in advance of the Cambodian must bear full responsibility
personally for the dangerous sit-
turn to Cambodia, the new re- coup and approved it." uation in the country."
?
gime has indicated. Lon Nol's In interview printed yesterday The only basis for peace, the ..
government has tried to remove by the Times of London, the
every possible trace of Sihanouk,' new Cambodian ruler, Gen. Lon peace plan calling for a cease
LP? said, is the five-point LPF
but U.S. reporters found that the Nol, denied working with theJ fire, an end to U.S. involvement, rid a provisional coalition gov-
-
prince is still popular with ordi- CIA.
nary Cambodian people. i "We, as the government of sal- ernment prior to national aloe.
. a
The Hanoi newspaper, "Nhan. vation," he said, "had to re- ' lions, as foreseen by the 1962
Dan," organ of the Vietnamese iquest full powers in order to j Garunial Agreattleldil On La0s.
Workers' Party, said on Tues- protest all those demonstrators."
day: "U.S. intrigues in Cambo- .tie was referring to the thou- '
dia show the extremely reaction- sands of people who sacked the
?ary nature of the Nixon admini- DRV and PRG embassies in
stration, which despite heavy de- Phnom Phnh two weeks ago
feats, is still looking for ways New York Times reporter
of expanding and protracting the Henry Kamm wrote on March
: war in Indochina." The news-, 14 that the mobs "were believ-
paper called the Cambodian peo- ed to have been instigated by .
. pie "our comrades-in-arms in ? the military."
' the struggle against our common The Lao Patriotic Front radio
t enemy?American imperialism." late Monday broadcast the peace .
' Giai Phong ("Liberation") proposals sent by LPF leader
News Agency, the official press Prince Souphanouvong to "Royal
service of the Provisional Revo- . Lao" Premier Souvanna Phouma.
lutionary Government of South The broadcast said the LPF
Vietnam,. said yesterday; "The asked Souvanna to call an "im-
danger of aggression against . mediate, complete and uncondi-
Cambodia, and against Vietnam. tional halt" to U.S. bombings in':
and Laos as well, comes from Laos, in order to demonstrate
the U.S. and its puppets. The
way to eradicate this danger is
to unite in the struggle against
American aggressors.'
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PiiILAPT:i,rilIA, PA.
BULLETIN
E ? 654,741
S ? 697,004
MAR 2 5 1970
Congressman Links War in Laos to U. S. Heroin Traffic
were related to .tribal antag- territory, it le within the realm the' 4.,government could be
onisma and the opium fields of possibility that the c1andea-1 aiding and, .abetting ? heroin
are the prize eat off cial.eperations di traffic' here at home."
The area is capable of pro-
ducing four to ten tons o
marketable opium annually, h
said, which refined as heroin
would bring nearly $900 million
on the American market.
"It is not impossible to be-
lieve that our unexplained
actions in northern Laos could
be a vital link in the chain of
drug traffic to the United
States," he continued.
"By providing military assist-,
ante, air support and munition
to the Mee tribesmen; by rein-
forcing their efforts with Thal.
and American troops; by assist
them. in maintaining their
Los Angeles ? (UPI) ? Rep.
John V. Tunney last night
charged the Nixon Adminis-
tration with involving Amer-
lean troops in a 1?aotian tribal
/war being fought over one of
the world's largest opium grow-
ing regions. ,
"The CIA has committed the
United?",etes to support a
faction of Meo tribesmen led
by General yang Pao, whose
sole objective is to dominate
other factions of this opium-
producing tribe throughout
.northern Laos," he said.
Tunnoy, seeking the Demo-
cratic nomination for the U.S.
Senate, told the Wilshire Cham-
ber of Commerte, that recent
battles over the Plain of Jars in
..... , 8., e, ....L.mmiiiio ' ' s` '
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PA4.13.44IliWOki STAat
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?
COVERS ALL OF INDOCHINA
?
Thais Are Only Part
. Of U.S. 'Secret Army
By TAMMY ARBUCKLE have killed Communist lead-
Special to The Star ers, destroyed key links in
VIENTIANE ? The Thai , Communist communications
troops who have joined the and logistics and, ,tied down
fighting in Laos are part of WI large numbers of Communist
American-directed "s ecret soldiers in defensive actions.
army" which operates all In Laos the secret army has
through SoutheaSt Asia, wiped out Communist head-
Making up its units are quarters and taken over prison
Cambodians, Vietnamese, camps and rescued inmates.
Chinese and Laotians, as well On one occasion in South
as Thais and various hill Laos, a guerrilla group in one
tribes, such as the Meos who night operation wiped out a
have been active on the?Plain prison camp controlled by Pa-
of Jars. thet Lao guards and rescued
Its operations extend into ? 59 prisoners, crossing back
northeast Burma, China 's ? into Thailand before the munists could strike back. ?
Corn-
Yunnan Province, North Viet- ,
nam, South Vietnam, Cambod-
The Thai' force at Long
ia and Thailand ? all part of Chien, which helped yesterday
? the guerrilla war fought by to clear a ridge overlooking
both Communist and anti- the base, may be listed as the
Communist forces for many
y ars in this part of the world.
For example, Haw tribal
? agents working for the Central
? Intelligence Agency Cross into
South China from Laos and
Black That tribesmen cross
into North Vietnam from Laos.
These tribes live on both
sides of the borders, the Haw
in northern Laos and Yunnan,
the Black Thai in Laos' Sam
? Neua Province and North Viet-
? nam's Dien Bien Phu Prov-
ince, making their. detection
STATINTL
secret army's latest success.
About 1,000 Thais were re-
ported yesterday to have
joined Gen. yang Pao's army
of Meo tribesmen at Long
Chien. Reports from the area
today said a North Vietnam-
ese attack was beaten back
and some positions previously
lost to the Communists had
been retaken.
Thais have long operated in
Laos. In February, 1967, re-
porters saw Thai commandoes
at Nam Bac, a Lao govern-
difficult. ?, merit base 60 miles north of
, The pro-American 'pennies the royal capital of Luant?p,
? ' Prabang, not ar from the Ha- .!
nol-Peking borders.
The Thais stood out like a ),
sore thumb for they spoke in a
-Bangkok dialect.
? When questioned closely
.they admitted they were front.? 4
the Thai military.
The secret army' operations ,
in Southeast Asia are directed, c.
by small groups of efficient
Americans working out of of.
flees under cover of organiza- ;
? tions in various cities in the ;
region.
?? Laos, bordering on all the ;
;Southeast Asia nations, is'
:ideal for these U.S. operations.
And the secret army concept ;
fits neatly into the Guam doe-,..
4,trine.
Americans take care of the
.leadership, training, planning
and logistics. The Asians
\the built of the fighting.
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DAILY WORLD
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'CI rouse crushed
by co) 2crtiociz
' Daily World Foreign Department
Sam Thong, the U.S. CIA base in Laos 75 miles north of the capital of Vientiane, V
has been put to the torch by Lao Patriotic Front forces, according to U.S. sources in
.Vientiane yesterday. The sources said a helicopter from the CIA-run "Air America" k7
line observed the scene on Sunday but left when it met ground fire from LPF units.
Long Cheng, sister base to Sam ered this down somewhat by add- had been immediately hired by
'Thong only six miles away in ing that Thai involvement was the U.S. CIA and then airlifted
northern Laos, has become the "very limited." into Long Cheng in Laos. The
1 focal point for an international On Saturday, President Richard sources said two entire Thai bat-
political controversy with farci.. Nixon confirmed the earlier ' italions (1,000 men) were in-
cal overtones. U.S. newsmen last statements of Ziegler that Thai ? I volved.
week reported that Long Cheng troops were in Laos. Nixon said: If this politically-embarrassing
was being reinforced by Thai "The Thai interest in Laos ... in incident makes anything clear, it
mercenaries' and other Thai . attempting to sustain the neutral- certainly is the fact that the U.S. ?
troops flownn from neighboring 1st government ... has been known is in complete command of the,
Thailand in the CIA's "Air Amer- for many years." ? "Royal Lao" and Thai armies ?
'lea" planes. ? Nixon also tried to connect this ? and does not even bother to in-
Both the Laos government in Thai violation of the 1962 Geneva form Bangkok or Vientiane of
Vientiane and the Thai govern- ? Agreement on Laos with a re-..., what it is doing with them.
, ment officially denied these re- quest for aid from the Laos gov- ; In Cambodia, General Lon Nol, ?
, ports. ernme t to Thailand. But the who was, granted "full power"
? "There are no Thai troops In 1962 agreement prohibits such last Wednesday by his National
Laos," the Vientiane government "requests." Assembly, said in a statement*
declared. Sources in Vientiane, mean- Sunday: "The time of repression,
But on Friday, White House- while, said that large numbers of dictatorship, is finished." Gen.
press secretary Ronald L. Meg-. of Thai soldiers (of Lao minor- Lon and the Cambodian military
ler said there were kicked Thai fly origin) had suddenly resigned are in control of Phnom Penh,
troops in Laps, although he wat- from the Thal Second Army and the Cambodian capital..
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DAILY WORLD STATINTL
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aleczaa i
rizailat 'Limits to nterve
By TOM FOLEY
lialf of an ally which is the victim ? This latter remark is perhaps '
An article in the first quarter of overt aggression." one of the most revealing in the
(January, 1970) issue of Foreign In effect, the authors are calling whole article. It shows some of
Affairs, called "Limits to Inter-, for the weeding out of all."com- ' the more sordid problems before
vention," calls bra sharp cutback mitments" which are not absolu- the U.S. ruling class. The authors
in U.S. military intervention poll- tely vital to U.S. capitalism's sur- argue, not very'convincingly, that
cies abroad and also advocates vival. the President can make U.S. poli-
.
? that the Nixon administration In the second category, the ' cies "unmistakably clear" to the
should reduce U.S. non-nuclear . authors say "there should be a ? CIA, the Pentagon, and other out- . ?
armed forces "to levels that char- presumption against 'U.S. inter- fits, and these agencies will toe
' acterized the Eisenhower per- vention." (Emphasis in the origi- the line.
tad" of the 1950s. nal - T.F.). Only in cases where The article as a whole reveals a
Foreign Affairs Is widely re- other major powers, or better, the tendency in certain sectors of the ?
garded, both here and abroad, as, other major power is involved, U.S. capitalist class to at least
the foreign policy organ of an im- should there be any question. This recognize problems and dangers
. portant part of the U.S. capitalist' is an argument, on a very practi- involved in trying to rule the world. ?
class. cal basis, against the U.S. acting. It would seem that they are aware I
' The positions of the three au- as a "world gendarme" against that the previous policy of "open-
thors of the article would support revolt everywhere. ended" commitments everywhere
that view: Graham T. Allison, "Internal disorder," the third simply is no longer possible, given .
? former Deputy Assistant Secre- ? category, is discussed at some the balance of forces in the world
tary of Defense in 1965; Ernest R. 1 length by the authors, with a focus today.
?I May, Dean of Harvard College; on Thailand, Laos and Vietnam. ' But the article also shows an
NJ and Adam Yarmolineky, former They say: "the administration ;awareness that empires founded
, , special assistant to the Defense ? should make a serious effort to es-, on military power tend to produce
-Secretary, 1961-64, and Deputy tablish a strong presumption ..:burracks emperors."
Asst. Secretary of Defense for In- ? against intervention, in cases of
, ternational Security Affairs (CIA,. internal disorder and/or sub- ' ?
? Liaison), 1965-66. version, even when there is out. ?
The authors show real concern '. side encouragement or aid." (Ork ,
about the "uncertainty, confusion ginal emphasis - T.F.).
. ',and discontent" created by U.S. The authors adopt this point of ? I
intervention in Vietnam. They. view from the following consider- 1
:note that the "broad bipartisan ations: wbether the U.S. will or .
:
consensus" which characterized will not intervene is likely to be
the Cold War period in the U.S. only one factor in the decision of
.. has been replaced by "widespread, ? People to revolt; the factors which
? bipartisan confusion.., the expen- 'produce revolt are "overwhelm-
diture of blood and treasure in ingly local"; also, reduced U.S.
. Viet Nam has deepened funda- . intervention would encourage..
. mental doubts throughout our so- ' "flabby" local regimes to set their ?
ciety... as to whether the U.S. own houses in order, and this "dis- ;
.? should in any circumstances be- order" is often what produces-re-
come involved again in a limited volt in the first place.
? . ? war." .. A different problem is the role',
' ? Policy re-examination asked' ? of various U.S. government agen-
. ? In their words, the authors try des (Pentagon, CIA, State Dept.,":,
?to identify three types of cases 7 etc.) in evaluating a situation. The,
where the question of U.S. armed , . authors strongly argue for "insti-
1 intervention would be raised: "(1) tutional ways to guarantee compe-
" overt aggression by a major corn- - titian," Le., that not only CIA data ,
? munist power against a U.S. ally; , is used to the exclusion of all else
. (2) overt aggression by any state in determining intervention.
? against a nation not a U.S. ally; As an illustration of what they
STATINTL
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1 NASHVILLE, TENN. 1
1 TENNESSEAN
- 141Na 4 1970
S - 234,036
1-6-Nho's Where Th
When in Laos?
INCE serious debate on United
'0? States involvement in Laos be-
gan, the Nixon administration's
response has been one of more con-
fusion than clarity.
On the matter of casualties,
' President Nixon first said that "no
?
American" had ever been killed in,
ground combat action there. Then
1. an Army captain was named as a
t, casualty. Then the White House
1, recounted and found '37" civilian 4
land military dead. Then recounted.
again
I again and found "less than 50."
The latest reports indicate that I
' the Central Intelligence Agency,
' the Army, the A gency terlitterna-
,tiohal Development and even some
? 1r6o,ps from Thailand are involved
in defense of a Laotian base at
? Long Chen. . ?
,
American Special. Forces teams
appdrently are training Meo tribes-
,' men as guerillas atid other Ameri- I
cans are flying as aerial intelli-1
-
gence observers. ? '
i
! Although Mr. Nixon has talked .1
..
of a policy of disengagement in f
-Asia, the casualty and activity re-
ports indicate a serious, andl
possibly deepening, engagement in
Laos.
Mr. Nixon has "explained" the
U.S. role in Laos once, but since
then the public has needed a score-
card to tell who was where when.
It may soon be time for another gx,--
planation_
watt.s.:264,'
?
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.33
Approved For Release 2s9a011Nalgt:S
24 March 1970
(C h r o 11 i c I c correspon(h
ant Lisa Hobbs recently com-
pleted an assignment in Cam-
bodia, where she had several
candid talks with Prince
Norodom Sihanouk, the- dc-
posed chief pf state.) '
By Lisa Hobbs '
Chronicle Foreign Service I
It. has become part of
American folklore to sus-
pect the enthusiastic, if
clandestine, presence of the
Central Intelligence Agen-1 perpetual danger" from the
cy whenever . a Southeast Thais in the west and the
Asian government rises or. Vietnamese in the east. Yet
falls, it was clear that the prince
The overthrow of Prince envisioned no situation that
Norodom Sihanouk and his . could cause him to relinquish
neutralist government l a St his neutr alit y by seeking
week might well justify this American military .aid in the
now customary suspicion. ? , , form of combatants.
There is no known evi- "Americans . should leave
clence t Ii a t the CIA played ? Vietnam but stay in all coun-
any role in the Phnom Penh tries that .accept their pres-
coup. But the suspicion ex- ence. There is no ' lack of
ists, at least in this writer's , countries like that: theyneed
s
(2 Ertl t."4:0-
0-01601
?
with Laos as well as with
News Analysis Thailand and South Vietnam,
became overnight a critical
?""-?????????"""-???-???-???-?-?,--."- strategic prize. In view of the
Laotian situation, her neu-
tralist stance might well j
have became untenable to,
the three powers that, have ;
lusted after her .possession
for many years. ,
The die was cast when the
under Communist control
and Cambodia ruled from
Peking, it would be only a
matter of time before the
American presence would be
squeezed out of Thailand.
DANGER
The ?prince spoke repeated-
ly' of Cambodia being "in
mind. Such was Sihanouk's
personal popularity that any
attempt by his political ri-
vals to depose him would.
'have necessitated foreign
support.
REASON
If the CIA were involved,
what would have been the ra-
tionale? Perhaps it had its
? genesis in an attitude that
the prince expressed to me
during a private two-hour in-
terview at his Phnom Penh
villa last summer.
"If the Americans with-
draw from Southeast Asia,
Cambodia can no longer sur-
vive as an independent na-
tion," he said. "And, as
Khmers, we would prefer the
Chinese to the Vietnamese."
Later, the prince spoke of
the inevitability of a final
Communist takeover of all
Vietnam.
The prince was positing a
situation that would be intol-
erable At AmericAN_Asiajp.
policy.P.MWQWWWdilfalkg
the U.S. dollar. We are poor,
but have our pride."
.t But pride, it seems, was
?not 'enough to stay the aced-
erating internal and external
;pressures. These pressures
Vs pr an g from. three main
sources -- the Army which,
living on coolie level, has not
? had a raise in pay since 1954;
the politically, powerful and
personally ' wealthy rightists
within the Sangkum, the rul-
ing party ; the increasing po-
litical and economic instabili-
ty throughout Southeast
Asia.
CRITICAL
prince left for Paris. In a !
swift and apparently well- ;
planned maneuver, the goy- -,
ernment fell into the hands of
the pro-American rightists. ?
The prince, long a thorn i n i
the side of U. S. policy-mak- ,
\
ers, was out. ?
Was the, CIA standing in.'
the wings directing this in- f
triguing little Asian drama?!
There is no proof. However,'
the agency puts in such long
hours plotting and planning
? all over Asia it Ehould be giv-
en a little credit on the basis
of the probable, . , .?.- :, .. ?,'
Within the last few weeks,
U. S. domestic awareness of
American involvement in
Laos had reached a peak.
Cambodia, sharing borders
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.mime? 01???????.???
TROY, N.Y.
TIMES RECORD
E - 42 , 181
MAR 24 In
Critics At Work
The critics of American foreign policy and
activity i both in Congress and in the country at
large, are .endeavoring to make a prime case of
the fact thaLc.a.a.gents and some service volun-
teers are assisting the Laotion army build up a
machine to resist ? Communist invasion.
The unfairness of the criticism is magnified by
the fact that it is so one sided. Whatever the
United States does is horrible. Americans miss no
opportunity to picture their country as an' ogre.
The other side is a matter to be overlooked.
Russia has at least 4,000 "technicians" help-
,
' ing the Arab countries. She has thousands in North
Vietnam. They are scattered throughout Africa.
France and England have similar representatives,
not in thessame numbers, but none the less there.
?
But because the United States has a feW hun-
dred men willing to help a beleaguered country
fend off a Communist invasion, we are a threat
? to world peace. Someone is being misled, and un-
fortunately so.
Entangling foreign alliances were part of
George Washington's parting warning. He spoke
at a time when world communication was almost
non-exikent. Today there is no vast separation of
countries. The most disant are only hours away.
There are times 'when the strong must play a role
' according to that biblical qithtation. They Cannot
avoid being their brother's keeper.
I. ?
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a?-?
)01611111UXON STAR
Approved For Release 22%ifpq470CIA-REI8IC1141601
1,000 Thais
? Reinforce
,
Lao Troops
By TAMMY ARBUCKLE ,
y?
VIENTSpedal to The Star
IANE?American Spe-
cial Forces officers working for
the Central Intelligence Agency
are leading LOGO Thai soldiers
reinforcing Gen. yang Pao's
Moo troops defending Long
Chien, Lao military sources
said today.
The Americans are newly as-
signed, but the sources said the
Thais saw action last year at
? Xieng Khouang on the Plain of
Jars.
The Thai group is not perma-
nently assigned to Laos, but en-
ters periodically under a con-
? tract with the Lao government.
Lao Premier Souvanna Phou-
ma's denial over the weekend of
the Thai entry of Laos was tech-
nically correct, sources said, be-
cause the new contract for Long
Chien had not yet been signed.
About 800 Thais already have
arrived in the Long Chien area
and the remaining 200 are en
route.
Two Thai artillery batteries
of four guns each also have ar-
rived at Long Chien, plus Thai
security troops for the guns.
They are not the only Thai
forces serving in Laos. Thai air
force pilots fly transports belong-
ing to the Central Intelligenc
Agency-contracted airline, Con-
tinental Airlines, and for an air-
line in south Laos.
One of the Thais, Lt. Col. Kru
?
of the 1st Thai Air Wing at Don
Muang, was killed in a crash at
Long Chien recently.
Sporadic patrol clashes were
reported today around Long
Chien, the main base for the
U.S.-supported "Secret Army"
of Mea tribesmen led by Gen.
yang Pao. Long Chien is about
75 miles north of Vientiane.
Edgar (Pop) Buell, the Ameri-
can AID co-ordinator for the re-
gion, said that between 80,000
and 100,000 Meos are. walking
cut of the Long Chien area as
refugees. ?
