NEW MAN FOR CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000600120001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 179
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 30, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

STATINTL
Approved For. Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-
DES MOINES, IOWA,
REGISTER
0 E 3 O 137a
M - 250,261
S - 515,710
New Man for CIA
Only a few insiders have much basis
for judging the work of the United
S t a t e s Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) and they raroly talk. But there
are a few hints along the way about the
meaning of President Nixon's decision
to name James R. Schlesinger CIA di-
rector and make the present director.
Richard Helms, ambassador to Iran.
President Nixon has not been satisfied
with the performance of the U.S. "in-
telligence community." In late 19139 he
cut CIA personnel abroad by 10 to 12
per cent. He ordered a study of the CIA
and intelligence generally by James
V Schlesinger, then a military and inter-
national specialist in the White House
Office of Management and Budget. and
b7v K. W. Smith, a National Security
Council aide.
Their report. came out in May, 1971. it
recommended puiling intelligence to-
gether either by riving CIA Director
Helms more authority over the five oth-
er U.S. agencies beside the CIA that
gather intelligence, or by setting up a
now cabinet-level Department of In-
telligence.
In November, 1971. the White ` House
ordered a reorgani-r.ation of intelligence
activities to give Helms more leadership
over the rival intelligence agencies in
the State and Defense Departments, the
Atomic Energy Commission and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Now the President pulls helms out
and puts in one of the authors of the
report - Schlesinger.
One complaint that the President is
said to have against the CIA under
helms is that the CIA often has been
realistic about Vietnam. hoc example,
the CL\ didn't think bombing North
Vietnam would be effective, or that it
was effective after it started.
Ousting Helms for being right is
wrong.
On the other hand, Senator J. William
F.ulbright's Foreign Relations Com-
mittee has been hassling the CIA for its
private wars in Laos and Cambodia,
which either violate U.S. law or come
close to it. Ousting Helms for making
war against the will of Congress would
be proper - but it is clear Helms was
only carrying out Nixon's policy there.
James Schlesinger is an economist
who spent 12 years in the RAND Corpo-
ration. an Air Force think tank, then
three years as a Nixon appointee in the
,Bureau of the Budget and the White
House Office of Management and Bud--
et, then a year as Nixon's choice as
chairman of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission. His record in government is
good, but he is a weapons man and a
hardliner. `
Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5
 ti'iSHIiGiOI POST
Chahneiftyro.90&F . Release 2000/09/& 6IAZI DP80-0
Helms, the Shah and the CIA
THERE IS A CERTAIN irony in the
fact that Richard klclns will go to Iran
as the American ambassador 20 years
after the agency he now heads organ-
ized and directed the overthrow of the
regime then in power in Teheran. The
tale is worth recounting if only be-
cause of the changes in two decades
which have affected the Central Intel-
ligence Agency as well as American
foreign policy.
Helms first went to work at the CIA
Ili- 1947 and he came up to his present
post as directorthrouoh what is gener-
ally called the "department of dirty
tricks." However, there is nothing on
the public record to slow that lie per-
sonally had a hand in the overthrow of
the Communist backed and/or ori-
ented regime of Premier Moh;:ni red
Mossadegli in 1933. an action that re-
turned the Shall to his throne. (';',c can
only guess at the wry smile ti ,t must
have come to the Shah's face when he
first heard that President - i::on was
proposing to solid the CIA's top man
to be the American envoy.
The Iranian affair, and a similar
CIA action in Guatemala the following
year, are looked upon by old hands at
1953: Teheran rioting iijat over.
threw the (goccrnmen.t left the Unit.
ed Stotes Point Pour office with
gaping holes for tr:ndowcs and doors.
the agency as high points of a sort in
the Cold War years. David Wise and
Thomas 13. Ross have toil the Iranian
story in their hook, "The Invisible.Gov-
Verni ent," and the CIA bo. s at the
time, Allen Dulles, conceded in public
after he left the goternn)ent that the
United Stales had had a hand in what
occurred.
and the country was thrown into crisis.
JIossade_;h "connived," as Wise and
Ross put it, with Turich, Iran's Com-
munist party, to bolster his hand. The
British and Americans decided he had
to go and picked Gen. hazo11 h Zanedi
to replace him. The man who stage-
managed the job on the spot was Ker-
mit "Kim" Roosevelt (who also had a
hand in some fancy goingrs-on in
Egypt), grandson of T.R. and seventh
cousin of F.D.R., and now a Washing-
tonian in private business.
Roosevelt managed to get to Teheran
and set tit) underground headquarters.
A chief aide was Brig. Gen. II. Norman
Schwarzkopf, who, as head of the \"ew
Jersey state police, had become famous
during the Lindbergh baby kidnaping
case. Schwarzkopf had reorganized the
Shah's police force and he and Roose-
velt joined in the 1953 operation. The
Shah dismissed llossade,;h and named
Zaheldi as Premier but Mossade;,h ar-
rested the officer who hr.;ught the bad
news. The Teheran streets filled with
rioters and a scared Shall fled first to
Baghdad and then to Lome. Dulles
flew to Rome to confer with him. Roo-
sevelt ordered the Shah's backers into
the streets, the leftists were arrested
by the army and the Shah returned in
triumph. Mossade,h went to jail. In
time a new international oil consor-
tium took over Anglo-Irnian which
operates to this day,thouh the Shall
has squeezed more and more revenue
from the Westerners.
tivity, there were plenty of other suc-
ces:-ful enterprises that fell short of
changing government regimes. Today
the CIA. humiliated by the 1961 Bay of
Pigs fiasco it planned and ran, has
withdrawn from such large scale af-
fairs as tran, save for its continuing
major role in the no longer ''secret
war in Laos." The climate of today
would not permit the United States to
repeat the Iranian operation, or so one
resident Nixon (who was Vice Presi-
prise
The climate of 1953, however, was
very different and must he taken into
account in any judgment. Moscow
then was fishing in a great many
troublctd waters and among them was
Iran. It was probably true, as Allen
Dulles said on that 1965 TV show, that
"at no time has the CIA engaged in
any political activity or any intelli-
gence that was not approved at the
highest level." It was all part of a
deadly "game of nations." Richard Bis-
sell, who ran the U-2 program and the
Bay of Pigs, was asked on that TV
show about the morality of CIA activi-
ties. "I think," he replied, that "the
morality of . . . shall we call it for
short, cold war . , . is so infinitely eas-
ier than the morality of almost any
kind of hot war that I never encoun-
tered this as a serious problem."
PERHAPS the' philosophy of the
Cold War years and the CIA role were
best put by Dulles in a letter that he
wrote me in 1961. Excerpts from his
then forthcoming book had appeared
o him
it) Ilarper's and I had sueeested
t
book, "The Cof Intel- ]ligennh his " 1963 53 book, further revelations lie mint in-
Dulles wrote i. published vv' after Craft lie a in both left t CIA Iran , elude in the hook. He wrote about ad-
Dulles lie was making: "This includes
and Guatemala it "became clear" that more on Iran and Guatemala and the
a.Communist state was in the makin:. problems of policy in action when
"support from outside was given to there begins to be evidence that a
loyal anti-Communist elements." Ina country is slipping and Communist
1965 television documentary on take-over is threatened. We can't wait
"The Science of Spyitn " Dulles said: for an engraved invitation to come and
"Tile government of lIossadceli, if you give aid."
recall history, was overthrown by the There is a story, too, that Winston
action of the Shah. Now, that we en- Churchill was so pleased by the opera-
couraged the Shah to take that action tion in Iran that he profcrred the
I will not deny." Miles Copeland, an George Cross to Kim Roosevelt. But
ex-CIA operative in Inc Middle Last, the CIA wouldn't let him accept the
wrote in his book. "The Game of decoration. So Churchill commented to
Nations." that the Iranian derrin-do Roosevelt: "I would be proud to have
was called "Operation Ajax." lie cred- served tinder you" in such an opera-
ited Roosevelt with "almost single- Lion. 'I?hat remark, Roosevelt is said to
liandedly" calling the "pro-Shah forces! have. replied, was hotter than the deco
Oil to the streets of Teheran" and so- ration.
perv;sinO 'their riots so as to oust" Ilclms doubtless would be the last to
T'OD.AY THE IRAN to which Ifelnts
Will go alter he ieaves tiie CiA is a sta-
ble, well armed avid well oil-finances.,
recirite under the S hali's coniinand
IRAN IS NEX-l' DOUR to the Soviet which has mended its tencc?s With Mos-
Union. In 1951 1Iosrade;;h, who con- Cow without hurling its close relation-
fused V,'estertters w;th his habits of ship with w'a>a;in^lon. The t-iiah has
Weeping in public' and running govern- taken full aciv:uua.:e of the changes in
silent business from his bed, national- East-West relation : front the Cold % at-
say so out loud but I can imagine his
reflecting that. if it hadn't been for
what 1.)ullcs. Kim I,ooseveit and the
others did in I953, he would not have
the chance to present his credentials
to a Shah still on the peacock throne
in 1973. .
STATINTL
I ed t h e eJ,)IitApp the raved;Fo iReleasea2,000~a5 iStl,.CIA.RDP80-
cry. The west boycotted Iranian oil High prints of covert CIA Culd 1ti'ar ac-
 113
Approved For Release 20001,ff/t11 CPA-RDP80-0
I r" . "
> o Z e
By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Star-News Special Correspondent
'VIENTIANE - Some Amer-
icans killed in Indochina com-
bat do rot appear in the U.S.
Indochina death toll which
stands at latest count at
45,915.
These unacknowledged com-
bat deaths are of American
civilians performing military
duties normally carried out by
U.S. Air Force or Army per-
sonnel.
As they are civilians the
U.S. military does not include
them in the death tall when
they are killed in action.
For example, U.S. officials
this weekend announced two
t1 ~i L ' P kl C t \,
engaged were hit by Commu-
nist fire but none crashed. A
third American adviser to the
irregulars was killed during
an operation which failed to
retake the Plain of Jars in
North Laos in September.
Air America officials say
about twenty of their Arleri-
can crew members have been
killed in Laos since March
1970.
Air America is a private
contractor to the Central Intel-
ligence Agency and other U.S.
government agencies and as
air crew personnel are civil-
ians.
They are not carried on the
military death toll.
American military deaths:
Air America engages in re-
They said U.S. Air Force Capt. supply drops to irregulars of-
-v , . r
Osborne, Kan., was killed Sat- ~aireraft fire and in infiltration
urday when his light observa- and exfiltration of irregular in-
tion plane was shot clown by tellis;ence and c o in m a n d o
small arms over the embattled tcaris behind enemy lines. An-
.South Laos town of Saravane. ether company, Continental
U.S. officials said a second Airlines, has lost some Ameri-
American was lost over the can personnel in similar oper-
plain of Jars area but were ations in Laos.
unable to incientifv him u:itil American o f f i c i a 1 s say
next of kin were notified. roughly 800 Americans were
On Friday, Dec. 15, how- killed or aremissing in Laos
at a town on the Sot th since 'Mn 1964 when the Unit-
ever, ed . States first t shouldered a
Laos' Bolovens Plateau called greater burden of the Laos
.Paksong another kind of war. This figure includes all
death occurred. John Kearns categories and is mostly mili-
of Alvaredo, Tex., was listed tary.
? as killed by North Vietnamese The unheralded paramili-
mortar shells which hit the tary deaths in Laos indicate a
command post of the Lao ir- trend which may start to show
regular unit lie was advising, in South Vietnam as American
Killed at Saravane military wind down the war
An embassy spokesman de- there and various private
American civilian companies
scribed Kearns as "American are poised to move in to take
icpntract personnel attached to over paramilitary chores.
n irregular Lao unit." Irregu-
lar Lao units are handled by Deaths Unreported
the Central Intelligence agen-
. Increasing use of disguised
- T'--_
:
h
rd
was the
mil
American adviser to irre-m- paraitary organizations will
jars kill--,d in action since Sep- allow the U.S. military to put
tember. out figures of zero American
Another A m e r i. can was casualties on the ground as
killed when Lao irregultlr they > do now in Laos, as it will
units launched a helibornc at-
twing
tack on Sa rmv?ule on Oct. ]'1. be "civilians" who are
He was aboard age of eight killed, not U.S. military per-
U.S. Air Force helicopters sonnel.
which carried Lao irrc;uiars As in Laos most of these
.into the S~uravane airstrip un- - '1'? .''I k , f ?
mm
cy or other U.S. government.
agencies.
The U.S. failure to announce
a list of paramilitary deaths in
Laos, however, is one of the
few faults which mar these
operations.
in Laos, instead of having
thousands of Americans as the
Xenta,,on has poured into
Guth Vietnam, the war is run
just as effective if not more
so by 5'00 to 600 Americans.
Small Group Functions
While Hanoi fields four, and
in the dry season, five weak
divisions of some 40,000 com-
bat troops in Laos, the United
States has only between 30 and
40 men on the ground at the
most in combat areas through-
out the country.
In the past eight years an
estimated 31 of these Ameri-
cans been killed. This figure
i n c l u d e s some technicians
caught flatfooted onthe
ground in 1963 at Phou Pathi,
a supersecret installation in
North Laos which the North
Vietnamese overran.
About GO Air America crew-
men of American nationality
are believed to have been
killed in the same time period.
The small number of Ameri-
cans with the irregulars are
essential to insure good Lao
leadership and lack of corrup-
tion. Poor leadership and
non-payment of troops severe-
ly weakened Royal Lao regu-
lar forces throughout the war.
It has been suggested, how-
ever, that U.S. Embassy offi-
cials should admit it when
such Americans are killed in
action instead o: trying to pre-
tend they are "American per-
sonnel in mana ement" as
happened initially in the
Kearns' case and these An;eri-
can deaths should he included
in military cap:ualty fiiiiires re-
leased weekly in Saigon. .
STATINTL
der intense a car . lms . a 0"N"
ic,ltl V~, R A.foLrc Rekease QQ0_15 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5
Amc 1 i
the helicopter touched down. and similar units contracted to
Six of the.U.S. helicopters the Central Intelligence Agen-
 2 0 DEC ~,~ ,TATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15:
t"!
~./ `Y t.1[ Lai ti?? ,xL t,.i ill
By Ft c'_:M:ef P.. Ward
Despite press speculation a peace
agreement for Vietnam may soon be con-
cluded, there is concrete evidence indicating
the U.S. Ls planning to prolong the conflict
-and will attempt to subvert any peace ac-
cords.
U.S. procrastination in Paris, intensified
.bombing and the huge shipments of arms to
Saigon, among other developments, are all
indicators that the White liouse has no
desire for true peace hard has not abandoned
its neo-colonial designs in Indochina.
An even more ominous proof of U.S.
intentions of maintaining its puppet regimes
in Indochina, was the apparent effort by
presidential envoy Henry Kissinger to press
Saigon's "demands" in Paris at the end of
November, which would have virtually
scrapped the agreement reached in October
by Kissincer and in Due Tho of the DRV.
"Even as the U.S. military is packing up
for its expected exit ' from. Vietnam,
American officials here are secretly plan-
ning a major postwar presence of U.S.
civilians in Vietnam, with many of them
doing jobs formerly done by the military
,"
wrote Fox Butterfield in a report from
Saigon in the Nov. 27 New York Times.
-Without. alluding to the delay in Paris,
Butterfield noted that the U.S. is in the
process of au;nicntln_ its "civilian ad:iscry
force in Vietnam, from 50 CO to 10,;;0, its
peak level at the stage of maximum U.S.
mihhtary presence in Vietnam. But it should
be apparent that this "advisory" apparatus
could not be assembled overnight, anymore
than the enormous flow of U.S. arms co-,;Id
be brought to Saigon in a day. S aigo n's air
force was increased t;:o-fold, from
prox?i:nat.ely 1030 to 20130 aircraft during the
past two r:ontLs, to give only one item of
U.S. supply effort.
To place recent developments in their
proper pcrrpe:ctive, it must be noted that
t; ere has tbeen it major shift in U.S. strategy
art in motion lest spring in the wake of t e
Io- au t oied offensive by the Liberation
Armed Forces in S011111 Vietnam.
Despite adrniinistration efforts to play
down the strength of the offensive, it is
evident that once ag ain the whole. U.S.
strategy for victory in Vietnam was smashed.
Only. the most drastic U.S. measures of the
war prevented the complete collapse of the
Sadron regime and its armed forces: the
blockade of the DRV, the greatest aerial
escalation against the DR\' and liberated
areas of South Vietnam (while heavy
bombing of Laos and Cambodia was
sustained), and unprecedented aerial tac-
tical and logistics support for the Saigon'
forces.
The au mentation of the U.S. air logistics
:
support for S::i on s forces during the of
h
eses put
There have been various hypot
for ~'c^rd in the Western press concerning to give surged irori a montiFly aver 1e o;
about flint. million pounds o. cargo tore
Kissinger's seeming about-face on b?hnif of <
Saigon, after proclaiming in October before the ohensrve U.S. o 60 million pounds in.May.
the world that "peace is at hand." Nearly Augmented U"support" for Saigon after
f -
ever possible explanation has been the offensive be an, raised total U.S. ex
proposed by the pundits except the most pen itures on the war by an anneal rate of
plausible one. The U.S stal,is[g in Paris does approximately '410 billion or nearly double
~t:x rate prior to the offensive.
t
t
d
f
it
S
i
erence
no
represen
any
e
to
s
a
gon _ puppets, but rather it is for the purposes of ire Nixon administration co;:ccnicd this
augmentation by requesting additional war
U.S. policy and the Saigon repimc is merely F
an instrument. U.S. expressions of "su-,nort" fund'alg only for the period ending Se t. ,0.
for Saigon's policies, now as :n the past, to At about the same time the administration
the extent they are not fictions for deceising presented Congress with a request for these
American opinion, are fundamentally ex funds in June, Air America and Continental
presaions of the aims and designs of the U.S. Ait Ser.ices, the CIA coat ractual "civilian"
airlines, began stepping up recruitir among
Gain time Air Force personnel in Indochina, according
toil Dec. I report of Dispatch News Service,
In essence, An:cri`anprocrastination in by Jc;:n iwrFCc S. Ile quoted from a con
Paris has been an effortt to gain time for
augmenting Saigon's war machine and f,d'cntml recruirecruiting brochure which, am ono
setting tip a huee clandestine ., network ,~ of ot..tr points, stated:
,
"Clvll:atl advisors" which will attempt to
C['LlGi`-5t[r!c virrY'
ptb'.ongthe stru;,3le in Vietnam, as well as is c`ri-
the rest of IA
k
F
l~
l
E r~aVe~
~
~it
e
e~s
Oki 1 1-09 W
e rcciaents have been reacted.
govcrn;llcut, that is government ag:nc}?s
U,Lk~j3 l;.%
such as USO:vt, USAID, USIS, etc. While
these agencies may be under CIA direction,
you don't know and you don't care. The
government agencies direct the routin^s and
schcdutings, your company provides the
teei:inical know-hew and you fly the air-
P'aC.
--- n The brochure makes it clear that "civilian
frying" is merely a cover for clandestine
military activity: "Although flights mainly
serve U.S. offiical personnel movement and
n a:.tive officials and civilians, you sometimes
en gage in the movement of friendly troops,
or of enemy captives; or in the transport. of
cargo more potent than rice and beans!
T er e's a war going . on. Use your
imagination!"
In what Burgess describes as a
"hastily"added postrcipt, the brochure
states: "Foreign aid situation unclear
pending outcome military situation is RVN
(Pci,uh'-ic of Vietnam), but it looks as if we'll
fl:ieb t e war (and peace terms favorable for
our side); if so, it is expected than a boom
among contract operators will result.... "
In ether words, here we have the first
.concrete indication that the White House
was impacitiy admitting defeat of its
"Vieth tnimtion" program and reverting; to
a less costly program of clandestine warfare.
The U.S. str al c Sy shift was probably cqu?s'ly
dicta: ed by a desire to further diminish the
political impact Of the war on American
c; -.,inn a=1 finally by a desire to diminish
tree dowry to U.S. prestige is t e event of
i ' -1:2-c f:.. that is the cell?sc of the
}a;? st roll a.
i""a U.S. is clearly trying to stave off this
devetorment as long as pcssitle, but it also
wants to avoid the impression of being
engaged in di: ect and large-scale U.S. in-
tcrvc:rtion at the time, which sooner or later
Nixon and Kissinger must know is inevitable.
Even if they cannot face this reality, they
are now in deadly earnest about maintaining
support for the puppet regimes, regardless of
peace agreement. If the U.S. honestly
any
adhered to a peace agreement, Saigon's
political collapse would quickly follow. That
i why the U.S. is stepping up clandestine
support for the Saigon regime, military aid
disguised as civilian "contractual" aid,
provided mainly by U.S, private military
contractors.
There is a relationship between the U.S.
arrays build-up Indochina and the program
fur secret contractual aid. Before the Oc-
tober peace agreement, the U.S. made little
effort to keep the program' secret. In
tc timcny before ti:- Senate Appropriations
(Cotr.nlittee on Se)t. 13,,Air Force 'laj. Gen.
?a;cpli it. I:eLuca explained in detail U.S.
plans for contracting for personnel to train
Saigon Air Force members. In the area of
maintenance alone, the U.S. was planning to
make contracts for a54 million of one to
tar t}:erv:ords l' r
ersonnel ac
t p
,
 TWASHINGTON' P ST STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/151 P80-01601 R00
Thailand Approves.
U..: c uarters
BANGKOK. Dec. 16 (UP])-I headquarters from Saigon to a
Field Marshal Thanom Kitti- i remote base in Thailand only
kachorn said today that lie has 60 miles from North Vietnam
given the United States ap- when a cease-fire goes into ef-
proval to move its military feet in Vietnam.
Thanom confirmed the plan-
ned move to isolated Nakorn
Phanom Airbasc, 380 miles
northeast of Bangkok. The
base, which formerly -served
as a major center for close air
support of government and
CIA-sponsored troops in Laos,
was the jumping-off point for
the unsuccessful commando
(raid on North Vietnam's Son
tay POW camp in 1970.
It is the closest base to both
Laos and North Vietnam, ly-
in; about 60 miles from North,
Vietnam at the closest point.
Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5
 LOS L""-.L
Approved For Release 20001P?/rk: q -RDP80-01601 R00ffPQ1i(.01-5
eds Shell
C.I 's HQ at
..Long.Deng-
The headquarters of the
Central Intelligence Agen-
cy in Laos at Long Cheng
has come under Commu-
'nist artillery fire for the
first.time since early Sep-
tember, American officials
said, Thursday..
The North Vietnamese
shelling took place Tues-
day night, the officials
'said. They said about 30
rounds , of long-range 130-
,mn). 'artillery and 10
r oup d s of shorter-range
85-mm.;_ artillery hit the
western end of the airstrip
and damaged several hous-
es at the mountain base.
, No casualties were re-
.ported.
Lopg Cheng, -about SO
miles north of Vientiane,
is headquarters. for the
CIA:- sponsored t s e c r e t
army" led by the Meo hill
tribesmen's Maj. Gen.
Vang- Pao. In addition to
Vang Pao and his soldiers,
at number of CIA advisers
stay overnight at the base.
Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5
 NJ\
STATINTL
WASHINGTON 'STAR
Approved For Release 2000/05/0:19 WftP80-01
By JOHN BURGESS
Special to The Star-News
BANGKOK - "The flying is
non-mi]itary; in other words,
`civilian flying. You are flying
.for the U.S. government, that
.is government agencies such
as USOM, USAID, USIS, etc.
? While these agencies may be
'under CIA direction, you don't
know and you don't care. The
government agencies direct
the routings and schedulings,
your company provides the
technical know-how and you
fly the airplane." ,
Thus an unnamed American
pilot describes "civilian
flying" in Southeast Asia for
Air America and the lesser
known Continental Air Serv-
ices -both private companies
on contract to the U.S. govern-
?'ment. The pilot's comments
are part of a confidential,
16-page brochure available at
certain Air Force personnel of-
fices. It is shown to Air Force
,.pilots interested in flying for
one of the companies upon
-completing their military serv-
lee.
The brochure lists no author
,or publisher, but it offers 'an
: lltlminating view into the in-
sternal operations of Air. Amer-
.Ica, which lias played a cru-
'cial role in the Indochina war
theater since the 1930s. Air
,.America, along with the other
"companies, has airlifted
troops, refugees, CIA agents,
American politicians, war ma-
terial, food and occasionally
prisoners all over Southeast
Asia.
Extravagant Salaries
The brochure, dated June 29,
1972, boasts that Air America
ranked as one of the most
profitable corporation in the
United States in 1969, a year
when most of the world's air-
lines lost heavily. Air Ameri-
ca's customer is the U.S.
government.
It employs about 436 pilot's,
according to the pamphlet, of
which 384 are working in
Southeast Asia. The center of
Air America's operation is
Laos, where the presence of
military or military-related
personnel is prohibited by the
thuch-abused Geneva Confer-
ence of 1962.
{ Air America's profits are
high despite the somewhat ex-
travagant salaries it pays for
flying personnel. According to
the repo 4,a ppilot i 11
years ~PC 6~V i 1,o ff
Ull-34D helicopter based . at
Udorn air base in Thailand an
average of 100 hours monthly, it hints at the subject of con-
will take home $51,525. All sal- traband:
aries are tax free. "Although flights mainly
A newly hired pilot flyinga serve U.S. official personnel
C-7 Caribou transport based in movement and native officials
Vientiane, averaging 100 hours and civilians, you sometimes
flying time monthly, would engage in the movement of
earn a minimum $29,442. The friendly troops, or of enemy
U.S. commercial pilot average captives; or in the transport of
is $24,000. cargo much more potent than
Also available to Air Ameri- rice and beans! There's a war
ca personnel, in addition to a going on. Use your imagina-
liberal expense account, is life tiont"
and medical insurance, two- Air America works hand-
weeks leave, tickets on other in-hand with the U.S. Air
airlines at 20 percent normal Force. At Udorn air base in
cost, PX and government Thailand, Air Force mechan-
mailing privileges and educa- ics repair the airline's trans-
tional allowances for depend- ports and helicopters, many of
ents. Many Air America pilots them unmarked. The Air
are retired military men re- Force has reportedly leased
ceiving military pensions. giant C130 transports when the
-`Good' Investment planes were needed for opera-
Americans can also become tions in Laos. In the section on
"air freight specialists", com- Air America's benefits, the
monly called kickers. Their brochure lists in. addition to
job is to push cargo out over normal home and sick leave:
drop. zones. S a 1 a r y is "Military leave will be gx'ant-
$1,600-$1,800 per month. Quali- ed appropriately" - an appar-
ficat.ions: American' citizen- ent acknowledgement t h a t
ship, air borne training, expe- there are military people
rience with the U.S. Air Force working directly with Air
America.
Seattle First National 'Brink;
director of General Insurance
'Co.; director of Boeing Co.;;
director of Pacific Car Found-
ry Co.; director of Nor:nern
Pacific Railroad; director cf
Stanford Research Institute.
Arthur Berry Richardsall -
foreign service officer in Rus-
sia, China and England from
'1914 to 1936; chairman of the
b o a r d of Cheeseborough
Ponds, Inc. from 1955 to 1961;
director of United Hospital
Fund, New York; trustee of
Lenox Hill Hospital.
James Barr Ames - law
partner in Ropes & Gray, Bos-
ton; director of Air Asia Co..,
Ltd., director of International
Student Association; member,
Cambridge Civic Assoociationl
and trustee of Mt. Auburn
Hospital.
preferred. One should not conclude, STATINTL
Air America, Inc., is owned
laries ex-
t the
th
sa
a
however
,by a private aviation invest- citement, and tax advantages
ment concern called the Pacif- mean that Air l.nicrlca pilots
is Corp. Dunn and Brad- hope the war will continue. As
street's investment directory the brochure's author notes in
places its assets in the $10-$50
million category, and rates it typed postscript:
"good" as an investment risk. "Foreign aid situation un-
Air America itself employs al- clear pending outcome mili-
tary situation in RVN (P~epub-
together about 8,000 persons, lie of Vietnam), but it looks as
ranking in size just below Na- if we'll finish the war (and
tional Airlines and above most peace terms favorable for our
of the smaller U.S. domestic
airlines side); if so, it is expected that
. a boom among contract opera-
Formerly called Civil Air~tors will result when imple-
Transport (CAT), Air America mented, due to inevitable re-
was organized after World 'habilitation and reconstruction
War II by General Claire 'aid in wartorn areas.... Job
Chennault, commander of the market highly competitive and
American fighter squadrons in ybu'll need all the help you
Burma and China known as can get."
the Flying Tigers. CAT played According to Pacific News
a major role in post-war China Service, the following men sit
supplying Nationalist troops. on the Air America board of
CAT also supplied the French directors:
during their phase of the war Samuel Randolph Walker -
in Indochina. chairman of the board of Wm.
Air America is commonly IC. Walker's Son, New York;
considered an arm of the CIA. director of Equitable Life As-
In Laos, the CIA for the past surance Society; member of
10 years or more has main- Federal City Council, Wash-
tained an army of hill tribe- ington, D.C.; member of Ac-
men, mainly Thai and Lao tion Council for Better Cities,
mercenaries. Most of the air 'Urban America, Inc., and life
supply and transport needs for trustee, Columbia University.
this army have been handled William A. Reed - chair-
by Air America. man of the.board of Simpson
chairman of the
Co
Ti
b
;
er
m
. Relea ' t2b0 fl : CI7 DIRN4161 R.OOO600120001-5
Though the brochure oes Co,; director of Crown -Imp-
not mention opium explicitly, son Timber Co.; director of
 Approved For Release ;'I J'72CIA-RDP80-01601 R
ENEMY HITS HARD-
"AT LAOS POSITIONS
The New York 11mes/Dec. 12,
Heavy Communist attacks
were reported near Long
Tieng (1). Laotians were
driving eastward in the
Dong Hene area (2).
Start of Drive on Key Base
Near Plain Is-indicated
By MALCOLM P.I. BROWNE
Special to The Neir York Times
VIENTIANE, Laos, Dec. 11-
Communist forces mounted
heavy attacks on Laotian Gov-
ernment positions near the for-
ward base supporting opera-
tions on the Plainc des Jarres
over the weekend in what may
be the start of a new drive to
overrun the base.
The attacks, which were be-
lieved to have overrun two
Government positions, in-
creased .pressure on Long
-k STATINTL
A third position attacked and,
believed overrun was only five)
miles east southeast of Long
Tieng, military informants here)
said. Contact with the Govern-?
ment unit there was lost and
many of the defenders are be-j
lieved to be missing.
Long a Focus of Fighting
In another action near the;
plain, Communist commandos
reportedly attempted to set off.
explosive charges against do-;
fenses at the eastern end of
the Long.Tieng valley, but were
repulsed.
The Long Tieng base, which
is supplied by air, is surround-
ed by mountains in which
strong Communist forces fre-
quently operate. Military offi-
cials here say the Communists
could probably take the base
any time they choose, provided
they Were willing to pay a high
cost in casualties.
But a military source said
today that the situation there
was not regarded as "any
worse than usual" and that the
several thousand military de-
pendents living at Long Tieng
were apparently not seeking to
leave.
The Plaine des Jarres, a pla-
teau surrounded by mountains,
bas been fought over for more
than a decade by Communist,
neutralist and rightist forces,
changing hand frequently.
In official disatches it is
frequently referred to as "stra-
tegic," but there are increasing
doubts among military observ-
ers here as to its real strategic
value.
. "Obviously we would like to
get it back if only because the
refugees who left there when
jhe Communists took over
could like to go home," an
American officer said. "It is
important to the Moo tribes-
men whose home is there. But
in terms. of deciding the war
in Laos the plain has long been
overrated."
In recent months General
Vang Pao and his Moo troops
have made several attempts to
regain a toehold on the plain,
but have been driven off each
time.
Drive in South Continues
In southern Laos, Govern-
ments forces were reported to-
be 0 -O 1u 1 O
alcently recaptured mar et own
of Dong Hcne past, Muong
Tieng, the Government's for-'
.ward base in the mountains
southwest of the Plaine des
darres.
The plain itself is occppied
by strong North Vietnamese
forces, and Long Tieng serves
as a base for air operations
and Government guerrilla at-
tacks against the plain. The
base, which lies in a rugged
valley, is the headquarters of
Gen. yang Pao and the irregp-
lar Moo troops he commands.
Laotian forces in the area
are. supplied, advised and in
some cases commanded by of-
ficials of the United States
Central Intelligence Agency.
Two of the positions believed
Approved FortRelease 2000/0506:
shelling and ground attacks
Friday and Saturday were close
to the southern tip of the plain.
Phalane and toward the Ho Chil
Minh Trail network bordering
South Vietnam.
The Vientiane troops were
said to have recaptured a large
cache of Communist mortar
and rocket shells in a clash
seven miles southeast of Mu-
ong Phalane. Street fighting
was reported continuing in
Muong Phalane against North
Vietnamese bunkers.
Elsewhere, in southern Laos,
10 clashes or shelling attacks
were reported around Sara-
vane, which has changed
hands a number of tines
during the last month. Govern-
ment troops have a precarious
hold on the abandoned and
shattered town, but Communist
pressure remains intense, and
a North . Vietnamese counter-
thrust is expected.
0600120001-5
 PHILADELPHIA, P They Want Out , Sow CIA militarization has
PULY ET 6 proved For ~t 9,OO OS ?5 1"MA-B '80L01'60IRO
t a o escape he the Lao eung. But the once
E - 634,371
S - 701,743
OCG 1 0 1972
$GU and the war, return to prosperous Meo have been
their villages and families, decimated by the CIA's mili-
and grow rice. tary programs.
' The deterrent to escape was . The tens of 'thousands of un-
the Royal Lao Army - 26 willing and unknowing tribes-
years in the Royal Lao Army. men helicoptered up to the
Military service is compul- Plain of Jars each dry season
sory for all males of 15, though since 1968 have been cut to
Irm
La"o U1 if a 13-year-old is big enough pieces by communist guns and
to hold a gun he will be drafted, shelling.
N And once a soldier, the only Barely 10 percent of the
Getiway out is bribery or serving .Meos survive in their tradi-
until you're 40. Twenty-six tional mountain-top homes. As
years in the Royal Lao Army their villages fell behind Com-
G s ~ is risky at the very best odds. munist lines, they were bomb-
T 66 A r in y recruiting teams - ed by the Americans.
B JOAN EVERINGHAM reach even remote villages, Dispatch News Service Inter- ,/
Y getting in by helicopter where national
Special to The Bulletin trucks won't go.
Phou Dum, Laos - The
twin antennae of a small U.S.
communications transmitter
sticks up from a lonely moun-
It isn't hard to see why'
those who had the chance
opted for being an "American
soldier" instead. "American
tain top'10 miles northwest of- Army" pay begins at 12,500
the village of Luang Prabang
in northern Laos.
According to a `Thai civilian
J employed by Air America
(under contract to the CIA) to
Maintain the installation, it
provides the U.S. military
with communications between
Northern Laos and the U.S. air
base at Udorn, Thailand.
Pro-Communist Pathet Lao
f .o r c e s control everything
north and west of the moun-
tain, beginning just a few hun-
dred meters from the trans-
mitter.
Not 'Irregular'
The 400 Lao Teung (moun-
taln>Lao) "irregulars" at the
lhttallation are among the 30,-
000 mountain villagers who
form the backbone of the
CIA's no longer secret army
jh Laos, an army that is vir-
tually independent of Laotian
control. ?
kip? per month ($15); Lao
army at 4,500 per month ($5).
Food too, I was assured,
was far better and more
plentiful, chiefly because the
Americans deliver it them
selves. Even big jars of local.
firewater whisky are occa-
sionally given out.
In battle, SGU troops have
access to superior weapons
and a more reliable flow of
ammunition than their broth-
ers in the Lao army. Air sup-
port comes faster and their
wounded are evacuated more
swiftly, said Lieutenant Ohn
See, the company command-
er.
More Respect
The Lao Teung speak of the
"American bosses" with more
respect than do the Meo SGUs
with whom they share these
highlands. .
Before CIA militarization of,
Officials refer to them as 1M"r'fl"rtet%t44 tribes, the
"irregulars," but they are Meo had a firmly established
f u l I t i rn e, highly trained s o c f a l-political structure
Troops. The Special Guerilla which the CIA brushed aside.
Units (SGU) are given credit But the Lao Teung were dis-
l o r the Vientiane govern- organized and scattered; and
Inent's not having lost control the CIA had no need 'to inter-
of the whole country. Commu_ fore with their traditional
h i s t forces occupy ' three- leadership.
fourths of Laos. The Lao Teung's economic
' How did these mountain sol- position has always been well
diers wind up in an American below that of the Meo. Their
army? crops were less carefully ten-
"Money," I was told over ded:and their livestock fewer.
.and over again on a recent
'overnight visit to the moun-
lain. (Chances of a journalist
being given a lift aboard the
-American helicopter that- ?
serves the mountain are about
.STATINTL
nil. The ni>~~olrt~dtlFor Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5
mountains t
 BALT1:,:v:S:. SUN
80-01601
V' 4'~J J. 0 id (:/ 3 Ci 4Y .t.,' t:l t/ i3 E/ G:~
perysion, though others ntay li- 'It is known, though. that the
BY ARNOLA n, ISAACS have faded across the border.
Sv.n?Staff Correspovident ,i bombing has been very heavy.
IThn mal? m,ickiv t'esntned. altdl' r.. 110~ ,~~h .. ..._.,.a ......,.:,.,.
Vientiane, Laos-The United so (lid American support,
States role in the Indochina
war may have diminished-but
not, in Laos. war in Indochina and the ported. to have been 900 a day-
No longer top secret but still North Vietnamese increased Iii-her rate than has ever
partly concealed from public their commitment o, Alen and 1been reached over N has iet-.
view, the American war effort I arms to the battles in South Want.
in support of the Lao govern Vietnam, the Laos war tool; on In the ground war, American
went remains as large as a pattern that tins remained Embassy officials, military at-
ever. Without it, U.S. and Lao essentially unchanged ever tac}tes and Central Intelligence
officials agree, the war against since. Agency personnel arc deeply
the Pathet Lao and its North The U.S_ seeking to fill-,ode involved in war planning. ']'he
'Vietnamese allies would col- the flow of Communist troops U.S. Embassy spokesman in
lapse not in months but possi- and supplies dot ?n the. Ito Chi Vientiane, gives a military
bly in days. Minh trail complex in eastern ?
"They might last a couple of Laos; stepped up its support of: briefing .for correspondents at
weeks without us," said ' an ~ Lao government troops in re- 11.30 every morning.
American officer with long ex- turn for diplomatic silence on The briefings are. quite' de-I
perience in Laos. He. grinned, U.S. bombing of the trail. The tailed except on U.S. opera
but he wasn't joking. A Lao l North Vietnamese in turn in- tions. 'I' hough the spokesman
woouldl take askedv with continued But-! Communist eforces in north einl forlexoctet) amplejeheowiair ll'not strikes,
side' aid for the Lao I rrny to Laos, committing thousar.-Is of whose planes: .were flying
be able to defend itself, said; their own Wien to keep Lao them.
seriously: "Eight or 10 years". government troops pinned All supplies
In support of the govern- clown safely away from the 1
meat's war effort, the U.S. is approaches to the trail and On the ground, the U.S. fur-
prov'iding direct niiliary aid of North Vietnam's border. nishes all the weapons, animu-
;+350 million a year. This is In the ensuing years. both nition and supplies for the
about 10 times the whole Lao Washington and Hanoi at-! 56.000-man -Royal Lao Army
national bud.-et, and almost 'I tempted to hide the degree of I -which, despite the, U.S. aid,
twice the country's gross na-their involvement in Laos. The still is regarded as ' poorly
tional product. North Vietnamese have never trained, badly-led and largely
The aici totals do not include ]acknowledged the presence of i ineffective, except for defensive
the cost. of American bonihill ;, their troops in the country- garrison duly. i
which is mounted from outside now estimated to number The Alain American effort.
