NKRUMAH: THE REAL TRAGEDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000500200001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 19, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 5, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2001/66TINts. CIA-RDP80
.5 JUN 1972
TIIMMUNA11-2: T
STATINTL
ST. CLAM DRAKE ?
Mr. Drake was head of the Department of Sociology at the
University of Ghana from October 1958 to February 1961.
He returned to Ghana in 1965 as a visicing professor at the
university's Institute of African Studies. Today, Mr. Drake
is a professor of anthropology and sociology at Stanford
Uhiversity and chairman there of the Program in African
'and Afro-American Studies.
?
?
When Kwame Nkrumah, former President of the Re-
public of Ghana, died on April 27, he was in the sixth
year of an exile imposed upon him by a military coup
d'etat. Nkrumah was out of the country when the over-
throw came, en route to Hanoi for the publicly announced
purpose .of persuading Ho Chi Minh to open peace nego-
tiations with President Lyndon Johnson. But Nkrumah
also ? took with him a group of advisers on trade and
finance, presumably to seek vital financial aid in Moscow
and Peking that Washington was refusing to give Ghana.
?A high point in verbal euphoria between Ghana and the
United States had occurred a month earlier, when
.Nkrumah dedicated the Volta River dam and praised
the United States for the $160 million it lent in 1961
for the, publicly owned hydroelectric project and the
.alurhinum smelter owned by Kaiser and associates. Then
Nkrumah took off to visit the East, since the United
States Government had made clear that criticisms ex-
pressed in his resent book, Neocolonialism: The Last
Stage of Imperialism, and what Americans called his ir-
responsible extravagance, had put an end to his hope of
getting aid in raising $300 million desperately needed for
. payments on short-term loans. But Ghana's policy of
"positive nonalignment" did not concede that an approach
to the East was an act hostile to the United States.
The coup came while Nkrumah was in Peking, the
United States recognizing the junta within three days and.
proffering immediate financial assistance. Whatever pro-
Nkrumah resistance there had been evaporated quickly,
and the deposed head of state accepted Sekou Toure's
invitation to come to Guinea as co-President, since the
Ghana-Guinea Union established in 1958 had never
been dissolved. The extent of American complicity in
Nkrtimah's overthow, if any, will not be assessed until
State Department archives are opened several decades
? from now. A comment appearing in s New York Times
obituary the day after his death was announced is, how-
ever, significant: ? ?
Mr. Nkrumah suggested that the "criminal insurrec-
, /lion" was the work of the imperialists, sp.gcifically the
'United States Central Intelligence Agency. Although
neutral observers did not discount his allegation in view
? of increasingly warm relations with the Soviet Union
and China, they also noted that Mr. Nkrumah had per-
mined power to go to his head and had become a
despot who had alienated thousands of his once fervent
supporters. (Author's italics.)
The implication is that the Americans might have
moved against him, but that the success of the coup
to be explained in 144019rdEfliletdriE013iReriSatSekiedaii
hint that power had gone to his head may be found in
Newsweek's comment that "T 77
-
1 his way to Hanoi to seek an African solution to the
Vietnam war when, during a stopover in Peking, he learned
that he had been overthrown. . ." (Author's italics.)
The American press was jubilant when the military and
police seized power in Ghana. A widely disseminated
picture accompanying the news showed a statue of
Nkrumah lying on the ground, presumably toppled by an
irate people fed up with his arrogance and tyranny. The
statue had stood in Accra since the early 1950s, a
modest, life-size creation in front of the legislative as-
sembly. The Western press had seldom mentioned it be-
fore, except in 1961, when some members of the Ga
tribe expressed grievances against the government by
bombing it. Two of Nkrumah's maxims were carved on
its base: "Seek Ye First the Political Kingdom and
All Other Things Shall Be Added Unto Thee," and: "The
Liberation of Ghana Is Meaningless go Me Without the
Liberation of All of Africa." The statue seemed to sym-
bolize to journalists what they referreno as Nkrumah's.