Buell, who has been In Laos
for about 10 years, most of the
time working with the Meos,
said he did not believe the fall of
Flown in by U.S.
The Thais arrive in American
aircraft and are dressed in civil-
ian clothes. On arrival they are
issued Lao army uniforms, Lao
identity papers and paybooks.
Many of the Thais are regular
officers of the royal Thai army
serving in Laos with full knowl-
edge of Thailand and continue to
receive their full salary from
the Thai government. Consid-
ered on temporary detachment
from the That army, they also
receive a Lao salary paid from
Long Chien to the North Viet-
namese would finish yang Pao's
guerrillas, the major force fight-
ing the Communists. .
Buell said he thought yang
Pao, with the help of .Lao
Theung tribes from the lower
mountain slopes, would be able
to hold new defense lines.
Communist units, meanwhile,
were reported assembling west
of the neutralist headquarters at
yang Vieng, 100 miles north of
Vientiane.
? Sources said about 650 Com-
munist troops are some 12,000
yards from the west edge of
yang Vieng. The mission of
these troops is believed to be the
preparation of supply caches for
men are more interestc n e
ter-than-average pay than
ing the job.
Guerrilla leaders it the local
level have stolen U.S. funds and
equipment meant for operations.
Some soldiers, especially the
Thais, well-informed sources
say, "talk too much to their girl
friends" about their exploits,
real or imagined.
More important, however, Se-
cret Army critics charge its cen-
tral intelligence agency bosses
make policy. It is alleged that
the CIA and U.S. military advis-
ers persuaded yang Pao to
"tweak the tiger's tail" by tak-
ing the Plain of Jars last year
and offering Thai support as the
tool to accomplish this. ?
and the Thais have pinned don
one North Vietnamese Division,
Hanoi's 316th, In Laos for nearly
eight years.
Now it is pinning down a sec-
ond division, the 312th, as well
as two supply regiments and two
North Vietnamese border regi-
ments.
the troops ? currently attacking
Long Chien. .
Failure of the royal Lao army
to reinforce the Meo guerrillas
of yang Pao is believed behind
the use of the Thais at Long
Chien. Ethnic Lao troops, whetli-
Over 15,000 North Vietnamese
have died in northern Laos since
1962. If it had not been for these ,
U.S.-led operations in Laos, the,
Hanoi troops might have been
used in South Vietnam.'
Because the Geneva accords
forbid paramilitary forces in
Laos, these U.S.-Thai opera-
tions have remained secret. The
Communists know about these,
STATINTL
operations, however, and Presi-
dent Nixon told of some of them
March 6. U.S. Embassy officials
here say secrecy must remain.
"The President's speech rep-
resents a stage, not a point of
departure for us" to say more,.
an embassy official said. ,
He compared the govern-
ment's Geneva accords policy to
a man' hanging to a ledge with
the press climbing up his legs
asking what's on the ledge.
Officials seem to cling to the
Geneva accords as more unpor,
er on the side of the North Viet-
U.S. funds as an additional in namese or against them, have tont than ? any credibility gap
centive. .* caused by secreCy. Said a Lao-
. not proved reliable fighters. This ?4
?an "You can't go to Long
These Thais are mostly natives led to the formation of Vans Chien today because some Thais
. of northeastern Thailand, near Pao's Secret Army, trained an are still in, their civilian.
the Lao border, and are there-
fore fluent Lao speakers. The
Thais are experienced forest
fighters and some were trained
In South Vietnam near Vung
? ' Tau, northeast of Saigon,
sources said.
equipped by the U.S.
But the Secret Army also has ? ; ?
Its drawbacks., ' .
Americans engged in its op-
erations have told of being left
alone in the forest when their
guerrillas fled uncles' attack.
They say some Secret Army
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? ?
WASHINTOS Si.CA4
Approved For Release Min& Wi-RDP80-01601R
Green Berets
Lead Thai Unit
In Laos Action
By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Spedal to The Star
VIENTIANE?American Spe-
cial Forces officers working for
the Central Intelligence Agency,
are leading 1,000 Thai soldiers
reinforcing Gen. Yang Pao's
Meo troops defending Long
Chien, Lao military sources
said today.
The Americans are newly as-
signed, but the sources said the
Thais saw action last year at
Xieng Khouang on the Plain of
Jars.
The Thai group is not perma-
'nently assigned to Laos, but en-
ters periodically under a con-
tract with the Lao government.
' Lao Premier Souvanna Phou-
ma's denial over the weekend of
the Thai entry of Laos was tech-
nically correct, sources said, be-
cause the new contract for Long
Chien had not yet been signed.
About 800 Thais already have
arrived in the Long Chien area
and the remaining 200 are en
route. .
Flown in by U.S.
The Thais arrive in American
aircraft and are dressed in civil-
ian clothes. On arrival they are
Issued Lao army uniforms, Lao
identity papers and paybooks.
Many of the Thais are regular
officers of the royal Thai army
serving in Laos with full knowl-
edge of Thailand and continue to
receive their full salary from
the ? Thai government. Consid-
ered on temporary detachment
from the Thai army, they also
receive a Lao salary paid from
U.S. funds as an additional In-
centive.
These Thais are mostly natives
of northeastern Thailand, near
the Lao border, and are there-
fore fluent Lao speakers. The
Thais are experienced forest
fighters and some were trained
in South Vietnam near Vung
Tau . northeast . of Saigon,
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STATINTL'
They are not the only Thai
forces serving in Laos. Thai air
force pilots fly transports belong-
ing to the Central Intelligence
Agency-contracted airline, Con-
tinental Airlines, and for an air-
line in south Laos.
Killed in Crash
One of the Thais, Lt. Col. Kru
of the 1st Thai Air Wing at Don
Muang, was killed in a crash at
Long Chien recently.
Sporadic patrol clashes were,
reported today around Long:
Chien, the main base for the,
U.S.-supported "Secret Army",
of Moo tribesmen led by Gen.
yang Pao. Long Chien is about ?
75 miles north of Vientiane.
Edgar (Pop) Buell, the Amen-
Can AID co-ordinator for the re-
gion, said that between 80,000
and 100,000 Meos are walking,
out of the Long Chien area as
refugees.
'Buell, who has been in Laos
kr about 10 years, most of the
time working with the Mew. ,
said he did not believe the fall of
Long Chien to the North Viet-
namese would finish yang Pao's'
guerrillas, the major force fight-
ing the Communists. "
. Feels Lines Will Hold
Hull said he thought Vang
Pao,. with the help of Lao
Theung tribes from the lower
mountain slopes, would be able
to hold new defense lines.
Communist units, meanwhile,
were reported assembling west
of the neutralist headquarters at
yang ? Vieng, 100 miles north of
Vientiane.
Sources said about 650 Corn-
muhist troops are some 12,000
yards from the west edge of
yang Vieng. The mission of
these troops is believed to be the
preparation of supply caches for
the troops ;mealy attacking
Long Chien, e
BALTI HOBE SUII
Approved For Release 2001/%3A0gARCIVoRM9rAlit0
Analysis
' History Tempers U.S.
Americans here if a decision
were given to pull hack. "We
cad get out in 24 hours if we
have to," said one key Ameri-
can. Others echo these views.
By PETER J. KUMPA
[Sun Stall Correspondent.] .
? Vientiane, Laos, March 22?
The American effort to keep the
neutralist government of Prime
Minister Souvanna Phouma from
succumbing to Communist ag-
gression in Laos has been tai-
lored to avoid the mistakes of
Vietnam.
? No United States ground
forces are being used. Laotian
! government armies are being
. supplied, advised and trained by
minimum number of Amen-
/cans, many of them in civilian
guise from the Central Intelli-
gence Agency or under contract
But the Laotian operation, put
together in the Kennedy admin-
istration, then increased in the
Johnson years and continued by
the' Nixon government, has in-
curred some moral responsibili-
ties... ? .
Purely American Effort
On a smaller scale, the Ameri-
cans are responsible for the
clandestine army of Gen. yang
Pao, the head of the Men guer-
; and using such. covers as the rilla movement. This has been a
Agency for International Devel- purely American effort, per-
. opment program. , , formed skillfully and secretly by
Reduction Of Supplies ? ' the Central Intelligence Agenc
, ? From 1964 on, air power was though under the political direc-
,
directed both at the Ho Chi Minh
Trail and in northern Laos. Air
strikes were launched from
tion of the State Department.
General yang is now battling
to hold Lcing Cheng, his head-
South Vietnam, Thailand and the quarters and capital of his
7th fleet in the South China Sea. mountain empire.' He Is also
? The aim on the trail was sim..'fighting for the very existence
pie?to reduce the flow of North of his army, which 'is losing its were made available in Laos,.
statement listed 616 Americans
Vietnamese troops and supplies -morale. and its men. His leader- Presitient Nixon, in his March
- directly employed here and an-
northern Laos, it was similarly are at stake. Doesn't the United the increased level of American
designed to reduce the number States owe. something to him aid operations was due only to government contracts for a
of men that Hanoi could keep arid his nomadic hill people who the "massive" intervention of grand total of 1,040 Americans.
operative to threaten the mill-
have fought the Noi;th, Viet- But in October, official State
tary and political balance .in namese and the, communist
Pathet Lao in a remarkable
Laos.
a
In both countries, the Amen- and mainly successful behind-
the-lines guerrila war? Can, the
cans have learned that while air
power can punish an enemy, in-
flicting damage and casualties,
It cannot interdict a determined
foe without ground forces. The
North Vietnamese have not been
'stopped.
Fears Seem Unjustified
Unlike South Vietnam, the
United States is not in any deep
morass in Laos. There are no
large bases or concentrations of
men. There are military sup-
!plies, that can be quickly turned
over to the Laotian government
or destroyed. Air strikes can be
turned off by pushing a button.
Thus, congressional fears that
the United States might get
bogged down militarily ? here
seem unjustified.
There is nothing visible in any
.+ of Laos that mad keep kong River to the ,nearby Thal Western diplomats here feel
'took considerable liberties withi
some fuzzy estimates and raised
them to excuse a vast jump in
Ithe number of American air sor-
!ties and in at least one case the
Laos Role use of giant 13-52 bombers. They,
feel the United States could have
justified its elevation of air pow-,
plain. American ground -
ground troops, er by acknowledging the weak-
and Thais as well, would be used
If the North Vietnamese at-
tempted a total takeover of the
country.
With such a threat no longer
plausible, congressional fears
about turning Laos into another
Vietnam appear to be equally
groundless.
Threat Remains
The threat of heavy Thai inter-
vention does remain. As this
presumablY would be backed by
American air might and other
ness of Laotian government op-
position (politically undesirable)
or by pointing out the_yastly
increased firepower now being
employed by the North Vietnam-
ese. The Communist forces now
use rockets, the full range of
Chinese-made automatic weap-
ons, considerable artillery and
large numbers of truck and oth-
er wheeled transport.
Mr. Nixon's figures for past
North Vietnamese strength in
Laos iilso seem to have been
logistic support, it may be just toyed with, and are lower than
as chilling a consideration for S those provided at the time in
Hanoi.
'There is a, prima fade case to
be made on the other hand that
it as the Nixon administration
at increased' the level of fight-
,.g during the past few months
by escalating the numbers and
the type of air attacks upon the
Communists in northern Laos. ,
The original American escala-
tion was made in October, 1968,
when the bombing of North Viet-
nam was halted and targets
1967. The net effect makes Hanoi
appear as the party that has
been the one to blame for rapid
escalation of the war in Laos
when it seems closer to fact to
say that the Communists have
kept ?a rather substantial force
in the country.
Using only official figures, one
can conclude that there has been
a considerable -increase in the
size of the American effort in
Laos. The President's March 6
additional North Vietnamese
'troops. He said 13,000 Commu-
nist troops had been poured into
raising their Wei to 67,000
men.
American government Permit . If there was any such escala- 'men. Has the Nixon administra-
the Mess to be annihilated now?' tion pumped in more than 200
extra men for the Laotian effort
during the past few months?
Perhaps, but more likely not.
The best guess here is that the
State Department figures of last
fall were deliberately underval-
ued to keep the cover on a num-
ber of secret operations.
Mr.. Nixon's own figures are
undoubtedly a little low. For
while he talks of Americans em-
ployed "in Laos," he says noth-
ing about other . Americans,
largely.intelligence men but also
some contract pilots, who live in
and ' work out of nearby Thai-
Department figures showed 330
Americans on contract and 500
directly on the government pay-
rolls. This makes a total of 830
Moral, LegalDbligation
The United States also has a
moral if not legal obligation to
continue to support within lim-
its, the Souvanna Phouma gov-
ernment until . international
agreement or a more local
agreement by the contending
Laotian parties brings peace and
. some stability here. ?
? The Nixon Doctrine, which
calls for a .reduction of Ameri-
can military power in Southeast
Asia', does appear to discard one
of the better trumps the United
states used in the past to limit
Communist advances. The Ken-
nedy administration could and
did send marines across the Me-
bon by Hanoi,' it was not known
by the American mission here.
' "Massive" Intervention
In an embarrassing lack of
coordination, briefers here still
were using the 50,000 figure as
an estimate for North Vietnam-
ese forces in Laos.
Intelligence sources here con-
tended that they could find no
significant change in North Viet-
namese strength in Laos over
the past year.
Even the 50,000 figure Is consi-
dered inflated by other Western
sources. French estimates place
the figure for 'North Vietnamere
at more than 44,500. ?
? Fuzzy Estimates
Approved For Ritittget31POSATretA-b0?11.-641A onoo4BeRNIte
?
STATINTL
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BALTIMORE, MD.
SUN
M 180,656/
E 209,65Y
S 347,939
L'Zi 2 3 1970
Questions in Laos
The report in The Sun today of participa ;
lion by the Central Intelligence Agency in '
the defense of the Long Chen Base in Laos is
, disturbingly familiar. Before the 1965 buildup:
of
; of United States troops in South Vietnam the
CIA was deeply invOlved there against the
Vietcong. CIA Activities against the Pathet
Lao?which has included the training and
equiping of a guerrilla army of Meo tribes-
.,men?may not be directly responsible, for
the present deteriorating situation in Laos,
but they certainly have contributed to it.
, The conflict in Laos is already following '
L a pattern similar to what occurred in South
Vietnam. The United States is there, mak ?
-
ing war from the air and through its clan-
. destine agents on the ground. Theo number .:el
, participants is even growing: Thailand ha
i sent an expeditionary force, and North Viet.
namese troop i are camped on the Plain Of
, Jars. The conflict is thoroughly international-
ized.
: The parallel between Vietnam and Laos,
!however, is not predetermined. We are as-
sured by The Sun's Peter Kumpa that the '
l Nixon administration can avoil the mistakes
1President Johnson 'made in South Vietnam, 1,
:mainly 'because of public opinion in the,
'United States. Also the attitude of Congress is
t.such that - commitment of- United States '
' ground forces is something Mr. Nixon 'could ,
1
, just not get away with.
iThat may be true, but no one can be sure
and we are left with the ,uneasy feeling that
;
tall this has happened before. President John-
!son accepted and acted upon faulty intelll-
'gence in Vietnam, Is the advice Mr., Nixod
,receives superior? We suspect CIA agents
and Pentagon functionaries in Vietnam have ?:
,I made large decisions on their own that should,
only have been made by elected civilians
in Washington. Does Mr. Nixon really have an
taccUrate picture of what is occuring in Laos?
Is ?he really in control of events? Who can,
with certainty, answer these questions, 'af-
'firmatively? . - '
imiliminimm,.....?...-.4. -
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MaraMia,r9051 F?rciNenessia11231PEtiM-Tre2i9t#2160"fe021
grams to teach critically needed skills.
Thus, we can provide students with
much-needed skills in fields in which
they can establish careers. This is a Most
significant endeavor for the future of cur
country and its educational institutions.
I urge my colleagues to join mein sup-
porting this valuable program.
SITUATION IN GREECE
? HON. DON EDWARDS
Or CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OP REPRI1(3ENTATIVES
Monday, March 23, 1970
Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr.
Speaker, the situation in Greece seems
to be worsening every day. Not only are
. more and more individuals suffering the
barbarism of a government which uses
torture to keep its citizens in line, but
the country which was the first democ-
racy and remained a symbol to the free
world for years, under the reign of the
junta is turning more and more toward
the East and away from the principles
of freedom. I request that two articles
which appeared in the most recent issue
of News of Greece be included in the
RECORD. The first is the preface from a
new book by James Becket, "Barbarism
in Greece," whose report for Amnesty In-
ternational was the first comprehensive
account of the use of torture by the Greek
junta. The second describes the growing
alliance of the junta with the Eastern
European countries, while still enjoying
a great deal of military support from
the United States. How can the United
States, in good conscience, still continue
its support for such a government? ,
The articles follow:
. BARBARISM IN GREECE
The subject of this book is horrible. Torture
belongs on the darkest side of human be-
havior, yet in the Greek case there are en-
tries to be made on the credit side of the
human ledger. People outside of Greece, es-
pecially in Europe, have cared about what was
going on. and public opinion has played O.
?* role. The European Press has vigorously pur-
sued the subject. The international com-
munity through its oragnizations has shown
that it is willing to try to do something about
it. The Scandinavian governments brought
their case before the European Commission
of Human Rights not for any commercial or
territorial advantage, but because they be-
lieved an human rights. Despite pressure
from many sides, they had the perseverance
to see the case through to Its conclusion. The
members of the Commission conscientiously
discharged their duty, concluding that the
Greek regime tortures political prisoners as
a matter of policy. Most important of all.
Greeks themselves, at great personal sacrifice,
had the courage to tell their stories and give
?
their names.
I am convinced that because of this fewer
Greeks have been tortured than would have
been if the regime had a free hand. Efforts
from abroad, however, have their limits,
which are tragically demonstrated by the fact
the regime continues to torture prisoners. In
a sense the possible International effort has
? now been made, and torture has not been
stopped. The future is uncertain. All that
baa happened, all that is described in these
pages cannot be simply forgotten, by Greeks.
If there is not a change soon, it Is difficult to
see how Greece can avoid great bloodshed.
GREECE AND TUE WORLD: JUNTA TURNS EAST
? Relations between tho colonels and their
Communist neighbors have always been
based on expediency, rather than on the
ringing denunciations of "communism" and
"fascism" which the two parties have uttered
for public consumption. They have become
especially close in the past year, as both have
been estranged from the West European
democracies by the objections of the latter
to torture In Greece and the invasion of
Czechoslovakia.
Two recent developments are especially
striking. One is the conclusion of a now eco-
nomic agreement with the U.S.S.R., tinder
which Soviet exports to Greece ere to be
atepped up and receive moat-favored-nation
treatment. At the same time, the Soviet
Union Is to send technicians to the area
north of KayeIla to look for peat (and ac-
cording to some reports other minerals) and
prepare plans for electric production based
on it. Greece is to pay for this survey with
some of its perennially surplus tobacco.
From the Soviet point of view, however, one
cigaret might scorn an adequate recompense.
For the area in question is the site of major
American top-secret radar installations. And
the Soviet technicians, hunting for minerals
with the aid of modern electronic devices,
might reasonably be expected to discover1
other things as well.
The second development is the resumption
of trade with Albania for the first time since
the end of World war II. The announcement
of this agreement between the junta and
Communist China's only satellite does not
specify what commodities are involved. An
appropriate exchange, however, might give
Greece a supply of the little red book of
Mao's thoughts in return for an equal quan-
tity of the book in which Papadopoulos has
embalmed his commentaries.
The junta has also decided to station o.
permanent triide representative in East Ger-
many, while agreeing to increase. its trade
with Bulgaria. And Hungary has sent a trade
delegation to Athens in connection with the
holding of a "Hungarian Festival" there?at
a time when the intellectual and artistic'
world of democratic countries is engaged in
a cultural boycott of the Greek dictatorship,
"Agreement in principle" has also reportedly
been reached on a trade pact with Peking.
The junta will certainly find itself more at
home ideologically with the Eastern dictator-
ships than with the democracies which just
chased It out of the Council of Europe. Yet
in the present state of the world Papado.
pontos may soon find himself faced with the
necessity of making an agonizing choice be..
tween Moscow and Peking: "Under which
king, Bezonian? Speak or diel"
. ?
MAN'S INHUMANITY TO MAN?HOW
LONG?
?
HON. WILLIAM J. SCHERLE
OF IOWA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, March 23, 1970
' Mr. SCHERLE. Mr. Speaker,, a child
asks: "Where is daddy?" A mother asks:
"How is my son?" A wife asks: "Is my
husband alive or dead?"
Communist North Vietnam is sadisti-
cally practicing spiritual and mental
genocide on over 1.400 American,prieon?
era of war and their families. '
fl MR. NIXON'S SILENCES IS A
SHADOW OF A DOUBT
HON. HENRY HELSTOSKI
Or NEW JERSEY ?
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, March 23, 1970
Mr. HELSTOSKI: Mr. Speaker, it ap-
pears that we have another credibility
gap on our hands. This time as It relate
to Laos.