Laos. Although t'.:e present ex- about 20.000. The Americans, has been with the irregular
tent of bombing in Laos is not trough feeling their aid was' units, originally. ..'organized,
known, fighter-bombers and 1justified by iNorlh Vietnam's trained, paid and in many
B 52's have at times in the4 violation of the Geneva agree- cases directed by the CIA. The
felt it ivou' I ! i
arentl
ular forces have grown to'
a
t
,
pp
rreg
past reached sortie rates over Inen
y
the embarrassing to intervene; 'bol't 3x1000 ? men and many]
highest
Laos exceeding the ever reached over North Viet.
cans launched full-scale air
most bombing of North Vict-
nam was suspeneded. the sor-
tie rate over Laos was re-
openly while 1-lartoi continued Hof then] are only'ver;v loosely
to deny its role. contr'olicd by the Lao military
Warn. Though an effort as large as
U.S. aid,to Laos began in the U. S war i^ Laos could not
1350's. During the confused the
warfare preceding the Geneva really be kept. hidden, official
Conference of 1362, the Amen- secrecy was maintained for a
cans supplied nearly half a long time.. It was not until
billion dollars for militar, sal- March, 1970, that President
aries and equipment, adminis- Nixon publicly acknowledgd
tering the military assistance! All,erican aircraft were bomb-I,a through a mission misleadingly i en aos,though be(c?Irfacts. had
'called the Pro ;rants E . 'lua- ,
tion Office and manned by . Few details
military officers in civilian, ,,l t, It,,. t,nn,hinv is now
1oug
command--a fact which is now!
giving some concern to the
government and to U.S. offi-
cials looking ahead to a possi-
' ` ~TATI NTL
regular units "just grew'"-
partly he au~c many ?Anieli-
i cans felt the IP yal Lao Army.
was simply too inept to he
illade into a capable fighting
forces
"Has etrdvcd" .. ,'.
"The situatit>it' has e ohvecl,
said , an ? Anu~rican officer;
speaking of the formation of
the irregular units. "and F.111
not sure our policy' has evolved
along with it as it should
'
have.
'
Along with 'the irregular
units. tile 1:.S. bay's and equips
battalions of "volunteers".
from Thailand. Almost every-
thing; about the Thai units is
classifled, because both (he
Lao and 'Thai governments are
sensitive oil the subject, There
are said to? he about 12.000
Thai troops in the country
now, almost double the' num-
ber present a year 11"'0.
Working with the Lao forces,
according; to the U.S. Em-
bassy, are 3^_0 U.S. advisers,
which does not seem a large
ntltnber but aclualty represents
a far higher ratio of American
advisers to local troops than
his existed foi y~eari in South
Vietnam.
i It is not known how many
Americans working for "the
annex"--local slang for the
CIA-are directly involved
with military or paramilitary
units.
Between 300 and 400 Ameri-
cans provide logistical support
for Lao forces, mostly ' through
Air America, the CIA-financed
,charter airline that flies troops
houi
d
? sut,r,,,es ,,., ~?,,,;
ble cease-fire.: i an
The origins of ' the irregular i i country. Air America's helicop-
forces are still shrouded in '1ter's m1(1,..transport planes,
secrecy, but the information some -of-them with the conlpa-
available suggests that the; riy's insignia but most nu-
Americans did not intend, in marked, can be seen at vir-
the beginning, to create what I tually every airstrip in Laos.
has become a parallel army. i
The first. units apparently were;
e the
a
tt
d
-
d
nd
e
, ?-----
.
mi
clothes
a-- , otlicially a
"teclilliciai1S"-ail ouer,`ion are glade available. 'Tile'111m1-! guerrilla warfare against the!
that foreshadowed later clan beg of missions each day, for llo` C1ui Minh trail-an activity ";.
destine efforts. example, is not disclosed, nor 1 that might have ernbarrassedi
\\'hen the Geneva Accords' are. weekly, monthly or eveni tilt, 1 ;lo novernmeut; ' which':
banned foreign military aid. yearly totals. Presumably this has always regarded' the' war'
the Americans conscientiously' is not for security reasons, , in Laster]] Laos as the affair
withdrew 6G6 military advisers. since the Americans have for of the Americans and'. North
Only 40' of the 10,000 North' years released fairly precise Vietnatese ' t' ..
Laos awiy p' F uitc)-- Iftei n Wr s 11 ' E!' IQrf Dk~~80-0Ai6 80100600120001-5
American official sal he Ir-
Itional Control Commis,ion su- and South Vietnam.
 NA'L IUn.
Approved For Release 2000i0tPM: lC'1J t-RDP80-0160
THE POLITICS OF HEROIN' IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA. By-Alfred W. Mc-
Coy, with Cathleen B. Read and Leonard
P. Adams 11. Harper & Row. 464 pp.
$10.95.
nnUcF m. 3F ssr,' , r
Mr. Russets teaches political
Yale University.
ably you in our less-enlightened days)
contributed by failing to know or to care
much about the more subtle conse-
quences of that policy.
As McCoy points out, there were
around 20,000 addicts in the United
States in 1946; the best estimates are
that the figures then grew to about
57,000 in 1965, 315,000 in 1969, and
Most Americans used to think that the
costs of an interventionist foreign policy
were low. For relatively small expendi-
tures of foreign aid money, arms, or oc-
casionally ? the presence of American
troops, one could build bastions of the
Free World all around the globe. Anti-
Communist governments in the under-
developed countries could he supported
or created, and anti-Communist politi-
cians subsidized. Indeed, as in the Shan
states of Burma or the Indonesian islands,
separatist forces could be encouraged-
if the ruling government could not be
overthrown, or at least persuaded to.
move in desired directions. Some of these
efforts might also bring enlightened gov-
ernments and policies, to the countries in
.question. Others would succeed at the
cost of strengthening or imposing cor-
rupt, oligarchic, reactionary govern-
ments. Many others would fail, at the
cost of death and misery for the peoples
who lived in those distant countries. But
the costs to the United States would be
minimal, easily tolerated by the world's
richest power: And those small costs to
us seemed far preferable to living in a
world of Communist or neutralist.
nationalist states.
Our innocence about the costs of an
interventionist foreign policy has been
lost in the wake of Indochina. Even if
we could (as many still would) ignore
the costs of our war to the wretched
peoples of that area, we now have felt
some substantial costs to ourselves. Fifty-
six thousand young Americans dead,
$200 billion spent, an economy and for-
eign trade balance badly out of kilter,
intense strains on our domestic, social
and political system-these we now
recognize as part of the price we pay.
In this new book Alfred McCoy and his
associates show us another cost, very
possibly the grimmest of all, resulting
from our addiction to interventionism:
the heroin plague.
560,000 in 1971. The avalanche of ad-
diction was made possible by an evil
combination of supply and demand. De-
mand means the ability of American
drug consumers to pay high prices, social
conditions feeding the desire for an es-
cape, and the enthusiasm of pushers pre-
pared to distribute free samples gener-
ously. Under such circumstances the
market will grow as fast as supply will
permit. The supply comes from abroad:
formerly from Turkey and Iran, now
largely from Southeast Asia-60 to 70
per cent of the world's illicit opium from
the "Golden Triangle" of Burma, Laos
and Thailand. It is grown by peasants,
shipped to the United States and dis-
tributed by Corsican and Mafia under-
world gangs, and moved from the peas-
ants to the gangs with the assistance of
such friendly Freedom Fighters as Gen.
Phoumi Nosavan of Laos, and Ngo Dinh
Diem and Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky
of South Vietnam. After enormous and
carefully documented exposition McCoy
finds that the United States:
has acquired enormous power
in the region. And it has used this
power to create new nations where
none existed, handpick prime ministers,
topple governments, and crush revolu-
tions. But U.S. officials in Southeast
Asia have always tended to consider
the opium traffic a quaint local custom
and have generally turned a blind eye
to official involvement. . . However,
American involvement has gone far
beyond coincidental complicity; em-
bassies have covered up involvement
by client governments,, CIA .contract
airlines have carried opium, and in-
dividual CIA agents have winked at
the opium traffic.
opium runners and their accomplices in
Southeast Asia, that was just the. way it
had to be. In any case, it usually 'seemed
to -be the. citizens of the countries far
away, not Americans, who paid the price
of such alliances. Until 1970, for in-
stance, opium grown in the Golden Tri-
angle stayed almost entirely in South-
east Asia for Southeast Asians. Only in
that spring did the great flood of heroin
to GIs in Vietnam begin, and only later
still did it start to flow directly to the
United States. And it was not until that
time that senior officials in the U.S. Gov-
ernment decided that the Southeast Asian
heroin trade should be suppressed.
McCoy and his 'colleagues show
us, convincingly, that the heroin trade
grew with the acquiescence and some-
times with the assistance of men in our
government. Without our government's
history of single-minded anticommu-
nism, and of meddling in the politics of
foreign lands, our government and our
people would now have a heroin prob-
lem of much smaller proportions: Official
American complicity in the drug trade
has to stop. No matter. how much some
cold-warrior leaders may like the foreign
policy of a particular foreign govern-
ment, if that government is condoning
heroin traffic, American military and
economic aid should be withdrawn. The
STATINTL.
This important book should not be
interpreted as a piece of yellow journal-
ism or ' as an expose of scandals in the
CIA. It details none of the. classic sort
of corruption for personal enrichment on
the part of CIA men or of any other ,
U.S. Government officials (though there
is plenty on the part of the locals). The
Drug addiction has of course been corruption is of a more subtle sort, stem-
a curse of men for many centuries, and ming from the enthusiasm of "good" men
the United States has had thousands of for doing a good job. The job was de-
heroin addicts since about sixty years fined as halting, communism; the choice
ago. Neither the CIA nor Dean Rusk of means or of allies was not so im-
nor Henry I:AM? e t r ~~d- rM910 `'Cet tAP n` 51601 R000600120001-5
diction. But s e ct ,
enthusiast for an interventionist foreign in Marseilles, the Mafia in Sicily, or
policy (and that includes me and prob-
 FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS NEWSLETTE
Dec 1972
THE INTELLIGENCE CO1M,UNITY: TIME FOR R VIEW?
Approved For Release 2008/05/15: CIA-RDRPA0 -tR000
The intcllit;c ace community, and its budget, pose many a rrrrries such additional services of common concern as,
Council determines can be more
f Amcr-' the National Securit
i
y
on o
problcnrs of traditional concern to the Federat
ican Scientists: governmental reform, morality, proper' . eiTcctively accomplished centrally;
use of high technology, and defense expenditures. In the "perform such other functions and duties related to
N
a-
last quarter century, intelligence agencies have prolifcr- tnreiligeirce affecting the national security as the
ated. The United States has established an agency which tional Security Council may from tlmc to lima direct
goes thcyoncl intelligence collection and, periodically, inter- (italics added)
fcres in the internal affairs of other nations. Technology
suited to the invasion of national and personal privacy
has been developed apace. And the $4 to $6 billion being
spent for intelligence might well be termed the largest
".unrcvicwcd" part of the defense budget.
Twcnty-frvc years after the passage of the National Sc-'
eurity Act of 1947, it sears a good time to consider the
problems posed by these developments. .
Of least concern in terms of its budget but of over-riding
significance in its international political impact, is the Di-
rectorate of III-iris of CIA, within which clandcstinc politi-
cal operations are mounted. This is (lie issue discussed in
dais newsletter.' More and more, informed observers qucs-
tIon whether clandestine political operations ought to be
continued on a "business. as usual" basis. In the absence
of an investigation, a 'secret bureaucracy---which started
in the Office of Strategic Services during a hot war and
which grew in the CIA during a cold war-may simply
continue to practice a questionable trade.
Clandestine "dirty tricks" have their costs not only'
abroad but at home, where they are encouraged only too
easily. And is not interference in the affairs of other
nations wrong?
Two decades ago, as the cold war gained momentum,
one of America's greatest political scientists, Harold D..
I,asswcll. wrote a comprehensive and prophetic boo}:,
"(?7arional Security and Individual Freedom." He warned
of the "insidious menace" that a continuing'crisis might
"undermine and eventually destroy free institutions." We
would see, he predicted: 'pressure for defense expendi-
tures, expansion and centralization of Government, with-
holding of information, general=suspicion, an undermining
of press and public opinion, a weakening, of political
p4rtics, a decline of the Congress, and. of the courts.
:Today, with the Cold War waning, it seems in order to,
reexamine our institutions, goals and standards.. Which
responses to the emergency of yesterday can we justify
J today? ^
{}
The National Security Act of 1947 created the Central
Intcllircncc Agency and gave it overall responsibility for
coordinating the intelligence activities of the several role-:
vtint government departments and agencies interested in'
Such matters. Today, a quarter century later, CIA is re
ported to have a budget of about $700-million to $I
billion and a stall of perhaps 18,000 people, or about
1,000 more than the Department of State! (This ad
vantage in sic gives CIA an edg*_c in interdepartmental
ptectings for which, for example, others may be too rushed
fo (ally prepare or not be able to assign a suitable person.)
These clauses clearly authorize clandestine intclligcnc
collection but they are also used, to justify clandestine po
litical operations. However, overthrowing governments
secret wars, assassination, and fixing, elections are err
tainly not done "for the benefit of the existing inteliit,cnc
agencies" nor are they duties "related to inteiligcncc.
Someday a court may rule that ,political activities are no
authorized.'
In any case, at the urging of Alien Dulles, the Nationa
Security Council issued a nccret.ctrcctivc (NSC 10/2i ii
1948, authorizing such special operations of all kinds
provided they were secret and small enough to be pausioi
.deniable by the Government.
Even this. authority has been exceeded since several irn
possible-to-deny operation's have been undertaken: ti.,
U-2 flight, the flay of Pigs invasion, the Iranian Coup, ,It
Laotian War, and so on. ,
The National Security Act: gave the CIA no "polio
subpoena, law enforcement po\a?crs, or internal securit
functions ..." But another secret Executive Branch docu
fnent evidently did give the CIA authority to cnFa;;c i
domestic operations related to its job. It was under t6d
authority that such' organizations as foundations, cduca-
'tional organizations, and private voluntary groups were
involved with the CIA at the time of the National Student J
Association revelations (1966). '
Tbe. "white" part of CIA is, in a sense, a cover for the
"black" side. CiA supporters and officials invarianiy er.-
phasize the intelligence, rather than the ? rttanifrur,.;;?:ln
function of CIA, ignoring the latter or using phrase., tat
gloss over it quietly. The public can easily accept the .ic-
siiability of knowing as much as-possible. But its instincts
oppose doing abroad what it would not tolerate at home.
And it rightly fears that injustices committed abroad may
begin to he tolerated at home: how many elections can
be fixed abroad before we begin to try it here? The last
election showed such a degeneration of traditional Ameri-
can standards.
The, present Director of Central, intelligence, Rici-hard
Helms, is working hard and effectively at presenting; an
image of CIA that will not, offend. In a recc it speech. he
laid:
"The same objectivity which makes us useful to o,rr
government and our, country leaves us uncontfortabi;,
aware of our ambiguous place in it..... We propose tc
adapt intelligence to American society, not vice versa."
Even construed narrowly,-this is no easy job, and adapt-
ins, clandestine political operations to American ideals nta>
well be quite impossible..
At the time of the Bay of Pigs, President Kcrtncdv gave
~ ..' ?' UViiat ,xLurtay r%e,r dllluvllfvu wrL w.
p nC yC C y~ t ~f l' {~y j r w~lFor k
"perform foorrpthe hVe~r oft eeeisting in(ewgeoce 1 st c ~tl.ll c s~c?F i~tl'IOoi ~sidcnt
 2 9 NOV 1971
Approved For Release 200G/05/15: CI T&Aa.b1
Republic of Vietnam in the early 19b0's, as
documented in the Pentagon Papers, but
which provided few details. The present
program, apparently undergoing a partial
"Vietnamization," is. an outgrowth of the
original escalation of CIA-Special Forces
ne Speciaf`Forceswe[eranT who par-
ticipated in Command and Control raids
from Danang, said he had taken part in
missions in North Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia. "lid said they were. for'the
pfurpose of gathering intelligence, rescuing
supplies and disrupting enemy com-
Although the Post Dispatch does not Command and Control Central, operating
mention the CIA, it is clear that Studies and ut of Dakto and Kontum, near the tri-
Observations Group is a CIA operation. Thelorder area of South Vietnam and Laos and
informant most knowledgeable about SOG,
a Special Forces officer, was described by
correspondent Meyer as fearful of being
jailed or fined, saying: "If I talked to you and
got caught, I could get 10 years in prison and
a $10,000 fine."
The Special Forces officer said that the
connections between Command and Control
and the 'MAC-V 8OG' organization in'
Saigon were so highly classified that we
would not risk commenting on them," wrote
Meyer.
Despite his reluctance to talk the officer
explained that the Command and Control
operations were "formally" under the
By Richard E. Ward
Second.of a series
Clandestine sabotagz, combat and
espionage missions have been conducted- in
Laos and Cambodia by U.S. military per
sonnel, despite White House denials and
contrary to congressional prohibition.
Such missions are top-secret actions
directed by the Studies and, Observations
Group of the U.S. Army Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam, located in Saigon and
generally known by its initials, MAC-V
SOG. The most comprehensive picture of
these activities available, based on testimony
of former participants in these missions,
known as Command and Control operations.
is contained in a series of three articles by
Gerald Meyer, published in the Nov. 5, 10
and 12 issues of the St. Louis Post 'Dispatch.
Unless otherwise indicated all material in
thisart.icle is based on the articles by Meyer,
a regular staff member of the Post Dispatch,
who interviewed former Special Forces
:members, helicopter pilots and others who
,took part in the Command and Control
operations during the 1960s and into 1972.
The Post Dispatch's informants, whose
names were not revealed to protect them
from possible prosecution, stated that the
clandestine commando raids were still in
;progress as of August. One informant said
that in August when he left Bien Hoa, one of
the Command and Control bases, more than
100 Army Special Forces were stationed
there and reinforcements were being sent
from Okinawa.
The commando raids in recent years,
utilizing Army personnel who generally
command teams composed of mercenaries
from Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam,
were also sent into North Vietnam and
liberated areas of South Vietnam. There is
evidence that the Air Force has operational
jurisdiction over a similar program based at
direction of the Fifth Special Forces Group
until January 1971, when the Fifth Special
Forces officially was described as having
been withdrawn from Vietnam. Actually,
according to Meyer, "numerous Fifth
Special Forces were left behind at Command
and Control bases throughout South
Vietnam" and various efforts were employed
to conceal their continued presence. They
were forbidden to wear the green.beret and
.Special Forces insignia while they remained
in Indochina.
Symbolic of the Command and Control
operations, was a gestapo-like insignia, used
by one of the units, a green-bereted 'skull
with blood dripping from its teeth. This was
the emblem of Command and Control
Central. There were at least two other main
units, Command and Control North and
Command and Control South. The North,
Central and South referred to the base areas
of the commando teams.
Apparently most of the operations under
the Command and Control program, at least
in recent years, took place in southern Laos.
However, after the U.S.-Saigon invasion of
Cambodia and subsequent Congressional
prohibition against use of U.S. ground
troops in Cambodia, it is safe to assume that
the secret U.S. missions were increased in
the latter country.
Airborne bandits
Typically, Command and Control missions
comprised several U.S. officers or NCO's
commanding a mercenary team which
would land in Laos' or Cambodia, and
"aimed at taking prisoners, gathering in-
formation and disrupting communist ac-
tivities." The commandos would be tran-
sported in four helicopters, while four
helicopter gunships would. provide air cover,
Cambodia, was used for raids deep within
the two latter countries.
"A Special Forces soldier formerly
assigned to Command and Control Central
said that the group's missions were handled
by about 150 Americans and from 30Q to '100
Montagnard tribesmen. Men participating in
missions first were transported to Dakto and
then sent by helicopter across the borders,
he said.
"The missions were rotated among the
men and casualties were severe, the man
said.... Such teams usually included two or
three American leaders and about half a
dozen Montagnards.
"Dakto was the starting point also for
large'hatchet forces; with larger numbers of
Americans and Montagnards... .
"Less frequently-apparently only about
once every six months-very large groups of
Americans were sent across the borders on
so-called Slam (Search, locate and an-
nihilate) missions. More than 100 men
sometimes participated in such missions....
"Some penetrations into Laos apparently
were quite deep. Both the Special Forces'
(two of Meyer's informants) said the U.S'.
operated a radio relay station on a mountain
top about 30 miles inside Laos.
'This station, called the 'Eagle's Nest,' was
used to transmit messages between South
Vietnam and Command and Control teams
operating beyond the mountain top in the
Laotian countryside."
The radio station, whose exact location
was not specified, could have been located
near the Bolovens plateau, in Southern Laos,
where the Pathet Lao told this correspon-
dent in 1970 there was a secret U.S. base.
The Pathet Lao liberation forces captured
STATINTL
'Laotian -b- Rele6seR000600120001-5
Commando raids were ordered by the forward air controller, were also, in-
 THE Ai4ERI CAN NEB CVRY
Approved For Release 200010AVLt1W-DP80-0160
"SIAIINIL
r sozzt e ystei?ioucre~rsozz, the Sri X0,2 ' tlzisizzistratiofx
o
F
is ~i=zg to the people tboi tizm,ports of opium and
:'he,4 oin from Red China
By KENNETH JOHNS
H OW MUCH of President
Nixon's re-election was en-
gineered by "blood money"
from the Red Chinese narcotics "death
trade?" This is, the question that many
observers are asking as they speculate
about the sources of the large sums of
money contributed to Nixon's campaign
committee whose donors were not pub-
licly identified.
The informed guess is that these sums
were payoffs from those who control
the traffic in opium. Several Washington
correspondents pointed out that the
"missing item" not discussed by Presi-
dent Nixon and Chinese Conununist
leaders during the meetings earlier this
year was the question of stopping the
deadly shipments of heroin and its
source material, opium, from the China
tion ends up in the United States to sup-
ply its estimated 600,000 heroin addicts.
Yet, the Nixon Administration and its
spokesmen constantly. play down or
deny the existence of large imports,
especially from China.
Noteworthy also is the fact that while
official pronouncements are made de-
ploring the "evil" from President Nixon
down, the Nixon Administration has as-
signed only ten agents to all of Asia to
intercept shipments. As one expert put
it, "If he's [Nixon] really interested in
slopping the flow he would see that the
CIA, FBI and other agencies assign 500
to I-long Kong, 500 to Bangkok and
500 to Saigon. These are the major
trans-shipment points to the U.S. This
would make a dent in the supplies
reaching the U.S."
mainland. See No Evil, Hear No Evil ...
The rapidly growing number of dope Preposterous as it may sound, the
addicts is considered by experts to be Administration's official policy is that no
the number one danger to this country's heroin or opinni comes fron.Red China.
health and internal security. - Why this outright lie in the face of what
all experts and foreign government of-
Extremely suspicious also is the repe- ficials know is not so?
tition of statements about stopping the. Red China's involvement in the
flow of opium from Turkey. This coup- opium traffic has been known to in-
try grows only a small part of total formed people, both in and out of gov-
world production, about 400 tons, coin- ernment, for years. One of the first gov-
pared to 1,000 tons in Southeast Asia ernment experts to point out the exist-
and an estimated 10,000 tons in Red ence of the "death trade" was Harry J.
China .Approved For Release 2000/0oj j' ; I d t f the Bureau of
XwAUM! 1 ,0 100120001-5
A substantial part.of world produc- he told the Senate. Judiciary Committee C0ftiiiuc3.
 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5
BE,ST.COP
Available
Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5
 '1'ti1; EL1'LA13E'i'li, N. J. DAILY JOTSTAITINTL
27 Nov 1972
rovr Releas00/05/15: CIA-RD ~ 60
(Former GrtFn Fcrrt
Capt. finl?srt F. ,1at'acrn
and set-rn nfhrr Cprci.il
Forces nlemheri were iil-
?vnlvrtl in one n( the mainr
enlllinversu' or the `'iet-
Itanl War ill ltllifl when nr.
f.iicetl of tnrrrrinihro , trinin
agent, Now i civilian ' ill
Bloomfield, lip tprnt. norm
hotirs hritr~ intrrvlr ved by
Dally Jnnrnal repnrfrr
TI minas liirlialshi, rrrill_
In.g ex-llt% c,lrrnitttdi11 ; Illy
afisQ.KSinat-nn th:i( he say3
never were mails public),
By Tuna 1S frtl(FlAl,SKI
J'eutttal Staff ;Writer
Former (ire-en Beret. Capt.
Fohert. F. 1Tararn ;ajr] ha
and nthel? sorrily) Pores;
per,r!nnl were involved in
clandectin' crn;s harrier in-
telligence operations i n
Cambodia a; far hack as OCR.
That. fart i; actually {r
rei?vanf, hnttcvrr, i.n that
small Unit; of iT.,i. ;Military
and the f'entral ItltrII ''ire
A?ency have hcrn operating
"Un;rrittell abant" -,emir; inf.h
l;'ct_1h (C13111bodna anr) Lan; frir.
F?vcra] year; prel'inu= to 12r,%,
stilt '11.ara;rt and seven
ether C?real krrFt; tcrrt3
grritb d b`r the Ar nl,, with the
June 1?li'4 "rltmrnatiinn" of
Thai Khac Chinyen, a triply
anent who jointly :,river) the
U F;. North Vietnam and i nllth
1'ir-team Fa -rrnnhrntc a; a
tot'. This came directly a3 A
Cambodia ;end bans during
?~F3.
The ra;c, l-ln_ .omrd into an
enln-tlon-lar)pn rnntrover=v
that tnurhed (nnorp c, the
cerretaire3 of the :lfrov and
D-fen_e, the Crr.tral i11-
teilt:ellce Agrnry a n d
Mara;rn was charged with
pumping fun iiiillei ; into
(-l,it'en's hr-.ad h14'. "
At the bottom were the says nothing about civilian
'words: "U. S. citizens only."
The ad was one of the first
open indications here of plans
for an American civilian advi-
sory corps to remain in South
Vietnam after a ceasefire.
NIIA INC. - one of the
larger American contractors
here -- is seeking mainte-
nance men for South Vietnam-
. ese aircraft, both fighter
planes and helicopters.
.The ad represented only a
portion of the advisory corps'
iceberg.
The United States is devel-
oping plans in many fields for
advisers to maintain sophisti-
cated equipment, run comput-
ers, supervise economic as-
sistance - and a good deal
more.
The force could easily sur-
pass 10,000 - and that figure
could be an underestimate.
"YOU CAN BET that the
Joint Chiefs of Staff can do
more for South Vietnam than
just help out technically.
They'll, want 10,000 snake-eat-
ers in here for sure," one
source said.
'A "snake-eater" in Saigon
advisers.
It does say that the United
States will not "intervene in
the internal
Vietnam:"
AS NEARLY as can be dis-
cerned from various sources
here, all of whom would pre-
fer to talk of the advisory
corps in whispers, the civil-
ians would fall into at least
three major categories:
-U. S. CONTRACT person-
nel, working for companies
that sign up to do specific
jobs, such as NHA's aricraft
maintenance work.
-ADVISERS to the Saigon
government in each of South
Vietnam's 44 provinces, from
the Mekong Delta to the de-
militarized zone.
COVERT MILITARY opera-
tions - perhaps in the pattern
of Laos, where di;,, CIA 1 1
boon running the Laotian war
for years - would be another
possibility.
No one is willing to talk
about that, and decisions may
not yet have been made in
Washington on a covert ba17-
game. Such decisions may be
held back until U. S. officials
determine whether Hanoi vio-
A U. S. officer said it will
probably operate largely out
of USIAD (U. S. Agency for
International Development). .
AID, headed . by former
Michigan State University
president John A. Hannah,
has been used as a cover for
covert military operations in
Laos - much to Ilannah's
distress.
CORDS has maintained ad-
visers to South Vietnam's 44
lates a ceasefire. province chiefs and to its 272
In Laos, plainclothes CIA districts. If a ceasefire aqree-
military advisers have been merit is signed, plans call for
attached to the U. S. Embassy continuing U. S. advisers at
in Vientiane as military at- only the province level. Still,
taches, they would travel extensively.
One big civilian contractor j CORDS has about 1,500 ad-
in Vietnam is Air America 1 visers in Vietnam. That num-
a CIA-controlled airline which ber will probably be cut.
has played a key role in the
"T; IF BIGGEST contracts
are going to gall in the area of
maintenance and logistics,'.'
said one official.
"The Souith Vietnamese are
going to need help in keeping
our sophisticated equipment
going. They do a pretty good
job, overail, hurt there are just
some things they can't yet do
- at least duo well enough."
In logistics, they'll need
help primarily in running
-MEN TO KEEP an eve on U.S. computers, to keep track
the hundreds of millions of of mauntains of equipment
dollars worth of economics as- and of military units. And
sistance that is expected to they are used in intelligence
pour in here to help rebuild work.
South Vietnam.
What all this adds up to is GOVERNMENT advisers
perhaps 5,000 to 6,000 contract : will be organized along the
people; 500 to 1,000 advisers, lines of the present "CORDS,"
most of them outside Saigon; the U. S. "pacification"
and a few thousand oversee-
ing the spending of huge stuns
in American money.
effort. (The initials stand for
"Civil Operations and. Rural
Development Support.")
PRIMARY NEEDS in Viet-
nam, according to experts,
will be in agricultural advice,
public health and engineering.
Approved' For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5
 STATINTL
DAILY YIORLD
Approved For Release 2000Ogiy: ?)Jk-RDP80-01601 R
EDITOR
THE DAILY WORLD
205 WEST 19t T.
PREMATURE OBITUARY
Newsweek and Time this week prematurely
buried the war in Vietnam as over. The theme
was that it is all over except for final details.
Of course. that is Nixon ,s pre-election propaganda
line. Whether they fell victim to that propaganda
line or consciously joined in the deception is still
to be, discovered. The main fact at this point is.
that they did it.
As for Nixon. his strategy is obvious. In addi-
tion to all that the Daily World has already
written exposing that strategy, there needs to be
added that not only is Nixon not winding down
the war, he is once again shifting the basis of
operations to continue it at a new level.
Not only is he beefing up the Thieu mercenary
regime, but U.S. advisers will continue to "guide"
Thieu and pull other strings from behind the
scenes as the CIA has been doing in Laos for
years. Tricky Dick has lost none of his adeptness
in deception of the people.
-ROSS MALCOLM, Queens, N.Y.
~--'-FLEW YOPK 10011
Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5
 Approved For Release 200
ATTACK total of about 90 rounds of
mortar hit positions held by
INTENSIVE
name
rbrne rangers about one mile~
north is
north of Quangtri city. This
MAI'sJijjJETS
h b t 1000
ou
t
ON SUPPLY ROUTE.
,
a
compares wi
enemy mortar artillery and
rocket shells that fell in the
Only light ground fighting
300 Fighter-Bomber Strikes was reported elsewhere. Mili-
tary officials said they would
and 11 B-52 Raids Focus have to study the pattern of
on panhandle Region fighting a few more days be-
fore concluding whether it was
related to reports from high
By JAMES P. STERBA level American military sources
Special to The New York 1'Imes Tuesday that some North Viet-
Il d b k
SAIGON, South Vietnam,
Thursday, Nov. 16-The United
States command reported yes-
terday that American bombers
had staged one of the heaviest
days of raids of the war on the
southern panhandle of North
Vietnam.
More than 300 tactical strikes
by fighter-bombers were re-
ported concentrated Tuesday in
an area from about 20 miles,
south of Thanhhoa down to the
demilitarized zone that strad-i
dles the border between North;
Vietnam and South Vietnam.
This. total, a ? substantial in-:
crease' from the 220 reported
Monday, was higher than the
average number that formerly
.was flown over all North Viet-
nam.
Biggest Raids in 3 Weeks
I In addition, 11 three-plane.
'missions by B-52 heavy bomb-
ers were flown over the pan
handle.
The raids, aimed at blocking
the North Vietnamese supplies
being rushed to Communist
troops in South Vietnam before
any ceasefire, were the heaviest
since President Nixon restrict-
ed bombing of the North to the
namese units had pu e away from the fighting.
In a delayed report, the
South Vietnamese command
said the bodies of 50 people
that it described as the
"enemy" were discovered in
STATINTL
bP80-01601 R000600
Meo Said to Retreat
VIENTIANE, Laos, Nov. 15
(AP)-A United States military
spokesman reported today that
Gen. Vang Pao's army of Meo
tribesmen, which the American
Central Intelligence Agency
finances, had been pushed off
the southern edge of the Plaine
des Jarres. He said North Viet-1
namese forces shelled a force
of several battalions for sixi
hours Monday night and then
made a ground attack Tuesday.
The Meos retreated after suffer-
ing "moderate" casualties and
were trying to regroup to the
south, the spokesman said.
Saigon Desertions Reported
Special to The New York TI mes
PARIS, Nov. 15-The Viet-
cong delegation to the peace
talks here asserted today that
there had been substantial de-
sertions from South Vietnamese
forces last month, and Vietcong
battlefield victories.
A statement issued by the
delegation said 1,640 South
Vietnamese' soldiers, including
"hundreds of the Saigon Sev-
enth Division" deserted in the
Mekong delta province of My-
tho in October. It said this was
the result of an organized cam-
paign of 50,000 people who
"marched on enemy posts to
call' on their sons, husbands
and brothers to return home."
Quantin Province south of
Danang. They were killed by an
American B-52 raid, the com-
mand said.
The UUnited States command
said that "preliminary bomb
damage assessment reports" on
the results of the bombing of
North Vietnam on Tuesday in-
dicated two transhipment i
points, two airfields two fuel
dumps, 38 trucks, 11 ware-
houses, an antiaircraft gun,
four supply caches, six supply,
storage areas, seven boats, 15
bridges, 20 railroad cars, nine
artillery guns and a railroad
spur were damaged or de-
stroyed.
American pilots, meanwhile,
continued raids on Laos, Cam-
bodia and South - Vietnam.
Twenty-two B-52 missions and
217 tactical airstrikes by
fighter-bombers were flown
over South Vietnam,mostly in
Quangtri Province, the com-
mand's news release said.
Luang
Prabang
Cambodians Report Road Open
PNOMPENH, Cambodia, Nov.'
15 (AP)-The Cambodian high
command said today that its
troops had recaptured the dis-
trict capital of Trapeang Kra-
leng and had reopened a 37
mile stretch of the road con-
necting Pnompenh with the sea.
The road, Route 4, from'
Cambodia's sole deep water,
1 port of Kompong Som, was cut!
area south of the 20th Parallel
on Oct. 23.
. Ground fighting, meanwhile,
continued to be below average
levels, with 45 North Vietnam-
ese shelling attacks and only
20 ground actions reported in
the 24 hours ended at dawn
yesterday.
Ground Fighting Light
Fighting in the northernmost
province of South Vietnam,
g
-
).
North Vietnam(
Quantri, -also tapered off, ac- ` upon entering the town; 1-se
cording to Saigon military)( -411 1,n,vr-,,er that two to three ing waned near Quangtri
esmen. mile f tl e road from Tra eang (2). Cambodians retook
pproved For Releasea2 6 ~W5 v e URDP P81*60ePRGGO6 X 120001-5
held by the enemy., Laos, enemy gained on
two weeks ago when the en-
1 emy seized Trapeang Kralcng.
1 The command spokesman,
Col. Am Rong, said the 13th
.
today
istance
The New Xork Times/Nov. 16, 1972
U.S. stepped up bombing
of southern panhandle of
Fi
ht
1
Plaine des Jarres (4).
 STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000-/05.A g ?!b1A RbP80-01-604R00,
By Michael Morrow
Dispatch News service international
Peace negotiations in
I Laos seem to have reached a
higher plateau since the re-
cent talks in Vientiane be-
'tween Phoumi Vongvachit
of the Comtnmunist Pathet
r' Lao and Prince Souvanna
Phouma, the Laotian prime
minister.
Phoumi and Prince Sou-
phanouong, Prince Souvan-
na's half-brother who is tit-
ular leader of the Pathet
Lao, served in the first Lao-
tian coalition government in
1957.
Negotiations .had shown
steady improvement since
Souvanna's acceptance ear-
lier this ,year of a j%c-point
Pathet Lao plan as a basis
for negotiations. The talks
between Phoumi, the real
power in the Pathet Lao,
and Souvanna may indicate
that the Communists now
are willing to compromise
on these five points instead
of insisting on them as the
final settlement.
If substantive discussions
should move forward,
stumbling blocks still exist.
Only the second of Souphan-
ouong's five points poses no
problem. This calls for Laos
to observe the Principles of
.peaceful coexistence in the
1962 Geneva agreement-
principles to which nearly
everyone in Laotian politics
pays at least lip service.
The other four points are
less simple. The first pro-
poses that the United States
must totally withdraw from
Laos and halt all bombing
of Laotian territory. The
United States has agreed-
in presidential adviser Hen-
ry Kissinger's nine-point
peace plan-to withdraw its
forces when North Vietnam
withdraws its troops. That
pact is still unsigned. Since
the Pathet Lao lists this
point first, it may insist
that this be a condition for
further negotiations.
The third point calls for
establishment of a demo-
cratic coalition government.
Vientiane and the Pathet
Lao, however, disagree on
what happened to the coali-
tion government established
by the Geneva agreement
of 1962.
The Pathet Lao claims
that it was dissolved by a
military putsch in 1964, Sou-
vanna and the United States
maintain that the putsch
was unsuccessful, and that
the government of 1962 re-
mains in power In Vien-
tiane. Pathet Lao cabinet
seats, says Solrvanna, are
still empty for them to re.
OCCUPY.
This difference -pits the
concept of a new, reconsti-
tuted coalition government
against the idea that the old
tripartite (leftist, neutralist,
rightist) coalition can he re-
stored. Souvanna's legi.ti-
niacy is thus called into
question-the Pathet Lao no
longer refers. to him as the
prime minister-as well as
the rightists' privilege of
participation in the coali-
tion.
The Pathet Lao has long
regarded the rightists as
unacceptable in a new coa-
lition. The rightists are, in
general, members of the
military and of the rich and
powerful Cha.mpassak and
Sananikone families.
Although the Pathet Lao
does pot question Sou-
vanna's participation iff -a
new coalition, it probably
would not accept him as a
neutral leader of a tripar-
tite agreement, since the
current government is lhcav-
ily dominated by rightists.
The fourth Pathet Lao
point proposes a provisional
coalition government pend-
ing elections. The pathet
Lao Is likely to oppose par-
ticipation of the rightists
and press for representation
for the Patriotic Neutralist
Faction, a splinter neutral-
ist group which is consid-
ered friendly to the Pathet
Lao.
The fifth point calls for
pro-American forces - for
example, the CIA-backed
mercenaries and Thai troops
-to withdraw from illegally
occupied territory. It also
demands that refugees be
compensated and returned
to' their native areas pend-
ing unification through con-
sultations.
Redrawing the old Gen-
eva cease-fire lines will be
easy, but deciding who is to
control what territory and
what population will be a
knotty problem. The Pathet
Lao, with North Vietnamese
help, has taken considerable
territory, and U.S. bombing
has forced large numbers of
refugees into camps that are
under Vientiane's control.
The speed with which ne-
gotiations in Laos are begun
in earnest will be influenced
by military developments
there and by agreements
reached between Washing-
ton and ILanoi.
Laos is still a sovereign
state=--but barely so.
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 NEW YORK 'It4ES
Approved For Release 200OId /'19QbCF 4DP80-01601 RO
STATINTL
51 Rockets Hit Laotian. Capital's Airport'
By MALCOLM W. BROWNE !attack on Thakhck, a Laotian east of Savannakhet, had been,
Spector to The New York Times town on the Mekong River bor- in Communist hands since last
VIENTIANE, Laos, Nov. 13 dering Thailand. Just across I year.
Communist forces fired 51!the river is Nakhon Phanom, al Military sources said that.