"megalomania," "narcissism" and "despotism." Rumor
multiplied the number and size of such monuments, al-
legedly erected at Nkrumah's insistence between 1960 and
1966. Psychoanalytic jargon was useil to explain his acts.
In addition to a fixation on statues, existent 'and non-
existent, Western journalists added "blasphemy" to what-
ever political 'sins they attributed to Nkrumah by ats-
torting and misinterpreting a historical event. When
? Ghana adopted a new constitution in 1960 to transform
the country from a British dominion with the Queen as
head of state into a republic with an African President
elected for five years, the' legislative assembly was re-
decorated in African style. The traditional staff of office'
carried by a chief's linguist was substitnted for the British
mace in ceremonials, and the role of President was in-
vested with chiefly attributes. So, the. title, "Osagyefo,"
was added to 'President." This word means in the Akan
languages "Warrior Chief Who Defeated .the Enemy and
Saved the Nation." Time, however, like other magazines
and newspapers, insisted upon translating it as "Saviour"
and "Redeemer," thereby giving it overtones of divinity.
Insofar as the term "Redeemer" was ever associated with
the title "Osagyefo" it would only have been in the sense
that Southern anti-Republicans during Reconstruction
called themselves "Redeemers," or Marcus Garvey spoke
of the "redemption of Africa" from colonialism. Yet, in
Commenting on Nkrumah's death, Time, in addition to
presenting a very unflattering photograph, captioned its'
article "Death of a Deity." This was echoed by other pub-
lications?thus, the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and
Chronicle headed its obituary "The Redeemer Dies."
Time's "Death of a Deity" article referred to Nkrumah's
"despotic ruling style," describing it as "devious, ruthless,
and thoroughly effective." The New York Tunes diag-
nosed him as being afflicted with "galloping megalo-
mania" and "narcissism." Newsweek commented that
"several attempts on his life only drove him to new levels
of megalomaniacal excesses." Those of us who lived and
worked in Ghana between 1958 and 1965 do not recog-
.
or in The New York Times's charge gat rum insti-
tuted "one-man rule .clothed in sycophancy." The de-
08/04itivelcSARDPM01801R019 SVCIOROticer
ypic a y e ougi tie was on ?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000500200001-7
BEST COPY
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I J
6/24/98
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Approved For Release 20021104/19MICAA-RD1680-01601R00
2It MAY 1972 STAMM
By William Worthy
Not long after being restored to power in
1958. as the North African crisis in Algeria
deepened. French President Charles de
Gaulle offered %a so-called "choice" to
France's West African colonies i a place
within the French Union (a euphemism for
French neo-colonialism) or a total, abrupt
severance of all formal ties with the
"mother- country.
Alter long and varying periods of plunder
by French imperialism, all but one colony
decided they couldn't make a clean break
with their dependent status. It was obvious
that de Gaulle had manipulated and counted
on just that reaction. Some 14 years later,
most of the countries that followed his script
have yet to gain true national liberation.
The one colony that picked up de Gaulle's
other option was Guinea. To the surprise
and fury of Paris. President Sekou Toure led
his finanCially bankrupt people out of the
French -embrace. For the colonial
, metropolis, his decision was as intolerable
(as a precedent for others) as was -Fidel
? Castio's opting out of the U..S. empire in
Latin. America.
Every conceivable measure was devised to
make an eXample of the uppity upstart from
" Guinea. All programs .of economic aid in
.every field were abruptly terminated.
Teachers. doctors, technicians and other
. experts were summoned home to France,
leaving behind a trail of economic sabotage
and a colonized people with almost none of
the educated cadres needed to keep a
society afloat. Toure acceded to "Power,"
only to find that his treasury had been
literally - rifled by the departing French
"civiiizgrs" and that the free and in-
dependent country was on the verge of
collapse and imminent starvation.
6, I
,character, sections of the- Western press
periodically invented "rifts" between the two
close friends.
Numerous assassination attempts, usually
traceable to outside intervention, dotted
Nkrumah's years in power. In one instance,
by unintentionally arriving a few 'minutes
late for a dedication ceremony, he, avoided
being killed by a time-bomb planted in a
bouquet of flowers that had been given to a
small child to present to him. Knowing how
eagerly the West sought his ouster because
of his strong anti-colonialism, Nkrumah was
naive to absent himself iron; home and
thereby to make a coup that much easier
tostage. From reports at the time, British
intelligence seemed to have played the
major outside role in the coup, with the CIA
lending active support.
Those two closely meshed agencies may
well have instigated the naive and futile
Vietnam "peace mission" . that Nkrumah
allowed the British prime minister and other
Commonwealth leaders to talk him into
undertaking. As long ago as 1966, both
Hanoi and the National Liberation Front' of
-South Vietnam had already made clear the
basic terms on which the war could be
settled and there was no role for the London-
dominated British Commonwealth to play in
reaching such a settlement.