It is well spelled out in the following
column by Mr. Stuart H. Loory as carried
In the Record of Hackensack, N.J., on ?
March 12, 1070:
XIS MR. NIXON'S SILENCES Is A SHADOW Or A
DOUOT
? (By Stuart If. Loory)
Now President Nixon has bared some?but
certainly-not all?of the secrets of the clan-
destine war in Laos he inherited from two
previous administrations. The United States,
he, openly admits, is neck deep in a part of
the southeast Asia jungle war outside
Vietnam.
In six years of fighting, 400 American air-
men have become casualties, 400 airplanes
have been lost?about as many as, maybe
even more, than the number of fixed-wing
airplanes the United States has lost over
South Vietnam.
These facts emerged from the torpid calm
of the Southern White House?the Key Bis-
cayne, Fla , vacation 'retreat to which the
President retired late last week to make his
Laos statement.
Why not speak from Washington'? If Mr.
Nixon wanted to be completely candid, why
not make the statement at a news confer-
ence where his words and intentions could
really be probed and clarified?
Unfortunately, Mr. Nixon's statement on
Laos was a politically reflexive reaction to a
growing clamor for candor in the White
House. It was Intended to break the silence
that has surrounded the secret war, to show
that the nation harbors no secret guilt. But
It was only half candid; and so it was wholly
unsatisfactory.
The unhappy experience with the Gulf of
Tbnkin resolution of August 19f34, originally
presented as a show of solidarity behind
President Lyndon B. Johnson but then con-
strued by him as a virtual declaration of
war, has taught Congress and the American
people to read words carefully. The presents.
tion of selected facts by the Johnson ad-
ministration to bolster Its case for the mas-
sive intervention in South Vietnam In 1965
has cautioned the American people to check
and double-check on a President's facts.
And so, when Mr. Nixon says of Laos, "We
have no plans for introducing combat forces
into Laos," one must look for the loop-
holes like a Philadelphia lawyer.
No plans? Does that mean plans may be
developed later? Maybe.
Ground combat forces? Does that mean
more ground combat support forces?engi-
neers to build roads and bridges, suppliers to
carry ammunition to combat troops, repair- .
men to fix disabled weapons, advisers to alm ?
and show the Laotians how to fire the weap-
ons?might be dispatched? ?
Ground combat forces? What about ma-
hating the American involvement through the
Introduction of more aircraft to fly cover for
the CIA-trained and supplied Laotian forces
as well as the Royal Laotian Army?
The President said: "The levels of our
assistance have risen In response to the
growth of North Vietnamese combat acUr. .
Mee '''
. . ? ? , implication of that esatence le
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E - 93,538
MAR 2 3 1970
fAr s secret Foie in the secre
By MICHAEL ICRAFT
Mauldin
Reuters News Service
WASHINGTON &-- Congressional crit- Congo. Correspondents who were there
being played by the Central Intelli- . The American assistance was regard-' tation, and some tactical support for the '
- ,
The agency is also alleged to have fi-
les of American involvement in Laos are ': at the time saY the C.I.A.'s role was an
Ii-
/ -- showing increasing interest in the part . open secret. named air operations, including transpor
. gence Agency and what they consider ed as an important factor in helping the pro-government neutralist forces against
the unusual role of the U.S. ambassador; ,,;
Congo government suppress the rebellion, ? the Communists.
i According to Sen. Stuart Symington,
with the help of white mercenary sol- Single-engine Laotian T-28 fighters '
'
are serviced by American mechanics, al-
(D., Mo.) Ambassador. McMurtrie Godle" diers. '
though the combat flying has been done
? ,,
operates in Vientiane, the Laotian capital,, . In response to congressional inquiries, , by Laotians and other non-Americans.,
'' as a sort of pro-consul, directing Amen- .) the Nixon Administration has asserted ' the repute say.
-. can military and intelligence activities' in,'" that it is merely a coincidence that both : ? -
addition to his normal diplomatic"func-': Godley and Devlin are now assigned to ?
. Laos.
war
i.
-.tions. , . . ,? ' ,. Godley was assailed on the Senate: ?
., Jr
- Sen. William Fuibright (D., Ark.) ie-4:j floor recently by Symington, one of the
'toed in on a press report that the Agency 'i; most vocal critics of both the Laotian in- ..7,.
. for International Development (A.I.D;) in' volvement and the administration secrecy . ?
Laos is a cover for C.I.A. men, declaring ''e? about it. 1
? .,1 ' r .
that if true "it is another sign that' w?e are -I Symington has been rebuffed by the '
in over our heads.',' ?
?
, -?,. State Department in his demand for the
\Though President Nixon has adopted l', ambassador's immediate recall to testify ?
? '.a new policy of frank disclosure of all cas- , before Congress. , . ?
.ualties and air losses in Laos and has t
Fuibright also wants to bring the am-
given a 4,000-word explanation of Antal- ,1 bassador home and sent a letter to the
. can policy, he has never mentioned the ? : State Department backing the recall de-,
'-super-secret C.I.A.
(
.. .. y mand.
But Laos has been known for years as ' press reports have said there are hun- l':,-14,' ,, ? ?
,an "agency country," and C.I.A. men are ' 'dreds of C.I.A. agents in Laos, and Ful- ..,',?IT''YJ ?
.'suspected of accounting for a large pro- bright told a reporter he thought the 'i,:::...
portion of the 643 Americans acknowl- agency's operations there were costing 1, ,,.,1,. .
'edged by Nixon to be engaged in a between $200 million and $300 million a
military,
1,.,., ?
? advisory and logistical support '? 'year. '1
,
role. : ? Silver !leas of aircraft on 'charter to ? I
i The U.S. operation in Laos is directed ' the C.I.A. are said to have been providing ? I
; by two men who supervised a similar'', tactical support for years to Gem. Van ,1
. U.S. support program in the Congo in the, 1 Pao's pro-government force of Moo.. **
! 1960's. 1, tribesmen.
Godley, now 52, was ambassador in , Three Air America employes wore'
. "
the Congo from 1964 to 1966, a time ,,among six civilian fatalities acknowl- -
i when the U.S. was providing equipment edged by the State Department to have . 4
and tactical air support for the central ? occurred in Laos in the past year.
t, I.,
- C o n g 0 1 e s e government's campaign." '? One of the victims, J. C. Merkel, was ' 4
- against the leftist Simba rebels. ' ' 1 .killed by a bullet when piloting a helicop- ?,1 '
ter over the Plain of Jars last month
The C.I.A. operations in the Congo during the Communist offensive that,1 ,
4.- '
? were directed by Lawrenea naviir? now a recaptured the strategic area. ?
?
:political officer in the U.S. Embassy in ?
According to press, accounts cited by
Vintiane but described in official docu- .
members of the Senate, Green Berets and..
znents as the chief of the C.I.A. mission, other army veterans now technically civil-
Jana have been operating d
,.i
The Congolese air force was supplied under contract . , .44
with reconditioned U.S. twin-engine 3-26 ;t? the !'A'' ilkIA?11',. ? , ),,..,??,' ,,Q....',i...4
. bombersAIEVO4tRigin6Fiti. a_t_
Oale;2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3
? were flown by Cuban and Eas
.STATINTL
'O. ?
exiles against the cebels.in the
NEWSWEEK
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THE WAR IN VIETNAM
7"4,t'
Yo U
VIET N'g?A
VOL!
ENTERNG
Lctios
190,011,1--N.Y. POOL
'Let Me Make Every-
thing Perfectly Clear'
S ?? P
LA
n the scruffy little capital of Vientiane
I last week, the bars and cabarets were
as merry as usual. A few miles outside
town, a $50,000 Olympic swimming pool
for U.S. Government employees was
., nearing completion. And everywhere the
Laotians continued their languid pace of
life. Most of the time, it was difficult to
believe that Laos was the locus of a
mounting international crisis. Yet, events
in that little Southeast Asian kingdom
clearly presented the Nixon Administra-
tion with some painful problems. Not the
least was how the Nixon Doctrine?with
its principle that the U.S. should avoid
committing ground troops to other na-
tions' internal wars?would work in its
first crucial test. Of equal importance was
'the possibility that the situation. in Laos
might saddle Mr. Nixon with the kind of
credibility gap that afflicted his prede-
cessor in the White House.
It was ironic that Laos was the country
to raise such large issues. For years, the
seesaw skirmishing in Laos has been re-
garded in Washington as a sideshow war,
something to be settled after the blood-
letting in Vietnam came to an end. ("The
situation in Laos is disastrous but not
serious," went the old Washington quip.)
But since the start of the year, the North
Vietnamese, along with their local Com-
munist allies the Pathet Lao, have put a
different cast on things. Mounting a ma-
jor offensive, they swept the U.S.-backed
Laotian Government forces from the
Plain of Jars and by last week threatened
both Vientiane and the royal capital of
Luang Prabang. For the first time since
the 1962 Geneva conference "settled"
the Laotian problem, the Communists
seemed intent not only on regaining lost
ground but on converting their undeni-
able military superiority into solid politi-
cal gains.
This, in leopmvcialifor Retells
the dovecote in Washington. Two weeks
(AiN
(.1.1enicip MOW Nawm
'Withdrawal'
FANCY) TALK
ago, in fact, Mr. Nixon tried to head off
Congressional critics who maintain that
he is leading the U.S. down the road to
another Vietnam. In a carefully wrought
policy, statement issued from Key Bis-
cayne, the President admitted for the
first time that the U.S. was not only
bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail but also
flying air support missions for Laotian
ground forces. But be steadfastly insisted ,
that "there are no American ground com-
bat troops in Laos" and that "no Ameri-
can ? stationed in Laos has ever been
killed in ground combat operations."
Distinction: The evasiveness of the
President's language soon became clear
when The Los Angeles Times reported
that a U.S. Army captain named Joseph
Bush had in fact lost his life during a
battle in Laos. An American adviser to
Laotian Government troops, Captain Bush
was killed in February 1969 fighting off a
North Vietnamese attack on his com-
pound. But when the incident was called
to the attention of the White House, em-
barrassed spokesmen would say only that
the President stood by his statement.
Captain Bush had not been killed in a
"ground combat operation," it was ex-
plained, but had died as a result of
"hostile action"?a distinction that left
many Americans unconvinced.
Inevitably, the episode cast doubt on
Mr. Nixon's candor. And so last week, in
the aftermath of the Captain Bush story,
the White House went out of its way to
salvage its credibility on Laos. First,
spokesmen said that the President had
not known about Captain Bush at the
time of his policy statement. In addition
to Captain Bush, it was then added, at
least. 26 U.S. "civilians" (most of them
presumably CIA agents working with the
both in the air and on the ground?at
about 400.
In line with this new candor, the Ad-
ministration added that, in the future,
casualties in Laos would be made pub-
lic as they occur. It also revealed that
U.S. servicemen stationed in Laos (as
advisers, technicians or attaches) have
been receiving "hostile-fire pay" for some
time past.
But even this effort at forthrightness
hardly yielded the whole truth about the
U.S. involvement in Laos. For one thing,.
military sources admitted that the figures.
were imprecise. And they did not take
into account the many Americans who
have met death in Laos while on secret,
? missions across the border from either
Thailand or South Vietnam. Their op-
erations range from trail-watching and
sabotage to prisoner-snatching and an oc-
casional murder. And it is all very hush-
hush. Many of the infiltrators carry ,
British-made weapons with silencing de-
vices. In some cases, the soles of their
army boots carry a special tread that
leaves an imprint like that of the sandals
worn by the Vietnamese.
Secrecy: Most, if not all, of these in-
cursions into Laos are run by the U.S.
Studies and Observation Group (SOG),
which has its headquarters in a . heavi-
ly guarded and rarely visited building in
downtown Saigon. And there the secrecy
is impressive. Reporters are strictly non
grata, and NEWSWEEK correspondents
were sternly warned last week that de-
tailed reporting on U.S. operations across
the border into Laos would be in con-
travention of "Ground Rule 5." This mili-
ary regulation forbids the press to report
Ion specific "intelligence activities, meth-
ods of operation or specific locations." A
Laotians) have been killed by the enc. possible penalty for violating Ground
my on the ground in Laos, Earlier, the Rule 5 is the i evocation of press credcn- ?
Anacrican ead, captured an missing? n vie dtle operations,
C o
eg2001101/04vOIAJR1r80411t Oiltd01571Mpp
Approved For Release
it was little wonder that a number of
leading Congressional critics were not
satisfied by the President's assurances.
Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield,
for one, repeated his charge last week
that "we arc up to our necks in Laos" and
demanded a withdrawal of all U.S. per-
sonnel. Sen. J. William Fu'bright went a
good deal farther, introducing a "sense
of the Senate" resolution that challenged
the President's constitutional authority to
commit U.S. air or ground combat troops
to the fighting in Laos without Congres-
sional approval. But Mr. Nixon had his
supporters. "November's corning up and
the Democrats have to have something to
talk about," remarked GOP Sen. George
Aiken of Vermont. And Senate Minority
Leader Hugh Scott scoffed: "The Demo-
crats have failed to make an issue out of
Vietnamization. Now they are desperate
to build up Laos as an issue. Why, we
have had more casualties in Guatemala
than in Laos."
Points: Senator Scott notwithstanding,
the situation in Laos held far more perils
for U.S. policy than Guatemala. And the
nature of some of those dangers was
made plain last week when the Commu-
nists launched a diplomatic offensive. In
a "peace proposal" broadcast over Radio
Hanoi, the Pathet Lao offered to negoti-
ate with the government of Premier Sou-
vanna Phouma on what they called five
basic points: a standstill cease-fire, a con-
ference of all political parties on the es-
tablishment of a new provisional coalition
, government, a demilitarized zone in
which the conference would be held, a
mutual pledge against reprisals?and an
end to U.S. "intervention and aggression"
in Laos.
Following up this initiative, Prince
Souphanouvong, titular head of the Pa-
thet Lao, sent a cable to Souvanna
Phouma, his half-brother, urging him to
receive a personal emissary with an im-
portant message. Temporarily thrown off
balance by the surprise proposal, Sou-
vanna?though deeply mistrustful of the
Communists?accepted. In the draft re-
sponse prepared by Souvanna's staff, his
half-brother was addressed correctly as
"Son Altesse" (Your Highness). But Sou-
vanna huffily scratched off the honorific
before sending the cable: "The Prime
Minister will be happy to accept Prince
Souphanouvong's message, the sooner
the better."
Talks: Although a Communist emissary
was due to arrive in Vientiane late this
week, there was considerable doubt in
the Laotian capital that talks with the
Communists held much promise. For
Souvanna is presumably determined to
preserve his control over the govern-
ment, while the Communists want to es-
tablish a coalition that reflects the "new
realities" of the military situation. More-
over, the Communists have demanded
an end to the U.S. air strikes as a pre-
condition for talks, and Souvanna last
week insisted that the air attacks would
be called off onl if the North Vietnam-
ese w "7
itWISr''P r bdtrraf ittg1eW6
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"Let us not talk uniquely about aerial
bombardment," said Souvanna. "The two
things are tied together. In order to re-
move the effect of the bombing, you
must remove the cause of the bombing,
which is the presence of North Vietnam-
ese troops in Laos."
The display of verbal firmness by Sou-
vanna went down well in Washington,
but it was also fully understood that the,
Communists were in an extremely strong
bargaining position. They could, if they
wanted to, overrun the entire country.
And in the circumstances, it is consid-
ered conceivable that Souvanna might
decide to strike a deal with.the Commu-
nists, trading, domestic political favors in
exchange for calling on the U.S. to cease
bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail. If that
Captain Bush: A curious distinction'
should happen, the Communists might
well have the U.S. over a barrel, since it
would be difficult to continue the bomb-
ing if Souvanna wanted it stopped. To
meet such a contingency, in fact, the
U.S. military has been drawing up secret,
plans to halt the strikes against the trail-,
and to make up for the loss with a satu-
ration bombing campaign along the South,
Vietnamese-Laotian border, concentrat-
ing on the approximately 30 points where
the terrain allows the North Vietnamese
to use trucks and other heavy equipment.
How effective that would be in chok-
ing off the flow of Communist troops and
equipment to South Vietnam, however,
is open to considerable doubt. And
should a peaceful settlement be bought
in Laos at the expense of. the U.S. posi-
tion in Vietnam, the result would be a.
damaging setback for the Nixon Doctrine
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23 111prch 1970
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Laos: Old War/ New Dispute
C XCEPT for occasional Communist Warren. Bush was "behind the lines,?.ernment, a peace proposal. It suggested
L patrols that stole to within a few tan-I and therefore a victim only of "hos. talks obout a standstill cease-fire and a
talizing miles of Luangprabang and tile enemy action"; most assuredly, War
_conference of all Lao factions aimed at.
Vientiane, there was little military move- ren said, he was not on a"combat restoring a new coalition government
ment in Laos last week. Exhausted after operation," or in a "combat situation,r.. in Vientiane. There was, of course, one ?
their defeat by Pathet Lao and North ? or "even in combat." Somehow', -of precondition: a U.S. withdrawal from _
Vietnamese troops on the Plain of Jars, course, Bush had won several deco-Laos. Premier Souvanna Phouma said ?
General Vang Pao's U.S.-supported Meo rations, including a posthumous Silver that he was "ready for a cease-fire,"
guerrillas-retired into their mountains Star, for "gallantry in action." arid, :,, but, much to Washington's relief, he re-
to rest and regroup. Almost nothing: his letters to his wife indicate (see fused to discuss even a U.S. bombing
stirred on the ground in northern Laos, box, page 12), 'le would have been cessation until Hanoi agreed to withdraw -
except for some 20,000 Meo, many of the last to ? say that he had not been its still pnacknowledged force of 67,000
-them families of Pao's warriors, who' in a "cornbat situation." troops (by White House accounting) in
began "walking out" of their hillside en- In its eagerness to recoup the situ-.; Laos. These troops. of Course, wcrc ig-
. chives towards the Thai border and rel- ation, the White House hurriedly r-e., norcd in the Pathet Lao proposal.
? ative safety from the new Conimunist?yealed that at least 26 American ci- ' The prince's public line comforted
. push that they fear will come. Edgar' vilians had died one way or another in I Washington, but one high Administra-
flii'iL U.S. aid coordinator in' the Laotian war. They included three: tion official cot:tresses that "we still don't
Laos, estimates that disease or enemy ac-, members of the International Voluntary
tion will take 20% of the Mco ref- Service, a Peace Corps-style group sup.?
ugees during their 15-day march-by-, ported in part by the State Department.
'night, hide-by-day trek west. 1 The others worked for Air America
Despite the lull, the conflict was stilt' the CIA's Asian airline. Moving fur-
the object of fascination and contro- ther, the President ordered U.S. corn.:
.vcrsy, not because of the agonies of mandcrs to report air and ground ca.
the Laotians but because of new dip-. sualtics incurred from hostile enemy'
lomatie maneuvering and the discomfort: action in the Laotian war separately
.of the Nixon Administration. Instead: from the Viet Nam totals, in which
of quashing congressional criticism of they had always been included.
.the U.S. role in the war, the White- Had the Administration been caught,
?House's explanation of the extent and in a deception? Nixon had been gen-
;
nature of the U.S. involvement in Laos uinely unaware of the killing of Cap.
?has only brought on a new dispute. tam n Bush, whose death had been lost
Th Administration's troubles began i the intricacies of casualty bookkeep.
c n
weeks ago, with news of the military re- ing. Nonetheless, it has long been corn-
.
versal on the Plain of Jars. The reports mon knowledge that Americans, military
provided an opening for war critics advisers and specialists, as well as ci-
like Senator George McGovern, who vilins, have died in Laos under enemy:
seized on B-52 rai'ds on the Plain to fire. The credibility flap provided a new,:
charge that "we are going down the irresistible opportunity for congressional
same road in Laos [as in Viet Nam], critics of U.S. Asian policy. The major
and we are doing it in secret." Richard challenge came from J. William Ful-
Nixon's response was swift and appar- bright, chairman of the Senate Foreign
ently candid. On March 6 in Key 'Bis-Relation's?Committee. Last week, in an
caync, he outlined the U.S. role ineffort to maintain congressional control
Laos?never before admitted in detail over the Laotian war, the Arkansas Dem.
by any Administration?as "supportive ocrat introduced a "sense of the Sen-
and defensive." To emphasize the "urn-ate" resolution that the President could
ited" nature of the U.S. role, he stated not employ ground?or air?forces in
flatly that "no American stationed in Laos without "affirmative action" by
Laos has ever been killed in ground coin-Congress. .
' bat operations." At a "backgrounder"' A Hard Choice. A popular and con-
after the Nixon speech, a White House gressional argument over Laos is pre-
aide said that all of some 400 Amer- cisely what the White House wanted to
jeans killed, missing or captured in six avoid. Nixon promised at Key Biscayne
years of war in Laos had been airmen. that there would be no commitment of
As for "advisers," he asserted, their ca- U.S. ground troops to that country,
: sualty rate "is zero." .but airpower is something else. A ma-
last week ran Freelance Journalist Don ,
south on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
namese troops and supplies heading:
bat deaths"? The Los Angeles Times
y .
