REDS IN LAOS DEMAND HALT TO BOMBING BY U.S.

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CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3
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RIPPUB
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K
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161
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December 9, 2016
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December 14, 2000
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1
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Publication Date: 
April 19, 1970
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NSPR
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(Th CHICAGO TRIBUNE Approved For Release 2001148411. tick-R8W611T61-01 eds in Laos_ Demand H lt to_; VIENTIANE, Laos, April 17? A major aim of communist North Viet Nam and the Pathet Lao in their proposals to Pre- mier Souvanna Phouma for ' peace talks in Laos is believed to be to try to force him to oppose American bombing of the Ho Chi Minh trail. Souvanna told this reporter In an interview that his govern- ment had not specially author- ized the bombing raids in the first place and had no control over them now. Care Little for N. Viets He made it clear, however, ; that he cares little for what ? happens to the North Vietnam- ese, who refused to live up to the 1962 Geneva accord and divisions Of 10, leave Laos. ' the 312th and, the 316th. Vang. 'We have no objections to the Pao's troops, whose specialty ' bombing of the trail," Sou- has a 1 w a y s been surprise ? a said. ? guerrilla-like s t a b a, offered sources s.ald. Americans h e r e say the only to k en resistance and .. . ? 1,1 I f Meanwhile yang Pao's men on bin1' bm U. S. BY SAMUEL JAMESON 1 . totem ?rf IWO PtI111 solocipi tChlef of Tokyo Bureau:I Pathet Lao Weak However, a" Nor th Viet- namese pullout from north Laos would leave only the Pathet Lao to battle Laotian government forces and yang Pao's Moos. Like the Viet Cong in South Viet Nam, the Pathet Lao have lost much of their former strength and effective- ness. Today they are rated as pushovers in a straight contest with Vang Pao's men. That is why westerfi military observers believe .Hanoi com- mitted its own troops to the current offensive. When the North Vietnamese began their offensive in, Jan- uary they mobilized two full 000 men each 2,000 men of the 316th were ' are more Laotians in Thailand committed to the probes at Long Cheng. If Vang Pao can hold on at than in Laos itself. The sweep across the Plain of Long Cheng for five more Jars cost the North Vietnamese weeks until the rainy season few casualties because cloudy begins, the military picture will skies h a m p e r e d American brighten considerably, observ- bombing missions. But the ers here said. mass evacuation of tribesmen ,. . from the area did deprive them. Rains Stop Fighting of a . source of forced labor The rainy- season forces all which might have been used to fighting to stop. When the skies bear supplies and ammunition.i clear up, yang Pao's forces are 155, . expected to hold the upper hand At least 8,000 men of the 'because of the air support they Committed to Supplies . 316th division in forward posi- get from the United States. lions near Long Cheng are Last year, one military ob- believed , to be . totally corn-1 sie. rver said, the United States mitted to moving up supplies at bombed the North Vietnamese this Utile. and Pathet Lao off the Plain of Had the whole division s' truck jars" and yang Pao swept in . at Long Cheng, the Norm ,..m,, thin, 1. likely to occur _, behind the air support. The 1 Vietnamese could have taken "aim; IV; ?otuome'i. if Long 1 I. *Riad sakL .. the outpost, American military Cheng holds out, this military United States would be em- barrassed severely at the least to continue bombing the Ho Chi ? Minh trail over the protests of Souvanna. However, they see r no signs of the Laotian prince yielding to Hanoi on this point. The fact that Souvanna's' r government and Laos itself survive on American military and economic aid will remain ' a large factor in any talkS which may be held with the, Pathet Lao. Asks for Plights , In May, 1964, Souvanna first asked the United States to I' make reconnaissance flights ? over north Laos in the Plain of Jars area. As more and more North Vietnamese poured Into i? Laos, Souvanna said, he asked for more American air support. Eventually, full scale bomb-, . . ing raids in support of Laotian ? ground troops developed. When. the weather is clear, more than 400 sorties have been flown on some days. Souvanna told this reporter he already had offered to stop the bombing in north Laos if the North Vietnamese pulled their troops back to the Ho Chi lpfinh trail.. '? . Appi:oved-Voi moved westott the Jars. They had seized the plain moved back into Sam Thong on with substantial American air March 31. Reinforcements were support only last August. .? flown into Long Cheng by. Air Troops in Disarray ' America, the CIA's southeast By the time yang Pao and Asia air line. Supplies continue his force of an estimated 8,000 to come, and as each daypasses yang Pao will get stronger. Thai Reinforcements Among the reported rein- forcements was a battery of Thai artillery men, whose num- bers have been estimated at between 320 and 750. The Thai, Laotian, and American governments have denied this report, but all three governments have acknowl- edged that Thai nationals had come to fight?as Individuals.. Thais and Laotians are re- lated'closely by race.. culture, and family. As Souvalitiiiold a ' press Have Logistics Woes conferene c April 7, there - ? In the next few days, how- ever,the North Vietnamese made no attempt to occupy Sam Thong and failed to mass enough troops to overwhelm Long Cheng. It soon became in- creasingly apparent that the Hanoi forces were having logis-.. ties proIA6ms. I teillgence sources reported , ,aspn26011/660.450CIA-RDP80-01 6 men got' back to their strong- holds at Sam Thong and Long Cheng in late February, .the Meo troops were 'in disarray. No one had expected the North: Vietnamese to, 'push beyond the Plain of jars, where they had lost 8,000 tons of weapons and equipment In yang Pao's thrust last sum- mer. For the first time since 1962, hokvever, they moved south of the plain. Sam Thong was' evacuated without a fight on March 18 and 'yang Pao dug in at Long. Cheng. ? had been left' ehind on the Plain of Jars and that only,, Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R00 ommommil HUNTSVILLE, ALA. TIMES APR 1 9 19/0 E - 53,936 S - 51,808 ? A Part of the Story I SIX HUNDRED PAGES of se- cret testimony on U.S. involve- ment in Laos will be released to- morrow by Sen. Stuart Syming- L? ton, D-Mo. The .senator says that it is with regret he has agreed to the release with about 10 per cent of the factual information still withheld. * * * The release of the testimony ac- cumulated by Symington's Senate subcommittee on U.S. security commitments comes after a six- month battle with the White House and the State Department. The senator declares that the bat- tle was to obtain release of enough of the hearings to make them meaningful. Sen. Symington insists, and we agree, that it is one thing to keep ? - STATI NTL silent about a covert operation, but another to keep from the American people a war that has,. . cost billions of dollars? and, what is more important, American lives. ; U.S. participation in the war in Laos has been kept secret long past the time when it should have been a matter of public record. We hope Sen. Symington con- tinues to battle for further revela- tion.. A, ,A, ?A, 11 A staff aide to the senator in- forms us there are several major areas which remain secret: There will be no details releas- _ ed concerning the irregular Lao forces supported by Central Intelli- gence Agency funds. There will be no information about increas- ed combat air sorties over north em Laos. There will be no infor- mation about U.S.-operated air bases in Thailand from which the U.S. flies missions over Laos. There will be nothing said about U.S. financing of third-country n:L- tionals in the war in North Laos. * * IAnd why is. the administratiod fighting release? Because,, as it is quite awe, such information would show the U.S. had violated the 1962 Geneva Accords which guaranteed the neutrality of Laos. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 -01: Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R0007 THE NEW YORKER 18 April 1970 STATI NTL THE TALK OF THE TOWN . ....cannot he affected by :':fiuman effort. health resort and those of a concentra? Notes and Comment ' The war has iniilived ilie hour of the tion camp. We might well feel slightly War. ' les? 1968, America hail a kind of ' mad as we wrote things, such as N In the Ilays when the debate was "Whereas in a health resort there arc national debate im the Vietnam still vigorous, opponents of the war doctors appeared that,; -as far used to find k helpful to exnose false ! giving people medicine, here, on war, and it a as the debate was concerned, the dis- . claims made by the g?v0.1?1?.fit, ?,?1- the contrary, wc field armed guards ?wilting forces won a victory of sorts. . to pi,int out ironies and contradictions' systematically murdering the inmates." All of the political candidates for na- . We might have the same sense of ah- tional office incorporated a good deal of ? in government policy. Tlwy useil to ',sterility as we wrote that "whereas the the rhetoric of the peace movement in say things like "The body count is American forces are supposed to be ? their public remarks, and all of them exaggerated, and anyway a body count . building democratic political structures : seemed persuaded that withdrawal of is no r mea eal sure t?f success," or "The . in the villages of Vietnam, we find that ? ? or troops was the only course the next 'pacification program isn't to,?;ing as Well ,; they arc bombing the villages and shoot- u ??President could afford to follow. The as the government..s.,:eys it i.s'," or "The ing the villagers." The disparity be- ' war was shorn of its justifications not South Vietnamese ellictionisare rigged, tween the offiCial policy and the reality SF only in the minds of its veteran critics and the Saigon regime is a dictatorship is flow s? great that k eippears as though but also, somewhat surprisingly, in the and doesn't have the sopport Of its own policy is developing in accordance with minds of its former supporters. I lie people." And finally they pieced to- a set of rules that will he responsive to demand for military victory in Vietnam gether the ultimate irony?that we the political situation in America hut . all hut disappeared from national poli- seemed actually to be physically de- that the actual conduct of the war is ?. tics, and the considerably slackened de- . stroying the country we were supposed' developing according to a completely : bate centered almost exclusively on the to he saving. In the last Year or so, . separatd ?set of rules, determined by , question of how long it should take us I however, opponents of the war have the con di t on s of unspeakable brutal- to get out. Hawkish sentiment appeared 'found that it is inadequate to repeat ity and confusion in Vietnam itself. to undergo an odd twist, in which these arguments. Perhaps one reason (Our soldiers in Vietnam have started anger at critics of the war intensified . is that the gap between the official ex-? referring to the United ...States and hut support for the war actually de- planations and the realities we are other places outside Vietnam as "the dined. ( A rally held in Washington faced whit daily on television and in -world"?as though Vietnam were last week in support of military victory - : the newspapers has become so stag- on another planet.) The war, which . in Vietnam ilrew, according to police ? geringly huge and so 1/11VIIIIIS that when Row grinds on without evoking either or- . , .estimates, only fifteen thousand pel)- one persists in making these points one much support or much new criti-.- ' pl .) And yet now, nearly two years feels almost ludicrously simpleminded.; e.sen, or much national debate of any .after the beginning of the 1968 cam- Also, pointing out discrepancies he- kind, .seems to have acquired an in- paign, in a peculiar atmosphere of tween the official versions and the re- Aalle life of its own, and to have de- mental exhaustion, in which both op- . ' ;elides seems to presume a rationality Moped in utterly . unexpected ways poncnts and supporters of the war seem in the whole enterprise that is now re- that neither its critics nor its supporters. to have lost their forensic stamina, tow vealed to be entirely lacking. It is as ever anticipated. Several recent news involvement in the conflict continues though we were taken on a tour of an stories have brought this feeling home . on almost the same scale, and even alleged health resort that turned out in to us with particular force. A number . threatens to expand into Laos .rind - fact to he a concentration camp, and. of them have been so strange as to Cambodia. It is as though the public , were then obliged to write A report most *defy rational COMMCM, Anti we . had shrugged its shoulders and decided describing in great detail the specific have been trying to imagine what this II) accept. the war as inmething that ? ,differences between the facilities of a Adniinistrat would ay wou say about them Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :-CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :e CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 if we were still in the period wlwn the government felt obligated to justify .and rationalize the consequences of its policies in Vietnam. What com- ment might the Administration make, for example, about recent reports that the Saigon police beat up disabled ? veterans of their own Army when !het' attempted to demonstrate for a rise in tlwir disability allowance (which can be as low as IWO 4lOnar5 111011th ) ? ? 1Vliat might government officials say about the recent United States Army report that at least thirty-five per cent of the combat soldiers in one hrig,ade ; are regular IISCES of ma ? What justifications could be offered for send- ing a lull-stoned army into the vil- lages of Vietnam to wield the greatest volume of firepower that any army has ever possessed? (Around the same time, there has been the peculiar dis- covery, which we mentioned recently in these pages, that the general we . support in Laos may be fighting in order to gain control of a- multimillion- dollar opium trade in the contested re- gion.) And what arguments could be. advanced in defense of the First Infan- try's decision?at what turned out to be the cost of three American casualties-- to carve a mile-and-a-half-long boule- vard in Ow Vietnamese jungle in the shape of its divisional insignia? Situa- tions such as these show that the Army, like the nation itself, now has no idea at all of what it is supposed to be do- ing in Vietnam. They reveal that the war has lost even the pretense of a pur- pose, and has become nothing more than ? a bloody playground for our. i idealism and our cruelty.. NW Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 Approved For Release 2ffigigaliNFMAR93sfipAOrlARR 18 APR 1970 0 U.S. Is Consi ering Arms A id ti Cam o By Murrey 'Warder ,;),? ranee suggested on April 1, '? 'with calculated ambiguity. ; Yesterday, the United ; States expressed interest in exploring the Soviet move. ? The United States is un- , Wexhirirton Post Staff Writer The United States is con- sidering giving limited arms aid to Cambodia for "self-de- fense" to checkmate any ithreat by Vietnamese Com- , munist forces to overrun the ? capital of Phnom Penh, it was learned yesterday. ; Administration strategists , reportedly rule out any mas- sive U.S. military aid pro- gram to Cambodia intended ! to drive out the 40,000 to ? 60,000 North Vietnamese , and Communist invaders in :.that nation. Such an effort Is regarded as far beyond I the capacity of the 35,000- Man Cambodian army with- out huge foreign help. f, Normally any U.S. mill- taiy aid program is accom- panied by American mill- tary advisers. But there is reported to be great opposi- tion inside the Nixon admin- istration to sending such an advisory team to Cambodia, ' even if the decision is ?made to send some arms and war er a . ' No actual decision has been reached to respond af- firmatively to Cambodia's , military aid request which, the United States said on ( Thursday is being "exam- ined," informed sources ern- On Capitol Hill, however, new warnings were sounded , yesterday against any Amer- ican involvement in Cam- bodia. . The international diplo; am tic circuit is new whirl- ring with shrouded moves and speculation about. Cam- bodia and the deeply inter- 'twined wars in Vietnam and Laos. This atmosphere of r 4 'unpredictability was intensi-, Vied Thursday by the unex- pected SovJet expression of Interest in a new Indochina. likely to make any precipi- ; tate move under these cir- cumstances, 'U.S. sources in?, dicate. But what the United , States evidently wants to convey is that it is not slam-, ? ming the door on Cambo- dia's aid request this week. to do so could , encourage the formidable force of Viet- ' ,namese Communist troops in that country td force the, month-old government of Premier Lon Nol to guaran- ? tee them "sanctuary" from the war in South Vietnam.; This is what the United States obviously wants to interest when he said, "It sp- pears to be that only a new Geneva conference could bring about a fresh solution , I and a relaxation of tension , ? ' on the Indochinese penin- la sula . . . If the Soviet comment is ? . "serious," one U.S. source typically said yesterday, it ? could have "really quite ex- traordinary implications." ' Until now, the Soviet Uni- on, in conformity with North Vie t n a m's position, has .? balked at all proposals for-a/ Geneva-wide conferenct" oh:1 Indochina, or even a confer- !! ence on Laos, as President ! Nixon has proposed. North Vietnamese Politburo mem- ber Le Due Tho, on leaving ? Paris last week, gave a cold 7 , shoulder to the French pro- tion that North Vietnamese Premier Phan Van Dong joined Silianpuk there this week, but other Western sources now say the visitor. , p? was North Vietnamese Com- ? munist Party Leader Le ? , Dunn, on his way to Moscow. via Peking. , Le Duan reportedly was greeted in Peking by Chi- , ? nese Premier Chou En-lal, I, One !inajor international ;Iquestien pending is whether .' ChinqL- North Vietnam and ; otherwCommunist nations will back Sihanouk's return t to. the Communist-held sec; ? ? tor of Cambodia. If they do, ? the ? Communist powers might then recoup the dam- age to their interests from ? ? 'the March 18 coup which overthrew Sihanouk, ? by .4 conXerence ivaricp pprove checkmate. U.S. analysts privately' have expressed considerable. doubt that the Vietnamese Communists in Cambodia have any intention to "can- , quer" that nation, as Lon, ? Nol has warned. Instead. American specialists gener- ?,? ? 'ally believe it Is the Commu- nist objective not to ,over.... ; run .Phipm Penh, but to, ? .safeguard the 'occupied. re- gions along the Cambodian- i?? ?South Vietnamese border and to assure ? supplies to : maintain these troops, ca- pacity to strike into South Vietn ?1pnysicaiiy Supporting him as ' the "legal" ruler of Cam. ? bodia. ' This *quid pose a major. :Challenge to the western- .. oriented' government of ,.,Premier Lou Nol. ? Britain publicly fumed 1. down yesterday . Lon Nol's , appeal for arms aid. ? ? .,. "It, would not be appropri- ate for us as co-chairman ,of the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina to furnish min- .:. tary assistance, a Foreign 1 ',I. Office spokesman said. t, Britain has "welcomed" the '; ? "important initiative of , ,.France" in proposing an en- larged conference on Indo- china, a British official said , in Paris yesterday. But in ?, fact no one, including ' France, has said exactly . what kind of conference is ? contemplated except that it should recognize., as the A limited grant of 'U.S. hrms aid to help defend this ? Phnom Penh region there- 1.fore probably would be in- teMed more as a symbolic move, than a major military action. Even so, however, it . could raise the risk that it was only the "opening wedge" of a Vietnam-type ' U.S. Involvement, raising a , ? clamor of domestic and in- ternational alarm. I Deposed Cambodian ' Prince Norodom Sihanouk is now in Peking threatening ':to return to v Cambodia di* ivikr2Igit ?? , French said on April 1, the , "indivisibility" of the prob- lems in Vietnam, Laos and -? Cambodia. ' Spokesmen at the White. ? house and State Department both said yesterday the Unit-, ?? ed States is "interested in ?j exploring" what "the Soviet government may have in mind" by Soviet Ambassador Yakov Malik's statement in' ?,! ;New York Thursday. the Soviet ambaisa., glatIA posal, emphasizing that set- 'I tiement of the Vietnamese!- , problem must come first,' ? , "as a basis" for resolving ??the overall Indochina prob- lem. Many U.S. experts believe , that Malik's sudden show of ? ? , Soviet interest in an Indo- , , china-wide conference ? must have been cleared in advance with North Vietnam, which could mean a shift of posi- tion in Hanoi. ,. Senate To Bare . Laos. Operations . e ..; . A' senate subcommittee i headed by Stuart Syming- ; ton (D-Mo.) announced it 4 . will lift on Monday part of the veil of secrecy on U.S. ; _involvement in Laos. Mean- " ? while n e w congressional ?'' !. concern welled up over 1, Cambodia. c Symington told a . news I ... ? conference yesterday that A t? transcript of Laos hearings' will show that the "covert 1, operation" there has cost the t United States "billions of 'dollars, and what is more important, American lives.? ? Great misgivings were ex- pressed, meanwhile, about r? the risk of "creeping U.S. Involvement" In Cambodia by many participants at the opening of a two-day Con- ? gressional Conerence on Na- tional Security Affairs. It should be the duty of ' thhe Nixon administration to ? consult with the Senate For. eign Relations 'Committee, : parent of the Symington throb &Mid 0403 der."' ri Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601 s AN LFANDRu, CAL. STATINTL NEVIS , 14 - 0,205 APR 17 1970 f , Twenty-nine days after a right- and he kept his country out of ? wing coup deposed Prince the bloody mess in Vietnam and ! Sihanouk as Chief of State of Laos. :. Cambodia, the new government ' While he was out of the coun- ? ,l',, , was appealing to any and all try?under rightwing pressure? . nations for whatever military', seeking aid to get the foreign. help it could get. 'troops out of his country, his , . , It was at war with the Viet , political foes unseated him. - 1 ' Cong. ' Within two weeks the new , It is well to recall the swift military government called for ',. sequence of events which "volunteers" to 'man an army. followed Sihanouk's ouster?(a . And shortly thereafter, Cam- : move which the Russians--and hodians were fighting Viet- ' 7. . many Americans--believe might namese. The conflict was, only Viet- /.. well have been precipitated by ? two weeks old when the news 7 the CIA. _That organization, came that 100 villagers of Viet-. , origitirafforriT41 as a super-spy n a m os e extraction were i.: system, has gravitated into a massacred by Cambodian troops.'' .. , ? I; policy-making paramilitary or- At first the reports said they were ,r'. ganization which operates under killed by crossfire of Cambodian , the cloak of utter secrecy in the and Viet Cong troops, but it was : name of "national interest." later revealed that Cambodians i ( It has been engaging in , performed the genocide. military operations , in Laos, And so while the Nixon Ad- clandestinely for a long time, ministration has been refusing to , finally smoked' out by the recent come to realistic grips with the , ?advances of the Pathet Lao and : Vietnamese war, it is spreading? : North Vietnamese. to Laos, now Cambodia. ' (Senator Albert Gore, member When will the ? citizens of this of the Senate Foreign Relations c o u n t r y demand of their Committee, recently hinted that g 0 v e r n m e n t that it end ? . , ,. t testimony from the CIA indicated the nightmare of Southeast Asia? !, that its Laotian military role was When will our people awaken tol ,..? assumed on orders of the see our country as it is seen by (. National Security Council. When the rest of the world?as a giant the order was issued, no one power, meddling in the affairs ; knows except those directly in- ? of people 12,000 miles ? away, , volved, because the National killing them, destroying their i ? Security Council, like the., CIA, ?crops, ruining their land with ,? ','.; operates under wraps. Its . poison chemicals? . decisions, however, affect the The U.S. role is the outrage, ?' future of the country, for better of the century, a blight on t-r', ; or for worse). ? , ' i nation's proud history, a canccr While Sihanouk ? ruled Cam_ , that will devour our ideals, our .. 1 . bodia, 4141 country managed to dreams, our nobility. For this /AP PENNichMillie keaSer?0(1110344040n,CIAARDP80-41801R000700040001 -3 nr,-,-- ' ;;;:i,ni:k yietnameso.4%,-,. war -' ? The War Spreads lie The White House Fiddles ,?, Approved For Release 2001/03104 :weltDRDP80-01 15 APR 1970 (Concerned about Laos? All of a ?sudden n'iany people are?peo- ple who have never seen or heard of this small. Southeast . Asian kingdom before are now finding its , name in screaming : newspaper headlines. President' Nixon now is forced to admit that. yes. there are U.S. forces . in Laos. and news analysts now' tell their readers that. yes. -Laos may become a -second Vietnam." . If 'you had been reading the ? Daily World last year. you would have a pretty good idea of what was going on in Laos. long be- fore Nixon was compelled to tell you a small part of the truth about U.S. involvement there. You would have read: May 24. 1969: the U. S. steps up its air raids on Laos five 'times above the . previous levels: ' U.S. CIA agents in Laos are using the U.S. AID ( Agency for 'International Development) Mis- sion as a front for their Laotian activities. May 27: A "Focus on Asia" column gives you the detailed background on U.S. bombing of .Laos?who. what. vhen. where and why. % ? July 26: the .Daily World charges that U.S. and Thai troops are fighting the Lao Patriotic , Front: detailed background of the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos and 1963 CIA coup there. ? Aug. 7: another "Focus on Asia" tioiunin tells you that the U.S. is using two secret bases in . northern Laos (Sam Thong and Long Cheng i to bomb Lao libe- ? rated areas: the bases are full ,of U.S. Special Forces and Meo , tribesmen. U.S. operation of the Lao economy (gold and opium) is detailed. Aug. 13: the D.W. charges that in the secret bases of Sam Thong illx.n adrnis wilTat our readers krzeuf ..???????? and Long Cheng there are 1,500 U. S. troops, whose base is at Udorn, Thailand, and who are members of the 46th Special Forces unit. General yang Pao is named as head of a 15,000 man "secret army" of Meo tribesmen backed by the CIA. The D.W. says there are 3,000 Thai troops at the bases too. Sept,. 23: the D.W. says the "secret" war in Laos is not so secret any more, gives a detail- ed breakdown? of U.S. military involvement including numbers of "military attaches" i 72 ) at the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane. The D.W. gives a precise list of Air Force personnel and equipment in Laos: 2.000 USAF advisors. 3.5Q0. maintenance per- sonnel, types of aircraft and helicopters, where based and in what numbers. Sept. 27: The D.W. strongly .denies President Nixon's asser- tion that there are no U.S. forces involved in Laos. notes that there are thousands of U.S. military "advisors," "attaches" and CIA agents. using civilian Covers to hide their actitiiities. March 6. 1970: President Nixon admits that there are -some" U.S.personnel involved in Laos. cites the total number as 1,040, says U.S. involvement is limited and defensive. ' March 11: Pentagon admits U.S. military in Laos gets com- bat pay. March 11: story breaks that CIA is involved in Laos. uses U.S. AID mission as a front. has, set up a secret. army of Meo tribesmen based on two secret centers. Sam Thong and Long Cheng. Read what President Nixon is. going to admit tomorrow, or six months from now, or never? read it today in the Daily World! ) ? STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDF'80-01601R000700040001-3 Approved For Release 20011010a4w(A9b-RpP80-01601 ' 1 5 APR 1970 STATI NTL Sihanouk hits Cam fia o dk MOSSO cre ? which juts into South Vietnam were only victims of -the hazard of war." They denied reports b U.S. newsmen that the Vietnam ese were massacred. They assert ed the slain Vietnamese had been ' caught in a cross-fire between .; Cambodian soldiers and what i termed -Vietcong" forces. Jack Walsh. of UPI, a veteran 'of 18 months' reporting of the Vi- etnam war, had said on the scene in Prasaut that the victims all ?seemed to have beef!' killed at close range within the refugee compound after having been told to run by the armed Cambodians. Prince Norodom Sihanouk. in i Radio Peking broadcast on Mon- day accused the Lon Nol govern- ment of massacring more than 500 since taking power. . In Cambodia's southern Ta'keo. r province. where 'regular army troops ? killed 109 pro-Sihanouk Daily World Foreign Department i The Cambodian rulers claimed yesterday that 90 Vietnamese ref- ugees killed April 10 in Prasaut. In the -Parrot's .Seak" area . demonstrators last week. the Lon . s Nol government charged that y -several hundred Vietcong" in- - vaded a military post and took - police and army personnel pris- oner. about 45 miles south of the capital of Phnom Penh. More ? t fighting was centered in Chrey Thom. 36 miles east of the cap- , ital. where the Lon, Nol regime ' said ??1.000 Communists" had at- tacked the town. In southern Lads. the Lao Patri- ' otic Front took the town of Mu- ong Pha lane. about 50 miles east ' of the Thai border. ? ? Muong Phalane was a *base for the U.S. CIA's clandestine army in Laos. ,The U.S.. through the CIA ?? and Agency for International De- velopment IAIDI, as well as oth- or agencies, trains, equips and di- . rects the -Royal Lao- armed forces, and finances the Lao mu-.' itary budget Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 Approved For Release 2001/03/Q4 : CIA-RDP80-0160 STATINTL YOUNGSTOWN OHIO VINDICATOR E 100,987 S ? 155,444 'APR 1 1970 War I-Ias Ensnaied Newsman Tells YSU gaily ..,??, . "Nixon has lost his.chance politically to blame :the war on the Democrats. It is, now thoroughly his war and he is trapped as badly as Johnson was because he won't admit the whole thing is a mistake," Blair Clark, associate publisher of The New York, Post, said Tues- day at the main spring moratorium activity at Youngs- town State University. "The prospects of the war in all of Indo-China are terribly omninous," he said, "and the war definitely is spreading to other countries like Cambodia and Laos." "The evidence of the 'spread- ing war," he said, "lies in the fact that our hand, partaicularly the Central Intelligence Agency, has been active , in both coun- tries. The language in which we discuss the war is getting more and more' bellicose.. Nobody talks anymore about anything but the enemy, whereas Dean Rusk used to call them the other side." , ? "I feel there is ,a growing at- mossiketbk.? ? country," he said, "so much so that a meeting like this one may actually be dangerous in ,a few months, "This repression is led by (Vice President Spiro) Agnew and the threat of the liberty ot the press and people who dis- agree with government policy," he said. ' While seemingly touching all the bases, Clark referred to the moon shot as an investment of billions of dollars in the mili- tary-industrial complex. ' He said, "We must thin whether this whole program the right way of investing bil- lions of dollars. It is a perfect trial complex selling ;ifs policies i to the governincht." - Clark, former campaign man- ager for Eugene McCarthy and i vice president of CBS N, was ..) introduced by the Rev. Burton Cantrell. His a,ppearance was spon- sored by the YSU Community of Concern and Youngstown Chap- ter of SANE, both organizations ?am. seeking to end the war in Viet- 4 Approved For Release 2001/03/04.: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-016 STATINTL UTICA, N.Y PRESS : U? 28,782 APR 14 1970 Goodell Again Presses Nixon orililla Senator Charles Goodell is carrying his he has had amazing success, winning t I , Independence still further in saying he ?.. popular support 'and his party's endorse- would have "grave questions about sup- ;., ment. Perhaps Mr. Nixon will announce a ( port" for President Nixon in 1972, if the ' - speed-up of troop withdrawals 'Thursday: r. Vietnam war is intensified. .' night, further enhancing. Mr. GoodeIrs L . According to the most recent Gallup ' po,sitinri. i 4' ,, , 7.' ..; , . !I Poll, Mr. Goodell has considerable public ,,,: , A speed-up would be most ? welcome i : support for his anti-escalation stand. For . ,? : ..:t. , news lot: the puhlici as well as Mr. Gnodeu43 , the first time, the poll showed that less 11,...,..tii4..,:iiiiijj.iii?Liki.t..,j.,,._...A / than half of the voters support the Presi-. ? , 4, 1. dent's handling of the war. The public,:. !, support for Mr. Nixon's de-escalation plan I has been eroding gradually since last fall. , . ,,. , L. ' ? ? ? r THE PENTAGON HAS now announced ?' nthat the latest troop withdrawal 'has been'..,,, \ completed ahead of schedule, but we still ,have more than 400,000 troops In Vietnam. .i j: In recent weeks, the war has escalated, not only in South Vietnam but also Laos and Cambodia, raising questions of our.. helping 1 helping out In the latter two countries. i :p Our military also has reportedly urged ,,i :Mr. Nixon to delay further troop with- A drawals, pending a clarification of the Communists' intentions. . I There has also been the temptation for i us to expand our operations into Cambodia:, ' and to beef up our ,L14.4forts in Laos. ,.1 i;Fortunately, the White House appears to 2,4' i be playing it cool on both questions. 7: In light of the new situation, a , peace demonstration this week, and the 1 :( ''.growing lack of support the President's ., ? war strategy, Mr. Nixon is likely to seek If,1 '... .to bolster his position when he addresses .,',i i the public on the war this Thursday night-1 , ? ? , MR. GOODELL MAY BE foolhardy' in t 17, attacking his own party's, President in thfq' Nuest...f4P.c40.*3x..,t#Aci:fatii Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000000400013 Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RoP%orRFord-ffoo 1 HOUSTON, TEX. POST APR 1 3 1970 14 - 289,395 r 322.761 roouna-ut at is "'.a in aos, in TT' . . . I was intrigued by the patent in- congruity of . . . "Can we learn from his- .tory?" (By. Carl T. Rowan, Post April 1). '; A valid predicate was laid when Rowan stated little beknown facts, such as: ? "Dulles prevailed . . . to make Laos a . . . ? 'bastion against Communism,' so the U.S. poured in some $300 million by 1960 . . . to ? build a Royal Laotian Army of 25,000 men that would be a carbon copy of the U.S. Army. ". . . the U.S. maneuvered to oust Souvanna and replace him with . . . Phoumi Nosavan, ? who was hustled back to Laos from Paris by 'CIA operatives. . . ".. . So he (President Kennedy) .. . worked out a compromise that restored Souvanna to ?the premiership of a coalition government Now for the incongruity. ? L; "SOUVANNA, FACED with . , . an OB- VIOUS EFFORT BY NORTH VIETNAM TO r, OVERWHELM his country, turned out to be .!., anything but the PRO-RED PATSY (emphasis (added) . . . !t, Who do we, as Americans, think we are? a t;,We funnel $300 million ($1.50 for every man, g woman and child in the U.S.) into Laos, to i? make a CARBON COPY of the U.S. Army, I then we not only maneuver to oust Souvanna, 'i Laos' premier, but are presumptious enough 1. to provide his replacement. Not satisfied, we 'i restore Souvanna, whom we have ousted pre- viously, to premier. .., By what right, privilege or power do we en- il r ter into a country, try to stamp a "carbon copy" of our Army on their Army, (which can ifikl.. tt , be used against the people as well as for , ? ?...., ,,,??t_., ..?,....i...L:?,.......0......4.i...b4., , Prince Samna* name Wawa...004 them); oust, replace, and re-oust the replace- . '1-? , ment premier with the premier we originally, . .. ,i ousted? ? Approved For Release 210g EDITORIALS The Third Indo-China War ? CIA-RDP80-01 STATI NTL have been tossed indirectly?perhaps through That I, It is the nature of governments to deceive. In the; intermediaries. (We know that Thai troops have been perspective of its two-century existence, the govern-'fighting on the American side in Laos, and that the ment of the United States is no, worse than others. In! Thai satraps are unexcelled in intrigue.) fact, in its early history, its candor was considerably better than the average. Now, however, it appears to be making up for lost time. Mr. Nixon may plead, plausibly enough, that Vietnam is not his war. He did, however, undertake to get us out of it. The plain fact is that the war is being extended, and so far Mr. Nixon has done nothing to prevent its spread. On the contrary, his policy of Vietnamization is dragging us deeper into the Indo-Chinese quagmire. Unless he takes forthright action to arrest this trend, it will be difficult to avoid the suspicion that he is not averse to developments that will enable him to keep mas- sive American military power in Asia, and that re- cent events have been largely of our making. Of course, that is not the official scenario. Official- So now the Vietcong and North Vietnamese who have been using the Cambodian sanctuary are caught in a squeeze between, on the east, the South Viet- namese, aided by reinforced American detachments I close to the border and by American gunships firing into Cambodia, and on the west, such forces as the '1 new government of Cambodia can muster. From the standpoint of the Pentagon and the CIA it is a muchi,/ more agreeable situation than when Prince Sihanouk held the reins. It is worth noting, also, that General Westmoreland has long advocated military action against Cambodia. Can our Southeast Asian allies act in matters of such importance without American approval and! some kind of commitment that, If the gamble turns ly, we were taken by surprise when the coup ousted against them, Uncle Sam will not let them go down Prince Sihanouk; we are now waiting for the dust to the' drain? The Carnbodians say they are not asking settle, and perhaps hoping for events to take a turn for American military help now. They do not say that might redound to our advantage. There is a sug- they will not ask tomorrow. gestion that Sihanouk was overthrown because the What has happened took considerable rigging. Did enemy is losing, is being pushed back, and that this the President know about it? Did he want to know , accounts for the turn to the right in Cambodia which, about it? How much control has Mr. Kissinger got ' over operations in the field? Does even General Abrams know exactly what goes on while he runs the war from a desk in Saigon and With an occasion- al visit to the numerous fronts for which he, or the CIA, is responsible? In the news these latest developments are referred , low level. The CIA upset that balance by egging on to as the second Indo-China war. The count seems its mercenaries, deployed with the aid of American.:short. First there was the war in Which the French "advisers." The enemy retaliated and seized a ma- . Jot the flower of their officer corps and got the coup ) jor piece of the Plain of Jars,. Did the CIA plan it that way? They may have been as innocent as un- born babes, but that is not their usual role. Anyhow, it happened; and it now appears that Laos is in dire though nominally neutralist,,had been giving shelter to some 40,000 to 60,000 North Vietnamese or Viet- cong troops. That scenario warrants scrutiny. It begins in Laos, where there was a tacit standstill with the enemy. r It was incomplete, to be sure, but fighting was at a de grace at Dienbienphu. Then there was the secon Indo?China war, engineered mainly by Lyndon B. Johnson, and which proved his political nemesis. Now we have the third war. Will it rescue Mr. Nixon straits?another domino is in danger of falling. There politically, or ruin him? He must be thinking hard.; is one difference, however, from the earlier domino his risks are not small. game: the public does not seem to be concerned. It does not demand that we "save" Laos; it would rath- er that we got out of Southeast Asia, and the sooner the better, as long as we retain , some shreds of superpower dignity. The illicit scenario continues with the coup in Cam- bodia. Whoever pulled the strings, the result was very much to the liking of the Pentagon and the CIA, and perhaps of an Administration bent on keep- ing a big, sprawling foothold in Asia. (See Michael Klare: "The Great South Asian War," The Nation, March 9.) It passes understanding that Prince Siha- nouk's rivals should have acted so boldly, unless they had substantial covert backing It may be assumed that the CIA no longer delivers sledgehammer blows, as in 1953 when Mosspaegh as elimlnaj Whatever 4ptPMiqIl t CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 Approved For Release 20011MV4CIA-RDP80-01601ROOXIIIIIIM f, 13 APR 1970 STATINTL WANTED: SOLDIERS OF FORTUNE U.S. officials maintain they will send no ground troops into Laos or Cambodia?but civilian mer- cenaries appear to be something else again. CIA agents in Saigon are actively recruiting both American and non-American civilians there? construction men, U.S. Government employees, men who have left the Army but can't quite bring themselves to leave the war?to lead raiding par- ties of Meo tribesmen against the North Vietnam- ese in Laos. One such offer last week included a salary of $1,000 a week and a week's vacation in , Taiwan for every four weeks in the field. Pros- ' pective employees are asked to submit resumes in Bangkok, where there is less chance of unwel- come publicity than in Saigon. THE END OF THE SIHANOUK TRAIL ' Sihanoukville, the port in southern Cambodia that funneled supplies to the Communists in South Vietnam along the "Sihanouk Trail," has been entirely closed by the new regime in Phnom Penh. But from the Communist point of view, this is not a particularly heavy blow. Intelligence reports indicate that no new Communist supplies had arrived in the port for the past year and that Prince Sihanouk had held on to earlier shipments- , in order to dribble them out to Communist forces for political leverage. ROK-U.S.S.R.: FADING ENMITY? The Republic of Korea has invited the Soviet Un-, ion to send delegates to the Asian Development-..i. Bank's convention in Seoul this month. This is the friendliest gesture the South Koreans have made to the Russians, longtime patrons of the rival North Korean regime, in twenty years. With ? North Korea drawing closer to China and the United States talking about reducing or with- - drawing its 55,000-man garrison in South Korea, Seoul is apparently looking for new friends wherever it can find them. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 rTh txouSTA4 Approved For Release 20ammetuFIA-Rop80-01601R00 STATI NTL Hanoi Troops Hammer A rea f US. Aid Base in Laos By TAMMY ARBUCKLE Special to The Star VIENTIANE ?Fighting flared again in North Laos over the weekend, reliable sources said today, when more than 500 North Vietnamese infantrymen assaulted government positions around battered Sam Thong. North Vietnamese troops cap- tured government positions west and north of Sam Thong, the major U.S. support base, 75 miles northeast of here, but failed to penetrate the base it- self. Twenty-seven North Vietnam- ese bodies were found. Casual- ties from the defending Men guerrilla forces were described as "moderate." However, Lao army ambul- ances, one driven by an Ameri- can, were passing constantly be- American aircraft, and the Vien- tiane military hospital. Thirty-one more North Viet- namese were killed in other fighting around Sam Thong this weekend. Eight were killed when a patrol penetrated within 1,000 yards of Sam Thong's air- strip. Eight more died in a Meo ambush near Sam Thong and 15 were said to have been killed by U.S. air strikes against North Vietnamese troops on route 4 east of Sam Thong. The weekend fighting follows the pattern of North Vietnamese light probes and infantry at- tacks against weaker govern- ment positions. American and Moo command- ers based in Long Chien, south of Sam Thong, were countering this , by airlifting troops from ,tweeo Vientiane airport where hilltop to hilltop, keeping 'the I 'casualties were unloaded from North Vietnamese baffled... vii I... AI ? 172i. 1140114l.:...1:',4 .1)14i ,4;% These troops were carried by light aircraft flown by American civilians working for Air Ameri- ca, which has the Central Intelli- gence Agency as one of its cus- tomers. The Americans were coming under fire. . This morning three 122mm rockets landed within 100 yards of the Long Chien airstrip which . the Americans use. In other fighting in Laos, ' North Vietnamese troops for the , fourth consecutive day hit Bou- . alorn, the last government guer- ? rilla outpost in government hands north of the Plain of Jars. Laotians were pushed from . one mountaintop position when ? they said they ran out of ammu- nition and water. This Lao unit suffered ntr Casualties. In South 'Laos, Communist troops overcan the Tang VeL guerrilla position west of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The North Viet- namese retreated this morning ' after U.S. air strikes which the Lao estimated after retaking the position cost SO North Viet- namese casualties, mostly wounded.. : . . ? . ? ', ? .. ? .?.: Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 Approved For Release 20M0a941,62A-RDP80-01 11 April 70 STATI NTL THE TALK OF THE TOWN :Notes and Comment Representative 'rummy is in the middle of a hard campaign, and this is, if course, campaign oratory. It so hap- ? pens, though, that his adviser on South- east Asian affairs is Professor John T. ?/ McAlister, Jr., of the ?Voitilrow Wil- son School of Public and International Affairs, at Princeton, who is the author of "Viet-Nam: The Origins of keen- Imhof" and is probably the must mi. ? nent scholar in the Southeast Asian field. Suspecting that it was on his au- thority that the candidate made these extraordinary assertions, we checked with the Professor and found that this'. was indeed the case. He would, he said, 4 swear to the truth of them in any fa- rum. The next move, we should think; _impldile up to Senator Fulbright. N March 24th, Representative ? r John V. Tunney, a CaliforniA ? Democrat who seeks his party's . nomination for United States senator, addressed the Wilshire Chamber of Commerce in Los Angeles and made some charges about our involvement in Laos that have not, as far as we have been able to learn, previously been made. We yield the floor to the con. , grvitstrum: 1,. We are today engaged in at secret war in Laos, a tribal war in which the ? C.I.A. has committed the United States ; to support a faction of Men tribesmen, ? led by General Vang Pao, whose sole ; objective is to dominate other factions of this opium-producing Men tribe through- out Northern Laos. The C.I.A. has in- volved us in this covert (operation; which is being fought around the Plain of Jars, ? more than one thousand miles away from the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Adminis- tration has deliberately veiled in secrecy . our deepening involvement in ao opium .. tribal war which has the potential to - engulf all of Southeast Asia in a full- fledged conflict which would have global ; repercussions....On grounds of moral indignation, as a defender of democracy, ; we have unwittingly allowed ourselves to become involved in a situation which, to the Meo tribesman or Laotian warlord, has very little to do with his major cash crop?opium. For this tribal war has, as . one of its prizes, an area capable of pro- ducing, on an annual basis, four to 'ten ? ' tors of marketable opium. This is equal to from two to six million dollars in Lao- tian currency. Relined as heroin and sold ? on the streets of Los Angeles, it would bring nearly nine hundred million dol-4, ? Jars. ... The clandestine yet official opera- tiors of the United States government , could be aiding and abetting herointraf- fic here at home. ? 1 ? Approved -,For Release.'2001./03/04:01A-RDP80-01601.R000790040001:-3 , f,, STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 BLOOMSBURG, PA. PRESS ? ! APRt 0 1970. - 11,115 h.Rope.Tune VVENTS' IN ,Southeast ? ,Asia have Involved, but personnel does not show made this, 'a time for 'tight rope ' 1,yp on either Embassy or Aid payrolls. walking in 'Washington if we are ,to Planes bombing supply lines are avoid increased militar,y involvement .`based r.outside Laos, but of ) the ? 1 there: Both in our, capital and 'in ' Americans employed under gov- Moscow caution 'is :evident. ernment contracts, 200 are pilots and ;?? . Tension . there:' has heightened 't,j100 ground employes working -for the ,because of internal conflict in, r.,two ? , Cambodia, for Communist pressure on At a time When we are attempting the: Cambodians has increased since ,:.to reduce our forces, in Vietnam,. it the Ouster. of Prince Sihanouk and ?, i would be foolhardy, 1.0 get ,Mixed up , ?the new premier to the ,,uncertain situations prevailing consolidate power.. Outside ' pressurof 'both Law and, Cambodia..?- apparently can do' little to restorei.: 1. stability and:mightinvolve More risks.I., 'than benefits for this country. Complicating ? the situation is the. : bombing of supply lines within 'which have been - used with little impediment by the. North Vietnamese,i' to furnish .support to Suerrillas in South Vietnam, Secrecy shrouds the American role ? In Laos; but the personnel there is sufficiently .large , to 'constitute a t: clanger. A month. ago President' Nixon i said the number was 616, With an additional 424 employed on contract ;.to the government or contractors. The; ; civilians perform what amounts to: `military functions under; auspices of the 'U.S. Embassy, the Agency. 4gency..,,forklk7 'International.,:)Development,i, conwanies under. charter tojho latter America and Continental ? Service's. More than 200 Air Force and !I Army attaches,.. regular lri,J 4? officers, serve as .advisers In 'the fieldh and 114 aerial observers and ,qotters? :for bombing or artillery, zniislOris.' thel sentr4?.Ditglligence.,Apyic,T,c,a1p7:13,.; ti 'f ? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 Approved For Release 2iffearv9 -RDP8F0V6IONITRI-0011 10 AP11.19 N. Viet Troops Find No. 1 Enemy Samuel Jameson. chief of Altho, the Mco general has ported a n oiher American! " THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE'S broadcast appeals urging his bombing raid on North Viet- I ? ?namesc positions had been conducted from bases in Thai- land. Clauds of haze, however, have curtailed the raids on silver neckbands. It was their most days since the beginning way of keeping their wealth in of the year. a land without banks and Elsewhere at Landing Site 37 savings accounts. a new market was thriving. The Meo are a dramatic contrast to the Montagnaid hill tribes of neighboring Viet Nam. Whereas the Montagnards are dark skinned, the Meo look almost like Chinese. Unlike the Montagnards, Bodily cleanliness and sanita- tion also appear to be greater concern for the Meo than for than for the Montagnard. The adaptability and relative sophistication of the Meo, as seen at Landing Site 37, helped explain why the North Viet- namese have singled out their troops and their leader, Gen. yang Pao, as the major target of the current offensive. Fighting recently has slackened off but western mili- tary observers predict new attacks will occur. Not a True Match The Mco, however, are not fighting for Laos, a politichl entity which exists more on maps than it does in the hearts of the people who live within its ?????,' Tokyo bureau, is presently people to come back to am touring southeast Asia to Thong, the Meos at Landing " report on the changing mill- Site 37 showed no signs of, ?, tar) situation there. Today's leaving their new found home. article tells of the fight being Robert MeClymonds, 51, of ? 