Marge rockets into the airport Tlrai base operated by thciwhen Government forces end
of the royal Laotian capital of;United States Air Force as its'tered the village of Bung Kha,1
Luang Prabang today, damag-main surveillance hea(Iquartersione mile from Doug Hene,'
ing at least five military planes. for activity along the Ho Chi Saturday, they found the bodies
The rocket attack was the Minh Trail network. of .42 North Vietnamese sol-
first directed at the airport in) The attack on Thakhck was diers.
nearly a year and reflected the' reported mounted from three Heavy fighting was reported
increasing intensity of North; sides. An American plane was over the weekend in a wide
Vietnamese pressure in the, called in to strafe the attackers. arc in the mountainous region
area. 'The North Vietnamese rc- surrounding the Communist-
A ntilita'ry spokesman saidiportedly withdrew from Thak- controlled Plaine des Jarres.
Soviet-inadg 122-min. rockets hek after some fighting in the. Clashes were reported near
damaged two T-28 propeller-, town. Military sources said the Khan- eKbay, s rst of the pear
driven 1ghter-bombers of the enemy attack may have been.
Laotian air force and three; reconnaissance as a rehearsal: in which at least 18 Communist
light observation planes. An am-for a future large-scale at-soldiers were reported killed.
munition, dump was reported' tack, But south of the plain, Govern-
demolished and a military corn Town Reported Talcen ment troops were forced to
pound damaged. !abandon a position nine miles
Two Laotian soldiers were, In another part. of southern cast of Long Tieng, forward
said to have been wounded. Laos, Government troops re-,headquarters of a force createdi
ported having conipleted the and equipped by the American:
Attack before Dawn capture of Dong Ilene Saturday; Central Intelligence Agency for
The attack occurred before', after nearly a week of fighting.1 operations on the Plaine des
dawn today, which is the 65thjThe town, 30 miles east south; Jarres.
birthday of the Laotian King,1
Savang Vatthana.
Laos is governed from its ad-
ministrative capital at Vien-
tiane, but the )ionic of the King
and the traditional royal capital
is Luang Prabang to the north.
The two cities are connected by
a road that is subject to fre-
quent enemy ambushes.
Political experts felt that an
infantry attack on Luang Pra-
bang is unlikely because the
Communist-led Pathet Lao
nominally accept the King as
chief of state. However, Com-
munist forces seem intent on1
ringing Ltiang Prabang and
eliminating nearby Government
strongpoints.
Yesterday, the Government
troops were forced to abandon;
a position eight miles southeast)
of Luang Prabang in the face?
of heavy shelling. I
Elsewhere, a North Vietna-;
mese force of about 500 men
reportedly launched a heavy
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 STATINTL
AP vioc] Far. Rai e 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R00060
AUS i ii1, TLX,
STATESMAN
THE `SECRET' ARMY'- Thy verted T-28 planes flown by Meo
L waiting at Long Cheng to drop these in northern Laos. (NEA Photo)
250-pound bombs. Beyond _are - con-
Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5
 DAILY 1,'ORLD
Approved For Release 20000/M1&Yd!AZRDP81-0160
0 pi drug's
? ~i. ?'-..vnsFt7 C
By DONNA >il>'iU bU.,~,.
Use of drubs-- marijuana, soft trade, while they seem to have no
drugs" and heroin-}s rampant trouble harassing and arresting
r s secondary thousands of black, Chicano and
in New York City' Puerto Rican youth for no reason
schools, according to the Flcish and disrupting and intimidating
.mann Commission, a special com- movement organiz2tions and
mission formed to make an over- leaders.
all evaluation of the NYC school The role of the CIA and the mil-
system. , itary in the drug smuggling trade,
The commission's report, re- Pal .ticularly from Thailand, Laos
cently released, estimates that
nearly half of NYC high school and Burma has been established,
students and approximately one- as has police cooperation in drug
fifth of the junior high school pushing in cities like New York.
students use drugs of some sort. This must be stopped.
an the commission's Equally important, however,
Will Iti
vg
, assdciate director of research, is the need to get rid of the causes
said the students' use of drugs is of drug usage among youth.
A basic cause, Tyner has point-
generally more than "occasional." y Black
Fifty percent of "inner city" ed out, particularly among
crime in'the United States. is said youth, is unemployment, The Bur-
to-be heroin-connected. can of Narcotics and Dangerous
Recent reports have estimated Drugs says the majority of young
that the number of drug addicts in drug addicts are without steady
the nation has reached 600,000, employment,
arguing that previous surveys "Lack of jobs turns large onto
underestimated the extent of her,, of ghetto youth towards drug
drug addiction. addiction," Tyner says. "People's
The National Industrial Con- spirit can take but so much with-
ference 13bard of New York said out working for long periods
last year, that a survey of 222 com- time. Some youth have come out
a
You andnh ve neveunderstandr how
panics showed 53 percent reported of school
some drug abuse among employ-
drugs seem like a way out."
ees. Despite claims by President lie added, "We believe this is a Nixon last month that Federal conscious policy on the part of
anti-drug funds increased eleven-
the Administration." programs and guar Yet, fold since 1969, that arrests anteeing that youth and young ex-
d
doubled in the same period an
with mean-
given j,
that a recent sharp increase in
ing addicts d are ecent salary, are not a
heroin prices on the-East Coast
that the "supply is major part of a drug rehabilitaticn
dry-
t evention programs.
ing up," drug usage and addic- or drug p'
Lion have dramatically increased, It was recently revealed in a
among youth. survey commissioned by the La-
particularly bor Department that the question
John Finlator, who retired last of jobs in relation to drug rehab-
January as deputy.di rector of the ilitation has been largely ignored
Bureau of Narcotics and Danger- by the drug treatment programs
ous Drugs, charged that "we are and employers.
in worse shape in the war against "Employers are actively ex
drug abuse today than on the day closing people with a history of
the present Administration took drug problems from the labor
office." force in the belief that these peo-
Jarvis Tyner, national _ chair pie constitute bad business risks
man of the Young Workers Liber- and endanger the productivity of
ation League and candidate for the company," the report said,
Vice President on the Common- and added that "drug programs
ist party ticket, has commented do not see vocation training or
often on the apparent inability (or job placement as playing an mm-
unwillingness) of tile' FBI, the ortant role in the rehabilitative
- 11
alp ice pat tments and p
Ap c Fnq 1gqrn 1easea2000FO5Pt5 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5
to crush organized crime and put
The program of the YWW'LL and
the election platform of the CP
advocate in addition to establish-
STATINTL
ing a massive drug-abuse educa-
tion program in the schools, get-
ting to the root of the drug prob-
lem. The, program calls for a
massive construction of decent.
medical centers,
sing
t h
ou
low cos
, schools, recreation and cultural
centers which would create mil-
lions of jobs for youth and at the
game time meet their basic social
needs. The .funds for this would
come from ending the Vietnam
war, dismantling .U.S. military
bases all over the world and gen-
erally drastically r0d"cincr the
military budget. Along with edu-
cation and drug rehabilitation pro-
grams, this would greatly con-
tribute . to ending drug addiction
and the widespread drug usage
that is plaguing youth.
 NEV AYORK DAILY NEWS
Approved, For Release 2000/0%A %V: v": &-RDP80-01601 R000
IN THE WORLD
He Likes the French
Paris, Nov. 6 (AP)-Prince
Souvaima Phouma, the premier
of Laos, said today would
like to see the
French military
mission bolster-.
ed when peace
returns to Indo-
china 'and re-
gain the impor-
tance given it
by the'1954
Genera agree-
china. Souvanna
Phouma discuss-
ed the matter
Messmer . w i t h Premier
Pierre Messmer. The French mis-
sion was authorized under the
Geneva agreement on Laos. Its
importance gradually diminished /
as United States military aid and
.Central Intelligence Agency oper-
ations took over more and more
of the military functions in Laos.
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 SAN D >r t e~eof2~~/~1tl~arfiCIA-RDPS9PIMlR000600120001-5
SJNIQN ckers, and allowed American
-- 139 , 739
- 246,007
NOV 519123
military aircraft to be used to
transport drugs
4 I E1
p r
TIlE POLITICS OF HEROIN
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.. By
Alfred W. McCoy, Harper &
now, $Ia."s).
Heroin didn't always have
The charges are difficult to
refute because, in the main,
they happen to be true,
McCoy has done his home
work. Critics may quarrel
with sonic of his facts and
dispute many of his judg-
ments, but he convincingly
denmonstrates, for example,
that the Cl. .heroin epidemic
in South Vietnam could not
have happened without the
active participation of greedy
generals and government of-
ficials who owed their jobs to
the United States.
U.S. involvement In the
drug traffic was, as the au-
thors contend, an "inevitable
consequence" of our in-
volvement in Southeast Asia,
where opium was a way of
life. But it did not become an'
a bad name. Around the turn ' "American problem" until it
of the century it was hAiled touched American lives.
as a "miracle drug" and ap-
proved by the AMA for gener-
al use. in fact, it didn't even
have a name until Germany's
Bayer chemical combine in-
vented "heroin" as a brand
name and put it on the mar-
ket as a cough medicine.
The book is not quite the
scholarly work that it pre,
tends to be. It is as much an
indictment of the Vietnam
war as it is a documentation
of the drug traffic. The au-
thors suggest that all will be
well if President Nixon is de
fcated and the United States
pulls out of Southeast Asia
But this fascinating flit of 'lock, stock and barrel.
drug lore is only incidental to Maybe so. But the sad thing
the central theme of this dev- is that the book's chief vic-
astating book; that because Urns are a handful of dedi-
of its commitment to contain cated CAA men who vent to
communism in Southeast Southeast Asia to do a job.
Asia, the U.S. government, That job was to fight commu-
helped create a generation of nism, not reform a society,
junkies. -Chicago Daily News
Southeast Asia's "golden
triangle" where Laos,
Thailand and Burma meet -
has been an opium-growing
area for centuries. But what
McCoy and his fellow authors
are concerned about is how
M'ithin the last 20 years the
"triangle" has expanded its
production until today it ac-
counts for 70 per cent of the
world's illicit supply of her-
. I
For this the authors hold
the United States responsible.
They specifically, charge that
in their clandestine war
against the Communists, U.S.
agencies, notably the CIA, al-
lied themselves wittli - ele-
merits known to be engaged
in the drug traffic; ignored
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 DE'nVER, COLO.
ROCKY MT. NEWS
ApproWdAf eI
M - 192,279
? 8 -- 209,887
NOV 5IM !
,.New' book delves info probleM
1971 opium harvests were flown cut in Ai
America UII-11.llucy'.' helicopters.
RENDEZVOUS IS DI SCR1131;D
District Officer Ger Su Yang described th
'rendezvous with Air America: "_Moo officer
came from Long Chieng 'to buy our opium
They carne in American helicopters, perhap
two or three men at a time. The helicopte
leaves them here for a few days and they wal
to villages over there (swinging his arm in i
semi-circle in the direction of Gier Goot, Lon;
Makkhay and Nam Pac), then come back hen
and radio Long Chieng to send anath, r helico ter for them. They take the opium back to Lon
Chicng." The pilots were always Americans
and the Meo army traders did the buying.
The head man of Nam Ou, a Lao Theun
By JIMI MORRELL
For Pacific News Service
A doctoral candidate in Chinese History at
Harvard University, Jim Morrell has previously
written for scholarly journals in the Asian Studies
field.
WASHINGTON, D.C. - "It's a
damned lie. You can say THAT'." We
were asking, Arthur Berry Richardson
of New York, about reports that his air-
line, Air America, was one of the big-
gest' opium. shippers in the world.
"We've discussed them at our board
meeting, these scurrilous articles.
There's no substance to them."
Last month Harper & Row published Alfred
McCoy's long-awaited book, "The Politics of
Heroin in Southeast Asia." The heavily docu-
mented book is based on some 240 interviews
with C !~,,,^ I:}1ts, Bureau of Narcotics officials,
top Laotian military commandes, and opium-
growing Moo tribesmen. And it presented strik-
ing evidence that Air America has been flying
Meo-grown opium out of north- and northeast TRADITION OF POLITICAL POWE7t A.PtSW'EI{ 7'O 'I'IIE VILLAGERS
Laos ever since 1905. 1 The village of Lang Pot is a Meo community Fit ht or starve -- this was the CIA's answe
When asked specifically about McC'oy's of 47 wooden dirt-floored houses. It is one of 12 to the villagers of Long Pot. Air America flee
Interviews with the ,Meo opium farmers whose Meo and Lao Theung villages that make up the village's young men away to fight and re
harvest was flown out on Air America, all Ar- Long Pot District. One of the oldest Moo vil- turned their corpses to the. village - proles
thur Richardson would say was: "Some guy ]ages in Northeast Laos, it has a tradition of po- sionally %~,Tapped in sanitary plastic bags.
thinks he's clever. Just take my word for it. it teal power and is the home of District Officer For the CIA the Moos offered a eonvenien
GGoodby!" Ger Su Yang. According to Ger Su Yang, the instrument for keeping alive their war in Laos
Interviews with the publicity-shy directors village households produce 15 kilos (33 pounds) but for the Mcos their alliance with the CIA any
of Air America tend to be brief but emotional of opium apiece. They are guaranteed an ode- Air"America has only broui?ht disaster. 11re~
affairs. For years Air America, the CIA's "pri- quote food supply by Air America rice drops. have been decimated and the survivors have
vate" charter airline in Southeast Asia, has In return, officers of the CIA's "clandestine fled the hills for the refugee camps arounc
Indignantly denied any involvement in the army" (led by the -lleo Chieftain Vang Pao) Long Chieng.
Southeast Asian heroin traffic. This year, pay them a high price for the opium. The Long l'ot's 1972 opium harvest was destroy
though, fewer people than ever seem inclined source of Vang Pao's money, of course, is. the ed when "allied" fighters napalmed the village
to take their word for it. tJA. and three nearby Lao Theun g vill ;r;es. Anc
MOTTO IS NO IDLE BOAST
? Long ~ Pot is s one of , the -._ few remainig areas in Vietnam's National Liberation l rout. re;;ortet
Air America's motto is 'Anything, Anytime, Northeast Laos where opium history can still that on Jan. 1.0, 1972, units of the Lao People'
Anywhere - Professionally" and it is no idle be observed: close enough to Long Chieng still Liberation Army took Long Pot.
boast. From dusty airstrips in the Meo hill to be controlled by Vang Pao but far enough to Because of the fighting, in fact, Laos toil
country they have been airlifting the raw only account for a fraction of Southeast Asia':
opium to laboratories 'in Lou- Chieng or Vieti- escape the fighting. The Moo tribesmen's only estimated 1,000-ton 1972 harvest, L-nd Ah
& e where it is refined into No. 4 heroin (90 to cash crop is opium, and the CIA's deal with America may be shipping more dead bogies
9S per cent pure), then smuggled abroad by Vang Pao, badly put, comes to this: you send than opium this year.
Corsican gangsters or Laotian diplomats for us soldiers and we'll buy?your opium. Revelations like these in McCoy's boo]
ultimate disposal in U.S. markets. The 47 households' harvest of 700 kilos of made the CIA so nervous that they cotntacie
The Opium Trail leads from the poppy fields opium will yield 70 kilos of pure morphine base the publisher and insisted on a prior review, a
of the Southeast Asian "Fertile Triangle" (of after it has been boiled, processed and pressed unprecedented move. After coil sider,at-le err'
Burma, Thailand, and Laos which nowv produce into bricks. Then further processed in one of twisting, Harper & Row reluctantly agreed, I"
over 70 per cent of the world's opium supply) the region's seven heroin labs, the Long Pot found the CIA's critique of the book unur,f;: e
to Saigon, Ilong Kong, or ?,Iarseilles, and then harvest will yield 70 kilos of No. 4 heroin. sive and went ahead with publication rnyvra y
right to the waiting arms of America's estimat- Worth $5e0 to the villagers of Long Pert, it will Since the CIA is Air America's r^.-.or Co
ed one million heroin users. bring $225,000 on the streets of New York or tractor, the trail of responsibility leads dir.eci
In separate interviews, Laotian Gens. Ouane San Francisco. to the Executive Branch of the U.S. ; ,over;
Rattikone and Thao Ma both told McCoy that Formerly Long Pot's opium harvest was meat. It neatly undercuts all the 'T aiv a Air America began flying opium to markets in bought up by merchant caravans, but these order" statements flowing from ti Wlti
Long ChienApprov nd F6r5RVe 2 /45 n1G1 RDP8OsO4& OOO6QQ12QQQ1.-a5?... _ ........._,
.-est heroin refinery in Southeast Asia. Gen. tlko officers helicoptered into TanSr:n village
Thao Ma is former commander of the Laotian hiked to Nam Ou, and purchased the opiun
Air Force. harvest, then continued on their way to, Ivan
After several more interviews in Vientiane, Suk and Long Pot.
McCoy told its he took a bus out of Luang The harvest of 1.971 may well have bee:
Prabang, hitched a ride in a government truck Ling Pot's last. In return for the rice drops an
and, when the road gave out, started hiking opium purchases, Vang Pao and the CIA )cep
over the mountains. By nightfall he reached a demanding soldiers. _LS AID (United States A, -
small village, spending a sleepless night under ency for International. 'J:5evelopment) built
a thin thatched roof.
" y school in the vi}.age, and "Mr. Pop" (hdga
There was always
. ~otherneth sound
nme it t of a plane 1,111011, then the CIA's chief operative in Laos
away sometimes lie d it seemed right was s far r had high hopes for the place, but in 1970 Van
away and overhead. Pao demanded that all the young men in th
And every so often you would hear the sound of
its mini-guns going off=600 rounds a minute at village including 15 year-olds join his arm,
who knows what, anything that sets off its fighting the Pathet Lao. Ger Su Ynag complies
infrared detectors, anything that moves or and they were flown away by Air America hell
breathes or gives off warmth." copters in late 1970.
The next morning "McCoy and an interpreter But reports of heavy casualties came in an
walked down from the mist-enveloped mown- the village refused to send more. Ger Su Yaps
tains into the village of Long Pot, 10 miles west described what happened next: "The Ameri
of the Plain of Jars. There, tinder the shadow cans in Long Chieng said I must send all t
of 6,200-foot Mt. Phou Phachau, which dom.- rest of our men. But I refused. So they stopper
nates the entire district, 1l:cCoy had reached dropping rice to its. The last rice drop was ii
eplaced by pony Cara
RDP80-01601 R0'i 4'4,9 e ,. But the 1969, 1970 an,
 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5
STATINTL
QUINCY, MASS.
PATRIOT LEDGER
NOV 4 1972,
E - 65,785
NO SECRET. WAR
An Associated Press report yes-
terday from Saigon that the United
States is planning to keep a mili-
tary advisory group of American
civilians in South Vietnam after
regular military forces are with-
drawn is disturbing.
The report quoted military
sources as saying that the ad-
visers would be employed by ci-
vilian firms under contract either
,to the Defense or State Depart-
ments.
Whether such activities would
be covered by a Vietnam peace
agreement or excluded from them
remains conjectural. There is as
yet no signed peace agreement.
The. U.S. is insisting upon reach-
ing certain mutual understandings
concerning the basic accord that is
being worked out.
The implication of this report is
quite clear - the continuation of
American clandestine operations
in Vietnam after the uniformed
egulars are withdrawn, the kind
operations being. conducted in
the "secret wars" In Laos an
Cambodia.
Nobody in the U.S. government,
of course, is going to confirm that
,IA or er agents will remain
behind to do what they can secret-
ly to prevent Communist takeovers
in Indochina. Obviously a number
of American civilian officials will
stay in Laos, Cambodia and South
Vietnam in various capacities.
The New York Times reported
this week, for example, "In conver-
sations in recent days with Prime
Minister Souvanna Phouma of
Laos and others, Nixon has
stressed that he would seek to con-
tinue American economic and other
assistance to Laos, Cambodia, and
South Vietnam because he believed
it was important to maintain non-
Communist governments in South-
east Asia."
It would be all too tempting to
use "civilian" aid officials, for ex-
ample, for .covert operations. It
would be naive to suggest that
the United States have no intelli-
gence agents in Indochina after a
peace agreement. But the U.S.
should not shift its involvement
'in Vietnam from an open war to
an underground war waged by
agents under- cover.
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 DAILY WORLD.
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Daily World Ccmbined Services
The U.S. has assured Saigon puppet President Nguyen Van Thicu it will not sign any agreement allowing
South Vietnam's patriotic forces any participation in governing the country, United Press International said
-
yesterday.
The Nixon Administration move was the latest in maneuvers to back out of the agreement reached Oct.
8 .with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), and in effect was the equivalent of Thicu's re-
jection of a coalition government.
Reports from the Pentagon yes
terday stated that the U.S. is rush-
ing hundreds of new warplanes to
Thieu's forces, while UPI news-
man Walter Logan quoted a high-
ranking U.S. Army. officer in New
York as revealing that U.S. ad-
visers would remain in South Viet-
nam even i,f all U.S. troops are
withdrawn.
Logan's story follows': =
By WALTER LOGAN
NEW YORK, Nov. 3 (UPI) - A
cease-fire in Vietnam will not end
the American presence there,
even. if all U.S. troops are with-
drawn, a high ranking U.S. Army
officer told UPI today.
The officer, himself a veteran
of the Vietnamese army training
program, said a large group of
civilian advisers would remain
after the cease-fire to aid the
South Vietnamese armed forces
but that the advisory group would
consist largely of a brain trust of
young West Point graduates work-
ing as an unofficial joint chiefs of
staff...
The officer. said the first of
these civilian advisers already
had arrived in Saigon and were
consulting with U.S.. officers and
South Vietnamese military offi-
cials on the future program.
The program would amount to a
continuation of the Vietnamization
program but with the American
civilians advising the South Viet-
namese command not only on war-
fare techniques but on training
programs for the South Vietnam-
ese armed forces, the officer said.
The program would, in effect,
put the United States back where
it started in South Vietnam. In the
early days of American involve-
merit in Vietnam in 1s' .0 there was
only a handful of military advisers.
The advisory group in South
Vietnam would to a large extent
resemble the program carried out
in the "secret war" in Laos and to
a lesser extent in Cambodia, the
officer said. The Central Intelli-
gence Agency (CIA) trained and
equipped the army of Maj. Gen.
Yang Pao, Meo hill tribesmen who
operated out of a once secret base
at Long Tieng.
The CIA-financed group in Laos
even has its own airline, Air
America, and such an arrange-
ment presumably could be used in
South Vietnam and Cambodia.
In recent years West Point
graduates expert in training pro-
grams and still in the U.S. mili-
tary service, carried out wide-
spread officer training programs
in South Vietnam in hopes the
South Vietnamese eventually
would be able to handle their own
training programs on warfare
geared to American weapons.
U.S. military advisers also
accompanied South Vietnamese
Units in the field and worked di-
rectly with the troops, a practice
that tapered off, Some advisers
are still working with the South
Vietnamese, the Army officer
said.
The officer was mainly con-
cerned with the South Vietnamese
Army but said there presumably
would. be similar programs of
advising the South Vietnamese
Air Force and Navy. None of the
training programs were men-
tioned in the cease-fire agreement
worked out by Presidential ad-
viser Henry A. Kissinger and the
North Vietnamese.
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 STATINTL
jp~bX WORT D
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4 NOV i3i2
Betraying peace
The White House has worked out an immediate pro-
gram for stalling and sabotaging peace in Vietnam; and a
long-range program of neo-colonialism in Indochina, to
take up where direct U.S. military action leaves off.
Henry Kissinger's promise of peace within days has
vanished. Now, White House officials point, vaguely, a
month or more hence. Kissinger said that one more meet-
ing with the representatives of Democratic Republic of
Vietnam would seal the pact. Now the White House says
that any agreement with the DRV would have to be ap-
proved by Nguyen Van Thieu. Nixon's puppet.
Under the short-term program, stalling of the treaty
signing is being used. even .now, for a massive buildup of
the U.S. air fleet and of war materiel in South Vietnam.
with the ownership papers made out in Thieu's name.
For the longer range. the White House is now pro
gramming the "sale" of arms to Laos and Cambodia, and
the shipment of "economic" aid to U.S. puppets in Indo-
china. For the long haul, too, the-White House is planning
the continued presence of U.S. "advisers" in Indochina -
,of para-military forces in mufti, of CIA agents. and of
assorted mercenaries.
. Last week the White House "leaked" the demand that.
in violation of the agreement, the DRV should remove
some 35.000 of its troops. Now, days later, the number has
been escalated to unspecified dimensions.
Violation of the still-unsigned Vietnam treaty is par-
alleled by violation of U.S. undertakings in other areas.
Thus, the White House has'decided to continue the use of
the island of Culebra, off of Puerto Rico, as a U.S. Navy
gunnery range. in direct violation of Secretary of Defense
Melvin Laird's pledge to end such use. The press reveals
also that. contrary to Nixon's personal pledges, the U.S.
is continuing at the Fort Dettrick. Md.. infectious diseases
laboratories. preparations for biological warfare.
J
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 W'ASHII;GTON STAR
Approved For Release 2000105 1PCIW2RDPR~Wk
By HENRY S. BRADSIIER
Star-News Staff writer
SAIGON - The thin end of a
wedge has appeared here
which could lead to a continu-
ing U.S. military advisory pro-
gram for South Vietnam after
a cease-fire.
It consists of plans to use
American civilians for mili-
tary training and maintenance
as a continuation of the Viet-
:namization program after U.S.
troops leave Vietnam.
According to the peace plan
worked out between Washing-
.ton and Hanoi, but now begged
down in dispute, all U.S. and
allied military personnel must
:leave South Vietnam within CO
days of a cease-fire agree-
ment.
The terms of the plan made
public by Hanoi last week say
neither the Saigon government
\._ nor the Viet Cong will "be
allowed to accept the sending
of forces, military advisers,
personnel, weapons, ammuni-
tion and war material into
South Vietnam."
Laos Pact Ignored
The full text of the tentative
agreement is still secret, but
the published summary is not
so tight on advisers or other
personnel as the 1962 Laos
agreement.
The unsuccessful effort to
neutralize that neighboring
country contained wording
which theoretically would pro-
hibit the kind of plans now
being made here.
American servicemen in Viet-
nam.
North Vietnam had original-
ly sought in peace negotiations
The Laos agreement was Command nor the embassy
quickly ignored. An American here would comment on this
"secret war" under Central p port from well-qualified mil-
Intelligence Agency auspices /itary sources.
developed against North Viet- A far broader program than
namese violations of the C130 training has been sig-
agreement. Whether the seeds haled by advertisements in
of a similar development here Saigon's only English-
exist in the plans for civilian language newspaper, the Sai-
training and maintenance of gon Post.
South Vietnamese weaponry One Ad for an unidentified
might now depend on how well employer is seeking "person.
a cease-fire is observed, once nel familiar with U.S. Army
agreed upon. methods and procedures" with
The United States has been specialities in armaments,
rushing military equipment to communications and electron-
South Vietnam against the ics, and other fields. "Posi-
possibility t It a t agreement tions to ' be filled no later than
might cone quickly and fur- 1 January 1973 are available
ther weapons be cut off. for Americans or third-country
Transports Rushed nations, the ad says.
"Third-country nationals"
Equipment being" sent in- usually refers in this context
eludes items such as F5 jet to Filipinos or South Koreans
fighter planes to defend the who followed the U.S. war ef-
South a g a i n s t Hanoi's fort to South Vietnam.
Soviet -m a d e MIIG21s and Sonic Veterans Stay On
Chinese-made MIG19s. This is y
simply a speedup of an exist- Another ad, by Lear Siegler,
ing program. Inc., seeks U.S. citizens for
But in at least one case a immediate positions that in-
new item has been added to elude helicopter and fixed-
the Vietnamization program. wing aircraft' mechanics, jet
This is the C130 turboprop and piston engine mechanics,
transport plane. Some 30 of and related specialities.
them are being rushed here In the past, American con-
even though South Vietnamese tractors here have hired U.S.?
pilots and maintenance men servicemen who take dis-
are not trained for them. charges in Saigon and stay on
Ace o: r d i n g to military doing work similar to their
sources, they will be trained military jobs.
by American civilians on con- The CIA staffed much of its
tract to the U.S. government.
Neither the U.S. Military
all its military equipment
home, when it left - taking
away from South Vietnamese
units the weapons which
America had supplied.
Hanoi retreated from this
position by agreeing to let ex-
isting equipment stay.
As that equipment wears
out, the draft agreement says.
It can "be replaced on a one-
for-one basis by weapons of
the same characteristics and
similar characteristics and
properties," Dr. Henry A. Kis-
singer explained last week.
Kissinger said nothing about
civilians staying behind to ad-
vise on that equipment.
Sweeping Prohibition
The 1962 Laos agreement re-
quired the withdrawal of all
foreign troops and military
personnel, with none to bo
reintroduced. Foreseeing prob-
lems, the countries that sought
to neutralize Laos added a
protocol which said:
"The term `foreign military
personnel' shall include mem-
bers of foreign military mis-
sions, foreign military advis-
ers, experts, instructors, con-
sultants, technicians, observ-
ers, and any other foreign mil-
itary persons, including those
serving in any armed forces in
Laos, and foreign civilians
connected with the supply,
maintenance, storing and
Laos operations by hiring utilization of war materials."
-/ Applied to South Vietnam,
such wording would seem to
prohibit the kind of civilian
program which the U. S. gov-
ernment is now organizing
here.
But the -hasty dispatch of
C130s to South Vietnam indi-
cates confidence in Washing-
ton that it will not be applied.
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 COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION
Approved For Release 2003 Sri RDWMINUR
The Central Intelligence Agency:
A 5hQrt History tbTf l L1363 ~- . P
James Hepburn
"1 never had any thought ... when I set up the CIA, that it would be injected into
peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations. Some of the complications and embarrassment
that I think we have experienced are in a part attributable-to the fact that this quiet
Intelligence arm of the President has been so removed from its intended role .. .
Introductory Note by the Editor
The book "Farewell America", by James Hepburn,
was published in 1960 in English by Frontiers Co.
in Vaduz, Liechtenstein; 418 pages long, including
14 pages of index. Jae s Hepburn is a pseudonym;
the book is reputed to have been written by the
French Intelligence, in order to report to Ameri-
cans %-,hat actually happened in the assassination
of. President John F. Kennedy. Copies of the book
may be purchased readily in Canada, and at one or
two addresses in the United States. No bookstore
in the United States that 1 know of will order and
sell copies of the book. (Inquire of the National
Committee to Investigate Assassinations, 927 15th
St. NW, lfashington, D.C. 20005, for ways to pur-
chase the book.) The twenty chapters are ab-
sorbingly interesting.
Information about secret intelligence services
and the way they operate is of course not in the
open literature. In the two and a half years
since I read the book, 1 have seen no demonstra-
tion that any of the information contained in the
book is false - and the information does tic in
with much else that is known. Perhaps more than
90;0 of what is in the book is true.
The following article is based on Chapter 15,
"Spies", of "Farewell America".
- Harry Truman, President of the US-
quoted at the start of the chapter
kov's "Tsar Saltan" at the Kiev Opera.l The assassin,
a lawyer named Din, itri Bogrov, was convinced he had
acted in the cause of freedom, and many others before
him had sacrificed thpmselves in the struggle against
the Tsars. But fanatics like Bogrov who are pre-
pared to die for a cause are few indeed, and the
nihilists lost more men,-than the imperial families.
Professional Soldier Assassins
Today,' professional soldiers and guerilla war-
riors have taken up where the nihilists left off.
.They are just as courageous, but often less success-
ful. In Germany, in 12 years of Nazism and 5 years
of war, despite the Kreisau Circle and the numerous
groups that claimed in 1946 to have belonged to the
underground, despite the work of the Allied intel-
ligence.services and the plots hatched by several
high-ranking officers of the Welirmacht and the OK',f,
Hitler was never assassinated. Two officers, how-
ever, tried.
The first planted a bomb on one of Hitler's
:es, claiming it was a bottle of cognac. The
bomb was due to go off in the plane carrying the
Fuehrer to the eastern front, but it failed to
explode. The assassination attempt was never dis-
covered. It was publicized later by its author,
who meanwhile had recovered, his "bottle of cognac.".
Colonel Von Stauffenberg Against Hitler
The second, more serious attempt was the work of
Colonel Klaus Von Stauffenberg. His failure dealt
a deathblow-to the.plot of July 20, 1944. Stauffen-
berg either didn't dare or didn't care to shoot
Everywhere - and the United States is no excep- llitler.2 Instead, he pl6ced his briefcase, contain-
tion - there are criminals who will do anything for ing the equivalent of a pound of TNT3, under the
money. But it is one thing to murder a creditor, a conference table there Hitler was sitting and left
Senator or a jealous husband, and quite another to the room, claiming he had to make a phone call. The
assassinate the President of the United States. Thf was set off by a detonator a few minutes later.
Hired Killers But Colonel Von Stauffenberg, while a brilliant
Hired killers are rarely employed by a parapolit- cavalryman, was a poor saboteur. His bomb would
seal or paramilitary group. They are much too dan- have killed Hitler, and probably most of th, other
gerous. Their connections, their morals, and their officers present, if the conference had been held,
insatiable avarice pose too many problems for a as was usually the case at Itastenburg, in the case-
responsible organization. On the other hand, a ment of a cement blockhouse. The closed quarters
number of individuals active in groups like the would have magnified the compression, and the explo-
John Birch Society, the Patrick Henry Association, Sion would have proved fatal. On that hot July day,
and the Christian Crusaders would be only too happy however, the conference was held instead in a wooden
only
to volunteer for an ideological crime. But, although barracks with the vindnws open. Hitler was
successful assassinations have on occasion been the knocked to the floor and slightly wounded by the
work of fanatics, serious-minded conspirators would explosion.
prefer not to rely on idealists. History tells us. Colonel Von Stauff.cnberg was mistaken in his
Why. choice of an explosive. TNT is excellent for blow-
Approved it fRt eanggse 2000/05/ ((C~IA-R $P4it,Ea J~' h an d es al 5naforus~~5~ type
The Tsar's Prime Minister, Stolypin, was s~ 't 3''
death In 1911 during a performance of Himsky-horsa- defensive grenade of the type used by the German
 ATL1.11TIC
Approved For Release 2000/O J1I51b f IA-RDP80-016
LIFE'
LETTERS
THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTH-
EAST ASIA
by Alfred W. McCoy
Harper & Row, $ 10.95
One fact is beyond dispute: heroin
Js flooding into the United States in
sufficient quantities to. support an
ever growing number of addicts. Esti-
mates about the drug traffic are unre-
liable, but trends are painfully clear
in mounting deaths, young zombies
stumbling through city streets., crime
to the point of civic terror. There are
? ?said to be some 560.000 addicts in
America now, twice the number esti-
mated two years ago and ten times
the level of 1960.
Another fact goes unchallenged:
suddenly, in 1970, high-grade pure
white heroin, which Americans prefer
to the less refined drug more nor-
mally consumed by Asians, appeared
in plentiful and cheap supply wher-
ever there were GI's in Vietnam. The
epidemic was a vast eruption. It took
the withdrawal of the troops to douse
it, for the fearful flow could not be
staunched.
Beyond those facts, the sordid story
of drug trafficking has been a shad-
owy, elusive mixture of controversial
elements. It was obvious that there
must be corruption involved. It was
obvious that there must be politics in-
volved, if only because the traffic con-
tinues to flourish on such a scale de-
spite the energetic pronouncements
of powerful governments. It takes a
map of the whole world to trace the
drug net.
Since the United States suddenly
became aware of the sinister dimen-
sions of the plague and President
Nixon bravely declared war on drugs
(unlike the persistently undeclared
war in Indochina), it has been cus-
tomary for U.S. officials to pinpoint
the poppy fields of Turkey and the
clandestine laboratories of Marseille
as the source of most of the American
curse. Nobody denied that the bulk of
the world's illicit opium some say 70
percent, some say 50 to 60 percent) is
grown in Southeast Asia and partic-
ularly in the "golden triangle" of
mountains where Burma, Thailand,
and Laos meet. But the U.S. govern-
ment insisted, and continues to insist
in the 111-page report on the world
opium trade published in August,
that this supplies natives and seldom
enters American veins.
Not so, says Alfred W. McCoy,
who spent some two years studying
the trade. And further, it is certain to
become less and less so as measures
which the United States demanded in
Turkey and France take effect in
blocking the old production and
smuggling patterns. This is of crucial
importance for two reasons. One is
that firm establishment of an Asian
pattern to America means that the
crackdown in Turkey and France will
be next to futile so far as availability
of heroin in the United States is con-
cerned. The second is that focusing
attention on Southeast Asia would
bring Americans to understand that
the "war on drugs" is inextricably in-
volved with the Indochina war, and
has to be fought on the same battle-
ground from which President Nixon
STATINTL
assured us he was disengaging "with
honor."
McCoy, a twenty-seven-year-old
Yale graduate student, worked with
immense diligence and considerable
courage-for the opium trade is dan-
gerous business and the combination
of opium, politics, and. war can be
murderous-to document the facts of
the Asian pattern.
A good deal of it has been common
gossip in tawdry bars of Saigon, Vien-
tiane, and Bangkok for years. But the
gossip mills of Indochina are a long
way from the streets of Harlem and
the high schools of Westchester
County. The general knowledge that
the rumors reflected is a long way
from precise, confirmed detail. So the
Asian pattern had -never come
through clearly in the United States.
Now, in his book The Politics of
Heroin in Southeast Asia, McCoy has
set it down. To show how it devel-
oped, he had to backtrack. The use of
opiates in the United States has a
long history. It wasn't until after
World War I that widespread oppro-
brium, added to growing understand-
ing of the dangers, turned the trade
into an underworld monopoly. But
World War II disrupted the supply
routes. Unable to get drugs, Ameri-
can addicts were forced to quit the
hard way. The market diminished,
and, with a modicum of enforcement
effort and international cooperation,
might have been wiped out.
A single U.S. official act, McCoy
believes, turned that chance around
and enabled the creation of a world-
wide octopus of evil almost beyond
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 .L'riis iVhW XUHK '1'1M1J5 MAUAZLNJ;
29 Oct 1972
Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-R fi6!b1h0
An "T
that an insider has publicly discussed the "secret'
r war."
Who .-Cr, That war has evolved into a steady procession
of rainy-season offensives by the Pathet Lao and
Rile ftQxe2s 20;26. North Vietnamese. The other side has gained stead-'
:.3 4i Ily and now controls at least two-thirds of the
territory and about half of the three million popu-
lation of Laos. In essence, the United States' mis-
; , 'J ! Sion in Laos is ?still the same as it was five years
Ci in Vientiane. Bombing wasn't working militarily
in Laos or in North Vietnam then, and-according
`~ t tl bl' h d
d
By Seymour M. Hersh
Seymour M. Hersh is a member of The Times's
Washington bureau. His latest book is "Cover-Up:
The Army's Secret Investigation of the Massacre
at My Lai 4."
J
Jerome J. Brown could easily be mistaken for a
typical American businessman living abroad. He's
30 years old, slightly beefy, profane and constantly
wears oversized sunglasses. He's now a partner in
a management consulting firm headquartered in
Malaysia, where he lives with his Indonesian wife a bachelor's degree in 1964. His family, moderately
and their young son. wealthy, now lives in Wilmette, Ill., a high-income
Brown has been in Southeast Asia less than suburb of Chicago. Brown's biggest passions, be-
seven years, but he knows it extremely well. He fore Vietnam, were golf, baseball and a sports car
should. He was once in charge of bombing parts his father bought him for his 17th birthday.'
of it. "When I first came back to the States in 1970,"
For 18 months, beginning in early' 1967, Capt.- he said, "I wasn't ready to sit down and talk. I
Jerry Brown operated covertly as the chief Air don't care now. I think the country's ready for it.
Force targeting official for the secret air war in Something has to be done."
Laos. He was assigned to Project 404, a still- Brown is convinced that what was wrong with
classified bombing operation personally controlled the air war in the nineteen-sixties is still wrong.
by the American Ambassador to Laos. And for "The bombing can't work and the senior air officers
more than a year before his assignment to Laos, would never totally present the picture as it really.
Brown - then a lieutenant - worked as a highly was. The politicians and the ambassadors and the.
trained photo-intelligence specialist for the Seventh Presidents are continually being lied to," Brown
Air Force in Saigon. Later in his career, he was said during the interview, which took place at
assigned the key job of writing intelligence man- the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York.
uals for Southeast Asia reconnaissance operations. He described what he said were the two most
Because of the secrecy, Captain Brown never
wore his uniform in Vientiane, Laos's capital.