1
Case closed?or so the Administration jor reason that the U.S. is in Laos is to
i
and forcibly reopened. No "ground cothought. It was, however, immediately eon-
out bombing raids on North Viet-
rn-
'
Trouble on Capitol Hill could se-,
, Schanche's eyewitness account of the riously crimp the Administration's al.
death of one U.S. military adviser, Cap- ready narrow room for maneuver in.
tain Joseph K. Bush Jr.,. during an Laos?a fact that Hanoi and the Pa,
enemy attack on a Laotian army com-i thct Lao seem to appreciate thoroughly.
semantics. 'Nix-
In an intriguing and unexpected dip.
with Schanche's story, White pound in February 1969. Confronted'
lomatic move, Prince Souphanouvong,
aides sought safety in sem-
House DeOggingra the Pathot Lao leader, last week of-
on had bee. ? ed2160ifeeter Vante-
houma. ea r o the t
know what Souphanouvong may he tell-
ing his half brother." Eventually, the
gotian government could bend to Corn-
unist pressure and ask the U.S. to
stop the bombing. In that case, Wash-
ington would face a hard choice. It
could either risk a political outcry by
continuing the raids, or it could stop
the raids and risk giving the North Viet.. -..-
namese the opportunity for still greater '
mischief in the big war next door.
Bulletins from
Bad Guy Land
Captain Joseph Kerr Bush Jr., 25,
the Texan whose death in Laos offi-
cially did not occur in "a combat situ-.
at ion," saw much action nonetheless.
When he arrived in the country in June
196$ as an "assistant military attach?
he was posted to Muong Soui, a key
town now hi Communist hands. Bush's
tour ended eight months later, when a
force of 20 North Vietnamese coin-
mandos attacked his hilltop compound,
a camp ?hoitsing a group of Air Force
radar specialists. The captain died fight-
ing, and was awarded a posthumous Sil-
ver Star. Bush's wile Carol, who lives
in Temple, Texas, with her daughter,
says that her husband "believed in what
; he 'vas doing." As his letters to her in-
dicate. what Bush was doing and see-
ing would not be unfamiliar to his coun-
terparts in Viet Nam.
Excerpts from the letters, made
available to TIME by Mrs. Bush:
24 JUNE, '66. You asked how close Muong
Soul is to Viet Nam?not close at all,
but it is within sight of the Ho Chi
Minh Trail. There is a war going on in
*Laos, and it is difficult to tell who is fight-
ing who.
23 JUNE, 'dB. The Lao government doesn't
really control but about one-half the
country, and they're having to fight for
that. From mountain tops in my area I
can actually see bad guy trucks rolling
Olittailioretfilodatittffholm
II I
Orit.
1/
N:IpisyrsLEsar-Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0
SCIF:NFCTADY , N.Y.
GAZETTE
U ? 55,934
MAR 2 3 Iva
CIA, Army Officers
Re ported elping
!Defend Laos Base
)'
VIENTIANE, Laos (Al') ? The U.S. Central Intelligence
1. Agency, the U.S. Army and neighboring Thailand are directly
involved in defense of the threatened Laotian base, at Long
? Cheng, informed sources said Sunday night.
* * ?x? 0.?
i They said as many as 100 CIA: aerial' observers, gathering in.
/agents, working under the cover. telligence on which to base tac-
of the U.S. Embassy and the: tical ground and air operations.
V
? U.S. Agency for International Sources said these Americans
, Development (AID), are taking, never remain at Long Cheng ov-
: part in the secret operation, ernight, but commute daily,
' training Meo tribesmen as guer.' leaving Vientiane early in the
' rillas in both Laos and Thai- 1 Morning and returning by dusk.
land. ! It is a 45-minute helicopter
It is known that U.S. Army of- . flight each way. '
, ficers directed a massive airlift ' * * *
it of both Laotian and. Thai reipti "We wouldn't ,want the Corn-
forcements into Long Cheng, munists to capture any Amen.
which is the headquarters of ' cans or find any American dead
" Gen. yang Pao's American- ? on the battlefield," one source
trained army of Mea guerrillas explained. Most enemy attacks
and is under heavy North Viet-. on Long Cheng are launched tin-
' namese pressure. R is locatedi der the cover of darkness:
By GEORGE ESPER
heighbors and both coUritries'i
people have blood relations. Thet
volunteers may be cousins 01'1
brothers of Laotians."
Pressed on whether the airlift,
of Thai Troops had taken place,;
he said: "There may be some'
truth in it." But he added: "As
said, these men may be 'volun-f
teers." 1
He also said some Laotian sol-I
diers have "received training in!
Thailand and returned to Laos?
to be advisers and instructors in,
the Laotian army." '
Gen. Surakit Mayalarb, Thai'
army chief of staff, said no Thai!
1 80 miles north of the capital,. North ;Vietnamese hit the lase troops had been sent to Laos.
just below the Plain of Jars,. Tr? , Surakit was reported to have,
flown secretly to Laos twoi
weeks ago for talks on the
,mili-
tary situation with the Laotian.
'premier, Prince Souvanna!
Phouma, and his generals.
* it? *.?
. now held by the North Viet-
namese.
In Bangkok the Thai premier,'
? Field Marshal Thanom Kittika-1
chorn, denied Sunday that two!
Thai army battalions were sent!
to reinforce Long Cheng but ad-!
? mitted that "some volunteers"
? may have gone there.
Estimates in Bangkok of the
number of volunteers, reported-
ly being trained by U.S. Special
? Forces teams, range from 300 to
:12,000. The figure mentioned
t, most often Is 5,000.
1
.1 ? * * *
, Sources in Vientiane said as
; many as 900 Thai troops, includ-
ing an artillery detachment,
?' were flown into Long Cheng,
r mostly from bases in Thailand.
They added that the United
States has been prodding the
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601.11/11111.3
UTICA, N.Y.
PRESS
28,782
MAR 2 3 1970
STATI NTL
Agnew gain Complahn About Media,
Suggesting He Wants to Take Heat Off
Vice President Agnew last week again
attacked the news media, as though he
/had found this to be his best topic and,
therefore, is reluctant to drop it. Instead,
it would seem that by now the country
would be getting awfully sick of the re-
petitive theme.
? ? ?
THIS TIME, MR. AGNEW at least
changed the locale of his complaint. Speak-
ing to a Republican fund raising dinner in
?
the Virgin Islands, he complained that the
nation's news media was more anxious to
attack our military presence in Laos than ?
the Communists' having 67,000 troops
there.
"I'll admit that Pulitzers are not won as
quickly exposing the evils of communism
as they are by discrediting an American
public official," the Vice President said.
Mr. Agnew is sounding more and more
like a run-of-the-mill politician trying to
win notice by exaggerating and distorting.
what he considers a popular theme.
If he were just the sort of politician he
sounds like, instead of fhe Vice President,
his remarks probably would not deserve
comment. But this country should 'be bet-
ter served by a man in his high position.
? ? ? ,
IT IS HARD TO BELIEVE that Mr. Ag-
?
new is not aware that the news media are
more interested in our presence in Laos
than the Communists' because the media
are mainly concerned about our violations
of treaties and our official deception.
We agreed to the Geneva treaty that
guaranteed the neutrality of Laos, yet we V
have fighting men there, many as civilians
under the CIA's cloak of secrecy.
The NorlMeriamese are also violating
the Geneva agreement, as the news media
? have reported. But naturally, immoral acts,
? such as treaty violations or Song My mas-
sacres, by this country are of more' con-
cern to this country's media.
Presumably, if North Vietnam were a
democracy, its media would be more con-
cerned with its illegal acts than with ours.
Mr. Agnew said also that "Innuendos
and smears" against our public officials
appear every day in the American media.
Does he suggest that wrongdoing by our
officials be glossed over, while the media
concentrates on the crimes of North Viet-
namese officials, over whom the voters
of this country have no control?
? ? ?
? THE VICE PRESIDENT certainly must
have a better understanding of our reason
for having a free press even if he appar..I
? ently would like to curb that freedom. /
a
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THE WASpINGTON POST
Approved For Release 2001/i9/9Api W-RDP80-016
STATINTL
*Red Courier
'Takes Plan to
Lao Premier
By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writ" i) (The Pathet Lao rcpresenta-
VIENTIANE, March 22--. Owe also reportedly handed
Premier Souvanna Phouma ,Souvanna two personal letters
' stepped gingerly along the from Souphanouvong, one urg-
' Laotian political tightrope lag the premier to resume
today. talks aimed at reconstituting
He received a Pathet Lao the government and ending
the fighting, and the other ad-
, emissary with a "proposition"
qrom his half-brother, Prince dressed to King Savang Vat-
thana, . pledging Souphanou-
vong's fidelity to the monarch
and urging him to use his in-
fluence to end American inter-
vention in Laos, The Los An-
geles Tithes reported.)
Souvanna's generals are
known to be unhappy about
the exchange ,of contacts be-
tween the premier and Sou-
phanouvong. For today's meet-,
ing, the generals arrived just
35 minutes after the Pathet
? Souphanouvong, for settle-
ment of the war. Then he
, granted an amiable half-hour
'audience to his right-wing gen-
eral staff.
As though to buffer his con-
tacts between right and left,
Souvanna also called on King
Savang Vatthana to transmit
his half-brother's letter.
ISouvanna said later that
, North Vietnam has moved 13,-
000 additional troops into Laos Lao delegation had left.
' and the current Communist of-,, Among those present' were
fensive could be the biggest Generals Kouprasith, corn-
mancier of the region around
Vientiane; Chief of Staff
Oudon Sananikone; Com-
mander in Chief Ouane Rathi-
koune and Souvanna's mili-
tary chief of ,cabinet, Thong-
panh Knoksy. -
As they filed out, Thong-
paph said the meeting had
been called to "examine the
military situation". ;
But it would have been most
unlikely that the conversation
failed to touch on the ex-
change of communications be-
tween the half-brothers who
lead the opposing sides in the
war. ?
Highly placed Lao officials
in private conversation are
voicing concern that the coup
,Cambodia may increase
North Vietnamese military
pressures on the Laotian nor-
tion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail,
apecially if the new Cambo-
stability of Souvanna's govern- , (Ban government seeks to re-
Meat. :, strict Communist use of its
The Pathet Lao?in propos. section of the trail.
als announced nearly two There has also been gossip
weeks ago and presumably de-, ' ?I-discounted in official guar-
tailed in the letter handed ters?of a possible coup by the
right-wing Laotian generals on
the Cambodian model.
U.S. OV-10 light spotter
plane was shot down yester-
day over the Plain of Jars but
the ? pilot escaped uninjured,
the U.S. Command in Saigon
Hanoi has ever launched in the
. neutralist nation, UPI reported.
. [The premier made the re:
, marks in an address commem-
? orating the 20th anniversary
. a the Laotian army Monday.)
.Contradictory accounts were
being circulated over the
status of the battle for the
' strategic base of Long Tieng,
i' operated by the Laotian .gov-
i etnment and the CIA.' ,
1 :The most reliable intelli-
, gence indicated that the battle
i was still in progress, with the
base in government hands and
i reinforcements being rushed
j in from the south. Newsmen
are being confined to Vienti-
ane, where there are no relia-
ble reports from either Lao-
tian or American authorities.
! Within the administratiVe,
capital,. the two chief concerns
are the outcome of the new
peace probe and ,the political
over today by the Communist
' emissary?have raised the pos-
sibility of a cease-fire based
on the withdrawal of Amer--
'can troops and cessation of
the American bombings. But
they kale made noaom it-
ment itkif0 &art
the estimated 50,000 to 67,000
North Vietnamese troops said
T.n.? ;
RDP80-01 601 R0100700040001 -3
NEW yora TIUS 3TATINISL
Approved For Release 200g/21.1911 f99A-RDP8o-u1 6
.-,-; antiwar sentiment and negotii; it suspects a political rather than' .more than 40,000 troops from,
. . .
Indochin. a ,., tions positions of the United a military pur.pose. The North. his soil, it was hoped' that he
? States, And calculating that a Vietnamese already hold the cru- might have some effect.
. Communist victory in Vietnam cial Western half of Laos that , His argument was that If the'
Dpminoes . , is no longer inevitable, the hard-. provides a supply line into South North Vietnamese refused to*
? pressed anti-Communist army Vietnam and they gain few ma- budge, his impatient army, Na.
. Are Falling ... leaders of Cambodia were em.- ? terial advantages from a wider tional Assembly and provincial
,. boldened to overthrow their occupation. ; leaders might seize power and;
o move closer to the "American"
. ,
oscillating Prince and may now,
But by frightening the Thais
But Which help "win" the war .by harassing
, . and American opponents of war I camp.
and evicting the menacing North
The Prince is still not dis-
;trying to strengthen their hand'
, in Asia, they are thought to be 1
counted here as a force in Cam-
Vietnamese forces on Cambodian i
for two possible kinds of nego?', b.sodaiatinonpodloiteiscsn, obtusthathree Senator.
... .* soil. . tiation. First, a tacit deal under ;:i
tr
1 which the United States witarld ' Mike -Mansfield's view that his
The gloomy view, advanced
, downfall would be a terrible;
? .
less openly but ,with almost l' call off the intensive bombing
disaster.
equal vigor, ran about as ,of the Ho Chi Minh supply trail
There is fear that Hanoi might
WASHINGTON?While off in follows: 'through Laos. Second, a better
provoked by the coup into
Moscow and Peking trying to get , While biding its time and bet- : deal in a wider Indochina nego-. be
further encroachments on Cam-
North Vietnamese troops thrdwn. ting on the failure of "Vietna-?? if
, . tiation than they may provoke',
bodian territory, leading to a
? out of his country, Prince Noro- mization," Hanoi has been ,. ."Vietnamization" should de-,
for; wider conflict in which the
? dom Sihanouk finds himself, . shrewdly building up its mill- vel" into a viable policy
St 'through
h i Vietnameset, the
ArmyT.nited staatensd,
thrown out of power instead. At ,. tary, political and psychological.' Washington and Saigon.
, posi ions inboth Laos anCam-, 1..
t' ? L d - To offset these thrusts, the 'might become involved But.
least, he appears to be thrown .1 ?
out. boclia. The inexpensive but wor. Nixon Administration attempted there 'also ? '
ere was a lingering hope
His successors, led by Lieut. ..' risme advance through Laos .senrAl parries. .The most 'thatim... with a more determined'
shocks the Thais and shakes the', Portant was designed to quash antih-Communist regime in Pnom-.
Gen. Lon Nol, assume the Prince's, ,
goals of neutrality and independ- ' antiwar lions in the United! .the ...signs of new antiwar pro- 'vend. , the ground,forces of Cam-
ence, suspend civil rights, obtain . States from their enforced sleep.' test, by explaining the extent :bo ia and South Vietnam, sup-'
an expression of automatic rec- The gradual build-up of North: of American involvement in Laos'
;ported by American air power,
ognition from the United States, Vietnamese ? encampments in ., and also by setting clear limits
, !could effectively deprive Hanoi's'
and lend a willing hand to eager , Cambodia?as near ?as 35 miles' ;t9 it. form of their Cambodian sane.
South Vietnamese troops who '
1.to Saigon?promises a major in-. B-52 Raid tua. , ? .
; 6*
? ? .'' r ' ? ''??-? ''?:;! . ;.-IVIAX FRANICEL
want to fire artillery, into the. vasion after the bulk of the ,
Against the better judgment ; 't ?-? ?? , ... -
?,......1?,........................... ,..x....i
? ranks of the North Vietnamese , American forces are withdrawn''-
, of most of his advisers, Presi-
and Vietcong across their border from the war. The demonstra-
with Cambodia. tion of Washington's inability to i dent Nixon last month also or- !
dered one B-52 bombing raid ,
The North Vietnamese and' repel the threat, will prove be .
Pathet Lao troops. In northern yond doubt that the United ' beyond the Ho Chi Minh Trail,"
'
Laos, meanwhile, continue their'. States cannot long assure the by way of saying that Hanoi
'
, , was . inviting greater bombing ;
slow advance into portions of the stability of Southeast Asia.
rather than less with its offen-'i
. country they have not hitherto The risks an'd opportunities in.,sive. It is recognized through- ?
ccupied. The little MO army the situation seemed in such del-1 'out Washington, however, that 1
organized by the Central Intelli- icate balance that most analysts ; the 'only effective military re-,
gence Agency abandons yet an- found it safest to accept par-; sponse to Communist advances':.,;?
other outpost to them, but the tions of both theories. I. in Laos would be a resumption:
C.I.A. begins to ferry in at least of bombing in North Vietnam? I
? one battalion of regular Thal' Official Consensus
, , a move that is so far deemed .
troops from nearby nervous .
It thus remains ? something . to carry greater risk 'of disaf-.?
? Thailand. The White House says .
the Thai involvement is "limited.PI close to the official consensus ' ?fection at home than the mill-4.
here that the progressive trans- tary value in the war zone.
Two Views ' fer of combat duties to the South , Then came the coup in Cam-1
Vietnamese forces is working bodia. Most officials here were i
.
? No one here doubts any longer well, that it will permit further surprised, though they were not;
that the Indochina dominoes are large troop withdrawals this at -all displeased, by - the over- i .
toppling fast, but hardly anyone . spring and summer and that lia-', throw of Prince Sihanouk. He was'
can reliably tell which way. . noi, while no doubt hoarding its valued as a shrewd though diffi-l?
The cheerful view in Govern- resources for a major effort aft- cult figure on the Indochina.
ment last week went something . er the Americans depart, should 1 scene and regularly looked to as;
.like this: , be in sufficient doubt about the.. akind of weathervane of Airier-.
The allied position in South final outcome to consider serious '
, lean performance. When he re-.
? Vietnam keeps improving .even negotiation as a possible alter-. mulled diplomatic relations with:
as American troops continue to native to continued war. Washington last summer, it was.
be withdrawn. Confronted by the Developments in , Laos are i taken as confirmation that things,
apparent success of "Vietnami- therefore assessed accordinglY.1 in Vietnam were looking'
zation," North Vietnam must Washington is plainly distressed! When he. took off for Mosc up.'
that Ha. Moscow. '
take out its frustrations In Lao, to find tho Communist 'armies'. and Pelt* t demand
threatening a further advance , moving farther across that littlo' noi . b ling cti ? .
thero ,tf),. try ,.to,,stilLeti. up .tho:, kingdom than ow before, 'buto ' I' c?re '''it4I'd.""64
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Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3
COP
Available
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3
Appcoved-FerRelease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601
ST. LOUTS, TIO.
POST-VISFATCH
E - 345,675
S 581,591
MAR 22 1970
..A.511"Aina.
STATINTL
4,1., 7
V CI:
ititainig..es'U.S. Forces:
1:y. RICHARD 11/01)111AN
wvishingtoit Of Om Pnet.liiepritels
WASHINGTON, March 21
AFTER YEARS of .saying It seeks no wider war fICCITiiited-State
finds itself deeply involved in ti.V,Pcii?.?..,7 Iron': in Southeast Asia.
What is mote, certain specific actions :
by the United Slates Government are giv-
- Mg impetus hi the expaenion of n conflict
that already has cost dna conntry nun.?
than 40,000 lives mid dtore than )00 billion
dollars.
The United States was the first nation
to recognize the overthrow of Prince No-
rodom Sihanouk, the erratically neutralist
chief of state in Cambodia, although the
.Department of State de-emphasized the
? action by saying that the change in goy-
- eminent was constitutional and did not af-
fect existing .U.S. recognition. .
President Richard M. Nixon has ac-
,knowled;;ed and justified the open mill-
. tarsi intervention in the war in northern
,
Laos, as well as the intensive U.S. bomb-
'iii;: of North Vietnamese supply routes
. that lead through eastern Laos to South
? Vietnam.
V Two Thai army battalions have been air
/
i iifterrby the United States to Long Cheng,
?, Laos, site of a Central Intelligence Agen-
cy base threatened by, a North Vietnam.
c-.e offensive that already has,tnken the
Plain of Jars. Transportation was sup-
plied by Air America, an airline operated
by the CIA.
TIIESE developments reflect the fact
that the United Stable is embroiled In a
(Ivimflict that has spread from Just South
r.Vietnatn into much of the rest of South-
. cast Asia, threatens to involve still other
nations.of the region .and, critics Com-.
' plain, throws serious new doubt on the
Nixon Adminietration's plan to get the
United States oat of Vietnam,
. In C a in ho d ii despite re formal an-
nouncement by the stew leadera that the
country would contimiC 'ts policy of new
?tralita%, tyro
p s were reported in-
frontier regiane where 40,000 to 5rono
North Vietnamese soldiers have been.
. seeking !.?, ill! t Vary from U.S. bombing
raids is VI,. ewer.
A sieriificarit qtrtiori is whether the
new Cavil-a:filen gra eremeet will seek no.