1,? aged by the Meo guerrilla Walton, Kas., said 1,000 new The New York Review of Booko Approved For Release 2001?Ogal: 6W-RDP?MIRMIRO 0 7.)6ter Dale Coo LI?9 Iknzona, airad. the Laos: The Story Nixon Won't Tell ? :, 8TATINTL STATJNTL Peter Dale Scott 'Although the present war in Laos the then Premier Prince Souvanna dates back to 1959, the Presidcnl'Sl Phouma, received more votes than any President Nixon cannot expect peace statement is totally silent about the other candidate.) In Vietnam while escalating the warmn 1959-61 period. This is understandable, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in A Thou Laos. His Key Biscayne statement on.since virtually every independent ob- stand Days, has recorded the response Laos of March 6 itself draws attention server has condemned the subversive of the US to the election: to the connection between the two activities in Laos of the CIA and other conflicts, which has since been under- Washington decided to install a con US agencies during the period when lined by. Vice President Agnew, In reliably pro-Western regime. CIA ._.. Mr. Nixon was Vice President. A spooks put in their appearance, set reality the so-called "Vietnandiation" RAND. Corporation report on Laos ? up a Committee for the Defense Vietnam was balanced by a sharp concluded, for example, that in 1959 . of National Interest (CDNI) and in 1969 of the ground war in South ' brought back from France as es escalation of the US air war in Laos,' it was not the pro-Communist Pathetl: chief an. energetic, ambitious and beyond the range of Inquisitive TV; Lao but the right-wing Sananikone devious officer named Phoumi No- camera teams. This escalation is now government (which had been installed !' savan. Prince Souvanna, who had ' rationalized (though not admitted) by by US intrigue and was counseled by . shown himself an honest and re- the President's statement on Laos, US iaisers) that "precipitated the spected if impulsive leader, was v.hich puts forth a grossly misleading final crisis which led to war in Laos." '. forced out of office lby a wit ' .. holding of US aid and CIA encour- ,history of North Vietnamese 'persist- This "final crisis" followed a probe . . ent subversion" and "invasion." . by a government patrol into the small :.? agement of a parliamentary crisis, allegedly through the use of 4 ' This story was put together long before the present administration. Many of its allegations were supplied years ago by US intelligence sources, who had a stake in misrepresenting the Laotian war which they had themselves largely helped to create. The statement must however be answered, since it is at least as misleading as the intelligence reports of North-Vietnamese and Chin- ese aggression in South Vietnam, which preceded our air war in that country. Of course, the escalation in the long run will involve two sides, and some day historians can analyze the whole involvement in Laos of Thailand, the Philippines, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, the United States, Taiwan, and China. It has been not North Vietnam but the and were permitted to participate in actions deflected the Pathet Lao from ' It is important, however, to see that ? United States, and more particularly its elections for specially created seats in the role of political opposition into a apparatus of civil and military Intel- ,the National Assembly. In this election military insurgency for which it was ligence agencies, which has been con- the Pathet Lao and their allies (the poorly prepared, and hence it was sistently guilty of the initial subversion party of left-leaning neutralist Quinim forced increasingly to depend on North of whatever order has been established :Pholsena) obtained 32 percent of the Vietnamese support. (By 1969 this in Laos through international agree- , 'votes and thirteen of the twenty-one included regular units of the North 'ments. Thus the President's statement., contested seats, showing that they had :Vietnamese army.) ., grown considerably in popularity in: in August 719'59 the government ,?,/ indubitable . CIA and US sir (otos; , meets. (Prince Souphanouvong, , itself received a large increase in US should be examined in the Rini 017 the four years since the 1954 Agree- , the military support by claiming, falsely, activities that he wholly leaves out. i ii,Pathet Leo leader and half-brother of that who' been invaded.. by a North Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 . but sensitive disputed area of Huong bribes) ... a veteran politician Lap on the North Vietnamese border?, . named Phoumi Sananikone look which had been governed as part of his place. Vietnam in the days of the French.. When the patrol was, predictably, , The Pathet Lao were then excluded fired upon, the government charged from the new Cabinet approved on the North Vietnamese with frontier August 18. 1958.. incursions and claimed that this was . related to a planned insurrection by: ,... , . the Pathet Lao. It then obtained a vote In may 1959 one 'Pathet Lao bat- of emergency powers from the Assem- talion refused, understandably, to be .bly, and soon ordered the two remain- assimilated under the new right-wing lug battalions of the Pallid Lao to be government, and it decamped to a Integrated forthwith into the national valley on the North Vietnamese bog- army. der. The Sananikone government then The Pathet Lao hail previously lin declared that i the Pathet Lao had November 1957) apeed to this Werra- committed an act of open rebellion lion, as part of a political settlement in and that only a military solution hich they received two Cabinet posts appeared possible. It thus by its own Approved For Release 2Ciffiffaide RDP80-01 9 APR 1970 Laos Hearing! Records Set 1 For Release By the Associated Press Sen. Stuart Symington says agreement has been reached with the Nixon administration to release after five months of ne- gotiations the transcript of closed door hearings on Laos. Symington, chairmn of the Foreign Relations subcommittee, on natiOnal commitments, told the Senate yesterday the record to be released?within two , weeks?is a "sanitized version." He said it deals in part "with the dangers of past administra- tion policy in Laos which permit- ted military involvement and es- calation to be wrapped in official secrecy, and thus to grow with- out the benefit of proper public discussion." "Those of us who have worked to t have that secrecy dropped? as it was with the President's March 6 statement on Laos? hope the unhappy lesson of Laos secrecy will not be lost on this administration as it designs its policy toward Cambodia," the Missouri Democrat said. Symington aides said about 10 percent of the transcript has been deleted. At one point, they Said, the administration sought to delete 60 percent. Besides Los, four more tran- scripts remain to be issued, on! 'Thailan d, Taiwan, Japan. , Okinawa, and 1Core!k., ? STATI NTL : , , Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00070004000173 r- OlUCKOCi 'Mint= Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 8 APR 1970 STATINTL 1Laos Head Tells Views to Tribune Samuel Jameson, chief of tha Tokyo bureau of Tip; Ctn- . CAGO TRIBUNE, IS in south- east Asia to study the widen- ing military and political situation there. The following is the first of several articles. BY SAMUEL JANIESON I [Chief of Tokyo Bureau) ICAlcege Tribune Press Service] VIENTIANE, Laos, April 7? Premier Souvanna Phouma of Loos said for the first time in Ian exclusive interview here !today that he had not autho- lrized and did not control ;American bombing raids on the !Il'o Chi Minh trail in southern Laos.t.. ? The 68-year-old prince said, however, that he did not object , to such raids. , "No, we do not control them (the bombing raids on the Ho :Chi Minh trail)," he said. "How ,could we control them? The only way to control them would be to prohibit American planes ; from flying over Laos. Even ; then, if planes came in from I the sea, how could we stop them? How could we even know they were bombing? There are no villages in the area. The area is all mountains end Jungles." Explains His Position Souvanna made his come merits in the course of a detailed explanation of how he originally asked the United States to start serial missions over northern Laos, an area unaffected by the Ho CM Minh trail. "There is no written agree- ment (giving the United States permission to bomb northern Laos). It is an oral agree- ment," be said. He said it ass concluded In May, 1964, when communist Pathet Lao and North Vietna- mese troops attacked the forces ? of Kong Le, then the leader of the neutralist army, In the Plain fo Jars. Souvanna said he asked his half brother, Prince Souphanouvong, titular head of the Pathet Lao to stop the fighting. Souphimouvong re- fused, claiming that the battle Involved only neutralist forces fighting among .themselves, not Pathet Lao or North Vietna- mese. Asks for Ilelp When the plain fell, Souvannu said he decided to ask for help. The prince said he made two requests to the United States. One was for arms and ammuni- tion for the neutralist army, which bad run out of ammuni- tion for its Russian-made weap- ons. The other was for Ameri- can reconnaissance flights over roads from North Viet Nam Into northern Laos. ? Nothing in the ..,agreement covered the Ho Chi Minh trail, he indicated. The roads covered by the agreement are in northern , Laos and are not connected with the Ho Chi Minh trail farthd eouth in the Laos panhandle. The step-up in American bombing in northern Laos to full-fledged tactical bombing missions totaling more than 400 a day occurred according to Laotian requests, he said. Souvanna said specific re- quests int bombing missions are made by Laos government guerrillas or regular army troops in the field. They are relayed by radio to communi- cation planes in the air and from there to air bases. Souvanna did not mention it but the bins to which he referred am In Thailand. , The premier said he had told the North Vietnamese ambas- sador in ?Vientiane that Laos would call off the American bombing raids in northern Laos if the North Vietnamese with' drew to the Ho Chi Minh trail or back to North VietNam. "Then it would be up to North Vietnamese and the Americans to make an agree- ment covering the bombing of the Ho Chi Minh trail. That is not our affair," he said. The leader also defended the secrecy which has shrouded American air support of Lao- tian army units. "The North Vietnamese are still coming into Laos but they refuse to admit it. Why should we tell the public in order. to let the Communists know what we are doing?" he said. .? ?, He added that foreign. jour- nalists were prohibited from visiting frontline Laotian units because Lao commanders were "too busy" to care for their needs. Admits Thais Helping Earlier at a press conference given for newsmen visiting with H. Ross Perot, Texas billion. ire, Souvanna acknowledged that Thai nationals were fight- ing in Laos. He denied; how- ever, that any units of the Thai armed forces are in Laos. There are more Loatians in Thailand than in Laos and some of these have come to fight in Laos as individuals, he said. Ile reiterated declarations that he would not ask the ,United States to send ground combat troops to Laos , but, emphasized that continuedl American military and eco- ? nomic support is essential. "We are fighting for our survival. The United States must understand we can do nothing without its help," he 8a id. He also said he would send a reply to a five-point Pathet Lao peace proposal in two or three ! days. Denies POW Information In another development Mrs. Dorothy Bodden of 5707 Walnut av., Downers Grove, met the Pathet Lao representative in Vientiane, Sot Petrasi. He otld Mrs. Bodden he had no infor- mation c oncerning her son, army sgt. Timothy Roy Bod- den, 27. The son has been listed as missing for more than 3 years. Four othe wives of missing service inn accom- panied her. All of the womeY requests were rejeted with a pat statement that nothing could b accomplished until the United States Mops Its bombing of Laos. However, the Pathet Lao representative did tell the women that about 100 of 1,200 Americans shot down over Laos were .alive and being held in caves and camps near the places where they were shop , down. ? . Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 ?1 Approved For Release 2001MVAPINDIA-RDP80-0 8 APR 1970 ? STATI NTL U.S. building roads in Nepal KATHMANDU"? The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), recently identified as the CIA "front" for operations in Laos and Thailand, is busily engaged in building a road in Nepal, the strate- gically-located Himalayan kingdom between India and the People's Republic of China. The road starts in western Nepal, on the Indian border at Dhangar- hi. and will eventually tie in with another road to be built to Jumla, 100 miles to the north. A third road is planned, which will link Pokhara, in central Nepal, with the Mushtang enclave about 90 miles to the north. Pokhara is already connected by road with a network that extends south to the border with India: The Indian government, with Nepalese agree- ment. maintains reconaissanee teams on the northern Nepalese frontier with China. . ? ? 7 Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : cIA-RDP80-0.1601R000700040001-3 Vai 'S Li IA Approved For Release 2001/03/04.; CIA-RDP80-016 8 APR 1970 STATINTL Laotians Repel Hanoi Troops By liAMM'Y ARBUCKLE Spedal to The Star VIENTIANE?North Vietnam- ese forces attacked Ban Na Lao, a village near Paksane in east. central Laos, at dawn today. illeven Communists were killed vhen a Lao "Spooky" gunship woke up the attack. . Three Lao government sol- Hers were wounded. At he key? guerrilla base of Long Chien, meantime, a mas- sive American logistics effort was underway, sources report- ed. Communists Were reported to be firing occasional rocket shells Into the base, where at least 38 ' Americans are aiding the logis- tics effort. Twenty shells were fired into the base this morning, hitting houses and causing cas- ualties. Light aircraft and helicopters belonging to Air America, the ClAtchartered line, are landing almost every minute and are ferrying troops and ammunition to outposts around Long Chien. One American helicopter,? ? which was 'carrying its load of ammunition slung on a net un- derneath--dropped the load when the net broke. Four thousand of Long Chien's 40000 Meo tribesmen have, moved back into the town they fled last month, but many Mco soldiers are staying with their families in the surrounding hills. Thai infantry and artillery men dressed in unmarked fa- tigues were said to be the main factor in the stiffening town de- fense at Long Chien. . American jets today knocked out a 120Anillimeter mortar %Weil had been harassing gov- ernment forces sweeping out from Tam Bleung, 12 miles north of Long Chien headquar? tors of Mee Gen. Vani Pao. _ Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R00 ? ? REP(..)ai-LP, - 41). 5112 S 53,5is APR '7 1970 Neutralism Gone The overthrow of cambodia's !Prince Norodom Sihanouk has done at least one thing: It has destroyed I the myth of neutralism in Southeast Asia. Ever since the Geneva accords of ! 1962, which provided for the neutral- ism of Laos and Cambodia, neutral- ism has led an uneasy life. North Vietnam supported the Pathet Lao in Laos, and the United States support- ' ed the Vientiane regime through the CIA...In Cambodia, wily Prince Si- ttrilink tried to buy neutralism by winking at the use of a part of his country for the movement of North I Vietnamese troops and supplies into South Vietnam. He also tried to play Hanoi against Peking and Moscow. Now in exile, alternatively in Mos- I cow and Peking, Prince Sihanouk has begun his bid for a return to power.? I The result may be a civil war. North Vietnam may, indeed, end up with control of Laos and Cambodia, a na- tionalist dream of centuries. So much for neutralism in a bitter- rly divided world. Maybe the late John Foster Dulles was right when he arT, Lgued that neutraliam wait immoral.-A Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 NEWSWEEK Approved For Release 2001/03/04 ? CIA-Rg4-61rdi101R0 6 APR Igiu AIR AMERICA: ANYTHING GOES t doesn't pipe Mantovani into its cabins, I dress stewardesses in colorful Puccis or serve boctif bourguignon on any of its flights. And yet Air America is one of the largest U.S. airlines, ranking behind Na- tional and ahead of Northeast in the number of its planes and personnel. Air America can afford to be indifferent to the extras provided by other airlines be- cause it has only one customer to please ?the United States Government?for which it performs a wide variety of services connected with the American military involvement in Southeast Asia. As a rule, these services go unpublicized. lecently, however, Air America came into the spotlight when it flew several hundred Thai troops into Laos to help the CIA-sponsored secret army" of Gen. Vang Pao defend the outpost of Long Cheng from Communist attack. Although in practical terms it is an op- erating arm of the CIA, Air America is owned by a private aviation-investment concern called Pacific Corp. Its managing director and chief executive, a large, af- fable man named George Doole Jr., laughs heartily when questioned about dealings with intelligence organizations ?but hedges his answer. "I don't' know all of our customers' private business and relations," he said last week. "So help me, that's a fact." But while that may be so, Air America's motto, "Anything, Any- time, Anywhere?Professionally, sug- gests the company plays by rather free- ? wheeling rules. "I guess we carry about everything except bombs under our wings," says Air America Saigon manager E.J. Theisen, And In fact, the range of the company's activities almost lives up to its motto. CIA agents working in the Phoenix program? a campaign to ferret out Viet Cong op- eratives in South Vietnam?fly Air Ameri- ca when they need to move a high-level prisoner. Green Berets use the airline to carry supplies to NIontagnard mercenar- ies. And according to Theisen, even the U.S.'s supersecret Special Operations Group in Saigon, which works almost ex- clusively behind enemy lines, relies on Air America for some of its transport needs within South Vietnam. Contracl: At present, though, the bulk of the line's work is in Laos, where it drops tons of rice to Mco tribesmen un- der a contract with the Agency for Inter- national Development, carries troops to the front and evacuates refugees. But when it comes to discussing operations behind Pathet Lao lines, only miles from the North Vietnamese border, Vientiane manager James Cunningham Jr. is not giving away any secrets. 'We operate on a you-call, we-haul basis," he said. "We don't go into details." For its varied operations, Air America uses a fleet of some 150 planes?mostly unmarked twin-engine Volpar Beech- crafts and Swiss-built Pilatus Porters. Its 600 pilots, many of them Vietnam veterans, make as much as $25,000 a year?and earn every penny of it. Under all kinds of weather?and oaken under fire as well?they fly into remote jungle air- strips no bigger than football fields and wear thick gold bracelets, which thy can barter for food and Medicine in case of forced landings in remote regions. But in spite of the risks they take, the pilots are rarely the daredevil Steve Canyons one might expect. "They're in it for the money, comments one old Asian hand. "These guys all read Barron's for stock- market tips. 3" e? ? ? ? .4 Ap ? roved For Release 209.1/9?/(4 ? GIA-RIF8021601R0007000 0001-3 vacua ion ign 1mus: au ea, weru1 STATI NTL ? Approved For Release 2001/03491pFROoRDPset0A9MIF THE WAR IN VIETNAM "7747-717-7777.7t?7'17"!?""i7rr","?.',r " ? y en, k ' ' ..? '41; .5t ? '6-11tIr - y t ; . ? NIMM thonina N?wil Asian tinderbox: Cambodian leaders parade as Red envoy arrives in Laos Indochina: The Calm Before the Storm? a land where he was once slavishly adored, Prince Norodom Sihanouk s name was suddenly mud. The cabal that overthrew the Cambodian Chief of State two weeks ago diligently set about de- stroying his reputation in the hope of heading off any popular outcry for his return. Newspapers ran obscene cartoons of Sihanouk and his wife, Monique, and the same radio announcers who had sung his praises so extravagantly a short time ago now vied in berating him. Pictures of Sihanouk and his mother, Queen Siso- wath Kossamak, were ripped from walls all over the country, and there was talk of abolishing the monarchy. As a special gesture in honor of the coup, Phnom Peoh's Sihanouk Street was renamed "March 18, 1970, 1 p.m. Street." To those who kid feared that the Cambodian coup might trigger a wider war in Indochina, these activities seemed reassuringly parochial. "At this point," said a junior diplomat in Saigon, "the so- called 'Indochina war' is the greatest non-event in history." But later., events took a more ominous turn. In Cambodia, pro-Sihanouk rioters forced the govern- ment to call up reserves, and there were unconfirmed reports that Viet Cong troops were moving toward Phnom Penh. In Laos, the Communists appeared to be massing for another attack. And in South ? Vietnam, the government took advantage of the Cambodian coup by attacking ene- ? my forces across the border. In short, it seemed much too early to write off the PiNnbill05 geirtaigkedscit ' attack on the key government outpost at ? . Long Cheng did not materialize, and it looked as though the North Vietnams() and their local allies, the Pathet Lao, had stalled after taking 'nearby Sam Thong. But the Laotians were not yet out of the woods. "The North Vietnamese appar- ently tried to take both Sam Thong and Long Cheng in a rush," said an official foreign observer. "It only worked half- way, and now they are regrouping for a massive, more conventional assault on Long Cheng." No one had much faith that the force of Meo tribesmen defend- ing 'Long Cheng could hold out for long,- and there were fresh reports last week that transport planes laid on by the CIA (box) had carried several hundred Thai soldiers in as reinforcements. (Thailand denied that it had any regulars in Laos,. but officials conceded that "volunteers" might have joined the fray,) This trans- fusion, however, was no sure-fire cure. "Sending the Thais up there is not liko having a Panzer division defend the place," said one U.S. military man. "The Thais spook as badly as the Laotians," Unavailing Efforts: Diplomacy failed to ease the crisis. President Nixon sent a strong note to Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin asking Moscow' to reconvene the 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos, of which it is co-chairman, in order to stop the fighting. But most observers gave that effort little chance for success. Another letter was sent by messenger from the Pathet Lao's titular leader, Prince Sou- phanouvong, to his half-brother, Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma. The "peace 20" gCntiVii0 01061Y3164161 If the outlook was disturbing in Laos, ft was even more disheartening in Cam-' Wis. One of the principal aims of thy 'new regime is to expel North Vietnam- , ese and Viet Cong troops from their sanctuaries along the border with South ' Vietnam. But the triumvirs in Phnom Penh?the Prime Minister, Lt. Gen. Lon Nol, Deputy Prime Minister Prince Siso- wath Sink Matak and Chief of State Chen Heng?wisely decided that their best chance for survival was to follow the neutralist path that Sihanouk trod nimbly for many years. Accordingly, ,they asked the Soviet Union and Britain, ; the co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Con- ference on Indochina, to do the job for them by restoring the International Con- trol Commission that had been set up by the conference partly to police Cambo- , dian neutrality (Sihanouk sent the coin- ! mission packing in 1909 as an economy measure). The new leaders also tried to ' maintain working relations with Column- Dist diplomats in the hope that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops could be negotiated oil Cambodian soil. And ? Lon Nol's government even held onto the Columbia Eagle, the hijacked American - munitions ship, for fear that by releas- ing the vessel it might appear to favor the U.S. But Lon Nol seemed to be having 1 trouble balancing on the tightrope. It was unlikely that the Communists could - be persuaded to lend a hand, for Hanoi, Moscow and Peking were all convinced ; that the new regime in Phnom Penh was leaning toward the West. For one thing, 1 I ? ail 1,9 clamp down on hist military sup- plies through the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville?continuing a process be. STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03./WCIA-RDP80-01601R000,7 6 APR 1970 ? Mounting Uneasiness S a new regime sought to consolidate its hold on Cambodia last week, portraits of Prince Norodom Sihanouk were hurriedly removed in government offices and shops throughout the cap- ital of .Phnom-Penh. While the deposed chief of state was gone, however, it was clear that he was not forgotten. In a Phnom-Penh hotel, a visitor asked for one of the Sihanouk portraits as a Souvenir. "Oh no," replied a clerk. "We are saving it. Nothing is sure. We may have to put it back up." A mood of uneasiness and uncertainty prevailed in Cambodia and in neigh- AP LON NOL IN PHNOM-PENH New chapter in a turbulent history. boring Laos as well. In Peking, Si- hanouk called for a war of liberation against the "traitors and renegades" who had seized power in Phnom-Penh. From Hanoi came pledges of "total support" for Sihanouk, and North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong hurried to Pe- king to confer with the deposed prince. In Phnom-Penh, both the North Viet- namese and the Vict Cong closed their embassies, a move short of outright dip- lomatic rupture but suggestive of trou- ble to come. Late in the week it came. Pro-Si- hanouk riots erupted north of Phnom- Penh, and two National Assembly dep- uties who had voted to depose Siha- nouk were reportedly slashed to death. To keep the demonstrations from spreading to the capital, the government sent tanks to seal off roads leading to Phnom-Penh; closed Pochentong Air- port and imposed a 6 p.m.-to-6 a.m. cur- few. More ominously, Acting Head of in Southeast Asia State Cheng Heng charged that Viet Cong forces on Cambodian soil "have begun actions against the Cambodian people and our soldiers" near the bor- der, and Prince Sink Matak warned that an attack by thousands of Com- munist troops "could not be ruled out." There were reports that several thousand Communist troops had entered the coun- try to foment trouble, and the new gov- ernment called up its reserves and asked all veterans to report for duty: Mean- while, in Laos, rampaging Communist forces were less than 1 miles away from the key CIA base at Long Cheng. A new chapter in the turbulent history of Indochina was unfolding, and few cared to predict whether it was the pref- ace to a wider war. Down to Size. Styling itself a "gov- ernment of salvation," the regime of General Lon Nol, the Premier, and Prince Sink Matak, the Deputy Pre- mier, moved to persuade Cambodia of the rightness of its rule. In meetings with major national groups?leading Buddhist bonzes, district chiefs, students and members of Sihanouk's own po- litical movement, the Sangkum?the , new leaders explained their actions in de- tail and stressed the economic difficulties and moral corruption of recent years. Key Sihanouk backers were jailed. Still, one Western diplomat suggested that if Sihanouk were to turn up at the airport tomorrow, "the guards, in- stead of arresting him, would probably prostrate themselves before him." To cut Sihanouk down to size, the gov- ernment began waging an intensive prop- aganda campaign. The local press, which. had previously referred to him as a god prince, mocked him savagely and his half-Italian wife Princess Monique even more. Some newspapers ran composite photos of her head on anonymous nude bodies in obscene poses. The prince's popularity, however, remained a trou- blesome factor. An Army Affair. An equally serious difficulty was the Communist Vietnam- ese military presence. Before Sihanouk's fall, Lon Nd l called on the Communists to evacuate their Cambodian sanctuaries immediately. That demand was not em- phasized publicly after the 'takeover. Nonetheless, Sink Matak told TIME Correspondent Burton Pines in Phnom- Penh that getting rid of the Communist forces remained a primary goal. "We de- mand that they immediately leave our territory," the prince said. "Sihanouk vi- olated his own?and our?proclaimed policy of neutralism by permitting the Vietnamese foreigners to stay inside Cambodia. We cannot tolerate it. We have every expectation that this matter can be solved peacefully. If not, it will become an affair for our army." If last week's border clashes were to develop into an all-out war between Cambodia's 37,00(1-man army and the better-armed, better-organized Commu- nist troops, a slaughter would probably ensue. Cambodia could call on the Amer- icans and South Vietnamese, but that'? would almost certainly plunge the coun- try?like Laos?inextricably into the ag- onizing morass of the Viet Nam War. "In no case would I envisage asking any of our neighbors?Thailand, Laos, up' VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN LEAVES CAMBODIA Fresh fears of a wider war. South Viet Nam?for assistance," Sir- 1k Matak told Pines. "To ask others to help us militarily would destroy the in- dependence and neutrality that are the preconditions of our small nation's ex- istence." U.S. jets strafed Communist positions in Cambodia. It was the fifth time this year that the U.S. has ad- mitted to air raids over Cambodia. Coup Rumors, In Laos, the question was how far the six battalions of North Vietnamese troops that were probing Laotian defenses around Long Cheng in- tended to go. Would they overrun the base and keep moving right to the plains ' just north of Vientiane? A major push seemed several days off at least, but U.S. advisers and government defenders prepared a fallback position at Ban Son, 20 miles south of the base. Meanwhile, U.S. warplanes continued to bombCom- Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040303811-.Ped 1(1,1%17 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 munist supply routes across northern ; Laos. Despite U.S. estimates that the air attacks have inflicted 20% casualties on Communist units, the bombing has failed to stem the tide of supplies. Though a new Communist Pa thet Lao peace plan was delivered to Prince Sou- ' vanna Phounta, the neutralist but West- ern-leaning Premier of Laos, he de- cided to defer a decision until the Cam- bodian situation settles down. In any case, the prospect that anything solid ? may emerge from the Pathet Lao plan is slight. As a precondition, the Com- munists insist that American planes halt their bombing in Laos. U.S. officials . have indicated that the bombing will not stop, even at Souvanna' s request. As Secretary of State William Rogers noted last week: "If North Viet Nam: continues to use the Ho Chi Minh Trail as a principal supply route to South Viet Nam, obviously we would not be ! in a position to stop." Souvanna may be encountering some difficulty himself, from the right as well as the left. Rumors of a possible right- , wing coup were once again afloat in I Vientiane. As for the left, Souvanna said that Hanoi hoped to capitalize on the coup in Cambodia by solidifying its ; hold on Laos while everybody's atten- tion was directed elsewhere. "North Viet Nam," said Souvanna, "has a desire for hegemony in this area." Tempting Target. That seems true enough. There is little doubt ?that Ha- noi and Washington alike are deeply, worried about what may happen next in the area. A broadening of the war could place enormous strains. on Ha- noi's resources, but the North Vietnam- ese may be tempted to strike if their sanctuaries arc seriously endangered.. The U.S., on. the other hand, may be tempted to remove once and for all the border sanctuaries that have enabled, Hanoi- to prolong the war. ? Unless the U.S. is willing to take the chance of widening the war, however, ? it might be wiser to settle for smaller gains. One possibility Would be for the U.S. to discourage Cambodia from mil- itary action against the Communists, but to encourage Ate new regime to cur- tail their supplies. If Washington were to seek any more dramatic profit from, the current turmoil, it might risk throw- ing away the hope of a long-term po- litical settlement in exchange for a short- term military advantage. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 TI I 1,T AppwoyegletFor Release 2001/03/04 : ClAtIWynk1601 GAZETTE & DAILY ? LI ? 37,175 1070 CONSPIRACY??.?? ? , . Let ,ns assume that there -are those ?i? The history of the U.S. intervention . who believe this will work; no better.: in Vietnam is filled with unanswered now than it did before ? ? and that questions, the biggest one being how what is required is not the Nixon' f, we got into it in the first place. , instead, of What he seems to Arthur Goldberg, Ambassador to t be doing. How better to countermand: the United Nations, in the Johnson- Ahe troop withdrawal order of the-.: - Administration, says that it was 'all a Nixa n Administration than by mistake, from the beginning on creating what can be described as the ? t through. Not a conspiracy, he says,, necessity not for leSs U.S. forces but merely a mistake, a tragic one. ' for more? it Maybe. Why, though, would he The present picture in Laos and mention "conspiracy" in his remarks Cambodia,,,.surely suggests a buildup. on a recent television "Meet The toward this kind of emergency. Who is-. Press" show. Could. it be that, the constructing the buildup? In charge in. l events underway in Laos and Laos, we know from recent news-1 Cambodia, raising as they do. more reports obtained with great difficulty, ; mysterious ,questions, prompt ? is the U.S. Central Intelligence. thoughts coming under the heading of Agency, the ?c1,4?.. a sup`er secret "conspiracy?" . ? . service accountable for its funds and , There is a clear line extending back operations to. no one but. itself; as. from at least 1950 ? probably before , Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and: ? of U.S. intervention in the poisibly johns:on found out. The post-world-war-two situation in -Icharices. are- 'Strang that the hand of southeast Asia, in -the area which used the CIA wilrbe found to have .been ; to be called French Indochina. (That decisive - in CambOdia-in the right-Wing', t former colonial territory now consists ,military 'Caup.Which'-depoSed the of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.) ,tCatril#M4h- le4clet,'"Prinee' ! In 1950, with therrench embarked ? - upon an effort to maintain a form of... Control over their pre-war possession, U. S. advisors arrived from Korea and i the Philippines to teach-. guerrilla !- warfare to French 'officers. At about _ the same time there beganra , suostantial program of U.S. military aid to the French. t Four years later the French had had .1 I? it in Vietnam. But not so the U.S. Between 1954: and 1956 the United States military presence in Vietnam replaced the previous French'. ; presence. Little .by little ?? the complete story -remains to be told ?.. - the role of this presence changed from -training mission to combat support to- combat replacement, in the number of. a half million troops. . . The Nixon policy; as far as can be determined, is-- to attempt to reverse , this process-. To 'change the US. military role, that is, back to what it ! was nine or ten years ago.- To I "XlitiPaki giSP4I-eat-e- 2001 /0'3/04 : CIA-RDP8M1601R000700040001-3 STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160 CHAR L.T.Sleat, VA,rm GAZETTE- r M - 63,294 GAZETT1. -MAIL S - 106,775 ? 4.3 nan.. 1 r : ?? L The great danger of ' United".,,Thia 40',.'4:-It'Pe .q. Yx-raii'lemart. . , '.States ' Involvement in Laos ? ,:that.'.inuat,'net be allOWed ,t.o? oon0, :which? the Nixon administration i, tireie',;:??fer, it will Serve tu';,46?tro,Y,.., has gone to such pains to keep ''viii.4te:Var ii$0,?:,*111: this.?:?country., secret ? is that it ultimately will ...c:Ma'ii,N AVG ? t?-'1414 1,P.'?',arcnd "get us entangled in another Viet. ;;,:the:;',world,, through 'the' edOnornic nm-type war in Southeast Asia. l,!,eff6,143 of the .r?-?AgeheY j.OV.:??rat'ar" And, certainly, we already, : have t'Ait atii)nal ;Development' :';;-,','..''.? ? ,? a a k :more than we can handle with the iE??!, Indeed* ' a presidential mess in Vietnam. v,force.appointed to *takes cOmpre-. ' But there is nother aspect that '? hensive revievi of past U. S. elk.' can be severely damaging to this programs and chart new directions' country. That is our clandestine for the 1970s specifically recora.-?,'; operations in which we apparently mended on March 8. a completeo,' , are carrying out our cloak-and- -. separation of military and econora.,,,::? I dagger maneuvers in Laos under ' ic aid. . . , ; ?.'''? , ' , 1eni .. ._ " ' cover of the Agency for Interna- :' The 16-member panel, beaded bY,??', tional Development (AID). former:(Bank of America President ,, 1 The --Associated Press reported Rudolph A. Peteraon, urged. thati; a' fews days ago that Anri_can all types of "security' assistance".?!. civilians based in Laos '"perforni including military as8i8tance ? and ' what' amounts to military , fnne.: sales ? be combined in one legisia- tions under auspice?:af the I3., S. tive act, separate from economic Embassy, the Agency for Interna- aid, with the State Department , tional Development and two com- ,. exercising "firm pellei Oldanee"'? ;panies under charter to AID?Air -. '' Over -military programs. ;America and Continental Air Ser*::: .,'.. ,The purpose of the AID program ? :ices, Inc." ,. , , ;??:? ' :,' ., is to provide needed economic as- The ?best available information, ? sistance in underdeveloped cowl- 1 /Said this report, Is that as Tilli-TO , tries, and in the process win some as 10,0,,Pt4I.pet3ounq1 are operating 'friends for America, which it sure In Laos under cover 'of AID or the, ly :needs; :We can be sure that ,U.S:' Embassy, ? whilk; other. CIA. 'neither objective will be achieved !.?ageatzt are said to 911:11'4ti7,..in 007 ,by misusing the Agency for In- r bia4;':,31.4e4niTig. Weil are not_ca;r1V - ill ternationaj Development as an II ried::on either, bass: N Pr:' , ', ', i ' ? . . - ' ? .',.. ., e : ly . , .:, ? ,;,... e ,al cover for CIA activities. ?rolls.:?"'i ; ' .. sY7-i-??-k,,',????-????v!".Y,:!,' i ; .This can only serve to make all of ." SiOtele:antir;' 4Ill'officlials,,will ,..?? or efforts, however humanitarianeither'confir that their in nor deny ' . , 4414 fames they may he,,,,a4e.pec; t 1, Organization, 18':?-?4 cover., for ,CIA; , ?_ "(key" 44 the wericL i , operations:, This' it is C e tri s "tii Ma '. , ' ' " ? ? , ', ' "' ? ' ' corrieS doo,:to.!beirig a centessli,*; ,,,that' AID is iPrOstituting, itacil';byj providinF'PV. ,P1t, for our. ini1.14ry ! ; PeY140141; tl4ttF46.tn41/14'1111;;I:',A ? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA,RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 !r? ? cLFvFoPtapKoNRA3Forlelease 2001/03/04.: 61A-RDP80.01601R0 PLAIN DEALER STATINTL ? 409,414 S kini',42 1970 Blames Public ,Gullibilit 7 , the CIA and Pentagon, is expanding the V Now our federal government, pushed by SoutheasrAsian war into Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand, the American people shoukt be reminded of the following: When Richard Nixon was vice presh; 'dent, on April 17, 1954, he addressed news. paper editors at Washington in what was supposed to be an "off the record" talk. He tried to torpedo the Geneva Peace confer-, ence, then about to begin, by saying: "If, to avoid further Communist expansion in Asia and Indochina we must take the risk now by ? putting our boys in, I think the executive has to take the politically unpopular step to 'do it." Word leaked out the following day of what Nixon had said. The story was pub- lished. Americans should note that this is the same man who, since entering the White House, has been assuring the people "all we are interested in is to see the Viet- namese get the right of self-determination." That right was, thwarted when the late John Foster Dulles led the drive that pre.e vented the free elections in Vietnam sped= lied at Geneva. The CIA and Pentagon ap= plauded. Since then, a succession of ;federal administrations has convinced our people we had to go there and invade Asia orthe Vietnamese, with no bombers or Navy,' would come over and attack us. Some 50,000 of our men have died in combat or of frog.; cal diseases because of our gullibility: wanted? this really what the "silent majority!) JACK CLOWSER ???,; 1516 Bidwell Avenue,.;;,, ' ' ? 1 L. Roc]QRjverAl4fAki# for Expansion of Vietnam Approvecl.For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 Approved For Release 29N/RolreaSIRIP80701601 5 APR in STATINTL -Trigre'r-77-71 , Sy DON SCHANCHE THE STRONGEST FORCE he- hind the headlines in the strange, secret war of the CIA-supported ? Meo guerillas in Laos is a 57-year- old retired Indiana farmer whose ? bizarre career as humanitarian, battle tactician afid homespun philosopher combines the qualities ? of Albert Schweitzer, Lawrence of OS+ Ism lord, are on the run. The Didianan ' fled under Communist fire just a few days ago from his refugee headquarters and supply base at Sam Thong, a pro- vincial capital he founded seven years ago on a high mountain plateau 16 miles south of the Plaine des arres. , 1THE MEO GENERAL, who calls Buell "any father" and occasionally ignores his , CIA advisers to follow the old farmer' Iadvice, is fighting to save his own_head- , quarters 19 miles away. It is an &malty "new" town called Long Tiang and it has f during -a bloody, three-day enemy at-11 I tack. Once, he personally trained and led 4 a Meo commando demolition team that I blew up 30 kilometers of the Commu- nists' main supply highway from Hanoi I '.to the Plaine des Jams, stalling .the k enemy's war in Laos for a prec ous six ! months. ? I On another occasion, Buell advanced .1 with a guerrilla patrol to the fenceline 4, of the Pathet Lao's main headquarters . Win Sam Neua city, close to the North Vietnamese border. After helping to re- connoiter the stronghold. he caught ; ? pneumonia on the long trek back to his ? \ been swollen to the proportions of an Arabia and Will Rogers. ' He is Edgar (Pop) Bud, area 1 ifs .. ,..equipment and men from the CIA, th . . . Air Force and the Army of Thai- ' coordinator for the U.S. geney land. O. for International Development in 1.. When I first visited Long Tim ?..?1 iNorthennt Lnon and key figura in thiiinilit years ago, it was an abandoned 'the long struggle against the Com- ellvtittny grAry in the in a howbir de- f rnunist Pathet Lao. The primitive taw the Meo strongehlolgiulladaatinysear, le://1! Meo tribesmen think of him as a ? the (second largest city in Laos, bigger than the royal capital of Luang Pra- ' demi-god. His close friendship bang and almost as large as the petit!, [with their mysterious chieftain cal capital, Vientianet ,Maj. Gen. Vang Pao has often' Communist capture of these two f own base camp and almost died. Twenty times in the last 10 years 4 Into the darkened jungle to escape Com- tnunist attacks against villages in which I lie was sleeping, and each time he has led thousands of terrified refugees out with him. On one nicht alone, early in tho Wm!. he trawl 11,0a0 Meo and Lao . people from elaug ter by leading them away from a pursuing enemy force. For these actions and his unstinting humani- tarian work among Laotian and Meo war. ?refugees, King Savang Vatthana of Luba; awarded him the highest decoration a foreigner can receive, the Order of a mountain bases in the crazy-quilt little Million Elephants, The Meo have given , .; ri suburb b a vast infusion of uell has been forced to flee under fire !turned the course of the war and 'influenced American policy in that war-torn little country. The aging Hoosier, a plain and 'homely man even by Grant Wood war will bee disaster comparable, on him divine status and call him Tan Laos' small scale, to what the American Pop," which means "Mister Sent Prom command in Vietnam would face if Above?' 1 . Deming and Saigon were to be seized by &tell has had one near-fatal heart at- ' the Viet Cong. tack in the Laos mmintains and suffers Ironically, all Buell and Yang Pao ttloTitt of ovnieariTaiamoiiteh hafgrosumrvirveecgrloinuf.-.:,. e4ver sought was a period of peace in ,atandards, has lived with the IVIeo i in the mountains around the famed ' ' the mountains and an opportunity to in- mountain plane crashes and has been, ? . Plaine des Jarres since 1981. He has led 1 itegrato the beeltward 'Me? into the social Ineadrere I/labile bf :Um:. What' has happened .in-1, ifeirtealsmtsetendaw,11 embroiled in a 10-year war in which; and seriously injured several times in 1 American involvement has grown from: a .few bags of rice, riven by Pop Buell crashes of the small courier planes be .1 and Ed ar Buell use to hop around the kirufnotlred1.047aenagrs,Pyaeot, Pthem in victory, rallied them in defeat, ? 'founded their first schools and hospitals, stead is that both have become tragical! :on th SY harkdOitisleen shot twice performed emergency surgery, Including 30 amputations, and taught them a crude 'but efficient "new" kind of 19th century agnculture. to eo war re tweet; n 9 a os mountains of northeast Laos. t"If I can get 'em from a thousand last-ditch stand involving hundreds o , years behind the rest of the world to American fighter bombers, more than a Both are tireless wdrkers. It is rare I k to find either putting in less than an 18- only 70 or 80 years behind," Buell said, ?' billion dollars worth of munitions,A hun- 1 hour day. "I was always of the opinion "they're that much better off, ain't i tired-odd U.S. Army unit advisers and '. , they?" ' dozens of CIA counter-insurgency that I' ought to do a little bit extra after ,i In his devotion to the welfare of the., perts. ex- I did my day's work," said Buell. "It's When President Nixon minimizes. "he vlei.t4le bit that sells America to these) half million Met) and Lao refugees un- I der his care, Buell frequently boils over, , American involvement in ground combat ii he fates of Laos and American in- with irritation at American bureaucrats '?\. in Laos, he obviously hasn't been told tends in that country have been inter-' and diplomats who resist his demands'', about Pop Buell, just as he reportedly twined since the two small men (each is ' - for short-cuts in speeding "PA"' le* was not told about the death of Army 6'4") first met in a native restaurant In' ghe displaced people. His deep friend- '' Captain Joseph Bush in combat at Muong the village of Lhat Homing, just south ' I ships not only with Gen. Yang Pao and 1 consternation of the White House, a Soul, Laos, which I reported, to the of the PlaMe des Jams in 1980, They" i, Souvanna Phouma and dozens of other weeks ago, ter sealed a personal pact that night which. has often overshadowed the policies of' ' other Meo leaders, but with Premier Laotian leaders, including King Savang , ? both the Laotian government and the it i Vatthana himself, has made even high , United States. Buell then was a volunteer agrieul- 1 I cross sword State Department officials reluctant to ? rfoti Fitygetvqd Fohr IRlea d 4, 't ? AsiteiZeirgAtact:irtimputin fug *65 t w. A1.4 A,8 11. ue I an le close ago i his presence alone was credited with , servirenis a private pears ram JIM tirieno, Yang Pao, a tough tribal leader MUMS TOttather a pitifully weak defen-,,suit malty under matted ,to maul Iwito ralci like #44.1149004-04.11a0-4,;,09 ?tom jit aiplaes'.,oalled.,NaJAMI4 laW.X0RX nia$ Approved For Release 2001/03/R04 : CIA-RDP8011/6A1MCRO a Ar1970 o Indochina: The Players Don't Seem Stire What To Do Next .offe'r' :to exchange a peace in , western Laos for a halt in the ? bombing of their supply routes in eastern Laos is rejected out ' . of hand in Washington. ? Mr. Rogers also reiterated' i . American involvement in Laos. precipice at 30 miles an hour riding in a car ? heading' for 'a" Ithe promise not to enlarge the North Vietnam would saddeyn - than a tahte 8nOemwilepsolawnyhoaulir.:tGarant Grant-: Though its total conquest b , .:while,, a new regime struggles ., boring Thailand, it could not be ?:its due, I am still unwilling tot In jittery Cambodia, mean- ,Washington ,and frighten neigh- , '?to cansblidate the overthrow of .: defended by a war-weary na. adorn the lesser folly with the :?name of wisdom." . ? ; Prince- Sihanouk and to avert tion yearning to get its forces At best, the Senator argued, The Prince's successors reiter- p resumably, the Secretary of 1 iptunicshya rporolitciesto iknee!sa'i'igoounr ,civil strife with his followers. off the Asian mainland. ato his vows of neutrality, but I! State also offered a cautious Hstaggering around the ring for h.'account of the Administration's! a few years longer" so that the !Ahoy. possess neither the milt- Aary strength nor the diplomatic . belief that the tide of battle is Administration can avo " id the leverage to compel the North Vietnamese to leave their ommu kind of political settlement that g - I turning a ainst the C nists in South Vietnam. For it has called "defeat and hurmli- . ,tory , " reasons that no one can fully ation"?namely a coalition re- WASHINGTON?That war Just: The South Vietnamese and . . *ill not go away. 'SOTO, of their American military ;1 that no one wishes to defined. communist advance in Asia. , , understand and to an extent ;gime. But instead of deterring ? ? In 'the last week the North advisers are itching for an invi- ' : the "Vietnamization" and "pat-i Mr. Fulbright added, the United ? i country's Interests but to re- ? American troop withdrawals insisted, amounted to' "madness' . Vietnamese struck briefly, though . tatiori. fa cross the border into 1,: ification" programs are said to States has now actually stimu- :.. by no 'means feebly, in a first , 4tall)Poclia?not to defend that ! ,be progressing well, so that. ,lated it. The nation's course, he. spring spasm of offensive. The '' '1. . ? bodia left everyone wondering. 'Cambodian coup they have ar- about 225,000 by mid-1971. The escalatiOn of the, ritetork In . jousting in Laos continued incon- ' ?ileve the military pressure, on. , can probably be accelerated: on so grand a sealer ' elusively. The confusion in Cam-1 :themselves. Twice since ? the,. this year toward the goal of .? That in itself .was a major: ' The Paris talks droned on mono- fiangea.for such an invitation in I present troop level. in Vietnam ?washington. . . , ? ? - , 1 ' ?" ' tonously. The French offered a ',priy,atp.;.negotiations along the ! is 450,000. III. ."._.`"z44Ak?FiCANKEk,' propesal, vaguely. And under the. frontier. But Washington and Success in "Vietnamization" ,:;3?,,; .20.-"iiA,''''1. .26.th -, ..: ... rx ... weight of it all, the uneasy truce .PnoMpenh are plainly fright- ' ? Is also still held to be the only e . on, the home front collapsed. Vetted by such free lance exef- '-. way of forcing Hanoi to nego- ? ,? "It ' simply does not matter 'cises in escalation and. last " tiate for a peace settlement t' very much for the United, week demanded that they be ?I' throughout Indochina. What Iv- o - States;??in cold, unadorned stra-: stopped, at least for the time : % peared to be a. proposal by tegic' ' terms, who rules the, being. ' .France for another large inter- States of Indochina," said Sena-; Dreams of dramatic change . national conference to arrange tor 1... William Fulbright in a, in the military balance in such a settlement found little scornful attack on the nation's . Southeast Asia persist in some interest in Washington. But the policy" in Southeast Asia. American luarters- -if the troop ., proposal was not rejected, ' And though no one answered ? withdrawals could only be slow partly because it was not un- *him in public, the Administra- , enough, if the Cambodian sane- '..clerstood and partly because it ' tioies ' reply was self-evident: It ,: tuary could be harassed or de- ' ,was not clear whether Hanoi , does not matter very much who :stroyed, if, the home front,'? had been sounded out before. ' rules North Vietnam, Laos or woUld hold firm . economically , But the prevailing view in the -, Cambodia; but after all that has And politically, if the' President Administration is that the pres- '? been invested, it still matters meant what he said, about not .ent Paris talks could come .to I very much who rules South Accepting "defeat:";If.. . . , life on a mometies notice If ? ' Vietnam. ? 'North Vietnam were ever inter- - . . ? , :,.. But the prevailing Adminis- , The North Vietnamese have' tration position, as outlined to ,,ested in meeting the minimum' , occupied eastern Laos to pro- a restive' Senate Foreign Rela- ,' 'American condition for a "self-. tect their supply route into:. ,. tions, Committee by , Secretary determined" -- and ? 'presumably -- South,. Vietnam. They are en- ...? of State William P. Rogers, . non-Communist?regime. in Sal- tamped , in eastern Cambodia last week, seems to have been I Bon. to -keep Saigon and the Mekong much more modest. ? , , Vietnamization was seen In Delta . region under constant ? He said the United States, ? wholly different terms, how- threat., They are advancing In: had no intention of involving i 'ever, by Senator Vulbright. It is i western Laos to prove that.they 1 ? itself in Cambodia, either mili- ,.better than escalation, he Said; i cannot be defeated even when', tarily or diplomatically. Though. ,'in 'a long speech that signaled '. they are stymied inside South' the new regime there enjoys ,': the end of. his patience and pri- , Vietnam. They mount a periodic 1 Washington's tacit support, it is ' ' Irate. 