He dressed instead in another uniform: business
suit, white shirt and tie, and he carried papers
identifying him as an employe of the Agency
for International Development (A.I.D.). He worked
in an unmarked building in the center of the
city, 'along with more than 100 other Air Force
and Army attaches who were also clandestinely
assigned. His job was a remarkable one for a junior
Air Force officer-picking targets for a secret
bombing war carried out under the direction of the
American Ambassador,
Captain Brown left the Air Force in late 1968
and began his business consulting career in Malay-
sia, but he kept in touch with former colleagues
and with the air war. ' On a recent business trip
to the United States-only his second visit since
1968-the former officer agreed to a wide-ranging
.interview, in violation of his agreement not to
disclose clasflf fapp dif arvf a a$ist2_ _ -
IM'" y pu is e Unite
States intelligence
estimates-it still has failed to slow down the
Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese operations, de-
spite causing widespread damage and many deaths
In both North Vietnam and Laos.
There was little in Brown's background to sug-
gest he would become a maverick, A number of
his former colleagues and superiors, while reluctant
to discuss specifics, had high praise for him. "He's
a very respectable guy in our business," one high-
ranking Air Force intelligence officer said at the
Pentagon. Another officer said simply, "He's credi-
ble." And another privately confirmed many of
Brown's facts and specific recollections.
Brown was born in Newark and attended the
College of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minn., earning
important myths about the air war: "One, that
bombing is accurate" and two, "that when it's
accurate it totally destroys targets, which it
doesn't."
He cited a number of examples that demon-
strated, he said, that the North Vietnamese-de-
spite the heavier bombing and improved reconnais-
sance technology of the nineteen-seventies-were
capable of coping. Among them: their ability to
move scores of Russian-built tanks without detec-
tion down the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the months
before the North Vietnamese offensive this April.
The tanks were deployed around the province cap-
ital of Anloc, which was later besieged.
"Even the laser bomb can't make a difference,"
Brown said. "It's an agrarian society. We can
knock out a bridge at Thanhhoa [in North Vietnam]
and they'll go down river 10 miles and ford it
there: We can knock out all the electricity and
taey'II burn wood. We can mine Haiphong Harbor
th i p eum, P601 0?'20001
-5
5
the a ro eum oil an u scants
continued
 f
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Oc1obci ?5, 1972 CONG fl SSJONAL 1'I?COPD-E.l'xC;I51(IIIS of Remarks
Laotian ge ith ,ls, it scenes, are provkl-
ing the tin n , ration for chug sm u -
plers. Ironically', according to the n pons
in Andei:SON'S poa..ession, the and
trucks to tram;sport the. Al em'ica-ljound
naa.rcotics are ]r~: a for by the U.S. mili-
ta.ry programs which Con'lre_:S has said
should be cut of in just this kind of
ei+.uat;ion.
Ihi; secret report goes on to say, ac-
carding to Andei oil, that the didiculiy of
cuts n'g off aid is gaeet since ?tla ink
of jeopardizing smile part of the military
is high
Our $240 million aid to Cambodia goes
to help support one of the major `h ip-
ment Points for Southeast, Asuin heroin
and the tlrst able ecrfupt governri.erit
that protects this operation.
lin.iervon goes on to We from We
report:
If US. Ad v,ere wa5hdrr n, the govern-
n;ertt'S chit Iy to sichvland Comrlllni.>t ag-
gic.,:sion would be vwOened to the paint of
collapse.
Are we to believe that the prospect of
the Collapse Of a tiny corrupt govern-
ment on the other side of the world is
more important than We deaths of hun-
dreds of our young people, black and
white, because of heroin?
The story is no better in South Viet-
na:n. While the . Thicu regime has
mouthed promises to stem we flow of
heroin from its mountainous areas, Aih-
delmSon quotes this report as saying, "the
ecaruption among government, civili n,
military and police aft;ciois, retie of
whom have been participating in the
narcotics traffic themselves shakes the
prospects of stopping South Vietnamese
heroin traffic without drastic action very
dim.
As for these drastic actions, the report
is further quoted to saty:
it is not in the U.S. interests to lnipleineiit
an a-r cut-off, evert to punish Vietnam for
failure to control Ui-age.
Thailand and much of South America
repeat this some dcpressin c story. OU i-
ously, the war on drugs'has become the
victim of the war in Southeast Asia.
Up to 100,000 American GI's sent to
fighht in Vietnam since 1939 because ad-
Acted to heroin prod ucect and marketed
by our Southeast Asian allies. This salve
heroin is now taking its toll in our own
country.
Claims of impressive seizures, impor-
tant arrests, and international coopera-
tion can :simply not hicle the failures.
Bidding America cf the heroin plague
should be a seriously pursued national
go'=.1. When we spend $60 billion to figi:ht
North Vietnam and less than $1 billion
to fight drug acidicticn, the priorities are
an thing but correct.
In September 1070, a leading Federal
narcotics officer said:
Every time one addict is cured, more take
his place because of the ever-increasing
amounts of heroin available.
A year ago, the American people were
told that opium production was being
phased out in Turkey-nhich linen in the
past accounted for 00 percent of the her-
oin being smuggled into the United
States.
For Americans today, this elicits sever-
al questions which should be asked.
If opium production in '1arkea is bcint
ph d out, hbe; can Perot is i n,.rt.m?C
tin,,--and aciciicticn---ie mm;cr.rasnig?
aid why is tit c ema11 l,ics;le;a t`;orsc.
than ever after all the calls for special
asiioit?
T]hr answer, again, lies in the region
k:?asseni as the Golden T'mam-yIC where
tlae bordors of Thai!; mid, Lau war and hno.i
c*rivcrgo One s'ear's cru:: cif 759 to 1,0 h
Laos cr li be refaned 11110 el,ot a;li l eromu
k-snlllily Amherica?s addicts for 10 years.
Mere aid more of this herdn is r.'eachin
Ow Anic'-icmen market.
SonIin st Asia has been a Ina or pro-
dsrs_er of audit and lima had
titaar l:rc eIeihhs of its ov n some tityc.
BS only in 1009 did the wit^_ mire No. 4
it,.roin prized by Ai,ic:rican >tair. Put- two
years ago, w'?n heroin addic-
tion hit epidemic prapot'tions
among .Antericon Gis in South
Vietnam, th Astan narcotics
traffic -sud~'.~r,hr became Amer-
ica's busineo;.
Nov 1the GI market almost
has ',vanished with the with-
drawal of America n troops
from \'ietn;:re. But the drug
problem It tern on - a legacy
of the Vitamin War as the her-
oin trafiiclcers seek now out-
lets in the Luber States to no-
place their ks: GI market.
At the Barre time President
Nixon I:as drti, \C4t ~cAii 6 iC \i t) 11 n C ]1 I'I uI ctarr the' r.15!:'ii,Cc
drE:,,ttll.
I'ATT_A.~t,, I tn.: rc .r1 hconic
Alrlei'1Ca11 Iile:1 ii:l)C!1 in C2,.1lU~it ell i~lr Lt-,t,t'~riS 1'1 IC',1 111 tli In'benl'I st :aar h, a!`II1vr
9 q 9 II 'iel C"f+'it l ;1 r):ii:El 71 {rfl alal,ch of \vair d GU1E`.11dc ~l 1Jonui ,,ir
listed a rniszitl~ n!' csl'i;iu'ed this v'c2 nto~t th:trter alld hauler) ;nff
ill to fist fc~.;r tiwrt:: of In each ca,c inlrttse Cntn ', your ; m^n raU'ht vrithout
192 __.;i?.,lii I The ?' itrStic are rllltiist. A11L1:'i'`:' h 'tr Cc ".d 11rnper Well! f1C'Atioil Impor's.
StrifCCI U al1C, of 1',uman riVC fritttr,l d:SaUit At,tl}r reH'I'llit^1's Ill SnUtilerll
litltu e. SCtit ht :)ds d of Tan;1 n
~ lsc7 t~l t. ~1\) ] cr'.d 1,111
hitrt. In T.nder drag c:.f th^
age. The tit r i as f
the Americans. The, dirt air
Lon;; Chong had come
under a heavy North Viet-
namese attack in January'.
For the. fiest time,'the North
Vietnamese breached ridge-
line defenses that protected
the Long Cheng Valley and
a vital air strip.
Because of the situation
around Long Chong, it base
strip is receiving an all-
weather surface, and office
buildings and warehouses
STATINTL
are being built besides tie being enclosed with a chain-
link fence.
airstrip. The entire area is
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 ROANOKE, VA.
Appr 4rF tr1RePa se 20-00/05/15 : CW*b O-01601
-U G i 1i72 '
F - 49,146
Vere have been only a few
braye individuals in Congress will-
ing to take on the whole of the Nix-
on~'Administration's war on interna-
t}onal drug trafficking.
The reasons are obvious. No one
All his right mind wants to he placed
in the category of being pro-heroin,
and on the surface, the opposition of
Rep. Robert Steele, R-Conn., and a
few others would appear to be a
misjudgment. In addition, the corn-
pleXities of the traffic are so great
that one has to know his facts be-
fore venturing any opinion; those
who. couldn't- even follow the plot
line of "The French Connection"
would be totally lost after one'pass
at'the real world of drug trade.
But . the opposition has some
good points, and it turns out that
Rep. Steele and the others are not,
after all, suggesting that addiction
can be fun. What they are suggest-
ing is that the administration's 18-
month-old drug trade abatement
program may be both self-defeating
and. ,limed in the wrong direction,
toward European' labs and Turkish
"sources.
It is self-defeating, some of the
? critics say, because if the flow of
heroin into this country is apprecia-
bly slowed, it will "only guarantee
that the price for the commodity
will rise and that a price rise, in
turn, will cause more drug-related
crimes.
There is no answer to.this objec-
tion except the British system of
-drug-maintenance for addicts. A
law professor. at Stanford, Herbert
Packer, mainttains that decrimi-
nalization of heroin and related ac-
tivities 'would dry up the tremen-
dous profits in drugs overnight..
That may be an exaggeration; but
the British solution would make
such trade and sales less profitable.
14owever . the strain of Puritanism
AOptoved Ior Release 2000105/15
-in America, which would equate
such a drug maintenance program
as trafficking with the Devil, runs
strong enough to make prospects for
such a program dim for the foresee-
able future.
The . second charge--that the
U.S. program. is misdirected, is
based oil- the contention that the
Nixon efforts are largely ,overlook-
ing the tremendous role of South-
east Asia in the international heroin.
picture. Alfred McCoy, a student of
Southeast Asian history at Yale,
makes the case (in a.book excerpt-
ed in Harper's magazine) that the
greatest potential source of heroin
is the "Golden Triangle" of Burma,
Thailand and Laos. I-le-claims, also,
that the CIA, in its long struggle
to orgaili t4o1ril men of Laos in
a counter-insurgency war, has pro-
-vided the logistics. for vastly in-
creased heroin traffic and has re-
fused to admit the terrible implica-
tions of that traffic because some of
its most important "clients" are
making profit from that traffic.
The. Bureau of -Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs has admitted, be-
latedly, that there is some truth in
.the McCoy argument. In a recent
secret report that leaked out, the
agency says that the Southeast
Asian heroin sources are larger
than previously thought and that
there is evidence that the potential
of the, "Golden, Triangle". is n 6t
being lost on organized crime. That
area has produced as much as 70
per cent of the annual production of
opium, the source of heroin; and if
the CIA continues to build airfields
and prop up corrupt local generals,
production might even increase.
J
The administration should be
listening to the voices of dissent.
Drug trafficking; like prostitution, is I
not so much rooted out as temporar
ily inconvenienced. If the demand
continues, the administration had
better face up to some of the real-.
problems of pinched supply.
;CIA-RIP '0=01601 R00060012'6001-5
 NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOON
Approved For Release 2000/05Q11155,~I/ DP80-0160
On June 1 of this year an official of the
US Central Intelligence Agency paid a visit
to the New York offices of my publisher,
Harper and Row, Inc. This CIA official was
Mr. Cord. Meyer, Jr. (now the CIA's Assist-
ant Deputy Director of Plans; formerly the
CIA official . in charge of providing covert
financial 'subsidies for organizations such as
the ? National Student Association, Erz-
eount(cr Magazine, and the Congress for
Cultural Freedom).' Mr. Meyer urged sev-
eral of his old friends among Harper and
-',Row's senior management to provide him
with a copy of , the galley proofs of, my
history of. the international narcotics traf-
fie, The Politics of heroin in Southeast
U Asia. In this book. I sJiow the complicity
of various US agencies-particularly the CIA
and tlr State Department-in organizing
the Southeast Asian drug traffic since the
early 1950s.
'Mr. Meyer presented one. of Harper and
Row's senior editors with some documents
giving the .CIA's view on the Southeast
Asian drug traffic. His manner was grave.
-lie Said, "You wouldn't want to publish a
book that would be full of inaccuracies,'
embarrass thb United States government, or
get you involved in libel suits, would
you
Alfred W: McCoy
the galley. proofs to the CIA could set a
dangerous precedent and ultimately weaken
First Amendment guarantees concerning
freedom of the press. Moreover, in view of
what I had learned of the CIA's operating
methods in Southeast Asia I was convinced
that the Agency was. capable of using
unethical means-such as coercing my
sources into retracting statements they had
made to me about US complicity in the
international narcotics traffic-in order to
induce Harper and Row to withdraw the
book from publication.
After a week of negotiations, however,
Harper and Row, told me that they would
not be willing to publish the book. unless I
agreed to submit the manuscript to the
CIA. Faced with what I believed would be
lengthy delays if I took the book to
another publisher and the prospect of
losing my Harper and Row editor, Elisa-
beth Jakab, with whom I had worked
closely, I capitulated. ? Thus began more
than 'two months of lengthy negotiations
between the CIA, Harper and Row, and
myself. Most of what happened during
these elaborate negotiations is in the corre-
spondence reprinted below. 1 have added
introductory notes to explain some of.the
attending circumstances. ;
Harper and Row's management promised considered collectively, this. exchange of
to' consider Mr. Meyer's request and sum-' letters provides us with another important
n1pned me from Washington, DC, where I reminder-perhaps the first since tlce Na
was then testifying before the Senate tional Student Association scandals of
Appropriations Committee on my findings 1967-of the contempt this most clan-
after eighteen months of research into the destine of our governmental agencies has
Southeast Asian drug traffic. This research for the integrity of the press and publish-
included more than 2$0 interyiews with ing industry. As the CIA's letter of July
heroin dealers, police officials, and intelli- 28, 1972, shows, it was unable to rebut
STATINTL
and Row by stating categorically that it
could rebut all my charges about its
complicity in the international narcotics
traffic. We were surprised, however, that
the CIA made no reference to "national
security" as one of its concerns in.request-
ing to review the manuscript. Rather, the
Agency made its request purely on grounds
of government privilege.
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Mr. 13. Brooks Thomas
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
5. July 1972
gence agents in Europe and Asia. effectively my analysis of its role in the Dear Mr. Thomas: .
international heroin traffic during the last ,lir. Cord Meyer has asked me to
At a meeting in New York on the quarter century. Since the CIA simply-had respond to your letter to him of June 30th
afternoon of June 8, Harper and Row's no plausible defense against this charge, it in connection with the book, The Politics
president, Mr. Winthrop Knowlton, and. its ,tried to impose prior censorship in order to of Heroin in Southeast Asia, by Alfred W.
senior vice president,. Mr. B. Brooks avoid public scrutiny of its record. If it McCoy.
s, told me that they had decided to was not already clear, it now should be As you are no doubt aware, Mr. McCoy provide the CIA with a copy of the galley obvious to publishers that the Agency testified on '2. June 1972 before the
proofs prior to publication for the follow-
cannot be regarded as a responsible critic Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the
ing reasons
First, the CIA would be less likely to when its pubic image is seriously ti neat- Seri- to Appropriations Committee. His te..ti-
ened by what is. written about it. mony included allegations concerning sup-
seek a temporary. court -injunction barring
publication of the book if the Agency were port of the international opium traffic by
given a chance to persuade itself that U. S. agencies, including the Central Intel-
II-
national security was in no way endangered 1 ligence Agency, and numerous other allega-
by portions of my book; and secondly, 1 In this letter, written after Cord Meyer, tions concerning participation in the opium
Harper and Row felt that a responsible Jr.'s visit, Harper and Row asked the CIA traffic by both Americans and local per-
' sonnel in Southeast Asia.
publisher should have enough confidence in for official confirmation of their interest in pernicious' nature of
the veracity , of any of its particularly seeing the book. Since the CIA had never In light traffic, of allegations ththe pernic in-
controversial books to show them to any before been quite so willing to defend the the dthe vemuthe gt trfafthe U. S: concerning cr in-
. reputable critic for comment prior to itself publicly, neither Harper and Row nor
r ticalien of American citizens
publieati?~ AR(cove Fob telea U/0 /'15'Yt'O A'R[~P~~20 6 h dd 1 4 OA,3~200fild5on hard
At first I disc a strongly wn larper Agency.
and Row's decision, arguing that submitting evidence.' It is our belief that no reru?able
 NEWS`R'EEK
21 AUG.CI RDP80-01601 R000
Approved For Release 2000/05/15
Sparks or Sputters?
A Washington drawing room was the
scene last year of an unlikely encounter
between poet Allen Ginsberg and Rich-
ard Helms, director of the Central.Intel-
ligence Agency. The subject of the post-
poetry-reading confrontation was opium
/-and Ginsberg insisted that the CIA was
deeply involved in shipping it around
Southeast Asia. So totally false did
Helms consider the accusation that he
agreed to a fascinating bet with the
poet: Helms promised that he would sit
down for an hour of meditation each day
for the rest of his life if the charges wei-e
proved correct.
The same accusations-true or not-
boiled again last week. This time, the
STATINTL
Robert R. McElroy-Newsweek
McCoy interviewing Laotians,
and his provocative book
front guerrillas to government officials,
are so deeply involved-the CIA not only
even helps them transport opium and
heroin. Soon afterward, the CIA's gener-
al counsel, Lawrence Houston, wrote to
Harper & Row: "We believe we cannot
stand by and see baseless, criticism ...
without trying to set the record straight,"
After considerable deliberation, har-
per & Row sent the agency a set of gal-
leys. Seven days later, the CIA weighed
in with a lengthy critique-which Hai-per
up their own minds. "I had hoped that
Thy work would be interesting enough to
spark a public debate," lie says. "Now
the CIA, by attempting to suppress the
book, has itself sparked the debate." Still,
there is no indication that CIA director
Helms has been convinced by the book's
charges; he has not disclosed any plans
to begin daily .meditations,
& Row editors judged rather light. B.t,/
Brooks Thomas, vice president and gen-
eral counsel of the publishing house, then
replied to- Houston: "We believe the
best service we can render the author;
the CIA and the general public is to
CIA, which almost never takes a public
stand on any issue, clashed with the re-
spected publishing firm of Harper &
Row. At issue is a book-"The Politics of
Heroin in Southeast Asia"-in which au-
thor Alfred W. McCoy presents a heavi-
ly documented argument that the CIA
has assisted in the flow of opium and its
'by-product, heroin. The CIA challenged
the book before publication, and Harper
& Row reluctantly allowed the agency
to peruse the galleys. Then, despite ~a
list of objections specified by the CIA,
'.Harper & Row announced that it was
satisfied that the book was sound and
would publish it this week=a month
ahead of schedule..
McCoy, a 26-year-old Yale graduate
student, first made his accusations during
Congressional testimony in June. McCoy
charged that because drug traffic is such
a local custom in Asia-and U.S. allies,
publish the book as expeditiously as pos-
sible, and that is what we intend to do."
Privately, the Harper.. & Row lawyer
commented, "We were underwhelmed
by their criticism."
Why did the CIA-usually the most
silent of government' agencies-take on
Harper & Row so publicly? One agency
insider observed that McCoy's charges
had been made before-mostly in under-
ground or fringe publications. "But what
I think has got the - backs up around
here," he suggested, "is that the "charges
are now showing up in Harper 's maga-
zine and in a Harper & Row book. That
is hitting where these people live," he
said, gesturing around him'at CIA head-
quarters. "These are people with vast
contacts in the academic community and
government. They can't let this ridicu-
lous falsehood be accepted as fact."
McCoy is content to let readers make
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 THE HOUSTON POST .'
00/05/15 : CIA-R p80-01 60.1 R0
20 AUG72
Despite Its full commitment to the
light against the narcotics trade, the
CIA runs into continual accusations of
engaging In the traffic itself. .
The accusations. center around Air
America, an airline operating in Viet-
nam and Laos and Into the "Golden
Triango where 70 per cent of the
world's Illicit opium Is produced.
It is an open secret that Air America
was covertly established by the U.S.
government to provide safe and ade-
quate air services in a part of the world
where commercial. carriers provided nei-
ther.
The capital to start It v:as funneled
through the CIA, which still serves as a
-funding mechanism for operating costs,
but it is a?semi-autonomous organization
t{hose employes are. all civilians under
contract to the airline and not to the
CIA or the U.S. government.
AIR AMERICA, RUNS scheduled
flights throughout 'Vietnam and Laos,
and it Is used by all manner of passen-
gers with official travel orders.
fined for use only as currency In Meo
village barter.
Far, more serious is the problem of
ranking Laotian diplomats and military
notables who smuggle large quantities of
opium and heroin out of Laos and into
the world market.
The diplomats are Immune to search
when they travel, and an Air America
employe - a resident alien, in Laos -
would be on a sticky wicket if he tried
to search the luggage of a senior Lao-
tian official in Laos itself.
The responsibility, moreover, is not
that of the airline but of the customs
service in the country of arrival. Here
again, diplomatic luggage Is immune to
search, as are certain official aircraft
used by the military, and a country that
insists on an illegal search' had better
find what it i.$ looking for.
T1H JULY IT. BPEJi'S magazine fear
tares an extract from the forthcoming
book "The Politics of Heroin in Soutast Asia," by Yale Ph.D. student Al
l
feed McCoy. The extract starts, with a
detailed description of the arrival at
Orly Airport in Paris on 2.5 April 1971 of
Prince Sopsaisana, the new Laotian am-
bassador to France.
Despite'the presence of a large recep-
tion party, the prince insisted on waiting
for his numerous official suitcases like
an ordinary tourist, and when they ar-
rived he at once noticed one was miss-
in Laos, it' fs also used or a charter
basis to' support the irregular war effort
against the North Vietnamese, trans-
porting supplies, equipment and food as
well as advisers and the Moo tribesmen
and-their families from hilltop airstrip
to hilltop airstrip.
Throughout the "Golden Triangle" - ing. Ile angrily demanded that it he pro-
which is beyond all formal ' adminis duced, but was forced to depart with the
tration, no matter what the lines on the promise that it would be delivered to the
map say - no currency has much value, Laotian embassy- as soon as it was
and raw opium serves as the basis of found.
what passes for an economy. ' The suitcase contained 132 pounds of
The CIA does not and never has paid
its assets in it and does not and never
has dealt in It. The tribesmen with
whom the CIA works, however, -do deal
in it, and raw opium in small amounts
has undoubtedly moved on Air America
flights in the bundles of Meo personal
possessions.
pure heroin. France refused to accept
Sopsaisana's gtedentials, and he had to
return to Labs.(
The gist of 'McCoy's article Is that the.
drug trade in the "Golden Triangle"
flourishes with CIA support. His argu-
ment runs,.
.
0 All the leading figures in Laos 'are
deeply involved In the drug trade.
of these figures.
0 Ergo, the CIA Is supporting the
drug.trade'
STATINTL
While the first two statements are cor-
rect, the conclusion is not valid and :is
not borne out by any evidence.
McCoy might, for example, have
asked who tipped the French govern-
ment off to this particular shipment.
Customs officials do not 'take it upon
themselves to search an ambassador's
luggage. Authority for that can only
come from the highest levels, and takes
days to arrange.
The Orly, officials, moreover; knew
precisely. which suitcase to sequester.
They, removed the right piece of luggage
and let the rest go in a matter' of min-
utes, obviously before there had been
.any chance to -search all of them. In
short they had heard from Victiane ex-
actly what to look for, and this tip did
not come from the Laotian government..
The U.S. government, through. the
State Department and the CIA, is doing
all it can! to scotch the trade. The gov-
ernment of South Vietnam has had im-
pressed on it that collusion between its
customs officials and arriving smugglers
is a f;erious_matter, and it has arrested
.both its own citizens and halted and
searched ranking foreigners.
In s Ii o r t , neither ' the CIA nor
any other U.S. agency has ever deliber-
ately 'engaged in, fostered or cast a de-
liberately blind eye on narcotics smugcl-
ing, although it has worked in other
fields with officials who have been pri-
vately active in that one.
Raw opium has undoubtedly been
transported on Air America flights in
the past, but only as a private venture of
a foreign passenger, and never with the
connivance of an Air America employe.
And the CIA has done what it can to
prevent the use of Air America for such
purposes.
The stories will no doubt continue, as
-long as there is a need for air services
hi-Indochina, and as long as opium holds
the peculiar place it does in the econo-
my of that part of the world. But the
stories must be seen in perspective, and
in no way will they support the con-
tention that ' the U.S. government,
through the activities of the CIA, has de-
liberately furthered the International
narcotics trade.
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AM AMERICA WILL stop this when it
can,' but it Isn't easy. No U.S. airline,
for example, has yet discovered how to
prevent even shotguns from being
'smuggled aboard their flights. The prob-
lem is in any event inconsequential,
1since the amounts are small and des-
I
 THE MIAMI HURAID
"AMRDP80-016*01 R00
000/6
A
I
k
fl f~-{b ..
niter
t is m the coc
pit of Ino-
L china. that Marlin finds him-
self. disillusioned with the
"Company" because of a se-
ries of gory missions, includ-
ing one which devastated the
fishing villages of North
Vietnam and triggered the
Tonkin Gulf incident and ul-
timately the Tonkin Resolu-
tion-which plunged the U.S.
headlong into the Vietnam-
COMPANY MAN, by Joe
Maggio; G.P, Putnam; $5.95.
Re4fewed by't.AWRENCE MAHONEY
About the most accurate
appraisal of this first novel is
to call, it an expanded version
of the:'men's blood and guts
Fiction that appears in
pulp magazines.- That essen-. ese Civil'War.
tially is what Miamian Joe . IT .IS. IN 'Laos. near. the
Maggio has done. -North Viet border. that Mar-
Tho publisher touts it as a ';tin crosses up his superiors
sand finds himself arrested for
powerful novel of modern 'crossing the border to rescue
warfare, a rival to. Robin .tribesmen he had trained and
Moore's "The Green Berets" sent over.
stag of a few years back. Heady' The hook ends With'a to-
adventure stuff, but it; tally disillusioned Max) leav-
ing "the Company" for a
? local mercenary' force in the
MUCH of.the book is set
In Miami, Coconut Grove to
be exact. Maggio has long
-played the soldier-of-foll tine
there and the book's Nick
Marlin doubtlessly' is -based
on himself.
The paragraphs of this
.'book are stuffed to over-
flowing with military abbre-
viations. his doesn't help
Maggio's. chopped style ei-
ther and he has a lot to learn
about dialogue.
it is' quite easy to write
such fiction about the Cen=
tral Intelligence Agency be-
cause 'the truth about that
superspy "company" is so
hard to come by.
MAGGIO'S story line cen-
ters on Nick Martin, 'a Hem-.
ingway=type hero, a mavet-
Ick who finds himself in the
contract employment of the
CIA in Miami and Guatemala
during the buildup for the
Bay of Pigs episode.
Congo, -where lie becomes a
true mercenary, risking his
I i f e in combat only for
money, with no concern for
cause. -
If Maggio's. book is based'
on fact, which th.e publisher
claims it. is, then the CIA'
training and operations' are
even i'nore weird and un-
checked than Americans
have had reason to believe
y}befoi . . '
4 Lawrence Mal*ney Is a Herald -staff
4 ritcr.
Specifically, he is --cm
-.~,
ployed by something called
SOD (Special Operating Divi?
sion), a paramilitary group
used to do the CiA's dirtiest
work. After the abortive
Cuba invasion, Martin finds'
himself in a variety of other,
difficult spots..
I>nwts
STATINTL
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 STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R
QUINCY, MASS.
PATRIOT.LEDGER
E - 6 f35 1 9 1972':
L BAL C NN 9J I
Two U.S. government reports
released this week show the size
and complexity of the drug prob-
lem and point to some gloomy con-
clusions about, the effectiveness of
attempts to control it.
A "World Opium Survey, 1972,
put together by the State Depart-
ment, Central Tntelligcln4p A? en-
cy, Bureau of Narcotics, Customs
Bureau and Treasury, found that
the international heroin market
controlled by international crinri-
nah "cartels," continued to have
enough heroin. to supply the
Nvorld's users. despite increasing
crackdoiw,ns and seizures. A mini-
nhumn of 200 tons of opium (from
which heroin is refined) were es-
timated on the world market in
1971; in the same year, about one-
tenth of that amount was seized
by law-enforcement a g e ii c i e s
world wide. This year, seizures are
running somewhat higher than
last, year.
The report estimated that 100
kilo ''rams of heroin, representing
an investment of less than $300,-
000 to the French Corsicans who
control the European trade, would
ultimately sell for $22 million on
the streets of New York.
Although efforts are under way
to control the growing of the
ophnn poppy, notably in Turkey,'
the report said those efforts are
unlikely to be successful in' vari-
ous areas unless accompanied by
"serious changes in a number of
long-standing roc.ial and economic
traditions."
An illustration of the complexi-
ties involved in the opium trade'
is the case of the Meo hill tribes-
"T '
men of Laos. The 117eo tribesmen
have been an important force in
the U.S. effort to support the Lao-
tian government in its war with
the Communists. On the other
hand, the principal cash crop of
the Meo is the opium poppy.
.The other report this week was
on an investigation by the Covern-
ment Accounting Office of chug
abuse. control programs in the U.S.
military services. The report found
that although the Defense Depart-
went has actively cooperated in
the enforcement of laws against
drug trafficking, there is no way
of telling whether its drug educa-
tion programs are effective.
The study suggested that en-
forcement erackdowvns may have
contributed to the replacement in
the drug- trade of marijuana,
which is bulky and easily detected
by smell, by more dangerous
drugs such as heroin.
And, said the report, military,
programs offering c? cmptions
from prosecution for drug users
who voluntarily turned themselves
in for treatment had resulted
largely in confusion, distrust and
resentment among; both troops and
their immediate superiors. Fur-
ther, said the accounting office,
rehabilitation programs for drug
users have mef with very limited
success.
The conclusions to be drawn .are
as familiar as'they are cheerless:
the drug problem is a reflection of
deep and complex problems in the
modern world, and most of our
attempts to deal with it to date
have been hasty, shallow and in-
sufficient.
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G 1972
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.Free (drug). enterprise
Perusal of news dispatches about the Federal '-World
Opium Survey 1972" discloses several deficiencies in the
report.
It does not deal with the role of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in conspiring in the opium traffic in the
"golden triangle" in Burma. Thailand. and Laos. That CIA
'role is dealt with in detail in Alfred W. h'IcCov's "The-Pol-
itics of Heroin in Southeast Asia." published yesterday by
Harper & Row.
The.Survey is. thus. a coverup for the CIA's drug oper-
ations.
The Survey does not deal with the drug traffic in Sai-
gon where several of President Thieu's generals are major
operatQrs. That traffic has been protected by the U.S. com-
mand. One consequence has been the massive drug addic-
tion aiiiong GIs. addiction which.lias returned to the U.S.
with them.
The Survey reveals one useful.-consequence of Pt?esi-
dens Nixon's visit to Peking. For years the U.S. Narcotics
Bureau. and I1arry Anslinger. its chief. carried on a sland-'
erous war,against the Peoples Republic of China as the
main source of the world's opium traffic. The present re-
port admits. in effect. that that was a lie.'There is "no re-
liable evidence that China has either engaged in or sane-
tioned the illicit export of opium or its derivatives." it says.
The Survey concedes that. world-wide. government
"seizures... represent only a small fraction of the illicit
flow."
The obvious conclusion is than the flow, of opium
through the capitalist world is made possible by massive
corruption of government officials. police agents, etc.
The inspiration for the massive business in opium is
the same one that inspiresother business - profit. In this
respect. it is a shining example of "free enterprise."
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l4+ Aug 1972
.Approvedil-For'Release 2000/051`15 CIA-RDP8
Ax, "IN '11.1. an
V c~ 1'J itJ~ J
tit 9 ~tJ ~? VIT3'~~ ftfi,~ H, (Ili 1~t3 ~ti 1
G1t4+ Si '~E7 f.aiial[,.~'q t r t
inriirislratian has been striving to foster the Nguyen Van
Ni
h
xo n m
e
Editor's note. - T
Thieu regime as a tool for (lee 11 t'ietnamization " of the uurr. lint ino glossy velieer can hide the
latter's nature as a traitorous clique, a gang of robbers tridhq in prostitutes, drugs and war niearrs,
-n~arheteers and embezzlers rewho have been 1;hrnstering "aid
/
bl
:
oc
a band of political speculators,
fiends and the salaries, and :va;tes 0/ their awns civil servants. and soldiers -all this treader fl+.i:erican.
Protection. The follotz,ing inquiry by 1'h-rnh Aana exposes part of this corrupt and ro'tan US-preppet
AIGON, in early 1972.
Tens of thousands of Honda and Suzuki
motorbikes and Mercedes and Datsun sedans
of every colour and line rush along, belching clouds
of exhaust fumes which ruin the foliage and flowers
.'of the trees lining the stre.cts.
The 3-6 niilliorl people of Saigon live cowd'd
in eleven districts. ?11igh-rise US-style buildings of
nine, ten, eleven stnrevs tower insolently- in Doug
1 lianh and Nguyen Iluc avenues chile along muddy
and' refuse-strewn alleys in workers' quarters at
Chlio ng Dnong, Birth Dong and Chclon. whole fami-
lies are crantnlcd into'shantnes of thatch, tin and
card-board.
The number of Americans in military uniform
has decreased a great deal. More and nu,rc snack-
bars, Turl:islr-bath esta,blishincuts and massage
parlors catering to the. American soldiery are
closing down. Americaa military police continue
to stall: about, but in dwindling numbers.
Aid- yet, while the war is being " Vietnamizcd,
the Arincrican' presence remains intact, over.vhclnt-
in? in this city. Ir seems to have ro?s It ev.cn
heavier, more stifling.'Tlie scream of aruericiul jets
keeps coming from the Tan Son \hiit airfield,
Crowds of American civilians and air force officers
continue to thrum; To Do boulevard. The 'American
hand, the tricks of oil Bunker, the desperate
moves of President Nixon to avoid checkmate, as
well as the histrionics of Thieu, Ilc,onig, I hiem 'rand
Co. are still daily topics of discassion for the
Saigcnnese. People talk al-out the fiasco staring
Nixon in the face, the inre"itable departure of
Nguyen %'-,in Thieu, the collapse of " Vietnantiza-
tion. " For the Last seven or ci;;ht year-c, the
Saigonese people have had their e. rs full of the
" lofty missiuu of the Americans '' in this country
and the "stability " of the " Second Republic. "
More and more cleairly, the truth is appearing to
theta.
The fortress in the city
Everyone in Saigon knows about the new Amer-
ican fortress embassy, Bunker's residence. The of;l
embassy at the corner of Ham \ghi and Vo Di
N u street's now serves only for the reception of
and defended by nnachirlegun nest's. It is served
by a puuvcr-house in the backyard, Military police
stand guard day and night. The Americans boast'
that all building materials came from the United
Suites and that plans were drawn and cornstro'.ction
supervised by a renowned Anierieann military
engineer, at the cost of 2.25 million dollars. in
early 14?-11, in an interview with it French journal-
i f, .Bunker bragged about the solidity of this
"White House " oil tiio eastern shore of [lie
Pacific. The iiniinpressed Frenchman replied with
it %rrv smile III: Ambassador, in my opinion,
the fortress style ci the embassy building suits.
gout nanie rather- than ;unbassaclorial Lurlctions. "
t3unkcr's face showed that he was not amused by
the play on word. In fact, Bunker was no ordin-
ary ambassador- and the unusual style . of his
residence indeed fits his unusual assif;nment.
Banker has been in Saigon for six consecutive
years. His is the most difficult and dangerous job
eve: ht'hl by an American diplomat in any period
of Americair history. I'oliticad circles in Saigon are
rife with stories and rumours about the man and
the policies to li;'s, been pursuing. In spite of his
7v ccars, Punka is very fastidious about his clo-
thes, and the expensive ea-c", de Cologne he uses
vary according to the season-hind the occasion. Ile
has beer:, before his appointment to Saigon, ambas-
sador to Argentina, Italy, India- and Nepal.
The Aniericnii prosy considers hint as it skilful
trouble-shooter who shows cold toughness not only
to his adversaries but also to his allies. Saigon
politicians nickname hint The Old Fridge, while
the Saigon press has dubbed him the Proc,nusul.
His business is to pull the strings on which Nt,eve11
Van Thieu dance;, and It,! seems to' perform it
well, Even when the g)ing is 'hard, he knows luny
to smooth away the obstacles. For instanc' he
would lower his' voice and call Thieu by his name
(instead of dr President) and tell hint : "I lie
United States is a great country, but one of her
foibles is to lack patience. So you should realize
that there are limits to American forbearance.
Or he would say bluntly' " This has been decided
in \Vashington. Once our President has taken it
decision, there is no turning back. " Then the only
thing Thicu can do is to shut his mouth and stay
quiet. If he doesn't, fiunker will have this clin-
cher : " You know, Mr Thieu, Congress has became
rather restive. They might reduce or even cancel
some of the aid appropriations..." And that settles it.
STATINTL
g y passports
ordinary visitors and the delivery of The above arc part of what the world press calls
and visas. The new embassy is white painted and the tactics pf pressure and blackmail, the main-
six storeys hilt, ii'itlt a helicopter landing strip 's ring of Anicrican diplomacy.
on its terrace roof; where it chopper and its pilot ps fact, " Fridge " Bunker. still has one more
are standing by at all hours of the day trick reserved for when Thieu is really intractable.
and night. The. box shaped et, building is set back lie would smile and give- the. latter a gentle tap on
sonic distance from the stn et, surmunair by a the shoulder and say softly NIr Thieu, we happen
`solid Ferro-concrete wall, ter s anal with el oni- to know that you and Mrs Thieu have some persona
linncrs, electronic computers ass a hot telep phone al financial affairs to settle. We should be clad to
line linking it to the ??hito House in Washing toll, yea r A ,~ ~ ~
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 V/
Doceill-
d
o
Although the pout}cal groun
`?
anytime." bcr were dec?inlaterl. So
gain for the NVA by ~~ more plausible ex the urge to reenlist, for
standing, fast is aparent, Gen. Nguyen Giap's army planation-is that, the Royal shnrt-time high-paid duty
In Laos has-been under lit- Lao Army is using this in Laos has lost some of its
wet, season to rebuild and appeal.
ate pressure from the ?will be stronger than Gen. ,Yang Pao',, inac?ti-
American - backed Royal eve,, before" when it takes
re City may he explained by
wet Army so far. With }cthealf the field again. his only recent return from
ef season almost '- Thanks to the political a five-week sojourn in the'
have the Loo generals wizardry of U.S. Arnbassa United States. The color--
have made no effort yet d G AT ~Jur'rie Godley ful tribal leader and ex-
c ~
LOS ANGELES TIMES
F rt eIease1 ~ ~ h~ 1 ~1 ~i 1
(:. miles north of here. In the tice has been for each re-
south, the strategic I3olov- gional .warlord ,family to
ens plateau, totally lost for hold onto its troops and'
f g~ the first time to the enemy wait for the enemy to in-
, I i s TC--! !!~ 6 l this year, is'still finally Un- vade the fiefdom before
tier NVA control and the giving battle.