''tively to push the North Viet no me a e,
forces across the ramarked border and
deny them Y-V1501011ed- for.Rele
t-Tlowever, this raises the rirther guts'.
tion whether Cambodia's 35;000-man army
? can do the job, even" with the occasional
help it already has begun getting from
South Vietnamese artillery along the bor-
der.
At some point there lies the possibility
that Cambodia will ask for a renewal of
the U.S. military aid that it accepted until
0. 1963.
Informed sources say that indigenous
paramilitary groups led by CIA agents,
sometimes called White Star teams, have
continued to operate in Cambodian fron-
tier regions in efforts to check the flow of
men and supplies along infiltration routes
Into South Vietnam.
THE SAME sources consider it unlike-
ly, although not beyond possibility, that
CIA agents and funds breved in the over-
throw of Sihanouk. Cr ,'.. ig doubt on this
possibility is the faet het there are only
. 11 persons on the f.,a' of the U.S. Embas-
sy at Phnom Pen:. F .al only four or five
other American per. ument residents in
the country. Sizable '..IA operations usual-
ly are based in a i S. Embassy and re-
quire large numbe.,a of resident Ameri-
cans, Government officials and private
citizens to provide "cover" for undercov-
er ngents. ? ?
Whether the United Stater; helped engi-
1 ;leer .Sihmiouk's overthrow, the develop-
meld' there opens Cambodia as another
possible ilIVF10. for the widening struggle
for control of Southeast Asia, As a start-
er', It presenteltn upp 'nullity to open an-
other front against the North Vietnamese.
Apparently President Nixon will face an
eventual choice between helping?Cambod?
la retain a role as a neutral buffer state
or trying to coax it toward the role of
military ally against North Vietnam,
outside military intervention in Leos?
by bath the United States and, the North
Vietnarneeo--has been an open secret for
veers. Each saw an advantage in with-
holding public neknowledeement of its ac-
tivities in Lana and in seeking to maintain
the form if tint the substance of the 1962
C
A RECENT dispatch ti ern Vientiane by
Ian Wright of the Manchester Guardian
shed new light on what was going on in
the Plain of Jars in 1901 and 151;3, when
the Communist Pathet L. a, and it; North,
Vietnamese allies held the area tuelth
Ii nited State8 was conducting "recon-\
naissaece' flights" over the plain, ostensi-
bly to gather evidence?of Conimunist vio-
lations of the 1962 agreement.. ?
Wright spoke at length with refutTes
from the area who laid been evacinted
last 'multi, from the path of the Contain-
'nisi advance.
"Th say that they are now happy would
be an overstatement, but they appear to
he prolnundly relieved," hi' writes. "In et-
feet, they have come out of hell; Their
? , ,
hell was not the overweeniag Pathet Lao ,
regime, which they found onerous enough ,
and disliked, but the continent's atell of
the bombing?most of it by American jet !
aircraft.
"They lived on the cast side of the
Plain of Jars, and since 1965 they have..
been subject to raids. In 1961 and 39691 the.
raids got worse. In the last months before.,
they Were 'liberated,' they were com-
pelled to live in caves, hardly daring to ,
'come out into the daylight for fear of the
bombing." ? .
WRIGIU concludes thn. the villagers'
alumina; completely dis1il-o/e4 tint U.S.
r40r4 thettit aircraft made only armed
reicietra ssanae tiat;lits at the request of
the IWO Ireernment and fired only !
If fireciarpoe. ? .
Thailai. !'s Vt, '7:lat In the war is not
a new de ve 'ear. ( it is becoming
more open. L"ia '.e. "at 'ears, there was
no official wm. ths U.S. air bases in
Thailand were :ne raids on North!
Vietnam and the fie C?"1 Minh trail. When .
it was ,revealed that 'I ...it artillery and
communications units were dreseed in
Inatian army abitin?nis and moved across
the Mekong Illaibr to fight in Laos, the re-
obit was ilenied by' the That government
id *Amy of indignation.,
ItPSAILPVIWTOMP 01601R000700040001-3
,
Approved For Release apyallai ?
co
Der',
22 March 1970
?
0-016?1RC
,7
G p' Over
:Secret Casualties
? By Patrick J. Sloyan
Washington Bureau
WASHINGTON ? To stra- ?
Logic planners, Laos is not a
country. It is a weakly
defended corridor for
Chinese or North. Vietnamese
troops seeking the prizes of
Southeast Asia ? Thailand,:
Cambodia, South Vietnam.
''But to Americans there
now or who have served
there in the past, Laos seems
more a comic opera where
the names of leaders have a
burlesque flavor and the sol-
diers tend to aim high in
hopes the enemy will return
the favor.
To some critics of Presi-
dent Nixon's current Laotian
policy, the Oregon-size land-
locked country is the breed-
ing ground for another mili-
tary commitment like Viet-.
nam.
The alarm has been sound-
ed by those in Congress who
have been watching U.S. in-
volvement in Laos for more
than 12 years. "Up to our
necks" in Laos, according to
Senate Democratic leader
Mike Mansfield.
But finding out what is
really going on in Laos is no
simple thing, as the Presi-
dent will tell you. His Key
Biscayne statement aimed at
curbing growing American
concern about Laos was di-
luted by inaccuracy.
'Inaccurate'
"No American stationed in
Laos had ever been killed in
ground combat operations,"
Nixon said. Despite careful
word'ng to avoid deaths of
Americans from the air war
over Laos, the flat assertion
proved inaccurate.
Newspapers were quick to
report that more than 12
Americans had been killed in
overran a rent tvic
15C8 wheA
Laos that helped bombing
raids on North Vietnam.
The debate over Nixon's
statement and some White
House back-pedalling tended
to cloud one of the most de-
tailed accounts ever of U.S.
involvement in Laos.
' Of the 1040 Americans in
. Laos gett in g U.S. govern-
ment money, 320 are civilian
and military personnel en-
gaged in a military advisory
or training activity, Nixon
said.
Another 323 are what Nix-
on called "logistic" person-
nel. "There are no American
ground combat troops in
Laos," he said.
While it does not 'seem like
Much, Nixon 's disclosures
were substantial, considering
Laos is a "secret" war for
the United States. ?
At the Def ense Depart-
ment, briefings for newsmen
on Laos are nonexistent.
Trying to hurdle the Wash-
ington barrier by going to
Laos has been fruitless.
Handout Battles '
From Vientiane last week,
Washington reporter James
McCartney said everything
was classified, even Nixon's
statement on Laos. "If re-
porters demand to go places
and see things, they don't get
far. Not without an ,escort.
Some even have been arrest-
ed."
Pentagon reporter Fred
Hoffman of the Associated
Press recalled his stay in
Laos. "I never met anyone
who had seen a battle in
In September, a Commu-
nist-striking force of 3500 /;
troops began an offensive,
overrunning eighty villages
in Northern Laos. In Decem-
ber, the first 'U.S. Military ?
Advisory Group arrived in
Vientiane.
It was disguised as the -
"programs evaluation o f f-
ice" (under the State Depart- ,
ment's AID pro gram) to ,
skirt charges of violating the I
Geneva accords.
Between 200 and 300 Amer-
ican military men, under ,the
command of Brig. Gen. John
A. Heintzes, were dropped
from the active lists of the
Defense Department to serve,
as the civilians in Laos.
These American soldiers In
civvies wer e training the
'Royal Laotian Army to han-
dle attacks by Communist-
connected Pathet Lao forces
and North Vietnamese!
, troops.
? U.S. military advisers are
not having much success. 1
The trouble is the "live-1
and-let-live" attitude of Lao-
tian troops who, according to
U.S. soldiers, are "about as
bloodthirsty as an American
Boy Scout."
The 1962 Laotian agree-
ment barred future foreign
,military involvement, it was
promptly ignored by North
Vietnam. Central Intel.:
tence Agency (CIA) activities
I increased.
Along with the Green Beret
I Special Forces of the Army,'
CIA employes use undeter-
mined amounts of money,
Laos. As far as reporters ,equipment and time to im-?
were concerned, these bat- prove the quality of Laotian
ties were fought by handout forces.
statements from opposing As the war started to build
forces." in Vietnam, it tended to slow:
. in Laos dates back to 1054 raids on Laos were aimed at
U.S. military involvement in Laos. Most U.S., bombing:
' and the final loss of face by Hanoi supply ?lines to South
the French at Dien Bien Phu :Vietnam. Btit U.S. training
e l2&O 193oh 00A04411418044001,4R000700040001 -3
colonialrole a e n aos, it - ? u? -
was replaced by U.S. mili-
tarv aid.
STATI NTL
.-----,
! ' assume that Prince Norodom Silia?
\--- Donk'', overthrow was just a lucks'
a:eistatt for the United States.
Way hack in 1966, the agency
? was accused by some watchdog
" Anwrican Seniors of supporting
? Cambodian rebels w ho opposed the
. Prince ? an accusation that was
widely trumpeted about South-East
.. ?Ada, where the C.I.A. is credited
with having spies in every town and
In eery Government.
? It probably does.
? While the super-spy agency has
made 2rOteccinc mistakes over the
past lo 'cars, it has also scored
isome brilliant successes and, under
. the enthusiastic support of Presi-
dent Nixon, C.I.A. director Rich-
ard Helms and his world-wide net-
work of spies arc doubtless more
powerful than ever.
Charges that they had meddled
far too much in Asian polities
cued the C.I.A. men to lie low
1 for some time, hut it was obvious
i even to a reporter on a brief visit
; to South-East Asia this month that
: the C.I.A. was "gung-ho" again.
Transport nnd passenger
V. plaoes or Air America lite.,
; which is run as a C.I.A. sub-
sidiary. are to be seen in Thai-
--7?? '' land. Laos and South Vietnam,
Approved For Release 2001/911/91:AgA-RUP130-10716.01
22 mar 1970
6.4 ,Cr""7=47. 4.1.1.4.Z.X..117Lat," alaal A.A.% %a d 16?0111.1,01d411111,
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ii)67C1
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%a 'a el) fiardtme?
C. I. ai? iEs boa
=a7=3:nii
AFTER several years of wait,
ing in the shadows? Ameri-
ca's Central Intelligence Agency
may be fully operational again.
This week's incredible coup in Cam-
.
whiat will have such far-reaching con-
, sequences throuQh the entire Asian theatre,
had the stamp ol the C.I.A. at ils most pro-
fessional.
Of course, there will be no DM-
eat detail on the C.I.A. rule. hut it
would he naive in loday's world to
11 ? ? .
..0,704-1:11,
? ?;1?1??? . ? ? ?????;eir".? .1;
? 4:t4;ig
4 111,4_ .4. 74+1040 ? 4474, I
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a.
b,, ? t
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, ? , : '
, ?
tf",??? *
-t; 0.!",
g".11."."'
? ?MA. ?frii!
' ?
t ?
-'?;',???J ?.??';V:L
?
, r ?
C.I.A. chief Richard Helms ? more powerful
.
than ever
?;?'
. ? ? .
STATINTL
IN????????moommowimum'immaillo;
From PETER
M1CHELMORE
in New York
and it is common knowledge that
titeat aircraft are used to more
anent', and weapens ft MON
PribleCts?
. '?
?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 ;.,CIALR,D980L016ortk0007cfedittoet-3
TiE WASIIINGTON POST
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 ? CIAIIIAFiVA1
2 2 MAR 157u
Laos: War in 1\orth, Par
By Laurence Stern
Wsshington Post Foreign Service mained publicly silent. He
VIENTIANE, March 21 may not remember too kindly
k
Communist troops today took
the deposed Prince Sihanouk's ?
bes of
control of the important gov- ji at him as a 'puppet"
ernment supply base of sam the "American imperialists."
i'.Thong and advanced within a There have been ,some ru-
I mile of Long Tieng, headquar- mors of 'a "CambOdian solu-
+ ters of Gen, yang Pao's clan- tion" in Laos by the right ,
; destine army of Mco ,tribes-J wing, and one press service to. ?
men. night reported that Souvanna'
But as news of the Commu- has moved a special Unit of
nist's successes reached Vien- troops into the capital to ward
tianc, a formation of Royal Lao off a rumored coup.
soldiers paraded on the Boule-? But a 'spokesman for Sou-
yard of a Million Elephants vanna denounced the report as
'here to the somber strains of completely false and insisted
the French Foreign Legion on a retraction. Well-informed
march. They were rehearsing observers here' are highly
for Monday's Army Day eele- skeptical of any Such move on
brations. the part of rightist leader
This was one of the small Prince Boun Oum.
ironies of the muddled state of Laos and Cambodia
t affairs in Laos today. Rumor ?
.?,and speculation hung like the "The attitude now is to rally
f' pervasive dry season haze round the flag," said one
over the capital where, as one knowledFable foreigner. ;
t foreign diplomat put it, "It is not a case of Laos be-
"things are confusing enough coming 'Cambodia," said an-
when they are quiet."
; other long-time resident." It is
As a counterpoint to the a case of Cambodia becoming
military action, a new install-
?
meat began unfolding today in
' the peace probe?the first in
, more than four years?be-
tween Pathet Lao and govern-
ment forces. ?
; An emissary arrived last
night with a letter from Pa-
, thet Lao leader Souphanou-
? vong to ? his half brother,
_
de in,
Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma, with supposedly con-
crete proposals for a settle-
.rnent.
Dramatic Arrival
? The arrival of the emissary,
.Col. Pradith Thiengthan, by
;air from Hanoi, came off as a
stagey piece of international'
melodrama.
? Although the contents of
the letter he carried in a brief-
case remained secret, highly
placed government officials
here were reported to be pes-
simistic over the immediate
prospects for negotiation.
Still, the fact that the two
sides are finally in contact
holds out some long-term
hope. Last year Souphanou-
vong spurned a peace-feeler
from Souvanna transmitted !Vve.f?.1P,Stqcik.4ong, Tiara and4
through Soviet Ambassador,
Victor 1Winin.
The impact of the coup in,
darnhodia is still another im- ,
ponderable in this volatile'
mix. Souvanna was said to ho!
privately pleased at the devel_L-
opment Apporweel6oreRelease 2001/03/04 : C
,
?
Sam Thong, the abandoned
U.S.-operated supply base 10
miles to the northwest.]
If Long Tieng falls, as it
may in the mit week, it
would be a serious blow, both I "There are no Thai troops in
to the prestige of Gen. yang 'Laos," authoritative sources in
Pao and to the war effort, Vientiane said, backed up by a
since the base houses an air-
strip and the elaborate com-
munications center that is
used for air strikes and
ground operations against the
Communist forces.
Sleep Elsewhere
American Army and Centra
Intelligence Agency advisers
assigned to Long Tieng have
stopped sleeping in the town
during the past week to avoid .
the risks of death or capture.
Should the base fall, the
Meo general would have to
fall back and establish 'a new
command :Center. But it would
by no-meatts end the desultory
war that has see-sawed across
was called to a government of-
'Laos for nearly 20 years. fice and asked who his sources
The government has moved
of information were. He re-
in reinforcements, however
,fused to name the sources, the
' ' AP said and the government
South
simultaneous statement from
Bangkok.
Laotian officials admitted
there were some Thal military
officers in Laos but said they
had been sent there as advis-
at the request of the Leo-
n government.
The denials followed press
reports Friday that two battali
Ions of Thai troops were at the -
base. They were flown there, ? *, `? ???--
by Air America transport'
planes, sources said.
- The Associated Press, which;
initially reported the presence'
of Thai troops, said yesterday
its correspondent in Vientiane
Cr
Laos." .; and the outcome of thd battle: then denied the report, add-
: of Long Tieng has by no' jag, "A warning will be made
The military.' situation, ? means been decided yet. to the representative of the
meanwhile, is highly decep- Meanwhile the state of af- Associated Press." ?
tive. With the exception of the fairs in Laos was best summed
battle-at Sam Thong and Long'. up by the ? cable one corre-
Tieng, there is very little war spondent here received from
in progress at the Moment. his home office. "Don't bother
Many encounters between filing," it said. "The story is.
Communist and government too confusing."
.
?
reported?often turning, upon, Nations Deny Thais' I The Thai volunteers there
I are of Laotian stock, speak
ti int
troops are being grossly over-, '
Being Used in Laos .! Lao and once in Laos would
examinaon, o minor k
sirm-I i
men. ? From News Dispatches . be indistinguishable from a
ishes between handfuls of'
. Laotian soldier, Bangkok .
The chief casualties of the ' 'Both the Laotian and Thai sources reported. ?
war at the moment are the: governments yesterday denied
more than 40,000 villagers who i reports that Thai troops had, Thai volunteers' pay, re-;
are being evacuated from the been sent as reinforcements to, ported to be met by the U.S.
I
vicinity of Sam Thong and: the Laotian s.hase at . Long government, ranges up to $250:
Long ',hong by foot in the face! TOntif? ...%..'......', :?:1/41?;,:..e.%?,.....,?,-...1:..,,;. a month, compared with nor-
of the Communist advance. ,i ' mal pay of $6. The volunteers'
Attack Long Tieng , reportedly resign from the
Thai army and then are said,
[North Vietnamese forces at- to be trained by U.S. Special
tacked Laotian government' Forces before being sent in
positions today on Skyline units to Join up with the Lao-.
Ridge, about two miles north, army..
of Long Tieng, the Associated, One source in Vientiane,
P'ress reported. . .
: ,[Long ? Tieng is . 80 miles
According to AP, soldiers in
the tlai 2d Army in northeast
Thailand have been volunteer-
ing for duty in Laos in large
numbers.
_
. ?
nort:h of Vientiane. The ridge ,
a.
'
said the arrivals from Thai-
land included Thai artillery-
.men. While never officially
confirmed, Thai artillerymen
were reported to have en%
gaged in the battle for Muong
Soul at the western edge of
the Fhtin of Jars list June.
IA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3
9
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601
BIRMINGHAM, ALA.
NEWS
MAR 2i 1970
E - 179,129
S ? 219,530
The'
STATI NTL
ig Lie In Asia
Sen. Fulbright, in his usual broad-
minded approach to such questions,
iI
said right away that he was willing
to assume "on general principles" '
that the American .LLA,.Liad a hand
In the Cambodian developments.
Others in the American peace bloa
made it sound as if, because an anti-
Communist government seems to
have taken over, the cause of peace
has suffered a setback, for which
? U. S. militants are to blame (or at
; least will applaud). .
? Similarly, in Laos, they view with
alarm the U. S. involvement there and
' try to make it seem that we have
, launched an aggressive campaign to
control the country?while they
rarely Aeknowledge the long-atanding,
presence of thousands of North Viet-
namese soldiers in Laos in violation
? of the Geneva accords, and never
point out that our involvement in
'Laos is directly in response to re-
:? quests by the legitimate 'Laotian
, government, which is fighting for its
life.
We are most reluctant to tag critics
of U. S. policy as un-American?but
some go beyond the bounds of honest?
'criticism. It is impossible to conclude.
? anything but that their activities are
? anti-U. S. national interest, and to
' assume that since they know better,
their distortion of the facts underly-
ing U. S. involvement and activities ?
in Southeast Asia is deliberate. ,
Moreover, they accuse the U. S. of
refusing to , negotiate seriously at
Paris, when the truth is , . . well,
listen to this from this week's session'
of the peace t,alks. The North Viet
-
mese delegate Is sneaking: ? ?
'OA ,C :long, time, nothe United
,
States has continually acted to in (
timidate and violate (Cambodia'
sovereignty and its territory in the '
hope of sapping its independence and
neutrality."
The truth is that the Viet Cong and
North Vietnam have literally occupied
portions of Cambodia for, years, using
the areas as sanctuaries for their
aggression in South Vietnam?this is
the very issue Cambodians riote ?
about last week, sacking the North
Vietnamese and V. C. embassies and
eventually bringing about the ouster
of Sihanouk.
"The United Sates is thus aiming r;
to make Cambodia into a second Laos
or South Vietnam. It is perfectly
or that the Nixon administration, ;
in order to save the defeat in Viet- ?
nem, is not only escalating in La03,
but is seeking moreover to expand 1
the war to the entire Indochinese ;1
peninsula, thus gravely threatening
peace in all Southeast Asia."
?
Get that. The U. S. is escalating
the war in Laos. The fighting there
is the result?the whole. world knows
this, and it is inconceivable that mem- ;
; bers of the United States Senate don't
know it?of North Vietnamese armed
? invasion of Laos, which the legitimate '??
government of Laos is resisting.
?
How can you talk, much less nego-
? tiate with people who brazenly, with,
out batting an eyelash, turn the truth
around 180 degrees and swear by it?
The bitterest pill of all ..is that some
influential people in our own country,
wittingly or unwittingly, encourage
? .them by. leading people to believ
that their bare-faced lies about th
? United States of Ain, oriSsea a11eged,
r"imPeFhnisqITI7trui?
,
Approved For Release 2001/03104: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3
. - ..1?? I ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ???-?
Approved For Release 2001/Mir:v166(12RDP80-01601R00
2 1 MAR 1970 STATINTL
rOF CIA AGNT, PoING A AGENc
VEVELoPmENT MEMaERs AIZE RECRUITING ,K TWANG TROOP6 IN LAoS
kutiln5P5 ESGS Y FOR INTERNATIoNAt.