'truce with Mr.' ROgers.1 , "But I welcome it only, in .the' sense 'that '4,' would , rather.' W' ' attack in South Vietnam to, em- phasize their menacing presence while the Americans try slowly i to depart. out of the Indochina war and. . . still give less aid and comfort; , Laos Deadlock to Hanoi than in Prince Si- 'The "neutral" Laotians resist hanouk's day, so much the bet-I as best they can, with the help ter. If it gets into trouble; and, .. of a C.I.A.-run army, some Thai seeks American help,' 4 Willi troops and American air born- I 'probably be refused.,.'' , bardmenLs. The. American ap. ' , ? ? ., ? ,. . vii. ' +' '. ? go' unh V afar lease 2001 /03/04.:'t ? recognized as weak and essen- tially impotent against the North Vietnamese. If It can stay, peals paatker istarg 'Promise Rated. fAl? king. The' North ' VIetnamette! DP80-01601R000700040001-3 STATINTL 4.4._XPRK.2,1104 Approved F&TKilliiige 2001/03/04: CIA-RD 5 APR 1970 Air America's Civilian Facade . Gives It Latitude in East Asia. By RICHARD HALLORAN syttal tA Th. . other Government agencies con- WASHINGTON, April 4?As' trolled and secure transport. On the American-supported clan- the economic side, commercial destine army went on the at. :work enables the company to tack in Laos again this week, Il!eaerf mg its large fildeleet. busy when pilots of a flamboyant airline P The outfit exudes an air of called Air America took to the Oriental adventure out of Mil- skies once again to ' move ton Caniff's comic strip "Terry and the Pirates." It has the troops, provide supplies and flamboyance of the late Lieut. evacuate wounded. Gen. Claire L. Chennault's war- Air America is a flight charter time Flying Tigers, from which company that, like the clan- it is descended. Working for Air estine army, is widely consid- red to be the servant of the United States Central Intelli- gence Agency. With its assorted fleet of 167 &Craft, Air America performs diverse missions across East Asia from Korea to Indonesia. It is believed to be a major, link for the C.I.A's extensive activi- ties throughout Asia. Air America parachutes Meo tribesmen and other secret 'agents behind North Vietnamese lines in Laos, trains mechanics for the aviation division of the national police in Thailand, hauls American aid cargo for the Agency for International Development in South Vietnam, and the latest in single-engine 'ferries United States Air Force and twin-engine utility planes. men from Okinawa to Japan Air America also borrows Air and South Korea, and dispatches , Force planes. The line's headquarters in, Intelligence flights from Taiwan 'Washington looks much like', 'along the coast of Communist Ithe offices of other medium-' China. size businesses?conservatively The company also transports dressed executives, miniskirted secretaries, bits of Asian art on helicopters from France and Italy for assembly in Southeast the twealelsn,daaretededcishh-eofresTegeer car- Asia, flies prospectors looking P The chief executive of Air for copper and geologists America is George A. Dooie Jr. searching for oil in Indonesia, la low-key 60-year-old business- man who holds a master's de- gree from the School of Busi- ness Administration at Harvard. Before joining Air America in 1953 he was the chief pilot for Pan American and pioneered trans-Atlantic air routes before World War II. ' In Asia the general manager Is Hugh L. Grundy, 55, who is described by acquaintances as a quiet, shy man. He too is an alumnus of Pan American, hav- ing been an engineer with the line before the war and then having served In China. His headquarters is in Taipei, Taiwan. , The CIA: evidently has at least two channels into Air tmericalieliiiroutthi the her old- au-Mates, the other 'through charter arrangements under the guise .of contracts with A.I. Gleanings from those contracts, which have been made available to The New York Times, show the extent of the operations. The C.I.A. declines to com- ment on this subject, and A.I.D. officials refuse to discuss in- telligence operations. Mr. Doole, in an Interview, brushed the matter aside. "If 'someone out there' is behind all this," he said, "we don't know about it." Incorporated in Delaware The parent company of Air America demands the resource- A.merica is the Pacific Corpor ful skill' of the bush pilots who Ition, which was incorporate have explored the unknown in Delaware in 1950 with beaches of northern Canada, the 1610,000. Mr. Doole said the South American highlands and ohar,es were privately held, Africa. mostly by the five members of Those who have seen Air the board of directors. The cor- America's pilots on the job in poration and its subsidiaries Asia say they have a sense of employ about 9,300 people. dedication and duty. They take The Pacific Corporation owns more than routine risks and 100 er cent of Air America, some have gone down in Asian jungles, not to be seen again. Asian Art on the Walls Most of the company's air- craft, like those of regular air- lines, -carry its name, though some are unmarked. The fleet includes long-haul jets, the C-46 and C-47 propeller craft that were the workhorses of World War II, a variety of helicopters which is also a Delaware cor- poration founded in 1950. The Samuel A. Walker, chairman Un owns 125 aircraft and ; of the Pacific Corporation, is a managing partner of Joseph Walker & Sons, a New York banking house. He is also a di- rector of Air America. Pilots Are Greatest Asset The chairman of Air America and Air Asia is Adm. Felix B. Stump, who was commander in chief of United States forces i the Pacific from 1953 to 59. Mr. Doole holds the titles of president of the Pacific Cor- poration and chief executive of Air America and Air Asia. ' Robert G. Goelet, William A. Read and Arthur B. Richardson are'directors Of all three com- panies. Mr. Goclet has exten- sive holdings in New York real estate, Mr. Read is a retired member of the investment house of Dillon, Road & Co., and Mr. Richardson was for- merly president of Chese- brough-Pond's. Air America's greatest assets are its pilots, mostly Americans but including some Chinese and Thais. "We hire the same pilots that Pan American and United hire," Mr.. Doole said, "except that Ours are -a bit more . experi- enced." He shied from the te "bush "We're all one family," Mr. Doole said. "You can't tell one from the other. We tie them together with contracts and, don't even keep separate books' except for tax purposes." ? Air America and its affiliatesl appear to be self-sustaining l operations in that they are paid! by A.I.D. and commercial cli- ents for their work. Because, more than 50 per cent of it is, done under Government cow' tract, it, is impossible to say whether the line makes a prof- it in the commercial sense. oreover, its financial transac- tions and earnings, are unavail- able because the Pacific Corpo- ration, being closely held, does not have to report them pub- licly. ? The boards of directors of ithe companies are closely tied together. Most of the directors serve on several boards, which are made up of reputable busi- nessmen chosen to give the en-1 tire complex respectability and and provides pilots for commer- cial airlines such as Air Viet- nam and Thai Airways and for China Airlines, which is 'on Taiwan. ? . Air America's civilian facade permits the United States to do things that would otherwise be 'Impossible or, at least, political- ly embarrassing. The 1962 Ge- neva accords, for instance,spro- hibit foreign military aircraft in Laos but they say nothing about civilian planes. The facade also averts public attention in coun- tries such as Japan that are sensitive to the American mili- tary presence. Then too, intelligence services the world over have aiwa pr. used b waidcpar en es the ,C.I.A.., an leases 42 more. It employs about 4,700 people, some 400 of them pilots, and has bases in . Okinawa, Taiwan, South Vietnam, Thailand and Laos. Air America, in turn owns 99 per cent of Air Asia, which was set up on Taiwan in 1955. Air- Asia claims the finest aircraft maintenance and repair facility In Asia, at Tainan. In addition, the Pacific Cor- poration 'owns 40 per cent of Civil Air Transport, incorporat ed under Chinese Nationalist law on Taiwan. it was founded in 1946 by General Chenaatilt, the United States air comman- der in China during World War II ? who 'died in 1958, and is mined by many of the pilots ho flew with the Flying Tigers against Japan during the war. - Civil Air Transport, known as C.A.T., which originally func- tioned as a regular airline as well as carrying out clandestine missions, is also generally be- lieved to have been operated and partly financed by United States intelligence agencies. Air America took over C.A.T. in 1950. When the Chinese National- ists wanted to establish a Chi- nese-run airline, C.A.T. had to get out of the passenger busi- ness. Most of its other, opera- tions have since been absorbed by Air America but it still flies some special missions. There is also a separate op- 3rating division of Air America aSic Engeriat n Continued ? IN, 00040001-3 ? DAILY 170110 Approved For Release 2001/6300:1926A-RDP80-01601 CU 'S i:aroopz in Lao mazy:slurred baze . Daily World Foreign Department - When "Royal Lao" forces and U.S. CIA mercenaries recaptured the northern Laos base of Sam Thong earlier this week. they looted it to such an extent that U.S. newsmen described it yesterday as "a shambles." U.S. officials said that "local employees" attempting to stop the looting were forced away at gun-point by the rZmPsThong, 75 mil'es north .of? '. Edgar M. "Pop" Buell, the ''' The mercenaries, who receive the Lao capital of Vientiane. is U.S. agent who allegedly runs $6 a month as Thai soldiers. a major CIA base for the clan- , "refugee operations' at Sam were reportedly offered $250 7 ? destine army of General yang Thong. was described yesterday apiece by the CIA to defend the Pao. a 15.000-man force made up , by U:S, newsmen as "so mad he "free world" atSam Thong. . of IVIto tribesmen and led by ' couldn't talk. There were almost Rene Andrie. editor-in-chief of . U.S. and Thai "advisors." tears in his eyes." The merce- "L'Humanite," the French Com- US.. planes had bombed Sam naries removed ' cots. furniture munist Party newspaper, wrote Thong day and night and the and mattresses from the U.S... yesterday that the pro-U.S. mili- , CIA had airlifted battalions of hospital and "walked off with tary coup in Cambodia on March ? Thai mercenaries to retake the anything portable," according to ? 18 -forms one link in a chain of V base. ?\ ? UPI correspondent. ICOlor. ? CIA activities. In the West German weekly magazine. "Stern," the political analyst, Sebastian Haffner wrote today: "The coup in Cambodia was staged by the U.S. CIA. The? slogans and methods by means of which the government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk was overthrown in Cambodia coincide in every detail With the notor- -, low CIA style." f ? In Cambodia.. the new military regime proclaimed today that ? "calm has now been restored." , It said that tourists and foreign ? visitors are again welcome. There ?was no immediate re- .sponsi fiiim Saigon, whose troops ? had made a heavy armored visit ' "in Cambodia last week: - At least 119 Cambodians were ? known to have been slain by Cambodian army troops and po- lice during pro-Sihanouk demon- trations in the last two weeks. ' The new. regime of General Lon'. ' Not has issued a demand that all the country's provinces pledge Yallegianee to the new government but fewer than half have done so. ? STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 REPUBLIDIC Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000 4 APR 1970 STATINTL Thieu Plus Two I ? ' by 1110 Editors Partly in consequence of CIA skulduggery, the war in Southeast Asia has expanded. It is no longer a Vietnamese conflict with Ameri- , can intervention, and side effects in adjoining areas. As in 1953, Laos and Cambodia again are directly involved, and China may be. In a sense, both Indo-China and Mr. Nixon have come full circle in 17. years. In 1953, the French were becoming hopelessly trapped in a , ?.1. costly, unwinnable colonial war. The way out that was suggested, . ? by no less than the French prime minister, Joseph Laniel, was settle- ment through international negotiation, with China as one of the ' negotiators. Vice President Richard Nixon was sternly opposed, and ? on November 4, 1953 he brashly lectured the French (who were the di:t ? ones fighting and dying in Indo-China): "It is impossible to lay down arms until victory is completely won." The finger of duty and destiny pointed to the expulsion of Communists from Southeast Asia. The ? . French, however, were fast losing interest in any such enterprise, ? 1,?;? with or without American assistance. Vice President Nixon never. r theless kept repeating that the United States'could settle for nothing; '? les., than "victory!" could not afford "another retreat" in Asia. In his , ? . view, the US shad "lost" China to the Communists four years earlier and now was threatened with the "loss" of Indo-China as well. The c: tide must be stemmed. If the French could not carry on alone, Amen'. !?;. can troops ought to get into the fight. Or so it seemed to Nixon in ? 2953, at a time when we had just, begun to extricate ourselves from a war in Korea that had cost 33,629 American battle deaths. In the upshot, there was an international conference about Indo. ? f! China, and China did participate in the Geneva agreement. But that the US did not, at that stage, become direCtly engaged militarily in ....; Southeast Asia Is not something Mr. Nixon can claim credit for.. On the contrary, he did his utmost to push events the other way. He I, was overruled by President Eisenhower, advised by the Army Chief ? I of Staff, General Matthew B. 'Ridgway. Ridgway investigated what l? American intervention would mean, concluded it would .entail far 1??? greater American losses than had been incurred irt Korea and said f. so to the National Security Council. That encouraged Eisenhower to . ? _ trust hie hunch against going to war in Indo-China, a hunch. that became conviction when the French .stronghold a Dienbienpha. fell on May 7, 19y4. Last-week the government of francs anotaied For a? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001antinued Approved For Release 2001/9WAIA-RDP80-016 STATI NTL 13h3 Losn]uilitorin (g? ung owings by HUGH D.S. GREENWAY A Tsme?Life correspondent covering the war On Southwest Asia since March 1967. Greenway has spent many months of his time in Laos. VIENTIANE Sam Thong has fallen. The North Vietnamese are in the town. The American bungalows around the airstrip, until just a few days ago the headquarters for U.S. aid and refugee / relief, are now only burned-out ruins. Long V Cheng, which holds the secret CIA base, the usfiElltor`fin Lnos of the Geneva accords. And, U.S. officials ar- gue privately, a clandestine operation doesn't risk prestige in case of setbacks, and is thus less likely to commit the U.S. to Vietnam-scale involvement. Aside from the fact that most Am:ricars linJ the idea of a secret war ab- horrent, the lack of reliable information has headquarters of General Vang Pao's clandes- f. led to gross exaggeration of the U.S. role inl tine army and the center for the entire Amer- Laos. President Nixon's recent speech was . jean-Laotian effort in northern Laos, may meant to take the wind out Of some or the ex- I soon be next. aggerations, but unfortunately the President I The Americans at Sam Thong have been was less than totally candid. While he admit- evacuated to the south. Thousands of civilians.. ted the bombing of Laos, he did not mention ?Mco tribesmen, wearing elaborate wrought- the CIA operation or the full role or the Amer- ' . ilver necklaces and carrying their handmade. ican advisers in the Laotian war. The Presi- flintlock muskets?arc trudging south with all dent's estimate or North Vietnamese troop their belongings on their backs. The silver air- strength in Laos was at least 17,000 higher than planes of Air America, the CIA contract air- the highest reliable estimate in Vientiane, in- ? i ? I'line, are flying in low over the jungle-covered ' eluding the estimates of the Americans them- . hills and limestone outcroppings, so ironically selves. His denial that there. have been any reminiscent of placid classical Chinese land- American combat deaths in Laos was.quickly , scape paintings, to drop 100-pound bags of proven false as well. 4 rice to feed the fleeing Meos. Laos is an improbable place for the U.S. The annual North Vietnamese dry-season ?or anybody, for that matter?to become in-*, ' offensive is in its seventh week and already the . volved. Except for a brier moment of glory in i troops from the northeast have penetrated the 14th Century, when Lan Xang (the King- i deeper than in previous years, bloodying the dom of the Million Elephants) held sway over nose of the dispirited Royal Laotian army and . what is now Laos as well as parts of Thailand dealing the government's morale and Prestige ' and Cambodia, Laos has been a prisoner of ge- a heavy blow. ography, fought over and plundered repeat- For years the Laotian war ran on in the , edly by its more powerful neighbors. The coun- ' wings of the larger Vietnam theater, with nci- 'try as now constituted dates only from 1946 thcr side pushing the other too hard. In the last 4hen the French assembled three kingdoms , two years the pendulum of war in Laos has :tinder their control and called it the Kingdom , been swinging harder and wider, and each wet- of Laos. Today there arc fewer than three mil. , season dry-season offensive has mounted a lit. Ilion people in the entire country, two million , tIe higher than before. There are two months of or them in government-controlled areas near dry season left. The fear now in both Washing- ? the mekone. ton and Vientiane is that, this time, the North F Perhaps losing so often and being subjugat- Vietnamese might be tempted to push on into eel by so many masters does something to a' the Mekong River valley?which would upset race, for the Lao answer has been to drop out. the balance of power in Indochina. If they did,, They are among the most charming people in it might put the Nixon Doctrine of limited in- Asia?and the most otherworldly and least volvemcnt in Asia to its severest test. martial as well. Consequently, Lao troops have There are several reasons why the U.S. pres- , sometimes fired over the heads of the enemy' ence in icabmvwer obit fid Jan 0040001-3 it is a vtoTadortillVeltraiaan 61,,, tft4516,sers. '1.411111Q North Vietnamese -Presence, Most olf(tfrreVgb,' STATINTL Vatai1.1?.0:0.1i STAIR, Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDW811:016.0 3 APR 1970 oiAliNIL PARTIAL TEXT OF FULBRIGHT SPEECH 'Myth of internationall Communist. ? This is a partial text of ?Me myth of them all: the myth j Southeast Asia, much less pos-. Sen. Fulbright's speech in the of the international Commu- A ing any kind of threat to the administration's policies in Just like the walking catfish, :1i United States . . l . . . It should not be necessary to. Conspirac Senate yesterday on the Nixon nist conspiracy. . . . Southeast Asia: which gets out of a pond when add?although I suppose it 'f ? , the water becomes uninhabita- ,, is?that I do not advocate a Stymied though not defeated , in I. Several years ago I made a ble and heads overland for ' Communist-dominated I n d o- ? Vietnam, the North Viet- ". : . ; speech on the subject of "old ' more hospitable waters, the ' 1 china. I merely propose to ac-'? namese have found in the pow- myths and new realities." I conspiracy myth is both mo- ccpt it, if it arises from the .: er vacuum of Laos an opportu- .! ' .8vrnocaoubrula fIrayn of a I ndt6hc e. ? ; recently re-read it and was ,, bile and indestructible. Dis- ? local power situation, as some-' 11tirlayge to gic turn ; surprised at how tame it ;credited in one locale, it soon thing unwelcome but tolerable, . seemed in retrospect. Some of . turns up in another, sustained and most emphatically not ' ade ago, they may have come ' u ' ' the "new realities' of 1904 still here and there by a kernel of worth the extravagant costs of p with a variation on the , . ' seem pertinent, but others I truth, not enough to validate a war like the one we are now "domino" theory: something ! ? have, ripened into cliches, the myth but more than fighting.... Nit might be called the"skip-a-domino" theory. With ; ?; while a few, which once had enough to secure its grip on validity, have passed into the the minds of leaders whose Victnamization represents a , the Vietnamese domino mo, . ..; realm of old mythology. ? ? . education in communism be- change in tactics from the mentarily glued down, the , Today, for a start, I should . gan ? and ended ? with Sta- Johnson policy but not a . Communists may simply have , !like to discuss some of the , , rin . . , . , change in the objective, which decided to go on to the next ? misconceptions which seem to, . We are fighting a double is to preserve some kind of American military foothold, one, where Souvapna Phou- . ,obtain in our policy in South- ' 'shadow in Indochina ? the either directly or by proxy, in 1. mals ,army of Meo tribesmen , east Asia. . . . , shadow of the international a alien sphere of influence. is hardly a moteli for the ..! The old myth of internation- Communist conspiracy and thewelcome t . North Vietnamese, even with , al politics ? that it was the shadow of the old, obsolete, . , I he change: Viet... . jibe support of an indetermi- ; private preserve of sovereigns mindless game of power poll- namization is better than esca- , nat I and their ministers and none 'tics. Armed with weapons that lation, but I welcome it only in e number of CIA soldiers, the sense that I would rather an unrevealed number of im- ,-- of the people's business ? has ? have given war a new dimen- : :ported Thais, and an appar- , given way to a new myth: that ?: sion of horror, and adorned be riding in a car heading for \ ; politics is life and everything with the sham morality of ide- ? a precipice at thirty miles an 'ently great number of B52's to: 1 ? political is highly consequen- ?logical conflict, the struggle hour than at eighty miles an pound the Communist supply ?lines. . I 1 tial ? not just: for those who for power and influence has hour. If I wally had my ' ? make their living by politics ' taken on a deadly, new intensi- car at,' all... . . Like the cicala- , tion of the North Vietnamese choice I wouldn't be in that ? I doubt that it is the inten-' i 1 hut for everybody, every- ? ty at exactly the time when it 1 to sweep through Laos and' 'where. Every issue is now a ? has lost much of the meaning tion which preceded it, Viet- . then have a go at the next '"critical" issue; every threat ' it once had. . . . namization is still an unsound . i a "grave" one; and I doubt if , The second myth, well- policy, aimed at an unne "domino," which would be?ces- ' ? : , ? there is a square inch left on ' established after five years of sarv - an dprobably unattaina- 'tThailand. I think it more likelyi , ' that they are pressing their ! the face of the earth that ,? futile warfare, is that we could ble objective.... I 'someone does not regard as .* do anything about it if it did The President still has time. -advantage in Lens to compen-. t for the stalemate in Viet- '. strateg,ic. . . ." ? matter ? anything worth ', to prevent an American defeat . sate , ;? nam and to demonstrate the V The master myth of Viet- , doing, that is. . . . . but not a lot of time. For 'all' , . . ., i nam is the greatly inflated im- . Puny as it is by great power "the fan -I futility of Vietnamization. cy sophistries that have I Events in Laos are showing up ? . portance which has been at- standards, North Vietnam is kbeen concocted about it, Viet.: I , Vietnamization for a kind of tached to it. From the stand- the paramount power in Indo- 3 ' namization is -not strengthen- , p o lit i c a 1 Maginot Line? "point of American security china. In unadorned strategic ?ing our hand; like any redue- , difficult to assault head on, ' d interests the central fact terms, it is "their" part of the' tion in military forces, it is but why bother when you can; ; about Indochina is that it does world in exactly the same way ? :weakening our hand, and our . walk around it? , not matter very much who ? except on a much more 1 , . . . The startling aspect of I ' rules in those small and back- modest scale ? that Eastern ' enemies are not such mental ? defectives that they can be the situation in Laos is our, i ward lands. . . . What it all Europe is Russia's part of the , ! virtual helplessness. Caught in comes down to is that, if all world and Latin America is ? kidded into believing 'other- 't a dilemma between its instinct, , other things were equal ? as ours. : . . ; for fighting communism wher- ; indeed they are not ? it might We ought in a way to wel- : By mid-1971, when American , ever it appears and the be a convenience to the United come North Vietnam's preem- forces are scheduled ,,to be i. straints imposed by public and. re- States to have the countries of inence in Indochina, because, ' down to about 225,000 men, it 'Indochina ruled by non- while North Vietnam has may well be too late. ? . , Communist leaders. For this shown itself strong enough to The myth of Vietnamization :'congressional opinion, the ad- ministration is reduced to hop. hypothetical advantage we dominate Indochina if left is thrown into sharp relief by ' loll for the best in Laos. . . , , have already spent Over 40,000 ' alone by outside powers, it has the deterioration o the anti- .. In Cambodia as in Laos the, lives and $100 billion. also shown' itself willing and Communist military position '?, initiative lie,s with the Comrnu-; 0 so colossally the importance of- tion. At the same time North bodia. 'These events point up 17 , How have we come to inflate , able to resist Chinese domino- in Laos and the coup in Cam- I ninth. ; , . -. Indochina to our own security? ' Vietnam is far too small a the futility of our Vietnamese r?-????? -...... 1 It is not my!purpose to taunt, . - 4 The answer lies in that boom; power ? to have any serious strategy in a conflict which is, est, hardiest, most indestructi- hope of. conquering 11 of, not confined to Vietnam but in, ? ? ' ' fact encompasses, All, pi illitp-if! . , ;,china.. ,?? Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00070004000103tinueci ;- , Approved For Release 2001/6/04 :CIA-RDP80r01601 STATINTL CAN'?%Sntlligt PA. NOTES ?""vr-",-"""r"-,* ???7????? Cambodia's Importance The recent revolution In Cambodia and What is really happening In this Part of the fighting in Laos are of ?great import- the world is a change of scene. The war in ,.; once to the war in Vietnam. Cambodia's :?Sout?h Vietnam' is declining in violence and 'f? new government might possibly close down?:.;the climax in Laos and Cambodia is op- [the port of Siharoukville to the commu-: prtioching. The showdown had to come, r? nists, through .which about one-third of ihe.? for South Vietnam's security is affected by i supplies to enemy in Vietnam are thoughti events in both countries. (Alt three formerly , i to poss. (It is Cambodia's'only deep wateCycomprised French Indochci.) ( harbor.) ? ' ..... , , . 1 . '.. ?Nixon Administrotion; though hogtied ; far as the use of US tro'o s is concern- ., Washington ii waiting hopefully for that .. as " P .. ., .,?ed, perhaps rightly 40, by congress and ? i closure and this Is probably ,why the U.S. . . public opinion, is doing its best to wage an! f.Navy was refused permission to board. .effective war against the communists in i the ammunition ship Columbia Eagle, with; , ; Laos (and to some extent in Cambodia) '.- its load of U.S. Iambi, recently, after the i ?? with only the Air Force and the C.I.A. Un. .? r Navy had already issued the orders and ? .. .'dercover work in Cambodia seerns?to hovel i, the cruiser Oklahoma City 'was: about to . :?-. ? ,. i, enter Sihanoukville harbor. ' '.', , ? ? . ? paid off recently and Thai troops are fight. ' Ing in Laos, with U.S. logistical and ,intelli.,1 . The fighting In Laos is of grave import- ge?nce support.. . . : once because .If. the. communists take the ' Most experts agree the situation .in *South , entire country, 'Thailand will be directly ? Vietnam is vastly-improved. If Cambodia is . ? threatened The United States is ,committed . made secure and at least the Western half Thailand's ailand'm defense:, that is why U.S. '. of Laos (bordering Thailand) is safeguard. planes have been ferrying Thai troops to .,.ed or, secured,:without. :the .,ase. of .US. Laos and the C.Iqsk. has been doing ,oil -it ,troops, 'mach will hav,e, been accomplished. can. working withiLaotionlribesmen,:?;::,1):-!,i' bltsthe Nixon 'A.kilministrOtiOn::.:,.,..!'t.,:..., '1, ....i.:, - ? ,-,-.- -,,,,,i),;4.14.?....01414.1.4a.u.664-tdoak4Li.2AAaw.:44:4vc;41:44.4611$414:4 - 1:14?114.4. Approved For Release 2001/6/04 : cIA-RDP86-01601R000700040001-3 may ivortrn_ Approved For Release 2001/03104: ciA=Rw_go.oisoiR Z APR 1970 ? ' 1.? IIN I L CIA 'Air Force' NEW YORK ? The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has both its ? I own private army in Laos and an "Air Force." Newsweek reports that \ Air America, one of the largest U.S. companies, is an arm of the CIA. It is nominally owned by a private concern, Pacific Corporation, which v Is only a front for the CIA operation. The force now ha's about 150 ? transport planes and employs about 600 pilots,. many veterans of the Vietnamese war. ? ? The planes are used to carry prIoners of war, move troops; rein- forcements, ammunition and supplies. , I., Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 Approved For Release 20efitIRCA$1:5384110111811R ? Letters to the Editor ? The War in Laos SIR: It was with great interest that I read your editorial, "The Laotian War." For over a year Associ- ated Press reporter Tammy Arbuckle has presented in- depth articles concerning Laos. He has done an out- standing and accurate job. If any of the Senators and commentators now cry- ing out has bothered to read The Star, they would real- ize that the press and the American public have not been misinformed or kept in the dark about the "un- declared war" in Laos. Thank you for presenting an ob- jective picture of the developments in this Southeast Asian country. ' J. V. Martin. * * * * SIR: Any intelligent, thoughtful person who will take the time to read the full text of President Nixon's,, statement on Laos must wonder why certain so-called ? "liberal" Senators, who are screaming about the 'alleged: Involvement of the United States in Laos, do not scream. about the 67,000 North Vietnamese troops who have invaded and are occupying that unfortunate country in flagrant violation of the Geneva . agreements to which': North Vietnam is a party. :.; Are these Senators straining to do everything possi-,1 ble to embarrass and discredit the United States and to give aid and comfort to the enemy? If so, why? ' Walter Wyatt. * * * * SIR: Hopefully your policies, editorial and news, ' concerning the recent excitement over our defensive activity in Laos will recognize your readers' basic , intelligence and desire for quality journalism. In this regard it would be :comforting and helpful to read why ? the Communists are actually invading, how many. treaties they have disregarded in this case and why, the', degree of Russian aid and direction and what encourage- ment Hanoi might receive and expect from inaccurate. ,reporting and misleading conclusions? Barbara Estridge. Editor's Note: Mr. Wyatt (letter above) answers ,Miss Estridge's question concerning broken treaties.' We can only assume that the Communists are invading to impose a Communist government on Laos by force., * * * 7.nt. .,:.-ients on Laos attributed to Senator, Stepnen Try-mg of Co, if true, are deplorable and,. certainly indicative of a few elected officials who make use of their office to create ill will between the United States and one of its allies. Referring to Laos as ". the most undeveloped nation in the world and not woith the life of one American" only dees a great disservice to the United States and the people .and government of ' Laos. ? To my knowledge Senator Young has never visited Laos; therefore I question his qualification to speak on the subject from the floor of the Senate in an obvious attempt to influence national policy. While Senator: Young professes his personal interest in "writing-off"; Laos, nine nations, including the United States, are actively engaged in providing support of development projects In Laos that will favorably affect most of that'l area of Southeast Asia. ? i Australia, Canada, Denmark:, France, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Thailand and, the United States have invested $30 million in construction Of the' Nam Ngum Dam just north of Vientiane. An additional' $1 billion is being considered for construction of the Pa. Meng Dam. Both are part of the Mekong River develop" meat program. Surely this is acceptable evidence of' world interest in assisting Laos to develop a natural re= source beneficial to a large population of &utWastAslaw With the exception of Vietnam-, there are more ,American civilians assigned to the mission in Laos than anywhere else in the world. Most are engaged in provid- ?ing development assistance, not CIA-agent activities as alleged by the Senator. The possibility of loss of life is ? ,always present while working in an area of active Insurgency. People are killed every day right here in the District of Columbia. The Pathet Lao and Hanoi will make excellent use of 'the Senator's comments in their travels through the vil- lages and in their press releases and radio broadcasts. - ? Reader. ? * * * * ? . SIR: Our treatment of Laos has been a mixture of ?chicanery and poltroonery ever since President Kennedy ,decided our position in that country was "untenable" , (April 1961). We had advised and persuaded Laos in 1954-55 to come under the umbrella of SEATO. The Lao- tian representatives then said: "We are a small weak people and all the Communists have to do to get in our country is walk across an imaginary line. You are the most powerful nation in the world, but you are 10,000 :miles away." We assured them that they would be pro- tected but that they would have to eschew Communism and throw the Pathet Lao out of their government.' Kennedy, i Kennedy, after deciding that our position in Laos was untenable, agreed to the urging of the UN, and particularly the Communist powers therein, that there .should be a "troika" government in that country. "Trot? ka," as many know, is a Russian word meaning a 3. horse team. In the case of Laos it was meant to stand ? for the re-entry in the government of the Communists along with the other two parties already represented. In other words, he agreed? that the Laotians should take back the very Communist Pathet Lao we had required that they put out. When the representaives of Laos in a , meeting with ours at Bangkok were faced with this de- mand, they asked how we squared our demand with our ' position in 1965. The answer was to the effect that they , were dealing with the Eisenhower administration in 1965 and that it was the Kennedy administration. ' We put the Laotians on the spot and we are obligat- ed to protect them from Communists, specifically North Vietnam. Our honor is at stake?as it is in South Viet- nam. There is only one possible just way out of the problem and that is to win the 'War in Vietnam and Laos. It could have been won lodgi ago, and it will have I to be won now or in the future if our word and our fu- ture means anything at all. We cannot sidestep the real Issue forever. And, it can be won very quickly by in- vading North Vietnam and destroying Haiphong. ' Clarkson 4. Beall. ? Fulton', Md. ? * * * SIR: I would like to ask one question. How can anyone accuse the Nixon administration of having se- cretly, or otherwise, involved the United States on such a large scale in Laos in a mere 14 months? We all know. that we have been committed in that country for many ,. years, not only to aid .111,0 peoplp ot Laos but tO suppctrt our troops in Vietnattt; 1. 4 & liailidasartsa: Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :.91A-RDP80-01601R00070004000173 STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/0i/Cie. 6K-IRDP80-0160113 1 APR 1970 7*(7 70 CU L1 Li 43 0 J LU? 171.1 71 I LL C&I Li LI CD] Daily World Foreign Department A U.S. Navy jet shot down a MIG-21 interceptor on Saturday over the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the U.S. command in Saigon revealed yesterday. It was the first DRV plane downed since the "bomb-halt" announced by ex-President Lyndon Johnson on Nov. 1, 1968, and represents one of .the most serious attempts at escalating the Vietnam war since that date. A Radio Hanoi broadcast on Tuesday stated that DRV anti- aircraft gunners shot down a U.S. RF-4-C photo-reconnaissance over -DRV air space on Monday. The RF-4-C is the spy version. of the "Phantom" jet fighter-bomber. The U.S. spokesman said the U.S. Navy "Phantom" jet was es- corting reconnaissance planes when it shot down the MIG-21. The action was said to have oc- curred over Thanh Ilea, 125 miles north of the Demilitarized Zone, It was admitted there were no reports that the MIG-21 had fired on the U.S. planes, and reporters quickly asked how the U.S. knew the MIG-21 was "attacking." Students in Saigon on a protest strike against the March 27 jail- ing of 40 fellow-students grew to 33,000 yesterday. The lead in the strike was taken by the 6,000 stu- dents of Saigon's ,Medical Insti- tute, who were then followed by university students in Hue, Dalat and Can Tho. The strike leaders sent a letter to Saigon President- Nguyen Van Thieu declaring, "Our struggle is not an isolated one. We are supported by many other strata in the population." They warned Thieu that they would call for a general strike. In Laos, General Vang Pao, head of the U.S, CIA's clande tine army of Meo tribesmen. claimed yesterday in a radio broadcast his troops had retaken Sam Thong, 80 miles north of the capital of Vientiane. Sam Thong, an important CIA air base and supply depot in northern Laos. had been taken March 18 by the Lao Patriotic Front. U.S. sources in Vientiane said the U.S. had made round-the-clock air strikes on Sam Thong ever ?since it was captured by the LPF. They believed LPF troops were ? only pulling back to higher ground. The Lao parliament in Vienti- ane urged Prince Souvanna Phou- ma, the premier, to open negotia- tions with the LPF on the basis of the LPF five-point peace plan. It added, however, that the peace negotiations must begin "without conditions.". The LPF had de- manded as a preliminary condi- tion that the [LS. halt its bomb- ing. U N development At the United Nations in New York. Secretary-General U Thant. after a meeting with Cambodian charge d'affaires, Or Kosalak. promised to "take a look into the matter" of Cambodia. The new military regime in Cambodia has charged that DRV and ?Viet- cong" troops are violating its soil. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 STATI NTL Approved For Ke Nar 'V By John I'. Wallach WashiActon Bureau WASHINGTON- ? Ameri- can involvement in Laos be- gan inconspicuously in the spring of 1946 in a remote province of Thailand. , An American office of Stra- tegic Services veteran named James Thompson called on the Governor of Thailand's Nong Khai prov- ince. "Come upstairs," the The Geneva accords parti- ; governor said, "I have a Lao honed Vietnam, barred Laos prince you might like to and Cambodia. from military meet." -I alliances, prohibited foreign The governor's guest was Il'bases on their soil, called for Prince Souphanouvong, then ?! the removal of all Viet Minh a leader of the newly-formed and French troops from Laos :Laotian independence move- and called for the withdrawal n ent and now head of the of the Pathet Lao to the two Communist Pathet Lao. Sou- Northern Laotian provinces. phanouvong asked Thompson . The Geneva accords pro.; 1 for pledges of U.S. support vided for the Laotian govern- against the French colonial- ment to administer these ists who were re-establishing provinces in - collaboration their control over Laos after with the Pathet Lao. Less the Japanese surrender. than a year after the accords - The same spring, ,another were signed, fighting broke meeting look place in Paris.: out between Communists and ? between Ho Chi Minh, who - government troops in the Communist-held provinces. Some La oti an leaders, among them Souvanna Phou- ma, the half-brother of Sou- IOW ot at ay, --Dipl Snafus moved in from neighboring Yunnan province. With the deterioration o the French po sit io n, the Western powers convened ii April, 1954, an internationa conference in. Geneva, also attended by North Vietnam and Communist China, to ne- gotiate an armistice in Indo- china. this govern ni e n t,was eclipsed. .. , Meanwhile, Gen. Phourni From that point, the U.S. established rival headrivar- f pros once in Laos grew hers, w li e r e he reportedly. again turned to the CIA 0 pport Finally, in Dece In 1955, North Vietnam be- i gan to infiltrate large num- i su. b ? f ops o their. Pathet bfoerrc, forces, a ..filnhosutm vi ielnetril a nieii,s 1 .Lao allies, and the U.S. be- gan training the royal Lao- tian army. A year later, : Prince S o u van ii a Phouma took over the government. In a matter of months, he mg to reconvene the Geneva was able to get his brother to conference, Hanoi infiltrated , , ' integration of the Communist. eral concurrence that Laos troops into the north. A gen- ] ? agree to a ceasefire, the re- and drove Souvanna Phouma up to the Plain of Jars to join his communist half-brother. Wrong War While the U.S. was press-'? had* jest be his anti- French resistance movement (Viet Minh) in neighboring Vietnam, and America offi- cials. .phanouvong, had urged the i President Harry Truman 1Geneva parties to set up a-, refused to commit Money, or coalition instead of dividing arms to, the fight against the the country in two. French, and months lat-' or, in the winter of 1946, the bitter Indochina war began. It ended eight years later,; after the siege of Dien Bien: Phu, the French stronghold' in North Vietnam, by ITo Chi' Minim's forces who had turned to Russia and Com- munist China for help. Partition By that time, Viet Minh troops had invaded Laos, and joined Souphanouvong's *Pa- that Lao, and a Chinese foree *5 .? ? ? Dulles Stand By this time, however, President Eisenhower's Sec- retary of State, John Foster Dulles, had decided to. back an anti-communist govern- merit in Vientiane, the Lao- tian capital, . and Souvanna Phouma,. later to 'take ,oyer ?4 ? V govermnent. The U.S. contin- was the wrong war in them provinces,, and to a coalition ued to support Souvanna, wrong place at the wrong Pho u ma. . . time led to the 1962 Geneva The Central Intelligence Conference, at which 14 na- Agency is thought to have ns agreed to guarantee] otian neutrality,- surfaced for the first time in,, December, 1959, by persuad-, ing Gen, Phourni Nosavan, a ! right-wing nationalist, to ,1 stage a coup against then I! . prime minister Pholuni San- 4 anikone. But the UN, in the name of 1 restoring the Geneva ac-.1 cords, stepped in, and plans were made for general elec. ,1 lions in which. Pathet candidates 1 seats in the Naliohal Assern,...4; bly, were won by supporters. of Gen. Phoumi. ? Once again, ch,irges,o.C.C.144.4 interference surfaced. A.? month after the elections, 1- Prince Souphanouvong caped from prison4 and re-4 turned north. The new gcw.cii ernment lasted eight months. An An unknown pitratrooper aptain named Kong Le led a I oup d'etat and returned Soul,/ alma Phouma to,power. ' STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 ? 0 =W. 3:01ZIC Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 1 APR 1970 STATINTL LLLLCSE VEZEINki'vc? For the inside story of American involvement in Laos read MISTER POP. Edgar "Pop" Buell Edgar Buell, whom the Pao tribesmen call "Mister Pop," has been in Laos for the past nine years, and he's still there. The first-hand story hc to tell about the C.I.A.'s role in Laos is an eye opener. Don Schanche (who broke the Laos story in-ttce news) let Pop Buell tell it all At all bookstores $7.95 Zle ZZA/21 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 Approved For Release 28Orall/M-RDP80-01601 STATI NTL 1 OUR INVOLVEMENT IN LAO By Robert Shaplen HE debate over Laos, almost as intense if not as bitter as the Vietnam debate, has done more than clarify the nature of the American involvement in that patchwork kingdom' which has played a secondary but significant role in the Vietnam war while also engaging in its own struggle to survive as a unitary nation. The Senate's dual actions in prohibiting the use of ground combat troops in both Laos and Thailand, and in curbing the right of the President to make a "national commit- ment" to any country without prior Congressional approval, have temporarily satisfied the common determination to avoid "another Vietnam." But the fundamental problem of how American policy should be made and conducted in Southeast Asia has only begun to be reexamined. The broad outlines of our future policy in Asia were given by President Nixon during his Asian trip last year, most fully at his preliminary stopover in Guam, but much remains hazy about the nature of our current commitments and responsibilities there. The President and other administration officials in speeches and press conferences since then have reemphasized that, in line with reducing "our involvement and our presence" around the world, as Mr. Nixon put it in his State of the Union Message, the nations of Southeast Asia will henceforth nave to bear the main burden of defending themselves against all but the most flagrant?including nuclear?forms of aggression. Still unclear . and requiring further reappraisal are such substantive matters as the prerogatives of the Executive and the Departments of State and Defense to make agreements or pledges short of treaties with foreign countries without "the advice and consent" of the Senate. What must be gone into thoroughly, moreover, are such com- plicated and specific questions as the advisability and legitimacy of using certain methods, especially clandestine ones, to achieve limited purposes. This includes the question of what sort of assistance the Central Intelligence Agency or any other intelli- gence branch of the government can or should give to nations engaged in counterinsurgency campaigns?or wars within or even beyond their borders. Also involved is the peaceful role that the Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 oontlnued S ...r????????? Approved FaraRbigaile,2691/03/04 : CIA-RDP80- SUN 1,1 ? 180,65V E - 209,65 S ? 347,939 mAn 3 1 1970 0, 41# STATI NTL Why Defend Laos? "I , ? By STEPHEN AMititt)SE i T AOS is a country of less at all. The war in South Viet- I t 4-4 than three million people, ' nain will not be affected by i most of whom either smuggle anything that, happens in Laos; 1 . gold or grow and process op- the bombings will go on even if 1 ium for a living. It is one of the the Communists occupy all! t, most isolated regions of the Laos and take over the govern- world. To get from one place to ment. . I I. another in Laos is almost im- Why, then, do we v ste mili-1 w' possible. By itself, Laos has ?tory effort by suppc ling the l ' `C absolutely no importance to Laotians with theSIA and air anyone except the Laotians. , . missions around the Plaine des ?Yet Laos now stands next to' Jarres, which is hundreds of ' the Middle East and Vietnam ., miles away from the Trail? 1 as the most dangerous tinder. Why is Nixon faced with the ( box in the world. So important agonizing decision on introduc-; ., has it become that the United big ground combat elements?! ' States has actually decreased Primarily, one fears, not bei ts air offensive in Vietnam in cause of any inherently impor-; tont strategic reasons, butt ohms in Laos. The CIA runs a rather as a result of a long-1 ' ', iIorder to carry on combat oper- private army in Laos (typical- term, insidious Process .of rhe4 ? ly, a rather ineffective one), torical escalation. "We gok American soldiers have been ahead treating 'this little pis- killed on the ground, and the sant country as if it 1t:re Rus-', . Pentagon is undoubtedly pre. sia and China put together,".' , i% paring contingency plans for Senator Fulbright once corn-4 the introduction of major corn- plained with respect to North! ' bat units. 1 -, Vietnam. Dean Rusk .compared Why all this activity? that tiny country to Nazi Ger-1 Supposedly because ' of the ninny ad nauseam, and the t l.strategie importance of Laos. former Secretary of State, used I l,The Ho Chi Minh Trail pro- to talk of the importance of; ; vides infiltration routes for the maintaining the sovereignty; 1 introduction of NVA troops into and freetiorn of Laos as if he , t South Vietnam, which justifies 'were defending Canada or Mex4 American involvement in Laos. ' ico from foreign invasion. "I I,Or does it?' . . ' All this nonsense about soy- Secretary of Defense Laird ereignty and freedom loving k said in a press conference on peoples has gotten us into deep' ,.1$4arch 19 that even if the Com-. troubles in the past. It threat- k munists took over the govern- .ens to do so in the future. The: tment of Laos and then demand- important facts about Laos are; 4 ed that we halt the bombing, that it does not matter to any, i, the Pentagon intended to con- outsider who rules there, and i., ?I', tinue the air offensive. Since that it borders on China. In 1 the Ho Chi Minh Trail is little 1950 we learned, or at least ohe Y more than a jungle Oath, and? hopes that we learned, that the ii since It is impossible to move Chinese react with a certain '. Iarge forces into the area, hostility when American G.I.'s t., much less support them once approach their border. Surely , I there, it is perfectly obvious no one, not even in the Penta- that we have no intention of gon, wants a ground war with slopping the infiltration by oc- the Chinese ,over anything, ? '4.cupying southeastern Laos. We much less Laos. Before we Iwill simply continue to chase blunder on in defense of Lao-4 ; the will-o'-the-wisp of attempt- ian sovereignty ,and get our-. to stop the Infiltration by ?, selves into a war with China, it dropping big bombs from B-523 is imperative that the adminis-, Approved For ; k,:edtalye,t ftcurol et. P OSOM , ? ? ,i? I opg. ,04ti0;5 1K6e00 0700040001 .- 3 In other words; who rules in'. defend, at what risk, and for'k ?. ' Vientiane' makes no difference. what purpose, ? ..l. - . :.....j . _ . STATINTL STATINTL ma rat /Fs,p5s3y8d For Relemagfbli(a: etkcapnymil R000 Mons on September 25, 1961. He warned that South Vietnam was under attack by forces infiltrated through Laos. Furthermore, on November 6, 1961, we publicly confirmed reports from Laos that Soviet transport planes were de- livering military supplies to the south- ern Lao air base of Tchepone which had been in Pallid Lao hands for months, after being captured by the Communist cadre. ? What happened ;,....1/4""Iff ? ire"- .... ? * .? ? 'A..: ??? .?, ,.. -,,?-???!?., -,./...t.i.,?'1?4,,,, ???? ...--dt,.."...:4, - "i:?????t--.. ????? .-? t 0/014;` ? -????-? ?':';?.1,A7, ..?., '..., ? -. r.:47,- 41...' )pt.e.,;','1 7, ? ,:":?...oc ei! te....,? ...".?,r044,4%.? ?,..., "?? ,./....5 , - ' 1' ?..-??,.....'.. ;,./.--......>.i.,-/,,, ...Z,,t;.- ? -00.1 im ?Ir ?.1;.?.?e '1?J'fr.:;af?..' ? qk?'',. .. r -,...4--..,,- re., , , ,.,',:... n.?,4.1 ? .,.. . v:., ..:,,;,,,???q. ; -4.0... ,.).?? .6.4,,. .?....4,,,,?:;1?,?.'r,izts....0.? ?-1.0. .4 .1":3:4?,..'1..?4-....0 1....tou..c.1.."-e._,, r,.., . ? .. ? . .....?; *???ir. fr.,. , i ', t ,. . . ? ' , .'"" -?...r ?? tir1.17-1,''',.; ;le ...4,,,., ? i , ? - ..(: 4.N? !i?-, ? , P V. .,.:* : 1: .: % :. ' . :, ' ..? ' t ? . ' -.0.... .r.?? '''' i 'Vi:0604/?;;e4; ..'".....),Vo S)?"*Ap ??02,4D ?,),VedFtirReTease Communist Pa thet Lao tioops and a Roya vrrirr.fr7.7- '')? ' r" fs- ??? ? ? ? ???: =.!??? ? ??? ? ? ????? 1. ? 4,11 : ? ?.-? ? ? pr.-- ? ?. . . ? - ? ? .-?,";?;, ? (7. . , ? ',";:il.::"? ? . , ?? ::.:,.--,i?"4::,'?:.;V:if,,'!... ? -: ?'? ?? "?'..- 'A I? ? ? ? ? . ? ?, .. .? , ...,,?..e. ,....-s,...,., ? .., . ?. ....:.:,....-....?--- .. , ?,.... .,..i...::.;,....... _..., -...v.-...,?,.- - ...:.._,,? ....,?......,,?.....-,.,?,.,..? 1 6?r,..,..,....::...,.......-7,-.. A :,--.7-41,, ;,,-..4 ? ..:;i-...--.1,..7.-",'::???:. ...., .; " *.- !... ,s, , ..... , ...-1;;;,....--n;v.,,,..--,..... ..71-- . "T ;"4".. ????'" , r?ttl.".' ?? .',..?;',.'; ...,.;`.*....,v "? . ' ".:- , 4..7:7,:,:e%,,"."..0%..." 4.,?., '' 4.?i'.?. ,_?. __?....*?!'''i,Z,???;?lt).7:4't ..'.0.? ?'.,... '' " ? '.? .,?'.... ?? 4. !,? C. (44'...0-4::::06....;.-1;t.*!*;:r21U":44?