Knowledge of neo-colonialism
By no means should it be implied that
Kwame Nkrumah had no understanding of
the devious workings of imperialism. That
he knew much about his enemies is clear
from his 1965 book "Neo-Colonialism: The
Last Stage of Imperialism," which he
dedicated to "the freedom fighters of Africa,
. living and dead."
While Nkrumah was in power, his country
was a home away from home for countless
Solidarity in practice African exiles and liberation fighters. In the
Into this dire gap stepped President early 1960s, our own W.E.B. DuBois and his
Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, with $20 million wife gave up their U.S. citizenship to move
to tide Guinea over the immediate crisis. For to Accra and to become highly honored
a country itself only a year or so out of the citizens of Ghana. Nkrumah personally
sponsored DuBois' last great scholarly
grip of classic British Colonialism, $20
undertaking (at age 90): the projected 10-
million was a good-sized loan that probably
year editorship of an encyclopedia of Africa
put a strain on Ghana's own treasury. (Shortly after the 1966 coup, DuBoise.
But it saved the day for Sekou Toure. who
widow, Shirley Graham, left Ghana.)
remained eternally grateful. Not sur-
As Nkrumah surveyed the neo-colonial
prisingly, it was he who invited Nkrumah to mess that much of Africa has become, he
come to live in exile in Guinea after the pro mltct -
h ?
ro en heart. e
Western 1966 army coup in Ghana deposed West has skillfully re-established its de facto
him Toure bestowed on him the honorara . Ifeeicriv,:eaptaceao
title of "co-president i
political independence to numerous
colonies during the 1950s and 1960s. One of
the best-publicised examples, of course, was
in the forrn.er Belgian Congo (now Zaire).
Both "in retrospect and in analysis, it is clear
that Brussels had not the slightest intention
of giving up its control over that colony's
priceless resources. The quick, greased
downfall of Congo Premier Patrice
Lumumba had been plotted long before the
formal lowering of the Belgian flag in June
1960 at so-called independence ceremonies.
Former UN diplomat Conor Cruse O'Brien
and others have thoroughly documented the
record of Belgian-British-U.S. duplicity. UN
Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold
,allowed the world organization to be used in
the re-enslavement of the Congo. By the
autumn of 1960, when events were closing in
on the trusting Lumumba?events that
culminated in his foul and brutal murder in
February 1961?Kwame Nkrumah, as
president of Ghana, wrote to him with the
classic warning: "The only colonialist or
imperialist that I trust is a dead one."
Believing that the UN would playa neutral,
role. Lurnurnha (to N'rrtrrIll's clisnvw) had
called in UN forces after a Belgian-insti,gatea
rebellion in his own army.
Had Nkrumah not died of cancer while
under medical treatment in Bucharest,
might he ultimately have regained power?
No one Can say for sure. But an official
invitation to return home to Ghana after the
recent overthrow of the repressive pro-
Western regime amounted to a vindication
of his efforts, if not of his complete ad-
ministrative record, as father and first
president of his country. After six years, the
right wing generals of Ghana and their
civilian supporters had shown they had no
socio-political-economic program to r;teet
the many problems of a new nation. The
policy of reopening Ghana to unlimited
western investment and exploitation had
41'orsened the economy and the condition of
the people. Discontent was massive.
Corruption was everywhere. Universities
were closed because the students were in
active rebellion.
As with Indonesia after Sukarno's
overthrow in 1965 by his army and the' CIA.
as with Cambodia after the military-CIA
coup in 1970 that deposed Prince Sihanouk,
as with all the former colonies that enjoyed a
brief respite of self-respect before being re-
?
Applii)Ve'dCFOr aMar having ? t d i I
y er gian e nom na
4413104tYllfi, VaCtOri r-r short-
comings, as a true patriot. He failed to build
iTtontinueci
STATI NTL
DAILY WC=
Approved For Release 2001/0-3/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601
2 8 APR. 1972
Kwame Ktrurnah dies at age of 63
CONAKRAY, Guinea, April 27
?Kwame Nkrumah, former Pres-
ident of Ghana, died here today, it
was announced on a radio broad-
cast by President Sekou Toure of
Guinea.
Nkruman, 63, was believed to
have died of cancer. He had lived
in Guinea since he was ousted in
1965 by a military coup widely
understood to have been engi-
neered by British and U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency operatives.