7141,, il,"ti?
REmEMBERt.
IF ANVoNE
ASKS, I'M AN
AGR(CULITRAL
ADVISOR
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001ifitioedA-RDP80-01601R01111
2 1 MAR 1970
I irt, 0
E'qii Li 13S
far
!LID
.? Daily World Foreign Department
Peace proposals from the Lao
Patriotic Front were brought last
night to Vientiane "Royal Lao'?
capital, by LPF Col. Pradit.
Thi-
engthcm, whose plane reached
the heavily-guarded Wattay Air-
port near Vientiane as small
LPF patrols were reported about
five miles away.
Co. Pradit was greeted by Col.
Soth Petrasy. the LP' representa-
tive in Vientiane.
Pradit was the first LPF offi-
cial to make a public visit to the
1 Lao capital since 1963. when the
U.S. CIA sabotaged the coalition
government and drove the :LPF
out. Only a small LPF delega-
tion under Col. Soth remained in
Vientiane under conditions re-
sembling permanent siege.
LPF troops were reported to
LI
raiT? Dir3 CI?
cll Ll?171C]
Lib 11= C" 'COS
witnin two miles oi Long
Cheng, headquarters for the CIA-
supported clandestine army of
General yang Pao. The battle for
LongCheng shaping up could de-
termine control of northeast Laos.
Long Cheng's sister base of
Sam Thong. six miles to the
northeast, reportedly was recap-
tured yesterday by CIA forces,
but later reports said no planes
could land there because its air-
port was under fire. CIA rein-
forcements pouring into the Long'
Cheng-Sam Thong, area, 75 miles
northeast of Vientiane, were de-
scribed by a UPI correspondent
as "mercenaries trained in Thai-
land."
The LPF radio earlier broad-
cast peace proposals by Prince
Souphanouvong, head of the LPF
Central Committee, which called
n- a halt to U.S. bombing and a
,eneral cease-fire in Laos.
Cambodia events
Saigon. puppet Lieutenant-
t?:;eneral Do Cao Tri gloated on
TV yesterday, that "Communist"
forces will be "annihilated" in
Cambodia, and said the Cam-
bodian National Assembly's oust-
of Prince Norodom Sihanouk
- ',is chief of state this week will
prove "very beneficial." 'Lt.-Gen.
Tri commands the Saigon forces
in the 11 provinces bordering
Cambodia.
Sihanouk is still in Peking arta
has said nothing further about his
vow last ? Tuesday to return to
Cambodia even if he faces arrest.
The new governmerst of armed
forces commander General Lon
Nol said yesterday: "Our army
must suppress by armed actions
all methods which Sihanouk could
provoke in attempting to make
use of the legality which he no
longer has." " ? ?
Phnom Penh, the Cambodian
capital, is still full of heavily-
armed troops, and at least five
tanks surrounded the National As-
sembly building. The Assembly
suspended, the Cambodian con-.
stitution Thursday and grant-
ed "full power" to Gen. Lon Nol.
Cheng Heng, the pro-U.S. mil-
lionaire acting as head of state,
will be confirmed in office to-
morrow by the Assembly. The
third member of this triumvirate
is Prince Sink Matik, a deputy
premier who is a member of the
rival Sisowath branch of the Cam-
bodian royal family.
Gen. Lon Nol is known as .a
conservative, pro-U.S. officer who
worked closely with the U.S. mil- ?
itary mission- ?in Cambodia in
1955-43. - ? '? .
'
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160
NATIONAL JOURNAL
21 Mar 1970
rap in Cans: The Senate Foreign Re:
lations Committee March 13 met in
closed session to receive a briefing on
the Agency for International Devel-
opment mission in Laos from Central
Intelligenc.e Agency Director Richard
M. Helms. ?
STATINtL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP.80-01601R000700040001-3
?
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2064/1/91MRDP80-016011
???????????
A Washout
'I'AId . for development does not usually buy depend-
able friends," remarked the Lester Pearson commission,
which World Bank president McNamara had set to
studying the problems of poor countries. It can even
i. lose them, for instance by being a cover for the CIA;
\i in Laos, CIA men pass as the Agency for International
Development's "Rural Development Annex." President
Nixon's own commission on foreign aid, appointed last
September, ignores such unpleasant facts but does
propose dismantling AID and replacing it with a new
US development bank and other ' new institutions,
topped by a coordinating International Development
Council with a high-level chairman in the White
House. What would be achieved thereby is hard to say.
The Pearson report wanted aid increased to achieve a
six percent annual growth rate for developing coun-
tries. The Peterson Report - Rudolph A. Peterson is
president of the Bank of America and 'could be the aid
man in the White House - is coy about both funding.
and targets. Its proposals could be a first step toward
Senator Fulbright's goal of internatidnalizing foreign
aid; on the other hand the report upholds bilateral aid,
and says tartly that "the international organizations
will have to take a less parochial view of their
. mission."
Senator Fulbright has condemned bilateral aid for
"becoming a vehicle for deep American involvement in
. areas and issues which lie beyond both our vital inter-
ests and our competence." The Peterson report says a
chief barrier to development is "unresponsive social and
political systems." But by this it doesn't seem to mean
- the Thieu regime, Chiang Kai-shek, or Greek and Latin
American juntas. The. report expects that military aid
to that sort of regime will go up not down, and it
proposes bigger loans to Latin America even while
admitting that these countries have what it delicately
calls "a capital outflow" - the top fellows stash their
boodle in ,Swiss accounts.
The US is providing as much development aid as all
other assisting countries lumped together. Addition-
ally, US military aid runs almost $3.5 billion a year,
including Vietnam, and the report says that "as the
United States reduces its forces overseas, Increased
. security assistance may be needed for a time, to cushion
' the effect and to improve local security capabilities."
What that could mean can be measured by the yard-
stick of what, according to the report, happens now:
Washington not only provides the arms but pays for
their operation and maintenance; in addition "US
military missions do most of .the detailed logistical
planning . . ." Does the Peterson report request Mr.
Nixon forthwith to butcher the sacred animal? On the
contrary, it objects to Congress's attempted curbs on
I FIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3
United States in. a better position to work out with
those countries, on a mature parnership basis, military
equipment expenditure policieL, . ." Peterson is going
to be a very popular fellow in Athens, Rio de Janeiro
and Bangkok.
Still,' the bleaker side has to be faced up to. The
report concedes that developing countries are neck-
deep in debt and that some of this can be blamed on
"excessive military purchases." The debt actually adds
up to a staggering $50 billion, and the cost of merely
servicing it is increasing thrice as fast as the debtors' ,
earnings are rising. So far, the problem has been kicked
under the rug by "rescheduling .the debt of countries
about to default," in other words not embarrassing
them by asking for the Money. Fearing this can't go
? on, the report suggests as a partial answer further doses
of lending but on softer terms, by the proposed US
International !Development Bank, using appropriated
-money to subsidize its loans. There is a better recipe:
ruthlessly pruning credit for arms, and handing the
American foreign aid contribution to the World Bank,
its International Development Association, and other
such international financial bodies.
I
Approved For Releasen20011013= : CIATFelPtil-01 6
21 Mar 1970
The Nixon Watch
did, with his one and on
peace in Laos.
? 7 ---i-rc,--7(---- J.--,, 7
Much thought also went into the form of the an-
C.? .L. nouncement and the extent to which Nixon would per-
sonally identify himself with 'it. He could have deliv-
Enormous care and effort went into the preparation of.
ered the whole on national television, as he did his
the "precise description of our current activities' in,
November 3 speech on Vietnam. He could have record-
Laos" that Mr. Nixon submitted to the American pub-
cd and filmed parts of it for radio and television, as he
/ lic on. March 6. He got the assent of the National
,
v Security Council to a degree of disclosure that he and sometimes does with quite minor statements. He did
-
two of his predecessors, Presidents Kennedy and John-. neither. He postponed the statement until .he had_ar -
son, had not previously considered to be in the na-
rived and was settled at his Florida retreat on Key
tional interest. Nixon then assigned to his assistant for Biscayne for a long (Friday-Sunday) weekend. He
national security affairs, Henry A. Kissinger, the task remained in seclusion when his staff issued a written
of making certain that the disclosure was in fact pre-
statement in his name and followed it with the kind of special, though by now hardly unusual, background
sible criticism on the grounds of inaccuracy or deceit.
. cise if not complete, wholly credible, beyond any pos-
briefing at which reporters are exposed to the guidance
'
a
Kissinger undertook the task with characteristic and and wisdom of the highest available "White House of-
ferocious zeal. He warned the Departments of State ficials." The reporters present are not supposed to
Jand Defense, the military services, the CIA, the aid translate this into "White House official," but some do.
agency, the several subagencies that participate in The central purpose of the statement and of the
clandestine operations in Vietnam and Laos that the
supplementary briefing was to put to rest "grossly in-
officials who provided him With requested data, would accurate" reports and "intense public speculation" to
:
be fired if any of the information turned out to be in-
the effect th# "the United States involvement in Laos
complete, inaccurate or misleading in any way. Every
has substantially increased in violation of the Geneva
American who could be fairly said to be "stationed in Accords, that .American ground forces are engaged in
Laos" was to be identified, his or her activities were to combat in Laos and that our air activity has had the
be precisely defined, and military operations, air and
effect of escalating the conflict." Mr. Nixon acknowl-
.ground, conducted in and over Laos were to be report-
edged that "our air activity" has increased, both to in-
ed to him in equally meticulous detail. Kissinger and hibit North Vietnam's reinforcement of its units in
his staff had access to the secret testimony recently ?South Vietnam over the Ho Chi Minh trails through '
taken by Senator Symington's subcommittee on the
northern Laos, and in direct support of Laotian govern-
, '
Laos involvement, and took special care that the figures ment forces fighting North Vietnamese and Laotian
?
and assertions of fact incorporated in the Nixon state-
Communist forces in Laos. This the United States
ment should conform with the Symington record,
would continue to do, along with the supply, train-
when and if a sanitized version of it is published. ing and field support of "regular and irregular Laotian
Equal care attended certain corollaries. The one new
forces" so long as this was "necessary to protect Amer-
and positive action that the President and his advisers .jcan lives in Vietnam and to preserve a precarious
could think of, apart from the factual disclosure, was but important balance in 'Laos" ? and also necessary,
an appeal to Soviet Premier Kosygin to join British the President said, "to prevent the recognized Laotian
Prime Minister Wilson in working with other signa-
government from being overwhelmed by larger Corn-
tories of the 1962 Geneva Accords for restoration of munist forces dominated by the North Vietnamese."
the terms that then, in theory, guaranteed the peace
But the major intent of his statement and of the brief-
and neutrality of Laos. Wilson and Prime Minister ?
er's amplification was to minimize the American in-
? , Souvanna Phouma of Laos had already made the same volvement in ground combat in Laos. Of a total of
request, without effect. The United States had pre-
1040 Americans stationed in Laos, in direct govern-
viously refused to formally join or support such re-
ment employ, or on contract, 320 were military advisers
quests to the Soviet Government, in connection with
and trainers, 323 were suppliers, and (the briefer said)
_
the Laos and Vietnam conflicts, in the belief that the alittle over 200 of these were military personnel.
Soviets would refuse and that it was idle to waste what Three sentences in the Nixon statement drove home
the point: "There are no American ground combat
goodwill there was between Washington and Moscow
on a predictably vain gesture. Given the present deci-
. troops in Laos. We have no plans for introducing
round combat forces into Laos," and ? in an assertion
sion to make the gesture, the normal course would g
have been to forewarn the Soviet Government of the
that Kissinger had worked hard and carefully to docu-
public announcement. This was not done before the ment beforehand ? "No American stationed in Laos
morning of March 6 because, if. the request had been. has ever been killed in ground combat operations."
privately rejected before it was announced, the Presi-
This was Nixon's only reference to American casual-
dent couAlWilickvPiipEceE Be haasetaNadinIC4 il
:tticetoFklMateisigilj i
iykihotkitbriefer
to ivulge, wit ,a goo tr #Purn-birfig ar1 ,3 correc-
continued
THE NEW YORKER
21 mar 1970 STATINTL
-016,01
Lilfrpy,e
) I Li4 Frrorri killeavisik,3,ONTFR 80
ciffild he closed (Lawn, but the counter-
, ,g
NIAR1/4.4 I 13 but the naming of some of the, fronts. insurgents being trained by 'the C.I.A.
i it. nit Ito cr, who gen- In getting this avowal, Senator Vol- don't appear to be putting their training
L....) erally fears the worst atid is geo- bright scored a double pers(mal tri- to much use, and it isn't 17kely that we
erallv confirmed in his fears, now limph. Ile is opposcd to, military oper- would stop bombing the I ill Chi Minh
has it on the higlicst alit Iii thot 'the atiinis in Southeast Asia hee;luse he Trail because of any change in Laotian
Cent ml I'nciligi'iiCC Agcncv is in volved thinks them immoral and 'futile and he administrations. If economic and mai-
in in affairs in Luis and that, sub- is opp(ised to foreign ahl mit because he ta ry CI insiderations prevail in Hanoi,
stantiating 111W of the oldest of . the doesn't want to aid foreigners but be- ? ?the . case for full-scale war in Laos
Senator's misgivings, the military in- cause he has long looked upon it as a must he as unimpressive there as it
:volvement is an aspect of our foreign- road to, war. The Helms testimony isviappears to be here.
C.I.A., Richard i kilns, testified before ' at ions and our aid pro ins,gra though i
Liough, that .cconfimic ami in ;
y,
i
aid program. The director of the damaging to both our military oper-
Tlwre is always the poss ib iii
iliTT-oreign Relations Committee to- its direct impact on either is not likely considerations are not the deotninant ' !,
tiav, and althliugh the session was to he great. Support for foreign aid is ones, and that there may be s011nd po- :
cliisd and no verbatim testinuiny was already so low that little could weaken litical and ideiilogical reasons frir doing
released, the Senator's office said that it further, and the preoccupation with ? what otherwise seems. unreasonable.
II elms hail acknowledged that person- ,Laos has less to do with. our recent or '-There are reports of a North 1 VietnaM-
d were working present role there than with , Hanoi's vs,. .builiinp in Laos, and not all 01 ; nel under his command
;out of the Agency for International plans for the future of the place and them are from suspect stuirces, though .
'Development to train, equip, and fi- with Our response. to those plans. It may some aSsurcdly are. The President says .
Itance Laotian loyalists and mercenaries be, of course, that Hanoi has no plans. that in t.'..e last .four months thirteen 1
to fight against indigenous Pathet Lao beyond the obvious one of continuing to thousand "additional" troops have en-
rebels and North Vietnamese regulars. Use the Ho Chi Minh Trail ;is a means tered 'Laos from North Vietnam, this
No denials have been made. According of access to South Vietnam. In tern- bringing the "total" to over sixty-seven. ?
to the Fulbright version of the di- tonal 'terms, more than half ?f Laos thousand. But he did not say?presirm-'
'rector's testimony, a unit of MD known has been under Communist Control for ' ably because he could not be sure?
las the Rural Development Annex is? 'years, and military experts hero. and in --. what they were doing (Pr where they
as some mwspaper accounts have rim- other capitals are generally agreed that ? were going. The count is the work of .
..mored?responsible for recruiting and the rest could he taken with ease at Aii Force reconnaissance, and it is well
Araining guerrillas, while another unit, any time Hanoi decided to . do so. It . known that the Air Force, having been
.known as the Special Requirements hasn't happened, and from this it has relieved of the opportunity to serve us
Office, has been meeting the anti-Com- commonly been inferred that Hanoi has by bombing North Vietnam, has been ...
? munist combatants' requirements for weighed the advantages of a takeover directing its attention to Laos. If there .,??
fliati"..riel and money. None of today's against the disadvantages and found 'are now more North Vietnamese .!-
- ? revelations?or any other revelation ' the latter to he heavier. As a country .; troops travelling the Ho Chi Minh Trail ,
- during this recent period of preoccupa- (and there are those Who balk at. call- than before, it may he s'mply because .
? Lion with Laos?was inconsistent with ing it a "country" at all, on the ground' ? our bombs are falling in far greater pro-
the President's report on Laos a week that it has hardly any elements of ii;'- fusion, causing more loss of life along .
tionhood) Laos is practically without the trail and more damage to it?there-
resources other than acreage for grow- . by leading Hanot to have greater num-
ing rice and opium. It has the strategic hers of troops in transit and a larger
value of,a crossroads, hut this is already labor force to repair the damage. The. -
being exploited by North Vietnam in it9 .fact that Communists recently recap-
War against the United States and tuned the Plain of Tars may Or may not
South Vietnam,. and the only. military .- be militarily signifiCant;'" that combat ..,..7i
point of total occupation would be the area has changed . hands every few .?,..i.
opportunity it would provide to engage'. months for years?as a rule, with very ...
Thailand, in a war on its eastern and - .little combat. Yet it may well be that .,..,.
northern frontiers. If the Laotian goy- . the President's figures are ill-tsrant;ally ' '
eminent were ieverthrown or were -accurate and that the North Vietnam- .
. forced to take an anti-American posi- ? esc are getting into position for a broad :...
tion, the Rural Development Annex -offensive in Laos. Hanoi may sec a vie-
? - tory there as a morale builder at home.
, It may see 'Communist domination of -
11Trut Laos?or just the threat -of Communist
domination?as an asset to its diploma-
cy in Paris and elsewhere. It may see ? -
an opportunity to confront this Ail-
ministratiim- with disagreeable iliditical
Choices and to expose the contradictions
1, . -,tti, ,......._ 11,!,p1,4,:: m American policy. The fain that our
ways works behind one false front 1
.ir (7,1. .. ...- , _ . -,! 1,1 . .?1..4,3 .
7.11.17".'n.13q::.ig IN.! client, Premier- Souvanna Mumma, has
l';'!Iilit'l.i.
STATI I\
ago, in which it was stated that of the
;
one thousand and forty Americans on
the United States' payroll in Laos three
, hundred and twenty are engaged in "a
! military-advisory or military-training
: capacity" and that "logistics personnel
". number three hundred and twenty-
three." While it is possible that the
. President did not tell the whole truth?
it is even possible that he doesn't know
. the whole truth?these figures are
' roughly in line with the calculations of
. non-governmental observers. Though
. the President could hardly have been
- expected to explain to the world that
the Rural Development Annex was a .,.......if,./.
Special Requirements Office speeitilized w?4,0,1ep.v7-7,0b.:i':00,? 1 I,
?
counter-insurgency school or that .the..,.;
.44i q
he .was talking about the .c.I.A., which ? - '''., 1 !/1)1110. li;>1 IL i , i . I
-.111.i/1111(r.. . ,/:.(fibicil
in logistics, most people who studied his v11/41! ? --.: - . 0.-;,..; ,?1.
statement with tiny care assumed that ,q1,).,\';.Q..1:, ?,;if I. -. - '/ir, I.,
is in - the main a citindestine hrtinch !; , ,,,\ , 21" /111111/117/W?.
? 4., ril11' f 1 i. I ? ' 1 ?
, of the military, and which almost al- i'd?
, or aApprovadtForrliteleaset2 ? 0a106
only the C.I.A.'s avowal of thc fact be- Agi itlo7o/olipoitilA 4,$ ger to men
?iT
7 "
nate h - I. sot and bring
fore the Poreign Relations Committee themobatkuinto his Cabinet has to be
. . -1" ?
ViASIIIMV.CON STAR
Approved For Release 2001/931/06Ah-Rpfpn(11101
o ,350 Fight.m Laos,
?Thai mid !Indicates
?' By DONALD KIRK
Forelim Correspondent of The Stir
BANGKOK ? Thai officials strongly indicated for the first
time today that up to 350 'Thais may be fighting on the side of
Laotian government forces in Northern Laos. '
Authorities publicly denied reports that two battalions of Thai
troops were 'supporting the beleaguered base of Long Chien,
but privately hinted that Thais may have been sent a week or 10
days ago into the conflict
against the North Vietnamese.'
milihrv alliance they have
Sources here said the Thais formed with the United States.
involved in the fighting may not Thai authorities have provided
have actually been members of air bases for American planes
the Thai armed forces.
"A number of Thais have
flying over Laos and Vietnam
and have sent a division of
joined the government side in troops to South Vietnam, but
Laos on their own," said one have always tried to avoid pub-
knowledgeable source, indicat- licity that might compromise
ing the Thais may have been their relations with "neutral"
recruited as members of the Asian countrids.
army of general yang Pao, in1 U.S. officials here have sup-
charge of Laotian government ported the Thais' policy of mere-
forces in the mountainous jungle cy by declining to comment on Laotian troops fighting the
i
regions north and northeast of any aspect of the That role n North Vietnamese in Northern
Specific Report
The report Ziegler was asked
about was that Air America
planes flew two battalions of
Thai troops to reinforce Laotian
forces defending Long Chen, a
U.S.-supported base in Laos,
against advancing North Viet-
namese troops.