%6:1..:iti'.4t:ir4li.14:h..6;.16m...:11:::::SuZ.S.:1.1 /04i:-.'c'iA-K1-4 wra. +Alai' riny on poet' ,4141.1?E V114544% 7 gigarti44ignaan of peaco P80-,41.60,11RQ ? ? (1011+4ritIr.,4 STATINTL SCHFNECTADY, N.Y. Approved For Re asusseettle1/03/04 : CIA-780-01601 1,1 _55,934 , ioftvav- (k-7 (2_1 No Esca The citizen is pretty much In the , 'dark so far as war in Cambodia : is: , concerned because . few. persons knew,: ? what .is going on behind the scenes.), That has been true of the War in Yiet nam and the war in Laos. - The citizen knows what the Whit ' House is saying and knows What the ' various competing politicians and gen- ? orals are saying in, Cambodia. In short, the public knows what's on the:.'surface. But what is not known is what is going, on in secrecy?what ' is being done, for example,. by the CIA. ? Are we ,,i ?,/r . getting into deeper troub16'withciut, realizing it? No one knows , but the few who , are directly involved. The ': President himself could be deceived.:. The one thing that is ? Certain ..is that our people will not be happy about any escalation of war in Cambodia. If . our citizens were enthusiastic about,'; : the war in Vietnam it could easily bie;,, -.argued that we should be waging an '..,. aLlal -ooslt bwe caaritsi C on: foatmobi coadni lap 1 (ase ow, ?co% at cla 1 i 1 60;000 North Vietnamese troops have been using the border jungles of Cam! ?? bodia for years as sanctuaries ;from: 4: Which, to . strike ; against ,: American i '.,foreeS n South, Vietnam ; , ; The situation is, iit.a sense, stinger to that, during the Korean war when the UN fortes, were. fighting with one '''..hand.. tied ' !behind their back 'because :.,they, '.refrained from sending bombers across the line into, China, Where the . . , . , Onnese : ' WOKO: ,. enjoying . sanctuary. . pne. difference is that -had We gone into China we would have taken on :;;prieT:of. the , biggest :and ;Perhaps the ,:??,ntost. stubborn nation in ..the world.). .:.,'? f..Thei' only people who ,want ? us to, ...escalate war in Cambodia and Laos are those, who believe that no matter how ve g6 about ii; we mist,. at all costs, ecisiVely. . defeat Communists,: where- 'ever :they rear, their: heads .in .1South-: Veast -:ASia.;:' If what is imperative is :'...Aniericani .military victory, 1.0;'. South- east 'Asia- then we should' be ?waging :Jullscale JAVar in Cambodia, Laos and? every other country in 'which, there !fire - Communist factions that . Might ,!constitute a' threat. But, .very few American ? Citizens ?Want' to, pull out of ' war in Vietnam ..7.',only ;to . get deeper.' and ,deeper into .;. war in 'Cambodia or`Laos:?:It is ? hoped' that President Nixon is making ..that, polnt, iclear to any and all persons in I API i .;b01A, 4c1 ?10o.:::4'. ' , co,. :,,.,..22!;;Ld oi,,,, .2' .1' Approved For Rele 1R000700040001-3 IME -711 STATINTL Approved For Release 20031Thtek1PCIA-RDP80-01601 THE WORLD DANGER AND OPPORTUNITY IN INDOCHINA THROUGH the anguished years of the Viet Nam War. Cambodia and Laos have been strictly sideshows. Cam- bodia has almost entirely escaped the storm of steel that so far has cost the lives of an estimated 610.000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops, 175,- 000 South Vietnamese troops. and more than 42.000 Americans?not to mention some 300,000 Vietnamese civilians. The conflict in Laos, though bloody enough, has not approached the scale of the. war in Viet Nam. Now the situation is suddenly changing. Events in Laos and called for?and got?help from U.S.. and South Vietnamese forces. With the war continuing in South Viet Nam and with the North wrestling with the grave problems that have grown out of the con- flict, all four states of Indochina were on the boil at the same time (see map). Privileged Sanctuaries For some time, Laos and Cambodia' have served as massive conduits for the flow of men and supplies from North Viet Nam to the southern battlegrounds. There is, of course, the spidery Ho Chi cm n Cambodia arc the "Parrot's Beak" and the "Angel's Wing," where five Com- munist regiments operating in the Me- kong Delta "float in and out," as a U.S. source puts it. Farther north in Cambodia is the "Fishhook," only 70 miles from Saigon, which is the haven for two full divisions as well as Viet Cong headquarters. It is no exaggeration to say that the existence of these sanc- tuaries has virtually precluded a mil- itary solution to the Viet Nam War. In fact, General Creighton Abrams, the U.S. commander in South Viet Nam, HELICOPTERS NEAR CAMBODIAN BORDER LAOTIAN Changing the whole thrust of the war. Minh Trail, threading into South Viet Nam from more than half a dozen points in Laos and Cambodia. There is also the Cambodian port of Sihanouk- ville, through which, according to sonic estimates, the Communists get fully 80% of their ? supplies for the war in the lower half of South Viet Nam, Much of the mat6riel is brought in aboard Chi- nese and Soviet freighters and moved north over first-class roads (including one built with U.S. aid) by a fleet of some 500 canvas-covered lorries op- .? crated by the Chinese firm of Hak Ly. Even more important is the use of Cambodia and Laos as privileged base. areas for Communist troops. North Viet- namese and Viet Cong hospitals, stip- . ply dumps, rest camps and training areas ? are scattered throughout eastern Cam- bodia. A 2,300-man headquarters for the. joint North Vietnamese-Viet Cong ' effort in the South lies in a complex of huts beneath a triple canopy of jungle.? Some of the sanctuaries bear pictur- Cambodia last week may well prove to be a watershed in the protracted Vict Nam War. Indeed, they could change the whole thrust of the war. For the first time since the Geneva ac- cords of 1962 brought an equivocal peace to Laos, Communist troops moved south in force from the Plain of Jars. They seized one key base that had been cld by the Laotians with U.S. support and menaced another that serves as the center of CIA operations in the coun- try. The onslaught made it clear that the North Vietnamese could overrun all of Laos at will; what was agoniz- ingly unclear was just how far they in- tended to go. , Developments in neighboring Cam- bodia were equally unsettling. In Phnom- Penh, anti-Communists led by Premier General Lon Nol and Deputy Premier Prince Sisowath Sink Matak deposed Prince Norodom Sihanouk as chief of state and ordered North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops out of Cambodia. In a number munist t ?1 lilt ilsVeitstAdvittbiape COMMUNISTS IN SOVIET ARMORED CAR MaratsgtriMeNig6 has said that if they were eliminated the war would be over within a year. In recent months, increasing allied successes in South Viet Nam have forced the Communists to lean more than ever on the Cambodian and Lao- tian sanctuaries. Cambodia in particular noted an upsurge in activity as the al- lies pressed toward the western frontiers of South Viet Nam. Phnom-Penh, for example, reported 200 attacks by Com- munist troops on Cambodian outposts in the past few months. In Laos, U.S. in- telligence sources note that Hanoi has sent in one ? fresh 9,000-man division and fully reinforced another in recent months for its current offensive. Promise and Peril . To policymakers in the U.S., the Cam- bodian and Laotian crises present a tan- talizing mixture of promise and peril. Should the U.S. go to Cambodia's aid if asked, providing supplies or men in the hope of wiping out the sanctuaries moo ItT.S. were to "Mr pouring in 11:1,6 continued - Approved For Release 2001/03/04 ? CIA-RDPB0-01601R000700040001-3 ? Kept non m in tile spotlight notn at nome aoized. A year ago, during a tour of Cambodia's northeast provinces, Siha- nouk saw for himself the extent of Com- munist occupation, Subsequently, the prince said that he had had enough of the Communist intruders. So had many of his countrymen. Inevitably, American and South -Viet- namese troops were guilty of incursions as well, though not for protracted pe- riods, Last December, Cainhcidia's Unit- ed -Nations Ambassador, Huot Sampoth,. appealed for an end to "this war of ex- termination" in which, he said, more than 300 Cambodians had been killed and 700 wounded by U.S. and...South Vietnamese forces. There was little, how- ever; that Cambodia could do except complain: its scantily equipped 40,000- man armed forces could not adequately patrol Cambodia's ill-defined, 575-mile more troops n opening yet ano er front, or by intensifying its thrust in Laos. This, coming at a point when the U.S. is attempting to disengage from the Indochinese quagmire, could prove politically as well as militarily disastrous. The U.S. effort to disengage, in fact, may well have contributed to Much of the current turmoil. If Washington faces difficult decisions over the next several weeks, however, so does Hanoi. Can North Viet Nam stand calmly by and see its supply lines to the South endangered? Should the Communists seize all of .Laos, and risk massive U.S. bombing as well as at- tack by a Thai army that is unlikely to. feel comfortable with Communist forc- es just across the Mekong River? With problems of these dimensions suddenly looming, the next few months are bound ? to be crucial for Southeast Asia. The common denominator in the cur- ? rent turmoil is the North Vietnamese in- fantryman, and his presence in sizable . numbers in supposedly neutral lands., Hanoi's forces long ago took on the bur- den of the Laos campaign from the in- / ffectual, home-grown Pathet Lao. Nei- ther the frangible Laotian regulars nor ? the lightly armed, CIA-backed Meo guerrillas of Laotian General Vang Pao have been able to withstand them. In Cambodia, it was North Viet Nam's freewheeling use of Cambodian ter- ritory that finally precipitated Sihanouk's ? ouster. With the U.S. withdrawal ,?. under way, Sihanouk grew increasingly alarmed that the presence of so many . North Vietnamese and Viet Cong sol- diers would encourage Cambodia's own Communists, the Khmer Rouge, to act more boldly. For all his diplomatic dex- terity, however, the ebullient prince had found it impossible to persuade his un- welcome guests to leave, and power was seized by men who may try hard- ? cr. Of course, many observers familiar with the Byzantine workings of Siha- nouk's mind suspect that he may have ? engineered the whole thing as a way of pressuring Moscow and Peking to talk the intruders into leaving. But most an- alysts suspect that this time no dis- sembling was involved. In the Spotlight Dissatisfaction with Sihanouk has sprung from several sources. Foreign policy intrigues the mercurial prince and so does education, but economic pol- icy, which is vital to Cambodia's wel- fare, simply bores him. There were ru- mors that the prince's relatives had prof- ited enormously from government con- tacts. After Sihanouk was deposed, his. wife, attractive Princess Monique, was attacked for alleged profiteering. Even Queen Kossomak, Sihanouk's mother, was the subject of ugly speculation on the same count. "The pretext was that Sihanouk was not doing enough against the Vietnamese," said a young Cam- bodian businessman. "The real reason was that we were all tired of him." . It was SitArFOreUediFjaptiagtlea ? and abroad. in the early '60s, the prince concluded that the U.S. would never be able to defeat the Vietnamese Com- munists. Accordingly, he began disen- gaging , from the U.S. and ingratiating himself with the Soviet Union and, more important, China. In late 1963, Si- hanouk ordered U.S. aid officials out of the country, and 18 months later he broke off relations completely. After Lyndon Johnson's decision to halt the bombing of North Viet Nam, Si- hanouk began swinging back toward - the U.S. "The American presence helps Cambodia indirectly by maintaining the balance of power in the arca," he said. "If the U.S. pulls out of the region, the weight of China will be too great for the small countries of SOutheast Asia to bear. They will all become atti Pathet Lao Control??????+,.... PLA Lu?-?*anrabang* \ OF JARS Moung Souls?,.74Xie!ls Ithotrang Sam Thong47.?ACheng (CIA HO). L A ?\S 55,000 in Royal Laotian Army 5,000-10,000 Mao Tribesmen Vientiane ? Worn 1,040 Americans in LAOS incl. 320 military advisers and 323 logistical personnel HAI L A N., 126,000 in Thai forces 43,800 9.5. personnel Kar Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 frontier with Viet Nam. A typical tech- nique was to send a single Cambodian trooper, mounted on a motorcycle, to the site of a border violation. The sol- dier would race up to the invading troops, wave a Cambodian flag at them and try to persuade them to leave. It is a tribute to Cambodian bravado that the tactic sometimes worked. Energizing the Economy Last summer Sihanouk made the two men who eventually overthrew him, the principal figures in a "movement of sal- vation" designed to energize Cambodia's stagnant cconomy. Both had been key of- ficials for some time. Lon Nol is a quiet, pragmatic 56-year-old general who . has been Cambodia's best-known anti- Communist for many years. He be- came head of the national police in ' 1951 and entered the army in 1952, tak- ing part in operations against the Viet Minh invaders until the end of the French war in Indochina. Three years after joining the army, he became its chief of staff, and in 1966 was elected Premier. He resigned the following year. after suffering injuries in an auto ac- cident, but returned to the government in 1968 as Defense Minister. In mid-'69, when Lon Nol was again elected Pre- mier, he demanded?and got?substan- tial powers from Sihanouk. Prince Sink Matak, 56, who helped Lon Not depose Sihanouk, is the scion of the Sisowath branch of the royal fam- ily (Sihanouk is of the Norodom branch). A more colorful figure than Lon No, he could emerge as Cambodia's real ncw leader. Though he has prac- tically made a career out of publicly op- posing Sihanouk on major issues, his unquestioned ability has all but guar- anteed him a succession of important government posts. With Lou No, he has long fought Sihanouk's policy of tol- erating the Communist border presence, but he has struggled hardest to free the economy of oppressive government con- trols and corruption. Familiar Gambit ? - . Last January, with domestic conflicts developing over economic reforms and ? the issue of the Vietnamese troops, Si- hanouk decided to depart for France. It was a familiar gambit?leave at a Lime when trouble is brewing, come back after the situation has worsened, point out how inefficient the temporary chieftains have been and then create a . flurry of activity that resembles a so- lution. This time, however. Sihanouk's absence simply gave Lon Nol and Si- rik Matak time to plot. ? In February, the governors of Cam- bodia's 19 provinces met in Phnom- Penh. As they reported, one by one, , on thcir problems, it slowly became ap- parent that unrest extended over most . of the nation?and that the chief source of the trouble was the North Viet-. 1 narnese presence. Lon Nol and Sink' oggitiotg atioretaing had to Cockpit of Conflict ? ITTLE besides geography links the L four countries that make up mod- ern-day Indochina?Cambodia, Laos, North and South Viet Nam. For 20 centuries, neither foreign conquerors nor home-grown dynasts have ever managed to persuade the peoples of the verdant, fertile peninsula to col- lect themselves into a single nation. Indeed, long before the present strug- gle engulfed them, their differences had led to a history of prolonged and tangled conflicts. The most constant influence on the area's life, of course, has been China, where the forebears of most present-day Indochinese lived before migrating south centuries before . Christ. On all too many occasions, - the Heavenly Emperors to the North . sent their representatives?sometimes ' soldiers, more often messengers de- manding tribute. The feudal village, with its population of tax-paying peasants and aristocratic protectors, grew out of that practice, and is still the basic political unit in much of In- dochina. The Chinese presence was strongest in Viet Nam, which was more or less a colony for nearly 1,000 years; its ancient name in Chi- nese, Annam, literally means. "the pacified South." ? The second great culture to reach Indochina was that of ancient India, brought by sailors and traders. Along with their commerce, the Indians car- ried their culture?the religion of Buddha, works of art, the concept of a god-king. The unique fusion of Indo-Asian culture that resulted reached its greatest heights in Cam- bodia, the seat of the once-mighty Khmer Empire. Between the 9th and the 14th centuries, the Khmers con- quered all of Southeast Asia, from the Mekong Delta in Viet Nam to? Burma on the Bay of Bengal, back- ing up their rule by building an elab- orate set of canals and reservoirs and making rice a stable crop. They also left behind one of the archi- tectural wonders of the world: the col- onnaded temple of Angkor Wat. Laos,' the Land of the Million El- ephants and the White Parasol, man- aged to conquer the northern reach- es of the Khmer Empire in the 14th century. That accomplishment led to Laos' one brief period of expansion. Before long, however, both Laos and the Khmers were caught in the dead- ly vise of war between Slain (now. . Thailand) and Annam (now Viet Nam). The enmities between Indo- china's present-day neighbors stem in no small part from these wars, which reduced Laos to a tiny moun- tain kingdom, robbed Cambodia of the rich Mekong Deka (Cochin Chi- Arprnvpri Fnr RAIPaRA na) and created, for the first time in history, a vigorous unity in Viet Nam between the South (Annam) and North (Tonkin). France landed its first military ex-' ' pcdition in Viet Nam in 1858, os- tensibly to protect missionaries who were being put to death by the Viet- namese Emperor for teaching Chris- tianity. Soon the French objective was to colonize rather than Chris- tianize, and by 1883 Paris had es- ' tablished a "protectorate" in Cam- ? bodia and occupied all of Viet Nam; . in 1899, it placed a rasident su- pirieur in Vientiane. Economically, the French were unabashed parasites. As one report of the time put it: "Co- lonial production must be limited to ? ' supplying the mother country with. raw materials." ? Politically, the French were not so much oppressive as inept. Ad- ministrators often knew next to noth- ing about the land and people in their charge, and few were in office ? long enough to learn; between1 ..892 and 1930, Paris dispatched 23.,gov- ernors-general to Hanoi. Outside. the' major cities of Viet Nam, French sec-.,- ondary schools were almost noncx- ? istent; by 1939, Phnom-Penh's only school beyond the primary level had ? graduated a grand total of four students. Resistance groups flourished al- : most from the start. Ho Chi Minh, who Was to wage the most protract- ed and successful struggle against ? the French, was forced to leave school in 1910 for anti-French opinions. The Japanese occupation of Indo- china during World War II swept away the myth that the white man was indestructible. Before long, that dramatic discovery led to a place and turning point called Dienbicnphu. Engulfed in the miseries of war for 25 years?or longer?Indochina's newly independent people have not yet recaptured an identity with their past. Few Vietnamese, North or South, can find much reflected glo- ry in the elegant red-and-gold lac- quered panels of Hua's imperial. city. Laotians, living in, the shadow of the war next door and amid the grow- ing misery of the one in their own front yard, take small comfort in the ancient Buddhist temples of Luangprabang. To a certain extent, Cambodians could relive the triumphs of the Khmers in the resounding rhet- oric of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who at least kept the kingdom in- dependent. Clearly, if the past some- times seems impossibly remote and unreal to Indochina's long-suffering peoples, that is the result of an all too real present. 9nniinam4: CIA-RDP80-01 P, seriousness continued 3 Approved For Release 201/04/04 CIA,TRpP80 01 of the situation to both the wandering mier hou he to' ambot ran Sihanouk and the North Vietnamese. To this end, they organized mass dem- onstrations. first in Svay Kieng province, site of the Fishhook sanctuary, then three days later in the capital. Thou- sands of civil servants, students and sol- diers in civilian clothes joined in. Many of the placards they carried had been , ? printed on government presses. The . North Vietnamese and N.L.F. embassies were sacked. Though the demonstrations ? were sparked by the army, there was enough spontaneous participation to in- dicate a high level of popular hatred for the North Vietnamese. It was then, that the anti-Sihanouk forces seriously began to consider ousting the prince. Object Lesson Other factors helped crystallize their feelings. The continuing disintegration in Laos, for instance, was an object les- son in the perils of a large North Viet- namese troop presence. In addition, ex- ploratory post-riot talks with the af- fronted North Vietnamese in Phnom- Penh got nowhere. The Communist diplomats brushed aside the rights or wrongs of their military presence; they were only interested in reparations and a public apology for their ruined em- bassies. At that point Sihanouk weighed in with a cable warning of Soviet un- hanpiness with the demonstrations and indicating that he had no plans to get tough with Hanoi's representatives. Lon Nol and Sink Matak decided that the time had come to shut the door on the re- turning prince. The National Assembly and the Council of the Kingdom re- moved Sihanouk as head of state and named Assembly Speaker Cheng Heng as his acting successor. The first sign that Sihanouk might have lost control came when air con- trollers at Phnom-Penh's Pochentong Airport began to turn away incoming air- liners. A Burma Airways plane, whose passengers included a U.S. Coast Guard officer en route to Cambodia to nego- tiate the return of the hijacked Co- lumbia Eagle (see THE NATION), was in its approach pattern when it was waved off. A few hours later, a gov- ernment communiqu?nnounced: "In view of the political crisis created in re- cent days by the chief of state, Prince Si- hanouk, and in conformity with the constitution, the National Assembly and the Council of the Kingdom have unan- imously agreed to withdraw confidence in Prince Sihanouk." The coup had a distinctive Cambodian flavor. Some of the tanks drawn up around public build- ings in the capital had white kerchiefs over their gun muzzles, and scores of sol- diers were seen snoozing on the grass, many without shoes. ,students at Vnukovo II Airport that he might establish an exile government in Moscow or Peking. Earlier, he bad sent off a cable to his mother quoting Ko- sygin as having said: "If the extreme right continues to strike foul blows on our allies, war is inevitable between Cambodia and Viet Nam." Back in Phnom-Penh, Lon Nol and Sink Matak had been doing their best to make Kosygin's allies uncomfortable. They sent pro forma notes of apology to the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong for the damage to their embas- sies but at the same time handed the Communists an ultimatum: all of their troops must be out within three days. It was an impossible demand, and Cambodia's new leaders made no move to enforce it. In fact, they made a point of announcing that Cambodia AP 6911N9TP9? Pq 11 I siaying with the Premier and the balance joining the Pathet Lao. Pathet Lao ministers in Vientiane, rightfully fearing assassina- tion, fled to the Plain of Jars in 1963 and formed a rump government. The right wing made a bid to seize full power in 1964. At that time, the U.S. dropped its backing of the rightists and swung its support to Souvanna. The idea of tripartite rule was dead. Unsettling Element For the next five years, the strategical- ly located Plain of Jars remained in Communist hands; most of the fighting in that period occurred around the pe- riphery of the plain, and the Communists went no farther south. Last fall Vang Pao's CIA-backed army, aided by heavy U.S. air support, succeeded in driving the Communist forces from the plain. AA VII Impossible Ultimatum Sihanouk heard of his overthrow from Soviet Premier Alcksei Kosygin in Moscow. At first he took the news calmly. Aim hours laterjust Ilefore fly- ing off Appstavs-0 thier Release .4...i i? ,? CHENG HENG - LON NOL SIRIK MATAK Enough spontaneity to indicate the popular hatred. would maintain its traditional policy of ' Five weeks ago, reinforced North Viet- neutrality and nonalignment. U.S. sourc- namcse and Pathet Lao troops reoccu- es in Saigon reported some increase in pied the plain?and this time they_decid- the number of .enemy troops crossing ed to go farther. After pausing to resup- into South Viet Nam about the time ? ply, the Communists moved southeast. the ultimatum expired, but the Viet ? Late last week government forces aban- Cong and North Vietnamese are still es- doned Sam Thong to the Communists, timated to have close to 40,000 men in ..' and North Vietnamese troops were re. Cambodia. ? ported on the verge of attacking the CIA center at Long Cheng. Coming Unstuck With the government forces in se- While Cambodia's new leadership ' riot's trouble, Vientiane sent in rein- moved to consolidate its hold, the mili- ' forcements, including a number of ex- tary situation in Laos continued to ii is- tremely young conscripts. Unexpectedly, . rv/ integrate. That was not altogether star- several hundred Thai mercenaries were - tling; ever since, the establishment of a airlifted into Long Cheng by Air Amer- neutralist tripartite government in Laos lea, the CIA's Asian airline.' This marked ., as a result of the Geneva accords of ? the first time that Thai participation in 1962, news from there had generally the Laos war had been officially ac- been gloomy. Under the accords, the knowledged by .the U.S.?though Thai country's three major parties?the Neo artillery units and pilots arc known to Lao Bak Xat (Communist), the Neutral- have fought in Laos on several pre- ists und:r Souvanna Phouma, and the vious occasions. It was a turn of events right wing under General Phoumi Nosa- that intensely displeased doves in Wash- van?were to work together in a single ington. "It's too bad," said Senate For- government. Souvanna held the balance eign Relations Committee Chairman ' of power as Premier, and Cabinet posts J.W. ? Fulbrignt. "It's a very unsettling were shared by all three groups. . . element." . This solution began to come unstuck ? As the Communist pressure mounted, Wag as soon as it was icced to- a Pathet Lao emissary flew into Vien- el t0)3i044setAkREIFIU3104h1-604ER006716100400?0-Or Souvanna continue:1R Approved For Release Phouma. It was assumed that the mes- sage included a proposal calling for a conference of Laotian political factions on the question of a settlement, and for an end to U.S. bombing in Laos. In the past, Souvanna has countered such proposals by insisting that North Vietnamese troops first be withdrawn from his country; this time, in the face of the North Vietnamese advance to- ward Long Cheng, there was a faint chance that Souvanna might agree to talks with the Pathet Lao (which is led by his half brother Prince Souphanou- vong). Despite the increased pressure, Vientiane remained ' characteristically tranquil. Even the news of Sihanouk's overthrow failed to stir much of a re- action. Most attention was focused on the flamboyant wedding of Souvanna Phouma's son to a Thai model, an event attended by smiling representatives of Western and Communist powers. A Smile from Thieu The parallel crises in Indochina evoked strikingly cautious comments. Where Cambodia was concerned, of- ficials were wary of pronouncements be- cause no one could firmly count Si- hanouk out for good. Given his pop- ular support and his penchant for the surprise initiative, Sihanouk may well remain an important factor in Cam- bodian politics for some time to come. To be sure, he was not giving up with- out a fight. In Peking, he charged that his removal had been "absolutely il- legal" and demanded a referendum under neutral supervision. Both Moscow and Peking emphasized that they still considered Sihanouk to be Cambodia's chief of state. In Washington, Cam- bodia's stability is considered essential to peace in Southeast Asia. For that reason, a ranking White House official said: "We're not going to take any action that could foul us 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-016 up. We're playing it cool." In Saigon, where Sihanouk has long been con- sidered a Communist dupe, there Was un- disguised pleasure. South Viet Nam's President .Nguyen Van Thicu had just finished telling a group of Asian news- men, "We can be friendly with a neu- tral ,,country, but 'neutral' does not Mean being in complicity with the enemy," when an aide handed him the news of Si- hanouk's downfall. Thicu broke into a broad grin. Hanoi's response Was, naturally, less enthusiastic. North Vietnamese successes. in Laos seemed to be offset by the un- certain situation in Cambodia. Without a guaranteed border sanctuary, Com- munist forces could expect severe dif- ficulties, particularly if Cambodian forc- es started acting in conjunction with allied troops. Would North Viet Nam fight to keep the sanctuary? That may - not be necessary. In any case, for the time being Hanoi appears to be keep- ing the fighting in South Viet Nam at a -low level. Ho Chi Minh's death last September may well be the reason. Sir Robert Scott, former British Commis- sioner General for Southeast Asia, notes in Foreign A (lairs that the new leaders in Haribi "do not now feel the,siime ur- gency.to translate Ho's vision into re- ality in his lifetime." Adds Scott: "There is no purpose to be served by shedding too much blood to win what they ex- pect to win anyway." Plus and Minus .. In terms of the Viet Nam conflict, last week's-developments appear to leave Washington with one questionable plus ?Cambodia?and one probable minus ?Laos. Whatever may happen in Laos, the U.S, is extremely unlikely to use ground troops?as Senator Fulbright in- formbil the world last week by releas- .ing secret testimony by Secretary of State William Rogers. Rogers said that AP NIHON DENPA NEWS 01 R000700040001 -3 the Nixon Administration had "no pres- ent plans" to send GIs to Laos even if Communist troops threatened to overrun it. Nonetheless, Defense Secretary Mel- vin Laird indicated that the U.S. would probably continue to bomb the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Cambodia could be a plus ?over the short run, at least?provided the situation does not degenerate into an- archy and prompt a panicky Hanoi to mount a full-scale invasion. (Sihanouk was useful in that he kept Cambodia sta- ble. If the new regime swings vio- lently anti-Communist, there could be serious trouble.) Hanoi, too, had a mixed week, with a definite plus in Laos all but outweighed by a possible. minus in Cambodia. The survival of the sanctuary in Cambodia is now in question; supplies coming through Si- hanoukville reportedly have been slowed, and some Communist troops may soon begin to feel the pinch of hunger. One positive factor for everybody would be a multinational peace con- ference whose aim would be a set- tlement embracing all of Indochina. The Soviets have opposed reconvening the 14 nation Geneva parley until the U.S. stops its bombing in Laos; the dangers posed by Sihanouk's departure from the scene could persuade them to drop their opposition. Hanoi, with its lifeline in Cambodia endangered, now has more reason to come to the bargaining table. ? A more remote possibility is that the Communist Chinese. whose foreign pol- icy is no longer distorted by the lunatic frenzies of the Cultural Revolution: ? might be persuaded to join. Last week's demonstration of Indochina's chronic in- ? stability may eventually prove persuasive enough to bring all the nations con- cerned to the bargaining table. Nothing, in all likelihood, could do more to please Norodom Sihanouk, or Souvanna Phou- ma, or Richard Nixon. il ;.'7"'" .7.,?,...a., x.,; e .,.. I ,,?, i .:.,%r NY 11 I , ?il * i 11.:' 1 . 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GAZETTE MAR 29 1 970 Li ? 42,441 I S '? 5 4,232 Vietnam Is a CorAnumg Tragedly?Pvilitte Mansfield m the ?eastern provinces of Cambodia ' clear over the northern frontier to the provincecs of Cambodia . clear over the northern frontier to the province of Batdambang on the Thai frontier. "What will happen now may well mean that the Chinese will ? support Sihanouk. He may line up with the people who used to ? be his enemies?the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. "It might well be a new ball- game as far as Cambodia is con- cerned. ' "As far awe are concerned, I ' ?don't think we ought to send in iany troops or offer any aid but stay clear of it completely. STATI NTL 1, By ROGER HAWTHORNE Gazette Staff Writer "It will be a near miracle" II' : American troops are withdrawn i from Southeast Asia within the , . next 15-20 months, U. S. Senate i Majority Leader Mike Mansfield : says. "I wish it would happen. I wish they could be gotten out sooner because I think becoming Involved in Vietnam was a mis- i aos , take and a continuing tragedy," .1 "The North Vietnamese, ac- the Montana Senator says, with . cording to the President, have 1 obvious emotion in his voice. 67,000 troops. The Pathet Lao Mansfield says he doubts i have 15,000-20,000,1 understand. American troops will be with- I ' "Last year the Senate passed . I Helms (director of the CIA) b land unless it was with Congxes- 1.4re have a pretty good idea what the situation is there. fore us so "We do not intend to become Phouma sent to Souvanna Phou- drawn on any large scale be- the Cooper-Church resolution cause of developments in Cam- . i which forbade the use of U.S. . bodia and Laos. . ? I Combat troops in Laos and Thai- - i MANSFIELD stopped in Bil- , sional assent. ' involved CIA or otherwise, and ma and received, I believe, lings during the Senate break for , "The administration support- the Cooper-Church amendment Wedneday, to see if they can't- ' "As far as Vietnam is con-. ' will be adhered to." : f :work. Out . some at of agree'Easter. l' ed that amendment. cerned, the question why we 'are "I DO NOT expect that any . ?? there is one that has plagued me ground troops will be used, but . ' for many years. We shouldn't be it appears that air attacks have ' t 1 to reinforce (General) Vane ? Vietntiane. . , given more money and use its , ? bivan- namese on the Pathet Lao's southwestward toward Khuoa about 40 miles. side. What is being done on our ,/ id the Royal Laotian side, is, "That brings them within 20 , , I being done by American planes miles of the Thai border. 1 from Meo tribesmen under "I HAVE approved the Presi- dent's phased withdraw out of Mansfield admits' that the ietnam. My only complaint is about 8,000-10,000 labor troops Agency that it isn't fast enough. and antiaircraft personnel Central Intelligence guarding these roads. They have "har-cmital"InrVang-P-a" "However, the situation i Meo Artily. "I think those con- which has developed in Laos and not participated actively except tads are remaining constant and Cambodia may well bring about in defensive actions in that area 1 I have been tit, last three or four a stop to even that much with- drawal because a situation "We have become aware of ? might develop there that would Amen- that recently. . call for the attention of Ameri- ._ can personnel. "IT IS NOT public knowledge "It would be my hope as far as but. we have had Mr. (Richar Laos is concerned that the two brothers, Prince Souphan- ouvong, head of the Pathet Lao, and Prime Minister Souvanna 1 ment. News reports say yang Pao as 40,000 Meo bibesmen in his army, which is supported wholly ; "I WOULD hope that the ICC, the CIA, with the army beat-,.the International Control Com- mission, would be beefed up, there. ?,,been step p_ ? ? e a bout 40 miles "As of last Thursday, there ? ; were something on the order o 318,000 casualties in Vietnam ? alone. , "Approximately 50,000 were deaths, 42,000 combat deaths and 8,000 noncombat deaths. The rest were wounded. T Pao's so-called clandestine army. "But the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao keep. on coming. "If they stop where they are now, it will be a remarking of : "What you have in Laos is a; offices to bring about a degree__ differential between the lowland of stabilization' Laotians and the Meo, Yaos, and; "I would hope that President Lobos who are the highland pee-i Nixon's 'request to the United i i)le," Mansfield says. Kingdom and the USSR, the co- chairmen of the Geneva Conven- "THEY DON'T get along with ? tion which set up the neutrality "WE HAVE spent well over - the old line (during the. late one another. of Laos in 1962, would call the $100 billion in that war to date 1950's and early 1960's) and ? . "The Moos are carrying the Geneva conferences together to . ! maybe it will hold for 2-3 ' most of the fighting at this time,' the end that a settlement could and now we have the situation in Laos which is taking more in the months until the rainy season doing the best they can, but it's be achieved. . ' not very well. "It's my belief that if there is . "In Cambodia, I think that the going to be peace in Laos, there way of our resources. ends. ?. "The Pathet Lao and the '"rhen the other side will go North Vietnamese have id- back to the line to which they deposing of Prince Sihanouk 1; is going to have to be peace in . Ik , ' could turn into a tragedy. Re- Cambodia and the two Viet- ? ' vanced beyond the Plain of used to advance in other years. gardless what we think of him I Jars. They are within 20 miles, I . tinam's as well. ? . __. understand, of the Royal Lao- "IT'S A terrible war in that Personally, he did keep "The only way that peace can I tian capital of Luang Prabang. country because the Laotions Cambodia together and he .did be' ensured, I think, is to have a ! I i "The Chinese have built a are probably the most peaceful maintain a neutrality of sorts. vi guarantee of neutrality on the 1 , road down from Muong Leo in People in the world and the "He had to confront border 1 part of the Geneva conferees for 1 Yunnan Province (in China) to world's worst fighters, activities as ' far as U.S. and , all of Indochina and Thailand as i y Muong Nhie. They have built an "The fighting being done is outh Vietnamese operatic, well" Mansfield sas. ere concerned. : extension eastward toward. Dien being dons by. the , North. Viet'.. ? He suffered . _Alen Phu sArne 25 ndles and one , sualties for , which We have . pproved For Release 2001/03/04 : (!k5riliigiti1:8041F40fr 00040001-3 STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000 DES !MINES, IOWA REGISTER ? 246,841 S 511,496 ,MAR 2 9 1970 Fighting for Opium . Americans whose drug addictions are : limited to the "normal" alcohol, to- bacco, patent medicine and prescription ! varieties get a chill of horror at reports ! of 60 per cent marijuana use in they . American Infantry company involved in ; the My Lai - massacre. Their spines : tingle with horror at the word that the , Meo tribal faction in Laos recruited by ; the U.S. central Intelligence Agency ' Onto a "clAdestine army" are less in- terested in "fighting Communist ogres:" ( sion" than in retaining and acquiring ; ,k- opium poppy fields. i 1 In South Vietnam and Laos, where i ) anarchy and civil war have been going I on for years, both opium and marijuana ; are readily available and occupy about ? ' the same place in the seheme of things 1. that alcohol and tobacco do here. Laotian opium is a special case. Gov- ernments have been trying since Theo-;, i dore Roosevelt's time to limit growth of , . opium poppies to rorld medicinal needs , and to regulate international traffic in '? opium and its derivatives (which include icodeine, morphine and heroin). But in the chaos of Laos such 'efforts are large: ly futile Opium is the major cash crop in the , Laotian highlands, among the Meos and other tribes. In this almost' roadless :i 1 ' country, a high-value cash crop which is , t low in weight and bulk is an economic i 7 boon. The Meos consume some of their ,i I,own product and think they are confer- ) ring a benefit, not harm, in selling it to far-off lowlanders. In the 'early days of ArrietiOah aid to 11," k!,,..*0 ,4. ottani to Imo/Loot* - - --.011144kit opium dealers (who often double as roy- al officials) from using U.S. planes to transport their costly freight. Air-dropped U.S. arms and supplies ??made it possible for years for many hill. top Meo villages to retain their inde- , pendence (and their poppy patches) in ? spite of being surrounded by Commu- ? nist-held. land. Now that most of these 'warrior villagers have been evacuated by air, the Meos still retain hope of win- ning back opium fields again, with U.S. , arms and air support. From the Meo ' point of view, (his is all quite logical. and upright. The CIA and the Pentagon are willing J to go along, on the theory that this. "fighting for freedom." The Meo view that the fight is for opium fields is more - forthright and more accurate, but it! raises the awkward question, What kind ,A..,\aluatailliniVIL,tIttuttliPtAtest ? Approved For Release?2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 0 In view of the continuing American ., for Gen. Vang Pao and his Meo guer. push on as far as they -want: ? reaction to the war in Vietnam, the rillas, the point might well have been ' This is just as far as may be needed ; news can scarcely be said to be a bomb- made that the United States was, (Wing to get neutralist Prime 'Minister Sou. ; vivApfewRd For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R0 REG I ST ER STATINTL 1 - 246,941 S -N1114A9(1970 . , How the', U.S. Callqd Its, Own _ t a ? ? ? in Laos; By Diens Warner ' T HE BIGGEST single deterrent to a sive in Laos always has been e uncer- 0' Foreign Relations Committee, it is high- I persuade Laos that it will soon have no .-....-$..4 , no-limits North Vietnamese offen- the , ton, and the watchdogs of the Senate . ministration has been quietly trying trl ... - -.... taint), about what American reaction *. ly improbable that any second thoughtii- .:".alternative but to do much less. It did might be. Since the TeL offensive, when now would be of a type calculated to ,not succeed in getting the message American optimism and send waves of G.I.s across the Mekong. across. This will be easier now, though jr Asia began to evaporate : In fact, the publication of Defense ...the effects are likely to be quite interest in Southeast differ- quickly, the deterrent, Secretary Melvin Laird's statement ent. Insteld of being coaxed to do more, , has been substantially ? clearly brings appreciably closer the ? the Laritians can scarcely be blamed if - less than it used to be, end to American efforts, clandestine or thtY begin to regard the situation as but at least it was bet. ', Yotherwise, to prevent the North Viet- , hopeless: ... . ter than nothing. : namese forces from rolling as far as ? Under'peessure to show the state of ' Now, after months or they want through Laos. Bombing and, its mind, the Nixon Administration also . pressure, the Senate 1 budgetary support to the Royal Lao gov- has been obliged to show Its hand, and '. Foreign Relations !Com- : .. ernment excepted, these efforts have ,there is no easier way than this to mit,t,ec finally ' has!, ex. ; , always been low key, as the grudging lose the poker game. Since Hanoi no . tracted, and, i)ubliShed, ; admissions of casualties by the Nixon . longer has any reason to doubt what ? 1 the admission from the Nixon Adrninis- , , Administration have now made clear. ..: Washington has in its hand, and there' tration that it has no plans for using ? In fact, if any agency other than the ' are now no lines that it is unsafe to ,.. ,I. ground forces in Laos, even if the North CIAshad been involved in providing the cross, there seems to be no reason why ',Vietnamese overrun the entire country. , ,10Tbaerial support and military guidance . I the North Vietnamese , should not now ; . very ......- shellilta to help preserve,theivanna ,Phouma to settle with his Corn- '. $ ,.."0Yal Lao government. ..! ...., -- -...0...munist half-brother -Prince Soirphariou- 1 ... ,-- either to its American allies or. , . to Laos. But for the security of Laos 'ISO, for many,montha theliyon A.I-Ein oi.....1_,,,,__Sonphanouvong'it own terms. j iand the whole region it would have beet :-,4'........61.4,,,,......-.... ...,?,-.?,-.....< ...,.- :, better left unsaid, or, if the Senate For-.! ' ' eign Relations Committee insisted on i knowing all, at least kept secret. t . 1. Memories are short these days. Only 1 20 years have passed since South Korea' was excluded from the list of countries that came under the shade of the Amer-.. lean defense umbrella. The North 'Co-!' . reans accepted this as the green light ; DEN IS WARNER . Denis Warner, an Australian sour- ; nalist, .has been writing about South- east Asia for more than 25 years. and the Truman Administration was forced to do some quick rethinking and A.: reacting, at the cost of Immense amounts of blood and treasure. ! Things are very different these ,days... The United States at the height of Its ' postwar power in 1950 had no , second,. thoughts about moving to the defense, of -.Korea and its more vital interests- hti Japan. Judging by the mood of the nerA, 44 ? 044 .M6111 ? Approved For Release 2001/03/04 CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 THE WASHINGTON POST Approved For Release 2001/01/94NAVODP8s01:0A1Tni0 ..1% rerril ? 416 -; XIII Fe/stunt. Bywilaito "Tho CIA welcornsfxou to Laos, In Approved For Release 2001/03/04: er-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :,CIA-RDP80,01601R VIL1V/i'l;?Fe USC. """VAR 28 1970 WEEKLY 11,000 Mack Alliance 6a-r-ges-fedeicil? crimes in car bombing STATINTL The following statement was issued March 12 by the Black 1 Liberation Alliance is Chica- go, Robert Lucas, chairman.. We charge the Federal Go- vernment with the crime of wan- ! tonly murdering our two bro- thers, Ralph Featherstone and (apparently) William "Che" Paine. We suspect, although we may never be able to prove it, that p. agents of the Federal Govern- ment were directly involved, probably because they thought [ that Brother Rap was in the car. This is the way that the I CIA has operated all over the Timm- World, from the Congo ?'to Laos, from Ghana to Viet- nam U they are in the way, people of color and their lea- ders are mysteriously blown to bits, with even less thought .than if they were boulders bloc-' t king a road or trees blocking 1- a view. But directly involved or not, ' . the Federal Government is res- ponsible for initiating the chain of events that has now resulted In this heinous crime against , Black people. Just as the Mayor of Memphis, Tennessee, creat- ed the political climate of vio- :lence and hysteria which led to 3. That the FBI, the CIA and t . the wanton murder of Dr. King , in the spring of 1968, the Fe- ; deral Government today, with Its repressive legislation! tivists and that the Permanent ? against Movement activists, Subcommittee on Investigation ?, ,. such as the "Rap Brown" Anti- of the Committee on Govern- " ? .Riot Act and the Anti-Conspi- ment Operations of the U.S.Se- , racy Act, and its bringing to , nate, whose extensive and pub- trial of Movement activists on lished hearings have revealed ? the basis of this repressive le-, ' only a small part of what is gislation, has now created-the contained in these dossiers, be political climate of violence and immediately disbanded: , ' hysteria which has led to the 4. That whatever. agent .pro- , pact for the judicial process, c, incited to riot and murder, and terrorism charged against Mo- unleashed the most reactionary ? vement activists, the charges' forces in the nation. By sending in agent provoca- teurs to Movement organiza- 1osed to be invo1ved in acts o f be brought instead against these agents and the official agencies ' employing them, for conspiring .4 to violate the civil rights of tions, as in the notorious elle- citizens. ged plot by RAM to blow up WE CALL UPON THE BLACK the Statue of Liberty, it has de- ? COMMUNITY AND ALL DE- 1 liberately instigated and sought CENT CITIZENS ACROSS THE to provoke freedom fighters to NATION TO SUPPORT THESE ! acts of terrorism which only ? 4.- DEMANDS WHICH ARE NECE- ; end in their imprisonment or, SSARY TO CLEAR UP THE t death., CALCULATED CONFUSION THE TIME HAS COME TO1 BETWEEN POLITICAL OPPO? TAKE SOME SIGNIFICANT.t SITION AND CRIME, WITH ) STEPS TO BRING A HALT TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT IS THIS VIOLENCE AND UNEND- SEEKING TO DESTROY THE ING INCITEMENT TO VIO- I MOVEMENT LENCE BY THE GOVERN- - 1 ' At the same time we call upon MENT. TO THIS'END WE DE i MAND: ,I ; Black organizations to appoint 1. That the Federal Govern-. their own legislative commit- ment itself take the initiative . .; tees to determine the guilty par- ties to this murder and we - I. de- Immediately to move the dis 1 .. i mand that the Justice Depart- 1 missal of all charges against ? ment and all other officials on IL Rap Brown as well as against I every level cooperate with this i, ? all other political defendants, i Committee, giving it the right,', Black and White, who have been i to subpoena persons and docu- , charged under the Anti-Riot, . meats and granting it access Anti-Conspiracy Acts and si- ; to all files and information re- J milar repressive legislation.. iated to this and similar crim- 2. That step be taken imme- es. diately to repeal the Anti-Riot In particular, we urge Move-1 and Anti-Conspiracy Acts. inent peopy to reflect upon the ? police departments across the country., immediately destroy their dossiers on Movement ac- need, for new forms of organi- zations which will minimize ? tore opportunities for the enemy:, to waste our brothers and sin- 1 ters. ?? We cannot continue to lose our Medgars, our Malcolms our ? Martins, our Fredstour,;larks, . our Ralphs and our, Ches. Dan Mdridge James Boggs ; William Strickland' Robert Lucas, s'7? ? John Watson.' ? voeateure bare been oraredis-A mike f. wanton murder of these two de- ! dic.ated, hard-working unsung.: fighters for human freedom. i ' For the ,last many years it is ? the Federal Government itself, which has been responsible for r the growing chaos and disorder ; ; in and around the courts. By its I deliberate efforts to muddy-up ' the fundamental distinctionbet- ' ween lat Itbvettitiorailit lease 2001/03/04 : dIA-RDP80-01.601R000700040001-3 t crimp, At fostered disres. Approved For Release M1iOadg43beleaRPTAQ-10$0111 28 mar 19T0 Approv WATCHING THE WORLD with FRANK J. GARDNER An ounce of prevention? A CLOAK-AND-DAGGER operation off the West Coast of Africa has : the offshore oil industry agog. In what is perhaps the first instance of underwater sabotage of a mobile drilling rig, some rascal tried to sink the Kenting I jackup off the Ivory Coast. That's the rig that's destined for the Gulf of Suez to drill a most controversial wildcat for Israel's Oil Routes Ltd. next to Egypt's El Morgan oil field (ow, Feb. 9, p. 37). As usual in such incidents, very little is known of the who, ? why, when, or where of the attack. For several weeks. the Kenting I had been undergoing repairs in Dakar, Senegal. It was damaged in a severe winter storm while crossing the Atlantic from eastern Canada. Apparently, while rounding the African hump, something went awry, and the rig was towed into shallow water at the port of Abidjan, Ivory Coast, for a checkover. There, it's reported, frogmen under cover of darkness tied four explosive charges to the rig's hull, at or near the water line. The four blasts failed to penetrate the double hull, however, and none ' of the crew was injured. There was, of course, some damage to the . unit's legs. WHODUNIT? That's the big question now. I. Well, there are lots of possibilities. First off, one would suspect the Egyptians, but Abidjan is 2,800 miles from Cairo (crow-style), ? and it's doubtful Egyptian intelligence is that far-flung these days. Someone aboard the rig? We prefer this one, for there was just a little too much coincidence in the sudden detour, to Abidjan and ; the almost immediate sabotage of the rig. Someone onshore must , have heard from someone offshore that. the Kenting would put in at , Abidjan. Or was some kind of hanky-panky on board,..the rig , responsible for the need to go into pore? The industry buzzes with theories, of course. One, described by the offshore press as "way out," holds that it was the work of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. That figures, for the CIA habitually i. gets the blame for whatever happens anywhere. -- ? Still, three governments involved?the U.S., Canada, and Britain? are known to fear that Israel's sinking a wildcat off the west coast , of the Sinai Peninsula could well set off an inferno in the Middle ? East. And so, the speculation goes, as an ounce of prevention, any one of them may have concluded that it would be better to sacrifice ? a $2.8-million rig than to risk another war. Or perhaps the whole thing is simply a matter of predestination. ? The Kenting 1,-a new rig, has yet to drill a hole. It failed its first assignment in Lake Eric when its legs sank into the lake floor. It was heavily damaged in the Atlantic storm. It's been condemned by ed F opfte4e4isen20041163/64rfee FPf- ftie i'MI116716 040 0 0 1-3 now the sabotage. ? Approved For Release 20641M/15CitIA-RDK36--M1R 27 MAR 1970 0 ODI:(7) r2' 7:17_ LoD 0 ? Co: ? ? Daily World Foreign Department U.S. planes made heavy air strikes on Cambodian territory last Tuesday, the U.S. military command in Saigon revealed yesterday. The . U.S. jet fighter-bomber raids were ordered on what the U.S. command described as "enemy firing posi- tions" in Cambodia "with unknown results." The air strikes followed B-52 bombing attacks all along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border. The U.S. raids were the first reported since the ouster of Prince Norodom Sihanouk by An anti-Communist military groiip' headed by General Lon Nol. ' The U.S. command yesterday also reported the second heavi- est U.S. casualties of this year in fighting in South Vietnam. Last week, 110 Americans were killed and 864 wounded; Saigon forces lost 398 killed and 902 wounded. In continuing fighting in Laos, U.S. planes. made repeated air strikes in tactical support of a "Royal Lao" army drive to try to win back territory lost to the Lao Patriotic Front. LPF troops were reported to be dug in on a ridge three miles north of the big U.S. base in northern Laos at Long Cheng. The governrnent of Thailand yesterday requested the recon- vening of the 1962 Geneva Con- ference on Laos. The Thai For- eign Ministry accused the .De- mocratic Republic of Vietnam of sending troops into Laos but continues to deny U.S. news re- ports that thousands of Thai troops are fighting there on the U.S. side. A United Press Inter- national report yesterday stated that "specially-trained tribesmen from Thailand" were airlifted into Long Cheng by "Air Amer- ica," the CIA-operated airline in Southeast Asia. The DRV and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam recalled their diplomatic representatives from Phnom Penh, Cambodian capital, for "consultations," and it was announced that diplomats from all socialist countries will meet in the Polish Embassy in Phnom Penh it a farewell party for the .DRV and PRG representatives. , - Ark 00V4i71 Fefic l*Wage )2 0 0 1 /0 3/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 Saigon delegate, Nguyen Phong, offered to release Xuan what TOTAL DEAD he said were 343 "North Viet- namese" prisoners of war "with no strings attached" and said he hoped the DRV would accept them. Saigon has never offered to release any of the estimated 25,000 National Liberation Front prisoner of war status. In Long Binh, South Vietnam,, U.S. Army lieutenant James B. Duffy, 22 admitted yesterday he had killed a Vietnamese prison- er. He told a military tribunal he had radioed his company com- mander that the Vietnamese had been "shot while trying to es- cape." "In war, people are going to get killed," Duffy said. "This major told me I was to kill and not bring back prisoners. I con- sidered it part of the war." STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/%44 :10150RDP80-01601R 27 MAR 1970 4 Sonora:, and marijuana druo CII ianions spiked WASHINGTON ? "A majority of those shooting were marijuana smokers but not all the marijuana smokers were shooting." That was how Sen. Thomas J. Dodd summarized the testimony March 24 of Vietnam veteran Charles West, who was with Company C of the First Battal- ion of the 20th Infantry at the time of the mass killings at Songiny of Vietnamese civilians by U.S. troops on March 16, 1968. West . testified at hearings of, the Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delin- quency, and he agreed with Dodd that that was a correct summa- tion. Other remarks by West, and by Dr. Joel H. Kaplan, an Army psychiatrist who also served in Vietnam, take issue with cretain illusions among drug addicts, es- pecially those of so-called "soft" drug users who have built up quite an argument for using marijuana. West said he smoked marijuana twice, and that the second time when he went on guard duty "it seemed to me the vegetation was moving. I thought it was people."