` town of Pakse is threa- Gen, Vane Pao's Mco
` tened. motintain t r i b a l army,
ru"J With the furthest ever- noiv being suz1ported Io-
n 1
:CIS' JACK FOIS1E advance of the Communist gistically by the American
Time. scarf writer forces in Laos bean ; Tc- Army as well as the C'en-
tained, only a third of the teal Intelligence :Agency,
VIEN'T'IANE, Laos - .nation remains under pro- also is undergoing recruit-
The "yo-yo" no longer government control. But ing and training.
seems a part of the Lao-,as the royal army. still Perhaps all this is ncc?c.-
tian war. holds all the Mekong river nary, for the Royal Lao
Em? the first time in the towns, about. two-thirds of Army-regular and irre-
decade since it became Laos' estimated three mil- gulag--is said to be out-
part of the Indochina in- lion people give at least ntinlbcred by the ccnn-
surgency conflict., combat nominal allegiance to the biped NVA and Palhet
in this landlocked' Asian Lao king in the royal capi- Lao (communist) force.
buffer state has ceased to tal of Luang Prabang and According to'A.merican cs-
thr,
be a series of seasonal ad- to Prime 'Ministcr Souvan- timates, in mid-Jul.07,600;
t'ances and retreats by na Phouma and his c.abi- enemy t o t a 1 1 c d both sides. The lines are net here. ? men. They included 13,20'l
virtually stationary. . Various reasons are ad- NVA. with the others be--
. North Vietnamese- vanced for the inability, or ing' NVA-led Pathet ],ao
Pathef. 'Lao forces, Which reluctance, of the Lao gen- units, PL irregulars and a
forplerly utilized the dry erals to do what normally handful of Communist;
season for attack and then. comes naturally at this leaning ("neutralists") La:
retreated when the rains time of year in Laos-ad- otians.
came, are not doing so this ranee on the heels of the Thai Volunteers
summer. Despite having NVA and Pathet Lao units ? The equalizer for the.
to .commit some of its falling back to rainy sea- Loyal Lao Army has been
-Laos-based troops to the .on quarters,- th Po a 1 '1' h a I 1r?ny
,
c
_
NVA three-front offensive IIcbui}ding Operation ?
-
in South Vietnam, those I t oluAntecrs, tvho for bet-
t r o o }i s remaining have Putting the best face on ter-than-Thai army pay
dug in at their forward- the no-go status, American provided by the 'Amen=
host positions. advisers say. the Lao gen- cans, cross the \Tel.ong
This is generally true all crams are reluctant to at- river .to fight in critical
along the loosely contest- tack without customary areas.
ed 800-mile front. There is U.S. close air support- -During the past.Novem
speculation that llanoi's and that all American air ber.llay dry season, about
stay-put order is predicat- power is preoccupied with 10,000 Thai infantry and
ed on possible ne ;otiations bombing North Vietnam. artillerymen were fh htin ;
t d tli J 1 'I ? r Air officers deny that its in Lao; under ;\nlcrican .
o en e llcoculla tin .
The? present front would Thailand-based 400-plane sponsorship, authoritative
,presumably then become b o ni b e r armada is sources revealed. Put. Thai
the cease-fire line, stretched thin and say units trying to steal the
h
'
t
e
are ready to support NVA offensive on
Little Pressure p
bevy of his children. u:ho
live with cx-I-ao veterans
in ~Tis oula, ~[ont. As a
man from the tropics, Gee.
Vang - Pao was able to
touch snort- for the first
time when he hut'itcd in'-
the Montana inountain ---
and he frolicker) in t.hhr:
cold white stuff harefoot-
ecl.
CIA Relocates
What promises of new
support he obtained, is
Washington is not ap-
parent, but "it's not his na-
ture to stand still," alt
American friend ex-
plainerl?. If he intends to
push back the foe front
around ' Long Chem, tho
NVA is not hacking nff:
They periodically shell his
base and his CIA support
team has recently relocat-
ed in Vang Vieng, closer to
Vientiane. -
Even while "wintering."
the NVA command has
ventured, for the first. lire;
in the war, into the Ale
kong Valley. An enemy
force captured Ehnng So-
done, a town in south Lang
on the main north-south
highway adjacent to the
.Mekong River. In its one,
forceful retaliation of the
present wet season, Lao
troops claim to have i?e
captured the town, killing.
225 enemy. By Lao war
standards that's a big bat-.
tle.
Throughout Laos since
.Tan: 1, the Royal Lao army
admits to having lost 400
men in battle.
y
r
'--r no move to recapture ' man .ao n . ~Vestmnreland and sew
l+',s.t Plain of Jars in the will be prepared under the Disneyland. He s p e n t
even sortie out tc plan, at ]east in theory, to t14rc~edf>artlQe`t'(4013/'i~ CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5
# rm ~a t c,
,
to stage their annual or . -,-
t h e warlord - controlled French army sergeant. is
Hunks at critical points Lao forces are being. the top soldier of the War
slang the long front. forged into Amer i c a n in CIA opinion. With Awn
('-`n. Fang; Pao, regarded wives he visited Washing-
L4 tlir Laotians' most ag- army divisional format.
U One-third of the 1,,000 ton, chatted. u ith fellow
~ irs~l~ a colmlli.ilder, has oldier Gen. .William C.
"s?
egular arm
I
STATINTL
 WASHINGTON STAR
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VA [4 111C 0
By TA'.1r\Iy AIIBUCKLE town on the Mekong bank west dent U.S. aircraft strafed what 11
Special to The Star-News of Khon
nown bn C full
VIENTIANE - Is the Unit- These sources said the infor- of was students claimed at to a k k a
om-
ed States using its giant mation officer will he compen- munist near
by crossing point near
C130 Spectre. gunships for sated with new furniture b Aloulahamok
nighttime assassinations of 41 between Kf:ong
Communist officials, U.S. embassy. and Pakse. How effective is
icials, Commu- Why should a high ranking the gunship if it is used in such
nist sympathizers and Com- official of the friendly Lao a way?
munist s u s p e c t s in their government and
homes? a Lao infor-
mation officer also a Lao goy- Pinpointed House
This charge is being leveled cr
t
nmen
employee mkh There is n dbt it
ae sucoou success-
at the U.S. by Lao officials, accusations against the United fully pinpointed a single house"
ouse
authoritative d i p 10 m a t i c States? and shot it
sou apart b its inhab-
rces say, after an incident itants escaped because at Khong island on the Lao- Deals in Contraband? first firing the
Cambodian border Friday The answer may be guilty zero in on the pass
target, used td
night July 21. ma get, informed
ht l quote Lsources conscience. sources said.
as sayingats a quote Lao Spectre sources Informed U.S. sources have One drawback to use of the
circled the house of Khong is- consistently asserted Lao offi? Spectre for assassination of
lands's chief information offi vials in Pal;se working with Khong officials is that it would
cer then opened fire blasting it Lao' officials in Khong have be rather obvious to the Lao
five times and reducing it to a been dealing i.n contraband public who did the killing as
shambles. The officer and his with North Vietnamese forces North Vietnam hasn't got
o
und to flying Spectres yet.
family escaped unharmed aft- and Pathet Lao whose. forces ar
surround the island. This traf- The incident has left a bad
er the first firing pass. taste in the mouth of Laooffi-
The sources. say weather fie in fuel, other petroleum vials even in Vientiane and de-
was clear and point out that pro Nets, batteries, rice and fense minister Sisouk Na
Khong Island which is 3,ciro the connivance of ? high-ranking on with orChal ders ss, c has given stern
yards long by 5,ooo yard; j~ ide orders not to discuss the inci-
and located in the middle of charge. army officers, Americans dent with the press, the Lao
the broad Alekong, is clearly say.
distinguishable. ?1?s ore, On June 5 a Royal Thai Air If the U.S. Air Force is
they say, the Spectre cannot' Force 01fF 10 Bronco fired on carrying out assassinations
have mistaken its target. ' and sank a boat traveling with Spectre gunships in Com-
from the ?Mekong town of munist-held areas off South-
Afraid to Go home ?
Pakse to M;on i i d
Diplomats quoted Khong's
province chief as saying the
'Central Intelligence Agency
was out to get him .and he is
afraid to go home each night.
Well informed sources, how-
ever, gave another version Qf
the incident. They say the
Spectre was about 12,000 yards
off target. The Spectre zeroed
in using a starscope, an instru-
ment which turns nihttime
into daylight' but colored' green
and shows the target almost
as clearly as in daylight.
These sources said the tar-
get was a house near Khom-
pong 'Srilao, a Cambodian
ado
edly filled with s contraband targeting seems more
n necessary.
cloth for Communist uniforms. Diplomats say a high-ranking
The boat's owner was believed group of U.S. officers is press
to. be Col. Sann?an Rajphakdy, ently in Vientiane to investi-
brother of the Laos army chief gate the incident but the em-,
of staff, Gen. Phasouk Rajph- . ' bassy has not confirmed- the
akdy. In another earlier inci- report...
- -----------
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t tit ;d dt D ~Ilf
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CIS
 STATINTL
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ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST-DISPATCH
E - 326,376
s - ab G 68
' 121972'
Tope r'
lid
The publishing firm of Harper & Row is to
be commended for' its rejection of Central In-
telligence Agency criticism of a book on the
heroin traffic in Southeast'Asia which it plans
to release this month. The author, Alfred W. /
were . "underwhelmed" by the CIA critique. Ile
Wadded that the CIA had been very courteousf
McCoy, alleges that some American officials
and CIA agents have allied themselves with
groups engaged in the drug traffic, have abetted
the traffic by covering up for drug runners
.and have been involved "in the transport of
opium and heroin."
The CIA, which has undertaken an unusual
publicity campaign to throw down the charges
.(some of which have been published previ-
ously), asked Harper's for _permission to ex-
amine the advance text. The firm complied, and
received a long CIA criticism of the book.
Harper & Row editors went over the comments
with Mr. McCoy, examined his substantiating
documents, and then informed the agency it-saw
no reason to make any changes in the book.
} B. Brook Thomas, Harper & Row vice presi-
dent and general counsel, said 'the -publishers
W~'~would consider the, very. request by. the-
: CIA to be a form of pressure, however, '.and
Harper & Row was well-advised to resist it..
IISr. McCoy makes-a strong case for the charge
? that CIA policies have in fact aided the heroin
traffic in Southeast Asia. This has come about
through the agency's free-wheeling clandestine
efforts to control events in remote areas of
Indocfiina. If the CIA would stick to intelligence
gathering it would not : be, subject to such
charges as M. McCoy has .leveled, and would
not ,have to defend itself.
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 DAILY WORLD , STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/J&1 v GGqJ RDP80-0
By: Dan Siegel
By the way, Young also happens to be world ivhere'USAID fronts for the CIAO, STATINTL
chairman of the Asia Society! - but his admission suffices to prove that. % His Introduction rambles on about Penn counts the CIA as one of its patrons
"professional advisors" a while longer of higher learning. .
and then finally mentions "specific sub Moreover, Young's Introduction states
jects". SEADAG will study: Develop- flatly that USAID has "the final veto pow-
ment Administration, Education and er on every SEADAG grant," exercising
Manpower, Mekong Development, Poll- the following criteria:.
tical Development, Regional Develop- 0 "Projects should be related to are-
mont, Rural Develoment, Urban De- as of AID geographic concern.. Priority
velopment and -- nota bone - the Prob- will be given to projects involving or
lems of Development Under Conditions relevant to the Philippines, Thailand,
of Insurgency, which means how to foist Laos, Indonesia, Vietnam and Korea...
a capitalistic game plan on people who ' 0 "Priority will be given to projects
hate capitalism. which are?relevant? to AID programs, ac-
"Clearly," the.Penn students wrote, tivitics and planning. -
one of the imperatives behind the for- 0 "Projects will be considered as to
mation of SEADAG was that money their sensitivity to. local political situa-
would be available from the Federal Gov- tions."(My emphasis - D.S.)
crnpnent," thus enabling Penn scholars
to go ahead with their research without
having to worry about the rent. "It is note-
worthy," the students point out, that
Young chairs both SEADAG and the Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations which helps Nix-
on formulate foreign policy. Obviously,
the Penn scientists' thoughts are fathered
by the wishes of Washington, not the -
needs of future Vietnamese. -
One more anagram is relevant here.
although the ubiquitous Central Intelli-
gence Agency's (CIA) ties to USAID are
almost common knowledge by now. In an
interview with Dan Blackburn of Metro-
media News, Dr. John Hannah. director
of USAID, was asked: "Doctor, how do
you respond to complaints that the AID
' Program is being used as a cover for CIA
operations in Laos?"
"Well," said Dr. Hannah,. "I just have
to admit that that is true. This was a de-
cision that was made back in 1962 and by.
administration from now until then (sic),
and it is the only place in the world that
we are."
Hannah was lying through his teeth
about Laos being the only country in the
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 WAS} T NGTON POST
Approved For Release 2000/0N- C~o~qq Dff,QiQ
1., UG19T2
131 L'_4 . _1 r J I_ 1
By Tim O'Brien
Washington Yost Stall Wnter
The Central Intelligence
Agency has sent Harper ands
Row, Inc., a detailed critique
of a book the firm is about to
release, saying the v,o; h will
do a "disservi'ce" to the fight
against narcotics traffic in
Southeast Asia.
The Nev., York publishing
house, however, has decided to
go ahead with publication of
/'The Politics of Ilcroin ink
Southeast Asia" by Alfred W,
McCoy. The firm informed the
CIA that "it is our sincere
meat protection
censorship."
prior
)McCoy cited "extralegal ac-
tions" taken by the CIA to ob-
struct the book's publications.
IT SP (1, "Visits by the (:IA to
Harper and Row, the tele-
phone calls, and the letters
are extralet al attempts by the
CIA to Iiatass and intimidate
Inic and rat' publ.isiher."
Thomas replied in a July 18
letter, however: "We
Want.
very much to publish (the
book). I3ut. '.e want even more
to live up to the traditions and
opinion that * Mr. hIccoy's responsibilities of a great l ,ub-
scholarship remains unshaken lishing house as we see them.
and we do not see any reason' if we are forced to make a.i
l
i
f
h
i
h
or ma
t
ng c
anges.
e
n t
text "
choice between the two, there;
can be no doubt what that
of the CIA's efforts to sup-I choice must he."
press opium production and; McCoy, under "strong pro-
smuggling in Southeast Asia. test," agreed to give the CJA
On July 5, CIA General an advance copy of his book.
Counsel Lawrence It. lloustoni lie (lid so, he said yesterday,
wrote to Harper and Rose, ask- "for pragmatic reasons,"
ingi "to see the text" of the partl
be
1
f
'
y
cause o
t
Lr- firm
s
book. "In the light of tlte'per- decision not to publish the
C
contradict it." .
":11r. ? McCoy's charges
against the CIA, both directly
and by innuendo, have been
repeated be editorial writers area. Out of all that, this is all!
throughout.' the nation and they (the ('1P.) could conic 111)
could create an accepted myth with. Tier c~' only criti,rizinc;
that the CIA has been in- about 2 per cent of coy total
volved in the drug traffThe information."
truth is that CIA has never ''The most remarkable thing,
been involved in the drug about the CIA's critirt,w is
traffic and is actively engaged that the agency actually ad-I
in fighting against it.. Wl'e be- mitted that one of its. 0%V1
liege that the effect of Ni-. mercenary army eornmanders.
I1cCoy's hook is to do a dis- 1 Laotian Gen. Chao Lt:, v, as
.,c' vice to this fight and to dis- running a heroin lab in north-
h earten the many sincere peg- western Thailand. Although
ple in CIA who are at least as the CIA said it destroyed his
concerned about this menace laboratory in mid-1971, it, had
McCoy said yesterday that j
'there are over 200 pages of
material on American opera-:
tious in fire Golden '1'rian:;le
In his book, McCoy r guest t
I the lrnency's full l.rio tiled?? '
that `.`American diplomats and he sand.
secret agents have been in-' Elisabeth Jakah, the editor
volved in the narcotics truffiel handling the mtu~usc il't, wilt
at three levels"-coincidental yesterday that "the industry
complicity- by allying with has been very c?antidus on
giouns engacted in dru ; traf-, things like this ever time the
Picking; abetting trafficking Clifford Irvin story
bi covering up for Strulheart' A source at harper and Row
Asian traffickers; and active' said the CIA wrote the pill,-
engagement "in the t ansport lishing firm that it could
01 opium and heroin." .~ "prove beyond doubt that.
The CIA critique covered;.DIcCoy's facts were svroc,gt.
several, although not all, of! "They just didn't do it," the
the illustrations used by source said.
McCoy to substantiate his" On Friday, the firm ~,vrote'
three charges. For, example,
McCoy said that Air America
-"which is really a CIA
charter airline.."-has been ac-
the CIA, responding to cock of
--he agency's criticisms. Tire
"best service we call rollcer
the author. the CJA and tlie'
tively involved in the trans ; general public is to publish
port of opium products out. of I the book as expeditiously as
Laos. Ibis sources, he said, in- possible, and that is what we
elude former' Laotian chief of intend to do." The book is
staff Ouane Rattikone (him-~ ed led fo4- release on Aug.
self a suspected drug smug-I A` INTrL -
gler), Laotian air force cone-~
mander Gen. Thao Ma, a
USAID officer in Laos, and I
McCoy's own interviews with
officials in Laotian villages.
The CIA critique said: "We'
believe the statement 1M r.
Paul Velte, Managing Director
of Air America, made on 2
June 1972 in response to these
allegations, labeling them .11 1
'utterly and absolutely false,'
clearly expresses the company
letter) to 13. Brook Thomas, the and intcrpreiations," the 1.1 and CIA views on this mat-'
fu'n's vice president and gen-, page criticism said. "From an; 'ter." t
G
nicious nature of. the drug - svdr;c if it were not first re-'
traffic, allegations concerning viewed by the CIA.
involvement. of the U`.. go',- Acknowledging receipt of
ernment therein or.the l arlici- the manuscript, CIA counsel
pation of American citizens itouston wrote harper and
should be made only if based l Row on July 21: "It is not our
on hard eviden(e," Houston intention to ask you to make
Wrote. "It is our belief that no changes in air. McCoy's book I
reputable publishing house even if we believe some of the
would wish to publish such Ill- statements mielit be harmful)
legations without being as- to the government. it is possi.
surcd that the support evi- ble that we might find some I
dence. Was valid." I
Staten-tent which is currently
"This, of course, in no wa and properly classified in the
affects the right of a publisher r interest of national security. If
to decide what to publish. I so, we will consult with you
find it difficult to believe,
however, that a responsible but we believe this is highly
unlikely. Our primary interest
publisher would wish to be as-
sociated with an attack on our is in the validity of the evi-
government involving the Vi- dence with which Mr. McCoy
cious international drug supports his allegations."
traffic without at least trying A CIA agent hand-delivered
to ascertain . the facts," he the agency's formal critique of
wrote. the book in a letter dated July
Author McCoy, when told 28. -
that Harper and Row planned "Mr. McCoy supports his
to release galley proofs to the theme by citing a large nurn-
CIA n-otested Ile ,,-pied in a her of allegations assertions
Ccla Ouane categori-
cally dnenied that Air America I
was in any way involved in;
-ftl"OEdl 601 R00060b 120001-'5
ble inform;,'tici i? s; loch ,n' ghi
prior review is, to agree to .1~ 1LS citations to those sup-
take theApprp ~ ter I PIS " O~bt /O5/ 51e $r~I
abandoning the First Amend- ? nave ignore availa.
 2
LOS ANGELES TIMES STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/1 t :A A P80-0
e , ~ ?
t ? ~1 f \ r
QF
,
{ 1S
t ~/ C
C n
s`.n t.lr, P cs i r ~~ y
E e, i
Es:`
U.S. Mlifit'ry 'f,a os )'r`iorc Far-{it;n ing.
Ctolef :~ofticiill IRe-i1io1clin;t Row l l-,rrny
\\'ith ? Godleys sec-for-
yourself policy, one plight,
assume his image V:ould,
have improved in the
press. But he is still 3-
c.-garde(i in most profiles as
a ciiplonlat-turned v:arri-
or. Ile USC such I'r.tton-
lihe eX pl e lions as "giving
them the (,teel in refer..
ring to a larger import of
artillery to he used agiinst
the ~orth.Vietnamese and
Pal bet Lao force'. in Liao:;.
And while there is still
some denial, many pre-
-V i o ll S 1'ec.tl'ici.ior)S on
111ierican military activi-
lies in Laos have bccn-
1'elaxed Burin:; G0-11cv's
r e f; i in c. As a foreian
diplopia t ob-erVed: "The-
J 2 Geneva bib _ pn vcr
at,rn0)11('11t (to
non-involved i'n. the: in-
dochina year) is the mo t
violated document .in re.-
('c))t hi'stor'y ?-- by both,
silo."
BY JACK FOl CIF.
Times Mai( V,riier'
VIENTIANE, Laos - to oversee.- the process at
American involvc,'mcnt in each of fora' I r a i n i n r;
South Vietnam dovch'FopiRelej" 2000MSMZNs '~:~`IA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5
"two or- three" Americans American coverup still
exists.
. '
arge
adlied a secon
building, is nov, construct-
ing a third. Such diplo-
mats es narcotics agents
are housed inside.
The All) rr,i lion, be-
sides its own legitimate ci-
i?ili
of opium.' country in Southeast Asia, that the vast ma?jorit~; of the
lated among congressmen Tartaglino said the sum- high grade herein sold to Cris
early ' last month gives a mary was based on "raw Intel- The Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs esti- fighting in South Vietnam is
gloomy forecast for U.S. ef- ligenee" and had been "dis- mates that Burma's illicit manufactured in Laotian lab
counted as unreliable." He ! oratories."
forts to stern illicit narcotics opium production is about 400
said the summary is classified ' in northern Laos," he sai;},
trafficking in Southeast Asia,; ons a year.
Vietnam. and cannot he released ,iith- It According to the report, Air America aircraft and hel-
particularly Burma and South out going through "established ,the - Burmese government's icoPtees chartered by the U.S.
procedures. policy of non alignment and Central Intelligence Agt mcy
The little noticed report I The United States paid $1 sensitivity aett, gn influence and USAID have been trans-
shows that a total of only 29 ri ff
million for the 26 tons of ma- is a limiting factor in its in- porting opium harvested by
tons of illegal opium or its de- terial that was voluntarily vohvement with the U.S. or the the agency's tribal nmerccnar-
r}vatites were seized in South- turned over by bands of Na- United Nations in the narcot- ics on a regular basis."
east Asia bets een August 1971 tionalist Chinese living in ice field." ! Publication of the hook by
and June 1972. This represents northern Thailand according "There are no BNDD (Bu Harper and Row. Inc., has
about four- per cent of the an- to Tartaglino? rrau. of Narcotics and Danger- been held up by a CIA request
nual illicit production in ti
se The White House study, ous Drugs) or U.S. Customs to review it. McCoy, t:nc3er
.region, which according to the strong protest." agreed to
^ .. r rT^... - ^ ^.,a n^ signed by Richard Harkness, programs in Burma such as
uc h* Drugs
By Tim O'Brien
Washin ton Post Staff Writer
The report-a chronology of
"narcotics action" in Thailand,
Laos, Burma and South Viet.-
nam-shows th- t 26 of 29 tons
wel-e destroyed at Chiang Mai,
Thailand, last March. ?
The action has frequently
-been cited as an indication
o~ a crackdown in Thailand.
cam/ But' columnist Jack Ander-
son says that "the CIA and
other federal agencies have
quietly informed Washington
that something besides opium
went tip in that bonfire." Ile
said that all but five of the 26
tons was nothing but fodder,
plant material and chemicals.
The Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs refuted
those charges, claiming that
on-the-spot U.S. inspectors ex-
amined the material under mi-
croscopes and found it to be
" fl
Program, said there would be
difficulties in any Iong-term
effort. to stem the flow of Ille-
gal drugs in South Vietnam.
"Smuggling is endemic in
the country and real control is
unlikely," the report said.
According to the. study,
South Vietnam President
Thieu was handed a memoran-
dum on May 3, 1971, "which
notes relationship between
narcotics problems and future
U.S: role in Vietnam." The
memo urged him to greatly
improve "intelligence and en-
forcement activities to iden-
tify and arrest narcotics ring-
leaders and pushers."
The following day, the head
of the Vietnamese national po-
lice's narcotics bureau was re-
placed, and its personnel ex-
panded from 26 to 52.
But the unpublicized White
genuine opium. ? House report summarized:
Andrew C. Tartaglino, Dep "Encouraging as Vietnam's
uty Director for Operations in recognition of the problem
the BNDD, said "our chemist
tested and (its) dynamic response may
it before it was burned.
progress of a la
`there is' no question-it was be , term real nature Is questionable."
c+piu This conclusion stands in
Anderson's colleague, re- contrast to the administra-
porter Les Whitten, was pies- {Ion's public optimism, reiter-
>/
Summary, Whitten said, con- p t y~
taIi puce edeF?rtl eifeasj i?e *1i~ki5l~3 Ohe?~r~ c~ okn i
Im, HT ~tt` `s, ~ ;4000 001-5
feet lbiat extraneous matter ction chr^n01oc'V t i(h t t ca rrrri+te~
sa
with which the U.S. is allied r-.ast "rill a>, t
or his common security inter livered "writ. ten comments
ests and programs," the study and criticisms" to the New
said. York publisher, but the corn-
et announead
The White House said "very pang has not yet'
, hether the Ci A asl; it for re-
little opium is now grown in w
Laos; less than 30 tons a Visions or a halt to pubiica-
i tion. It is believed the firm
year. However, the Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous!; will not agree to alter the
Drugs estimated last Tuesday ? manuscript, a source close to
that Laos produces more than 1McCoy said.
three times that amount -
about 100 tons a year.
"Nearly all of (the Laotian
opium) still being grown is
consumed by the growers,"
the report said. "There is no
evidence that significant
amounts of Lao-grown opium
are entering the international
traffic. Laos is a conduit for
Burmese opium and, opium de-
rivatives, including heroin,
however."
Of the 30 or 100 tons of
opium products grown each
year in Laos, less than one ton
was confiscated between Au-
gust 1971 and June 1972, ac-
cording to the t eport's chron-
ology of narcotics actions.
Although the report said
that Laos is a "conduit" for
Burmese opium and although
only one ton was confiscated
there in the 10-mouth period,
the report concludes that "the
flow of opium and heroin
through Laos has been seri-
ously disrupted."
Alfred W. McCoy, author of
I a soon to be published book
ent at a BNDD press confer- ated only a week ago by presi-I
ence, challenging Tartaglino dential assistant, Egil I roghi
o make available a weekly in- . Jr.
telligence summary compiled, The study was compiled for
by the bureau from CIA and the white House by those
State Department reports. The State Department desks re-
. ,
fore a Den. e
The report listed no specific I early last month that "all U.S.
__. .,,. errocrc in tlnrrna
 i ASEI :GTo2l S` !
000/05/15: CIA-RDP8O-0
2 AUG 197?TATIN
By ROGER JZ?LLINvEK
New York Tines News Service
In 3941 a British naval intelligence
officer named Ian Fleming recomrnend-
efi to Gen. William (Wild Bill) Donovan
that he recruit as American intelligence
officers men of "absolute discretion,
sobriety, devotion to duty, languages,
and wide experience." Donovan, a
World War I hero and successful Wall
Street lawyer, understood the fantasies
of writers and presidents, and in a memo
to President Roosevelt promised an in-
ternational secret service staffed by
young officers who were "calculatingly
reckless," with "disciplined daring" and
trained for "aggressive action."
The Office of Strategic Services
came to include such James Bonds as
John Birch, Norman 0. Brown, David K.
B. Bruce, Dr. IZalpli J. Bunche, William
Bundy, Michael Burke, Julia Child,
Clark Clifford, John Kenneth Gr.lbraith,
John W. Gardner and Arthur J. Gold-
berg. There were others - Sterling
Hayden, August Heckscher, Roger 0.
'?Itilsman, Philip Morton, H. Stuart
Hughes, Clark M. MacGregor, Herbert
Marcuse, Henry Ringling North. And
still others: John Oakes, Walt W. Ros-
tow, Elmo Roper, Arthur M. Schlcsigner
Jr., Ralph de Toledano - to name just a
few of the hundreds in this book by R.
Harris Smith.
SMITH, WHO W A-8 in the trade him-
self, resigning in 1968 after a "very
brief, uneventful, and undistinguished
association with the most misunderstood
bureaucracy of the American govern-
ment," the Central Intelligence Agency,
now lectures in political science at the
University of California's Extension
Division. "This history of Americi..'s
first central intelligence agency" is
"secret" because Smith was denied ac-
cess to OSS archives, and so had to rely
on the existing literature supplemented
by some 200 written and verbal recollec-
tions of OSS alumni.
The book is densely packed with the
bewildering variety of OSS exploits in
World War II: Spying, sabotage, propa-
ganda, military training missions, poli-
ticking and coordinating resistance
groups against the Germans.
OSS agents had to compete as much
with their allies as with their enemies.
OSS: The Secret History of America's
First Central Intelligence Agency. By
R. Harris Smith. Univ. of California
Press. 458 pages. Illustrated. v10.95.
In France and Switzerland, where Alleml
Dulles operated, the British SOB
(Special Operations Executive) was
especially grudging.. In Germany itself,
the OSS lo.3t out to more orthodox Arnnri-
can military intelligence, though para-
doxica ly they were strongly represent-
ed at Nuremberg, where Gen. Donovan
was himself a deputy prosecutor at
the same time that the head of the Nazi
secret service, Gen. Reinhard Gehlen,
was under OSS protection in exchange
for his intelligence network in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union.
From present perspective the most
(literally) intriguing story is that of the
OSS in China and Indochina. There were
both pro-Com-niui ists and anti C ommu-
nists in the OSS, and most a verts syrnpa-
thized with A. ian riatic.ualistr. so that
the OSS aided Thai partisans a~~ainst the
British and, of course, more i rnou ly,
the Vietminh against the French in Laos
and Vietnam (an OSS. medic saved Ito
Chi Minh's fife). Smith's retelling of the
tragicomedy of Indochina after the Jap-
anese surrender in 1945, with Vichy and
Gaullist French, British, Chinese and
the Vietminh jockeying for control,
makes a fascinating sctpiece.
The book ends v.'ith an a,ecoi nt of tt,,e
transformation of the OSS into its
"mirror imago," the CIA Sa:ith's admi-
ration for the OSS's wa.rtir:e prr.erns
tism, its "tradition of dissent" and is
anticolonialisrn suggests his thesis: That
the OSS/CIA has been mead;- the straw
man of the radical and lil.r,l left. In
fact, he asserts, the CIA hss keen the
principal guardian of li errl values in
the "intelligence comet' unity."
HE REMINDS US that the CIA
fought Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy, and he
argues that tLe CIA's carnp:iigmi to fund
anti-Communist liberals successful .y
undermined international Cenuimunist
organizations and disarmed the para-
nuid anti-Cornier nisin of the FBI and
others at home. Ile notes that CIA lil-er-
als worked against Batista for Castro,
who betrayed them, allowing., the CIA
conservatives to plan the Bay of Pi ;s
action. Finally, he points to the evidence
in the Pentagon Papers that the CIA has
been a critic cf the Vietnam War from
the beginning. .
But the question remains whether
the OSS "tradtion of dissent" is mean-
ingful, whether it doesn't cornpromise'
liberals as much as aid them. Smith's
book is full of cryptic references to for-
mer OSS agents now prominent in inter-
national business and finance. CIA liber-
alism has not prevented a number of
CIA-fomented coups d'etat in favor of
military regimes. Even CIA liberal criti-
cism of the war in Vietnam seems to
have had little effect on policy. All migit
be fair in time of war, but Smith ought to
have scouted the need for a permanent
bureaucracy part of whose function is
officially devoted to clandestine political
manipulations abroad in time. of
' `peace."
Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP8O-01601 R000600120001-5
 ST. LOUIS -POST DISPATCH
Approved'For Release 2000/081151-9nA-RDP80-0160
r.G,_[0St V rr
D he: CIA
Intelligence Agency Deities Links
With Drug Trade In L
STATINTL
(The following letter to the editor of the
Post-atch takes issue with statements made in an
editorial printed on this page. The sti,twrrents,
although iefleeting charges publicized over a period
of several years, were based in this instance mainly
on tun article in the July 1972 issue of Ilarper'a
Magazine, titled "Flowers Of Eril, The CIA and the
Heroin trade," by Alfred IP, McCoy, The article. was
adapted from a chapter in The Politics of 1leroin in
Southeast Asia, a book by Mr. McCoy, a I'll/) student
in Southeast Asian history or Yale University, to be
published in September by Harper & Role, Inc.)
In. your editorial of June 27, you state: "The
connection of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
with the dope traffic in Laos has long been no-
torious," I write you to state that this allegation
is false and unfounded. It is disappointing to see a
journal of the Post-Dispatch's reputation repeating
such an unfounded assertion without a check of its
accurac;,v, any reference to the public record to the
contrary, or any apparent effort to specify its
sources, -
' ?Normally CIA does. not respond publicly to alle-
gations made against it. Because of the serious na-
ture of the drug problem in this country, I am
writing to you to make the record clear, although
the.sweeping phraseology of your comment is diffi-
cult to counter in detail.
CIA's real "connection" with the "dope traffic
in, Laos" has been to work against it. John E.
Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs, in a letter to Representative
Charles S. Gubser of California on May 27, 1971
(reproduced in the Congressional Record of June
2, 1971), stated:
"Actually, CIA has. for sometime been this
bureau's strongest partner in identifying foreign
sources and routes of illegal trade in narcotics.
Their help'has included both direct support in in-
telligence collection, as well as in intelligence
analysis and production. Liaison between our two
agencies is close and 'constant in matters of mutual
interest, Much of the progress we are now making
in identifying overseas narcotics traffic can, in
fact, be-attributed to CIA co-operation."
Roland Paul, investigator for the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, reported in the April 1971
issue of Foreign Affairs "that due to the long asso-
ciation with the CIA, the Meo tribesmen in Laos
were shifting from opium to rice and other crops.
You also allege that "The big shot of the Laotian
trade is Gen. Vang Pao, an unsavory character who
for the last decade has been commander of the
CIA's secret army in nor theasiern Laos. Ameri-
can diplomatic officials in Laos seem to look the,
other way; they have confined their recent efforts
to promoting Laotian laws against opium addicts."
In truth, Gen. Vang Pao is not engaged in the
?drug.trade in Laos. On the. contrary, he has, as a
leader of the Meo, conducted an energetic program
over the years to bring this tribal group to aban-
don their traditional growth of the opium poppy
and develop substitute crops and new forms of
livestock to provide daily sustenance and income.
Ile has done this in the course of fighting off a
North Vietnamese invasion of the Moo territories
in Laos. Ile has received American asssistance in
both of these efforts,
While vague assertions such as your editorial
have been made about him in the past, the U.S.
Government personnel in- constant contact with
him for many years have never found evidence
connecting him with trafficking in narcotics.
More than one year ago, in an address before
the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Rich-' I
and Helms, director of Central Intelligence, stated /
the followitig:
"There is the arrant nonsense, for example,. that
the Central Intelligence Agency is somehow in-
volved in the world drug traffic. We are not. As
fathers,, we are as concerned about the lives of
our children and grandchildren as are all of you.,,,
As an agency, in fact, we are heavily engaged in
tracing 'the foreign roots of the drug traffic for the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. We
hope we are helping with a solution; we know we
are not contributing to the problem."
This statement remains Valid today.
W. E. Colby
Executive Director
Central Intelligence Agency
CNv't6{sARPT
I'osbbispatch, July 25, 1971
... And I Thought It Was An Escape!'
Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R0006.00120001-5
 STATINTL
Approved For Release 200&IO59i1,5 'CIA-RDP80-01
STATINTL
A Re,-porton to Qovern ent oc r mr-
By Carol *M. Barker and Matthew H. Foxe
The Twentieth Century Fund/New York/1.972
Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA=RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5
aantli:~c=]
 RAMPARTS
Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-0160
AUG 1972
A OUT T111RTY MILES NORTHEAST of CIA head-
quarters in Langley, Virginia, right off the
Baltimore-\Vashington expressway overlooking
the flat Maryland countryside, stands a large
three story building known informally as the "cookie fac-
tory." It's-officially known as Ft. George G. Meadc, head-
quarters of the National Security Agency.
Three fences surround the headquarters. The inner
and outer barriers are topped with barbed wire, the middle
one is a five-strand electrified wire. Four gatehouses span-
ning ` the complex at regular intervals house specially-
trained marine guards. Those allowed access all wear irri-
descent I. D. badges - green for "top secret crypto," red
for "secret crypto." Even the janitors are cleared for secret
codeword material. Once inside, you enter the world's
longest "corridor"-980 feet long by 560 feet wide. And
all along the corridor are more marine guards, protecting
STATINTL
the doors of key NSA offices. At 1,400,000 square
feet, it is larger than CIA headquarters, 1,135,000
square feet. Only the State Department and the Pentagon
and the new headquarters planned for the FBI are more
spacious. But the D11RNSA building (Director, National
Security Agency) can be further distinguished from the
headquarters buildingti of these other giant bureaucracies
-it has no windows. Another palace of paranoia? No.
For DIRNSA is the command center for the largest, most
sensitive and far-flung intelligence gathering apparatus in
the world's history. Here, and in the nine-story Op,,ra-
tions Building Annex, upwards of 15,000 employees work
to break the military, diplomatic and comnicrcial. codes
of every nation in the world, analyze the dc-crypted mes-
sages, and send on the results to- the rest of the U.S. in-
telligence community.
Far less widely known than the CIA, whose Director
STATINTL
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 liSHINCTON POST. STATINTL
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CIA Moving Base
In'Nort ern Laos
Special to The Washington Post
VIENTIANE, July 30-The
headquarters for CIA-backed
Laotian irregular forces in
northern Laos is moving from
the Long Chong area to a new
location 17 miles west, accord-
ing to highly reliable U.S.
;sources here. -
' Vang Vieng, a town on
Route 13 85 miles north of Vi-
entiane and 34 miles south-
west of Long Chong Valley,
has been chosen as the new
operations and logistics center
for Gen. Van." Pao's guerrilla
force.
The move to Vang Vieng be-
came necessary as a result oI
setbacks suffered by Gen.
Vang Pao's forces, according
to the U.S. sources.
Arms, ammunition, petro-
leum and all other war mate-
rial supplied by the United
States to Gen. Yang Pao's ir-
regular army of Moo tribes-
men are expected to be stock-
piled at Vang Vieng for
greater safety, sources said.
Both CIA and i11eo planners,
coordinators and advisors also
,will be based at the new cen-
ter, where they will be in less
danger than they currentlyJJ~
are in at Long Chong and Ban
Song.
U.S. sources in Long Chong;
recently reported yang Pao'sl'
forces are having considerable;
difficulty recapturing posi
Lions strategically important
to the defense of Long Cheng
Valley.
U.S. advisers to Vang Pao!
are said to be increasingly
worried about the vulnerabil-
ity of the Ban Song base.
Ban Song replaced Long
Chong as headquarters for
Vang Pao's irregular army
early this year when North Vi-
etnamese forces launched
heavy attacks on Long Chong}
after capturing the Plain ofI
Jars.
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 App ' oCO Poi eai2000A)5/15 : CIA-RDP80 0 JOURNAL STATINTL
M - 23 1 1972
S - 350,303
U0S;
for the drug
t ra fi rs?
AS PART OF the effort to combat drug
abuse-which, according to President Nixon
last summer, has "assumed the dimensions
of a national emergency"-the administration
is' committed to an all-out attack on the inter-
national narcotics. trade, This'involves not just
the breaking up of the syndicates that. pro-
cess and import the heroin to the United
States, but persuading other governments,
particularly in Southeast Asia where most of
the world's heroin now originates, to come
:down hard on the- growers and marketeers.
IBut is the Nixon administration trying as hard
as it could to cut off this profitable trade at
its source?