It was the first report of any
sizable force of Thai troops en-
tering the current conflict in
neighboring Laos.
After saying "the report is '
grossly exaggerated," Ziegler ,
said "I am not going to com-
ment on the very limited Thai
involvement in Laos."
The United States is deeply
committed to the defense of
Thailand, a Southeast Asian
Treaty ally which has made sev-
eral air bases available to the
U.S. Air Force. '
American planes fly from the
Thai bases on regular bombing
missions against North Viet-
- - ?
namese forces in North Viet-
nam, along the Ho Chi Minh
trail and in the support of the
the capital of Vientiane. the Laotian conflict. The Amen-
The army of Generwl yang cans rarely discussed the mili-
Pao consists almost entirely of tary phase of American partici-
Meo tribesmen, who roam the Pation in Laos until President
mountains from the southeast- Nixon's statement three weeks
rn Chinese province of Yunnan ago acknowledging the United
to Northern Thailand. The Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency pro- States was supporting Laotian
vides the money for yang Pao's, forces with air strikes, equip-
forces, equipped with American meat and advisers.
weapons and uniforms and Thai authorities were reported
extremely upset by the admis-
sion of White House press secre-
tary Ronald Ziegler of "very
limited Thai involvement in
Laos."
Ziegler used the "very limit-
ed" phrase late yesterday in
telling newsmen that a report of
two battalions of Thai troops
being ferried into Laos by Air
America transport planes was
"grossly exaggerated."
He made clear that the part of
the report he termed "grossly
exaggerated" concerned two
battalions of Thai troops.
He would not comment on the
portion of the report that the
troops had been flown from
Thailand into Laos by Air Amer-
ica planes. In effect, he refused
to confirm or deny the use of Air
America planes in some troop
movements.
Ziegler's statement also was.
the first official acknowledg-
ment in Washington of any in-
volvement of Thai troops in the
Laotian fighting. There have
been reports of small numbers
of Th a lag gresw
flying Laotian war planes.
transported from isolated out-
posts on American aircraft.
Some sources believed, howev-
er, that the Thais with yang
Pao's army may have been
members of regular Thai units,
possibly artillery batteries flown
into Long Chien to help defend
the key base in the face of the
most serious Communist ' mili-
tary offensive in Laos since the
Geneva accords were signed in
1962.
Thai officials were extremely
reluctant to discuss the entire
issue of their possible military
involvement in Laos. In the past,
Thai authorities have routinely
denied all reports' any Thai
troops were supporting Laotian
government forces.
One reason for the sensitivi-
ties of the Thais on this subject
is their general embarrassment
over the close diplomatic and
Approved For Re
marcn out ot the mountains and
approach the Mekong River bor-
der 'dividing, Laos from Thai-
land.
For the record, 'however, Thai
officials simply were not dis-
cussing any phase of their mill-, "
tary interests in Laos. "We did;
not send troops to Laos and we
have no intention of doing so in
the future," was the only coin- .
merit offered publicly today by al
spokesman of the Supreme Com-
rased Headquarters
hr..
Laos.
The introduction of even a lim-
ited number of Thai troops into ,
the battle for Laos is in line with I
the emphasis in the "Nixon Doc-
trine," proclaimed at Guam last
summer, on regional coopera-
tion by the free countries of
Southeast Asia for their own de-
fense.
Thai soldiers were first report-
ed in Laos when Communist
forces overran the government -
held base at Muong Soui on
Route 7, the main road across
Northern Laos from North Viet-
nam. Thai artillery batteries
were said to have lowered their,
guns and fired point blank at the
Communist forces before they!
were evacuated on Americani
planes.
Direct Threat
? Despite their unhappness over t
reports of Thai troops in Laos, ,
horitics here were not expect-
to change their general posi-
on. The Thais, fighting Corn-
unist-led guerrilla revolt in
both the northern and the north- t
eastern provinces, view,Commu-
nist advances across Laos as a,
direct threat on their own terri-
tory.
Indeed, some Thai leaders be: '
Hove the country should send
large-scale forces into Laos and
directly confront the North Viet-
namese. Analysts here view this
kind of move as extremely un-
likely, however, unleSs' the North
littini544tti gefo 0 ft 0 0 40 0 0 1-3
au
1
LOS ANGELES TIMES
Approved For Release 2001 601
STATI NTL
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STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160
MONT101y1L-R? , ALA.
ADVER1ISER
M ? 61,769
1 S 'an. 1970
C40, A Deserved But Untimely Coup
CAMBODIA, Laos, Thailand a n d
Vietnam are largely unnatural countries
thrust on the world in the last . two
l' decades. They have been pushed far
1 beyond their rightful positions of Im-
portance.
f Vietnam has been a major headliner
r
, for almost 10 years. A scattering of news
4 about Thailand reaches front pages only
l because of the strategic role it plays as a
1. major U.S. base In the Vietnam war.
r Normally, it would be heard from only in
?travel articles about Its unique hedges
P-and royal aviaries. Laos is like a pot of
1 gumbo, heated and cooled periodically to
suit 'appetites.
Now it's Cambodia again. Cambodia
' used to make the news because its ruling
'
' prince for 29 years possessed an advanc-
ed talent for pomposity, incongruity and
. plain lying, which he faithfully exposed to,
the world with a perverse sense of
. thning. ,
Since Prince Sihanouk has apparently
lost his job, it would be comforting to ?
write him off, in much the same way that
his sister-under-the-skin Madame Nhu
1 ' was dispatched. But It isn't so easy.
From a rice paddy foundation,
. Sihanouk somehow managed to insinuate
. himself and CaMbodialn6 larger affairs
(during the last decade. It is a sad com-
mentary that, this 'Indo-Chinese
. princeling, otherwise a laughable buffoon,
" has an effect on the East-West balance of
:power and world peace.
' Here are some of the possibilities of
i,. the Cambodian coup:
., Sihanouk was on a trip to Moscow and
',Peking when he was deposed. It was
; thought in Washington he was using the
tThreat of a right-wing challenge to his.
, rule to reinforce demands that Hanoi be
persuaded to withdraw its troops from
Cambodia, a sanctuary from American
? firepower in Vietnam. Such a removal,
.? although doubtful, would have eased the
; pressures in Vietnam.. That's supposedly
. shot now.
In the past, Sihanouk hop-scotched ?
between the communist and non-com-
munist camps. As an unequalled egotist,
he would stoop to anything to regain I
power, including enlisting the aid of
Hanoi. His challengers preside over an
ill-trained and poorly equipped army of
35,000. Hanoi has at least 40,000 troops on
Cambodian soil. It would be no contest if
the communist guns were aimed at
Cambodia rather than Vietnam.
The coup could provoke new en-,
croachments in Cambodia by Hanoi. The I
danger is that the Vietnam wai.could be I
extended into Cambodia. It is already 1
threatening in Laos.
There is the possibility of help from the '
new Cambodian leaders. They could exert
pressure on North Vietnamese hops ,
camped on their land, which Sihanouk
' persistently refused to do. But there is
danger there, too. If the Cambodians
'wanted to peck at the North Vietnamese,
they would need additional equipment]
and assistance.
The Central Intelliggag?AgWY and , V
other secret agencies would probably be
delighted to get into the act in Cambodia,
as they are in Laos. A North Vietnamese'
reaction would' spread the war over
almost the entire Southeast Asia penin-
sula, sucking the U.S. deeper into the
mire. Actually, the CIA could already be
active in Cambodia. It could be the force:
? behind the Siltanoulc coup.
? If it were not for the dangers implicit
In the Sihanouk toppling, it would be pue
pleasure to see the clown prince get hisil
due. But there is no comfort in a sittrai
tion that could bring new conflict and
? disorder at a time when this nation is at.;
tempting to reduce its involvement in,
the region.
It is a partof the enigma of the area
and its inflated importance that the fall.
of Sihanouk, whose corruption arid?
capriciousness were travesties leader-i
ship, sho;uI4.beer'auchforehodIzsj
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STATINTL
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NEW YORK, N.Y.
POST MAR 20 1970
- 706,180
The Widening War
-4%4%44
U. S. .,military officials say flatly that the U. S. could win a "quick mili-
tary iTioiir in Vietnam if ground troops were permitted to invade the Co,mmu-
nist sanctuaries in Cambodia and. Laos.---.from yesterday's news pages. ' 4
*
In the dangerously uncertain hours
following the ouster of Prince Sihanouk
of Cambodia in a "constitutional coup,"
there has been some optimistic specu-
lation that the development is welcome
from official Washington's point of
view. The Pentagon seems to think so
?but its responsibility is waging war.
The outlook is far different for anyone
who cares about peace.
What could be encouraging about
the facts that the war in Vietnam
blazes on, that the war in Laos is rapid-
ly escalating and that Cambodia is now,
ruled by a right-wing regime whose
professions of adherence to Cambodian
neutralism remain to be tested?
No sooner had South Vietnamese
President Thieu learned of the .coup
than he smilingly suggested?obviously
recognizing kindred spirits in Pnom
Penh?that joint military operations
" against the Communists might be in ,
order. He graciously included references
to an older ally?the U. S.
- Is Washington really prepared prepared 'to
take on new clients in Cambodia? Isn't
one Thieu far more than enough? What
application does President Nixon pro-
pose to make of the "Nixon Doctrine"
for progressive military disengagement
now? Does the siren-song of "quick mil-
itary victory" really sound appealing?
So far, Washington has done noth-
ing more publicly than to "recognize"
the new Cambodian regime?on the
ground that Sihanouk's removal was
constitutionally carried out. What role,
if any, the Ti. S. intelligence apparatus
actually played in the process is not?
known but the CIA has scarcely been
unobtrusive in flj Vietnam and Laos .
and it is hard to believe it was missing
in action in Cambodia.
The crucial question is whether,'
Washington will attempt once more in
Indochina to regulate events which
t reaten to pass beyond its control and.
whether the Vietnam quagmire will ex-
tend itself deeper into Laos and Cam-
bodia. That would not herald "quick
yietory",but,a new, wider, dead-en
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. BALTikfORIO 5t12(
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I
STATINTL
LAOS STRONGHOLD
APPARENTLY LOST
North Vietnamese Capture
Meo Headquarters .
Thong, primarily a supply and
staging area for Moo refugees.
The fire may have been set by
rockets from attacking North
ietnameSe, softening resistance
for their attack.
None of the American advisers
who normally stay in Sam
Thong were involved in the
fighting. They had been evacuat-
ed during the past two days.
The attacking North Vietnam-
ese were estimated to number
about 5,000 men, most of them
from North? Vietnamese Army
division that had helped recap-
ture the battle-scarred, grassy
Plain of Jars earlier this year.
About two battalions were strik-
ing at Sam Thong itself, while
others coming from both North
and South were attacking small-
er Meo outposts nearby. 1,
By PETER J. KUMPA
(Sun Stall Correspondent)
Vientiane, March 18?North
Vietnamese Army regulars ap-
parently captured Sam Thong
today, one of the twin mountain
headquarters strongholds of Meo
Gen. yang Pao, head of the se-
cret CIA-financed army?the
last effective fighting force on
the government side in Laos.
Evacuation also began at Long
Cheng, the long-secret military
command post of the Meo gener-
al, 18 miles away over .a high
mountain ridge. Some families
and equipment were being
moved out by air.
Radio chntact with Sam Thong
was lost by the Laotian general
staff here at about noon today.
The last flights two hours earlier
brought in ammunition and took
out dead and wounded.
Pilots this morning reported
seeing the United States Agency
for International Development
warehouse burning et . Sam
HJ
' I
go t.
his , surprise. counterattack Mefis might all pick up their few
against extended North Viet;
na mese troop concentrations
last fall and drove them off the
plain for the first time in five
years.
Now the question that haunts
both the Laotian government
and the Americans here is
whether Gen. yang Pao and his
clandestine army, estimated to
vary from 10,000 to 35,000. men,
can hold together.
' The loss of Long Cheng would
be Gen. yang Pao's most seri-
ous. It is a well stocked military
counterpart to the civilian oper-
ation at Sam Thong.
For periods, the ?short, 40-
year-old Moo -general, once a
sergeant in the French Army,
kept same of his five wives here
and held sort of an inforrrial,trib-
al court appointing, subleaders
for-most of the estimated 250,000
Meo S in northern Laos.
Psychological Defeat
At the least, he has suffered a
severe psychological defeat.
With continued heavy American
assistance, he could recover, for
there are other bases in the high
valleys to which he could trans-
fer his operations. It is a costly
operation, estimated at about
$150 million a year.
For months before the latest
reverses, Gen. yang Pao al-
ready was having trouble find-
ing recruits. The hard core of
his army is under 10,000 men.
The rest are part-time fighters
scattered over dozens of sites,
many of them deep in Commu-
nist territory. .
Rumors again were being res-
urrected here that the nornadic.
Adept As Guerrillas
One informed Meo source here
said that Sam Thong had been
ordered evacuated early this
morning. The tribesmen, 1 who
are adept at guerrilla tactics,
have not been able to withstand
concentrated North Vietnamese
attacks.
It is assumed here that Long
Cheng will fall shortly. Some
American military advisers
were predicting three weeks ago
that the North Vietnamese
would strike at the two bases
that endanger North Vietnamese
control of the politically and mil-
itarily Important Plain of Jars
region.
It was from these bases that
Gen. Vang Pao with heavy
.American' air support launched
possessions and move to the far
west of Laos or even into Thai-
land.
' Over the past 10 years, how-
ever, the Moo leader has shown
tenacity, coming back when the
Communists boasted that he had
been defeated.
Viet Cong-Style Tactics
Gen. yang Pao has fought a'
hit-and-run guerrilla war for 10
years with American support.
From their high ridges behind
Communist lines, his men have
specialized in Viet Cong-style
tactics, laying mines and am-
bushing convoys.
During the bombing of North
Vietnam, it was the Meo tribes-
men who defended hilltop instal.;
lations of radar guiding Amen-:
can planes. From these preca-
rious strips, rescue helicopters
took off to pick up pilots downed
behind enemy lines.
Some guerrilla activity was,
extended right into North Viet.,
nam.
Virtually independent of the
Vientiane government, Gen.
yang, Pao, politically a right-
winger, has not been popular
with the neutralists. A major
general by rank in the Laotian
army, he was tolerated for his
?
fighting ability.
If some new coalition govern-
ment can be formed again
through ? coming exchanges be-
tween the Pathet Lao and Vienti-
ane, the Communists can be ex-
pected to demand an end to the
activities. of yang Pao, their
toughest adversary. ?
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Approved For Rele'ase 20910424.jialifeipP80-0.1601R00
19 Mar 1970
[War! e6uulld. cad MI Wa 6goemeil
_ 0
,STATINTL
0
.By James McCartney
,Chicago Daily News Service
'.. The right-wing military coup
'In Cambodia?if it is success-
ful?has the potential of chang-
?ing the ground rules of the
Vietnam War.
It could be the biggest break
that President Nixon has got-
. ten in trying to end the war.
Or it could lead to a North
P'Vietnamese attempt to ' take
over Cambodia by force, and
? thus cause a new and different
kind of crisis in Vietnam.
?? U.S. officials do not pretend
, "If they did that and hol-
lered for help, we might have
? a dilemma on our hands," said
one U.S. official.
SIHANOUK has permitted
? the North Vietnamese to use
his country as a sanctuary in
mounting attacks on southern
: South Vietnam. If that ground
rule were to be removed, the
1
Communists would be severely
crippled.
? to know what precisely is hap- , , That would aid President
: pening in Cambodia ? or who 1 Nioxn in de-escalating the war.'
g may wind up in charge. It's too : .
. , Approximtely Apo main- 1
early for that. ' force North Vietnamese troops I
i ? But they are certain that the,' are believed to be based in I
0 - events of the last few days in
-Cambodia will effect all of.1 Cambodia, poised to threaten ,
the capital city of Saigon and ?
t Southeast Asia. And they are the rich Mekong Delta to the.
.., seeking to weigh alternatives. 1 ,
south. ii
Cambodia is Important be-
cause it has sought, essential- I DAILY NEWS correspondenti,
ly, to remain neutral in strap. ; Milt Freudenheim reports that!
gle for Southeast Asia. 1
.' Paris observers were quick to
' Prince Norodom Sihanouk, ,, stress the dangers of a shift to
the chief of state who has been i the right in Cambodia. If thp
troops might try to do the job. 'The take-over In Cambodia
No Icsi an official than De- by Gen. Lon No! and Sihan-
tense Sec. Melvin R. Laird has oak's righthist relative, Prince
openly discussed this possi- Sisowath Sink Matak, is corn-
bility. pared in Paris with the ouster
That's where the importance of Indonesian President Su-
of a successful right-wing coup
comes into the picture.
?
If right-wing generals were
? to gain control in Cambodia
I and invite the United States to
clean out North Vietnamese
forces, the temptation to take
them up on the offer would be take over all of Cambodia if .
great. they wished in a counter at- :
, This course of?action, no tack.
doubt, would cause a political.
uproar
AT THE PARIS Vietnam
uproar in the United States.
talks Thursday, -Freudenheim
BUT LESS drastic possi-
bilities also are being dis-
cussed in official circles here.
For example, a right-wing re-
gime in Cambodia might.make
it possible to freeze supply
nition that Sihanouk has been
routes to the Communist forces
,ousted.
In Cambodia and South., Viet ousted
?
nam ? ? ? It is perfectly clear that the
.# I A
' ousted, has walked a narrow 'weak Cambodian 'army falls tO
Supplies for Communist an-
Nixon administration, in order
path ? often leaning one way, ' control the Communist Viet- 1 to save itself from defeat in
then the other. namese forces, United States ,i.mies in the Mekong Delta have,
? ? ' Vietnam, not only is escalating
been permitted to flow., freely i
!the war in Laos but also is try- '
'ing to extend the war to the
whole IndoChinese Peninsula,
placing a grave threat to peace
in Southeast Asia," Hanoi dele-
gate Nguyen Minh Vy - do-
led the scant reports moni- ,clued.
tored on Phnom Penh. Radio. # ?
, U.S. and South Vietnamese A 1 m te nCambodia. .
I it dl "The United States must as
JUDGMENT In Wash- ' have -no.
forces ha t been able to 1 THE OTHER side of the coin same full responsibility for,the
touch the supply routes ? or ;presents a diffe.rent picture. consequences," Vy said as he
ington is that Gen. Lon Nol ,
as premier and his accomplices 1, attack Communist bases ? ,
the United States ? probably
. went into the session.
U.S. Ambassador 'Philip C.
,
ostensible.neutrality. 4
, There is widespread specula
tion In Saigon and Paris that
without violating Cambodia's' '
have entrenched themselves in ;
power, and that the neutralist'
Sihanouk has been per-i
manently bounced. ,
This prospect raised appre-b
hensions, described as a "fear
of the unknown" by one
.
source, that the rightist anti-
Communist successors of Siha- '
'not& might get in over theft"
heads in their defiance of the '
karno, which the French also
credit to the _CIA._
The Communists have the
military power to respond.
They are already in 'a strong
position in Laos, north of Cain-
bodia. They probably could
reports, North Vietnam ?ac-
leased the United States of try-I
ing to spread the Vietnam War.
;into Cambodia and Laos. But
Hanoi carefully avoided recog-
0
forces could be sucked In, as
DAILY 'NEWS Washington I happened in t Vietnam and
Bureau chief Peter Lisagor re- .
} Laos, they warned.
ports that suspicion that the ; Cambodia also has provided
coup deposing him might be ? 1 the supply route for Commu-
another ruse faded quickly as' the
I forces in southern South
' Southeast Asian experts stud- Vietnam
through Cambodian ports. .
The United States also, might
,be invited to bomb Commst
[sanctuaries in Cambodia
Bombing has not been per-
U.S. MILITARY officials say through the Central Intelligenc
flatly that the United States Agency?has played a' role In
could win a "quick military the Cambodian coup. , 1 ment on Cambodia,"
victoty" in Vietnam if ground Freudenheim reports thatl South Vietnamese delegate
troops were permitted to in- ;French -military officials see it,
I Pham Dang Lam replied thati
vade , the Communist sanc-1 as a move to strengthen thei
tuaries in Cambodia and Laos. position of Thailand in case long-standing North. Vietnam-I
, ese denials that its troops are
And officials have not been Laos falls to North Vietnamese' in Laos and Cambodia have,
and Pathot Lao forces. , .
, 1.beinwsjildi ?oved by recent state-.
bib told reporters as he en-
ered the session, "I have no
intention of having any corn;
reluctant to discuss the possl-
North Ir6Ved For Rdiftia120960)10111_,193
. ?
'61:1TR000 G OdItias ot the neu.... .
tralist governments , of both,
CH/CACO TRIBUNE
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19 MAR ?PO 9
otia
VIENTIANE, Laos, March 13
tin?A limited withdrawal of
civilians and soldiers from
army headquarters at Long
Cheng began today, after the
fall of a nearby United States-
operated supply base at Sam
Thong to 2,000 North Viet-
namese troops.