? Dr. Kaplan, who commanded an Army neruo-psychiatric team at Nhatrang, 'Vietnam in 1968 and 1969, said that before going to Vietnam he did not consider mari- juana a dangerous drug. Now, however, after finding that 3,000 soldiers, or 70 percent of the men his outfit saw in Its outpatient clinic, used drugs "heavily day in and day out," Dr. Kaplan believes marijuana smoking "could have contributed" to the Songmy mas- sacre if it could be shown that the U.S. soldiers were "chronic pot- heads." West said the men on the Song- my mission had included "chronic users" of marijuana. "Before I went to Vietnam," said Dr. Kaplan, "if I had heard someone saying what I'm saying today, I would have laughed." What he said was this: "Contrary to many popular opinions held . here in the states, the drug could cause people to become fearful, paranoid, extremely angry, and led, in a number of cases, to acts of murder, rape and aggravated assault." ? So much for the illusion current in the United States that mari- juana is an innocuous substance? that merely makes people feel relaxed and amiable, with height- ened sensibilities and sexual po- tency. Other facts brought to light by the testimony of West and Dr. Kaplan give a cue to the preva- lence of the drug cult which has turned off so many young Ameri- ? cans from struggling to change society and turned them into petty criminals, the prey of drug ped- dlers, police informers, or pur- poseless and pliable ciphers. Whether the Pentagon and its money-grubbing accomplices in the world of high finance permit the Senate subcommittee to probe further and expose the real con- spirators behind this chemical' war against U.S. youth remains to be seen. But the drug cult is.' highly luc ra tive and where there's loot to be pocketed ? legal or illegal ? the Big Money is sure to be there, ft web et Intrigue, smuggling, and black marketeering in the countries of Indo-Chia is wide- spread. According to I. Andronov, A Soviet newsman writing in New Times of March 3, 1970, this web' includes such Free World stal- warts as yang Pao, the CIA's Meo mercenary leader now at- tacking the Pathet Lao villages; General Phoumi Nosavan, once the CIA's chief "boy" in Laos who now lives in Thailand; Sai- gon's puppet vice president Nguy- en Cao Ky, ex-chief of the Saigon air force; Colonel Khu Due Hung, the Siagon military attache in Vientiane; and the chief profiteers and black marketeers in Saigon ?* all American's. ?Observer, Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 Approved For Release 2001/6ide.?6A-RIMW1R 2 7 MAR 1970 1/4) `Vietnamizino-' Cambodia World opinion will hold the United 'States directly ? responsible for any future strife involving Cambodia, ?where a pro-U.S. rightist military group has seized po- ? wer and proclaimed the ouster of Prince Norodom Si- hanouk. The Cambodian coup comes at a time when the U.S. ?Central Intelligence Agency is active all over the world: the attempt on the life of President Makarios of Cyprus, the abortive coup against the new People's. Republic of the Congo-Brazzaville the intensification of the CIA "dirty war" in Laos, involving the use of U.S. and Thai ground troops and a U.S. terrorist air bom- bardment. Cambodia, under Sihanouk, stood up to Washington's empire builders and defied them. This is why the U.S. for years tried to overthrow Sihanouk. ? Sihanouk immediately recognized the new Piov,i- sional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam last year as the real representative of the South Vietna- mese people, developed -close and friendly ties with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and worked to end ? the war in Laos on the basis of the 1962 Geneva Agree- ment. This policy cost Cambodia heavily, in daily U.S.- Saigon air raids which killed and wounded hundreds , of peaceful Cambodian villagers, in CIA-led armed re-3 bellions inside Cambodia, in U.S. threats to invade ' Cambodia and to crush Sihanouk with force. Both the DRV and PRG have branded the Cambo- dian coup a CIA operation, and there are few whO will doubt it considering the background of the coup. , Sihanouk, according to U.S. news reports, is still im- mensely popular in Cambodia and the new regime is nervous about any attempted return he might make. The Nixon administration's pious humbug about : "Vietnamization" in the light of developments in Laos, Cambodia and Thailand can now be pinned down for what it is?"Vietnamization" means spreading the Viet- nam war all over Southeast Asia. If a Cambodian revolt against the millionaire pro- U.S. General Lon Nol produces a second Vietnam in this hitherto neutral country, Nixon and the CIA will have to be given the full credit for that kind of ."Viet- namization." Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 ' LOS ANGELES TIMES Approved For Release 2001/0AMRDP80-01 Cambodia, Laos': Acid Te?t) for the -Nixon Doctrine STATI NTL BY ROBERT S. ELEGANT ? The Vietnam war has been vitally '! Weak ?Cambod'ian'forces can prith- Washington virtually invited the 'affected by outside events: The .1.ahly do little more than harass the . invasion of Laos through a Senate . . , removal of Prince Nornclom Sihan- : Communist invaders. Still, halting]resolution last December and the the.t ouk of Cambodia and sustained .1 i. supplies . a n d co-ordinating into- ' deliberate imprecision of the Nixon Communist drive against Laos. , ligenee could severely impede their , Doctrine. Although that imprecision' Those events prove afresh ? the 7 operations in Vietnam ? if Cambo- , appeared desirable last ? summer, ... obvious propositions Americans are ,dia avoids crippling civil war. ? ,unpredictable events centering on. loath to accept: external develop- .. But. the Ho. Chi ,Minh Trail ?P Vietnam . have, once again, flung a., ments.deeply influence the Vietnam ..rough Laos ;, remains the key.".', challenge and offered an opportuni- conflict; and. the corollary, the j Receding before the owerful eo .1 to the United States. : outcome in Vietnam will directly i munist drive, Air AmPerica, the Ca. American public opinion debars shape the future of Southeast Asia I . airline, has a I r e a d Y .withdrawn, using a few American troops to turn and. indirectly, the rest of the world. V planes from forward bases. Uriorn in ? the tide in Laos. Yet we must" The shifts in the equilibrium of . Thailand is likely to be the main' saoirelal:wnetaogneso,,. . " '''tt e. the Cambodi..-- avnid a Laotian' ' 'power raise an imniediate : S question: ',,.newince Thai base far essential air support. : ? debacle?and. thus movelowards a .. . Arse thev good for Asians?and 'troops just-corriniittethlyaietnameie sue?cuk.; .1 ,,I 81.n.. ...,.... ..- Americans.? . :?cannot halt the Communist drive, --. The answer at this stage is a ??.1-lanol can take all Laos.at will. . . resounding "'Maybe!" The prospects The Nixon Doctrine, which. left'.' .are almost equally balanced. The ,open the possibilitY of armed assist-.P. new toughness toward Viet Cong' ,?' ance to Asian ?nations invaded by..." units in Cambodia is largely ()Met by . foreign troops', is being tested. North.. the imminent threat of Communist.. :Vietnam hap invaded Labs .to pro-'. ? . control of Laotian supply lines. 'z.'.:?tect its channel, of .reinforcement?? One feared deprivation ha s,' .:and to try. the President.. If Laos :. . ,however, been pos:poned. Prince , : falls, all rules will change. . '...!. ,Sihanouk has not ceased his brillf. . Though its effect is limited, -4 ant performance on the Asian stage.. ' bombing the trail could PreetlelahlY . .....continue?if, requested by a govern- * . trent In exile. But tribal ?Irregulara t Instead, he has within four days , ,organized by the, CIA and Special.: ' : ? Denounced North Vietnamese .,Forces could no longer harass North l . ? ,Vietnamesereplaeements effective- .' ; Infiltration of Cambodia and, 'later, ? : iv implicitly endorsed that WM110,101'1. .; J ? . Moreover. the ,psychological cf- 1 . . , .. .. ? From the unlikely platform of fects would be shattering. The". - Peking, declared that he would not . 'United States would have demon-' Feek to regain power and, later, raised the banner of a "national strably failed to protect its allies, .liberation army" to regain : ? and Thailand would he wholly, , . vulnerable to Communist infiltra-] power through civil war. tion?or invasion Even the anti- , ? Finally, proclaimed a new poll- , u- ? 'Communist Cambodians might Well ' ? 1 movement called "The National conclude that they had after all t United Front of Xampuehea i[Cam- ? made the wrong move. ? ? ? bodia)." The official abbreviation, his statement meticulously notes, is , ? , * . FUNK. Sihanouk is now in Peking, and ? P, ? Though Sihanouk still commands 'i the Chinese have staked out [Thong- . some popular support. FUNK' is not ' . saly in northwest Laos as an area of . likely to topple the new regime? . . 'special influence. Washington and .even with Viet Cong assistance.' Cambodian, American and South P ' . direct psychological confrontation.' r Vietnamese troops are already co- 'eking are, therefore, met in a . operating against. Communist . Peking apparently is not primarily con- ' ..rentrations on the border, while interested in "liberating" South; ,?., Vietnam or Cambodia. But Peking is massiv ; ',Phnom Penh can .easily turn off .-; vitally concerned to strengthen Its e supplies now flowing to the*, , buffer states ? Communist North VIPs. Cong through Sianoukville.. , Vietnam and potentially Communist Approved For Release' 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 .140011. .? , ,.: ? .. STATINTL Approved For Release 201K/OW044GOIA-REF80-01601R00 27 MAR 2970 ouvannta Replies to Pathet Lao Prom News Dispatches VIENTIANE, March 26 ? Laotian Premier Souvanna Phourna today wired Prince Souphanouvong, the head of the Pathet Laos, complaining of North Vietnamese "interfer- ence" in their country. , The telegram; viewed here primarily as a means of call- ing attention to the presence of the 50,000 or more North Vienamese troops in Laos, did not constitute a reply to Sou- phanouvong's five-point peace plan, which Prince Souvanna said in his cable "we are in the process of studying." "I believe North Vietnam was aware beforehand of what would happen in Cambodia. That's why they started an of- fensive, in order to put the Pa- thet Lao in a strong position for conversation with us." Meanwhile, sporadic fight-' ing continued around the CIA base at Long Tieng, south- west of the Plain of Jars. Military sources said North Vietnamese troops launched company-sized attacks against two government positions on Skyline Ridge, a hill overlook- ing the base, The sources said both attacks were repulsed with "very light" government casualties. Souvanna said, "In your let- ter of the 22d of this month, you have proposed that the In- ternational Control Commis- sion should supervise the pres- ence of foreign troops in both zones. "The royal government only knows about the interference of North Vietnamese troops in Laos for many years now. This is a problem that you have chosen not to mention either In your five-point programs or in other messages." Asked in an interview whether he thought there was a possibility of an agreement with the Pathet Lao, the pre- mier said: "It is rather diffi- cult because the given condi- tions are considered by us as unacceptable." He said that if his government agreed to an American bombing halt, it would be a unilateral conces- sion to the Communists. Souvanna said the present North Vietnamese offensive is the beginning of "a different' crisis" in Southeast Asia that may have a link with develop- ments in Cambodia and South Vietnam. "It is a desire for hegemony by North Vietnam," said Sou- vanna. Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 STATINTL Approved For ReniseaggilapiViiEqMp_pwArtoiR 1970 'A S 4650 structionist4 that Mr. Nixon promised to appoint when he campaigned for the Presi- dency. In speeches across the country., Mr. Nixon promised to name men to the high court who would "Interpret" the law, not "make" it. In 11 years as a Federal District judge In Tallahassee. Fla., and in six months as a member of the United States Court of Ap-? peals for the Fifth Circuit, Judge Carswell sprinkled the lawbooks will opinions on Mat- ters ranging from civil rights to the legality of Florida's poultry law. Throughout these opinions runs a con- sistent tendency to view the law as a neutral device for settling disputes, and not as a force for either legal innovation or social change. AN IRONIC COMPARISON An ironic byproduct of this consistency is that Judge Carswell's judicial record Is more conservative than that of Judge Cle- ment F. Haynsworth Jr., who was defeated for confirmation to the genie sent by liberal forces that branded him as a conservative who was "not a contemporary man of the times?! Judge Haynsworth was ahead of the Su, preme Court in devising fuller review for . state prisoners in Federal habeas corpus proceedings, and occasionally anticipated the high court in ruling in favor of Negroes in civil rights cases. An exact comparison with Judge Carswell is difficult, as the new nominee served as a trial judge much of the time, and most of his opinions dealt with day-to-day issues rather than sweeping constitutional matters. ? But the lawbooks contain at least 25 ap- pellate opinions he wrote when he sat, Rs Carswell ranked 23d. Her study showed that, of the subcommittee to persuade the District judges frequently do, on the Court , of his civil rights decisions to be appealed, State Department to declassify portions 60 per cent were reversed. of Appeals. Of the record, however, have been to no ? These opinions reveal a jurist who hest- ? In most of these cases, Judge Carswell __ail. tates to use judicial power unless the need avail. ..is have had to move beyond clearly -is clear and demanding; who finds few con- settled precedents to rule in fever of the We want it to be clear, Mr. President, troversies that cannot be settled by invok- ? civil rights position. When these precedents that we have never suggested the entire Rig some settled precedent, and who rarely have existed. He has struck down segrega- record should be published. I agree it . finds the need to refer to the social con. tion In crisp forthright opinions. contains some material which should not ., -. flict outside the courtroom that brought his In 1965, he declared that the barber shop be published. But it contains a great deal ? ? cases before him.of material which should be published in Tallahassee's Duval Hotel had to serve Negroes under the public accommodations ATTITUDE OF RESTRAINT. provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. if the American people are to maintain ? This attitude of restraint has generated He brushed aside a barber's assertion that that proper confidence in their Govern- friction only in the field of civil rights, he was not covered because 95 per cent of the .ment. where Judge Carswell's policy of sticking with customers were local people and not guests Almost daily the press makes more settled precedents until change came from In the hotel. "From a reading of the act It revelations?or raises more questions? , higher courts had the result of allowing dila- is clear," Judge Carswell observed, "that about what is going on in Laos, and in tory school officials to delay segregation. . relative percentages of local, as compared to Thailand as it affects Laos' An example was provided when parents of transient, customers may not be used as ell- The Washington Star, in a dispatch ? Negro children in the Pensacola area sued to teria to determine coverage:. break up the segregation of faculty and by Henry S. Bradsher from "(Morn, Thai- staffs PROSPECTS ERWHTER In the formerly all-black school. Although ? In 1960 when Tallahassee Negroes sued to the higher courts had not said in so many words that faculty, as well as student, segre- desegregate the counters, waiting rooms and gation must end, lawyers for the Negroes restrooms in the city-owned airport, he did ? not hesitate to order desegregation. argued that these courts could not have meant that the newly integrated schools ' Even though Judge Carswell's civil rights - record may be fully as objectionable to civil would be staffed with all-black and all-white ... rights forces as that of Judge Haynsworth, faculties. Judge Carswell ruled otherwise. "The Drown cases," he wrote, referring to the new nominee's prospects for confirma- tion seem much brighter, partly because ho the Supreme Court's landmark gehapt de- cisiona of 1054 and 1965, "hold that the negro- has not antagonized organized labor as gation of white and Negro children on the Judge Haynsworth had. Federal District Judges rarely rule on labor basis of race denies to Negro children equal cases, which are usually appealed from the a dispatch by Tammy Arbuckle, de- .. protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th .. National Labor Relations Board directly to Scribed the evacuation of Sam Thong, Amendment to the Constitution." lie put the i a Court of Appeals. Laos, by Air America. This story went , word "children" in italics, and went on to enjoin the assignment to the school of teach- comply with the minimum wage laws, he em s who were too strict or too lenient." dissented. saying: "It is my view that the Some civil rights lawyers who have np- injunctive power of courts should never petered before Judge Carswell have charged invoked lightly, nor should it be converted that his tendency to issue declaratory judg- into a mere ministerial function triggered . ments rather than injunctions?to hand automatically upon the finding of an infrac- STATI NT down limited desegregation orders rather tion of the law." . than sweeping ones?was a convenient use Judge Carswell's opinions tend to be of judicial self-restraint to cloak segregation- , bloodless documents, setting out the facts ist sympathies. ' and the prececient,t, then briskly coming to Leroy D. Clark, a professor of law at New a conclusion that, i.s said to be within the .. York University, who formerly headed the precedents. operations of the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense He is not given to broad statements of his _ and Educational Fund, Inc., In northern Flor- ' philosophy, but his creed at this point In Ida, asserted in an interview today that Judge his career seems to have been summed up Carswell had repeatedly delayed school cases in one statement from an opinion he wrote by failing to rule until pressed to do so, shortly after ho became a judge in 1958: and then by of ten Issuing decisions that wore "Established law, with its imperfections, palpably wrong and quickly reversed. Must.rionetheless be applied s..s it is and not "We would have a hearing and it woulcL..eon the predilections of the court." take several months for him to rule," Mr. Clark said. "I would have to file R motion tq ask him 'would you please ruler?which IF) WHY THE LONG DELAY IN RELEAS- outrageous. 4 ING THE LAOS TESTIMONY "It was my view that of the Federal District ' judges I appeared before, Ilarrold Carswell Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, it is was clearly the most openly and blatantly now more than 5 months since the Sub- segregationist. He was a clever and an intern- committee of the Foreign Relations gent man, so that when he was wrong on the Committee on U.S. Security Agreements law it wasn't because he didn't know what and Commitments Abroad completed its the law was?it was because he was biased." hearings on Laos. * * ? wrote a political science dis- The record of those hearings remains sertation in 1968 that analyzed the civil , classified top secret at the insistence of rights decisions of the 31 Federal District the State Department. That record eon- 'judges appointed to posts in the Deep South between 1953 and 1963. tains a great deal of information about When she ranked the 31 judges in terms U.S. activities in Laos which the Amen- of the number of times they had ruled In' can people should know and have a right ? favor of Negro plaintiffs' position, Judge to know. Repeated attempts on the part land, March 15, described how the air- war in Laos is run out of seven bases in Thailand, sometimes with unmarked planes. The Washington Post on March 16, in a dispatch by T. D. Allman from Vientiane, reported in detail how 12 Americans were killed 2 years ago de- fending a secret air navigation facility at Phou Pha Thi, Laos. The Washington Star on March 17, in ? Tom Harris the official of the American state that these decisons and subsequent ones . ? on to say that there have been approxi- Federation of Labor and Congress of Indus- by the Fifth Circuit did not reach the quoin- ? mately 70 Americans in the Sam trial Organizations who led the successful Thong- tion of faculty desegregation. attack against Judge Haynsworth, said to- Long Chien area armed with M-16 rifles NOT DIR.ECTLY AT ISSUE day that Judge Carswell "doesn't appear to and captured Communist AK-47 subma- "This court can not indulge in a presump- ,have a significant record on labor eases." Ile ' .chineguris. - tion that these Federal courts decided the said the AFL-CIO had no plans as present to . In a dispatch from Vientiane March points of law asserted by plaintiff by infer- ? oppose him. 20, the Associated Press reported that ence," he said, because staff members' rights The few labor opinions that Judge Cars- were not directly at issue in those cases. well has written reflect his reticence to use two Thai battalions have been flown to Finally, he declared, students have no 'Judicial power and his tendency not to ex-. Long Chien in U.S. civil aircraft.to help standing to intervene in such matters; "Stu. tend the Judiciary's power. ? defend that Army base from an expected dents herein can no more complain of injury . SOME bISSENTINO OPINIONS North Vietnamese onslaught.. ? to themselves of the selection or assignment ? ? In one decision, when si, three-Judge Court On March 23, a story from Bangkok by of toschers than they can bring Acton to of Appeals ordered a soft-drink company to Jack Poisie in the Washington Post de- Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000790040001-3 DAILY WORLD Approved For Release 2001/03A4iiiRIAIDP1313Arli ..., !Canabodirm dile2aSous: 03 too, bar L3)0E53C-D om, aszy Daily World Foreign Departmcpt , ? , The Cambodian government has advised Western diplomats that it is closing' down the port of Sihanoukville to what it says are ships bearing arms to the "Viet- cong" in South Vietnam. The move was announced yesterday to the diplomats in ILA special briefing by the Cambodian Foreign Office in the capital of Phnom Penh. A Foreign Office spokesman :encourage a U.S.-backed war " northeast of the capital of Vien-''' also disclosed that the Embassy r.' over all of Indochina. It said the ., tiane. . . of the Polish People's Republic '? Lon Nol government was sup- I. Cambodian relations, Poland, to- regime nor the U.S. has offered flown into besieged Long Cheng? have captured a Thai mercenary'. by the CIA-operated airline "Air:. America" Angnet, admitted that. Lao .Patriotic Front forces' was being closed down, but...? ported by the U.S. Central' In-:/( denied knowing why or whether' telligence Agency. this meant a break in Polish- , Neither the new 'Cambodian gether with Canada and India, any evidence of 'their charges he had served under the corn,: is a member of the International that Sihanoukville was being ' . mand of the U.S. military mis- ' Control Commission (ICC) set used for arms shipments to the sion in Vientiane. He said in ' up by the 1954 Geneva Agree- National 'Liberation Front in , January, 1968, he was sent to , ment to watchover Cambodia's South Vietnam. . the U.S. base at Long Cheng and neutrality. ?.. Sihanoukville, on the Gulf of then to another base at Muong , General Lon Nol, the armed , Thailand, wai built in 1960 as a Ta. forces commander and new anti- new port city for Cambodia. Communist' premier of Cambodia: Previously, all traffic had to use He said there were 600 Thai was reported to be on the verge the Mekong River (through South ' troops at Long Cheng under joint ' of renaming Sihanoukville and Vietnam) to reach Phnom Penh. U.S.-Thai command, and that 40.: proclaiming a republic. ? 'The main port facilities at Siha- Thai paratroop officers serve as, The reports. from official Cam- ? noukville ,today are a 900 foot. Lao General Vang Pao's staff,: bodian sources, said that in a' ,'wharf reached by a 600 foot while 30 more (officially listed few weeks Cambodia's constitu- -causeway. Ships of up to 15,000 as "interpreters") directly super- tional monarchy would be de- 1 '.,tons ,can discharge cargoes on, vise combat operations. He also dared abolished. The monarch?',', both sides of 'the wharf, but this Said at Long Cheng the CIA had Queen Kossarriak?is under heavy is a rather slow process since set up a communications center guard in Phnom Penh. Prince no cranes have been installed in for direct contact with Washing- - Norodom Sihanouk, the Cambo- ?.?: the dock area as yet. Sihanouk- , t.'311. ? . ' than chief of state, remains in ',1 vine still remains to be linked ; The' interview 'with this Thai Peking, where he has announced . to the interior by railroad., mercenary-. was published by , he will form a liberation army ,. Battles. in northern Laos con- 1 Vietnamese .News Agency of the ., to overthrow the Lon Nol, gov- tinned yesterday around the main . Democratic Republic of Viet-'" uomeriMICE..t ? , . ! CIA base of Long Cheng, 75 miles , nam. ' ' ? ""'"'""u"......."" Lon Nol has already suspend- ed all civil rights provisions of ,. , the Cambodian constitution, un-, der the "full powers" granted him by the National Assembly last week. He has accused Siha- ' nouk of being a "dictator" and , of secretly signing an agreement with the "Vietcong" to transship , arms from China across Cambo- , dian territory into South Viet- nam. Warning by Pravda Pravda, the Soviet Communist Party newspaper, yesterday praised Sihanouk's policy of neu- tralism and said any changes by the Lon Nol government would .?. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 Approved For Release 200WARGIV-FROVONRY111111 2 6 MAR 1 0 ?, ? ? ?Meos oister By T.D. Allman around Long Tieng last night 5./c1.1 to The Washinston Post and today. VIENTIANE, March 25? Military sources said today When Laotian government they were optimistic that troops reoccupied Skyline 1, a Long Tieng, menaced by five ihill position two miles north North Vietnamese battalions of Long Tieng, they re-estab- since the fall of Sam Thong ilast a measure of securityast week, could be defended. !for that important base and Some 800 Thal troops have . &- also for a vital U.S. telecom been flown there to bolster munications station nearby. fenses. Reliable sources said The station, known as Sky- today the Thais would man ar- line 2, provides a beacon for tillery positions. 'U.S. bombers operating in U.S. sources denied reports northeast Laos and also serves that they were led by Ameri? as a relay for U.S. and Laotian can Special Forces. militart communications. Other reliable sources, how- 1 Military sources said today ever; have reported an in: that U.S personnel had been crease in American personnel .evacuated from Skyline 2 but at. Long Tienvas the Amen- - automatic that the station's :equipment could continue to ? function so long as periodic, maintenance can be, per- formed. Early this morning, two :North Vietnamese battalions attacked another government ? position six miles north of Long Tieng. The military, sources said government :troops withstood the attack until dawn, when U.S. aircraft intervened and the Commu- ases' Security amese troops late last week regained Zan Hat Teu and two nearby viliages that govern:- , ment troops had taken in an American-assisted airborne op- . eration six weeks ago. All three villages lie on the Mekong, about 30 miles west of the royal capital of Luang' Prablog. Government troops / reportedly suffered extremely., heavy casualties in last week's fighting. Military sources said 'today,. the apparent aim of the Com- ? munist attacks around Bank.* Hat Teu was to cut river, - traffic between Luang Pra-t bang and Ban Hood Sal, .100.., miles upstream. . 4.1 has cans plan the defense of the CIA base, which is also th headquarters for Mco General Vang Pao's clandestine army. The sources said they were optimistic about Long Tieng because of what they called its ideal defensive position ring of high, government-held hills and because of the difficulty the Communists would have with the rough terrain and in- tensive U.S. bombing. Meanwhile, in northern Laos, government troops are reportedly continuing' to re- treat following their loss of three uPper Mekong Rivqr vil- lages. ??? . . . Pathet?Lao and North Viet. nists withdrew. A so-called Spooky gunship, a propeller-driven plane heavi- ly equipped with machine guns and flying from a base in Thailand also reportedly strafed Communist positions Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 Approved For Release 2001kg1/541FM-RDP?M1lpi1 2 5 MAR 1970 -1 ? u- (7.51 0 Lir-7.'1] CD--J 1-2 .9D 7.7D ..Yo-poYIDo4 co-i-TS136nurm Daily World Foreign Department . Cambodia's new rightist military regime reacted swiftly yesterday to a Radio Peking broadcast in which Prince Norodom Sihanouk called for formation of a "Cambodian national-liberation army" to carry on the "struggle against the Ameri- can imperialists" and their puppets in Cambodia. ?, . ? the "Royal Lao" government's dian armed forces commander, On Monday, "Quan Doi Nhan General Lon Nol, the Cambo- ? ? CIA role stressed ' genuine interest in a peaceful who headed the coup which pro- . Dan," a Hanoi newspaper, blunt- claimed Sihanouk's ouster. last ly stated that "the coup in Cam- settlement. Wednesday, pushed ahead with bodia was staged with ? the par-he LPF accused President NixonN a purge of Sihanouk's supporters tieipation of the U.S. CIA. directly.of "escalating the from the government, the army The Paris daily, "Combat," war in Laos to an unprecedent- and the Sangkum party. wrote' ed degree," and warned Pre- mier Souvanna Phouma that he . "There is no doubt that . Sihanouk will be tried for the White House was informed ... ' ' high treason if ',be tries to re- in advance of the Cambodian must bear full responsibility personally for the dangerous sit- turn to Cambodia, the new re- coup and approved it." uation in the country." ? gime has indicated. Lon Nol's In interview printed yesterday The only basis for peace, the .. government has tried to remove by the Times of London, the every possible trace of Sihanouk,' new Cambodian ruler, Gen. Lon peace plan calling for a cease LP? said, is the five-point LPF but U.S. reporters found that the Nol, denied working with theJ fire, an end to U.S. involvement, rid a provisional coalition gov- - prince is still popular with ordi- CIA. nary Cambodian people. i "We, as the government of sal- ernment prior to national aloe. . a The Hanoi newspaper, "Nhan. vation," he said, "had to re- ' lions, as foreseen by the 1962 Dan," organ of the Vietnamese iquest full powers in order to j Garunial Agreattleldil On La0s. Workers' Party, said on Tues- protest all those demonstrators." day: "U.S. intrigues in Cambo- .tie was referring to the thou- ' dia show the extremely reaction- sands of people who sacked the ?ary nature of the Nixon admini- DRV and PRG embassies in stration, which despite heavy de- Phnom Phnh two weeks ago feats, is still looking for ways New York Times reporter of expanding and protracting the Henry Kamm wrote on March : war in Indochina." The news-, 14 that the mobs "were believ- paper called the Cambodian peo- ed to have been instigated by . . pie "our comrades-in-arms in ? the military." ' the struggle against our common The Lao Patriotic Front radio t enemy?American imperialism." late Monday broadcast the peace . ' Giai Phong ("Liberation") proposals sent by LPF leader News Agency, the official press Prince Souphanouvong to "Royal service of the Provisional Revo- . Lao" Premier Souvanna Phouma. lutionary Government of South The broadcast said the LPF Vietnam,. said yesterday; "The asked Souvanna to call an "im- danger of aggression against . mediate, complete and uncondi- Cambodia, and against Vietnam. tional halt" to U.S. bombings in': and Laos as well, comes from Laos, in order to demonstrate the U.S. and its puppets. The way to eradicate this danger is to unite in the struggle against American aggressors.' Approved For Release 2001/03/04: dIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01?MR31313100040001-3 PiiILAPT:i,rilIA, PA. BULLETIN E ? 654,741 S ? 697,004 MAR 2 5 1970 Congressman Links War in Laos to U. S. Heroin Traffic were related to .tribal antag- territory, it le within the realm the' 4.,government could be onisma and the opium fields of possibility that the c1andea-1 aiding and, .abetting ? heroin are the prize eat off cial.eperations di traffic' here at home." The area is capable of pro- ducing four to ten tons o marketable opium annually, h said, which refined as heroin would bring nearly $900 million on the American market. "It is not impossible to be- lieve that our unexplained actions in northern Laos could be a vital link in the chain of drug traffic to the United States," he continued. "By providing military assist-, ante, air support and munition to the Mee tribesmen; by rein- forcing their efforts with Thal. and American troops; by assist them. in maintaining their Los Angeles ? (UPI) ? Rep. John V. Tunney last night charged the Nixon Adminis- tration with involving Amer- lean troops in a 1?aotian tribal /war being fought over one of the world's largest opium grow- ing regions. , "The CIA has committed the United?",etes to support a faction of Meo tribesmen led by General yang Pao, whose sole objective is to dominate other factions of this opium- producing tribe throughout .northern Laos," he said. Tunnoy, seeking the Demo- cratic nomination for the U.S. Senate, told the Wilshire Cham- ber of Commerte, that recent battles over the Plain of Jars in ..... , 8., e, ....L.mmiiiio ' ' s` ' Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 PA4.13.44IliWOki STAat Approved For Re!base 200110i/NR.S-RDP ? COVERS ALL OF INDOCHINA ? Thais Are Only Part . Of U.S. 'Secret Army By TAMMY ARBUCKLE have killed Communist lead- Special to The Star ers, destroyed key links in VIENTIANE ? The Thai , Communist communications troops who have joined the and logistics and, ,tied down fighting in Laos are part of WI large numbers of Communist American-directed "s ecret soldiers in defensive actions. army" which operates all In Laos the secret army has through SoutheaSt Asia, wiped out Communist head- Making up its units are quarters and taken over prison Cambodians, Vietnamese, camps and rescued inmates. Chinese and Laotians, as well On one occasion in South as Thais and various hill Laos, a guerrilla group in one tribes, such as the Meos who night operation wiped out a have been active on the?Plain prison camp controlled by Pa- of Jars. thet Lao guards and rescued Its operations extend into ? 59 prisoners, crossing back northeast Burma, China 's ? into Thailand before the munists could strike back. ? Corn- Yunnan Province, North Viet- , nam, South Vietnam, Cambod- The Thai' force at Long ia and Thailand ? all part of Chien, which helped yesterday ? the guerrilla war fought by to clear a ridge overlooking both Communist and anti- the base, may be listed as the Communist forces for many y ars in this part of the world. For example, Haw tribal ? agents working for the Central ? Intelligence Agency Cross into South China from Laos and Black That tribesmen cross into North Vietnam from Laos. These tribes live on both sides of the borders, the Haw in northern Laos and Yunnan, the Black Thai in Laos' Sam ? Neua Province and North Viet- ? nam's Dien Bien Phu Prov- ince, making their. detection STATINTL secret army's latest success. About 1,000 Thais were re- ported yesterday to have joined Gen. yang Pao's army of Meo tribesmen at Long Chien. Reports from the area today said a North Vietnam- ese attack was beaten back and some positions previously lost to the Communists had been retaken. Thais have long operated in Laos. In February, 1967, re- porters saw Thai commandoes at Nam Bac, a Lao govern- difficult. ?, merit base 60 miles north of , The pro-American 'pennies the royal capital of Luant?p, ? ' Prabang, not ar from the Ha- .! nol-Peking borders. The Thais stood out like a ), sore thumb for they spoke in a -Bangkok dialect. ? When questioned closely .they admitted they were front.? 4 the Thai military. The secret army' operations , in Southeast Asia are directed, c. by small groups of efficient Americans working out of of. flees under cover of organiza- ; ? tions in various cities in the ; region. ?? Laos, bordering on all the ; ;Southeast Asia nations, is' :ideal for these U.S. operations. And the secret army concept ; fits neatly into the Guam doe-,.. 4,trine. Americans take care of the .leadership, training, planning and logistics. The Asians \the built of the fighting. Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 DAILY WORLD Approved For Release 2oollitzwzgiA-FitTp?81141116 'CI rouse crushed by co) 2crtiociz ' Daily World Foreign Department Sam Thong, the U.S. CIA base in Laos 75 miles north of the capital of Vientiane, V has been put to the torch by Lao Patriotic Front forces, according to U.S. sources in .Vientiane yesterday. The sources said a helicopter from the CIA-run "Air America" k7 line observed the scene on Sunday but left when it met ground fire from LPF units. Long Cheng, sister base to Sam ered this down somewhat by add- had been immediately hired by 'Thong only six miles away in ing that Thai involvement was the U.S. CIA and then airlifted northern Laos, has become the "very limited." into Long Cheng in Laos. The 1 focal point for an international On Saturday, President Richard sources said two entire Thai bat- political controversy with farci.. Nixon confirmed the earlier ' italions (1,000 men) were in- cal overtones. U.S. newsmen last statements of Ziegler that Thai ? I volved. week reported that Long Cheng troops were in Laos. Nixon said: If this politically-embarrassing was being reinforced by Thai "The Thai interest in Laos ... in incident makes anything clear, it mercenaries' and other Thai . attempting to sustain the neutral- certainly is the fact that the U.S. ? troops flownn from neighboring 1st government ... has been known is in complete command of the, Thailand in the CIA's "Air Amer- for many years." ? "Royal Lao" and Thai armies ? 'lea" planes. ? Nixon also tried to connect this ? and does not even bother to in- Both the Laos government in Thai violation of the 1962 Geneva form Bangkok or Vientiane of Vientiane and the Thai govern- ? Agreement on Laos with a re-..., what it is doing with them. , ment officially denied these re- quest for aid from the Laos gov- ; In Cambodia, General Lon Nol, ? , ports. ernme t to Thailand. But the who was, granted "full power" ? "There are no Thai troops In 1962 agreement prohibits such last Wednesday by his National Laos," the Vientiane government "requests." Assembly, said in a statement* declared. Sources in Vientiane, mean- Sunday: "The time of repression, But on Friday, White House- while, said that large numbers of dictatorship, is finished." Gen. press secretary Ronald L. Meg-. of Thai soldiers (of Lao minor- Lon and the Cambodian military ler said there were kicked Thai fly origin) had suddenly resigned are in control of Phnom Penh, troops in Laps, although he wat- from the Thal Second Army and the Cambodian capital.. Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 1-7 DAILY WORLD STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/4:144A~DP80-0160 aleczaa i rizailat 'Limits to nterve By TOM FOLEY lialf of an ally which is the victim ? This latter remark is perhaps ' An article in the first quarter of overt aggression." one of the most revealing in the (January, 1970) issue of Foreign In effect, the authors are calling whole article. It shows some of Affairs, called "Limits to Inter-, for the weeding out of all."com- ' the more sordid problems before vention," calls bra sharp cutback mitments" which are not absolu- the U.S. ruling class. The authors in U.S. military intervention poll- tely vital to U.S. capitalism's sur- argue, not very'convincingly, that cies abroad and also advocates vival. the President can make U.S. poli- . ? that the Nixon administration In the second category, the ' cies "unmistakably clear" to the should reduce U.S. non-nuclear . authors say "there should be a ? CIA, the Pentagon, and other out- . ? armed forces "to levels that char- presumption against 'U.S. inter- fits, and these agencies will toe ' acterized the Eisenhower per- vention." (Emphasis in the origi- the line. tad" of the 1950s. nal - T.F.). Only in cases where The article as a whole reveals a Foreign Affairs Is widely re- other major powers, or better, the tendency in certain sectors of the ? garded, both here and abroad, as, other major power is involved, U.S. capitalist class to at least the foreign policy organ of an im- should there be any question. This recognize problems and dangers . portant part of the U.S. capitalist' is an argument, on a very practi- involved in trying to rule the world. ? class. cal basis, against the U.S. acting. It would seem that they are aware I ' The positions of the three au- as a "world gendarme" against that the previous policy of "open- thors of the article would support revolt everywhere. ended" commitments everywhere that view: Graham T. Allison, "Internal disorder," the third simply is no longer possible, given . ? former Deputy Assistant Secre- ? category, is discussed at some the balance of forces in the world tary of Defense in 1965; Ernest R. 1 length by the authors, with a focus today. ?I May, Dean of Harvard College; on Thailand, Laos and Vietnam. ' But the article also shows an NJ and Adam Yarmolineky, former They say: "the administration ;awareness that empires founded , , special assistant to the Defense ? should make a serious effort to es-, on military power tend to produce -Secretary, 1961-64, and Deputy tablish a strong presumption ..:burracks emperors." Asst. Secretary of Defense for In- ? against intervention, in cases of , ternational Security Affairs (CIA,. internal disorder and/or sub- ' ? ? Liaison), 1965-66. version, even when there is out. ? The authors show real concern '. side encouragement or aid." (Ork , about the "uncertainty, confusion ginal emphasis - T.F.). . ',and discontent" created by U.S. The authors adopt this point of ? I intervention in Vietnam. They. view from the following consider- 1 :note that the "broad bipartisan ations: wbether the U.S. will or . : consensus" which characterized will not intervene is likely to be the Cold War period in the U.S. only one factor in the decision of .. has been replaced by "widespread, ? People to revolt; the factors which ? bipartisan confusion.., the expen- 'produce revolt are "overwhelm- diture of blood and treasure in ingly local"; also, reduced U.S. . Viet Nam has deepened funda- . intervention would encourage.. . mental doubts throughout our so- ' "flabby" local regimes to set their ? ciety... as to whether the U.S. own houses in order, and this "dis- ; .? should in any circumstances be- order" is often what produces-re- come involved again in a limited volt in the first place. ? . ? war." .. A different problem is the role', ' ? Policy re-examination asked' ? of various U.S. government agen- . ? In their words, the authors try des (Pentagon, CIA, State Dept.,":, ?to identify three types of cases 7 etc.) in evaluating a situation. The, where the question of U.S. armed , . authors strongly argue for "insti- 1 intervention would be raised: "(1) tutional ways to guarantee compe- " overt aggression by a major corn- - titian," Le., that not only CIA data , ? munist power against a U.S. ally; , is used to the exclusion of all else . (2) overt aggression by any state in determining intervention. ? against a nation not a U.S. ally; As an illustration of what they STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 1100..........??????..amkt 4 1 NASHVILLE, TENN. 1 1 TENNESSEAN - 141Na 4 1970 S - 234,036 1-6-Nho's Where Th When in Laos? INCE serious debate on United '0? States involvement in Laos be- gan, the Nixon administration's response has been one of more con- fusion than clarity. On the matter of casualties, ' President Nixon first said that "no ? American" had ever been killed in, ground combat action there. Then 1. an Army captain was named as a t, casualty. Then the White House 1, recounted and found '37" civilian 4 land military dead. Then recounted. again I again and found "less than 50." The latest reports indicate that I ' the Central Intelligence Agency, ' the Army, the A gency terlitterna- ,tiohal Development and even some ? 1r6o,ps from Thailand are involved in defense of a Laotian base at ? Long Chen. . ? , American Special. Forces teams appdrently are training Meo tribes- ,' men as guerillas atid other Ameri- I cans are flying as aerial intelli-1 - gence observers. ? ' i ! Although Mr. Nixon has talked .1 .. of a policy of disengagement in f -Asia, the casualty and activity re- ports indicate a serious, andl possibly deepening, engagement in Laos. Mr. Nixon has "explained" the U.S. role in Laos once, but since then the public has needed a score- card to tell who was where when. It may soon be time for another gx,-- planation_ watt.s.:264,' ? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 .33 Approved For Release 2s9a011Nalgt:S 24 March 1970 (C h r o 11 i c I c correspon(h ant Lisa Hobbs recently com- pleted an assignment in Cam- bodia, where she had several candid talks with Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the- dc- posed chief pf state.) ' By Lisa Hobbs ' Chronicle Foreign Service I It. has become part of American folklore to sus- pect the enthusiastic, if clandestine, presence of the Central Intelligence Agen-1 perpetual danger" from the cy whenever . a Southeast Thais in the west and the Asian government rises or. Vietnamese in the east. Yet falls, it was clear that the prince The overthrow of Prince envisioned no situation that Norodom Sihanouk and his . could cause him to relinquish neutralist government l a St his neutr alit y by seeking week might well justify this American military .aid in the now customary suspicion. ? , , form of combatants. There is no known evi- "Americans . should leave clence t Ii a t the CIA played ? Vietnam but stay in all coun- any role in the Phnom Penh tries that .accept their pres- coup. But the suspicion ex- ence. There is no ' lack of ists, at least in this writer's , countries like that: theyneed s (2 Ertl t."4:0- 0-01601 ? with Laos as well as with News Analysis Thailand and South Vietnam, became overnight a critical ?""-?????????"""-???-???-???-?-?,--."- strategic prize. In view of the Laotian situation, her neu- tralist stance might well j have became untenable to, the three powers that, have ; lusted after her .possession for many years. , The die was cast when the under Communist control and Cambodia ruled from Peking, it would be only a matter of time before the American presence would be squeezed out of Thailand. DANGER The ?prince spoke repeated- ly' of Cambodia being "in mind. Such was Sihanouk's personal popularity that any attempt by his political ri- vals to depose him would. 'have necessitated foreign support. REASON If the CIA were involved, what would have been the ra- tionale? Perhaps it had its ? genesis in an attitude that the prince expressed to me during a private two-hour in- terview at his Phnom Penh villa last summer. "If the Americans with- draw from Southeast Asia, Cambodia can no longer sur- vive as an independent na- tion," he said. "And, as Khmers, we would prefer the Chinese to the Vietnamese." Later, the prince spoke of the inevitability of a final Communist takeover of all Vietnam. The prince was positing a situation that would be intol- erable At AmericAN_Asiajp. policy.P.MWQWWWdilfalkg the U.S. dollar. We are poor, but have our pride." .t But pride, it seems, was ?not 'enough to stay the aced- erating internal and external ;pressures. These pressures Vs pr an g from. three main sources -- the Army which, living on coolie level, has not ? had a raise in pay since 1954; the politically, powerful and personally ' wealthy rightists within the Sangkum, the rul- ing party ; the increasing po- litical and economic instabili- ty throughout Southeast Asia. CRITICAL prince left for Paris. In a ! swift and apparently well- ; planned maneuver, the goy- -, ernment fell into the hands of the pro-American rightists. ? The prince, long a thorn i n i the side of U. S. policy-mak- , \ ers, was out. ? Was the, CIA standing in.' the wings directing this in- f triguing little Asian drama?! There is no proof. However,' the agency puts in such long hours plotting and planning ? all over Asia it Ehould be giv- en a little credit on the basis of the probable, . , .?.