Disturbing evidence is accumulating that
it may not be. -There is The Politics of Heroin
in Southeast Asiq,'to be published this fall but
excerpted in the July issue of Harper's by a
young. 'S',',e graduate student specializing in
Southeast Asian history and politics. This
doculnerits the involvement of high govern-
!merit and military officials in Laos and Thai-
land in ',t]n narcotics trade; it even charges
complicit' by the Central Intelligence Agency.
JThe CIA has challenged all the author's alle-
gations, asserting that most of them are with-
out foundation.
`Lever' is hard to use
"The place to start. is the
other. end."
of the opium poppy. In Turkey's case the
United States is to help in compensating the
thousands of peasant farmers for whom poppy-
growing has been an innocent livelihood for
centuries and who now must switch to other
cash crops. Whether the Turkish government
or anyone else is compensating the many mid-
dlemen who have grown fat off the opium
trade is not discussed publicly.
But the United States has another way of
persuading reluctant governments to join the
anti-drug campaign. Congress lacked on a pro-
vision to last year's foreign aid bill permitting
the President to suspend aid to any country
that doesn't take action against the drug traf-
fic. The only problem is that suspending aid
to the governments of Southeast Asia would
virtually end the Vietnam war overnight.
It's a dilemma, to be sure. But it's worth
recalling that last winter, when President
Nixon was vehemently reiterating this coun-
try's commitment to keeping President Thieu
in power in Saigon, even though this was the
main obstacle to serious negotiations in Paris,
the same regime was one of the major factors
being blamed by U.S. officials for the eon-
But there is also the study made last winter
by top-level officials of the CIA, the State De-
partment and the Pentagon, and just now dis-
closed. This report concludes that there is no
prospect of cutting off the smuggling of nar-
cotics from Southeast Asia because of, "the
corruption, collusion and indifference at some
places in some governments, particularly Thai-
land and South Vietnam." This conclusion,
too, is being discounted by administration of-
'ficials, who argue that it is out of date and
that "substantial progress" has been made
in the past four months.
Yet it would be naive to assume that a situa~
Ap t- Ead, 09 @d0 S 0AW ei%I*i iU> 8ArO l a01 Q60 4QQI-01C
ing the success it scored last year when it ?'as ' war on drugs, or must that effort still rank
Mlle to persuade the Tllriiiil ? government to way below a certain view of a solution for
tion that was so bad could have improved as tinuation of our own "national emergency"
 STATINTL
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STATE JOURNAL,
JUL 6 0 1972.
E - 15,301
S - 15,679
Wanted: Answers on Laos
Last week Americans learnedthroughthe
press that the Central Intelligence Agency is
experimenting with rainmaking techniques in
Laos to retard the flow of enemy supplies
down the Ho Chi Minh trail into South Vietnam.
The report came from "military sources
"
,
not from the Nixon administration, Sec. of
Defense Melvin Laird refused to comment
on the subject.
THAT IS HOW the American people have
learned over the years the extent of their
country's involvement in Laos, an involvement
that does not seem likely to diminish as a re-
sult of "Vietnamization" of the war or any
other scheme that focuses primarily on Viet?
nam.
Reports started appearing several years
ago that U.S. bombers were ranging far,be.
yond the Ho Chi Minh trail to drop their
J
deadly cargo on the Plain of Jars in central
Laos. There have been persistent rumors
that. the CIA has been training mercenaries
to fight"41?m the Communist Pathet-Lao,
which is engaged in a civil war with the Lao
government (admittedly with the help of the
North Vietnamese). There is also consider.
able evidence that Americans in the Army's
elite Special Forces Have been fighting on
the ground in Laos.
Only recently has the Nixon administra-
tion acknowledged that U.S. bombers have
,operated -over Laos, generally giving the
Impression that American air strikes there
have been directed ualy against North' Viet.
namese supply routes. The other reports
have either been denied or, as in this in-
stance, dismissed with a highhanded "no
corAment,"
YET REPORTS from U.S. military and
civilian personnel returning home from Laos,
Thailand, and Vietnam indicate that the hum.
ber pf bombs dropped in Laos since 1265 prob.
ably amounts to hundreds of times the destruc.
tion rained on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese.
That attack was rightfully considered an act
of war by the American leople, But when the
tables are turned, when the U.S, unleashes
literally thousands of air attacks on a small
Asian country, both Democratic and Repub.
lican administrations have refused to so much
as comment on what is going on, let alone
ask Congress for a declaration of war or
for its token approval with another Tonkin
Resolution.
Although the U.S. Constitution stipulates
Congress is the only power that can legiti-
mately commit American fighting men to
combat, reports coming out of Laos show
the xtent.to which Congress has lost control
over the U.S. war machine.
This'newspaper recently ran a two-part
condensation of a report to Congress by
Rep. Paul McCloskey, R-California, whichpre.
sented evidence that U.S, ambassadors in
Laos have been able to order Air Force
strikes against virtually any village in the
country with little interference from Con-
gress or the White House, 'McCloskey's re-
port, based on interviews with dozens of U.S.
servicemen and Laotian refugees, suggests
that lower echelon policy makers have used
bombs to "herd" the Laotian civilian popula-
tion out of Communist territory and into gov.
ernlnent controlled areas, the loss of a few
thousand lives notwithstanding. There was
even some evidence that biological warfare
materials have been used in Laos on a
selective basis. THIS INFORMATION is hard to believe,
if only because it seems unlikely that the U.S.
military and diplomatic corps would dare
to so flaunt the powers the Congress seems to
have lost by default. But the reports continue
to come in, despite government silence on the
war in Laos. If true, they provide a sad
commentary on the extent to which American
Oplomacy has been brutalized during adecade
of military free rein in Indochina.
It has been said that thanks to the clever
posturing of Richard Nixon during his trips
to Red China and Moscow and `yith the
withdrawal of troops from Vietnam, the war in
Indochina will not be an issue in this election
year. Americans may be able to write off the
tragedy of Vietnam, once our troops are back
home and the prisoners of war have been re.
,leased. But there will remain the tragedy of
Laos, of which most Americans are hardly
aware, thanks to the deliberate efforts of the
executive branch.
According to the present 1 ietna*nization
schedule, a substantial number of U.S. bomb-
ers will remain in Thailand, the source of
most of the air strikes into Laos. The Viet-
namization idea does not represent a signifi.
cant change from the kind of. thinking that
got his country involved in the quagmire of
Southeast Asia in the first place. The U.S.
Air Force will remain to literally fly to the
rescue of political regimes in Laos or who-
knows-where else.
THIS IS A good year for Americans to
ask the politicians where they stand on con.
tinuing this presence in Southeast Asia, and,
for those who favor it, whether they would
make it accountable to Congressional author-
ity.
Yes,' the reports coming out of Laos are
hard to believe. But impossible? As, your-
self, And then ask the candidates, - G;L
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 STATINTL
Approved For Release 2MM /W :IA RD D1601 RO
30 July 1972
By 14'ILLIAf4I If. WYANT ,IR.
A Wasiin ;ton Correspotzclent
01 the Pont-Dispatch
WASIliNcG'I o,,NT, July 29-Sen-
ator Stuart Symington (Dora,),
Missouri, denounced Saturday
the A g e n c y for Jnternatioual
Development's involvement i n
Laos with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.
"The activities and funds of
these two agencies in Laos are
now so mixed," he said, "that
it must be impossible for Lao
officials. to know whether they
are dealing with AID or with
the CIA."
Symington, chairman of the
S e n a t e foreign relations sub-
committee on security agree
ments and coin niitnients
abroad, made the statement in
a preface he rrote for a.declas-
sified version of hearings over
Which he presided last April 13.
He 'criticized the Executive
Branch. of the government for
making oxtensive deletions in
the hearing record, made public
Saturday, He said the deletions
were made "On alleged grounds
of security,
T h e hearing transcript was
scissored so- severely, Syming-
ton said, that his panel was at
first reluctant to make public
what remained. II o w e v c r, it
was decided that the report
would add to information avail-
able about Laos.
Roderic L. O'Connor, co-ordi-
nator of AID's bureau for sup-
porting assistance' appeared be-
fore . the subcommittee in re-
sponse to a letter Symington
wrote March 21 to John A. Han-
nah, administrator of the Agen-
cy for International Develop.
ment.
Symington's letter had asked
Hannah a series of questions
about the relationship in Laos
between AID, which adminis-
ters foreign assistance, and the
CIA, which finances irregular
troops fighting Communists.
In' a separate statement is-
s u e d Saturday with the cen-
s o r e d but now declassified
hearing r e c o r d, the Missouri
Senator said the facts now com
inn out "raise serious questiops
about the legality of some Unit-'
ed Stales e x p e n d i . t u res in,
Laos. ?
The facts also disclose, Sym-
ington said, "a pattern of de-
viousness, if not actual decep-
tion, Which has characterized
the conduct of our policy in
Laos for the last decade."
O'Connor told the subcommit
tee that AID was not novi fi-
n it n c i n and, never had fi-
naced, military or intelligence
operritions in Laos, as suc.h..Ile
conceded that AID's assistance
had helped the royal Lao gov-
ernment carry its defense bur-
den.
In fiscal 1i72,thewitness
said, the CIA is reimbursing
AID in the amount of c ~,500,OOo
for medical services and sup-
plies for paramilitary forces or
their dependents in Laos,
O'Connor said AID supplied
certain services in the health
and humanitarian fie ] d s for
"anybody' in -Laos who is ill,
sick, or wounded," I' l
se
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 LA
Ap v> F;drsR@1e?eb?2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-0
EXAMi,1ZR
E - 204,749
EXAMINER & CHRONICLE
S -- 640, 004_
-
FOUL 3 01972
sciuMP-ast Elsie
STATINTL
FOIV`-9CS 0
The
( T WAS the harvest land
j for raw opium, the infa-
? moos "golden triangle."In
the corner embracing north-
eastern B u r m a, northern
Thailand and northern Laos
about 1000, tons of raw opium
was produced, about 70 per
cent of the world's supply.
- From there it eventually
found its way to the Ameri-
.cap market, but that source
of heroin, according to Ad-
ministration officials, had
been turned off.
"We think all the coun-
tries are cooperating with us
.and we are quite satisfied
with that cooperation," said
Secretary of State William
P. Rogers to a Senate sub-
committee last May.
On the Defensive
How much cooperation,
however, was subject to dis-
'pute, with the Central Intel-
ligence Agency and eventu-
ally the Administration on
the defensive last week.
..Part of the official worry
originated with the soon-to-
be-published book by
r Alfred W. McCoy. a 26-
V year-old Yale graduate stu-
dent who spent 18 months in-
vestigating narcotics opera-
tions2 in Indochina.
In "The Politics of Heroin
-in Southeast Asia." McCoy
charged that the CIA knew
of the narcotics trade but
failed to take action and that
both CIA and State Depart-
ment officials had. provided
political - and military sup-
port for America's Indo,
chinese allies actively en-
gaged .in drug traffic. had
vered up evidence of'such
in\ ement and had been
actively involved themselves
in the trade.
The CIA launched a big ef-
fort to refute the charges,
calling them unwarranted,
unproven and fallacious, and
managed to persuade the
publishers of the expose,
Harper & Row, to permit the
CIA to review the manu-
script prior to publioation.
The book has been based
on more than 250 interview-
ers, some of them, McCoy
said, with past and present
officials of the CIA.
H e said that top-level
South Vietnamese officials,
The CIA was
accuse?f drug.
trafficking
including President Nguyen
Van Thieu and Premier
Tran Van Khiem, were in-
volved.
The CIA began an unusual
public defense by sending
two letters fpr publication to
the Washington Post, which
had -printed some of
McCoy's allegations.
.The Approach
The CIA -began its ap-
proach to. Harper & Ifow in
learning of McCoy's appear-
ance before a Senate sub-
-committee.
Harper & Row decided
that although "we don't
have any doubts about the
book at all ... as one of the
oldest publishing houses in
America, Harper &Row has
an obligation to itself and
what it stands for."
A. Harper & Row spokes-
man added that if McCoy
did not agree to the CIA re-
view, it would not publish
the book.
Cabinet Report
Then came a Cabinet level
report, released last Sunday.
Contrary to administration
assurances of success in
halting drug traffic, it said,
there was "no prospect" of
slowing the traffic "under
any conditions that can real-
istically be projected."
The report was prepared
by'officials of the CIA, State .~/
Department and Defense
Department and noted that
"the most basic problem
and that one that unfortu-.
nately appears least likely
of any early solution, is the
corruption, collusion and in-
difference at some places in
some governments, particu-
larly Thailand and South
Vietnam ..."
The report also stated that
"it should surely be possible
to convey to the right Thai
or Vietnamese officials the
mood of the Congress and
the Administration on the
subject of drugs."
To which, Lester L. Wolff,
a- New York Democratic
critic of government's han-
dling of Southeast Asia drug
traffic, said, "We think the
trade has got so much pro-
tection in high p l a c e s in
Thailand that the Adminis-
tration is afraid they'll tell
iu to take our air bases out
if we put too much pressure
on them," - .a
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 STATINTL
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_:7 A 17,
TORRINGTON; CONN.
REGISTER
JU L: Z 9 1972
E - 11,792
Editor
Uiicie Sam -dreg pusher
Acting FBI 'Director Patrick army, the CIA built up the power
Gray declared the other day that of tribal commanders both mil-
a shortage of heroin on the street itarily and economically. But by
market has developed . as a result Laos tradition, economics is opium,
of the gove'rnment's crackdown on' starting with poppy farmers' like
the drug traffic, "the most intensive the Meos and extending into the
drive this nation has ever directed royal Laotian government.
against narcotics racketeers." This One of the commanders of the
might be encouraging news were CIA secret army, McCoy reports,
it not- for. the fact that while the is General Vang Pao,' a major en-
FBI is trying to crack down on. the trepreneur in the opium business
drug merchants another federal since 1961. C14 ,,operatives guided
agency has been aiding and abet- the buildiizg of airstrips to link his
ting them: villages via Air America planes -
A detailed report linking the which, naturally,, soon were flying
1 CIA to the enormously profitableleo opium to market. CIA and the
traffic in heroin is presented in the 13. S. Agency for International De-
July issue of Harper's magazine. velopment later helped finance a
It was written by Alfred W. McCoy, private airline for Vang Pao,, who
a PhD student in Southeast Asian ? went on to open a heroin processing
history at Yale, not as a journalistic plant near CIA headquarters.
expose but as a chapter in a Harper A year ago, President Nixon de-
Row book scheduled for Sep- clared war on the international he-
tembet publication under the title roin traffic, and -- under U. S. pres-
"The Politics of Heroin in Southeast sure opium dens in Laos were
Asia." shut by the hundreds. But, ac-
It is a shocking indictment that cording to McCoy's report, neither
McCoy presents in reciting how, as U. S. nor Laotian officials are going
a result of direct and indirect Amer- after the drug traffickers. He notes
i.can involvement, opium production that, according to a United Nations
it Southeast Asia is increasing and report, 70 per cent of the world's
the -export of high-grade heroin is illicit opium has been coming from
flourishing. Most of the heroin used "the Golden Triangle of Southeast
by American GIs in Vietnam has . Asia - northeast Burma, northern
come from Laotian areas where the Thailand and northern Laos. -
CIA is active, McCoy writes, and "capable of supplying the U. S. with
increasing amounts are being sent unlimited quantities of heroin for
to the,United States. and Europe. generations."
As part of the US. effort to McCoy's conclusion: "Unless
bolster. Southeast Asia against Coin- something is done to change Amer-
mutlist inroads, the CIA has been ica's policies and priorities in South-
working since 1959 with the Meo east Asia, the drug crisis will deep-
tribesmen. of hilly northern Laos. en. and the heroin plague Will con-
I.1i forging an effective guerrilla tinue to spread."
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 Looking .t .aos
THE END OF NOWHERE: American Policy Toward
Laos Since 1954. By Charles A. Stevenson.
(Beacon. 367 pp. $0.95)
VOICES FROM THE PLAIN OF JARS: Life Under
an Air li'`er. Compiled with, an. Introduction and
Preface by Fred Branfmart.
'(Harper Colophon. 160 pp. 61,93)
Revi.ewced by
Wait. Haney
T h c reviewer taught in.
Lac for three ?tears and is
the author of "A Survey of
Civilian Casualties Among
Refugees from. the Plain of
Jars," published by the Ken-
tredy Subcommittee on Refu-
gees.
Millions upon millions of
words have been written
about America's involve-
ment in Vietnam but 1?c-
markably little about United
States actions in Laos-de-
spite the 'fact that we have
spent some $5-$S billion on
that small country in the
last' four years. These two
books, though strikingly dif-
ferent in many respects, rep-
resent valuable eontribu-
tionsto a loner needed public
discussion of the American
role there (or as one U.S.
official interviewed by
Charles A. Stevenson calls
that kingdom, and whence
the title of his book, "The
End of Nov;here").
Stevenson and Fred
Branfman differ as much as
their books. Stevenson is the
pedant; footnotes and bibli-
ography span almost 50 of
his book's 300 pages. An ear-
lier version of "The End of
Nowhere" served as his dog-
'toral dissertation at Har-
vard. In writing it, Steven-
on interviewed 816 past and
present government officials
-from AID bureaucrats to
CIA operatives, from ambas-
sadors to congressional staff
members. At first one thinks:
Now remarkably thorough,
this man must have traced
dosi'n nearly every Ameri-
can official who ever had
anything to do with Laos.
But he did not interview a
single Laotian.
Whether this omission
represents the arrogance of
American academia or
whether it reflects a de
facto acknowledgement that
Laotians have never had
much say about what t h e
U.S. (lid in their country is
not made clear. I suspect it
represents a mixture of both.
For as Stevenson writes:
"The basic fact is that
Americans control most of
what happens in areas alle-
giant to the Vientiane gov-
ernment. The United States
]provides essential advice,
coordination and supplies
for the war. Outside of a
few cities, Americans or
their agents perform most
of the functions of the cen-
tral government. U.S. funds
support the economy and the
government."
and then as a free-]ghee (13ranfman :.peaks of'' a se-
journalist.. cret decision to wage an air
Like Stevenson, he inter- war against the Plain, as if
viewed dozens of people there was some sort of huge
about U;S: policy in Laos. But conspiracy in the U.S. gov-
unlike Stevenson lie talked ernment when even the Pen-
with people on the receiving taron Minors afford little
end, with hundreds at Laouan evidence to support such a
refugees, which led him to the theory.) First, Stevenson
remarkable idea (and like shows the cavalier indiffer-
many innovative ideas,,quite ence of U.S. officials. For
obvious once it was put for- example, Dean Rusk told
ward) that is the basis for Stevenson, "After 1963, Laos
this book. Ile simply asked was only the wart ? on the
the refugees to write of hot; of Vietnam." And Ches-
their lives and the war they ter Cooper, a member of the
to Security 1967 Council
experienced-as they called National Security
-
T,n the result of the airplanes. from mented, 19 "Laos was not all.
huo honks , oaksg on all Indo- that goddamned important."
china, is hundreds truly unique. - Second, by the example of
c:hIts is' his own analysis, Stevenson
Its greatest weakness helps to explain why the
13raiifman's ? introductionn, .
A Plain was destroyed. For.
history of Laos as abhrevi- the pded. he
ated as his must inevitably like th studies, Stevenson carefully
contain sonic partial truths avoids moral judgments of
and consequent distortions. who escalated the conflict in
Yet the introduction to Laos of why the U.S. did
"Voices from the Plain of
Jars" contains too many. whaiour actions Lon pos-
speaks For example, BranIrnan whether e justified a the
speaks of the present condi? h be seek. Matter-of-
the of the refugees from ends
the Plain of Jars in ahnost y/
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 STATINT
Approved For Release 200p~0&i Ic T: '914-~~800
in line with the changes already voted Otherwise, we may again be drawn into through 1971 received 0,919.8 million worth
c~ . military arrangements without our full of U.S. farm commodities under Food for
enat in by the PI this bill? Peace. Of that, ~'.742.7 million was kicked
'i he PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the knowledge and consent. back to the Saigon government to use for
Senator repeat his parliamentary, in- Personally, I consider the use of food "common defense" purposes.
quiry? for peace as food for war to be a perver- Authority for the expenditures is provided
Mr. IIUGHES. Is the section 15 men- sion of the basic intent of Congress. I also in Section 101-0 of the Food for Peace Jaw,
tioned in this amendment now a properly believe that it does our credibility no good Further, the report shows, Korea I,.st year
numbered section, in view of the changes at home or abroad to have these. funds received $20 million Food for Peace aid to
already made in the proposed legislation rechanneled for war under the label of help pay military bills, and Cambodia got
food for' place. $7.4 million.
before the Senate today? . Through 1971, Korea had received ~5pa.1
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the For too long we have learned, after the million in common defense" funds under
Senator ask unanimous consent that the fact, of unauthorized funds going for Food for Peace out of it total aid under the
amendment be properly numbered? foreign aid-the under-valued excess tie- program of $752.2 million. Cambodia?begaih
The Parliamentarian informs the Pre- louse articles, the CIA money for Laos receiving the aicl last year.
siding Cfliccr that that will take care of which has been channeled through the Under a typical arrange ertt. the United
o pr to ee puts for Vietnam with
the problem of the Senator from Iowa. AID budget, and the quiet reprograming farm commodities, t
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I ask which leads to mushrooming commit- currencies. About co per cent is then klckcd
unanimous consent that the amendment means without the prior - consent of back for "common defense" cent is purposes. .
be properly numbered to conform with Congress. The report says: "The major uses ... are
the changes already made in the bill. This is merely another example of for personnel equipment, mostly clothing,
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without such concealed aid. construction anti construction materials, and
bjection, it is so ordered. 1il order that Congress can advise and local services provided for the United States
FOOD FOR PEACE VERSUS FOOD FOR WAR consent to such agreeme>t-s, I am today Military A::slstance Command-Victnain."
sion of the "common de-
Mr. IIUGIHES. Mr. President, I was offering an amendment to the pending Oyer-all supervi
tense" money e vision b the om ion de-
startled to read an article in this morn- bill which would provide simply that. no ?lent of Defense Find the Agency for Inter-
Ing's paper citing the latest report on agreement for common defense purposes national Development, the report says.
the food-for-peace program and noting under Public Law 480 shall be entered In the case of Korea, the study tars the
that in some instances about 80 percent into unless authorized by further affir- money is used "to help offset the Increasing
of the payment received for agricultural motive legislation by Congress. defense costs" which re being the triinsfearedl
commodities is funneled back to the local Since the hour is late and the time on defense btmilit. F aid mission governments for military equipment and this bill is short, I believe that this pro- in Cambodia is used "tar iuili-
facilities. vision would give Congress the Opportun The money
tai ?y pay and allowances," the report gays.
On further investigation, I discovered ity to step back and look at these dis- "Although 1971, was the last year local
that this activity is perfectly leial under guised military aid progrzx.ms-and then currency arrangements will be signecl,'it is
section 104(c) of Public Law '480, which accept or reject then as we choose, anticipated that 104-C grants will continue
permits agreements to use these repay- Mr. President, as I have stated, this to be made to Vietnam and Cambodia out o'
meats "To procure equipment, mnat.erials, amendment, vei:y simply, would give funds generated under credit agrceuxents,"
facilities, and services for the common Congress and the proper committees the the report says.
Since Food for Peace was enacted in 195?}.
defense including internal security." right from this point on, after the pas-. more than $1.7 billion has been spent oil
Perhaps, Mr. President, I and singular- sage and signing into law of this bill, to "connnon defense" arrangements. The report
ly naive in supposing that this fine pro- renew these matters if -our Government sbows that about $12.9 billion in total aid,
grans-which I have long supported and wants to rechannel the food for peace the military kickbacks have amounted to 1:3
which has done so much to help share funds into military channels. per cent.
America's abundance with the hungry Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President., will the Although Vietnam, .Korea and Carhb:,dia
Senator yield? are the only current recipients, many cut n-
and undernourished people of the Mr. 7IUh;PHREY. Mr. President, will tries over the years have shared In the "cons- be used only for peaceful moil defense" benefits.
activities. the Senator yield?
Mr. HUGHES. I yield to the distin- Mr. HIJMPIIP.EY. Mr. President. his t
After all, the declaration of policy at guished Senator from Minnesota. year, you in iy recall, the Presiding Of -
the start of this Iltw declares a major i\, r. IIUr~1PIIREY. Mr. President, will facer now in the chair ('.1r. Pl oxsln l r
purpose: the Senator yield me 3 minutes? Rill sure will, introduced an amendnlcnt;
To use the abundant agricultural produc-
ity of the United States Mr, HUGHES. I yield. sponsored by the Senator from ~;iir:c'.
and malnutrition c Mr. IIUMPIIR~EY. Mr. President, I ant sin (lair. Pr.O}C,1lYR Ii) , the Senator from
a malnutrition and to o to encourage economic coonnomiom it r
development in the developing countries, very pleased to join the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANsmirao), the S'en~!tor
with particular emphasis on assistance to Iowa (Air. HUGHES) in offering this from South Dakota (Mr. A cGovu:n u) ,
those countries that are determined to ins- amendment. and myself to the Foreign Assistance Act
prove their own agricultural production. I was very much disturbed this morn- of 1971, designed to repeal the wording-
But there is another declared purpose, ing to read reports indicating that the in Public Law 480 which in practice had
one which has apparently become a United States had funneled 078 million become a means for the U.S. Government,
blank check for many activities abroad: into South Vietnam's war budget from to provide additional military assistance
To promote in other ways the foreign poi- the surplus agriculture conlmoclities beyond the amounts authorized or ap-
icy of the United States. tier the terms of Public Law 480. The propriated by Congress. The amendment
report was brought to our attention this was designed to restore the original pur-
This catch-all clause has permitted morning in the press. I ask unanimous pose of Public Law 480 of which I was one
the U.S. Government to return nearly consent that the AP story on the White of the earlier sponsors.
three-quarters of a, billion dollars to the House report, entitled "'Food for Peace' Public Law 480 is the Food for Peace
government of South Vietnam in the Funds Arm Saigon" on food-for-peace Act. Its purpose is to promote interna-
.orm of military aid, nearly $600 million operations in Indochina last year, be tiona] trade in agricultural colnmoditie,:.
to the government of South Korea, and printed in the RECORD. to combat hunger and malnutrition, and
now we are doing the s,,me in Cambodia. There being no objection, the article to further economic development.
Over the years since 1954 we have 1 was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,' Putting $78 million into South Viet-
turned over 01.7 billion in defense-re- Dam's defense budget hardly fulfills the
late~l aid, as follows: spirit of the Food for Peace Act, It is
Although this amounts to only 13 per- "Peon FOR Peace" ru es Arir SAIGON hardly in keeping` with the anlendnlent
cent of total Public Law 480 assistance, A White House report shows the United introdui_cd last year, the PrO%Inire-llulli.-
St?s.tes funneled $78 million last year into grey bTaI15f]el yeasCGOV anleridi'tiCll t,
the figure is about EO pe1'CCrlt for Vietnam budget under the Fooci p
find Korea. South Vietnam's war for Peace foreign-aid program. written into law as Public Law 92-226.
Perhaps Congress would approve such - The disclosure came Ina report to Congress This amendment attempted to close a
provisions if given the opportunity. But on ,Food for Peace operations last year. it loophole and to prohibit any use Of Public
as signed by President Nixon on June 29. Law 480 funds for military Purposes.
I believe that we should be given that was'
Opportu M According to the report, South Vietnam That was its intent, and that was the
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JOURNAL-C
JUL
M 32,217
A Yale University graduate
student's forthcoming book. on
heroin traffic in Southeast Asia
is reportedly being reviewed by
the Central Intelligence Agency
Alfred W. McCoy, 26, of 29
Lake Place, a Ph.D. student in
Southeast, Asian studies, spent
'18 months in Asia investigating
narcotics operations and recent-
ly testified' before the Senate
.. Appropriations Subcommittee
on Foreign Aid.
He testified at the time that
.aircraft chartered by the CIA
'and the Agency for Internation-
'al Development "have been
transporting opium harvested
by the agency's tribal merce-
c E i.EYE
i
The CIA, with the permission
of Harper & Row, the book's
publishers, is reviewing t h e
manuscript of McCoy's book
with the intention of demon-
strating that some of the book's
claims t+re "totally false and.
without foundation," according
to a recent article in The New
York Times.
McCoy testified in two Con-
gressional appearances in June
that the material in the forth-
coming book, "The Politics of
Heroin in Southeast Asia". was
based on more than 250 inter-
views, some with CIA officials.
In a chapter of the book print-
ed in the current issue of Harp-
er's Magazine, McCoy charged
that "American involvement
the Golden Triangle-northeast-
ern Burma, northern Thailand
and northern Laos-produce 70
percent of the world's supply
of raw opium and that. much of
it is being funneled to addicts
on New York streets.
"After pouring billions of dol-
lars into Southeast Asia for
over 20 years, the United States
has acquired enormous power
in the region. And it has used
this power to create new na-
type" by a senate staff mem-
ber.
In the magazine article,
McCoy wrote. that during the
ast several months of 1970,
ore American soldiers were
vacuated "mas casualites
om South Vietnam for durg-
lated reasons than for reasons
aving to do with war wounds."
lie also wrote that farmers in
portedly carried opium a n d
individual CIA men have abet-
ited the op ium traffic."
t. At the time of his Congres-
sional testimony, McCoy was
described as a "very thorough
scholar and not the antiwar
~IA contract airlines have re-
Iment by client governments,
:has gone beyond coincidental
complicity; embassies h a v e
consciously covered up involve-
tions were non-existed, to hard
pick prime ministers, to topple
governments and to crush revo-
lutions.
"Unless something is done to
change America's policies and
priorities in Southeast Asia., the
drug crisis will deepen and the
heroin plague will continue to
spread," McCoy wrote.
- McCoy could not be reached
Sunday night for comment.
KATIM.YN POLKl1OfS11
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Foreign
Report to U.S. Sees
No Hope of Halting
Asian Drug Traffic
By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, July ' 23-A
Cabinet-level report has con-i
eluded that, contrary to the
Nixon Administration's public
.op,timism, "there is no pros-
.pect" of stemming the smug-
gling of narcotics by air and
.sea in Southeast Asia "under
any conditions that can realisti-
cally be projected."
"This 'is. so," the report,.
dated Feb. 21, 1972, said, "be-
cause the governineiits in the
region are unable and, in some
cases, unwilling to do those
thjngs that would havi to be
done by them; if a truly ef-
fective effort :were to be
made!"
' The report, prepared by of-
t/ficials of the Central lntelli-
gence Agency, the. State De= .
partrnent and the Defense Dc-'
Iaartment, noted that "the most
basic problem, and the one that
unfortunately appears least
likely of any early solution, is
the- corrtiption, collusion and
indifference at some places in
some governments, particularly
Thailand and South Vietnam,)
that precludes more effective
'supression of traffic by the,
ppnu.lJ ments on whose territory
The report sharply contra-
t'n`af'~i 1O1e Official Administra-
tion position and Government
intelligence sources say its
conclusions are still valid today.!
In May, Secretary of State Wil-'
]fam P. Rogers told a Senate
subcommittee that "we think all
the countries are cooperating
with us and we are quite satsi-
lied with that cooperation."
Similarly, Nelson G. Gross,
Senior Adviser to the Secretary
of State and Coordinator for
International Narcotics, Matters,
testified before Congress in
June on the subject of narcotics
smuggling that "the govern-
ments of Thailand, Laos and
Vietnam have already joined us
in the fight and, while we have
C
a long way to go, we feel'that
during the past year some real
progress has been achieved."
All officials concerned with
the drug problem acknowledge
that the United States agencies,
under personal prodding from
inte
nsffpli'av~eV9f
intensive ive e. ~t~p
than Administration officials
say it is. .
Critics' Charges Backed
Two leading critics of what
they allege to be the Govern-
ment's laxness in stopping the
flow of narcotics are Represent-
ative Robert H. Steele, Repub-
lican of Connecticut, and Alfred
W. McCoy, a 26-year-old Yale,
graduate student who has writ-
ten a book on narcotics in
Southeast Asia. The New York
Times reported Saturday that
Mr. McCoy's allegations con-
cerning the C.I.A. and the drug
traffic had been the subject of
an intense and unusually pub-
lic rebuttal by the agency.
saia, is monitoreu oy umtcu During a Congressional hear-
States intelligence agencies. ling into drug traffic last month,
Thai-U.S. Agreements Cited Representative Wolff disputed
Mr. Gross, the State Depart-
ment's adviser on international
narcotics, said in his Congres-
sional testimony that "during
the past year the Thais have
increased their efforts in the
/drug field with United States
and United Nations assistance."
He cited two agreements,
signed in late 1971, calling for
more cooperation and more
long-range planning between
Thai and United States officials
,to stamp out the trade.
"Based on all intelligence In-
formation available," Mr. Gross
er
c
t'f' d "th 1 d f th
the Administration's contention
that it was making "real prog-
ress" in stemming the narcotics
flow and said, "we think the
trade has got so much protec-
tion in high places in Thailand
that the Administration is
afraid they'll tell us to take our
air bases out if .we put too
much pressure on them."
s o
The Cabinet-level report, ~ tes i le , e ea
made available to The Times, Thai Government are not en-
buttressed many of the charges gaged in, the opium or heroin
made by the two critics, par- traffic, nor are they extending
ivotal im- protection to 'traffickers." He
bout the
l
l
i
p
y a
ar
t
tu
portance of Thailand to the in- added that the top police of-!
ternational drug smugglers. ficial in Thailand had publicly
Thailand is also a major Air stated that he would punish
Force staging area for the Unit- any corrupt official.
ed States. The cabinet-level report, sub-
In a report on the world mitted to the Cabinet Commit-
heroin problem last year, Mr. tee one International Narcotics
American viewpoint, Thailand
is as important to the control
of the illegal international
traffic in narcotics as Turkey.
While all of the opium pro-
duced in Southeast Asia is notl
grown in Thailand, most of it
is smuggled through that coun-
try."
Mr. Steele's report, filed with
the House Committee on For-
eign Affairs, noted that many
American citizens had estab-
lished 'residence in Bangkok,
and had moved into the nar-
cotics trade. The report added
that the inability of the United
States to have a few notorious
smugglers deported had led
some intelligence officials to
conclude that the mien were pay-
ing Thai officials for protec-
tion.
Mr. McCoy said in testimony
before Congressional commit.-
tees last month that hundreds
of tons of Burmese opium
passed through Thailand every
year to international markets
in Europe and the United Stales
and that 80 to 90 per cent of
the opium was carried by Chi-
nese Nationalist paramilitary
teams that were at one time
paid by the C.I.A..
There are a number of opium
refineries along the northern
Thai border, he said, and much
of the processed high-quality
heroin is shipped by trawler to
Hong Kong.
"Even though they are heav-
ily involved in the narcotics
traffic," Mr. McCoy testified, have sponsored legislation that
"these Nationalist. Chinese ir-!would cut off more than $100-
regulars units are closely allied million in foreign aid to Thai-
witin the Thai Government."-He ;land unless she took more ac-
port duty", of about $2.50 a!fairs Committee on June 21
The New York Tinrccs
Nelson G. Gross asserted
that there has been prog-
ress against smuggling.
Robert H. Steele charged
the Government is lax in
halting flow of drugs.
.Iic u'4 tt~ ,i A61010113 it qt 1'Tt iii8 '1'ir~fr i e si'tt000600120~A-h NTL
border area and collect an "im-1cleared the House Foreign Af-
ay- for suppression or tne trat-
fic by Thai trawlers, noting
that each trawler "would rep-
resent something like 6 per
cent of annual United States
consumption of heroin."
The report said that the
trawler-traffic should have pri-
ority because "it is possible to.
attack the Thai trawler traffic
without seeking the coopera-
tion or Thai authorities and
running the attendant risks of
leaks, tip-offs and betrayals."
After such a seizure, the re-
port said, the United States'
Embassy in Bangkok could "re-'
peat with still greater force,
and insistence the representa-,
tions it has already often made
to the Government of Thai-I
land" for more effective efforts
"to interdict traffic from the
north of Thailand to Bangkok
and also the loading of nar-
cotics on ships in Thai har-
bors."
At another point in the re-,
port, a general complaint was
voiced. "It should surely he
possible to convey to the right!
Thai or Vietnamese officials
the mood of the Congress and
he Administration on the sub-
ject of drugs," the report said.
"No real progress can be made
on the problem of illicit traffic
until and unless the local gov-
ernments concerned make it a
matter of highest priority."
Representatives Steele, Les-'
ter L. Wolff, Democrat of Nas-
sau County, and Morgan F.
 ti Y''.(i..''Yi t' iZZKI;J
Approved For Release NOM A ~ 198A9WW:KU 6
GALA, AIDES ASSAIL
ASIA DRUG CHARGE
Agency, Fights Reports That
It Ignored Heroin Traffic
Among Allies of U.S.
t By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, July 21 -
The Central Intelligence Agency
has begun a public battle
against accusations that it
knew- of but failed to stem
the -heroin traffic of United
States allies in Southeast Asia.
In recent weeks, high-ranking
officials of the C.I.A. have
signed letters for publication
to a newspaper and magazine,
granted a rare on-the-record
interview at the agency's head-
quarters in McLean, Va., and
most significantly -. per-
suaded the publishers of a
forthcoming expose on the
C.I.A. . and the drug traffic
to permit it to review the
manuscript prior to publica-
tion. The target of all these meas-
ures has been the recent writ-
ings and Congressional testi-
mony of Alfred W. McCoy, a
26-year-old Yale graduate stu-
dent who spent 18 months in-
vestigating the narcotics opera-
tions in Southeast Asia. His
book, "The Politics of Heroin
in Southeast Asia," is schcd-
tiled to be published by Harper
& Row in mid-September-bar-
ring delays caused by the in-
telligence agency's review.
In his book, Mr. McCoy al
leged that both C.I.A. and
State Department officials have
provided political and military
support for America's Indo-
chinese allies actively engaged
in the drug traffic, have con-
sciously covered up evidence
of such involvement, and have
been actively involved them-
selves in narcotic trade.
C.I.A. officials said they had
reason to believe that Mr. Mc-
Coy's book contained many un-
warranted, unproven and falla-
cious accusations. They ac-
knowledged that the public
stance in opposition to such
allegations was a departure
from the usual "low profile"
of the agency, but they in-
sisted that there was no evi-
dence affil
drug traffic i aft'
A ia.
One well-informed Government
official directly responsible for,
monitoring the illegal flow of ington-based official with Air did not agree, he added, Harper
narcotics complained in an in-,America, a charter airline that & Row would not publish the
terview that many of Mr. Mc-flies missions foi; the C.I.A. in book.
Coy's charges "are out of date." Southeast Asia. Both categoric- In a subsequent interview,
"Go back three or four years," ally denied the allegations link- ? Robert L. Bernstein, president
he said, "and no one was con- ing C.I.A. personnel to any of Random House and president
cerned about this. It wasn't! knowledge of or activity, in of the Association of American
until our own troops started: the drug traffic. Publishers, Inc., said that his
to get addicted, until 1968 or A similar letter of disavowal, concern had twice refused of-
'69, that anyone was aware" of signed by Mr. Colby, was sent ficial C.I.A. requests for per-
the narcotics problems in South-' for publication to the publisher mission to revise manuscripts
.
east Asia, of Harper's Magazine within "In general," Mr. Bernstein
This official said that In the the last week. Robert Schnayer- said, "our opinion would be
.eyes of the C.I.A., the charges son, the magazine's editor, said that we would not publish a
were "unfair." Ile said of the that the letter would be pub- book endangering the life of
C.I.A., "they think they're tak- lished as soon as possible, anybody working for the C.I.A.
ing the heat for being un- The C.I.A. began its approach or an other Government agency.
aware and not doing anything to Harper & Row in early Short of that, we would pub-
about something that was go- June, apparently after learning lish any valid criticism."
ing on two or three years of Mr. McCoy's appearance be- In a series of interviews with
ago." fore the Senate subcommittee. The New York Times, a number
Based on 250 Interviews Cord Meyer Jr., described asL of present and former officials
During two Cb?b?ssional ap- with officials of the publishing
l
pearances
ast :month, Mr. Mc- (concern and informally asked
Coy testified that his accusa-
tions were based on more than
250 interviews, some of them
with past and present officials
of the C.I.A. He said that top-
level South Vietnamese officials,
including President Nguyen
Van Thicu and Premier Iran
Van I hiem, were specifically
involved.