Long a leader of anti-imperial-
ist forces in Africa, Nkrumah, a
graduate of both Pennsylvania
University and the London School
of Economics, became the first
premier of Ghana ? previously
known as the Gold Coast ? when
it won its independence from
Britain after World War II.
He served as Prime Minister
until 1960 and then as president
until the military putsch against
him ? accomplished during his
absence on a state visit to China.
A prolific writer, he authored
numerous books and articles.
Among his works issued here b'y
International Publishers were
"Neo-Colonialism ? The Last
Stage of Imperialism," "Dark
'Day in Ghana," "Handbook of
Revolutionary Warfare," "Africa
Must Unite," "Class Struggle in
Africa" and "Challenge of the
Congo:"
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000500200001-7
For.Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01%14116-6b00200001-7
STATE JOURNAL
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armed sen,ices had ...reliect ,
"- -. ; - Boit h wasn't until 1917 that ?
Copley News Service : Con-ross created the CIA. It , /
. ---, heavily -upon civilian specialists . v...:faoyoned? after OSS and it
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Perhap no area OU gov- ernment having a direct bear- NV'S ova', they sent the speci
io- ' ' , , bt'ir.o duolog the year that
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a Wars Old When th figilt
lug on our attitude in the cold ists home and forgot all ,,..,,1).3.`ut .: cal:f..i war ? was. declared.
the need for intelligence. ctually; Congress in Setting
war has been ;lore controver- : y.11o CIA delceated it, a single
Cen. George C. ? 'Marshall :.!,::_ntotinic, intellig;:nce,'and noth-
sial, yet kss understood than!
. o once 0.Qscrihod the Army's for- ;. hog more. That it does much
:01117 intelligence netv.-ork. .1
! eign intelligence as "little more .
? ' It is partly ?that we don't . than what a military attache 1.por.re is without question, btlt!
j what and whet'e it docs it is 1
. know what the Central Intelii- coold learn at a dinner,111- m::e
hard to say.
. gence Agency does, but if it ; or less, over the coffee cups." There i; a thecoo, among in
, oes what we think- it does, it
Five months before the Japa- telligence agents,. the good!
d .
' goes against our sense or faire ?most I
nee. attack on Pearl Harbor, ones, that (her should ?al
Harry Howe Ransom reports INveys" be no failures, It is 1
' play and that is bad. . in "the intelligence establish- better so the theory gcies; MI
, The popular notion is that the m o n t," President Roosevelt leave 'a problem unsolved than I
. ?
. CIA is a law unto itself. It is be- . summoned Col. (late Maj. to risk failure or discovery.
?? hexed that it freely interferes! (en.) William J. Donovan to Still, there' lor,,o, been fail:
M the illiC1'111 01 01 sover-: dr art a Pltn. 'ler a new int011i: tires: the. Bay of Pigs, the 172
eign nations, and that it ever-1 genee service designed for the incident. . . ?
- throws anti-American 'govern- t recIttil'ements of a global war ? Taking into account CIA's
' m en f s, even democratically 1 end patterned in the main after policy toovard supercaution, it
e i
elected ones, to , install v.ti_ , the broAsh. would seem reasonabl to as-
Communist governments. Donovan was a successful smite that. for every failure ?
there must have been, ch, ten;
. _. . _ .. _..
.or more successes.
The .1 a i lures have t-:.L' At
pinned. ' on the CIA while I:Je-
successes almost never are.
Not definitely. '
Some have suspected the CIA
of having brought on the down-
fall of Nkrumah in Ghana and
; *Some writers have capital- lawyer N?i119 had won the Medal
Ind on those beliefs, shadowed of Honor in World War 1. .
. Ahem with a cloak and fastened "He was an imaginative, ag-
.them with a dagger and written , gressive man," Ransom writes,
books to support them. Fortu- "who had travel-ed -abroad ex-
/lately, most were .crodely writ- ten5ive1y. So far as inteililfence
ten and rudely received, work went, he Was an amateur,
Still, many congressmen and but in the American tradition of
some journalists continue to ? public service he. seemed quali-
? ask, why haoe all intelligence ; fled to assemble what. was to Sukarno in Indonesia, of having
communitv at all? .I.Vlbstly the ' become the f p r e -r it u n e r of, installed the military junta in
questioners are- those to whom CIA."o ;,Greece and of having thrown
"intelligence" connotes spie.s, During World War II il-ic?. etoi- Sihootik out of Cambodia.