Informed sources saw the
advance on Sam Thong as the
first significant North Viet-
namese push south of the Plain
of Jars since the Geneva
agreement in 1962 set up Laos
as a neutral state.
Sam Thong._ 90 miles north of
s Exit as
Vientiane, is 15 miles southwest
of the Plain of Jars.
The plain was recaptured. by
the North Vietnamese in Feb-
nary. Long Cheng is 10 miles
southeast of Sam Thong.
7,000 Meo Soldiers
Gen. yang Pao, commander
of the Meo tribesman army,
has his base at Long Cheng and
has about 7,000 soldiers stand-
ing in the way of an advance.
These forces apparently put up
little resistance at Sam Thong.
At the Vientiane airport, Air.
America transport planes un-
loaded civilians and soldiers
from Long Cheng. Most of the
STATI NTL
ost Falls
soldiers were in uniform and
carrying their weapons. Some
were wounded but able to walk.
There was no immediate
report o n whether United
States cent r al intelligenc
agency personnel who support
Vang's army at Long Cheng
had left.
Elimination Effort
One source said of the new
North . Vietnamese thrust, "I
think this is his effort to
eliminate Sam Thong and Long
Cheng, the early phase of it."
Informed sources said the
Lao general staff in Vientiane
'lost radio contact with Sam
Thong at noon. Shortly before,
ammunition was delivered to
the government forces at. Sam
Thong and the wounded were
evacuated.
? There were reports that
North Vietnamese forces fired
rockets into the Sam Thong air
field.
Hospital, Warehouse Burn
The sources said allied
bombers attacked the high
ground around Sam Thong in
efforts to drive off the North
Vietnamese troops who by-
passed ? government positions
farther north to launch their
attack. Whether United States
warplanes, which. have been 1
supporting Laotian troops, took'
part was not clear.
Pilots flying over Sam Thong
reported that a United States
arehouse and an American.
(operated hospital were burning
and there were fires - in the
village. All 16 Americans and
more than 2,000 tribesmen and
Laotian peasants, including 209
hospital patients, were flown
out before the major attack.
T h e International Control
commission, prodded by India,
met informally to explore the
worsening situation. The
sources said the Indian govern-
ment was attempting a new
peace initiative but the meeting
produced nothing significant.
The commission made up of
India, Canada and Poland, was
set up to see that the Geneva
agreement was observed. But it
has no power and has been
denied entry into areas of Laos
controled by the pro-communist
Pathet Lao and its North
Vietnamese allies. ?
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DAILY WORLD
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STATI NTL
CO oyeall Lao'ircease'\.-1-'?;
QJQ'$?? iroirDCE
Daily World Foreign Department ?
Sam Thong, one of the largest U.S. CIA-"Royal Lao' bases in northern Laos, fell
late Tuesday night to the forces of the Lao Patriotic Front.
Officials in Vientiane, the "Roy-
al Lao" capital, said "We don't
know exactly where things stand
at this point," but added that it
was not true that the Sam 'rhong
hospital had been burned down as
earlier reported.
The CIA operations base is 75
miles north of Vientiane and about
30 miles southeast of the Plain of
Jars, the vital region the LPF re-
captured in the last few weeks.
?.,
Sam Thohg is only six miles
from Long Cheng, headquarters
and major supply base for the
clajteptine army of General Vang
Pao, a force of 15,000 Meo tribes-
men set up by the CIA. According
to U.S. reports, the Sam Thong
base ivas taken almost without a
fight from the CIA's secret army.
In past years, when the Meo
tribesmen on the U.S. gide were
confronted with heavy fighting,
they melted away by the hundreds,
tossing their brand-new, M-16 ri-
fles away. The repeated demands
of "Royal Lao" Premier Souvan-.
na Phouma last week for new ship-
ments of U.S. weapons may have
some relation to this earlier phen-
omenon:
In Saigon, the U.S. military
' ?
command reported the loss of the .
fifth U.S. warplane over Laos in '
' the last six days to anti-aircraft '
fire, an Air Force F-105 "Thunder- '
, chief based in Thailand. U.S..
sources
, sources said all reports indicated.
? the U.S. air losses were at a high-
er rate than losses over the Demo- .
.:' cratic Repuxlic of Vietnam be- -:
fore the 1968 "bomb halt."
? The U.S. this week admitted
that a "North Vietnamese" hell-
'? copter that it had earlier said its
planes had destroyed on the
? I
ground in Laos was in reality an
old American type used by the
South Vietnamese two years ago. :
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Approved For Release 200N1 P1-12DP80-01601R0XIIIIIM
?ff?
19 March 1970
Asian Crucible: (i) Cambodia and Laos
STATI NTL
South-east Asia is more of an ideological crucible this week than ever; Mr Galbraith's
notion that the countries of the area may relapse into the obscurity 'which they deserve'
looks singularly unrealistic. The irony is that the fate of the area may be determined
more in Laos and Cambodia than in Vietnam itself.
The overthrow of Prince Sihanouk bears all the impress of a brilliant intelligence vr
coup. The CIA may be in retreat in Laos; in Cambodia it could well have had a
hand in precisely the kind of job which it believes it is meant to do. One domino looks
like falling; but another is being shored up.
The net results of the events of the past week are unpredictable but certain lines of
speculation are admissible:
(i) Cambodia. If the new Cambodian regime cracks down hard on the communists
and deprives the North Vietnamese forces (and the Vietcong) of their sanctuaries and
supplies, the effect in South Vietnam will be considerable. North Vietnam's use of
Cambodian bases, and supplies, has been a factor of enormous importance throughout
the war.
(ii) Laos. In Laos, the position is very different. North Vietnam is aiming to secure
the establishment of a communist-dominated neutralist Coalition; it also wants to
extract an American pledge not to bomb the Ho Chi Minh trail. If it wins these two
points, it would have scored a notable triumph. The 'cteation of a rieW coalition in
Vientiane would be adduced as an adequate precedent for the formation of?a coalition
In Saigon.
The situation in Laos is now so grave that Mr Rogers, the American Secretary or
State, has dropped hints this week that American ground forces may, after all, have to
be introduced ? but only with the consent of Congress (which will be difficult to secure).
It is arguable that, if ?the Americans were prepared to make a firm stand in Laos,
they might carry the day in the whole of south-east Asia. This thesis will doubtless be
derided in many quarters; the mere idea of 'another Vietnam' frightens a large
. sector of American public opinion.
But, while exaggerated importance should not be given to the reported ascendancy
of the doves in the Hanoi politburo, it is clear that North Vietnam could not simul-
taneously (a) continue a losing war in the south, where Vietnamisation has proved
more effective than many people forecast, (b) face the sustained hostility of the
Cambodian regime, which would harass the Vietcong in various ways, and (c) face in
Laos the full brunt of American military might and air power, backed by the Meo
tribesmen.
North Vietnam's aim has always been the eventual control of all of former French
Indochina, not merely the acquisition of South Vietnam. But it would find it hard to
fight in three countries simultaneously.
(iii) Russia and China. From the calculations outlined above, it might seem that
there is the chance of some kind of deal; but deals in south-east Asia are notoriously
difficult to secure. Much will depend on the way Russia and China react to the current
crises. As they are in grim competition with each other, as well fas with the Americans,
their mood is likely to be tough and unyielding; certainly China's. The odds are there-
fore that (a) if the Cambodian challenge to the communists fails, south-cast asia will
become a more intractable, crisis-ridden region than ever, and the communists will
step up their efforts to give the Americans a bloody nose in Laos; but (b) if it succeeds,
the undermining of North Vietnam's whole strategy may have begun.
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Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80701601R0
?????? ? .................margularmarmall106,
PASCu, WAI'f'?ITON I
TRI-CITYALfD
iE - 22,733
S - 2.2,99b
UZ4N 191RD
STATI NTL
Isolation not possible
i
,.
, .
Sen. J. W. Fullbright's ob. Surely his committee g e t s
7 servation that "it is obvious" there numerous reports on the subversive ;
is a relationship ' .between the activities of other "foreign" powers ;
forejsn aid program and the Cen- in Laos and in other nations around :
tral IiitnigencO--Agency in Laos the world and. it's too much to ,1
. hardly falls under the category of swallow the possibility that he :
profound statements. ,
, ? would be surprised by a report of ,t
No one wants Laos to turn into CIA involvement in Laos.
. It another Vietnam but we frankly ----Ciro can readily agree that the ,
?
h slide or allow this don't see how the United States can administration shouldn't s n e a k, 4
1
ilcompletely withdraw from the - - country to be
.1
pulled into a second Vietnam.
wbrld and go into deep isolation.
1 It's possible the senator, head At the same time, however,
I of the Senate Foreign Relations espionage and assistance i n, i
. 1 Cotnmittee, was headline hunting ? training and recruiting programs if
i because of his views but the best are as much a part of the in-
[that can be said is that it was .' ternational facts of life as ern- ..
ridiculous for him to say, iilf it b a s s i e s , consulates, diplomatic
: is true (CIA involvement in Laos), missions and j u n k e t i n g con-
I it is only another warning we are gressmen.
' in over our heads." , There is no reason for the U.S.:.
i. . to hang illuminated banners around
How w,ould he propose that the ' the necks of our CIA or other
I U.S. help out countries that are agencies proclaiming them a s .1
1 . for an ideal world, .;
i
being beseiged.. by Communists and spies, recruiters, trainers, military il
facing possible take over? Should observers or anything else.
we put our head in the sand and We're all
.0
. bid them adieu? Or .possbily send ' Mr. Fullbright. Now if you can only "..4
in pacifists and rrnssionaries- to convince the other side before- we,ii
I convert the commun.* te anti-war unilaterally give away.. ajl. of:,otir.t4
iChriatians, ' ? . ." ? ? -! .4; i'. .., ? . .. :., . ,-- secrets and confess. ..ot40`eips'"
- ?
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DJIL VIORLI)
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25 Fin 1
""jo-DOU
2[41
CEVC]neng 'OE
STATI NTL
20.)
Daily World Foreign Department
U.S. B-52 bombers and other warplanes were diverted yesterday to missions over
northern Laos as two outposts barely six miles away fro& the U.S. CIA base at Sam
. Thong fell to the Lao Patriotic Front. Military sources in Saigon said the B-52's made
only three raids yesterday over South Vietnam because most of them had been sent
over Laos.
Cambodia has suspended
I eni frontiers," and said that. the International Control itsCorn-
Cambodia and Sihanouk could. ? mission 4ICC) on Vietnam. ad-
earlier demand that what it al-
leged to be "North Vietnamese
"reply on the Soviet Union's all.; ' ? mitted that he "passed on" in-.
'
and Vietcong" troops leave Cam-
round support in the struggle' formation to the U.S. CIA. The
bodian territory. The change
against imperialist provocations. Canadian officer said the CIA
and interference in her affairs.". would come to him claiming that
was indicated during a Monday
Cambodia parley "an entire Vietcong corps' was
meeting between Cambodian For-
eign Minister Norodom Phouris-
U.S. news sources in Cambodia. in a certain border area. and
sara and representatives of the said that.in Monday's Cambodia-. .Ketcheson said he would dis-
Democratic Republic of Vietnam DRV-PRG meeting, the two Viet- ? agree but very often they ,chose
and the Provisional Revolution- namese representatives did not ' to believe their own spies."
ary Government of South Viet- ' discuss the charge of Cambodian A report in the Feb. 26 issue?
nam, in the Cambodian capital Premier Lon Nol's government of the conservative "Far Eastern
of Phnom Penh. that NIP and DIIV troops were:: . Economic Review" iliong Kong)
In Moscow, Prince Norodom operating on Cambodian territory.... says that a reporter who Ow/-
Sihanouk. Cambodia's thief of ?The PRG and DRV pledged to eled all over Svay Rieng prov- .?
state, postponed his scheduled. respect, Cambodia's neutrality, ?ince in Cambodia. where the U.S.,
departure for Peking on his way territorial integrity and Inde- and Saigon say thousands of "Vi- ?
home, and in an interview he,. pendence, and also asked for etcong" are hiding, found it to '
said: "The events which have, damages to pay for last Wednes- be an absolutely flat, almost ?
just occurred in our country may' day's mob attacks on their two treeless area surrounded. on ?
make some foreign observers embassies in Phnom Penh. .. three sides by South Vietnamese.
think that Cambodia may change Informed sources are dubious , territory, where nothing could be ;
its orientation and its ideology..! about General Lon Nol's wild . hidden front patrolling U.S. air- .
But as head of state I can as ' charges that 40,000 DRV and ,...eratt.
sure you that we shall not change 'NLF troops are in Cambodia, a
our principles. We shall keep charge that U.S.-Saigon military
our neutrality and our independ? propaganda has been making for
ence. The Cambodian people and several years. In the Nov. 16.
I personally will not permit any 1969, Washington Post, Canadian
changes concerning our friend- 'General Donald Ketcheson gave
ship with the socialist camp, es*. I tome reasons why.
pecially with the USSR." . ? ;? Gen. Ketcheson, a member of
Joint communique
Sihanouk met with top-level So-
viet officials on Monday, intlud-
, ing President Nikolai Podgorny ?
.and Premier Alexei Kosygin. The
joint Soviet-Cambodian statement
at the end of the meeting stated: s
"The aggression of the American
imperialists in Vietnam, armed
intervention in Laos, U.S.-Saigon
provocations against Cambodia
and Cambodian neutrality are the,
, main reasons for the aggravation
. of the situation in Indochina and.,
in Southeast Asia as a whole."
The Soviet government "again ?
confirmed its respect for the .1
neutrality and territorial integ-
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DES MOINES, IOWA
TRIBUNE
E ? 113,781
MAR 18 1970
Bombing Nuisance ,
We were thinking that American control of the air
t,tiver Laos was completely useless when Russia
, suddenly said there could be no negotiations for
peace in Laos unless the United States first stopped
the bombing.
Does that sound familiar? It should. That was the'
Bussian and North Vietnamese cry for the years
when the United States was bombing North Viet-'
.
Air power is something Americans find it easy to
believe in. Yet the heavy bombing of the Ho Chi
' Minh trail does not seem to 'affect the traffic there.
Bombing interferes some, but North Vietnam just ,
takes its losses and goes on sending what it
thooses.
Support bombing in the Plain of Jars and points
,est and west seems singularly ineffective, too. It
may have helped with the surprise victory last fall 1
when Gen. yang Pao's clandestine army of Mei),
tfibesmen, payrolled by( the U.Sr?etifftrarlfl-
telli ence Agency, reconquered the plain from its
foe,s. ' winter North Vietnam reconquered
the plain again and pushed on beyond it, using a,
large force of regulars complete with tanks and
artillery ? a roadbound outfit ideal for bombing.
"U.S. planes were able to fly out the entire civilian
population in advance of the attack, and do heavy,
support bombing of the invading force, plus at leastl
one day of heavy area bombing, with the big B-52
bombers. But the North Vietnamese swept the plain
twith very little resistance.
Yet it must have had:so.M.e?quisitnee value Th
Alstereze911.4nd...a?L.)
STAT'l NTL
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NE17 YORK, N.Y.-.'
POST
E 708,180
MAR 181970
, 'Where Do-We.Go From Laos? - 73`"Stli
A great znany Americans have been
.wondering for some time just what the
' U.S. was doing in Laos?and. why. Per
?hapS it is heartening that high officials
( of the Nixon Administration seem to
i be equally puzzled and as much at a
loss for a convincing explanation. .
1
4?,1:x1.1.CMY"negro
, In the latest development, Chairman
Fulbright (D-Ark.) of the Senate For-
? eign Relations Committee reports that
Secretary of State Rogers insisted at tC
recent closed-door hearing that there
are not only "no present plans" to com-;
, mit ground troops but that the Admin-
istration will not do so?at least with-
out explicit Congressional sanction?'
even if Laos "is overrun" by Pathet
? Lao and North Vietnamese.
? That seemingly leaves few options
for Washington except to ground the,
? U. S. bombers making daily sorties in
support of Lao government troops and
to bring ,nailitary "advisers" home. Is
,anything izf'44,4e kind in prospect? Ori,
-will our presenthere henceforth 'be-,;
come a total CIA operation? Is there
.
,?1P"k?C1.4 force ?jj
The esca toting confusion dates gen-
erally from President Nixon's report on
k' Laos two weeks ago, a somewhat in-
icomplete accounting of the facts and
a wholly implausible justification of
f U. S. involvement there. More recently,
; the Administrajion indicated it was def-
' initely not relying on the Tonkin Gulf
; resolution for authority and professed
to be. neutral on a new Senate resolu-
tion relating, to Use of combat 'troops
,. in Laos;, :,, y),7. c,,, ' 2:.T...t.h:U" .-?tw-c,? ,i, .;?;?,::,. , i,.],.
E c.kt t,,,v4,-F.,44.,:.,'; ha iq U-ii4T::r...1.61tV.Snit.:44
1
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ever: appeared to put im a
/ ? Al . ,, ? some variance with the Secre-
tary of Defense, Melvin R.
. i? -?. Laird. On Feb. 26, Mr. Laird
Rocrers and Fulbriciiit A
. To Cl ' l'y U S Stand arz: ? U. - . on La051.- told newsmen that if President
- '. Nixon decided to send troops
' to Laos, "he would come to the
Congress of the United States
By RICHARD HALLORAN ';'? for such approval."
Special to e New Tor% Times --' ?' Spokesmen for the State and
WASHINGTON, March 17 ? Pres-{Dabelfeentsoe Departments were =-
Secretary of State William I'. ident in making any decision .consult" and "approval." Each
reconcile the use of
A position to foreclose the
Rogers and Senator 3. W. Ful- which might be required in the said his department stood by
bright sought today to soften future." what its Secretary had said.
the impact of Mr. Rogers's ? A spokesman for the Secre- The issue of the political and
assertion that the United Statestary said that Mr. Rogers, in his military conditions under which
remarks, had been trying to American coldiers might be
has no present plans to send soften the impact of the March sent to Laos came against a
ground combat troops to Laos 3 statement. backdrop of intensified North,
if that country should be over- In a telephone interview, Vietnamese action in that
run by Communist forces. Senator Fulbright said he had country.
Senator Fulbright, the chair- talked with Mr. Rogers this A State Department spokes-
man of the Senate Foreign afternoon to explain the cir- man, Carl Bartch, told news-
Relations Committee, revealed cumstances under :which the men that the military situation
-
statement had been made pub- in Laos was serious. He con-
yesterday that, in a closed ses- lie. He said the disclosure had firmed -that the North Viet-
sion of the committee on March "riot involved security" and was namese had taken several hill-1
? 3, Mr. Rogers said of Laos: "We "not intended to embarrass the top outposts around the Royal
?I Laotian forces headquarters at
have no present plans, if it is
Senator Fulbright said he Sam Thong ,and Long Ting.
overrun, to use combat troops.",
I thought the "small; incident"
j
Both men emphasized today
- 'had been "grossly exaggerated" ObectiVe Uncertain
that it had been. Mr. Rogers's and indicated that there was no Mr. Rogers said that the
intention to stress the "no pres:. disagreement between Mr. Rog- ultimate North 'Vietnamese oh-
cot plans" and to assure the .ers and himself. ; jective was not known. "We
'Congress that none would' be i . Conflict in Views Seen hope that what they are up to
is to make their negotiating
made by the Administration: g-
The quotation from Mr. Ro
. position a little stronger," he
without seeking Congressional_ ers came up yesterday whle said in his television appear-
? approval. ;? - - -.-. the Under Secretary of State,
- .? ? 1 ance. "We hope that they do
, Mr. Rogers said that -Cr a fElliot L. Richardson Was ?testi- .
1 not intend to overrun Laos."
situation should arise that yin, before. the Foreign Rela-
,. - , Other officials here said they
. tons Committee. Senators John
would require consideration or.. Williams, Republican of Dela-1 believed the North Vietnamese
forces were moving in for the
combat forces in Laos, I told ware, and Clifford P. Case, Re-
the Senate of the United States Publican of New Jersey, thought kill against the clandestine
that' we, h fully the 'Congress would
would consult with: t a r? Richardsonhad dif-
army of Maj. Gem yang Pao,i
the force trained and suppled
'them to the fullest 'extent .... fered from Secretary Rogers on
by the United States Central
Pc.l.s- ' ow
?sible." ? --:". : be consulted prior to any .
deci-, Intelligence Agency. General
Vang Pao's army has provided
The Secretary, in a televised: sion to send troops to Laos. .
i the only substantial opposition
'interview on the Naticinal? They asked to see the tran-
to the North Vietnamese in
script of the testimony that Mr.
Broadcasting- Company's': .1.7'o?-? Laos for several years.
day" show, said he had :ex-,: Rogers gave on Marc , After
consultation with Senator Ful-
h 3 Aft
The officials also said they
plained to the Foreign Relation's bright, they asked him to read had received no word on when
Committee "that I was not-in" from the transcript. That pro-
the courier with negotiating
' -