- :, .. ?,' Within the last few weeks, U. S. domestic awareness of American involvement in Laos had reached a peak. Cambodia, sharing borders STATI NTL lease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01.601R000700040001-3 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R00070g91019W .mime? 01???????.??? TROY, N.Y. TIMES RECORD E - 42 , 181 MAR 24 In Critics At Work The critics of American foreign policy and activity i both in Congress and in the country at large, are .endeavoring to make a prime case of the fact thaLc.a.a.gents and some service volun- teers are assisting the Laotion army build up a machine to resist ? Communist invasion. The unfairness of the criticism is magnified by the fact that it is so one sided. Whatever the United States does is horrible. Americans miss no opportunity to picture their country as an' ogre. The other side is a matter to be overlooked. Russia has at least 4,000 "technicians" help- , ' ing the Arab countries. She has thousands in North Vietnam. They are scattered throughout Africa. France and England have similar representatives, not in thessame numbers, but none the less there. ? But because the United States has a feW hun- dred men willing to help a beleaguered country fend off a Communist invasion, we are a threat ? to world peace. Someone is being misled, and un- fortunately so. Entangling foreign alliances were part of George Washington's parting warning. He spoke at a time when world communication was almost non-exikent. Today there is no vast separation of countries. The most disant are only hours away. There are times 'when the strong must play a role ' according to that biblical qithtation. They Cannot avoid being their brother's keeper. I. ? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 a?-? )01611111UXON STAR Approved For Release 22%ifpq470CIA-REI8IC1141601 1,000 Thais ? Reinforce , Lao Troops By TAMMY ARBUCKLE , y? VIENTSpedal to The Star IANE?American Spe- cial Forces officers working for the Central Intelligence Agency are leading LOGO Thai soldiers reinforcing Gen. yang Pao's Moo troops defending Long Chien, Lao military sources said today. The Americans are newly as- signed, but the sources said the Thais saw action last year at ? Xieng Khouang on the Plain of Jars. The Thai group is not perma- nently assigned to Laos, but en- ters periodically under a con- ? tract with the Lao government. Lao Premier Souvanna Phou- ma's denial over the weekend of the Thai entry of Laos was tech- nically correct, sources said, be- cause the new contract for Long Chien had not yet been signed. About 800 Thais already have arrived in the Long Chien area and the remaining 200 are en route. Two Thai artillery batteries of four guns each also have ar- rived at Long Chien, plus Thai security troops for the guns. They are not the only Thai forces serving in Laos. Thai air force pilots fly transports belong- ing to the Central Intelligenc Agency-contracted airline, Con- tinental Airlines, and for an air- line in south Laos. One of the Thais, Lt. Col. Kru ? of the 1st Thai Air Wing at Don Muang, was killed in a crash at Long Chien recently. Sporadic patrol clashes were reported today around Long Chien, the main base for the U.S.-supported "Secret Army" of Mea tribesmen led by Gen. yang Pao. Long Chien is about 75 miles north of Vientiane. Edgar (Pop) Buell, the Ameri- can AID co-ordinator for the re- gion, said that between 80,000 and 100,000 Meos are. walking cut of the Long Chien area as refugees. ? Buell, who has been In Laos for about 10 years, most of the time working with the Meos, said he did not believe the fall of Flown in by U.S. The Thais arrive in American aircraft and are dressed in civil- ian clothes. On arrival they are issued Lao army uniforms, Lao identity papers and paybooks. Many of the Thais are regular officers of the royal Thai army serving in Laos with full knowl- edge of Thailand and continue to receive their full salary from the Thai government. Consid- ered on temporary detachment from the That army, they also receive a Lao salary paid from Long Chien to the North Viet- namese would finish yang Pao's guerrillas, the major force fight- ing the Communists. . Buell said he thought yang Pao, with the help of .Lao Theung tribes from the lower mountain slopes, would be able to hold new defense lines. Communist units, meanwhile, were reported assembling west of the neutralist headquarters at yang Vieng, 100 miles north of Vientiane. ? Sources said about 650 Com- munist troops are some 12,000 yards from the west edge of yang Vieng. The mission of these troops is believed to be the preparation of supply caches for men are more interestc n e ter-than-average pay than ing the job. Guerrilla leaders it the local level have stolen U.S. funds and equipment meant for operations. Some soldiers, especially the Thais, well-informed sources say, "talk too much to their girl friends" about their exploits, real or imagined. More important, however, Se- cret Army critics charge its cen- tral intelligence agency bosses make policy. It is alleged that the CIA and U.S. military advis- ers persuaded yang Pao to "tweak the tiger's tail" by tak- ing the Plain of Jars last year and offering Thai support as the tool to accomplish this. ? and the Thais have pinned don one North Vietnamese Division, Hanoi's 316th, In Laos for nearly eight years. Now it is pinning down a sec- ond division, the 312th, as well as two supply regiments and two North Vietnamese border regi- ments. the troops ? currently attacking Long Chien. . Failure of the royal Lao army to reinforce the Meo guerrillas of yang Pao is believed behind the use of the Thais at Long Chien. Ethnic Lao troops, whetli- Over 15,000 North Vietnamese have died in northern Laos since 1962. If it had not been for these , U.S.-led operations in Laos, the, Hanoi troops might have been used in South Vietnam.' Because the Geneva accords forbid paramilitary forces in Laos, these U.S.-Thai opera- tions have remained secret. The Communists know about these, STATINTL operations, however, and Presi- dent Nixon told of some of them March 6. U.S. Embassy officials here say secrecy must remain. "The President's speech rep- resents a stage, not a point of departure for us" to say more,. an embassy official said. , He compared the govern- ment's Geneva accords policy to a man' hanging to a ledge with the press climbing up his legs asking what's on the ledge. Officials seem to cling to the Geneva accords as more unpor, er on the side of the North Viet- U.S. funds as an additional in namese or against them, have tont than ? any credibility gap centive. .* caused by secreCy. Said a Lao- . not proved reliable fighters. This ?4 ?an "You can't go to Long These Thais are mostly natives led to the formation of Vans Chien today because some Thais . of northeastern Thailand, near Pao's Secret Army, trained an are still in, their civilian. the Lao border, and are there- fore fluent Lao speakers. The Thais are experienced forest fighters and some were trained In South Vietnam near Vung ? ' Tau, northeast of Saigon, sources said. equipped by the U.S. But the Secret Army also has ? ; ? Its drawbacks., ' . Americans engged in its op- erations have told of being left alone in the forest when their guerrillas fled uncles' attack. They say some Secret Army Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 ? ? WASHINTOS Si.CA4 Approved For Release Min& Wi-RDP80-01601R Green Berets Lead Thai Unit In Laos Action By TAMMY ARBUCKLE Spedal to The Star VIENTIANE?American Spe- cial Forces officers working for the Central Intelligence Agency, are leading 1,000 Thai soldiers reinforcing Gen. Yang Pao's Meo troops defending Long Chien, Lao military sources said today. The Americans are newly as- signed, but the sources said the Thais saw action last year at Xieng Khouang on the Plain of Jars. The Thai group is not perma- 'nently assigned to Laos, but en- ters periodically under a con- tract with the Lao government. ' Lao Premier Souvanna Phou- ma's denial over the weekend of the Thai entry of Laos was tech- nically correct, sources said, be- cause the new contract for Long Chien had not yet been signed. About 800 Thais already have arrived in the Long Chien area and the remaining 200 are en route. . Flown in by U.S. The Thais arrive in American aircraft and are dressed in civil- ian clothes. On arrival they are Issued Lao army uniforms, Lao identity papers and paybooks. Many of the Thais are regular officers of the royal Thai army serving in Laos with full knowl- edge of Thailand and continue to receive their full salary from the ? Thai government. Consid- ered on temporary detachment from the Thai army, they also receive a Lao salary paid from U.S. funds as an additional In- centive. These Thais are mostly natives of northeastern Thailand, near the Lao border, and are there- fore fluent Lao speakers. The Thais are experienced forest fighters and some were trained in South Vietnam near Vung Tau . northeast . of Saigon, ApprouareopiRsglease:2004 3/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00070004000173 STATINTL' They are not the only Thai forces serving in Laos. Thai air force pilots fly transports belong- ing to the Central Intelligence Agency-contracted airline, Con- tinental Airlines, and for an air- line in south Laos. Killed in Crash One of the Thais, Lt. Col. Kru of the 1st Thai Air Wing at Don Muang, was killed in a crash at Long Chien recently. Sporadic patrol clashes were, reported today around Long: Chien, the main base for the, U.S.-supported "Secret Army", of Moo tribesmen led by Gen. yang Pao. Long Chien is about ? 75 miles north of Vientiane. Edgar (Pop) Buell, the Amen- Can AID co-ordinator for the re- gion, said that between 80,000 and 100,000 Meos are walking, out of the Long Chien area as refugees. 'Buell, who has been in Laos kr about 10 years, most of the time working with the Mew. , said he did not believe the fall of Long Chien to the North Viet- namese would finish yang Pao's' guerrillas, the major force fight- ing the Communists. " . Feels Lines Will Hold Hull said he thought Vang Pao,. with the help of Lao Theung tribes from the lower mountain slopes, would be able to hold new defense lines. Communist units, meanwhile, were reported assembling west of the neutralist headquarters at yang ? Vieng, 100 miles north of Vientiane. Sources said about 650 Corn- muhist troops are some 12,000 yards from the west edge of yang Vieng. The mission of these troops is believed to be the preparation of supply caches for the troops ;mealy attacking Long Chien, e BALTI HOBE SUII Approved For Release 2001/%3A0gARCIVoRM9rAlit0 Analysis ' History Tempers U.S. Americans here if a decision were given to pull hack. "We cad get out in 24 hours if we have to," said one key Ameri- can. Others echo these views. By PETER J. KUMPA [Sun Stall Correspondent.] . ? Vientiane, Laos, March 22? The American effort to keep the neutralist government of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma from succumbing to Communist ag- gression in Laos has been tai- lored to avoid the mistakes of Vietnam. ? No United States ground forces are being used. Laotian ! government armies are being . supplied, advised and trained by minimum number of Amen- /cans, many of them in civilian guise from the Central Intelli- gence Agency or under contract But the Laotian operation, put together in the Kennedy admin- istration, then increased in the Johnson years and continued by the' Nixon government, has in- curred some moral responsibili- ties... ? . Purely American Effort On a smaller scale, the Ameri- cans are responsible for the clandestine army of Gen. yang Pao, the head of the Men guer- ; and using such. covers as the rilla movement. This has been a Agency for International Devel- purely American effort, per- . opment program. , , formed skillfully and secretly by Reduction Of Supplies ? ' the Central Intelligence Agenc , ? From 1964 on, air power was though under the political direc- , directed both at the Ho Chi Minh Trail and in northern Laos. Air strikes were launched from tion of the State Department. General yang is now battling to hold Lcing Cheng, his head- South Vietnam, Thailand and the quarters and capital of his 7th fleet in the South China Sea. mountain empire.' He Is also ? The aim on the trail was sim..'fighting for the very existence pie?to reduce the flow of North of his army, which 'is losing its were made available in Laos,. statement listed 616 Americans Vietnamese troops and supplies -morale. and its men. His leader- Presitient Nixon, in his March - directly employed here and an- northern Laos, it was similarly are at stake. Doesn't the United the increased level of American designed to reduce the number States owe. something to him aid operations was due only to government contracts for a of men that Hanoi could keep arid his nomadic hill people who the "massive" intervention of grand total of 1,040 Americans. operative to threaten the mill- have fought the Noi;th, Viet- But in October, official State tary and political balance .in namese and the, communist Pathet Lao in a remarkable Laos. a In both countries, the Amen- and mainly successful behind- the-lines guerrila war? Can, the cans have learned that while air power can punish an enemy, in- flicting damage and casualties, It cannot interdict a determined foe without ground forces. The North Vietnamese have not been 'stopped. Fears Seem Unjustified Unlike South Vietnam, the United States is not in any deep morass in Laos. There are no large bases or concentrations of men. There are military sup- !plies, that can be quickly turned over to the Laotian government or destroyed. Air strikes can be turned off by pushing a button. Thus, congressional fears that the United States might get bogged down militarily ? here seem unjustified. There is nothing visible in any .+ of Laos that mad keep kong River to the ,nearby Thal Western diplomats here feel 'took considerable liberties withi some fuzzy estimates and raised them to excuse a vast jump in Ithe number of American air sor- !ties and in at least one case the Laos Role use of giant 13-52 bombers. They, feel the United States could have justified its elevation of air pow-, plain. American ground - ground troops, er by acknowledging the weak- and Thais as well, would be used If the North Vietnamese at- tempted a total takeover of the country. With such a threat no longer plausible, congressional fears about turning Laos into another Vietnam appear to be equally groundless. Threat Remains The threat of heavy Thai inter- vention does remain. As this presumablY would be backed by American air might and other ness of Laotian government op- position (politically undesirable) or by pointing out the_yastly increased firepower now being employed by the North Vietnam- ese. The Communist forces now use rockets, the full range of Chinese-made automatic weap- ons, considerable artillery and large numbers of truck and oth- er wheeled transport. Mr. Nixon's figures for past North Vietnamese strength in Laos iilso seem to have been logistic support, it may be just toyed with, and are lower than as chilling a consideration for S those provided at the time in Hanoi. 'There is a, prima fade case to be made on the other hand that it as the Nixon administration at increased' the level of fight- ,.g during the past few months by escalating the numbers and the type of air attacks upon the Communists in northern Laos. , The original American escala- tion was made in October, 1968, when the bombing of North Viet- nam was halted and targets 1967. The net effect makes Hanoi appear as the party that has been the one to blame for rapid escalation of the war in Laos when it seems closer to fact to say that the Communists have kept ?a rather substantial force in the country. Using only official figures, one can conclude that there has been a considerable -increase in the size of the American effort in Laos. The President's March 6 additional North Vietnamese 'troops. He said 13,000 Commu- nist troops had been poured into raising their Wei to 67,000 men. American government Permit . If there was any such escala- 'men. Has the Nixon administra- the Mess to be annihilated now?' tion pumped in more than 200 extra men for the Laotian effort during the past few months? Perhaps, but more likely not. The best guess here is that the State Department figures of last fall were deliberately underval- ued to keep the cover on a num- ber of secret operations. Mr.. Nixon's own figures are undoubtedly a little low. For while he talks of Americans em- ployed "in Laos," he says noth- ing about other . Americans, largely.intelligence men but also some contract pilots, who live in and ' work out of nearby Thai- Department figures showed 330 Americans on contract and 500 directly on the government pay- rolls. This makes a total of 830 Moral, LegalDbligation The United States also has a moral if not legal obligation to continue to support within lim- its, the Souvanna Phouma gov- ernment until . international agreement or a more local agreement by the contending Laotian parties brings peace and . some stability here. ? ? The Nixon Doctrine, which calls for a .reduction of Ameri- can military power in Southeast Asia', does appear to discard one of the better trumps the United states used in the past to limit Communist advances. The Ken- nedy administration could and did send marines across the Me- bon by Hanoi,' it was not known by the American mission here. ' "Massive" Intervention In an embarrassing lack of coordination, briefers here still were using the 50,000 figure as an estimate for North Vietnam- ese forces in Laos. Intelligence sources here con- tended that they could find no significant change in North Viet- namese strength in Laos over the past year. Even the 50,000 figure Is consi- dered inflated by other Western sources. French estimates place the figure for 'North Vietnamere at more than 44,500. ? ? Fuzzy Estimates Approved For Ritittget31POSATretA-b0?11.-641A onoo4BeRNIte ? STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-016 BALTIMORE, MD. SUN M 180,656/ E 209,65Y S 347,939 L'Zi 2 3 1970 Questions in Laos The report in The Sun today of participa ; lion by the Central Intelligence Agency in ' the defense of the Long Chen Base in Laos is , disturbingly familiar. Before the 1965 buildup: of ; of United States troops in South Vietnam the CIA was deeply invOlved there against the Vietcong. CIA Activities against the Pathet Lao?which has included the training and equiping of a guerrilla army of Meo tribes- .,men?may not be directly responsible, for the present deteriorating situation in Laos, but they certainly have contributed to it. , The conflict in Laos is already following ' L a pattern similar to what occurred in South Vietnam. The United States is there, mak ? - ing war from the air and through its clan- . destine agents on the ground. Theo number .:el , participants is even growing: Thailand ha i sent an expeditionary force, and North Viet. namese troop i are camped on the Plain Of , Jars. The conflict is thoroughly international- ized. : The parallel between Vietnam and Laos, !however, is not predetermined. We are as- sured by The Sun's Peter Kumpa that the ' l Nixon administration can avoil the mistakes 1President Johnson 'made in South Vietnam, 1, :mainly 'because of public opinion in the, 'United States. Also the attitude of Congress is t.such that - commitment of- United States ' ' ground forces is something Mr. Nixon 'could , 1 , just not get away with. iThat may be true, but no one can be sure and we are left with the ,uneasy feeling that ; tall this has happened before. President John- !son accepted and acted upon faulty intelll- 'gence in Vietnam, Is the advice Mr., Nixod ,receives superior? We suspect CIA agents and Pentagon functionaries in Vietnam have ?: ,I made large decisions on their own that should, only have been made by elected civilians in Washington. Does Mr. Nixon really have an taccUrate picture of what is occuring in Laos? Is ?he really in control of events? Who can, with certainty, answer these questions, 'af- 'firmatively? . - ' imiliminimm,.....?...-.4. - Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 STATINTL MaraMia,r9051 F?rciNenessia11231PEtiM-Tre2i9t#2160"fe021 grams to teach critically needed skills. Thus, we can provide students with much-needed skills in fields in which they can establish careers. This is a Most significant endeavor for the future of cur country and its educational institutions. I urge my colleagues to join mein sup- porting this valuable program. SITUATION IN GREECE ? HON. DON EDWARDS Or CALIFORNIA IN THE HOUSE OP REPRI1(3ENTATIVES Monday, March 23, 1970 Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Speaker, the situation in Greece seems to be worsening every day. Not only are . more and more individuals suffering the barbarism of a government which uses torture to keep its citizens in line, but the country which was the first democ- racy and remained a symbol to the free world for years, under the reign of the junta is turning more and more toward the East and away from the principles of freedom. I request that two articles which appeared in the most recent issue of News of Greece be included in the RECORD. The first is the preface from a new book by James Becket, "Barbarism in Greece," whose report for Amnesty In- ternational was the first comprehensive account of the use of torture by the Greek junta. The second describes the growing alliance of the junta with the Eastern European countries, while still enjoying a great deal of military support from the United States. How can the United States, in good conscience, still continue its support for such a government? , The articles follow: . BARBARISM IN GREECE The subject of this book is horrible. Torture belongs on the darkest side of human be- havior, yet in the Greek case there are en- tries to be made on the credit side of the human ledger. People outside of Greece, es- pecially in Europe, have cared about what was going on. and public opinion has played O. ?* role. The European Press has vigorously pur- sued the subject. The international com- munity through its oragnizations has shown that it is willing to try to do something about it. The Scandinavian governments brought their case before the European Commission of Human Rights not for any commercial or territorial advantage, but because they be- lieved an human rights. Despite pressure from many sides, they had the perseverance to see the case through to Its conclusion. The members of the Commission conscientiously discharged their duty, concluding that the Greek regime tortures political prisoners as a matter of policy. Most important of all. Greeks themselves, at great personal sacrifice, had the courage to tell their stories and give ? their names. I am convinced that because of this fewer Greeks have been tortured than would have been if the regime had a free hand. Efforts from abroad, however, have their limits, which are tragically demonstrated by the fact the regime continues to torture prisoners. In a sense the possible International effort has ? now been made, and torture has not been stopped. The future is uncertain. All that baa happened, all that is described in these pages cannot be simply forgotten, by Greeks. If there is not a change soon, it Is difficult to see how Greece can avoid great bloodshed. GREECE AND TUE WORLD: JUNTA TURNS EAST ? Relations between tho colonels and their Communist neighbors have always been based on expediency, rather than on the ringing denunciations of "communism" and "fascism" which the two parties have uttered for public consumption. They have become especially close in the past year, as both have been estranged from the West European democracies by the objections of the latter to torture In Greece and the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Two recent developments are especially striking. One is the conclusion of a now eco- nomic agreement with the U.S.S.R., tinder which Soviet exports to Greece ere to be atepped up and receive moat-favored-nation treatment. At the same time, the Soviet Union Is to send technicians to the area north of KayeIla to look for peat (and ac- cording to some reports other minerals) and prepare plans for electric production based on it. Greece is to pay for this survey with some of its perennially surplus tobacco. From the Soviet point of view, however, one cigaret might scorn an adequate recompense. For the area in question is the site of major American top-secret radar installations. And the Soviet technicians, hunting for minerals with the aid of modern electronic devices, might reasonably be expected to discover1 other things as well. The second development is the resumption of trade with Albania for the first time since the end of World war II. The announcement of this agreement between the junta and Communist China's only satellite does not specify what commodities are involved. An appropriate exchange, however, might give Greece a supply of the little red book of Mao's thoughts in return for an equal quan- tity of the book in which Papadopoulos has embalmed his commentaries. The junta has also decided to station o. permanent triide representative in East Ger- many, while agreeing to increase. its trade with Bulgaria. And Hungary has sent a trade delegation to Athens in connection with the holding of a "Hungarian Festival" there?at a time when the intellectual and artistic' world of democratic countries is engaged in a cultural boycott of the Greek dictatorship, "Agreement in principle" has also reportedly been reached on a trade pact with Peking. The junta will certainly find itself more at home ideologically with the Eastern dictator- ships than with the democracies which just chased It out of the Council of Europe. Yet in the present state of the world Papado. pontos may soon find himself faced with the necessity of making an agonizing choice be.. tween Moscow and Peking: "Under which king, Bezonian? Speak or diel" . ? MAN'S INHUMANITY TO MAN?HOW LONG? ? HON. WILLIAM J. SCHERLE OF IOWA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, March 23, 1970 ' Mr. SCHERLE. Mr. Speaker,, a child asks: "Where is daddy?" A mother asks: "How is my son?" A wife asks: "Is my husband alive or dead?" Communist North Vietnam is sadisti- cally practicing spiritual and mental genocide on over 1.400 American,prieon? era of war and their families. ' fl MR. NIXON'S SILENCES IS A SHADOW OF A DOUBT HON. HENRY HELSTOSKI Or NEW JERSEY ? IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, March 23, 1970 Mr. HELSTOSKI: Mr. Speaker, it ap- pears that we have another credibility gap on our hands. This time as It relate to Laos. It is well spelled out in the following column by Mr. Stuart H. Loory as carried In the Record of Hackensack, N.J., on ? March 12, 1070: XIS MR. NIXON'S SILENCES Is A SHADOW Or A DOUOT ? (By Stuart If. Loory) Now President Nixon has bared some?but certainly-not all?of the secrets of the clan- destine war in Laos he inherited from two previous administrations. The United States, he, openly admits, is neck deep in a part of the southeast Asia jungle war outside Vietnam. In six years of fighting, 400 American air- men have become casualties, 400 airplanes have been lost?about as many as, maybe even more, than the number of fixed-wing airplanes the United States has lost over South Vietnam. These facts emerged from the torpid calm of the Southern White House?the Key Bis- cayne, Fla , vacation 'retreat to which the President retired late last week to make his Laos statement. Why not speak from Washington'? If Mr. Nixon wanted to be completely candid, why not make the statement at a news confer- ence where his words and intentions could really be probed and clarified? Unfortunately, Mr. Nixon's statement on Laos was a politically reflexive reaction to a growing clamor for candor in the White House. It was Intended to break the silence that has surrounded the secret war, to show that the nation harbors no secret guilt. But It was only half candid; and so it was wholly unsatisfactory. The unhappy experience with the Gulf of Tbnkin resolution of August 19f34, originally presented as a show of solidarity behind President Lyndon B. Johnson but then con- strued by him as a virtual declaration of war, has taught Congress and the American people to read words carefully. The presents. tion of selected facts by the Johnson ad- ministration to bolster Its case for the mas- sive intervention in South Vietnam In 1965 has cautioned the American people to check and double-check on a President's facts. And so, when Mr. Nixon says of Laos, "We have no plans for introducing combat forces into Laos," one must look for the loop- holes like a Philadelphia lawyer. No plans? Does that mean plans may be developed later? Maybe. Ground combat forces? Does that mean more ground combat support forces?engi- neers to build roads and bridges, suppliers to carry ammunition to combat troops, repair- . men to fix disabled weapons, advisers to alm ? and show the Laotians how to fire the weap- ons?might be dispatched? ? Ground combat forces? What about ma- hating the American involvement through the Introduction of more aircraft to fly cover for the CIA-trained and supplied Laotian forces as well as the Royal Laotian Army? The President said: "The levels of our assistance have risen In response to the growth of North Vietnamese combat acUr. . Mee ''' . . ? ? , implication of that esatence le Apprplied For Release 2001/0310,4-: CIA1RDP80-01,601R0907.00040001-3 iteproved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 T STATINTL NUS E - 93,538 MAR 2 3 1970 fAr s secret Foie in the secre By MICHAEL ICRAFT Mauldin Reuters News Service WASHINGTON &-- Congressional crit- Congo. Correspondents who were there being played by the Central Intelli- . The American assistance was regard-' tation, and some tactical support for the ' - , The agency is also alleged to have fi- les of American involvement in Laos are ': at the time saY the C.I.A.'s role was an Ii- / -- showing increasing interest in the part . open secret. named air operations, including transpor . gence Agency and what they consider ed as an important factor in helping the pro-government neutralist forces against the unusual role of the U.S. ambassador; ,,; Congo government suppress the rebellion, ? the Communists. i According to Sen. Stuart Symington, with the help of white mercenary sol- Single-engine Laotian T-28 fighters ' ' are serviced by American mechanics, al- (D., Mo.) Ambassador. McMurtrie Godle" diers. ' though the combat flying has been done ? ,, operates in Vientiane, the Laotian capital,, . In response to congressional inquiries, , by Laotians and other non-Americans., '' as a sort of pro-consul, directing Amen- .) the Nixon Administration has asserted ' the repute say. -. can military and intelligence activities' in,'" that it is merely a coincidence that both : ? - addition to his normal diplomatic"func-': Godley and Devlin are now assigned to ? . Laos. war i. -.tions. , . . ,? ' ,. Godley was assailed on the Senate: ? ., Jr - Sen. William Fuibright (D., Ark.) ie-4:j floor recently by Symington, one of the 'toed in on a press report that the Agency 'i; most vocal critics of both the Laotian in- ..7,. . for International Development (A.I.D;) in' volvement and the administration secrecy . ? Laos is a cover for C.I.A. men, declaring ''e? about it. 1 ? .,1 ' r . that if true "it is another sign that' w?e are -I Symington has been rebuffed by the ' in over our heads.',' ? ? , -?,. State Department in his demand for the \Though President Nixon has adopted l', ambassador's immediate recall to testify ? ? '.a new policy of frank disclosure of all cas- , before Congress. , . ? .ualties and air losses in Laos and has t Fuibright also wants to bring the am- given a 4,000-word explanation of Antal- ,1 bassador home and sent a letter to the . can policy, he has never mentioned the ? : State Department backing the recall de-, '-super-secret C.I.A. ( .. .. y mand. But Laos has been known for years as ' press reports have said there are hun- l':,-14,' ,, ? ? ,an "agency country," and C.I.A. men are ' 'dreds of C.I.A. agents in Laos, and Ful- ..,',?IT''YJ ? .'suspected of accounting for a large pro- bright told a reporter he thought the 'i,:::... portion of the 643 Americans acknowl- agency's operations there were costing 1, ,,.,1,. . 'edged by Nixon to be engaged in a between $200 million and $300 million a military, 1,.,., ? ? advisory and logistical support '? 'year. '1 , role. : ? Silver !leas of aircraft on 'charter to ? I i The U.S. operation in Laos is directed ' the C.I.A. are said to have been providing ? I ; by two men who supervised a similar'', tactical support for years to Gem. Van ,1 . U.S. support program in the Congo in the, 1 Pao's pro-government force of Moo.. ** ! 1960's. 1, tribesmen. Godley, now 52, was ambassador in , Three Air America employes wore' . " the Congo from 1964 to 1966, a time ,,among six civilian fatalities acknowl- - i when the U.S. was providing equipment edged by the State Department to have . 4 and tactical air support for the central ? occurred in Laos in the past year. t, I., - C o n g 0 1 e s e government's campaign." '? One of the victims, J. C. Merkel, was ' 4 - against the leftist Simba rebels. ' ' 1 .killed by a bullet when piloting a helicop- ?,1 ' ter over the Plain of Jars last month The C.I.A. operations in the Congo during the Communist offensive that,1 , 4.- ' ? were directed by Lawrenea naviir? now a recaptured the strategic area. ? ? :political officer in the U.S. Embassy in ? According to press, accounts cited by Vintiane but described in official docu- . members of the Senate, Green Berets and.. znents as the chief of the C.I.A. mission, other army veterans now technically civil- Jana have been operating d ,.i The Congolese air force was supplied under contract . , .44 with reconditioned U.S. twin-engine 3-26 ;t? the !'A'' ilkIA?11',. ? , ),,..,??,' ,,Q....',i...4 . bombersAIEVO4tRigin6Fiti. a_t_ Oale;2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 ? were flown by Cuban and Eas .STATINTL 'O. ? exiles against the cebels.in the NEWSWEEK STATI NTL Approved For Releasdtli763/6'4Q. CIA-RDP80-01601 THE WAR IN VIETNAM 7"4,t' Yo U VIET N'g?A VOL! ENTERNG Lctios 190,011,1--N.Y. POOL 'Let Me Make Every- thing Perfectly Clear' S ?? P LA n the scruffy little capital of Vientiane I last week, the bars and cabarets were as merry as usual. A few miles outside town, a $50,000 Olympic swimming pool for U.S. Government employees was ., nearing completion. And everywhere the Laotians continued their languid pace of life. Most of the time, it was difficult to believe that Laos was the locus of a mounting international crisis. Yet, events in that little Southeast Asian kingdom clearly presented the Nixon Administra- tion with some painful problems. Not the least was how the Nixon Doctrine?with its principle that the U.S. should avoid committing ground troops to other na- tions' internal wars?would work in its first crucial test. Of equal importance was 'the possibility that the situation. in Laos might saddle Mr. Nixon with the kind of credibility gap that afflicted his prede- cessor in the White House. It was ironic that Laos was the country to raise such large issues. For years, the seesaw skirmishing in Laos has been re- garded in Washington as a sideshow war, something to be settled after the blood- letting in Vietnam came to an end. ("The situation in Laos is disastrous but not serious," went the old Washington quip.) But since the start of the year, the North Vietnamese, along with their local Com- munist allies the Pathet Lao, have put a different cast on things. Mounting a ma- jor offensive, they swept the U.S.-backed Laotian Government forces from the Plain of Jars and by last week threatened both Vientiane and the royal capital of Luang Prabang. For the first time since the 1962 Geneva conference "settled" the Laotian problem, the Communists seemed intent not only on regaining lost ground but on converting their undeni- able military superiority into solid politi- cal gains. This, in leopmvcialifor Retells the dovecote in Washington. Two weeks (AiN (.1.1enicip MOW Nawm 'Withdrawal' FANCY) TALK ago, in fact, Mr. Nixon tried to head off Congressional critics who maintain that he is leading the U.S. down the road to another Vietnam. In a carefully wrought policy, statement issued from Key Bis- cayne, the President admitted for the first time that the U.S. was not only bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail but also flying air support missions for Laotian ground forces. But be steadfastly insisted , that "there are no American ground com- bat troops in Laos" and that "no Ameri- can ? stationed in Laos has ever been killed in ground combat operations." Distinction: The evasiveness of the President's language soon became clear when The Los Angeles Times reported that a U.S. Army captain named Joseph Bush had in fact lost his life during a battle in Laos. An American adviser to Laotian Government troops, Captain Bush was killed in February 1969 fighting off a North Vietnamese attack on his com- pound. But when the incident was called to the attention of the White House, em- barrassed spokesmen would say only that the President stood by his statement. Captain Bush had not been killed in a "ground combat operation," it was ex- plained, but had died as a result of "hostile action"?a distinction that left many Americans unconvinced. Inevitably, the episode cast doubt on Mr. Nixon's candor. And so last week, in the aftermath of the Captain Bush story, the White House went out of its way to salvage its credibility on Laos. First, spokesmen said that the President had not known about Captain Bush at the time of his policy statement. In addition to Captain Bush, it was then added, at least. 26 U.S. "civilians" (most of them presumably CIA agents working with the both in the air and on the ground?at about 400. In line with this new candor, the Ad- ministration added that, in the future, casualties in Laos would be made pub- lic as they occur. It also revealed that U.S. servicemen stationed in Laos (as advisers, technicians or attaches) have been receiving "hostile-fire pay" for some time past. But even this effort at forthrightness hardly yielded the whole truth about the U.S. involvement in Laos. For one thing,. military sources admitted that the figures. were imprecise. And they did not take into account the many Americans who have met death in Laos while on secret, ? missions across the border from either Thailand or South Vietnam. Their op- erations range from trail-watching and sabotage to prisoner-snatching and an oc- casional murder. And it is all very hush- hush. Many of the infiltrators carry , British-made weapons with silencing de- vices. In some cases, the soles of their army boots carry a special tread that leaves an imprint like that of the sandals worn by the Vietnamese. Secrecy: Most, if not all, of these in- cursions into Laos are run by the U.S. Studies and Observation Group (SOG), which has its headquarters in a . heavi- ly guarded and rarely visited building in downtown Saigon. And there the secrecy is impressive. Reporters are strictly non grata, and NEWSWEEK correspondents were sternly warned last week that de- tailed reporting on U.S. operations across the border into Laos would be in con- travention of "Ground Rule 5." This mili- ary regulation forbids the press to report Ion specific "intelligence activities, meth- ods of operation or specific locations." A Laotians) have been killed by the enc. possible penalty for violating Ground my on the ground in Laos, Earlier, the Rule 5 is the i evocation of press credcn- ? Anacrican ead, captured an missing? n vie dtle operations, C o eg2001101/04vOIAJR1r80411t Oiltd01571Mpp Approved For Release it was little wonder that a number of leading Congressional critics were not satisfied by the President's assurances. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, for one, repeated his charge last week that "we arc up to our necks in Laos" and demanded a withdrawal of all U.S. per- sonnel. Sen. J. William Fu'bright went a good deal farther, introducing a "sense of the Senate" resolution that challenged the President's constitutional authority to commit U.S. air or ground combat troops to the fighting in Laos without Congres- sional approval. But Mr. Nixon had his supporters. "November's corning up and the Democrats have to have something to talk about," remarked GOP Sen. George Aiken of Vermont. And Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott scoffed: "The Demo- crats have failed to make an issue out of Vietnamization. Now they are desperate to build up Laos as an issue. Why, we have had more casualties in Guatemala than in Laos." Points: Senator Scott notwithstanding, the situation in Laos held far more perils for U.S. policy than Guatemala. And the nature of some of those dangers was made plain last week when the Commu- nists launched a diplomatic offensive. In a "peace proposal" broadcast over Radio Hanoi, the Pathet Lao offered to negoti- ate with the government of Premier Sou- vanna Phouma on what they called five basic points: a standstill cease-fire, a con- ference of all political parties on the es- tablishment of a new provisional coalition , government, a demilitarized zone in which the conference would be held, a mutual pledge against reprisals?and an end to U.S. "intervention and aggression" in Laos. Following up this initiative, Prince Souphanouvong, titular head of the Pa- thet Lao, sent a cable to Souvanna Phouma, his half-brother, urging him to receive a personal emissary with an im- portant message. Temporarily thrown off balance by the surprise proposal, Sou- vanna?though deeply mistrustful of the Communists?accepted. In the draft re- sponse prepared by Souvanna's staff, his half-brother was addressed correctly as "Son Altesse" (Your Highness). But Sou- vanna huffily scratched off the honorific before sending the cable: "The Prime Minister will be happy to accept Prince Souphanouvong's message, the sooner the better." Talks: Although a Communist emissary was due to arrive in Vientiane late this week, there was considerable doubt in the Laotian capital that talks with the Communists held much promise. For Souvanna is presumably determined to preserve his control over the govern- ment, while the Communists want to es- tablish a coalition that reflects the "new realities" of the military situation. More- over, the Communists have demanded an end to the U.S. air strikes as a pre- condition for talks, and Souvanna last week insisted that the air attacks would be called off onl if the North Vietnam- ese w "7 itWISr''P r bdtrraf ittg1eW6 2001/03/04: C IA-RDP80-01601 R000700040001-3 "Let us not talk uniquely about aerial bombardment," said Souvanna. "The two things are tied together. In order to re- move the effect of the bombing, you must remove the cause of the bombing, which is the presence of North Vietnam- ese troops in Laos." The display of verbal firmness by Sou- vanna went down well in Washington, but it was also fully understood that the, Communists were in an extremely strong bargaining position. They could, if they wanted to, overrun the entire country. And in the circumstances, it is consid- ered conceivable that Souvanna might decide to strike a deal with.the Commu- nists, trading, domestic political favors in exchange for calling on the U.S. to cease bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail. If that Captain Bush: A curious distinction' should happen, the Communists might well have the U.S. over a barrel, since it would be difficult to continue the bomb- ing if Souvanna wanted it stopped. To meet such a contingency, in fact, the U.S. military has been drawing up secret, plans to halt the strikes against the trail-, and to make up for the loss with a satu- ration bombing campaign along the South, Vietnamese-Laotian border, concentrat- ing on the approximately 30 points where the terrain allows the North Vietnamese to use trucks and other heavy equipment. How effective that would be in chok- ing off the flow of Communist troops and equipment to South Vietnam, however, is open to considerable doubt. And should a peaceful settlement be bought in Laos at the expense of. the U.S. posi- tion in Vietnam, the result would be a. damaging setback for the Nixon Doctrine 2ablisitd/ii* : C IA-RDP80-01601 R000700040001 -3 23 111prch 1970 , Approved For Release 2001/03104: CIA-RDBMVail Laos: Old War/ New Dispute C XCEPT for occasional Communist Warren. Bush was "behind the lines,?.ernment, a peace proposal. It suggested L patrols that stole to within a few tan-I and therefore a victim only of "hos. talks obout a standstill cease-fire and a talizing miles of Luangprabang and tile enemy action"; most assuredly, War _conference of all Lao factions aimed at. Vientiane, there was little military move- ren said, he was not on a"combat restoring a new coalition government ment in Laos last week. Exhausted after operation," or in a "combat situation,r.. in Vientiane. There was, of course, one ? their defeat by Pathet Lao and North ? or "even in combat." Somehow', -of precondition: a U.S. withdrawal from _ Vietnamese troops on the Plain of Jars, course, Bush had won several deco-Laos. Premier Souvanna Phouma said ? General Vang Pao's U.S.-supported Meo rations, including a posthumous Silver that he was "ready for a cease-fire," guerrillas-retired into their mountains Star, for "gallantry in action." arid, :,, but, much to Washington's relief, he re- to rest and regroup. Almost nothing: his letters to his wife indicate (see fused to discuss even a U.S. bombing stirred on the ground in northern Laos, box, page 12), 'le would have been cessation until Hanoi agreed to withdraw - except for some 20,000 Meo, many of the last to ? say that he had not been its still pnacknowledged force of 67,000 -them families of Pao's warriors, who' in a "cornbat situation." troops (by White House accounting) in began "walking out" of their hillside en- In its eagerness to recoup the situ-.; Laos. These troops. of Course, wcrc ig- . chives towards the Thai border and rel- ation, the White House hurriedly r-e., norcd in the Pathet Lao proposal. ? ative safety from the new Conimunist?yealed that at least 26 American ci- ' The prince's public line comforted . push that they fear will come. Edgar' vilians had died one way or another in I Washington, but one high Administra- flii'iL U.S. aid coordinator in' the Laotian war. They included three: tion official cot:tresses that "we still don't Laos, estimates that disease or enemy ac-, members of the International Voluntary tion will take 20% of the Mco ref- Service, a Peace Corps-style group sup.? ugees during their 15-day march-by-, ported in part by the State Department. 'night, hide-by-day trek west. 1 The others worked for Air America Despite the lull, the conflict was stilt' the CIA's Asian airline. Moving fur- the object of fascination and contro- ther, the President ordered U.S. corn.: .vcrsy, not because of the agonies of mandcrs to report air and ground ca. the Laotians but because of new dip-. sualtics incurred from hostile enemy' lomatie maneuvering and the discomfort: action in the Laotian war separately .of the Nixon Administration. Instead: from the Viet Nam totals, in which of quashing congressional criticism of they had always been included. .the U.S. role in the war, the White- Had the Administration been caught, ?House's explanation of the extent and in a deception? Nixon had been gen- ; nature of the U.S. involvement in Laos uinely unaware of the killing of Cap. ?has only brought on a new dispute. tam n Bush, whose death had been lost Th Administration's troubles began i the intricacies of casualty bookkeep. c n weeks ago, with news of the military re- ing. Nonetheless, it has long been corn- . versal on the Plain of Jars. The reports mon knowledge that Americans, military provided an opening for war critics advisers and specialists, as well as ci- like Senator George McGovern, who vilins, have died in Laos under enemy: seized on B-52 rai'ds on the Plain to fire. The credibility flap provided a new,: charge that "we are going down the irresistible opportunity for congressional same road in Laos [as in Viet Nam], critics of U.S. Asian policy. The major and we are doing it in secret." Richard challenge came from J. William Ful- Nixon's response was swift and appar- bright, chairman of the Senate Foreign ently candid. On March 6 in Key 'Bis-Relation's?Committee. Last week, in an caync, he outlined the U.S. role ineffort to maintain congressional control Laos?never before admitted in detail over the Laotian war, the Arkansas Dem. by any Administration?as "supportive ocrat introduced a "sense of the Sen- and defensive." To emphasize the "urn-ate" resolution that the President could ited" nature of the U.S. role, he stated not employ ground?or air?forces in flatly that "no American stationed in Laos without "affirmative action" by Laos has ever been killed in ground coin-Congress. . ' bat operations." At a "backgrounder"' A Hard Choice. A popular and con- after the Nixon speech, a White House gressional argument over Laos is pre- aide said that all of some 400 Amer- cisely what the White House wanted to jeans killed, missing or captured in six avoid. Nixon promised at Key Biscayne years of war in Laos had been airmen. that there would be no commitment of As for "advisers," he asserted, their ca- U.S. ground troops to that country, : sualty rate "is zero." .but airpower is something else. A ma- last week ran Freelance Journalist Don , south on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. namese troops and supplies heading: bat deaths"? The Los Angeles Times y . 1 Case closed?or so the Administration jor reason that the U.S. is in Laos is to i and forcibly reopened. No "ground cothought. It was, however, immediately eon- out bombing raids on North Viet- rn- ' Trouble on Capitol Hill could se-, , Schanche's eyewitness account of the riously crimp the Administration's al. death of one U.S. military adviser, Cap- ready narrow room for maneuver in. tain Joseph K. Bush Jr.,. during an Laos?a fact that Hanoi and the Pa, enemy attack on a Laotian army com-i thct Lao seem to appreciate thoroughly. semantics. 'Nix- In an intriguing and unexpected dip. with Schanche's story, White pound in February 1969. Confronted' lomatic move, Prince Souphanouvong, aides sought safety in sem- House DeOggingra the Pathot Lao leader, last week of- on had bee. ? ed2160ifeeter Vante- houma. ea r o the t know what Souphanouvong may he tell- ing his half brother." Eventually, the gotian government could bend to Corn- unist pressure and ask the U.S. to stop the bombing. In that case, Wash- ington would face a hard choice. It could either risk a political outcry by continuing the raids, or it could stop the raids and risk giving the North Viet.. -..- namese the opportunity for still greater ' mischief in the big war next door. Bulletins from Bad Guy Land Captain Joseph Kerr Bush Jr., 25, the Texan whose death in Laos offi- cially did not occur in "a combat situ-. at ion," saw much action nonetheless. When he arrived in the country in June 196$ as an "assistant military attach? he was posted to Muong Soui, a key town now hi Communist hands. Bush's tour ended eight months later, when a force of 20 North Vietnamese coin- mandos attacked his hilltop compound, a camp ?hoitsing a group of Air Force radar specialists. The captain died fight- ing, and was awarded a posthumous Sil- ver Star. Bush's wile Carol, who lives in Temple, Texas, with her daughter, says that her husband "believed in what ; he 'vas doing." As his letters to her in- dicate. what Bush was doing and see- ing would not be unfamiliar to his coun- terparts in Viet Nam. Excerpts from the letters, made available to TIME by Mrs. Bush: 24 JUNE, '66. You asked how close Muong Soul is to Viet Nam?not close at all, but it is within sight of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. There is a war going on in *Laos, and it is difficult to tell who is fight- ing who. 23 JUNE, 'dB. The Lao government doesn't really control but about one-half the country, and they're having to fight for that. From mountain tops in my area I can actually see bad guy trucks rolling Olittailioretfilodatittffholm II I Orit. 1/ N:IpisyrsLEsar-Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0 SCIF:NFCTADY , N.Y. GAZETTE U ? 