. In July, 1971, Representative
Robert H. Steele, Republican,
of Connecticut, said during a
,
e
my
House Foreign Affairs suhcom American citizens should be !bottom dollar that they were'
mittee hearing that the United
dl if bd o hd i i
mae onyasenarnt .
States Government possessed evidence."
east Asian officials, including.
Maj. Gen. Ngo Dzu, then com-I
mander of the South Viet
namese II Corps, with involve-1
meet in the narcotics trade.
Mr. Steele's accusations were
denied and mostly ignored.
Mr. McCoy also alleged that
Corsican and American syndi-
cate gangsters had become in-
volved in the narcotics trade.
He said that such information
was known to the C.I.A. In a
chapter of his book published
in this month's Harpers Maga-
zine, Mr. McCoy further
charged that in 1967 the in.
famous "Golden Triangle" -
an opium-producing area cm=
for review prior to publication. nineteen-sixties. But many noted
On July 5, a formal letter that the agency had since taken
making the request, signed by; strong steps to curb such prac-
counsel of the C.I.A. was sent.
to Harper & Row.
Mr. Houston's request was
not based on 'national securit
but on the thesis that "allega-
tions concerning involvement of
our belief that no reputable
publishing house would wish
to publish such allegations with-
out being assured that the sup-
porting evidence was valid."
If the manuscript were handed
over, the letter said. "we be-
lieve we could demonstrate to
you that a considerable num-
ber of Mr. McCoy's claims
about this agency's alleged in-
volvement are totally false and
without foundation, a number
re distorted beyond recogni-
ion, and none is based on
convincing evidence." A copy
of the letter was made avail-
able to The New York Times.
Mr.McCoy, in an interview,
said that the book had been
smuggling and "looking the oth-
er way" was common through-
4Ycars in Southeast Asia, said,
1 don't believe that agency
,
staff personnel were dealing
L/
in Opium. But if you're talking/
about Air America hauling the
stuff around
then I'll b
t
(described Mr. McCoy's pub-
Ilished writings as "1 per cent
'tendentious and 90 per cent of
the most valuable contributioot
:1 can think of."
(bracing parts of northeastern commissioned by Harper &
Burma, northern Thailand and Row and carefully and totally
northern Laos-was producing reviewed by its attorneys with
about 1,000 tons of raw opium no complaint until the C.I.A.
annually, then about 70 per request was made.
cent of the world's supply.
The bulk of Mr. McCoy's
accusations-both in the maga-
zine and during the Congres-
sional hearings--failed to gain
much national attention. None-
theless, the C.I.A. began its
unusual public defense after
a Washington Star reporter
cited some of Mr. McCoy's
allegations in a column.
Letter Sent to Paper
Two letters were sent to i
roReel segQ604D 8
Colby, the executive director
of the C.I.A., and the other
,by Paul C. Velte Jr. a. Wash-
! B. Brooks Thomas, vice presi-
dent and general counsel of
the publishing house, said in
,an interview in New York,
We don't have nay doubts
,about the book at all. We've
:had it reviewed by others and
we're persuaded that the work
is amply documented and schol-
arly." i
"We're not submitting to
censorship or anything like
that," Mr. Thomas said. "We're
taking a responsible middle po- J -TATINTL
'P l- 1 -e , 011 'n X600120001-
to review it.". If Mr.. McCoy
 9
STAB, STATINTL
22JUL19
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MILTON WORST
Just in case you've for-
gotten how all that fuss down
in Miami Beach (and since)
got started, may I remind
you that it was a war in Indo-
china-which, in the absence
of large American casualties,
has dropped off the front
pages again.
? For myself, I'm grateful
for a little book by Fred
Branfman, who spent four
years in Laos, called "Voices
From the Plain of Jars." It's
an account, largely in the
words of the victims, of what
living beneath an American
air canhpaiall is like. It's worth
$1.93 for this grim reminder
.of Orwellian struggle.
The Plain of Jars, Branf-
man tells us, is a small and
beautiful plateau, whose 150,-
000 inhabitants lived in vir-
tual isolation from the out-
side world in tiny farming
villages. For centuries, the
Plain was fought over by dif-
ferent tribal groups, none of
which seemed to hold it for
very long.
In 1961, the Plain was tak-
en rather effortlessly from
the right-wing, Laotian heirs of
the French colonial regime
by a local Communist group
called the?Pathet Lao. To res-
cue it from this fate, the United
States decided to bomb the
Plain of Jars, as we say, back
into the Stone Age.
The entire operation was
conceived by the CIA-and,
of course, the American peo-
ple were told nothing about it.
Over the ensuing years, U.S.
bombers literally destroyed
the ancient satiety there,
killing tens of thousands of
people and driving the others
Loth the forests and the cities.
It was a stirring American
victory or, as Tacitus put it,
"where they snake a desert,
they call it peace." It is hard
to know what strategic pur-
pose was served-but the Plain
of Jars victory has been
amply confirmed by outside
sources.
At first, I was disposed to
think that Branfman exagger-
ated when he wrote; "Al-
though few people realize it
as yet, the disappearance of
the Plain of Jars is one of the
signal events of our time, as
significant in its own way ? . .
as the atomic bombing of
Iliroshinha."
He went on to explain that
the Plain of Jars marked the
historical advent of ''automat-
ed" warfare.
The armies of our allies, he
pointed out, were so ? much
weaker than their adversaries
that conventional air support
was inadequate. "So," lie
wrote, "the traditional roles
of air and ground forces were
reversed." Air power became
the principal arm of conquest,
with ground forces supple-
menting the bombs.
To a superpower, he said,
the advantages of automated
war are that it is "relatively
inexpensive and . . . its own
citizens are barely or not at
all aware of it, and their lead-
ers are free to' wage war at
their pleasure."
But, even more frighten-
ingly, he adds; "The basic
psychology of war is altered
as well. Ileretofore, hatred
of the enemy and love of
country or faith -- real or
manufactured-has been a
necessary prerequisite for
sending men off to war.
"However, when tens of
thousands of technicians are
called upon to wage war
against a country and a peo-
ple they, will never see, then
the need for such motivation
disappears. When even the
relatively few who do enter
enemy territory remain 5,000
feet in the air and wage bat-
tle. by pushing buttons and
pulling levers to release ord-
nance on unseen persons be-
low, even the tenuous human
bonds which once existed be-
tween enemies are dissolved.
"War 'becomes a technical
exercise, bereft of malice or
rancor, freeing combatants
from pangs of conscience and
the moral constraints."
Branfman finished his book
before the full implications of
President Nixon's Indochina
strategy became apparent-
but it is clear that the lessons
we learned over the Plain of
Jars have been incorporated
into the fighting in South
Vietnam.
We no longer fight on the
ground. We send our bombers
in from our sanctuaries in
Thailand, Guam and the car-
riers in the Tonkin-Gulf. After
releasing their destruction, the
technicians who fly them re-
turn home to martinis and a
hot supper. .
Not even the Pentagon,
claims that the South Vietnam-
ese -army is more than a
minor auxiliary of American
air power.
As Secretary Laird said re-
cently, we will "be continuing
air and sea power in Asia for
a good time. The idea that
somehow or other the Nixon
Doctrine means that we will
not have air or sea power in
Asia is a great mistake."
So the next time someone
tells you slow swell it is that
President Nixon has wound
dow, n the war in Vietnam, you
can answer that he hasn't
wound down anything. IIe's
just shifted from the obsolete
kind of war to the new, in-
vigorating automated war.
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dos
By TAMMY ARBUCI~LE
Special to The Star-News
VIENTIANE - Considera-
,ble rivalry exists between the
U.S. State and Defense depart-
ments on who should run the
Laos- war and how the Laos
war should be run, wc1l-
informed U.S. official sources
say.
This rivalry is sd great that
sometimes one group of U.S.
officials is not totally aware of
what other another depart-
ment is doing, sources said.
Right now the Laos war is run
by the State. Department
through its man on the scene,
U.S. Ambassador G. Mc-
Murtrie Godley.
Personal Direction
Godley orchestrates the war
very personally, deciding for
example whether and where
;]352 strikes should be made.
To help and advise him from
the field the ambassador has
the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy. The agency acts as the
State Department's executive
assistant in Laos with its em-
ployes coordinating and direct-
ing the activities of the Laos
irregular army, which takes
the brunt of the Laos fighting.
Representing the defense
Department is the 127-man
army of the attaches' office.
It, too advises the ambassa-
dor, but its men in the field
are found only with units of
the Royal Lao Army, which
does not do very much fighting
in Laos.
Senior army attaches are
present at most policy meet-
Ns, -but a senior U.S. official
said this does not mean they
are always up to date on a
fast-moving military situation
because the CIA doesn't al-
ways tell them. A source said
one Army attache was "just
about in tears when he left
Laos because lie coulch"i't keep
up with it (the situation)."
During the military crisis in
north Laos the first three
months of this year, Godley
was conferring with. Central
Intelligence Agency officials
as soon, as they returned from
the field. The sessions were in
private, U.S. owned buildings
at the Vientiane airport, not at
eet-
full dress embassy team meet-
Reports Conficted
During the battle for the
provincial capital of Khong Se-
done the U.S. Army was say-
ing the mountain overlooking
the town was in friendly hands
when in fact it wasn't, accord-
ing to irregular commanders
on the scene. This preemi-
nence of the State Department
in a war has not caused the
top-ranking U.S. military to
love Godley.
A high-ranking visitor here
from Cincpac (Commander in
Chief Pacific) headquarters in
Hawaii snapped "Get rid of
that man (Godley) and we
would be all right."
T h e Defense Department
has assigned an officer to
oversee what Godley does in a
roundabout way.
The officer is Brig. Gen.
John W. Vessey, deputy chief
of the U.S. military mission to
Thailand. Vessey is based at
Udorn in northeast Thailand,
and is in charge of logistics for
the Laos war, which is paid
through Defense Department
funds. "Vessey's very sharp, a
kind of watchdog on Mac," is
how one U.S. source described
him. Most of the Defense De-
partment's animus seems di-
rected at the State Depart-
ment rather than the Central
Intelligence Agency. "That's
because they. know the CIA
wants- to get out of this busi-
ness," an informed American
source said. "The Army would
like to be doing what the CIA
is doing - outrunning the ir-
regulars," one source -said.
And, in fact, the Defense De-
partment is getting more and
more into the act in Laos
through control of funds for
the war.
Except, for $7.1 million from
the Defense Department, the
CIA has been funning the Lao
irregulars to the tune of close
to $100 million. All costs of Lao
irregulars, however, will come
out of Defense Department
funds In fiscal 1973, according
to a report this year for the
Senate Foreign R e l a t i o n s
Committee.
The Defense Department is
also taking over the $44 mil-
lion cost of air sunnly con-
ings wren ar>;lnv l 6n e O al X,ei rvrces a'n'8
ent. t
Air Development, contractors
who handle the delivery of war
supplies and other chores for
the U.S. government in Laos.
Ridden by State
These costs were previously
hidden in U.S. aid funds under
State Department control. Un-
fortunately, one shudders at
the thought the U.S. Army and
Defense. Department are run-
ning the Laos war. For under
their aegis, most U.S. officials
believe, U.S. involvement
would become greater and
more costly.
As ambassador, Godley is
abreast of political develop-
ments and' therefore better
able to orchestrate the war.
The CIA has set up a sepa-
rate Laos army relatively free
from the corruption and in-
trigue which plagues the Roy-
al army. Irregular officers are
promoted or demoted on mer-
it, the soldiers are paid on
time, they are fighting on a
voluntary basis and they fight
pretty well.
Guerrilla Instruction
The agency has introduced
some guerrilla warfare con-
cepts (though not enough)
such as mobility, keeping
away from static defense and
using small teams to find the
enemy. Each individual weap-
on is accountable and frequent
on-the-scene Inspection b y
Americans insures against
material wastage.
The State Department, CIA
and Army have all sent their
best officials to Laos, and it is
easy to sympathize with U.S.
Army frustrations here with a
war nobody will let them get
into. But given the Army's
record in South Vietnam, U.S.
officials here prefer to see the
war remain in the competent
hands of the State Depart-
ment's Godley and the CIA.
Generals, Staffs, Cooks
"The Army would have gen-
erals, an appropriate staff,
then cooks for the staff and so
on. We'd never get out of. here
if they were running ' it," an
American official said.
Sources said the Army had
shown itself not to be geared
for guerrilla warfare in Viet-
nam just from the point of
view of infantry tactics alone.
"They'd probably get the Lao
going on these big fancy oper-
ations with no results,"
sources scoffed. All U.S. offi-
cials here, however, admit to
one major problem looming
which concerns State, Defense
and CIA.
Downgrade or Upgrade?
0 C,
The problem is that at some
point .Lao irregulars and the
Royal army will have to be
integrated. How does one do
it? U.S. officials ask.
Obviously the latter is more
desirable and if it is going to
be done, who is going to do it?
The CIA -tends to shy away
from further involvement here
and that leaves the.job to the
Defense D e p artin eat, in-
formed U.S. sources say. This
plus increased participation in
funding by the Defense De-
partment indicates the Penta-
gon is likely to play an in-
creased role in Laos. Some
.Americans believe that is the
situation if Laos and Laos con-
glomerate military forces sur-
vive long enough against the
continuing North Vietnamese
pressure - currently a very
questionable factor indeed.
.They say there' has only
been a rise of 219 in the num-
ber of Americans involved in
the Laos war with 1,259 Ameri-
cans involved in early 1972
compared to 1,010 in March
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By Peter Smith
PAC!HG News Service
PIrITS.ANULOK, T h a 1-
land-In a U-shaped bend
of a small river about l5
miles east of this northern
district capital lies a secret
U.S. military training base
known as Camp Saritsana.
Near the point where I
,bad been told to turn off
the road to find the c mp,
a Thai waitress in a small
restaurant said that there
were usually about 1,000
Thai soldiers at the site,
but that. most had just left.
She falso told me that 10 or
15 Americans were station-
ed. there, and that planes
landed on an average of
five times gin' day.
As l: wal'ked' along the
river away from 'the high-
0
Til.
supervises and pays for the tag, a frequent tip-off that'
training of these irregulars people are engaged in ac-
in Thailand and provides tivity which might not
their salary, allowances (in- square with formal pro-
eluding death benefits), and nouncements of U.S. Policy.
operational costs in Laos." Scattered a m o n g the
These T'torthcrn Thai usual pin-up!-, and memor-
speak a dialect similar to abilia of home were other
711eo dialect, and they are siggns. One said: `"No war
easily integrated into Van., was ever won with modera-
l'ao's forces. talon and civility. 1-ILL!"
At the ci.nr^. Twos stopped Another said: ' i'dalte war,
at the main irate by three not p''ace. War is the final
Jhai ,,^;u?.rd wire called t: eir answer."
commanding oft:;er, a Thai The men were polite, al-
special forces sergeant ma- most p sinfully so. 'J'hey did
jor, on the phone. When I not mention their mission,
told hint I hart once served and i',hen I expressed in-
with 1,11c c pc'eial h'orces terest they changed the
in '1 ht.il.,wd and just wanted subject.
tall' with some Arneric.,ms Finally one of the men of-
t
o
way the whine of d!eselon the base, he :raid, Sure, ferZd to escort we to the
generators guided me until come on." O n e of the gate, and I followed his
I says several coca rc,te and
wooden buildings, a 100 foot-
high water tower, axed a
generator shed. Purther up,
a steel suspension bridge
carried truck traffic across
the river. The scene re-
minded me of places where
1. had served in Vietnam
guards got on the back of truck out. and waved to tlro
lily motorcycle and we drove Thai guards as I left..
to headfill arters.
The 50-acre site is divid-
cd roughly in the middle by
an airstrip. heavy woods
surround the +rase. Ten bar-
racks for 'Thai er,ldiers were
on the left aide. of the en-
and tThailand, trance road; Ial~e,viiere on.
At' Sariis ura, U.S. Army'. tile grounds were a Thai spe-
Special forces -train J-hat
soldiers for combat in
ne'ig'hboring Laos. Since
the early 'd0, CIA-financed
Mco mercenary armies, led
by their most powerful
chieftain Vang Pao, have
been fighting in Laos, and
estimates of the number of
.Moo mean killed run t m4 high
.as 50 per cent. To replace
these losses, the United
states has been training
Thais for the last three
years. hut the training and
the fact that Thailand has
been sending troops to Laos
have not been acknowl-
edged by U.S. or. Thai of-
ficials.
Senate Report
But a -U.S. Senate sub-
committee on security agree-
ments and commitments
abroad reported last year:
cial forces headquarters, a
jump tower and cable rig for
paraclitite training, a drying
loft for tine parachutes, and
several inaintenarice build-
'A'ir America' Sinn
After checking with the
Thai sergeant major, the
guard took me across the
runway to a building mark=
cd "Air America," the namo
of the charter line which
flies secret missions for the
CIA throughout Asia. My
Thai escort ushered me in-
to a U.S. Special Forces
team room, where, five men
were having their morning
beer. All w o r oo civilian
clothes or jungle fatigues
without insignia or . name
"The That Irregular pro-
gram ... was designed by
the CIA specifically along
the lines of the irregular
program in Laos. The CIA
I
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tUr rl trr t r '1 y~
0 0 f ?_s Se
(> ~::-,599 .
SIR: I refer to the letter of W. E. Colby, executive
director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who re-
butted the charges made by some American newspa-
permen that the CIA was involved in opium traf-
ficking. I do not question Colby's good faith, neither
do I say that the CIA, as an entity, traffics in opium;
but, I am sorry to say that there is more to these
charges than mere "gossip, conjecture and, old history."
I also know what I am talking about because 'I was
involved in security matters for the South Vietnamese
government under President Ngo Dinh Diem. In effect,
one day; the President told inc to investigate into the
activities of our chief of secret police, chief of our own
"CIA" and chief of military security, and to report di-
rectly to him, because, as he put it: "I cannot ask my
own chiefs of police, `CIA,' and military security to
investigate into themselves."
I found out the corruption of two. chiefs, and the
President took very drastic measures against them. I
have kept the contact with my security agents ever
since. They firmly confirm that a few CIA agents in
Indochina are involved in opium trafficking. But above
all, a line must be drawn between Indochina and the
rest of the world, because, due to the fact of the coun-
ter-insurgency warfare, the operations of the American
CIA in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are extremely im-
portant when they are compared to open ations of the
same agency in other countries. In Indochina, the CIA
is a real army with his own aerial fleet. A number of
CIA operatives deal directly with Vietnamese, Lao, or
Meo warlords or officials at the highest level, with
whom they share the proceeds of the opium traffic. For
good American citizens in the United States, it is very
difficult to imagine the influence and power of these
operatives in Indochina. Their power, in fact, is ua-
limnited-they are the true rulers of Indochina; their
desires are orders-no Vietnamese, Laotian or Canmbo-
i dian official would dare resist their orders. Corruption
growing from a de facto power-affects some of these
CIA operatives.
The traffic of opium involves a relatively large num-
ber of persons. Outside a few Americans, there are
Vietnamese, Laotians and Meo who are involved. Since
these persons have their clans, families and friends who
live from this traffic, the total number of persons con-
cerned become so great that it is impossible to keep
secret the operations.
I also do not question the good faith of CIA Director
Richard Helms when he said that "os an agency, in
fact, we are heavily engaged in tracing the foreign
roots of the drug traffic for the Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs. We hope we are helping with a
solution; we know we are not contributing to the prob-
lem ... ," However as I said previously, a line must
be drawn and a distinction must be made; for circum-
stances are not the same-there is not the vaguest re-
semblance between CIA operatives in Indochina and
their colleagues operating in other countries.
In conclusion, CIA Director Helms and Colby, Miss
Randal, and Mccoy said the truth and did not contra-
dict one another; they perhaps did not talk about the
same country.
Tian Van Khiem,
Attorney, Former Deputy,
Vietnamese National Assembly.
Chevy Chase, Md.
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LAN
Ignored Involvement
More importantly, the CIA, the U.S. Embassy and
the whole U.S. apparatus in Laos ignored Gen. Ouane
Rattikone's involvement in the narcotics traffic, even
while American troops in Vietnam were being deci-
mated by Laotian heroin. His involvement, as well as
the location of the heroin laboratories, was common
knowledge among even the most junior U.S. officials'.,
As late as June 9, 1972, Nelson Gross, the State De-
partment's drug coordinator, called my charges of Gen.
Ouane's involvement "unsubstantiated allegations."
However, John Warner of the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs in a June 19 interview in The Star
admitted for the first time that Gen. Duane controlled
and protected the Laotian narcotics traffic for years.
Colby quoted Warner in his letter to try to discredit
my charges, but conveniently emitted mention that the
former chief of staff of the Royal Laotian Army was
also the chief narcotics trafficker.
Southeast Asia is fast becoming the major source
of heroin for the U.S. market, and high government of-
ficials in Laos and South Vietnam are involved in the
narcotics traffic. 'i''he U.S. government knows this but
ignores and covers it tip.
The time has come when we have to decide which
is more important to our country--propping up corrupt
governments in Southeast Asia or getting heroin out of
our high schools.
Reply air :CIA Drug Charges
SIR: On July 5, N. E. Colby, executive direc-
tor of the Central Intelligence Agency, responded to a
June 29 column by Judith Randal in a letter. He stated
that charges of CIA involvement in the narcotics traf-
fie from Southeast Asia were "unsubstantiated." Since
I am one of the persons who have made such charges, I
would like to give the basis for my findings.
The specific charge is that Air America aircraft
chartered by the CIA have been transporting opium
harvested by the CIA-supported Meo tribesmen in Laos.
I have three sources for this information:
(1) This was told to me by Gen. Ouane Rat.tikone,
former chief of staff of the Royal Laotian Army, who
also admitted to me that he had controlled the opium
traffic in northwestern Laos since 1962.
(2) Air America's involvement was confirmed by
Gen.-Thao Ma, former commander of the Laotian Air
Force,. v,who refused to carry opium for Gen. Duane.
(3) I spent six days in August 1971 in the opium-
growing Moo village of Long Pot, Laos. (The writer
assures us that that. is, in fact its name--Ld.) Gcr
Su Yang, the district officer, told me:
. "Meo officers with three or four stripes (captain or
more) came from Long Tieng to buy our opium. They
came in American helicopters, p?:,~rhaps two or three
men at one time. The helicopter leaves them here for
a few days and they walk to villages over there, then
come back here jnd radioed I.,ong Tieng to send an-
other helicopter for them. They take the opium back to
Long Tieng."
Verified by Others
This account was verified by other officials, farmers
and soldiers in Long Pot. Ger Su Yang also reported
that the helicopter pilots were always Americans. Long
Pot harvests weighed approximately 700 kilos (1,513
pounds). and could not have been carried without the
pilot's knowledge.
In my June 2 testimony before the Senate Foreign
Operations Subcommittee. I charged that "by ignor-
ing, covering up and failing to counteract the massive
drug traffic from Southeast Asia our government is
aiding and abetting the influx of heroin into our na-
tion." I stand by this charge. The U.S. has put top
priority on its military and political goals in fighting
the war in Indochina. As long as our Asian allies have
fought the war, U.S. officials have tolerated govern-
mental corruption. Narcotics trafficking has not been
treated differently from stealing U.S. aid, currency
manipulation or black marketeering, all of which are
rampant.
The CIA has organized a mercenary rimy of most-
ly Agee tribesmen .in Laos under Gen. Vang Pao. The
Moos' cash crop has been opium, and the CIA merely
followed their French colonial predecessors' dictum:
"In order to have the Aieo, one must buy their opium."
The CIA may not have bought their opium, but did ship
it to market.
Alfred W. McCoy.
Editor's Note: McCoy is the author of the Harper's
Magazine article, "Flowers of oppcaring in its
July, 1972, issue, quoted by Miss Rarulal.
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 eVI'dF
;
1W 4
239,949
S - 350,303
6-11
~m
'vlnuials (or perhaps, as seems to be com-
r, }n.; THE S~'~:~iE people who gave the
v:c~Ild the Gatling the A-bomb and plastic
shrapnel we now have, once again, a new, im-
proved way of making war.
V
The U.S. Air Force. and the CIA can now
Snake it rain on your parade, whether that
parade is a military convoy on the Ilo Chi
Minh 'Trail or a political demonstration in
Saigon (or Louisville?).
We understand. the Nixon administration's
unwillingness to brag about the clouds eding
operations that the United States "has` been
conducting .1n :Indochina. Any, brag ding, ;ion'
or, even any -admission that such operations
have, indeed, taken place-would make it it)-
pear that Defense Secrat:ary Laird lied to the
Senate Foreign Rei.ations Committee last
i.eonth when he was asked about Air Force
rainmaking activities. The Secretary said,
"V,'e have not en ;aged in any over North Viet-
n am."
,Now at least a dozen present and former
military and civilian officials tell The New
York Times that our planes have seeded
clouds over North Vietnam at least as late as
I5171--and over Laos, Cambodia and South
Vietnam as well.
In addition to damaging Secretary Lairci's
impeccable credibility, premature admissions
to rainmaking might also lose Mr. Nixon f he
votes of those environmentalists, if any, who
f`orse than rain. However, the citizens
V, ji'll)w ~-)L'~', or our eastern scaboard ~~ trol panels, instructing 'Mother Nature. where
rnttit nut gree. And the ti ~htly cl se ~i .l 1 t 1
mouths atAp>proa~e fOrtil~~ @ e? 060/ 0 ~,o -Af `L') P ~" '1 ~ t b066620001-5
There'll be no need of nos then, and
"World War" will have a new meaning.
or Release 2000/05/1117 P
 9 JUL 1972 ,
Approved For Release 2000O5f4,1Y4,Z WR.DR&0S016II
Pentagon:
'WASHINGTON-Dr. Gordon J. F.
rhIacDonald, a prominent geophysicist
,who had just completed a tour as vice
president of the Defense Department's
Institute of Defense Analysis, pub-
,-lished in 1968 a little-noted but chilling
.study on the military potential of
?met.erological warfare. He listed a num-
?Jaer of options available to those who
would choose to tamper with nature.
,Among them:
.n- a Altering the world's temperature
.by rocketing materials into the earth's
;upper: atmosphere to either absorb light
(thereby cooling the surface below) or
.absorb outgoing heat (thereby heating'
.she surface below). This technique
could be targeted at a specific area.
a Triggering tidal waves by set-
ting off a series of underground ex-
plosions along the edge of the Conti-
'hental Shelf, or by producing a natural
riarthquake, A guided tidal wave could
be achieved by correctly shaping the
fflergy-release sources.
? Changing the physical makeup
, ? the atmosphere by creating, with
a rocket or similar weapon, a "hole"
in the important ozone layer between
90* and 30 miles up that is responsible
for absorbing much of the ultra-violet
Ii ht cast from the sun. Without the
protective layer of ozone, a molecular
-form of oxygen, the radiation would
-be fatal to all human, plant and animal
life that could not take shelter in the
affected area below,
,'-`Dr. MacDonald (who is now a
-member of the White House Council on
"rivironmental Quality) made it clear
Ahat' his essay was based only on spec-
ulation. Last week, however, it became
r' known that at least part of his maca-
bre weather arsenal had been secretly
s't'n use by the United States since the
`1960's.
l "Air Force planes, supported by the
Central Intelligence Agency, have been
.,,?.?6 ?. ~,,. ?..~~? ,a? , ? ,a~? ~.~ published data suggesting that weather
the infiltration trails of Laos, Cam- modification, in combination with
bodia, North Vietnam and South Viet-
nam. ecological stresses such as air
. The intent: suppress enemy anti- and pesticides, may have a
missile fire, provide cover for South pollution synergistic effect-that is, result in
Vietnamese commando teams pene- collective changes far greater than
movegment the of men North and and materiel hinder from the either abuse would have- caused by
movement
I'orth Vietnam into the South. In Indochina, where heavy bombing
The first experimental rain-making /already has robbed much of the land-
mission was flown by the C.I.A. in scape of its natural water-holding ca-
South Vietnam in 1963, but it was not pability by destroying foliage and trees,
until 1965 that a group of Air Force artifically induced rains may result in
scientists officially was ordered to far greater flooding than expected,
start thinking of ways to turn nature along with heavier soil erosion.
i
t
'
l
n
o a
mi
itary tool Technically, there are
"
We all sat down in a big brain-
storrping session," said one of the
scientists who participated at the Air
Force Cambridge Research Labora-
tories at Hanscomb Field near Bedford,
Mass. "The idea was to increase the
rain and reduce the trafficability in all
of Southeast Asia."
Within a year, the Air Force and
C.I.A. began a highly secret rain-mak-
ing project over the Ho Chi Minh Trail,
in Laos, known as "Operation Pop-
Eye." There were heated protests from
the State Department, and eventually
a directive from the Secretary of De-
fense Robert S. McNamara ordering a
halt to the project. Instead, well-
qualified sources - said last week, "it
went underground-into the dark." .
From 1969, through at least early
this year, weather warfare was a
covert operation being directed by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff with White House
acquiescence.
The fact that the program existed
at all came to light only last week in,
The New York Times. But, despite an
extensive investigation, it could not be
learned how successful the program
had been, how many missions were
conducted or whether it was-still being
used in connection with the heavy
bombing of North Vietnam that fol-
lowed the enemy offensive last April.
Making rain has long been techni-
cally feasible. Scientists have learned
that rain fall can be increased
by as much as- 40 per cent after seed-
ing clouds by aircraft with silver-io-
dide particles, Other chemicals, includ-
ing dry ice, also have been used with
success, both in the United States and
in Southeast Asia. .
Military and Government specialists
acknowledge that there is little precise
scientific knowledge of the short-range
impact of cloud seeding and practi-
cally none of the long-range ecological
effect of changing the amount of
natural rainfall. Some scientists have
tional agreements outlawing such war-
fare. But Government officials made
clear last week that the weather-mak-
ing activity of the Air Force was
shielded from public view because of
White House sensitivity to what could
be regarded as the impropriety of the
action. The issue, one well-informed
official said, was one in which Henry
A. Kissinger, the President's national.
security adviser, took a personal hand.
"This kind of thing was a bomb," the
official said, "and Henry restricted
information about it to those who had
to know."
SEY11IOUR Al. I-ERSII
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 L `yv?F,.~ T`;E STATINT
7 JUL 1972
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W r in Air Decentralized by Nixon,
But the Controls Are Termed Strict
Targets are then selected by
By NEIL SHEEHAN the field commands from those
Special to The New York Times on the authorized list. The field
WASHINGTON, July 6 commands tell the Joint Chiefs
President Nixon is waging the' in advance what they intend to
strike and by what date, thus
air war against North Vietnam giving the White House prior
with a decentralized 'system of ;notice.
command and control that dif- ' Mr. Nixon resumed full-scale
fors significantly from the air attacks on the southern
highly centralized system em- panhandle of North Vietnam
ployed by his predecessor, Lyn- in the first part of April after
don E. Johnson, during the the North Vietnamese had
1065-68 air campaign. In the launched their offensive across
view of a number the demilitarized zone. The
News of civilian and mil- new air war moved into high
itary officials withi gear in the latter half of the
Aiialysis experience in Indo- month, with raids throughout
china, the decen- the North.
tralization does The civilian and military of-
not imply the unraveling of ci- ficials, explaining their view
vilian control over the military! that decentralization has not
or the loosening of the chain of weakened coniniand and con-
military command. trot, say, first, that the Presi-
In effect they reject sugges- dent still decides how military
Lions of such a deterioration force will be applied and. to
made in the wake of the ac- what extent he will delegate
Lavelle that forces under his
command made at-least 28 un-
authorized air raids on the
North between last Nov. 8 and
March 8. 1-10 was dismissed as
commander of the Seventh Air
Force in Saigon after a secret)
inquiry that was completed
there March 23.
In the 1065-68 air war, lists
of proposed targQts were for-
warded from the war zone
through subordinate commands
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
Washington, who modified or
approved them and sent them,
to the White House.
At Tuesday luncheon meet-
ings, President Johnson and his
senior Vietnam policy aides de-
cided that certain targets could
be attacked by a given date.
If the attacks were not carried
out by then, the authorization
lapsed.
Robert S. McNamara, who
favored this highly centralized
system when he was Secretary
of Defense because he felt that
it resulted in calculated doses
of force carefully applied, in-
formed the Joint Chiefs, who
in turn informed the subor-
dinate commands what targets
could be attacked by what
dates.
List of Authorized Targets
Under the Nixon Adminis-
tration's system, according to
the officials, who were inter-
viewed by The New York Times,
a list of authorized targets in
the North was transmitted to
the subordinate commands by
the White House and the Joint
Chiefs
;
- that would automatically
prevent the kind of insubordi-
nation and falsification that
General Lavelle acknowledged
in testimony before the House
June 12.
The officials interviewed
Special Forces commander in
Vietnam at the time, may have
inadvertently misled Gen.
Creighton W. Abrams, General
Westmoreland's successor,
about the killing of a Viet-
namese agent suspected of sny-
contended that there was no trig for the other side because
way to build checks into the the colonel had in turn been
structure to automatically fore- misled by his subordinates.
stall insubordination and falsi- Subterfuge Proposed
fication without so thoroughly Before President Nixon's deci-
eroding the responsibility and lion to launch ground attacks:
initiative of subordinate com- on Communist bases in Cam
manders as to make the cure bodia in the spring of 1070,
worse than even the possibility Generals Westmoreland and,
of the disease. Abrams were repeatedly frus-
In the view of the officials trated in their pleas for per-
interviewed, a case similar to mission to assault those sanc-
the Lavelle affair could have turaries.
occurred - although there is Staff officers, it is now
no evidence that it did --- ten- known, proposed using the so-
der the highly centralized sys- called rules of engagment --
tem used by the Johnson Ad- in the way General Lavelle
ministration. They also believe used the rules of "protective
that it could occur under the reaction" - as a subterfuge
present system, to get around the prohibition.
. Conforming to the Format The rules of en
a
ge en per
g
u
d
re
American troops TO re-
It was pointed out that Gen-1 m
centralized system, in the light era1 Lavelle met the format oft turn fire across the border or
of the failure of the Johnson
' to condo t h
the reporting system by de-
Administration's policy to bring scribing the unauthorized
meththeod war of to a halt, applying is air a better power strikes, bas "protective reac-
in a coordinated campaign: tion'"
aimed at depriving North Viet- S milarly, when Air Force
nam of imports, both economic. jets accidentally strafed a So-
and military, through rain- Viet freighter in the North Viet-
ing and bombing. If air power n;rlese port of Campha in 1067
is to be effective, the officials while Mr. McNamara's highly
added, the commander on the centralized system was in force,
scene must be free to select the pilots and the acting wing
his targets and to time his at- commander, in an tulsuccess-
tacks.
In the end, regardless of
what guidance is issued by the
civilian leadership and the Joint
Chiefs, the sources asserted,
Washington and the various
of pulstut lZl.o
Cambodia in the midst of bat-
tle.
"People suggested getting
lost, or saying we were gettira
shot at and shooting back, but
Westmoreland and Abrams re-
fused to chisel," an officer re-
lated.
Some officials say that, spe-
cific cases aside, actions by re-
cent Administrations in the
fill attempt to cover up the) conduct of foreign policy and
mistake, filed a false report war-making have encouraged
and burned the gun-camera' an atmosphere of deception.!
film that had recorded the in-' They assert, for example, that,
cident. when the civilian leadership'
In the case of the Mylai in"-,j subverts the Congressional pro-I
to rely on what they are toldlJohnson Administration was in;; third country's troops in Laos
'
by the field commands.
warded to headquarters in Sai-
gon said that 128 Vietcong had
"On the way back you are'been killed and three weapons
the slave of the reporting sys- captured. Because the guerril-
tem," an official said. "It las are often able to recover
would be very difficult to tell most of the weapons from their
whether the report was falsified dead and because dozens of
if it met the required format, similar reports were received all
especially when you are ban- the time, the senior officer who
dung dozens of messages a day, saw this one ordered the rou-
It is highly improbable that tine message of congratulations
you would smell a rat unless from Gen. William C. West-
somebody tipped you off." rnoreland, then American mil-
The deciding factor in the itary commander, sent to the
system, the officials main- unit that had committed the
taired, is the )honesty and dis-massacre. General . \Vestmore-
cipline of the commanders close land may not even have read
enough to the scene to know'the report.
what 1s actually happening.! The circumstances of the fa
They noted that. there were mous Green Beret murder case
no checks -- sometimes re-the following year indicate
ferred to as fail-safe devices.that Col. Robert B. Rheault,
by having the Central Intelli-
gence Agency secretly hire Thai
mercenaries, this has an im-
pact on the willingness of sub-
ordinate officials to abide by
restrictive orders that they dis-
like.
The Possibility of Error
It is also noted that ev-n
the most carefully devised sys-
tem of civilian control can
prove ineffective because of
human error.
Mr. McNarnara's rigidly cen-
tralized target selection did not
prevent the bombing of schools,
churches, hospitals and homes
in North Vietnam because in-
dividual pilots mistook them
for designated military targets
or dropped their bombs pre-
maturely.
_
U,
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5A C) r
U'_`[j
C D CC jlcl Ff:)(DU,Cj0 cn, j" z crn
By LENO1tr WEISS
NEW YORK, July 4 - Returning from a three-day meeting last week in Paris
with veterans of the Southeast Asia liberation forces, 15 delegates of the Vietnam
Veterans Against'-die War (VVAW), announced plans here to report their' findings.
to their local areas.
This includes, said William They had to do their own pub- is last wee .they had III(.( with
del Rosario, a national coordina- licity, the veterans said, because veterans of the South Vietnamese
tor of the - VVAW, "speaking their trip had been. ignored by Natronrrl l.rber;rtron Front, the
tours, articles, testimony to Con- ? the commercial press, Ar,,,y. .{ ,,,.. .....-.
-- r??- -1 ? " ti l.a lrr. Ull' I'Zinlet Lao
oan tos documenting the effects of and the larub x(ian United Front
The interview took 'place at U.S. bombing raids on North to find c?rrrlllorl basis for.
VVAW headquarters on West 26 Vietnam- ell dingtheIva r-,"
street. In their three-day talks in Par- 't'hv talks had been organized
Approved
by I? r'cnclr pe;fee E'roups and rep-
resentalrvv of the War Crimes
Comnrsston, a ertrzens' group es-
ttrhlished several years ago
by
13crlrand Itus'sell: the late Brit-
ish philosopher.
"We arhreved ,note in three
days than our government has
achieved in three years, said
John 13oyvhuck, an active-duty
GI who was due to return to
Mt. Ilonle Air Force Base in
Idaho. "We didn't have to de-
cidc if we Wanted round ash-
trays, square ashtrays or who
was going to sit Where."
Precious minutes
Toby Hollander, of East St.
Louis, Ill., an Annapolis grad-
uate, said the PItG spokesman
in Paris, Ly Van Sau, expressed
the purpose of the meeting when
he said, "if our efforts cause
the war to end one minute ear-
lier, this equals four tons of
bombs.."
Veterans learned in Paris of
specifications by the U.S. mili-
tary for . 40,000 new "tiger
cages," which are cells 8 by 10
feet on Coll Son Island, for the
prisoners of the Saigon regime.
Laotian and Cambodian repre-
sentatives in Paris told the vet-
erans, said Paul Richard,
Seattle, that the war, contrary
to U.S. State Department reports,
is not limited to Vietnam. They
cited the presence of U.S, ad-
visers and helicopters along
Routes '4 and 5, as well as a
training camp in Cambodia con- I/
ducted by the CIA.