saboteurs and political acti- cat approach to a central into: Ii'ut these redits, if they are,
vists. _ ligence system was the widely do nothing more than support
TI1054,-; living in the intern- publieized Office of Strategic] the notions of' observers who
gence community consider the Services -- the almost legcno see the CIA as a molder of tern-
question absurd. But it de- clary OSS. porary odoeraohv?aod a shaper
: t., . r .... ? - of tentative hist oil .... .
serves an answer. It ' is difficult to assess th.;;:'
Ally president of a large cor- .worth of .OSS becauseoits oft 4 is the sartic attitude which
Miles -Copeland HI, who c;:lee
poration, and, indeed, anY cliff cial history still remains' classi-
. of state, must have "inteili- I fled. Still, it must 1x1 oven workecl. for the State Depart:-
genee" if he is to fulfill his re o I etc 'it . despite I at:, na
.ei ment and the wr
. CIA, it es of in
- ! -t
sponsibilities. 'tractors, for invatuahle cont.ri- his "rf he Game. of Nat'?11s:"
. He may get _it from newspa- 1 but ions to allied victory, cape-
"In the intelligence genie,
' '
pets fr
, ?om briefings by Inc s,ab- cially in . B ma ur trict in defeat:-
competitors seek to gain the
ordinates or from reports from ' Ig the axis in Not Africa and greatest possible athoint ago
constIltants. Wherever, he must in aiding the French resistance short -of going to \Val.."
have intelligence, Appro chforRelease.21301/03/04 ?. CIA-RDP80-01601R000500200001-7
ses of the word, or he. will not
survive long.
'.
STATI NTL
STATINTL
Approved For ReleasP2bdigiltiVRDP80-0.
r CARL T. ROWAN
? POS:1-bikrUiTicih
ACCRA, Ghana ? The peo-
ple of this troubled but newly
hopeful little West African
country think they offer a les-
son to the dozens of other new
:nations of Africa and Asia:
'don't try to purchase rapid
economic progress at the price
of the people's liberty.
. But the foregin minister of
? Ghana, Victor OWLISU, is con-
vinced that all the nations of
'Africa will learn that bitter
lesson the way Ghana did ?
by going full circle from a
liberal democracy to dictator-
ship to military rule and even-
tually back to a democratic
civilian government.
Ghana's passage full-circle
was tragic, classic, and rapid.
When the British turned power
over to Kwame Nkrumah in
1957, Ghana appeared to be a
model of democracy which
other countries might emulate.
But, as B. J. Darocha, general
secretary of the ruling Prog-
ress party, explains it, Nkru-
mah became a hero because of
lucky timing. He confused luck
with some special or superna-
tural quality in himself.
As he got more and more in
trouble, he reacted as all des-
pots have done and will do?
be shut the people off. Almost
ham
before Ghanaians knew it,
Nkrumah had closed down
newspapers that printed the
slightest criticism of him.
He put political opponents in
- jail, some of them to die there.
With the advice of the Rus-
sians, he set up a private
army and a network of secret
police and informers to insure
his personal safety and the
maintenance of his power.
With the help of the Chinese
Communists, he set up secret
camps to train Africans from
other countries to go home and
overthrow their governments,
a scheme Ghana's present
leaders claim was part of
Nkrumah's dream of becom-
ing emperor of Africa.
Within eight years, Nkru-
mah had transformed Ghana
into a pro-Communist police
state. In doing so he had
wrecked the economy to the
point that basic foods and
medicines were not available
to ordinary citizens.
Ghanaians are galled by
blacks in the United States or
the West Indies who persist in
arguing that the overthrow of
Nkrumah in February 1966
was engineered by the CIA
and/or British intelligence. I
asked Prime Minister K. A.
Busia about foreign involve-
ment. He simply recounted
ft
Enters
STATI NTL
ei New Phase
what he called Nkrumah's tyr-
anny, adding that the whole
country gave its support to the
military people who overthrew
him.
Ghana has just dissolved the
Presidential Commission, the
three-man body headed by Lt.
Gen. A. A. Afrifa, which has
been serving as head of state,
since a single civilian will
soon be elected head of state.
And it is a point of considera-
ble talk here that the constitu-
ent assembly drafted a new
constitution setting 40 as the
minimum age of a President.
This rules out Afrifa, the
main figure in Nkrumah's
overthrow, for he is 36. The
new constitution was clearly
designed with the intention of
preventing the rise of another
Nkrumah.