55,934 MAR 2 3 Iva CIA, Army Officers Re ported elping !Defend Laos Base )' VIENTIANE, Laos (Al') ? The U.S. Central Intelligence 1. Agency, the U.S. Army and neighboring Thailand are directly involved in defense of the threatened Laotian base, at Long ? Cheng, informed sources said Sunday night. * * ?x? 0.? i They said as many as 100 CIA: aerial' observers, gathering in. /agents, working under the cover. telligence on which to base tac- of the U.S. Embassy and the: tical ground and air operations. V ? U.S. Agency for International Sources said these Americans , Development (AID), are taking, never remain at Long Cheng ov- : part in the secret operation, ernight, but commute daily, ' training Meo tribesmen as guer.' leaving Vientiane early in the ' rillas in both Laos and Thai- 1 Morning and returning by dusk. land. ! It is a 45-minute helicopter It is known that U.S. Army of- . flight each way. ' , ficers directed a massive airlift ' * * * it of both Laotian and. Thai reipti "We wouldn't ,want the Corn- forcements into Long Cheng, munists to capture any Amen. which is the headquarters of ' cans or find any American dead " Gen. yang Pao's American- ? on the battlefield," one source trained army of Mea guerrillas explained. Most enemy attacks and is under heavy North Viet-. on Long Cheng are launched tin- ' namese pressure. R is locatedi der the cover of darkness: By GEORGE ESPER heighbors and both coUritries'i people have blood relations. Thet volunteers may be cousins 01'1 brothers of Laotians." Pressed on whether the airlift, of Thai Troops had taken place,; he said: "There may be some' truth in it." But he added: "As said, these men may be 'volun-f teers." 1 He also said some Laotian sol-I diers have "received training in! Thailand and returned to Laos? to be advisers and instructors in, the Laotian army." ' Gen. Surakit Mayalarb, Thai' army chief of staff, said no Thai! 1 80 miles north of the capital,. North ;Vietnamese hit the lase troops had been sent to Laos. just below the Plain of Jars,. Tr? , Surakit was reported to have, flown secretly to Laos twoi weeks ago for talks on the ,mili- tary situation with the Laotian. 'premier, Prince Souvanna! Phouma, and his generals. * it? *.? . now held by the North Viet- namese. In Bangkok the Thai premier,' ? Field Marshal Thanom Kittika-1 chorn, denied Sunday that two! Thai army battalions were sent! to reinforce Long Cheng but ad-! ? mitted that "some volunteers" ? may have gone there. Estimates in Bangkok of the number of volunteers, reported- ly being trained by U.S. Special ? Forces teams, range from 300 to :12,000. The figure mentioned t, most often Is 5,000. 1 .1 ? * * * , Sources in Vientiane said as ; many as 900 Thai troops, includ- ing an artillery detachment, ?' were flown into Long Cheng, r mostly from bases in Thailand. They added that the United States has been prodding the Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601.11/11111.3 UTICA, N.Y. PRESS 28,782 MAR 2 3 1970 STATI NTL Agnew gain Complahn About Media, Suggesting He Wants to Take Heat Off Vice President Agnew last week again attacked the news media, as though he /had found this to be his best topic and, therefore, is reluctant to drop it. Instead, it would seem that by now the country would be getting awfully sick of the re- petitive theme. ? ? ? THIS TIME, MR. AGNEW at least changed the locale of his complaint. Speak- ing to a Republican fund raising dinner in ? the Virgin Islands, he complained that the nation's news media was more anxious to attack our military presence in Laos than ? the Communists' having 67,000 troops there. "I'll admit that Pulitzers are not won as quickly exposing the evils of communism as they are by discrediting an American public official," the Vice President said. Mr. Agnew is sounding more and more like a run-of-the-mill politician trying to win notice by exaggerating and distorting. what he considers a popular theme. If he were just the sort of politician he sounds like, instead of fhe Vice President, his remarks probably would not deserve comment. But this country should 'be bet- ter served by a man in his high position. ? ? ? , IT IS HARD TO BELIEVE that Mr. Ag- ? new is not aware that the news media are more interested in our presence in Laos than the Communists' because the media are mainly concerned about our violations of treaties and our official deception. We agreed to the Geneva treaty that guaranteed the neutrality of Laos, yet we V have fighting men there, many as civilians under the CIA's cloak of secrecy. The NorlMeriamese are also violating the Geneva agreement, as the news media ? have reported. But naturally, immoral acts, ? such as treaty violations or Song My mas- sacres, by this country are of more' con- cern to this country's media. Presumably, if North Vietnam were a democracy, its media would be more con- cerned with its illegal acts than with ours. Mr. Agnew said also that "Innuendos and smears" against our public officials appear every day in the American media. Does he suggest that wrongdoing by our officials be glossed over, while the media concentrates on the crimes of North Viet- namese officials, over whom the voters of this country have no control? ? ? ? ? THE VICE PRESIDENT certainly must have a better understanding of our reason for having a free press even if he appar..I ? ently would like to curb that freedom. / a Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 THE WASpINGTON POST Approved For Release 2001/i9/9Api W-RDP80-016 STATINTL *Red Courier 'Takes Plan to Lao Premier By Laurence Stern Washington Post Staff Writ" i) (The Pathet Lao rcpresenta- VIENTIANE, March 22--. Owe also reportedly handed Premier Souvanna Phouma ,Souvanna two personal letters ' stepped gingerly along the from Souphanouvong, one urg- ' Laotian political tightrope lag the premier to resume today. talks aimed at reconstituting He received a Pathet Lao the government and ending the fighting, and the other ad- , emissary with a "proposition" qrom his half-brother, Prince dressed to King Savang Vat- thana, . pledging Souphanou- vong's fidelity to the monarch and urging him to use his in- fluence to end American inter- vention in Laos, The Los An- geles Tithes reported.) Souvanna's generals are known to be unhappy about the exchange ,of contacts be- tween the premier and Sou- phanouvong. For today's meet-, ing, the generals arrived just 35 minutes after the Pathet ? Souphanouvong, for settle- ment of the war. Then he , granted an amiable half-hour 'audience to his right-wing gen- eral staff. As though to buffer his con- tacts between right and left, Souvanna also called on King Savang Vatthana to transmit his half-brother's letter. ISouvanna said later that , North Vietnam has moved 13,- 000 additional troops into Laos Lao delegation had left. ' and the current Communist of-,, Among those present' were fensive could be the biggest Generals Kouprasith, corn- mancier of the region around Vientiane; Chief of Staff Oudon Sananikone; Com- mander in Chief Ouane Rathi- koune and Souvanna's mili- tary chief of ,cabinet, Thong- panh Knoksy. - As they filed out, Thong- paph said the meeting had been called to "examine the military situation". ; But it would have been most unlikely that the conversation failed to touch on the ex- change of communications be- tween the half-brothers who lead the opposing sides in the war. ? Highly placed Lao officials in private conversation are voicing concern that the coup ,Cambodia may increase North Vietnamese military pressures on the Laotian nor- tion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, apecially if the new Cambo- stability of Souvanna's govern- , (Ban government seeks to re- Meat. :, strict Communist use of its The Pathet Lao?in propos. section of the trail. als announced nearly two There has also been gossip weeks ago and presumably de-, ' ?I-discounted in official guar- tailed in the letter handed ters?of a possible coup by the right-wing Laotian generals on the Cambodian model. U.S. OV-10 light spotter plane was shot down yester- day over the Plain of Jars but the ? pilot escaped uninjured, the U.S. Command in Saigon Hanoi has ever launched in the . neutralist nation, UPI reported. . [The premier made the re: , marks in an address commem- ? orating the 20th anniversary . a the Laotian army Monday.) .Contradictory accounts were being circulated over the status of the battle for the ' strategic base of Long Tieng, i' operated by the Laotian .gov- i etnment and the CIA.' , 1 :The most reliable intelli- , gence indicated that the battle i was still in progress, with the base in government hands and i reinforcements being rushed j in from the south. Newsmen are being confined to Vienti- ane, where there are no relia- ble reports from either Lao- tian or American authorities. ! Within the administratiVe, capital,. the two chief concerns are the outcome of the new peace probe and ,the political over today by the Communist ' emissary?have raised the pos- sibility of a cease-fire based on the withdrawal of Amer-- 'can troops and cessation of the American bombings. But they kale made noaom it- ment itkif0 &art the estimated 50,000 to 67,000 North Vietnamese troops said T.n.? ; RDP80-01 601 R0100700040001 -3 NEW yora TIUS 3TATINISL Approved For Release 200g/21.1911 f99A-RDP8o-u1 6 .-,-; antiwar sentiment and negotii; it suspects a political rather than' .more than 40,000 troops from, . . . Indochin. a ,., tions positions of the United a military pur.pose. The North. his soil, it was hoped' that he ? States, And calculating that a Vietnamese already hold the cru- might have some effect. . Communist victory in Vietnam cial Western half of Laos that , His argument was that If the' Dpminoes . , is no longer inevitable, the hard-. provides a supply line into South North Vietnamese refused to* ? pressed anti-Communist army Vietnam and they gain few ma- budge, his impatient army, Na. . Are Falling ... leaders of Cambodia were em.- ? terial advantages from a wider tional Assembly and provincial ,. boldened to overthrow their occupation. ; leaders might seize power and; o move closer to the "American" . , oscillating Prince and may now, But by frightening the Thais But Which help "win" the war .by harassing , . and American opponents of war I camp. and evicting the menacing North The Prince is still not dis- ;trying to strengthen their hand' , in Asia, they are thought to be 1 counted here as a force in Cam- Vietnamese forces on Cambodian i for two possible kinds of nego?', b.sodaiatinonpodloiteiscsn, obtusthathree Senator. ... .* soil. . tiation. First, a tacit deal under ;:i tr 1 which the United States witarld ' Mike -Mansfield's view that his The gloomy view, advanced , downfall would be a terrible; ? . less openly but ,with almost l' call off the intensive bombing disaster. equal vigor, ran about as ,of the Ho Chi Minh supply trail There is fear that Hanoi might WASHINGTON?While off in follows: 'through Laos. Second, a better provoked by the coup into Moscow and Peking trying to get , While biding its time and bet- : deal in a wider Indochina nego-. be further encroachments on Cam- North Vietnamese troops thrdwn. ting on the failure of "Vietna-?? if , . tiation than they may provoke', bodian territory, leading to a ? out of his country, Prince Noro- mization," Hanoi has been ,. ."Vietnamization" should de-, for; wider conflict in which the ? dom Sihanouk finds himself, . shrewdly building up its mill- vel" into a viable policy St 'through h i Vietnameset, the ArmyT.nited staatensd, thrown out of power instead. At ,. tary, political and psychological.' Washington and Saigon. , posi ions inboth Laos anCam-, 1.. t' ? L d - To offset these thrusts, the 'might become involved But. least, he appears to be thrown .1 ? out. boclia. The inexpensive but wor. Nixon Administration attempted there 'also ? ' ere was a lingering hope His successors, led by Lieut. ..' risme advance through Laos .senrAl parries. .The most 'thatim... with a more determined' shocks the Thais and shakes the', Portant was designed to quash antih-Communist regime in Pnom-. Gen. Lon Nol, assume the Prince's, , goals of neutrality and independ- ' antiwar lions in the United! .the ...signs of new antiwar pro- 'vend. , the ground,forces of Cam- ence, suspend civil rights, obtain . States from their enforced sleep.' test, by explaining the extent :bo ia and South Vietnam, sup-' an expression of automatic rec- The gradual build-up of North: of American involvement in Laos' ;ported by American air power, ognition from the United States, Vietnamese ? encampments in ., and also by setting clear limits , !could effectively deprive Hanoi's' and lend a willing hand to eager , Cambodia?as near ?as 35 miles' ;t9 it. form of their Cambodian sane. South Vietnamese troops who ' 1.to Saigon?promises a major in-. B-52 Raid tua. , ? . ; 6* ? ? .'' r ' ? ''??-? ''?:;! . ;.-IVIAX FRANICEL want to fire artillery, into the. vasion after the bulk of the , Against the better judgment ; 't ?-? ?? , ... - ?,......1?,........................... ,..x....i ? ranks of the North Vietnamese , American forces are withdrawn''- , of most of his advisers, Presi- and Vietcong across their border from the war. The demonstra- with Cambodia. tion of Washington's inability to i dent Nixon last month also or- ! dered one B-52 bombing raid , The North Vietnamese and' repel the threat, will prove be . Pathet Lao troops. In northern yond doubt that the United ' beyond the Ho Chi Minh Trail," ' Laos, meanwhile, continue their'. States cannot long assure the by way of saying that Hanoi ' , , was . inviting greater bombing ; slow advance into portions of the stability of Southeast Asia. rather than less with its offen-'i . country they have not hitherto The risks an'd opportunities in.,sive. It is recognized through- ? ccupied. The little MO army the situation seemed in such del-1 'out Washington, however, that 1 organized by the Central Intelli- icate balance that most analysts ; the 'only effective military re-, gence Agency abandons yet an- found it safest to accept par-; sponse to Communist advances':.,;? other outpost to them, but the tions of both theories. I. in Laos would be a resumption: C.I.A. begins to ferry in at least of bombing in North Vietnam? I ? one battalion of regular Thal' Official Consensus , , a move that is so far deemed . troops from nearby nervous . It thus remains ? something . to carry greater risk 'of disaf-.? ? Thailand. The White House says . the Thai involvement is "limited.PI close to the official consensus ' ?fection at home than the mill-4. here that the progressive trans- tary value in the war zone. Two Views ' fer of combat duties to the South , Then came the coup in Cam-1 Vietnamese forces is working bodia. Most officials here were i . ? No one here doubts any longer well, that it will permit further surprised, though they were not; that the Indochina dominoes are large troop withdrawals this at -all displeased, by - the over- i . toppling fast, but hardly anyone . spring and summer and that lia-', throw of Prince Sihanouk. He was' can reliably tell which way. . noi, while no doubt hoarding its valued as a shrewd though diffi-l? The cheerful view in Govern- resources for a major effort aft- cult figure on the Indochina. ment last week went something . er the Americans depart, should 1 scene and regularly looked to as; .like this: , be in sufficient doubt about the.. akind of weathervane of Airier-. The allied position in South final outcome to consider serious ' , lean performance. When he re-. ? Vietnam keeps improving .even negotiation as a possible alter-. mulled diplomatic relations with: as American troops continue to native to continued war. Washington last summer, it was. be withdrawn. Confronted by the Developments in , Laos are i taken as confirmation that things, apparent success of "Vietnami- therefore assessed accordinglY.1 in Vietnam were looking' zation," North Vietnam must Washington is plainly distressed! When he. took off for Mosc up.' that Ha. Moscow. ' take out its frustrations In Lao, to find tho Communist 'armies'. and Pelt* t demand threatening a further advance , moving farther across that littlo' noi . b ling cti ? . thero ,tf),. try ,.to,,stilLeti. up .tho:, kingdom than ow before, 'buto ' I' c?re '''it4I'd.""64 Approved for Release 2001/03/04 : CIA7RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 COP Available Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 Appcoved-FerRelease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 ST. LOUTS, TIO. POST-VISFATCH E - 345,675 S 581,591 MAR 22 1970 ..A.511"Aina. STATINTL 4,1., 7 V CI: ititainig..es'U.S. Forces: 1:y. RICHARD 11/01)111AN wvishingtoit Of Om Pnet.liiepritels WASHINGTON, March 21 AFTER YEARS of .saying It seeks no wider war fICCITiiited-State finds itself deeply involved in ti.V,Pcii?.?..,7 Iron': in Southeast Asia. What is mote, certain specific actions : by the United Slates Government are giv- - Mg impetus hi the expaenion of n conflict that already has cost dna conntry nun.? than 40,000 lives mid dtore than )00 billion dollars. The United States was the first nation to recognize the overthrow of Prince No- rodom Sihanouk, the erratically neutralist chief of state in Cambodia, although the .Department of State de-emphasized the ? action by saying that the change in goy- - eminent was constitutional and did not af- fect existing .U.S. recognition. . President Richard M. Nixon has ac- ,knowled;;ed and justified the open mill- . tarsi intervention in the war in northern , Laos, as well as the intensive U.S. bomb- 'iii;: of North Vietnamese supply routes . that lead through eastern Laos to South ? Vietnam. V Two Thai army battalions have been air / i iifterrby the United States to Long Cheng, ?, Laos, site of a Central Intelligence Agen- cy base threatened by, a North Vietnam. c-.e offensive that already has,tnken the Plain of Jars. Transportation was sup- plied by Air America, an airline operated by the CIA. TIIESE developments reflect the fact that the United Stable is embroiled In a (Ivimflict that has spread from Just South r.Vietnatn into much of the rest of South- . cast Asia, threatens to involve still other nations.of the region .and, critics Com-. ' plain, throws serious new doubt on the Nixon Adminietration's plan to get the United States oat of Vietnam, . In C a in ho d ii despite re formal an- nouncement by the stew leadera that the country would contimiC 'ts policy of new ?tralita%, tyro p s were reported in- frontier regiane where 40,000 to 5rono North Vietnamese soldiers have been. . seeking !.?, ill! t Vary from U.S. bombing raids is VI,. ewer. A sieriificarit qtrtiori is whether the new Cavil-a:filen gra eremeet will seek no. ''tively to push the North Viet no me a e, forces across the ramarked border and deny them Y-V1501011ed- for.Rele t-Tlowever, this raises the rirther guts'. tion whether Cambodia's 35;000-man army ? can do the job, even" with the occasional help it already has begun getting from South Vietnamese artillery along the bor- der. At some point there lies the possibility that Cambodia will ask for a renewal of the U.S. military aid that it accepted until 0. 1963. Informed sources say that indigenous paramilitary groups led by CIA agents, sometimes called White Star teams, have continued to operate in Cambodian fron- tier regions in efforts to check the flow of men and supplies along infiltration routes Into South Vietnam. THE SAME sources consider it unlike- ly, although not beyond possibility, that CIA agents and funds breved in the over- throw of Sihanouk. Cr ,'.. ig doubt on this possibility is the faet het there are only . 11 persons on the f.,a' of the U.S. Embas- sy at Phnom Pen:. F .al only four or five other American per. ument residents in the country. Sizable '..IA operations usual- ly are based in a i S. Embassy and re- quire large numbe.,a of resident Ameri- cans, Government officials and private citizens to provide "cover" for undercov- er ngents. ? ? Whether the United Stater; helped engi- 1 ;leer .Sihmiouk's overthrow, the develop- meld' there opens Cambodia as another possible ilIVF10. for the widening struggle for control of Southeast Asia, As a start- er', It presenteltn upp 'nullity to open an- other front against the North Vietnamese. Apparently President Nixon will face an eventual choice between helping?Cambod? la retain a role as a neutral buffer state or trying to coax it toward the role of military ally against North Vietnam, outside military intervention in Leos? by bath the United States and, the North Vietnarneeo--has been an open secret for veers. Each saw an advantage in with- holding public neknowledeement of its ac- tivities in Lana and in seeking to maintain the form if tint the substance of the 1962 C A RECENT dispatch ti ern Vientiane by Ian Wright of the Manchester Guardian shed new light on what was going on in the Plain of Jars in 1901 and 151;3, when the Communist Pathet L. a, and it; North, Vietnamese allies held the area tuelth Ii nited State8 was conducting "recon-\ naissaece' flights" over the plain, ostensi- bly to gather evidence?of Conimunist vio- lations of the 1962 agreement.. ? Wright spoke at length with refutTes from the area who laid been evacinted last 'multi, from the path of the Contain- 'nisi advance. "Th say that they are now happy would be an overstatement, but they appear to he prolnundly relieved," hi' writes. "In et- feet, they have come out of hell; Their ? , , hell was not the overweeniag Pathet Lao , regime, which they found onerous enough , and disliked, but the continent's atell of the bombing?most of it by American jet ! aircraft. "They lived on the cast side of the Plain of Jars, and since 1965 they have.. been subject to raids. In 1961 and 39691 the. raids got worse. In the last months before., they Were 'liberated,' they were com- pelled to live in caves, hardly daring to , 'come out into the daylight for fear of the bombing." ? . WRIGIU concludes thn. the villagers' alumina; completely dis1il-o/e4 tint U.S. r40r4 thettit aircraft made only armed reicietra ssanae tiat;lits at the request of the IWO Ireernment and fired only ! If fireciarpoe. ? . Thailai. !'s Vt, '7:lat In the war is not a new de ve 'ear. ( it is becoming more open. L"ia '.e. "at 'ears, there was no official wm. ths U.S. air bases in Thailand were :ne raids on North! Vietnam and the fie C?"1 Minh trail. When . it was ,revealed that 'I ...it artillery and communications units were dreseed in Inatian army abitin?nis and moved across the Mekong Illaibr to fight in Laos, the re- obit was ilenied by' the That government id *Amy of indignation., ItPSAILPVIWTOMP 01601R000700040001-3 , Approved For Release apyallai ? co Der', 22 March 1970 ? 0-016?1RC ,7 G p' Over :Secret Casualties ? By Patrick J. Sloyan Washington Bureau WASHINGTON ? To stra- ? Logic planners, Laos is not a country. It is a weakly defended corridor for Chinese or North. Vietnamese troops seeking the prizes of Southeast Asia ? Thailand,: Cambodia, South Vietnam. ''But to Americans there now or who have served there in the past, Laos seems more a comic opera where the names of leaders have a burlesque flavor and the sol- diers tend to aim high in hopes the enemy will return the favor. To some critics of Presi- dent Nixon's current Laotian policy, the Oregon-size land- locked country is the breed- ing ground for another mili- tary commitment like Viet-. nam. The alarm has been sound- ed by those in Congress who have been watching U.S. in- volvement in Laos for more than 12 years. "Up to our necks" in Laos, according to Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield. But finding out what is really going on in Laos is no simple thing, as the Presi- dent will tell you. His Key Biscayne statement aimed at curbing growing American concern about Laos was di- luted by inaccuracy. 'Inaccurate' "No American stationed in Laos had ever been killed in ground combat operations," Nixon said. Despite careful word'ng to avoid deaths of Americans from the air war over Laos, the flat assertion proved inaccurate. Newspapers were quick to report that more than 12 Americans had been killed in overran a rent tvic 15C8 wheA Laos that helped bombing raids on North Vietnam. The debate over Nixon's statement and some White House back-pedalling tended to cloud one of the most de- tailed accounts ever of U.S. involvement in Laos. ' Of the 1040 Americans in . Laos gett in g U.S. govern- ment money, 320 are civilian and military personnel en- gaged in a military advisory or training activity, Nixon said. Another 323 are what Nix- on called "logistic" person- nel. "There are no American ground combat troops in Laos," he said. While it does not 'seem like Much, Nixon 's disclosures were substantial, considering Laos is a "secret" war for the United States. ? At the Def ense Depart- ment, briefings for newsmen on Laos are nonexistent. Trying to hurdle the Wash- ington barrier by going to Laos has been fruitless. Handout Battles ' From Vientiane last week, Washington reporter James McCartney said everything was classified, even Nixon's statement on Laos. "If re- porters demand to go places and see things, they don't get far. Not without an ,escort. Some even have been arrest- ed." Pentagon reporter Fred Hoffman of the Associated Press recalled his stay in Laos. "I never met anyone who had seen a battle in In September, a Commu- nist-striking force of 3500 /; troops began an offensive, overrunning eighty villages in Northern Laos. In Decem- ber, the first 'U.S. Military ? Advisory Group arrived in Vientiane. It was disguised as the - "programs evaluation o f f- ice" (under the State Depart- , ment's AID pro gram) to , skirt charges of violating the I Geneva accords. Between 200 and 300 Amer- ican military men, under ,the command of Brig. Gen. John A. Heintzes, were dropped from the active lists of the Defense Department to serve, as the civilians in Laos. These American soldiers In civvies wer e training the 'Royal Laotian Army to han- dle attacks by Communist- connected Pathet Lao forces and North Vietnamese! , troops. ? U.S. military advisers are not having much success. 1 The trouble is the "live-1 and-let-live" attitude of Lao- tian troops who, according to U.S. soldiers, are "about as bloodthirsty as an American Boy Scout." The 1962 Laotian agree- ment barred future foreign ,military involvement, it was promptly ignored by North Vietnam. Central Intel.: tence Agency (CIA) activities I increased. Along with the Green Beret I Special Forces of the Army,' CIA employes use undeter- mined amounts of money, Laos. As far as reporters ,equipment and time to im-? were concerned, these bat- prove the quality of Laotian ties were fought by handout forces. statements from opposing As the war started to build forces." in Vietnam, it tended to slow: . in Laos dates back to 1054 raids on Laos were aimed at U.S. military involvement in Laos. Most U.S., bombing: ' and the final loss of face by Hanoi supply ?lines to South the French at Dien Bien Phu :Vietnam. Btit U.S. training e l2&O 193oh 00A04411418044001,4R000700040001 -3 colonialrole a e n aos, it - ? u? - was replaced by U.S. mili- tarv aid. STATI NTL .-----, ! ' assume that Prince Norodom Silia? \--- Donk'', overthrow was just a lucks' a:eistatt for the United States. Way hack in 1966, the agency ? was accused by some watchdog " Anwrican Seniors of supporting ? Cambodian rebels w ho opposed the . Prince ? an accusation that was widely trumpeted about South-East .. ?Ada, where the C.I.A. is credited with having spies in every town and In eery Government. ? It probably does. ? While the super-spy agency has made 2rOteccinc mistakes over the past lo 'cars, it has also scored isome brilliant successes and, under . the enthusiastic support of Presi- dent Nixon, C.I.A. director Rich- ard Helms and his world-wide net- work of spies arc doubtless more powerful than ever. Charges that they had meddled far too much in Asian polities cued the C.I.A. men to lie low 1 for some time, hut it was obvious i even to a reporter on a brief visit ; to South-East Asia this month that : the C.I.A. was "gung-ho" again. Transport nnd passenger V. plaoes or Air America lite., ; which is run as a C.I.A. sub- sidiary. are to be seen in Thai- --7?? '' land. Laos and South Vietnam, Approved For Release 2001/911/91:AgA-RUP130-10716.01 22 mar 1970 6.4 ,Cr""7=47. 4.1.1.4.Z.X..117Lat," alaal A.A.% %a d 16?0111.1,01d411111, '771 li 1.4 co r aft CY ET t,110.? L.r41.711471.171 of Injirkiril ' C"'" ii)67C1 ti47?10.) 11ares %a 'a el) fiardtme? C. I. ai? iEs boa =a7=3:nii AFTER several years of wait, ing in the shadows? Ameri- ca's Central Intelligence Agency may be fully operational again. This week's incredible coup in Cam- . whiat will have such far-reaching con- , sequences throuQh the entire Asian theatre, had the stamp ol the C.I.A. at ils most pro- fessional. Of course, there will be no DM- eat detail on the C.I.A. rule. hut it would he naive in loday's world to 11 ? ? . ..0,704-1:11, ? ?;1?1??? . ? ? ?????;eir".? .1; ? 4:t4;ig 4 111,4_ .4. 74+1040 ? 4474, I ? a. b,, ? t ????(,,,e?*. '.+10,"4" :,??,? ? ?? A M., ?*i^ ,?1 ""??"04.,., '1r? , ? , : ' , ? tf",??? * -t; 0.!", g".11."."' ? ?MA. ?frii! ' ? t ? -'?;',???J ?.??';V:L ? , r ? C.I.A. chief Richard Helms ? more powerful . than ever ?;?' . ? ? . STATINTL IN????????moommowimum'immaillo; From PETER M1CHELMORE in New York and it is common knowledge that titeat aircraft are used to more anent', and weapens ft MON PribleCts? . '? ? Approved For Release 2001/03/04 ;.,CIALR,D980L016ortk0007cfedittoet-3 TiE WASIIINGTON POST Approved For Release 2001/03/04 ? CIAIIIAFiVA1 2 2 MAR 157u Laos: War in 1\orth, Par By Laurence Stern Wsshington Post Foreign Service mained publicly silent. He VIENTIANE, March 21 may not remember too kindly k Communist troops today took the deposed Prince Sihanouk's ? bes of control of the important gov- ji at him as a 'puppet" ernment supply base of sam the "American imperialists." i'.Thong and advanced within a There have been ,some ru- I mile of Long Tieng, headquar- mors of 'a "CambOdian solu- + ters of Gen, yang Pao's clan- tion" in Laos by the right , ; destine army of Mco ,tribes-J wing, and one press service to. ? men. night reported that Souvanna' But as news of the Commu- has moved a special Unit of nist's successes reached Vien- troops into the capital to ward tianc, a formation of Royal Lao off a rumored coup. soldiers paraded on the Boule-? But a 'spokesman for Sou- yard of a Million Elephants vanna denounced the report as 'here to the somber strains of completely false and insisted the French Foreign Legion on a retraction. Well-informed march. They were rehearsing observers here' are highly for Monday's Army Day eele- skeptical of any Such move on brations. the part of rightist leader This was one of the small Prince Boun Oum. ironies of the muddled state of Laos and Cambodia t affairs in Laos today. Rumor ? .?,and speculation hung like the "The attitude now is to rally f' pervasive dry season haze round the flag," said one over the capital where, as one knowledFable foreigner. ; t foreign diplomat put it, "It is not a case of Laos be- "things are confusing enough coming 'Cambodia," said an- when they are quiet." ; other long-time resident." It is As a counterpoint to the a case of Cambodia becoming military action, a new install- ? meat began unfolding today in ' the peace probe?the first in , more than four years?be- tween Pathet Lao and govern- ment forces. ? ; An emissary arrived last night with a letter from Pa- , thet Lao leader Souphanou- ? vong to ? his half brother, _ de in, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, with supposedly con- crete proposals for a settle- .rnent. Dramatic Arrival ? The arrival of the emissary, .Col. Pradith Thiengthan, by ;air from Hanoi, came off as a stagey piece of international' melodrama. ? Although the contents of the letter he carried in a brief- case remained secret, highly placed government officials here were reported to be pes- simistic over the immediate prospects for negotiation. Still, the fact that the two sides are finally in contact holds out some long-term hope. Last year Souphanou- vong spurned a peace-feeler from Souvanna transmitted !Vve.f?.1P,Stqcik.4ong, Tiara and4 through Soviet Ambassador, Victor 1Winin. The impact of the coup in, darnhodia is still another im- , ponderable in this volatile' mix. Souvanna was said to ho! privately pleased at the devel_L- opment Apporweel6oreRelease 2001/03/04 : C , ? Sam Thong, the abandoned U.S.-operated supply base 10 miles to the northwest.] If Long Tieng falls, as it may in the mit week, it would be a serious blow, both I "There are no Thai troops in to the prestige of Gen. yang 'Laos," authoritative sources in Pao and to the war effort, Vientiane said, backed up by a since the base houses an air- strip and the elaborate com- munications center that is used for air strikes and ground operations against the Communist forces. Sleep Elsewhere American Army and Centra Intelligence Agency advisers assigned to Long Tieng have stopped sleeping in the town during the past week to avoid . the risks of death or capture. Should the base fall, the Meo general would have to fall back and establish 'a new command :Center. But it would by no-meatts end the desultory war that has see-sawed across was called to a government of- 'Laos for nearly 20 years. fice and asked who his sources The government has moved of information were. He re- in reinforcements, however ,fused to name the sources, the ' ' AP said and the government South simultaneous statement from Bangkok. Laotian officials admitted there were some Thal military officers in Laos but said they had been sent there as advis- at the request of the Leo- n government. The denials followed press reports Friday that two battali Ions of Thai troops were at the - base. They were flown there, ? *, `? ???-- by Air America transport' planes, sources said. - The Associated Press, which; initially reported the presence' of Thai troops, said yesterday its correspondent in Vientiane Cr Laos." .; and the outcome of thd battle: then denied the report, add- : of Long Tieng has by no' jag, "A warning will be made The military.' situation, ? means been decided yet. to the representative of the meanwhile, is highly decep- Meanwhile the state of af- Associated Press." ? tive. With the exception of the fairs in Laos was best summed battle-at Sam Thong and Long'. up by the ? cable one corre- Tieng, there is very little war spondent here received from in progress at the Moment. his home office. "Don't bother Many encounters between filing," it said. "The story is. Communist and government too confusing." . ? reported?often turning, upon, Nations Deny Thais' I The Thai volunteers there I are of Laotian stock, speak ti int troops are being grossly over-, ' Being Used in Laos .! Lao and once in Laos would examinaon, o minor k sirm-I i men. ? From News Dispatches . be indistinguishable from a ishes between handfuls of' . Laotian soldier, Bangkok . The chief casualties of the ' 'Both the Laotian and Thai sources reported. ? war at the moment are the: governments yesterday denied more than 40,000 villagers who i reports that Thai troops had, Thai volunteers' pay, re-; are being evacuated from the been sent as reinforcements to, ported to be met by the U.S. I vicinity of Sam Thong and: the Laotian s.hase at . Long government, ranges up to $250: Long ',hong by foot in the face! TOntif? ...%..'......', :?:1/41?;,:..e.%?,.....,?,-...1:..,,;. a month, compared with nor- of the Communist advance. ,i ' mal pay of $6. The volunteers' Attack Long Tieng , reportedly resign from the Thai army and then are said, [North Vietnamese forces at- to be trained by U.S. Special tacked Laotian government' Forces before being sent in positions today on Skyline units to Join up with the Lao-. Ridge, about two miles north, army.. of Long Tieng, the Associated, One source in Vientiane, P'ress reported. . . : ,[Long ? Tieng is . 80 miles According to AP, soldiers in the tlai 2d Army in northeast Thailand have been volunteer- ing for duty in Laos in large numbers. _ . ? nort:h of Vientiane. The ridge , a. ' said the arrivals from Thai- land included Thai artillery- .men. While never officially confirmed, Thai artillerymen were reported to have en% gaged in the battle for Muong Soul at the western edge of the Fhtin of Jars list June. IA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 9 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 BIRMINGHAM, ALA. NEWS MAR 2i 1970 E - 179,129 S ? 219,530 The' STATI NTL ig Lie In Asia Sen. Fulbright, in his usual broad- minded approach to such questions, iI said right away that he was willing to assume "on general principles" ' that the American .LLA,.Liad a hand In the Cambodian developments. Others in the American peace bloa made it sound as if, because an anti- Communist government seems to have taken over, the cause of peace has suffered a setback, for which ? U. S. militants are to blame (or at ; least will applaud). . ? Similarly, in Laos, they view with alarm the U. S. involvement there and ' try to make it seem that we have , launched an aggressive campaign to control the country?while they rarely Aeknowledge the long-atanding, presence of thousands of North Viet- namese soldiers in Laos in violation ? of the Geneva accords, and never point out that our involvement in 'Laos is directly in response to re- :? quests by the legitimate 'Laotian , government, which is fighting for its life. We are most reluctant to tag critics of U. S. policy as un-American?but some go beyond the bounds of honest? 'criticism. It is impossible to conclude. ? anything but that their activities are ? anti-U. S. national interest, and to ' assume that since they know better, their distortion of the facts underly- ing U. S. involvement and activities ? in Southeast Asia is deliberate. , Moreover, they accuse the U. S. of refusing to , negotiate seriously at Paris, when the truth is , . . well, listen to this from this week's session' of the peace t,alks. The North Viet - mese delegate Is sneaking: ? ? 'OA ,C :long, time, nothe United , States has continually acted to in ( timidate and violate (Cambodia' sovereignty and its territory in the ' hope of sapping its independence and neutrality." The truth is that the Viet Cong and North Vietnam have literally occupied portions of Cambodia for, years, using the areas as sanctuaries for their aggression in South Vietnam?this is the very issue Cambodians riote ? about last week, sacking the North Vietnamese and V. C. embassies and eventually bringing about the ouster of Sihanouk. "The United Sates is thus aiming r; to make Cambodia into a second Laos or South Vietnam. It is perfectly or that the Nixon administration, ; in order to save the defeat in Viet- ? nem, is not only escalating in La03, but is seeking moreover to expand 1 the war to the entire Indochinese ;1 peninsula, thus gravely threatening peace in all Southeast Asia." ? Get that. The U. S. is escalating the war in Laos. The fighting there is the result?the whole. world knows this, and it is inconceivable that mem- ; ; bers of the United States Senate don't know it?of North Vietnamese armed ? invasion of Laos, which the legitimate '?? government of Laos is resisting. ? How can you talk, much less nego- ? tiate with people who brazenly, with, out batting an eyelash, turn the truth around 180 degrees and swear by it? The bitterest pill of all ..is that some influential people in our own country, wittingly or unwittingly, encourage ? .them by. leading people to believ that their bare-faced lies about th ? United States of Ain, oriSsea a11eged, r"imPeFhnisqITI7trui? , Approved For Release 2001/03104: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 . - ..1?? I ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ???-? Approved For Release 2001/Mir:v166(12RDP80-01601R00 2 1 MAR 1970 STATINTL rOF CIA AGNT, PoING A AGENc VEVELoPmENT MEMaERs AIZE RECRUITING ,K TWANG TROOP6 IN LAoS kutiln5P5 ESGS Y FOR INTERNATIoNAt. 7141,, il,"ti? REmEMBERt. IF ANVoNE ASKS, I'M AN AGR(CULITRAL ADVISOR Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001ifitioedA-RDP80-01601R01111 2 1 MAR 1970 I irt, 0 E'qii Li 13S far !LID .? Daily World Foreign Department Peace proposals from the Lao Patriotic Front were brought last night to Vientiane "Royal Lao'? capital, by LPF Col. Pradit. Thi- engthcm, whose plane reached the heavily-guarded Wattay Air- port near Vientiane as small LPF patrols were reported about five miles away. Co. Pradit was greeted by Col. Soth Petrasy. the LP' representa- tive in Vientiane. Pradit was the first LPF offi- cial to make a public visit to the 1 Lao capital since 1963. when the U.S. CIA sabotaged the coalition government and drove the :LPF out. Only a small LPF delega- tion under Col. Soth remained in Vientiane under conditions re- sembling permanent siege. LPF troops were reported to LI raiT? Dir3 CI? cll Ll?171C] Lib 11= C" 'COS witnin two miles oi Long Cheng, headquarters for the CIA- supported clandestine army of General yang Pao. The battle for LongCheng shaping up could de- termine control of northeast Laos. Long Cheng's sister base of Sam Thong. six miles to the northeast, reportedly was recap- tured yesterday by CIA forces, but later reports said no planes could land there because its air- port was under fire. CIA rein- forcements pouring into the Long' Cheng-Sam Thong, area, 75 miles northeast of Vientiane, were de- scribed by a UPI correspondent as "mercenaries trained in Thai- land." The LPF radio earlier broad- cast peace proposals by Prince Souphanouvong, head of the LPF Central Committee, which called n- a halt to U.S. bombing and a ,eneral cease-fire in Laos. Cambodia events Saigon. puppet Lieutenant- t?:;eneral Do Cao Tri gloated on TV yesterday, that "Communist" forces will be "annihilated" in Cambodia, and said the Cam- bodian National Assembly's oust- of Prince Norodom Sihanouk - ',is chief of state this week will prove "very beneficial." 'Lt.-Gen. Tri commands the Saigon forces in the 11 provinces bordering Cambodia. Sihanouk is still in Peking arta has said nothing further about his vow last ? Tuesday to return to Cambodia even if he faces arrest. The new governmerst of armed forces commander General Lon Nol said yesterday: "Our army must suppress by armed actions all methods which Sihanouk could provoke in attempting to make use of the legality which he no longer has." " ? ? Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital, is still full of heavily- armed troops, and at least five tanks surrounded the National As- sembly building. The Assembly suspended, the Cambodian con-. stitution Thursday and grant- ed "full power" to Gen. Lon Nol. Cheng Heng, the pro-U.S. mil- lionaire acting as head of state, will be confirmed in office to- morrow by the Assembly. The third member of this triumvirate is Prince Sink Matik, a deputy premier who is a member of the rival Sisowath branch of the Cam- bodian royal family. Gen. Lon Nol is known as .a conservative, pro-U.S. officer who worked closely with the U.S. mil- ? itary mission- ?in Cambodia in 1955-43. - ? '? . ' Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160 NATIONAL JOURNAL 21 Mar 1970 rap in Cans: The Senate Foreign Re: lations Committee March 13 met in closed session to receive a briefing on the Agency for International Devel- opment mission in Laos from Central Intelligenc.e Agency Director Richard M. Helms. ? STATINtL Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP.80-01601R000700040001-3 ? STATI NTL Approved For Release 2064/1/91MRDP80-016011 ??????????? A Washout 'I'AId . for development does not usually buy depend- able friends," remarked the Lester Pearson commission, which World Bank president McNamara had set to studying the problems of poor countries. It can even i. lose them, for instance by being a cover for the CIA; \i in Laos, CIA men pass as the Agency for International Development's "Rural Development Annex." President Nixon's own commission on foreign aid, appointed last September, ignores such unpleasant facts but does propose dismantling AID and replacing it with a new US development bank and other ' new institutions, topped by a coordinating International Development Council with a high-level chairman in the White House. What would be achieved thereby is hard to say. The Pearson report wanted aid increased to achieve a six percent annual growth rate for developing coun- tries. The Peterson Report - Rudolph A. Peterson is president of the Bank of America and 'could be the aid man in the White House - is coy about both funding. and targets. Its proposals could be a first step toward Senator Fulbright's goal of internatidnalizing foreign aid; on the other hand the report upholds bilateral aid, and says tartly that "the international organizations will have to take a less parochial view of their . mission." Senator Fulbright has condemned bilateral aid for "becoming a vehicle for deep American involvement in . areas and issues which lie beyond both our vital inter- ests and our competence." The Peterson report says a chief barrier to development is "unresponsive social and political systems." But by this it doesn't seem to mean - the Thieu regime, Chiang Kai-shek, or Greek and Latin American juntas. The. report expects that military aid to that sort of regime will go up not down, and it proposes bigger loans to Latin America even while admitting that these countries have what it delicately calls "a capital outflow" - the top fellows stash their boodle in ,Swiss accounts. The US is providing as much development aid as all other assisting countries lumped together. Addition- ally, US military aid runs almost $3.5 billion a year, including Vietnam, and the report says that "as the United States reduces its forces overseas, Increased . security assistance may be needed for a time, to cushion ' the effect and to improve local security capabilities." What that could mean can be measured by the yard- stick of what, according to the report, happens now: Washington not only provides the arms but pays for their operation and maintenance; in addition "US military missions do most of .the detailed logistical planning . . ." Does the Peterson report request Mr. Nixon forthwith to butcher the sacred animal? On the contrary, it objects to Congress's attempted curbs on I FIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 United States in. a better position to work out with those countries, on a mature parnership basis, military equipment expenditure policieL, . ." Peterson is going to be a very popular fellow in Athens, Rio de Janeiro and Bangkok. Still,' the bleaker side has to be faced up to. The report concedes that developing countries are neck- deep in debt and that some of this can be blamed on "excessive military purchases." The debt actually adds up to a staggering $50 billion, and the cost of merely servicing it is increasing thrice as fast as the debtors' , earnings are rising. So far, the problem has been kicked under the rug by "rescheduling .the debt of countries about to default," in other words not embarrassing them by asking for the Money. Fearing this can't go ? on, the report suggests as a partial answer further doses of lending but on softer terms, by the proposed US International !Development Bank, using appropriated -money to subsidize its loans. There is a better recipe: ruthlessly pruning credit for arms, and handing the American foreign aid contribution to the World Bank, its International Development Association, and other such international financial bodies. I Approved For Releasen20011013= : CIATFelPtil-01 6 21 Mar 1970 The Nixon Watch did, with his one and on peace in Laos. ? 7 ---i-rc,--7(---- J.--,, 7 Much thought also went into the form of the an- C.? .L. nouncement and the extent to which Nixon would per- sonally identify himself with 'it. He could have deliv- Enormous care and effort went into the preparation of. ered the whole on national television, as he did his the "precise description of our current activities' in, November 3 speech on Vietnam. He could have record- Laos" that Mr. Nixon submitted to the American pub- cd and filmed parts of it for radio and television, as he / lic on. March 6. He got the assent of the National , v Security Council to a degree of disclosure that he and sometimes does with quite minor statements. He did - two of his predecessors, Presidents Kennedy and John-. neither. He postponed the statement until .he had_ar - son, had not previously considered to be in the na- rived and was settled at his Florida retreat on Key tional interest. Nixon then assigned to his assistant for Biscayne for a long (Friday-Sunday) weekend. He national security affairs, Henry A. Kissinger, the task remained in seclusion when his staff issued a written of making certain that the disclosure was in fact pre- statement in his name and followed it with the kind of special, though by now hardly unusual, background sible criticism on the grounds of inaccuracy or deceit. . cise if not complete, wholly credible, beyond any pos- briefing at which reporters are exposed to the guidance ' a Kissinger undertook the task with characteristic and and wisdom of the highest available "White House of- ferocious zeal. He warned the Departments of State ficials." The reporters present are not supposed to Jand Defense, the military services, the CIA, the aid translate this into "White House official," but some do. agency, the several subagencies that participate in The central purpose of the statement and of the clandestine operations in Vietnam and Laos that the supplementary briefing was to put to rest "grossly in- officials who provided him With requested data, would accurate" reports and "intense public speculation" to : be fired if any of the information turned out to be in- the effect th# "the United States involvement in Laos complete, inaccurate or misleading in any way. Every has substantially increased in violation of the Geneva American who could be fairly said to be "stationed in Accords, that .American ground forces are engaged in Laos" was to be identified, his or her activities were to combat in Laos and that our air activity has had the be precisely defined, and military operations, air and effect of escalating the conflict." Mr. Nixon acknowl- .ground, conducted in and over Laos were to be report- edged that "our air activity" has increased, both to in- ed to him in equally meticulous detail. Kissinger and hibit North Vietnam's reinforcement of its units in his staff had access to the secret testimony recently ?South Vietnam over the Ho Chi Minh trails through ' taken by Senator Symington's subcommittee on the northern Laos, and in direct support of Laotian govern- , ' Laos involvement, and took special care that the figures ment forces fighting North Vietnamese and Laotian ? and assertions of fact incorporated in the Nixon state- Communist forces in Laos. This the United States ment should conform with the Symington record, would continue to do, along with the supply, train- when and if a sanitized version of it is published. ing and field support of "regular and irregular Laotian Equal care attended certain corollaries. The one new forces" so long as this was "necessary to protect Amer- and positive action that the President and his advisers .jcan lives in Vietnam and to preserve a precarious could think of, apart from the factual disclosure, was but important balance in 'Laos" ? and also necessary, an appeal to Soviet Premier Kosygin to join British the President said, "to prevent the recognized Laotian Prime Minister Wilson in working with other signa- government from being overwhelmed by larger Corn- tories of the 1962 Geneva Accords for restoration of munist forces dominated by the North Vietnamese." the terms that then, in theory, guaranteed the peace But the major intent of his statement and of the brief- and neutrality of Laos. Wilson and Prime Minister ? er's amplification was to minimize the American in- ? , Souvanna Phouma of Laos had already made the same volvement in ground combat in Laos. Of a total of request, without effect. The United States had pre- 1040 Americans stationed in Laos, in direct govern- viously refused to formally join or support such re- ment employ, or on contract, 320 were military advisers quests to the Soviet Government, in connection with and trainers, 323 were suppliers, and (the briefer said) _ the Laos and Vietnam conflicts, in the belief that the alittle over 200 of these were military personnel. Soviets would refuse and that it was idle to waste what Three sentences in the Nixon statement drove home the point: "There are no American ground combat goodwill there was between Washington and Moscow on a predictably vain gesture. Given the present deci- . troops in Laos. We have no plans for introducing round combat forces into Laos," and ? in an assertion sion to make the gesture, the normal course would g have been to forewarn the Soviet Government of the that Kissinger had worked hard and carefully to docu- public announcement. This was not done before the ment beforehand ? "No American stationed in Laos morning of March 6 because, if. the request had been. has ever been killed in ground combat operations." privately rejected before it was announced, the Presi- This was Nixon's only reference to American casual- dent couAlWilickvPiipEceE Be haasetaNadinIC4 il :tticetoFklMateisigilj i iykihotkitbriefer to ivulge, wit ,a goo tr #Purn-birfig ar1 ,3 correc- continued THE NEW YORKER 21 mar 1970 STATINTL -016,01 Lilfrpy,e ) I Li4 Frrorri killeavisik,3,ONTFR 80 ciffild he closed (Lawn, but the counter- , ,g NIAR1/4.4 I 13 but the naming of some of the, fronts. insurgents being trained by 'the C.I.A. i it. nit Ito cr, who gen- In getting this avowal, Senator Vol- don't appear to be putting their training L....) erally fears the worst atid is geo- bright scored a double pers(mal tri- to much use, and it isn't 17kely that we erallv confirmed in his fears, now limph. Ile is opposcd to, military oper- would stop bombing the I ill Chi Minh has it on the higlicst alit Iii thot 'the atiinis in Southeast Asia hee;luse he Trail because of any change in Laotian Cent ml I'nciligi'iiCC Agcncv is in volved thinks them immoral and 'futile and he administrations. If economic and mai- in in affairs in Luis and that, sub- is opp(ised to foreign ahl mit because he ta ry CI insiderations prevail in Hanoi, stantiating 111W of the oldest of . the doesn't want to aid foreigners but be- ? ?the . case for full-scale war in Laos Senator's misgivings, the military in- cause he has long looked upon it as a must he as unimpressive there as it :volvement is an aspect of our foreign- road to, war. The Helms testimony isviappears to be here. C.I.A., Richard i kilns, testified before ' at ions and our aid pro ins,gra though i Liough, that .cconfimic ami in ; y, i aid program. The director of the damaging to both our military oper- Tlwre is always the poss ib iii iliTT-oreign Relations Committee to- its direct impact on either is not likely considerations are not the deotninant ' !, tiav, and althliugh the session was to he great. Support for foreign aid is ones, and that there may be s011nd po- : cliisd and no verbatim testinuiny was already so low that little could weaken litical and ideiilogical reasons frir doing released, the Senator's office said that it further, and the preoccupation with ? what otherwise seems. unreasonable. II elms hail acknowledged that person- ,Laos has less to do with. our recent or '-There are reports of a North 1 VietnaM- d were working present role there than with , Hanoi's vs,. .builiinp in Laos, and not all 01 ; nel under his command ;out of the Agency for International plans for the future of the place and them are from suspect stuirces, though . 