The Paris meeting, said Rich-
ards, demonstrated the solidarity
of liberation o
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 'A4IING~ N STAR
Approved For Release 20000. L51ailA-RDP80-0160
Lefte's to the Editor
The CIA Responds
.Agency seldom responds to 'criticism of any sort. It
cannot remain silent, however, when a newspaper with
The Star's reputation prints an article alleging that this
agency supports the heroin traffic in Southeast Asia. I
refer to the column by Judith Randal in The Star of 29
June.
So serious a charge should be made only on the
basis of the most convincing evidence. Miss Randal
states only that "retorters have been hearing for more
STATINTL
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Approved For Release-2000/05/1
than a year" and 'then refers to an article in Harper's
magazine by a graduate student, Alfred W. McCoy.
Charges of this nature have been made previously
and'each time have been most carcfuliv investigated
and found to be unsubstantiated. The public record on
this subject is clear. There is, for instance, a report by
Roland Paul, investigator for the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, in the April 1971 issue of Foreign
Affairs, which states: ". . due to the lung association
with the CIA, the Mco tribesmen in Laos were shifting
from opium to rice and other crops."
The Congressional Reoerd of Jo'-c. 2, 1P'1.'rinlod a
letter from John E. Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of
Narcotics and. Dangerous Drugs, to Bcpresentative
Charles S. Gubser of California, which states: "A ctual- /
ly, CIA has for some time been this bureau's strongest
partner in identifying foreign sources and routes of
illegal trade in narcotics. Their help has included both
direct support in intelligence collection, as well as in
intelligence analysis and production. Liaison between
our two agencies is close and constant in matters of
mutual interest. Much of the progress we are now
making in identifying overseas narcotics traffic can, in
fact, be attributed to CIA cooperation."
Miss Randal's article is also in contrast to the two a/
articles by your staff writer, Miriam 4ttenberg, on
June 18 and 19, 1972, in which she pointed out: "U.S.
narcotics agents are making a sizable dent in the
Southeast Asian dope traffic and-despite reports to
the contrary -- America's Asian allies and the CIA are
helping them do it." And she quoted John Warner of the /
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs as saying,
"hc had seen nothing of an evidentiary nature from X r.
McCoy `other than gossip, conjecture and old history'."
Narcotics addiction is one of this country's most
serious social problems. The Central Intelligence Agen-
cy is dedicated to eradicating this menace and, specifi-
cally, to interdicting the flow of narcotics entering this
country.
It is difficult to understand why a writer would
publish material tending to undermine confidence in this
effort, without the most convincing proof. More than one
year ago, in an address before the American Society of
Newspaper Editors, Richard Helms, director of Central
Intelligence, stated: "There is the arrant nonsense, for
example, that the Central Intelligence Agency is some-
how involved in the world drug traffic. We are not..As
fathers, we are as concerned about the lives of our
children and grandchildren as are all of you. As an
agency, in fact, we are heavily engaged in tracing the
foreign roots - of the drug traffic for the Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. We hope we are help-
Ing with a solution; we know we are not contributing to
the problem."
This statement remains valid today.
W. E. Colby,
Executive Director,
 3 J U L 1972
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~ mina M6 Is Usca'
. V ap n by U.S.
!Cloud Seeding; in Indochina Confirmed_
Chemical Also Employed to Foil Rai:dar
By SEVi'.IOUR M. I E RSII
S;;e: al to 'file New York TJmes
WASHINGTON, July 2--The "What's worse," one official'
United States has been secretl}' asked, "dropping bombs on
seeding clouds over North Vi-i rain?"
etnam, Laos and South Viet-I All of ' the officials inter-'
gam to increase and control the: viewed said that the United!
rainfall for military purposes.
Government sources, both ci-
vilian and military, said during
an 'extensive series of inter-
States did not have the capabil-:
ity to cause heavy flooding dur-!.
ing the summer in the northern
parts of North Vietnam where
affect Laos and Vietnam. "It
was just trying to. add on to
something that you already'
got," one officer said
.
(Military sources said that one I
main goal was to increase then
Iduration of the southwest mon-1
soon, which spawns high-rising
cumulus clouds - those most
susceptible to cloud seeding--
over the panhandle areas of
Laos and North Vietnam from
May to early' October. The long-
er rainy season thus would give
the Air Force ntoro opnortmi
hours on one of our
Forces camps."
Despite the professed sl.epti-
cism on the part of some mom-
hers of the Johnson Adlninistra-
tion, military men npparently
took the weather modification
prot,ratn much more seriously.
Accordin,; to a documentl
contained in th- I'entaodn
papers, the Dc tense Dy_ _u t-
nnent's secret hi- tory of the
v.eatlrer modification was one'
ity to trigger rainstorms. of seven basic options for step?I
"We were trying to arrrngel ping up the war that were l ie
the weather pattern to suit our; rented on request by the Je?nti
convenience," said one formcr~ Chiefs of Staff to the
Government official who had! Douse in late February, 1967,
detailed knowledge of theoper-
ation.
According to interviews, the
Central Intelligence Agency in-
itiated the use of cloud-seedinp; reduce trafficability along infif-
"
views that the Air Force cloud-' serious flooding occurred last'
seeding program has been' era,.
over Huu; to the nolchern ping tratlon routes.
of - South Vietnam. "We first! 1 '
v ather program over Laos- w
tclall,y' 1>tlon as Operat on
v
i
Pop Eye--as an attempt "to
"''i ,,.,,L1 ?,..,,."Li of 1933," one former C.I.A.
ing movement of. North Vier and State Department declined, n
ment rL, t said,, "vvhrn the Diem
namese troo
s and e
ui
p
q
p
and suppressing enemy antiair-
craft missile fire.
The disc,osure confirmed
growing speculation in Con-
gl'essional and scientific circles
about the' use of weather mod-
ification in Southeast Asia, De-
spite years of experiments with
rainmaking in the United States
and elsewhere, scientists are
not sure they understand its
long-term effect on the ecology
of a region.
Some Opposed Program
The weather manipulation 111
Indochina, which was first
tried in South Vietnam in 10,63, 1
is the first confirmed use of
meteorological . warfare. Al- I
though it is not prohibited by,
any international conyentionsi
on warfare, artifical rains-nak-'
ing has been strenuously op-
posed by some State Depart-.
adept officials.
It could' not be determined
whether - the operations were
being conducted in connection
with the current North Viet-
namese offensive or the
renewed American bombing of
the North.
ra
,.
on o
icials depicted. the
North Vietn?nnesc attack a.,d
Effectiveness Doubted operations along the trait as
raids in south Vietnam sex er
Beginning in 1967, some e,\ltcriny or ta Ta
iloring ihe: p imtatal.
State Department officials pro- rain patterns over Nothl'iet-i,c The state of the pot. had not
to pot
tested that Ili(,, United States, nam and Laos to aid United!it was `po possible le the
by deliberately altering the nat. State.; bombing missions.
one
China, was taking Cr1V11'OnnlCrt' ''' fl iOltS to kCCp I,nlddied
Govern official 581(1,!1 A Nixon Administration of-
tar risks of unknown propor- roads and other lines of We used to go out flying !
corn - ficial
said that he believed the
tions. But m ally advocates of ,inanication in operation. around and loolunp for a cer first use of weather' modifi-
thc operation have found ]illle Keyed To NlonsoolI vial twin cloud formation," the of(i-!
cationover
NorthVictnanr
i '
~.~ 17V"i ~. iOT. Wron; with
t1 11 p e brUl~n~O'~t~ti3laf (IW ~CRt Ol nos ~ ~LL -& Call,
~
It said that - Presidential
authorization was "required to
comment on the use of mete- regime was having all the t -implement operational phase of
orological warfare. This Is one trouble with the Luddhists." ; vieatltor modification proc.cc
of those things where no one''They would, just stand; Previously successfully tested
? 'around durinf; d monstratiorns and evaluated in same nrca."
officiis going to said. say anything, oue: i1 n the police threw tear gas The brief scaniuarv concluded
,. < I
at t~tann, but we noticed that by stating t.nat. "ris? of cout-
?,lost officialr7 i.ntervicv,'ed ',then the. rains came they promise is minimal.''
agreed that the seeding had,vvouldn't stay on," the former A similar o;;t;on v. as cited
accomplished one of its main'~c'genl s; :id. n another 15;;7 vvrrking ctocu-
objectivcs edmuddying roads The agency pot an A' ntent published in the Penta,~zrn
nmerica I ccci!craft and hrlc P~!p"rs. Neither attr:,cted arty
and flooding linos of communi- it tic",ed up with silver iodide," immediate public attention,
cation. But there were also he said. "There was another' the Laos cloud-::ceding o_ .,
malty military and Government' demonstration znd we seeded orations (Ltd prow; e, however,
officials who e;.pressecl cloubt'tlic area. It rained." a lengthy and hitt.cr, alir; it
that the project had caused any A similar cloud-seeding was secret, dispute inside the ?lohn-
carried out by C.I.A. aircraft in scan Administration in 1967, A
dramatic results. Saigon at least once during the team of Shale Department at-
The sources, without provid-stln;mer of 19`64, the former torneys and officials protested
inc' details, also said that a I agent said. that the use of cloud-seedin
method. had been cievelo}led for!' Expanded to Trail was a dangerous precedent for
treating clouds with a chemical the United States.
The Intelligence Agency Cx "I felt. that the military and
that eventually produced an, paraded Its cloud-seeding activi- agency hadn't analyzed it to
acidic rainfall capable of foul-, ties to the Ho Chi Minh Supply'
if it was in our
ing the operation of North Viet-'trail in Laos sometime inpih interest," one official who was
nantese, radar equipment u?.ed 1 middle nineteen-sixties, a num- involved in the dispute said.
for directing surface-to-air mis- ber of Government sources lie also . was concerned over
silos. said. By 1967, the Air Force the rigid secrecy of the project,
In addition to hampering had become involved although, he although, "although it. might
SAM missiles and delaying as one former Government of- have been all right. to keep it
North Vietnamese infiltration, ficial said, "the agency was secret if you did it once and
the rainmaking program had calling-all he shots." - didn't want the precedent to
the folldwin,; guiposer: "I always assumed the agen- become known."
t;Providing rain and c::uld cy had a mandate from the The general feeling was sum-
cover for infiltration of South \Vhite House to do it," he marized by one former State
Vietnamese commando and in- added. Department official- who said
telllgence teams into North, -A nunmber of former CIA, an he was concerned that the
Vietnam, hi
h
"
g
ranking Johns Adii rainmakig
ihtiltht
onmns-nmf', voae wa (;Serving as a "spoiler" for
t
tl
ff
we considered the general rule
of the thumb for an illegal
weapon of war-somethin;
that would cause unusual suf-
fering or dispropr;ate damage.''
There also was concern. ho''
 25X1A
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 THE ANNALS OF T11 I M. ACADI AY OF. POLL
Approved For Releas pQQIJ ,1 ? ?1 i RDP80-01601 RO
July 19'r2
The Use of Force. In ores ~ olic} by the
eo,ple's Republic of China
By ALLEN S. ` )IITING
ABSTRACT: President Nixon' 'Journey for peace" to Peking
has implicitly modified the image of a Chinese Communist at
nressive threat delineated by all previous administrations.
Ho\w'ever, it has not cxp)icitly redefined the adminiStratollicic
accompanying its growth for full efaectivc
r C.--cs.
"There's always been ris eari:,y of i.
come," says AID's ` i vor
man can't step into the modern sectc
simultaneously. Every man didn't get a Inc
tory job at once in the days of the indus
trial revolution, It's what y0:: Co abot:
it - your policies - that are i mnortant."
Vmile virtually everyone e reel :teat t`};
rich-poor nap must be na ro.ved, the divi
sion between critics is sill sh,:rp on an
other ecorcmie point: the degree to 1~:pecu;d to arrive in tile next few weeks,
Hundreds of marines and N+'y sral ees lounge in the bar-
racks areas of tl:e tens cities -,,t up to house them or work in
the new storage vans \\ here the nnassi\ c amount of incoming
Air Force equipment in crates and serbee construction rr.,ate-
rial was bein4 sorted ow and deposited, awaiting later use.
Several Thai civilian co,;i.'.'ectors have already conic up from
Ba inl?o:: with earth moi.ing equipment. They intend to start
clearing almost Immediately to slake way for the aircraft
nlaintenence and parking areas and for the many adminis-
trative buildings that the base will r'equir'e to become folly
operational. !
The base is divided into two parts. The first comprises the
main air strip and related buildings and is entirely American-
operated, Later, when the construction is completed, this part
of the base will be turned over to the Royal Thai Air Force,
according to Thai press sources. But this is only a convenient
Peter Smith sorved vtltlt the U.S. Special Forces as a. sc?r-
geant in Vietnam. tic trained for at year ilt la 0,1,
formality ihat vt"ill alloy Anierii-;in; to give gP:ir'd duty and
respon,;ibiiities to the -l7hais, and l_t them fly the 'Thai flag,
while lestto ; effective Conlin)) ilit .t ' i' 0\':11 ha.tlds.
- i~ig ilersonnet loercasc
The second part of the base, selraralrtf -fl'rsill the tl-st, is e
secret ran;p a C-d to support the cti:ssified grott,:d ear k-:?ii g
Coaducted by he Cl?.-tln~SpI`~ttboi~d~t;R~QtO
on the Republican hopefuls.
1,
a t o m a e
1. S
ly withdraw all its armed forces (Al-
diers, sailors and airmen) from Viet-
nam on the sole condition of an agree-
ment for the repatriation of prisoners
of war, timed to coincide with our
withdrawal?
2. Shall the U.S. similarly withdraw
its armed forces from all of Indochina
on the same single condition? What
about U.S. bases in Thailand?
CHISHOLM: .
1. I firmly believe and stand for an
immediate total withdrawal of all U.S.
forces from Vietnam;. with the sole
.ondition being an agreement for the
repatriation of prisoners of war.
2. I also believe that it is imperative
that we withdraw our armed forces
from all'of Indochina. I must further
support a withdrawal of U.S. influence
on the lives of those who seek a pres-
ervation of their culture.
HUMPHREY:
1. Yes.
2. Yes, although in regard to Thai-
land the critical point is that these bases
not be used for strikes in Indochina.
The question of leaving these bases al-
together is a longer term proposition,
involving issues that go beyond the
Vietnam war; this calls for further
study at the Presidential level.
McG OV ERN :
1. Yes. It is important to note, how-
ever, that leaving U.S. forces in South
Vietnam to defend the Thieu regime is
a circuitous method of achieving re-
lease of our prisoners. I am convinced
that they will be returned within the
framework of Article 1 l8 of the Gen-
eva Convention on prisoners of war,
which provides that prisoners ? will be
released without delay "after the cessa-
tion of hostilities." This requires a com-
plete American disengagement from
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CHISHOLM:
6. Yes, it is most essential to any ef-
fective withdrawal that a time certain
be set and announced. ?
7. As a date for total withdrawal of
U.S. forces, I propose July 1, 1972.
HUMPHREY:
6. Yes.
7. I was co-sponsor last year of the
Vietnam Disengagement Act which
called for withdrawal of all our troops
by December 31. I still support any
,subsequent deadline within six months.
I endorsed this principle when I sup-
ported all the Mansfield amendments
calling for a withdrawal date six months
after the particular legislation was en-
acted.
MCGOVERN:
6. Yes.
7. The single limitation} should be a
calculation of time required to accom-
plisli the physical withdrawal. Last Sep
tember an American general who has
been responsible for, transport of sup-
plies in Vietnam told me that all equip-
ment worth salvaging, along with all
U.S. manpower, could be moved out
within 90 days. That is the date I have
been proposing but it is, of course,
quite possible that: withdrawals since
then have considerably shortened the
time needed.
MUSKIE:
6. Yes.
7. The earliest possible date.
The basic impression one gets from
these responses is that all the candi-
dates gave the,right answers, namely:
yes, yes, yes, and soon. The most strik-
ing difference is on the Thailand bases:
McGovern's readiness to part with
them and to define their objective with-
out euphemism has a forthright ring in
contrast to the geopolitical *raffiing of.
Muskie and Humphrey on that issue.
Of course, how far McGovern would
pursue the implications of this attitude
for the American role in S.E. Asia, or
for U.S. fleets and bases which "exert
influence" elsewhere, remains an open
and. interesting'question.
But, Thailand aside, in these four
questions we have the basic elements
which have come to be widely ac-
cepted as the Peace Alternative to
Nixon'g policy of war. It is a program
that took shape in the divisions and de-
bates within the U.S. Senate. The peri-
odic gathering of the Senate doves to
fight for various amendments froni the
Hatfield-McGovern to the Cooper,
Church and Mansfield, in the absence
of an aroused and visible popular
movement became the most dramatic
center of political opposition to Nixon's
war. Now these Senatorial initiatives,
whether they won or lost, or were di-
luted in the House, or arrogantly,,
flouted by Nixon himself, seem to have
defined the content of Presidential
peace politics, And one of the prob-
lems we find is that a Vietnam peace
settlement, negotiated with a House/
Senate conference committee, is treated
as if it had already been negotiated
with the Vietnamese.
McGovern distinguishes his plan for
withdrawal from a negotiating position:
it is not an offer coupled with a con-
dition, but an intention coupled with
an expectation. At first glance this
seems an amiable but moot distinction;
as if, instead of signing a peace treaty,
we would say, "we all trust each other,
let's skip the formalities," But it has
other implications that will appear be-
low. While Muskie's formulation sounds
more businesslike, most people would
accept *his summary of the Peace Alter-
native, "the basic exchange would be a
complete end to American military par-
ticipation in the Indochina war for the'
return of our prisoners." A considera-
tion of the remaining questions and
answers make clear, however, that this
"basic exchange" is not in fact a for-
mula for peace or genuine American
withdrawal, but a perilous negation of
these aims.
ECAUSE THE SENATORIAL defini-
tion of the peace issue has been
accepted, it is easy to think that,
when we turn to questions 3 and 4
which deal with cutting off U.S. mili-
tary and economic aid to the Saigon
.government, we are no longer dealing
with the meat of anti-war demands,
but with the gravy. There are a num-
ber of misconceptions involved in this.
One is that, if the candidate at least
answers Yes on those four questions,
then even if he falls down on the oth-
ers he is nonetheless committed to get-
ting the troops out' and ending the
U.S. bombing. But a closer analysis
of questions 3 and 4 will show the
opposite; such a candidate would -be
committed to maintaining the troops
and bombing indefinitely.
3. Shall the U.S. end all military
aid to the Saigon regime (whether or
not President Thieu should resign) on
the same basis?
4. Shall the United States end all
economic aid to the Saigon regime on
.the salve basis (with any humanitarian
exceptions such as an imported rice
dole to be distributed through an
agency agreed to by the PRG)?
Question 4 as posed in this way
might seem to ask the candidate in
effect to recognize the PRG as the
government of South Vietnam, and to
endorse it at the cost of humanitarian
aid. Therefore We sent a follow-up let-
ter reformulating the question to make
clearer the intended point, to distin-
guish granting aid to the country and
people of South Vietnam, in a politi-
cally neutral way, from underwriting
the government we have created in
Saigon as the chosen instrument of
American power.
The revised question 4 was in three
parts:
A. Pending an overall settlement of
the war, should U.S. economic aid to
Vietnam be of a form agreed to by-all
the major political 'forces there, in-
cluding the Provisional Revolutionary
Government (or NLF)?
It. Pending such a limited agree-
ment on aid, should all other aid (that
is aid worked out only with the Saigon
side of the conflict) be suspended be-
ginning from a "date certain"?
C. What date?
McGovern and Chisholm answered
first the original and then the revised
question, both answers are included
here. Humphrey and Muskie respond-
ed after the second letter and were
able to take the revised question into
account.
CHISHOLM:
3. There is no question in my mind
that the U.S. government must initiate
an immediate halt of all military assist-
ance to Saigon.
4.(Original question) I believe that
we can in good conscience leave the
people a land which we have both po-
litically and economically raped, with-
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 out some degree of economic assist-
ance. However, this is an item which
must be left to negotiation after total
military withdrawal.
4. (Revised question) I believe that
multilateral aid should be dispensed,
but with the approval of all sides in-
volved. An agreement on the specific
mechanics of distribution should be
worked out in consort with neutral
nations. '
I further propose that all military
assistance to South Vietnam be ended
by July 1, 1972. What sum of U.S.
Dear Mr. Kolodney:
economic assistance is granted to the
Vietnamese by the United States should
be taken directly from Pentagon funds,
and so allocated in, the military or De-
fense budget.
reiterate what I0 lave already said on
this subject in the past. I view eco-
nomic and humanitarian. assistance as
a matter which transcends govern-
mental relationships since its primary
purpose is to assist people in need and
not prop up any particular govern-
ment. Whereas I am clearly' against
any continuation of military assistance
to South Vietnam, .I do favor economic
assistance for all of Indochina. I think
that the same criteria for aid to South
Vietnam should be applied as is ap-
plied to0other countries. In other words,
the need for American assistance and
the programs where our money would
be channeled would have to be rigor-
ously' justified before any approval
would be given. Any massive recon-
HUMPHREY:
3. Yes, I voted for a 250 million dol-
lar ceiling for military assistance to
Laos and 250 million to Cambodia. I
am against any further military assist-
ance to Vietnam.
4. With respect to your question on 0
economic aid to Vietnam, I prefer to
UNITED STATES SENATE'
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, D.C. 20510
February 29, 1972
Thank you very much for your recent letter and for the advance copies of the
pieces by you and by Professor Chomsky. I must say that both articles seem to
have accepted, in a totally uncritical manner, the North Vietnamese position in
regard to the Southeast Asian conflict. I doubt that such onesidedness can
cdntribute very much to a just and equitable solution to the war, one that is fair
to all .the parties involved.
Nonetheless, I am happy to respond to the issues raised by the several 'giLestions
you Put forward in your letter. On September 1, 1970, in a letter to President
Nixon initiated by Senator Scott and me and signed by 28 other Senators (a copy
of which is enclosed), I proposed a multi-step program which would have required
all parties to the conflict to take affirmative actions toward peace. I continue to
believe that this sort of mutuality and reciprocity is an acceptable framework for.
ending the w.ar.
The President's recent eight-point peace proposal embodies many of the same
features of bur earlier suggestions. I believe that the President's initiative is a basis
for genuine negotiations; and that it is now incumbent upon the North Vietnamese
to cease demanding the complete capitulation of the Republic of Vietnam as a
condition for halting the killing. I do not believe that the cause of peace is
furthered by irresponsible, politically-inspired, criticisms. Indeed, endorsement of
the North Vietnamese position by well-known Americans only reinforces North
Vietnamese intransigence, thereby prolonging the war.
The diplomatic deadlock should not, however, prevent us from reducing our
military presence in South Vietnam. I have said that all of our ground combat
troops could have been out of Vietnam by the end of 1971. In any event, it is clear
that substantial reductions in American force levels have already been made. These
can be, and should be, continued.
On the question of future outside aid to the parties involved'in the Indochina
conflict, I proposed on February 10, 1972, a mutual big-power freeze on military
aid to North and South Vietrfam (stateipent enclosed). It seems to me that this is
one useful way of ending-or at least reducing-the role of outside powers in the
Indochina situation. '
The war in Indochina has proved difficult and painful for all concerned. On
April 6, 1968, I said that "contrary to the notions of some critics, oui? basic
problem in Vietnam has not been an arrogance of power. Rather, our basic
problem has been to achieve a reasonable compromise with an adversary who has
not wished to compromise." That, I am sorry to say, is still our basic problem
almost four years later.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Henry M. Jackson, U.S.S.
struction program in Indochina would
only be undertaken after a settlement
had been reached, but I do think that
we should focus our attention on this
possibility now.
It is likely that future aid programs
to South Vietnam, assuming that the
United States withdraws and the war
continues, would be Most acceptable
if they had the 'approval of all major
political forces in the country. This
approach has been taken by the United
Nations in Laos and Cambodia. The
United States would do well to study
this example and work closely with in-
ternational organizations in any future
aid program to South Vietnam.
Finally, I .would say that I do not
think aid should become 'a lever to
force our will on other countries. This
kind of quid pro quo arrangement de-
feats the central purpose of economic
and humanitarian assistance and rarely
achieves the goal it sets out to achieve.
The Senate during the recent aid de-
bate expressed a desire to move out of
bilateral aid programs and into multi-
lateral assistance where there would be
fewer strings attached. I support this
orientation.
McGOVERN:
3. Yes. Unless we do we will have no
basis for claiming that hostilities be-
tween the United States and other
parties in Southeast Asia have ended,
4. (Original question) No. The U.S.
withdrawal could easily push Vietnam
over the brink of economic disaster,
and I have no' wish to accelerate that
process. It is a certainty that the re-
moval of our forces and the end to
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 roved For Relea
military assistance would result in Pres-
ident Thicu's resignation, and in the
emergence of a government which
would be capable of negotiating a po-
litical settlement. Under those condi-
tions I think we have a responsibility
to'' begin repairing the incredible dam-
age we have done to the people and the
terrain of Indochina.
4. (Revised question)
A, Yes. Economic aid should be sup-
plied in forms which cannot be used by
~? the South Vietnamese government as a
method of solidifying its political posi-
tion. An effort to achieve agreement of
all parties on the form and distribution
of. such aid would be the best way to
achieve that result; and I would strong-
ly pursue such an effort.
B. Since his entire 'claim to power
in Vietnam is based on our military
guarantee, there is not the slightest
reason to believe that President Thieu
could continue to hold power in the
context of our complete military dis-
engagement. Both be. and the North
Vietnamese and National Liberation
.Front. representatives in Paris have
told me this directly. I have to say
frankly, therefore, that I think the
question is based on an impossible
premise. In that light, and considering
the potential prgblems involved in
reaching agreement on the kinds of
economic aid allowable, I would not
favor a total economic aid cutoff in the
absence of a multiparty agreement. In-
terruption of humanitarian aid pro-
grams going on now would intensify
the suffering of a great many innocent
people in South Vietnam, and many of
those people are suffering at our hands.
. C. As noted above, I would not set
such a date, although I think an adjust-
ment in our aid program designed to
focus on humanitarian relief should
coincide with our military withdrawal
timetable.
MUSKIE: ` ' ,
3. With regard to the maintenance
of military aid to the Saigon govern-
ment after American withdrawal, I
have said that "we must urge the gov-
ernment in Saigon to move toward a
.political accommodation with all the
elements of their society. Without such
an accommodation, the war cannot be
ended. And it is clear that the Ameri-
can people will not support an indefi-
nite war either by our presence or by
proxy." Thus, I would not use our aid
to perpetuate a war that benefits only
the dictatorial Thieu regime. I would.
condition our military aid. on progress
toward a political accommodation (and'
thus an end to all the fighting) in Viet-
nam.
4. 1 would treat the economic aid
which serves to support the Saigon
government in the same way that I
would treat military aid. I would de-
finitely make an exception for humani-
tarian aid which goes directly 'to serve
the needs of people. (I believe this and
the previous answer also cover your
more recent questions on how I would
handle aid to Saigon.)
It would be difficult not to note first
of all what--given the vague Liberal,
Moderate-Conservative spectrum that
usually places Muskie to the left of
.Humphrey---would appear to be a. sur-
prising result: Humphrey is prepared
to go further than Muskie on the aid
issue, i.e., to oppose at least military
aid.
Both Muskie and Humphrey discuss
the question of aid as if the withdrawal
of direct U.S. military participation by
a certain date could proceed even if
the aid issue were not satisfactorily'
settled. But their plans to withdraw
"within six months" or "at the earliest
possible time" are proposed as offers
made on the condition of a POW agree-
ment. They treat Vietnamese accept-
ance of this condition as a foregone
conclusion. However, the North Viet-
namese Nine Point Peace Plan has al-
ready made clear that they are un-
willing to meet this condition of re-
lease of PC)Ws unless withdrawal of
U.S. forces (Point 1) is accompanied
by an end to U.S. support to the Saigon
regime (Point 3). (The Nine Points
end with: "The above points form an
integrated whole.")
This was underscored last January
after Nixon made public his "generous
offer" and denounced the enemy's in-
transigent rejection of it. The press
spokesman of the North Vietnamese
delegation. in Paris countered: "In the
private meetings we had the very clear
impression that the Nixon Administra-
tion is clinging to its positions anc has
not, budged an inch on our demands
for total troop withdrawal and cessa-
tion of support for the Saigon regime."
This casts a different light on the
00
Peace Alternative as formulated, for
instance, in Muskic's response to ques-
tion 1. "The basic exchange would be
a complete end to American military
participation in the Indochina war for
the return of our prisoners." Muskie
campaigns as if this "complete end"
awaited only his election, but in fact
it is merely an offer of a deal he already
knows to be unacceptable. What would
the new President Muskie do when he
could not deliver the withdrawal and
the POWs? Would he pretend surprise?
1auld he, like -Nixon, denounce the
enemy for rejecting his generous offer,
and keep on pounding them with
bombs to force them to submit.
Any candidate who raises hopes of
such a POW-Withdrawal exchange,
while balking at a critical ingredient
on the question-of aid, is playing a
dangerous game at best. And Mc-
Govern, who proposes to go ahead
with our part of a nonexistent deal,
is setting the stage for vengeful public
outrage if they "stab us in the back"
by keeping our boys imprishned. The
effect of McGovern's plan-whether
intended or not-would be that for the
Vietnamese to act as they had clearly
said they would, would be made to seem
a terrible breach of faith (not to men-
tion a violation of the Geneva Con-
vention on prisoners as interpreted by
McGovern in answer 1j.
The question of aid to Saigon then
is central, not peripheral, to the pros-
pect of peace, and failure to confront
it could end in an explosive resurgence
of hawkish sentiment. What exactly is
at issue?
For Muskie, with his backing of
military as well as economic aid, a
commitment to continued dominance
for the Saigon regime (sans Thieu) is
fairly explicit in his answers to 3 and
4. He proposes to use military aid to
force Saigon "to move toward a po-
litical accommodation with all the
elements of their society." He would
"condition our military aid on prog-
ress toward a political accommoda-
tion (and thus an end to all the fight-
ing)." Giving military aid to one side
in a war to force it to accommodate
its enemies is a novel idea; normally
we give such aid to help force its
enemies to submit. He does not want
"an indefinite war" even "by proxy,"
but the political accommodation he
wants to bring about seems to amount
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to conciliatory terms for a' Saigon
victory.
Of the four candidates only Muskie
proposes military assistance, and only
he acknowledges support for a broad-
ened Saigon regime as an aim of aid.
The others restrict themselves to eco-
nomic aid, and the aim projected is
humanitarian, any benefits to the Sai-
gon regime as the recipient and agent
being purely incidental. Now this is
really a pretty thin argument. A less
likely model for humanitarian effort
is difficult to conceive than the U.S.
financing of. the government in Saigon
-a government legendary for corrup-
tion, preoccupied with maintaining an
army of a million with which to prose-
cute an abhorrent war, which still man-
ages to channel most of the foreign
exchange we provide right back out
of the country for the purchase of lux-
ury. goods by its pampered elite; an
economic assistance program 'watched
over by USAID which functions ex-
plicitly as a military' adjunct and no-
-toriously as a CIA conduit and cover
in Indochina, Can there be any ques-
tion that, pending a political settle-
ment and ,a new government, humani-
tarian interests would be better served
if all U.S. financial assistance to South
Vietnam were funneled through the
Swedish government or the United
Nations and programmed and adminis-
tered independent of Saigon's control
or ours?
. Rep. Chisholm seems to accept such
a plan in her answer to revised ques-
tion 4 (assuming her second paragraph
merely refers to how the aid described
in the first should be -accounted in the
U.S. Federal Budget). Humphrey's
second paragraph is tentative and non-
comittal. McGovern's argument is
curious: The denial of military aid by
itself will unseat Thieu, leading to a
political settlement. Since the military
cutoff will suffice to bring on a settle-0
meat, the suffering that would be -
caused by withholding in the interim
economic aid as well would be unnec-
essary, gratuitous. All the better, one
would think, to bypass the Saigon gov-.
ernment- in the first place through
Sweden or the U14. And that will has-
ten Saigon's downfall, cutting short the
unnecessary suffering of continued war
while we wait for the military cutoff
alone to bring it down.
LL THIS HAS LITTLE TO DO with
the real issues at stake. Access
,( to American money is the prin-
ciple of cohesion that holds together
the structure of the Saigon govern-
merit's power, its military machine, ad-
ministrative apparatus, all the greased
palms and beholden elites that support
it. It is not really even a question
of economically starving this entity.
Should it become known 'that the
access to U.S. money was going to
be cut off, this center.of power which ?'
is the prime instrument of American
influence in Vietnam would begin im-
mediately to disintegrate. Humphrey
and McGovern apparently accept the
possibility of a coalition government in
Vietnam, perhaps formed during the
early days in office of the new U.S.
President. But what' a coalition govern-
ment means depends. on how the Sai-
gon structure enters into it, to what
extent 'it remains intact, how much
control of its military and administra-
tive resources it retains, what territory
it effectively controls, what social ele-
ments gravitate to it. If it remains in-
tact, if it can make good use of con-
tinued access to U.S. money and back-
ing of American power,. then, even
though it were the weaker element of.
a coalition, all is not lost for U.S.
strategy in Vietnam. Such a coalition, as
we proved in Laos, leaves myriad open-
ings for the U.S. to expand its influ-
ence. Compromises can be torpedoed,
coups engineered, discord programmed
-everything, secret armies, Air Amer-
ica, the CIA, a whole new beginning is i
possible. But, if a new government is
formed in Vietnam on the basis of a
disintegrating Saigon regime, the ele-
ments of its power dissolved and dis-
persed, that is a different story.
The weight and unity that our Sai-
gon subsidiary would carry into a new
government depends in great measure
on the resolution of political and mili-
tary forces at the moment the settle-
ment is made. And that turns in large
part on two things: whether the assur-'
ance of access to U.S. money holds it
together and whether the bargaining
power of the U.S. military threat stands
behind it. The North Vietnamese Nine
Points call for 'formation of a. new
government at a point when both these
elements would be absent. The peace
plans of Humphrey and McGovern
would in effect get around this.
It is worth considering what the
offer of withdrawal tendered to the
Vietnamese actually amounts to. Nixon
is most likely going to offer some kind
of dove-pleasing spectacular before
election day. (Last January's did leave
the opposition speechless, but it was
too early to be his last word.) What-
ever - else it includes, the ' number of
U.S. ground troops in South Vietnam
by next January_ 20._ is likely to_be
relatively small. -At the same time
Nixon will by then surely have given
the Saigon government enough mili-
tary supplies and reserves to make fur-
ther military.aid not critical for some
time to come. Now the basic with-
drawal plan proposed calls for with-
drawing as fast' as they can go, those
GI s whom Nixon has left around, cut-
ting off the military aid that Saigon
hardly needs, and stopping the bomb-
ing (or promising to do so as soon as
the date certain arrives and the GIs
are out). The North Vietnamese are
supposed to be rushing the U.S. POWs
home at the same,rate the GIs leave
the. South. The exchange: the North
Vietnamese give up the most critical
political leverage they hold on U.S.
policy in Vietnam, the one thing that
has kept the war a serious political lia-
bility at home, presses us toward a
-peace. settlement; and limits our op-
tions of aggression.
In'return, they get a few thousand
non-combat GIs out of Vietnam and
two American promises. The first they
can add to their collection of U.S.
bombing halts; the second, that mili-
tary aid will not be resumed, they can
file with the similar provision of the
1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords. Pre-
sumably if we break these promises we
have to return the POWs to them. -
If there is to be a coalition govern-
ment, the question is whether it will
be formed with the Saigon dollar line
intact, the POWs safe at home, and
U.S. airpower, at best withdrawn any-
. where from 6 to 48 hours away, stand-
ing behind it.
- What it comes down to is that each
side has one fairly irretrievable con-
cession at stake: For them, release of
the POWs. For us, allowing a coali-
tion government to form in a context
where the Saigon regime is not backed
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 by access to money and the U.S. bomb- ticable. Nor would a commitment to may speculate that the issue of cutting
t~ ~(Q ((~~'f~~~ t side
ing threat. Approved tFuarc~eag`~s2c0ip90?3T1~'Sa~ iris &80-0 AS ~i"00~'ttfii'eri l Ada-
fore first, by releasing the POWs be- sumes awe an t ort tctnam- 5` p
fore a coalition forms, our concession ese can settle all'of the issues of the ti6n is not politics, and the political
will never be made. But, once a colon war between us. This issue would be- point at least must be made. Moreover,
tion is formed, they would have' to come academic in the context of a to take the passive attitude of a foot-
political settlement worked out ty the ball fan exhilarated by a winning
make their concession good because
the POW s would then be a.liability Vietnamese themselves. As I have said, team would be callous and destructive.
, a
political basis for new U.S. attacks. The we should urge sack a settlement. These are costly victories and the price
Nine Points call for this timetable: we of every victory is increased by the
All the answers missed the intended torpor of the anti-war movement at
stop supporting the Saigon regime, al- point. The candidates deal with the home. And, finally, the measures of
lowing it to collapse, at that point the residue of equipment still it) U.S.
Even-
victory may far from clear.
process of coalition will begin along hands next 3anuaiy 20. The question tually a new government may well be
l be
.with a cease-fire, U.S. withdrawal and meant to point to the fact that arms, forced into being, but it will represent
return of POWs. which even now are still American, a complex resolution of victories and
That is the sjgnificance of their in- are being given and transferred to the defeats, military and political, in Viet-
cluding a, cessation of support' for Sai- Saigon army and will be magically nam and in the United States.
.Son, as well as withdrawal of troops, transformed into indigenous Vietnam- For the Presidential Peace Candi-
as conditions for the POW release. So ese resources by the time the candi- dates the fundamental question in Viet-
when the doves gloss over the question dates' promise of withdrawn, comes nam is the same as it has been since
of economic aid as a purely hurnani- due. Of course it was a question that the U.S. first subverted the Geneva
tarian, politically incidental problem, could not really be confronted because Accords of 1954 (after paying 80 per-
they are plating a serious obstacle in how could they answer? I-low far back cent of the cost of the French war).
the way of peace, and they are evading does one draw the line? It was all Does the peace candidate propose now
the demands of true withdrawal from American once, and that reveals the
Vietnam. I ? key point about a true withdrawal: It to make our intervention cheaper,
in-
The ode question of the seven not still is, that government which we cleaner, struments less of direct, our to control, to salvage the leave an
yet covered, question 5, though rather called into being to serve its. We gave
inconclusive is nevertheless illuminat- it its constitution and its political police, opening for a resurgence of our ponv
the
ing on this point., its bureaucracy and its corruption. Its Or will he really turn his back on the
savage 20-year attempt at American
5. Shall withdrawal of U.S. forces leaders are our viceroys, its armies our domilrio0 e
include. withdrawal of any or all of the mercenaries. Even though the last GI
military equipment bases, supplies, and may ship out and President Thieu may
reserves now being transferred to the be discarded, it stands as the corner-
Saigon regime, or are these to be looked stone of our intervention, the creature
on. as Vietnamese and therefore im- of our aggression, the fruit of genocide.
triune to withdrawal? If any of this That is why we have a responsihil-
material is to be withdrawn, what: ity to cut off its support and undo its
How much? power. That is also why the most
CHISHOLM: dovish candidates may balk at cutting
5. I believe that total immediate off economic aid, because to do that is
withdrawal of all U.S. manpower to to deny its legitimacy, to renounce our
be the imperative priority. The usage control, to admit defeat..
of residual equipment bases, supplies, At this writing the results of the
etc., should be left open to negotiation offensive launched in early April are
only- after that first priority has been still undetermined. For radicals there
achieved. is ilways a tendency, especially be-
cause they understand its illegitimacy,
HUMPHREY; to dismiss the ci.ent government as.
5. I have sponsored Senate Bill weak, corrupt and doomed. Thus one
S2985 which would halt such give-
aways of military materiel in Indo-
china not authorized by Congress.
McGOVERN:
5. We should withdraw that portion
of military equipment which costs less
to transport-than to replace.
MUSKIE:
5, Although the United States would
naturally withdraw much of the equip-
ment its forces have been using in Viet-
nam, dismantling all bases built by the
United States and withdrawing all
American w ap tetFor Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000600120001-5