"You cannot sacrifice per-
sonal freedom for economic
development," the deputy
speaker of parliament told me.
"Personal security must stand
first, for all else flows out of
that." "
In pursuit of personal securi-
ty, Ghanaians have given their
/courts power over actions of
the executive branch that
seem to exceed the powers of
the U.S. Supreme Court. But
already Ghanaians note uneas-
ily the angry reactions of Bus-
ia and the ruling group when
the courts decide against
them on important matters.
The people are also saying
that constitutional safeguards -
are of dubious value where the:
government controls the radio
and television stations and vir-
tually all the newspapers.
I asked Darocha if he felt
the constitution was impregna-
ble or if it could be subverted
by another would-be dictator.
"The new constitution can be
run over as easily as the peo-
ple will permit," he said.
All Africa must be watching
these days, what with Uganda
apparently where Ghana was
just prior to Nkrumah's over-
throw, with Nigeria under mil-
itary rule but looking for a
return to civilian control, and
a lot of other countries some-
where along that rocky circle
that Ghana has just negotiat-
ed.
But Ghanaians expressed cer-
tainly that they have learned
something from the past,
something about the need to
resist at the outset preventive
detention laws and the similar,
tools of tyranny. And they .
seem happiest to have learned
that a small new African coun-
try has proved durable enough
to survive a fling with autocra-
cy and near chaos.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000500200001-7
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-016
tt10'. P',SENCH TO AFRICA 1700 GMT 19 rECEMBE icR,
STATINTL
(CLE '2 -::ITAYEV -COMMENTARY)
. CIA AGENTS ARE PREPARING A FRESH PROVOCATION IN AFRICA.
UNDER T HZ_ INSTRUCT /ONS SCV JET AND CZECHOSLOVAK?MADE ARMS ARE
BE: TLY TAKEN FROM 4IHA4A TO U.S. MILITARY DEPOTS IN LIBERIA.
.RMS WHICH THE SOVIET UNION AND CZECHGSLovAKIA SUPPLIED
TO C FEBRUARY NINETEEN SIXTYSIX 1966 AT THAT GOVERNMENT'S
USE BY THE GHANAIAN ARMY.
S. './PLOMAT HAS RAISF.D THF. CURTAIN FROM THE f,lYSTERY WHICH
Li OPZRATION. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE 'NIGERIAN PAPER
THE WE ICN PILOT, HE LET THE CAT OUT OF THE BAG. SOON,
HE SAL, aSE ARMS WILL BE FOUIZ IN VARIOUS AFRICAN COUNTRIES.
TP`,F.RLFC7t1F., :T IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT SOON tHE WESTERN PRESS WILL
? rATICAL NEWS TO THE EFF:CT THAT SOVIET AD cZECHCALOVAK
ARMS _ 7:.,:-3COVE.RED IN THE POSSESSION OF TSHO'ISF.IS MERCENARIES,
SALAZAT? _ N, L's.IITH'S CLIQUE, AND OTHER COLONIALISTS AND.THEIR
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;Et';PTATION IS TOO STRONG, AD THE IMPERIALISTS CANNOT WAIT
TO EZZ:IIRCH THE GOOD REPUATION OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND
AT THE SA:':E: TIME TO JUSTIFY THEIR SUPPORT TO SALAZAR, SMITH,
g. . 3ER T1-17. ENEMIES OF THE AFRICAN PEOPLE. THERE IS GOOD
REAS 70 SAY THAT THIS SYSTEM IS NOT RPT NOT NEWS, LIES
AND SL H4VE ALWAYS BEEN ONE OF THE WEAPONS USED SY THE
I2PERIAL.TS IN THEIR STRUGGLE AGAIN.il THE SOV/ET UNION AND
.:T THE PRESTIGE OF THE SOVIET UNION ISSO HIGH THAT THEY
WILL ,iGAIN FAIL TO UNDERMINE IT BY SLANDEROUS TALES.
PRI':CIPLE ADOPTED BY THE SOVIET UNION ON TIE QUESTION
OF SUPPLIES IS WELL KNOWN IN AFRICA. EACH COUNTRY STRUGGLING
OZONIALISIY: AND
IMPERIALISM CAN ALWAYS RELY IN
THIS ON THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS WITH SOVIET WEAPONS THAT
U.S. AIR PIRATES ARE BEING SHOT DOWN