'Development to train, equip, and fi- with Our response. to those plans. It may some aSsurcdly are. The President says . Itance Laotian loyalists and mercenaries be, of course, that Hanoi has no plans. that in t.'..e last .four months thirteen 1 to fight against indigenous Pathet Lao beyond the obvious one of continuing to thousand "additional" troops have en- rebels and North Vietnamese regulars. Use the Ho Chi Minh Trail ;is a means tered 'Laos from North Vietnam, this No denials have been made. According of access to South Vietnam. In tern- bringing the "total" to over sixty-seven. ? to the Fulbright version of the di- tonal 'terms, more than half ?f Laos thousand. But he did not say?presirm-' 'rector's testimony, a unit of MD known has been under Communist Control for ' ably because he could not be sure? las the Rural Development Annex is? 'years, and military experts hero. and in --. what they were doing (Pr where they as some mwspaper accounts have rim- other capitals are generally agreed that ? were going. The count is the work of . ..mored?responsible for recruiting and the rest could he taken with ease at Aii Force reconnaissance, and it is well Araining guerrillas, while another unit, any time Hanoi decided to . do so. It . known that the Air Force, having been .known as the Special Requirements hasn't happened, and from this it has relieved of the opportunity to serve us Office, has been meeting the anti-Com- commonly been inferred that Hanoi has by bombing North Vietnam, has been ... ? munist combatants' requirements for weighed the advantages of a takeover directing its attention to Laos. If there .,?? fliati"..riel and money. None of today's against the disadvantages and found 'are now more North Vietnamese .!- - ? revelations?or any other revelation ' the latter to he heavier. As a country .; troops travelling the Ho Chi Minh Trail , - during this recent period of preoccupa- (and there are those Who balk at. call- than before, it may he s'mply because . ? Lion with Laos?was inconsistent with ing it a "country" at all, on the ground' ? our bombs are falling in far greater pro- the President's report on Laos a week that it has hardly any elements of ii;'- fusion, causing more loss of life along . tionhood) Laos is practically without the trail and more damage to it?there- resources other than acreage for grow- . by leading Hanot to have greater num- ing rice and opium. It has the strategic hers of troops in transit and a larger value of,a crossroads, hut this is already labor force to repair the damage. The. - being exploited by North Vietnam in it9 .fact that Communists recently recap- War against the United States and tuned the Plain of Tars may Or may not South Vietnam,. and the only. military .- be militarily signifiCant;'" that combat ..,..7i point of total occupation would be the area has changed . hands every few .?,..i. opportunity it would provide to engage'. months for years?as a rule, with very ... Thailand, in a war on its eastern and - .little combat. Yet it may well be that .,..,. northern frontiers. If the Laotian goy- . the President's figures are ill-tsrant;ally ' ' eminent were ieverthrown or were -accurate and that the North Vietnam- . . forced to take an anti-American posi- ? esc are getting into position for a broad :... tion, the Rural Development Annex -offensive in Laos. Hanoi may sec a vie- ? - tory there as a morale builder at home. , It may see 'Communist domination of - 11Trut Laos?or just the threat -of Communist domination?as an asset to its diploma- cy in Paris and elsewhere. It may see ? - an opportunity to confront this Ail- ministratiim- with disagreeable iliditical Choices and to expose the contradictions 1, . -,tti, ,......._ 11,!,p1,4,:: m American policy. The fain that our ways works behind one false front 1 .ir (7,1. .. ...- , _ . -,! 1,1 . .?1..4,3 . 7.11.17".'n.13q::.ig IN.! client, Premier- Souvanna Mumma, has l';'!Iilit'l.i. STATI I\ ago, in which it was stated that of the ; one thousand and forty Americans on the United States' payroll in Laos three , hundred and twenty are engaged in "a ! military-advisory or military-training : capacity" and that "logistics personnel ". number three hundred and twenty- three." While it is possible that the . President did not tell the whole truth? it is even possible that he doesn't know . the whole truth?these figures are ' roughly in line with the calculations of . non-governmental observers. Though . the President could hardly have been - expected to explain to the world that the Rural Development Annex was a .,.......if,./. Special Requirements Office speeitilized w?4,0,1ep.v7-7,0b.:i':00,? 1 I, ? counter-insurgency school or that .the..,.; .44i q he .was talking about the .c.I.A., which ? - '''., 1 !/1)1110. li;>1 IL i , i . I -.111.i/1111(r.. . ,/:.(fibicil in logistics, most people who studied his v11/41! ? --.: - . 0.-;,..; ,?1. statement with tiny care assumed that ,q1,).,\';.Q..1:, ?,;if I. -. - '/ir, I., is in - the main a citindestine hrtinch !; , ,,,\ , 21" /111111/117/W?. ? 4., ril11' f 1 i. I ? ' 1 ? , of the military, and which almost al- i'd? , or aApprovadtForrliteleaset2 ? 0a106 only the C.I.A.'s avowal of thc fact be- Agi itlo7o/olipoitilA 4,$ ger to men ?iT 7 " nate h - I. sot and bring fore the Poreign Relations Committee themobatkuinto his Cabinet has to be . . -1" ? ViASIIIMV.CON STAR Approved For Release 2001/931/06Ah-Rpfpn(11101 o ,350 Fight.m Laos, ?Thai mid !Indicates ?' By DONALD KIRK Forelim Correspondent of The Stir BANGKOK ? Thai officials strongly indicated for the first time today that up to 350 'Thais may be fighting on the side of Laotian government forces in Northern Laos. ' Authorities publicly denied reports that two battalions of Thai troops were 'supporting the beleaguered base of Long Chien, but privately hinted that Thais may have been sent a week or 10 days ago into the conflict against the North Vietnamese.' milihrv alliance they have Sources here said the Thais formed with the United States. involved in the fighting may not Thai authorities have provided have actually been members of air bases for American planes the Thai armed forces. "A number of Thais have flying over Laos and Vietnam and have sent a division of joined the government side in troops to South Vietnam, but Laos on their own," said one have always tried to avoid pub- knowledgeable source, indicat- licity that might compromise ing the Thais may have been their relations with "neutral" recruited as members of the Asian countrids. army of general yang Pao, in1 U.S. officials here have sup- charge of Laotian government ported the Thais' policy of mere- forces in the mountainous jungle cy by declining to comment on Laotian troops fighting the i regions north and northeast of any aspect of the That role n North Vietnamese in Northern Specific Report The report Ziegler was asked about was that Air America planes flew two battalions of Thai troops to reinforce Laotian forces defending Long Chen, a U.S.-supported base in Laos, against advancing North Viet- namese troops. It was the first report of any sizable force of Thai troops en- tering the current conflict in neighboring Laos. After saying "the report is ' grossly exaggerated," Ziegler , said "I am not going to com- ment on the very limited Thai involvement in Laos." The United States is deeply committed to the defense of Thailand, a Southeast Asian Treaty ally which has made sev- eral air bases available to the U.S. Air Force. ' American planes fly from the Thai bases on regular bombing missions against North Viet- - - ? namese forces in North Viet- nam, along the Ho Chi Minh trail and in the support of the the capital of Vientiane. the Laotian conflict. The Amen- The army of Generwl yang cans rarely discussed the mili- Pao consists almost entirely of tary phase of American partici- Meo tribesmen, who roam the Pation in Laos until President mountains from the southeast- Nixon's statement three weeks rn Chinese province of Yunnan ago acknowledging the United to Northern Thailand. The Cen- tral Intelligence Agency pro- States was supporting Laotian vides the money for yang Pao's, forces with air strikes, equip- forces, equipped with American meat and advisers. weapons and uniforms and Thai authorities were reported extremely upset by the admis- sion of White House press secre- tary Ronald Ziegler of "very limited Thai involvement in Laos." Ziegler used the "very limit- ed" phrase late yesterday in telling newsmen that a report of two battalions of Thai troops being ferried into Laos by Air America transport planes was "grossly exaggerated." He made clear that the part of the report he termed "grossly exaggerated" concerned two battalions of Thai troops. He would not comment on the portion of the report that the troops had been flown from Thailand into Laos by Air Amer- ica planes. In effect, he refused to confirm or deny the use of Air America planes in some troop movements. Ziegler's statement also was. the first official acknowledg- ment in Washington of any in- volvement of Thai troops in the Laotian fighting. There have been reports of small numbers of Th a lag gresw flying Laotian war planes. transported from isolated out- posts on American aircraft. Some sources believed, howev- er, that the Thais with yang Pao's army may have been members of regular Thai units, possibly artillery batteries flown into Long Chien to help defend the key base in the face of the most serious Communist ' mili- tary offensive in Laos since the Geneva accords were signed in 1962. Thai officials were extremely reluctant to discuss the entire issue of their possible military involvement in Laos. In the past, Thai authorities have routinely denied all reports' any Thai troops were supporting Laotian government forces. One reason for the sensitivi- ties of the Thais on this subject is their general embarrassment over the close diplomatic and Approved For Re marcn out ot the mountains and approach the Mekong River bor- der 'dividing, Laos from Thai- land. For the record, 'however, Thai officials simply were not dis- cussing any phase of their mill-, " tary interests in Laos. "We did; not send troops to Laos and we have no intention of doing so in the future," was the only coin- . merit offered publicly today by al spokesman of the Supreme Com- rased Headquarters hr.. Laos. The introduction of even a lim- ited number of Thai troops into , the battle for Laos is in line with I the emphasis in the "Nixon Doc- trine," proclaimed at Guam last summer, on regional coopera- tion by the free countries of Southeast Asia for their own de- fense. Thai soldiers were first report- ed in Laos when Communist forces overran the government - held base at Muong Soui on Route 7, the main road across Northern Laos from North Viet- nam. Thai artillery batteries were said to have lowered their, guns and fired point blank at the Communist forces before they! were evacuated on Americani planes. Direct Threat ? Despite their unhappness over t reports of Thai troops in Laos, , horitics here were not expect- to change their general posi- on. The Thais, fighting Corn- unist-led guerrilla revolt in both the northern and the north- t eastern provinces, view,Commu- nist advances across Laos as a, direct threat on their own terri- tory. Indeed, some Thai leaders be: ' Hove the country should send large-scale forces into Laos and directly confront the North Viet- namese. Analysts here view this kind of move as extremely un- likely, however, unleSs' the North littini544tti gefo 0 ft 0 0 40 0 0 1-3 au 1 LOS ANGELES TIMES Approved For Release 2001 601 STATI NTL Approved Forli6ilease 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160 MONT101y1L-R? , ALA. ADVER1ISER M ? 61,769 1 S 'an. 1970 C40, A Deserved But Untimely Coup CAMBODIA, Laos, Thailand a n d Vietnam are largely unnatural countries thrust on the world in the last . two l' decades. They have been pushed far 1 beyond their rightful positions of Im- portance. f Vietnam has been a major headliner r , for almost 10 years. A scattering of news 4 about Thailand reaches front pages only l because of the strategic role it plays as a 1. major U.S. base In the Vietnam war. r Normally, it would be heard from only in ?travel articles about Its unique hedges P-and royal aviaries. Laos is like a pot of 1 gumbo, heated and cooled periodically to suit 'appetites. Now it's Cambodia again. Cambodia ' used to make the news because its ruling ' ' prince for 29 years possessed an advanc- ed talent for pomposity, incongruity and . plain lying, which he faithfully exposed to, the world with a perverse sense of . thning. , Since Prince Sihanouk has apparently lost his job, it would be comforting to ? write him off, in much the same way that his sister-under-the-skin Madame Nhu 1 ' was dispatched. But It isn't so easy. From a rice paddy foundation, . Sihanouk somehow managed to insinuate . himself and CaMbodialn6 larger affairs (during the last decade. It is a sad com- mentary that, this 'Indo-Chinese . princeling, otherwise a laughable buffoon, " has an effect on the East-West balance of :power and world peace. ' Here are some of the possibilities of i,. the Cambodian coup: ., Sihanouk was on a trip to Moscow and ',Peking when he was deposed. It was ; thought in Washington he was using the tThreat of a right-wing challenge to his. , rule to reinforce demands that Hanoi be persuaded to withdraw its troops from Cambodia, a sanctuary from American ? firepower in Vietnam. Such a removal, .? although doubtful, would have eased the ; pressures in Vietnam.. That's supposedly . shot now. In the past, Sihanouk hop-scotched ? between the communist and non-com- munist camps. As an unequalled egotist, he would stoop to anything to regain I power, including enlisting the aid of Hanoi. His challengers preside over an ill-trained and poorly equipped army of 35,000. Hanoi has at least 40,000 troops on Cambodian soil. It would be no contest if the communist guns were aimed at Cambodia rather than Vietnam. The coup could provoke new en-, croachments in Cambodia by Hanoi. The I danger is that the Vietnam wai.could be I extended into Cambodia. It is already 1 threatening in Laos. There is the possibility of help from the ' new Cambodian leaders. They could exert pressure on North Vietnamese hops , camped on their land, which Sihanouk ' persistently refused to do. But there is danger there, too. If the Cambodians 'wanted to peck at the North Vietnamese, they would need additional equipment] and assistance. The Central Intelliggag?AgWY and , V other secret agencies would probably be delighted to get into the act in Cambodia, as they are in Laos. A North Vietnamese' reaction would' spread the war over almost the entire Southeast Asia penin- sula, sucking the U.S. deeper into the mire. Actually, the CIA could already be active in Cambodia. It could be the force: ? behind the Siltanoulc coup. ? If it were not for the dangers implicit In the Sihanouk toppling, it would be pue pleasure to see the clown prince get hisil due. But there is no comfort in a sittrai tion that could bring new conflict and ? disorder at a time when this nation is at.; tempting to reduce its involvement in, the region. It is a partof the enigma of the area and its inflated importance that the fall. of Sihanouk, whose corruption arid? capriciousness were travesties leader-i ship, sho;uI4.beer'auchforehodIzsj Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160 NEW YORK, N.Y. POST MAR 20 1970 - 706,180 The Widening War -4%4%44 U. S. .,military officials say flatly that the U. S. could win a "quick mili- tary iTioiir in Vietnam if ground troops were permitted to invade the Co,mmu- nist sanctuaries in Cambodia and. Laos.---.from yesterday's news pages. ' 4 * In the dangerously uncertain hours following the ouster of Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia in a "constitutional coup," there has been some optimistic specu- lation that the development is welcome from official Washington's point of view. The Pentagon seems to think so ?but its responsibility is waging war. The outlook is far different for anyone who cares about peace. What could be encouraging about the facts that the war in Vietnam blazes on, that the war in Laos is rapid- ly escalating and that Cambodia is now, ruled by a right-wing regime whose professions of adherence to Cambodian neutralism remain to be tested? No sooner had South Vietnamese President Thieu learned of the .coup than he smilingly suggested?obviously recognizing kindred spirits in Pnom Penh?that joint military operations " against the Communists might be in , order. He graciously included references to an older ally?the U. S. - Is Washington really prepared prepared 'to take on new clients in Cambodia? Isn't one Thieu far more than enough? What application does President Nixon pro- pose to make of the "Nixon Doctrine" for progressive military disengagement now? Does the siren-song of "quick mil- itary victory" really sound appealing? So far, Washington has done noth- ing more publicly than to "recognize" the new Cambodian regime?on the ground that Sihanouk's removal was constitutionally carried out. What role, if any, the Ti. S. intelligence apparatus actually played in the process is not? known but the CIA has scarcely been unobtrusive in flj Vietnam and Laos . and it is hard to believe it was missing in action in Cambodia. The crucial question is whether,' Washington will attempt once more in Indochina to regulate events which t reaten to pass beyond its control and. whether the Vietnam quagmire will ex- tend itself deeper into Laos and Cam- bodia. That would not herald "quick yietory",but,a new, wider, dead-en Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 . BALTikfORIO 5t12( Approved For Release 2001/0160 i99A-RDP80-0160 I STATINTL LAOS STRONGHOLD APPARENTLY LOST North Vietnamese Capture Meo Headquarters . Thong, primarily a supply and staging area for Moo refugees. The fire may have been set by rockets from attacking North ietnameSe, softening resistance for their attack. None of the American advisers who normally stay in Sam Thong were involved in the fighting. They had been evacuat- ed during the past two days. The attacking North Vietnam- ese were estimated to number about 5,000 men, most of them from North? Vietnamese Army division that had helped recap- ture the battle-scarred, grassy Plain of Jars earlier this year. About two battalions were strik- ing at Sam Thong itself, while others coming from both North and South were attacking small- er Meo outposts nearby. 1, By PETER J. KUMPA (Sun Stall Correspondent) Vientiane, March 18?North Vietnamese Army regulars ap- parently captured Sam Thong today, one of the twin mountain headquarters strongholds of Meo Gen. yang Pao, head of the se- cret CIA-financed army?the last effective fighting force on the government side in Laos. Evacuation also began at Long Cheng, the long-secret military command post of the Meo gener- al, 18 miles away over .a high mountain ridge. Some families and equipment were being moved out by air. Radio chntact with Sam Thong was lost by the Laotian general staff here at about noon today. The last flights two hours earlier brought in ammunition and took out dead and wounded. Pilots this morning reported seeing the United States Agency for International Development warehouse burning et . Sam HJ ' I go t. his , surprise. counterattack Mefis might all pick up their few against extended North Viet; na mese troop concentrations last fall and drove them off the plain for the first time in five years. Now the question that haunts both the Laotian government and the Americans here is whether Gen. yang Pao and his clandestine army, estimated to vary from 10,000 to 35,000. men, can hold together. ' The loss of Long Cheng would be Gen. yang Pao's most seri- ous. It is a well stocked military counterpart to the civilian oper- ation at Sam Thong. For periods, the ?short, 40- year-old Moo -general, once a sergeant in the French Army, kept same of his five wives here and held sort of an inforrrial,trib- al court appointing, subleaders for-most of the estimated 250,000 Meo S in northern Laos. Psychological Defeat At the least, he has suffered a severe psychological defeat. With continued heavy American assistance, he could recover, for there are other bases in the high valleys to which he could trans- fer his operations. It is a costly operation, estimated at about $150 million a year. For months before the latest reverses, Gen. yang Pao al- ready was having trouble find- ing recruits. The hard core of his army is under 10,000 men. The rest are part-time fighters scattered over dozens of sites, many of them deep in Commu- nist territory. . Rumors again were being res- urrected here that the nornadic. Adept As Guerrillas One informed Meo source here said that Sam Thong had been ordered evacuated early this morning. The tribesmen, 1 who are adept at guerrilla tactics, have not been able to withstand concentrated North Vietnamese attacks. It is assumed here that Long Cheng will fall shortly. Some American military advisers were predicting three weeks ago that the North Vietnamese would strike at the two bases that endanger North Vietnamese control of the politically and mil- itarily Important Plain of Jars region. It was from these bases that Gen. Vang Pao with heavy .American' air support launched possessions and move to the far west of Laos or even into Thai- land. ' Over the past 10 years, how- ever, the Moo leader has shown tenacity, coming back when the Communists boasted that he had been defeated. Viet Cong-Style Tactics Gen. yang Pao has fought a' hit-and-run guerrilla war for 10 years with American support. From their high ridges behind Communist lines, his men have specialized in Viet Cong-style tactics, laying mines and am- bushing convoys. During the bombing of North Vietnam, it was the Meo tribes- men who defended hilltop instal.; lations of radar guiding Amen-: can planes. From these preca- rious strips, rescue helicopters took off to pick up pilots downed behind enemy lines. Some guerrilla activity was, extended right into North Viet., nam. Virtually independent of the Vientiane government, Gen. yang, Pao, politically a right- winger, has not been popular with the neutralists. A major general by rank in the Laotian army, he was tolerated for his ? fighting ability. If some new coalition govern- ment can be formed again through ? coming exchanges be- tween the Pathet Lao and Vienti- ane, the Communists can be ex- pected to demand an end to the activities. of yang Pao, their toughest adversary. ? Approved For 'Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RQP80-01601R000700040001-3 Approved For Rele'ase 20910424.jialifeipP80-0.1601R00 19 Mar 1970 [War! e6uulld. cad MI Wa 6goemeil _ 0 ,STATINTL 0 .By James McCartney ,Chicago Daily News Service '.. The right-wing military coup 'In Cambodia?if it is success- ful?has the potential of chang- ?ing the ground rules of the Vietnam War. It could be the biggest break that President Nixon has got- . ten in trying to end the war. Or it could lead to a North P'Vietnamese attempt to ' take over Cambodia by force, and ? thus cause a new and different kind of crisis in Vietnam. ?? U.S. officials do not pretend , "If they did that and hol- lered for help, we might have ? a dilemma on our hands," said one U.S. official. SIHANOUK has permitted ? the North Vietnamese to use his country as a sanctuary in mounting attacks on southern : South Vietnam. If that ground rule were to be removed, the 1 Communists would be severely crippled. ? to know what precisely is hap- , , That would aid President : pening in Cambodia ? or who 1 Nioxn in de-escalating the war.' g may wind up in charge. It's too : . . , Approximtely Apo main- 1 early for that. ' force North Vietnamese troops I i ? But they are certain that the,' are believed to be based in I 0 - events of the last few days in -Cambodia will effect all of.1 Cambodia, poised to threaten , the capital city of Saigon and ? t Southeast Asia. And they are the rich Mekong Delta to the. .., seeking to weigh alternatives. 1 , south. ii Cambodia is Important be- cause it has sought, essential- I DAILY NEWS correspondenti, ly, to remain neutral in strap. ; Milt Freudenheim reports that! gle for Southeast Asia. 1 .' Paris observers were quick to ' Prince Norodom Sihanouk, ,, stress the dangers of a shift to the chief of state who has been i the right in Cambodia. If thp troops might try to do the job. 'The take-over In Cambodia No Icsi an official than De- by Gen. Lon No! and Sihan- tense Sec. Melvin R. Laird has oak's righthist relative, Prince openly discussed this possi- Sisowath Sink Matak, is corn- bility. pared in Paris with the ouster That's where the importance of Indonesian President Su- of a successful right-wing coup comes into the picture. ? If right-wing generals were ? to gain control in Cambodia I and invite the United States to clean out North Vietnamese forces, the temptation to take them up on the offer would be take over all of Cambodia if . great. they wished in a counter at- : , This course of?action, no tack. doubt, would cause a political. uproar AT THE PARIS Vietnam uproar in the United States. talks Thursday, -Freudenheim BUT LESS drastic possi- bilities also are being dis- cussed in official circles here. For example, a right-wing re- gime in Cambodia might.make it possible to freeze supply nition that Sihanouk has been routes to the Communist forces ,ousted. In Cambodia and South., Viet ousted ? nam ? ? ? It is perfectly clear that the .# I A ' ousted, has walked a narrow 'weak Cambodian 'army falls tO Supplies for Communist an- Nixon administration, in order path ? often leaning one way, ' control the Communist Viet- 1 to save itself from defeat in then the other. namese forces, United States ,i.mies in the Mekong Delta have, ? ? ' Vietnam, not only is escalating been permitted to flow., freely i !the war in Laos but also is try- ' 'ing to extend the war to the whole IndoChinese Peninsula, placing a grave threat to peace in Southeast Asia," Hanoi dele- gate Nguyen Minh Vy - do- led the scant reports moni- ,clued. tored on Phnom Penh. Radio. # ? , U.S. and South Vietnamese A 1 m te nCambodia. . I it dl "The United States must as JUDGMENT In Wash- ' have -no. forces ha t been able to 1 THE OTHER side of the coin same full responsibility for,the touch the supply routes ? or ;presents a diffe.rent picture. consequences," Vy said as he ington is that Gen. Lon Nol , as premier and his accomplices 1, attack Communist bases ? , the United States ? probably . went into the session. U.S. Ambassador 'Philip C. , ostensible.neutrality. 4 , There is widespread specula tion In Saigon and Paris that without violating Cambodia's' ' have entrenched themselves in ; power, and that the neutralist' Sihanouk has been per-i manently bounced. , This prospect raised appre-b hensions, described as a "fear of the unknown" by one . source, that the rightist anti- Communist successors of Siha- ' 'not& might get in over theft" heads in their defiance of the ' karno, which the French also credit to the _CIA._ The Communists have the military power to respond. They are already in 'a strong position in Laos, north of Cain- bodia. They probably could reports, North Vietnam ?ac- leased the United States of try-I ing to spread the Vietnam War. ;into Cambodia and Laos. But Hanoi carefully avoided recog- 0 forces could be sucked In, as DAILY 'NEWS Washington I happened in t Vietnam and Bureau chief Peter Lisagor re- . } Laos, they warned. ports that suspicion that the ; Cambodia also has provided coup deposing him might be ? 1 the supply route for Commu- another ruse faded quickly as' the I forces in southern South ' Southeast Asian experts stud- Vietnam through Cambodian ports. . The United States also, might ,be invited to bomb Commst [sanctuaries in Cambodia Bombing has not been per- U.S. MILITARY officials say through the Central Intelligenc flatly that the United States Agency?has played a' role In could win a "quick military the Cambodian coup. , 1 ment on Cambodia," victoty" in Vietnam if ground Freudenheim reports thatl South Vietnamese delegate troops were permitted to in- ;French -military officials see it, I Pham Dang Lam replied thati vade , the Communist sanc-1 as a move to strengthen thei tuaries in Cambodia and Laos. position of Thailand in case long-standing North. Vietnam-I , ese denials that its troops are And officials have not been Laos falls to North Vietnamese' in Laos and Cambodia have, and Pathot Lao forces. , . , 1.beinwsjildi ?oved by recent state-. bib told reporters as he en- ered the session, "I have no intention of having any corn; reluctant to discuss the possl- North Ir6Ved For Rdiftia120960)10111_,193 . ? '61:1TR000 G OdItias ot the neu.... . tralist governments , of both, CH/CACO TRIBUNE Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000 19 MAR ?PO 9 otia VIENTIANE, Laos, March 13 tin?A limited withdrawal of civilians and soldiers from army headquarters at Long Cheng began today, after the fall of a nearby United States- operated supply base at Sam Thong to 2,000 North Viet- namese troops. Informed sources saw the advance on Sam Thong as the first significant North Viet- namese push south of the Plain of Jars since the Geneva agreement in 1962 set up Laos as a neutral state. Sam Thong._ 90 miles north of s Exit as Vientiane, is 15 miles southwest of the Plain of Jars. The plain was recaptured. by the North Vietnamese in Feb- nary. Long Cheng is 10 miles southeast of Sam Thong. 7,000 Meo Soldiers Gen. yang Pao, commander of the Meo tribesman army, has his base at Long Cheng and has about 7,000 soldiers stand- ing in the way of an advance. These forces apparently put up little resistance at Sam Thong. At the Vientiane airport, Air. America transport planes un- loaded civilians and soldiers from Long Cheng. Most of the STATI NTL ost Falls soldiers were in uniform and carrying their weapons. Some were wounded but able to walk. There was no immediate report o n whether United States cent r al intelligenc agency personnel who support Vang's army at Long Cheng had left. Elimination Effort One source said of the new North . Vietnamese thrust, "I think this is his effort to eliminate Sam Thong and Long Cheng, the early phase of it." Informed sources said the Lao general staff in Vientiane 'lost radio contact with Sam Thong at noon. Shortly before, ammunition was delivered to the government forces at. Sam Thong and the wounded were evacuated. ? There were reports that North Vietnamese forces fired rockets into the Sam Thong air field. Hospital, Warehouse Burn The sources said allied bombers attacked the high ground around Sam Thong in efforts to drive off the North Vietnamese troops who by- passed ? government positions farther north to launch their attack. Whether United States warplanes, which. have been 1 supporting Laotian troops, took' part was not clear. Pilots flying over Sam Thong reported that a United States arehouse and an American. (operated hospital were burning and there were fires - in the village. All 16 Americans and more than 2,000 tribesmen and Laotian peasants, including 209 hospital patients, were flown out before the major attack. T h e International Control commission, prodded by India, met informally to explore the worsening situation. The sources said the Indian govern- ment was attempting a new peace initiative but the meeting produced nothing significant. The commission made up of India, Canada and Poland, was set up to see that the Geneva agreement was observed. But it has no power and has been denied entry into areas of Laos controled by the pro-communist Pathet Lao and its North Vietnamese allies. ? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 DAILY WORLD Approved For Release 2001/894C9RA-RDP80-01601RPEW STATI NTL CO oyeall Lao'ircease'\.-1-'?; QJQ'$?? iroirDCE Daily World Foreign Department ? Sam Thong, one of the largest U.S. CIA-"Royal Lao' bases in northern Laos, fell late Tuesday night to the forces of the Lao Patriotic Front. Officials in Vientiane, the "Roy- al Lao" capital, said "We don't know exactly where things stand at this point," but added that it was not true that the Sam 'rhong hospital had been burned down as earlier reported. The CIA operations base is 75 miles north of Vientiane and about 30 miles southeast of the Plain of Jars, the vital region the LPF re- captured in the last few weeks. ?., Sam Thohg is only six miles from Long Cheng, headquarters and major supply base for the clajteptine army of General Vang Pao, a force of 15,000 Meo tribes- men set up by the CIA. According to U.S. reports, the Sam Thong base ivas taken almost without a fight from the CIA's secret army. In past years, when the Meo tribesmen on the U.S. gide were confronted with heavy fighting, they melted away by the hundreds, tossing their brand-new, M-16 ri- fles away. The repeated demands of "Royal Lao" Premier Souvan-. na Phouma last week for new ship- ments of U.S. weapons may have some relation to this earlier phen- omenon: In Saigon, the U.S. military ' ? command reported the loss of the . fifth U.S. warplane over Laos in ' ' the last six days to anti-aircraft ' fire, an Air Force F-105 "Thunder- ' , chief based in Thailand. U.S.. sources , sources said all reports indicated. ? the U.S. air losses were at a high- er rate than losses over the Demo- . .:' cratic Repuxlic of Vietnam be- -: fore the 1968 "bomb halt." ? The U.S. this week admitted that a "North Vietnamese" hell- '? copter that it had earlier said its planes had destroyed on the ? I ground in Laos was in reality an old American type used by the South Vietnamese two years ago. : Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 Approved For Release 200N1 P1-12DP80-01601R0XIIIIIM ?ff? 19 March 1970 Asian Crucible: (i) Cambodia and Laos STATI NTL South-east Asia is more of an ideological crucible this week than ever; Mr Galbraith's notion that the countries of the area may relapse into the obscurity 'which they deserve' looks singularly unrealistic. The irony is that the fate of the area may be determined more in Laos and Cambodia than in Vietnam itself. The overthrow of Prince Sihanouk bears all the impress of a brilliant intelligence vr coup. The CIA may be in retreat in Laos; in Cambodia it could well have had a hand in precisely the kind of job which it believes it is meant to do. One domino looks like falling; but another is being shored up. The net results of the events of the past week are unpredictable but certain lines of speculation are admissible: (i) Cambodia. If the new Cambodian regime cracks down hard on the communists and deprives the North Vietnamese forces (and the Vietcong) of their sanctuaries and supplies, the effect in South Vietnam will be considerable. North Vietnam's use of Cambodian bases, and supplies, has been a factor of enormous importance throughout the war. (ii) Laos. In Laos, the position is very different. North Vietnam is aiming to secure the establishment of a communist-dominated neutralist Coalition; it also wants to extract an American pledge not to bomb the Ho Chi Minh trail. If it wins these two points, it would have scored a notable triumph. The 'cteation of a rieW coalition in Vientiane would be adduced as an adequate precedent for the formation of?a coalition In Saigon. The situation in Laos is now so grave that Mr Rogers, the American Secretary or State, has dropped hints this week that American ground forces may, after all, have to be introduced ? but only with the consent of Congress (which will be difficult to secure). It is arguable that, if ?the Americans were prepared to make a firm stand in Laos, they might carry the day in the whole of south-east Asia. This thesis will doubtless be derided in many quarters; the mere idea of 'another Vietnam' frightens a large . sector of American public opinion. But, while exaggerated importance should not be given to the reported ascendancy of the doves in the Hanoi politburo, it is clear that North Vietnam could not simul- taneously (a) continue a losing war in the south, where Vietnamisation has proved more effective than many people forecast, (b) face the sustained hostility of the Cambodian regime, which would harass the Vietcong in various ways, and (c) face in Laos the full brunt of American military might and air power, backed by the Meo tribesmen. North Vietnam's aim has always been the eventual control of all of former French Indochina, not merely the acquisition of South Vietnam. But it would find it hard to fight in three countries simultaneously. (iii) Russia and China. From the calculations outlined above, it might seem that there is the chance of some kind of deal; but deals in south-east Asia are notoriously difficult to secure. Much will depend on the way Russia and China react to the current crises. As they are in grim competition with each other, as well fas with the Americans, their mood is likely to be tough and unyielding; certainly China's. The odds are there- fore that (a) if the Cambodian challenge to the communists fails, south-cast asia will become a more intractable, crisis-ridden region than ever, and the communists will step up their efforts to give the Americans a bloody nose in Laos; but (b) if it succeeds, the undermining of North Vietnam's whole strategy may have begun. Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80701601R0 ?????? ? .................margularmarmall106, PASCu, WAI'f'?ITON I TRI-CITYALfD iE - 22,733 S - 2.2,99b UZ4N 191RD STATI NTL Isolation not possible i ,. , . Sen. J. W. Fullbright's ob. Surely his committee g e t s 7 servation that "it is obvious" there numerous reports on the subversive ; is a relationship ' .between the activities of other "foreign" powers ; forejsn aid program and the Cen- in Laos and in other nations around : tral IiitnigencO--Agency in Laos the world and. it's too much to ,1 . hardly falls under the category of swallow the possibility that he : profound statements. , , ? would be surprised by a report of ,t No one wants Laos to turn into CIA involvement in Laos. . It another Vietnam but we frankly ----Ciro can readily agree that the , ? h slide or allow this don't see how the United States can administration shouldn't s n e a k, 4 1 ilcompletely withdraw from the - - country to be .1 pulled into a second Vietnam. wbrld and go into deep isolation. 1 It's possible the senator, head At the same time, however, I of the Senate Foreign Relations espionage and assistance i n, i . 1 Cotnmittee, was headline hunting ? training and recruiting programs if i because of his views but the best are as much a part of the in- [that can be said is that it was .' ternational facts of life as ern- .. ridiculous for him to say, iilf it b a s s i e s , consulates, diplomatic : is true (CIA involvement in Laos), missions and j u n k e t i n g con- I it is only another warning we are gressmen. ' in over our heads." , There is no reason for the U.S.:. i. . to hang illuminated banners around How w,ould he propose that the ' the necks of our CIA or other I U.S. help out countries that are agencies proclaiming them a s .1 1 . for an ideal world, .; i being beseiged.. by Communists and spies, recruiters, trainers, military il facing possible take over? Should observers or anything else. we put our head in the sand and We're all .0 . bid them adieu? Or .possbily send ' Mr. Fullbright. Now if you can only "..4 in pacifists and rrnssionaries- to convince the other side before- we,ii I convert the commun.* te anti-war unilaterally give away.. ajl. of:,otir.t4 iChriatians, ' ? . ." ? ? -! .4; i'. .., ? . .. :., . ,-- secrets and confess. ..ot40`eips'" - ? Approved,For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 DJIL VIORLI) Approved For Release 2001/9400.*A-RDP80-01601R0 25 Fin 1 ""jo-DOU 2[41 CEVC]neng 'OE STATI NTL 20.) Daily World Foreign Department U.S. B-52 bombers and other warplanes were diverted yesterday to missions over northern Laos as two outposts barely six miles away fro& the U.S. CIA base at Sam . Thong fell to the Lao Patriotic Front. Military sources in Saigon said the B-52's made only three raids yesterday over South Vietnam because most of them had been sent over Laos. Cambodia has suspended I eni frontiers," and said that. the International Control itsCorn- Cambodia and Sihanouk could. ? mission 4ICC) on Vietnam. ad- earlier demand that what it al- leged to be "North Vietnamese "reply on the Soviet Union's all.; ' ? mitted that he "passed on" in-. ' and Vietcong" troops leave Cam- round support in the struggle' formation to the U.S. CIA. The bodian territory. The change against imperialist provocations. Canadian officer said the CIA and interference in her affairs.". would come to him claiming that was indicated during a Monday Cambodia parley "an entire Vietcong corps' was meeting between Cambodian For- eign Minister Norodom Phouris- U.S. news sources in Cambodia. in a certain border area. and sara and representatives of the said that.in Monday's Cambodia-. .Ketcheson said he would dis- Democratic Republic of Vietnam DRV-PRG meeting, the two Viet- ? agree but very often they ,chose and the Provisional Revolution- namese representatives did not ' to believe their own spies." ary Government of South Viet- ' discuss the charge of Cambodian A report in the Feb. 26 issue? nam, in the Cambodian capital Premier Lon Nol's government of the conservative "Far Eastern of Phnom Penh. that NIP and DIIV troops were:: . Economic Review" iliong Kong) In Moscow, Prince Norodom operating on Cambodian territory.... says that a reporter who Ow/- Sihanouk. Cambodia's thief of ?The PRG and DRV pledged to eled all over Svay Rieng prov- .? state, postponed his scheduled. respect, Cambodia's neutrality, ?ince in Cambodia. where the U.S., departure for Peking on his way territorial integrity and Inde- and Saigon say thousands of "Vi- ? home, and in an interview he,. pendence, and also asked for etcong" are hiding, found it to ' said: "The events which have, damages to pay for last Wednes- be an absolutely flat, almost ? just occurred in our country may' day's mob attacks on their two treeless area surrounded. on ? make some foreign observers embassies in Phnom Penh. .. three sides by South Vietnamese. think that Cambodia may change Informed sources are dubious , territory, where nothing could be ; its orientation and its ideology..! about General Lon Nol's wild . hidden front patrolling U.S. air- . But as head of state I can as ' charges that 40,000 DRV and ,...eratt. sure you that we shall not change 'NLF troops are in Cambodia, a our principles. We shall keep charge that U.S.-Saigon military our neutrality and our independ? propaganda has been making for ence. The Cambodian people and several years. In the Nov. 16. I personally will not permit any 1969, Washington Post, Canadian changes concerning our friend- 'General Donald Ketcheson gave ship with the socialist camp, es*. I tome reasons why. pecially with the USSR." . ? ;? Gen. Ketcheson, a member of Joint communique Sihanouk met with top-level So- viet officials on Monday, intlud- , ing President Nikolai Podgorny ? .and Premier Alexei Kosygin. The joint Soviet-Cambodian statement at the end of the meeting stated: s "The aggression of the American imperialists in Vietnam, armed intervention in Laos, U.S.-Saigon provocations against Cambodia and Cambodian neutrality are the, , main reasons for the aggravation . of the situation in Indochina and., in Southeast Asia as a whole." The Soviet government "again ? confirmed its respect for the .1 neutrality and territorial integ- rity of igkfooftvtitilifitirPelease 2001/03/94 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160 li...111?1110?11111111111101?=??? DES MOINES, IOWA TRIBUNE E ? 113,781 MAR 18 1970 Bombing Nuisance , We were thinking that American control of the air t,tiver Laos was completely useless when Russia , suddenly said there could be no negotiations for peace in Laos unless the United States first stopped the bombing. Does that sound familiar? It should. That was the' Bussian and North Vietnamese cry for the years when the United States was bombing North Viet-' . Air power is something Americans find it easy to believe in. Yet the heavy bombing of the Ho Chi ' Minh trail does not seem to 'affect the traffic there. Bombing interferes some, but North Vietnam just , takes its losses and goes on sending what it thooses. Support bombing in the Plain of Jars and points ,est and west seems singularly ineffective, too. It may have helped with the surprise victory last fall 1 when Gen. yang Pao's clandestine army of Mei), tfibesmen, payrolled by( the U.Sr?etifftrarlfl- telli ence Agency, reconquered the plain from its foe,s. ' winter North Vietnam reconquered the plain again and pushed on beyond it, using a, large force of regulars complete with tanks and artillery ? a roadbound outfit ideal for bombing. "U.S. planes were able to fly out the entire civilian population in advance of the attack, and do heavy, support bombing of the invading force, plus at leastl one day of heavy area bombing, with the big B-52 bombers. But the North Vietnamese swept the plain twith very little resistance. Yet it must have had:so.M.e?quisitnee value Th Alstereze911.4nd...a?L.) STAT'l NTL Approved For Release 2601/03/04:: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 NE17 YORK, N.Y.-.' POST E 708,180 MAR 181970 , 'Where Do-We.Go From Laos? - 73`"Stli A great znany Americans have been .wondering for some time just what the ' U.S. was doing in Laos?and. why. Per ?hapS it is heartening that high officials ( of the Nixon Administration seem to i be equally puzzled and as much at a loss for a convincing explanation. . 1 4?,1:x1.1.CMY"negro , In the latest development, Chairman Fulbright (D-Ark.) of the Senate For- ? eign Relations Committee reports that Secretary of State Rogers insisted at tC recent closed-door hearing that there are not only "no present plans" to com-; , mit ground troops but that the Admin- istration will not do so?at least with- out explicit Congressional sanction?' even if Laos "is overrun" by Pathet ? Lao and North Vietnamese. ? That seemingly leaves few options for Washington except to ground the, ? U. S. bombers making daily sorties in support of Lao government troops and to bring ,nailitary "advisers" home. Is ,anything izf'44,4e kind in prospect? Ori, -will our presenthere henceforth 'be-,; come a total CIA operation? Is there . ,?1P"k?C1.4 force ?jj The esca toting confusion dates gen- erally from President Nixon's report on k' Laos two weeks ago, a somewhat in- icomplete accounting of the facts and a wholly implausible justification of f U. S. involvement there. More recently, ; the Administrajion indicated it was def- ' initely not relying on the Tonkin Gulf ; resolution for authority and professed to be. neutral on a new Senate resolu- tion relating, to Use of combat 'troops ,. in Laos;, :,, y),7. c,,, ' 2:.T...t.h:U" .-?tw-c,? ,i, .;?;?,::,. , i,.],. E c.kt t,,,v4,-F.,44.,:.,'; ha iq U-ii4T::r...1.61tV.Snit.:44 1 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700040001-3 NEW ?X024 Approved For Release 201:11i0R1R41JSIA-RDP80-01 ever: appeared to put im a / ? Al . ,, ? some variance with the Secre- tary of Defense, Melvin R. . i? -?. Laird. On Feb. 26, Mr. Laird Rocrers and Fulbriciiit A . To Cl ' l'y U S Stand arz: ? U. - . on La051.- told newsmen that if President - '. Nixon decided to send troops ' to Laos, "he would come to the Congress of the United States By RICHARD HALLORAN ';'? for such approval." Special to e New Tor% Times --' ?' Spokesmen for the State and WASHINGTON, March 17 ? Pres-{Dabelfeentsoe Departments were =- Secretary of State William I'. ident in making any decision .consult" and "approval." Each reconcile the use of A position to foreclose the Rogers and Senator 3. W. Ful- which might be required in the said his department stood by bright sought today to soften future." what its Secretary had said. the impact of Mr. Rogers's ? A spokesman for the Secre- The issue of the political and assertion that the United Statestary said that Mr. Rogers, in his military conditions under which remarks, had been trying to American coldiers might be has no present plans to send soften the impact of the March sent to Laos came against a ground combat troops to Laos 3 statement. backdrop of intensified North, if that country should be over- In a telephone interview, Vietnamese action in that run by Communist forces. Senator Fulbright said he had country. Senator Fulbright, the chair- talked with Mr. Rogers this A State Department spokes- man of the Senate Foreign afternoon to explain the cir- man, Carl Bartch, told news- Relations Committee, revealed cumstances under :which the men that the military situation - statement had been made pub- in Laos was serious. He con- yesterday that, in a closed ses- lie. He said the disclosure had firmed -that the North Viet- sion of the committee on March "riot involved security" and was namese had taken several hill-1 ? 3, Mr. Rogers said of Laos: "We "not intended to embarrass the top outposts around the Royal ?I Laotian forces headquarters at have no present plans, if it is Senator Fulbright said he Sam Thong ,and Long Ting. overrun, to use combat troops.", I thought the "small; incident" j Both men emphasized today - 'had been "grossly exaggerated" ObectiVe Uncertain that it had been. Mr. Rogers's and indicated that there was no Mr. Rogers said that the intention to stress the "no pres:. disagreement between Mr. Rog- ultimate North 'Vietnamese oh- cot plans" and to assure the .ers and himself. ; jective was not known. "We 'Congress that none would' be i . Conflict in Views Seen hope that what they are up to is to make their negotiating made by the Administration: g- The quotation from Mr. Ro . position a little stronger," he without seeking Congressional_ ers came up yesterday whle said in his television appear- ? approval. ;? - - -.-. the Under Secretary of State, - .? ? 1 ance. "We hope that they do , Mr. Rogers said that -Cr a fElliot L. Richardson Was ?testi- . 1 not intend to overrun Laos." situation should arise that yin, before. the Foreign Rela- ,. - , Other officials here said they . tons Committee. Senators John would require consideration or.. Williams, Republican of Dela-1 believed the North Vietnamese forces were moving in for the combat forces in Laos, I told ware, and Clifford P. Case, Re- the Senate of the United States Publican of New Jersey, thought kill against the clandestine that' we, h fully the 'Congress would would consult with: t a r? Richardsonhad dif- army of Maj. Gem yang Pao,i the force trained and suppled 'them to the fullest 'extent .... fered from Secretary Rogers on by the United States Central Pc.l.s- ' ow ?sible." ? --:". : be consulted prior to any . deci-, Intelligence Agency. General Vang Pao's army has provided The Secretary, in a televised: sion to send troops to Laos. . i the only substantial opposition 'interview on the Naticinal? They asked to see the tran- to the North Vietnamese in script of the testimony that Mr. Broadcasting- Company's': .1.7'o?-? Laos for several years. day" show, said he had :ex-,: Rogers gave on Marc , After consultation with Senator Ful- h 3 Aft The officials also said they plained to the Foreign Relation's bright, they asked him to read had received no word on when Committee "that I was not-in" from the transcript. That pro- the courier with negotiating ' -