NEW MAN FOR CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000400200001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 110
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 30, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

STATINTL
-12 Approved For Release 2000/08/16: CIA-RDP80-01601 R00_
DES MOINES, IOWA
REGISTER
0 .L 3 O 1370
M -- 250,261
s - 515,710
New Man for CIA
Only a few insiders have much basis
for judging the I,.ork of the United
States Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) and they rarely talk. But there
are a few hints along the way about the
meaning of President Nixon's decision
to name James R. Schlesinger Ct di-
rector and make the present director,
Richard Helms. ambassador to Iran.
President Nixon has not been satisfied
with the performance of the U.S. "in-
telligence Community." In late 1969 lie
cut CIA personnel abroad by to to 1S
per cent. Ile ordered a study of the CIA
and intelligence generally by James
Schlesinger, then a military and inter-
national specialist in the While House
Office of Management and Budget. and
by K. W. Smith, a National Security
Council aide.
Their report came out in May, 1971. It.
recommended pulling intelligence to-
gether either by giving CIA Director
Helms more authority over the five oth-
er U.S. agencies beside the CIA that
gather intelligence, or by setting up a
new cabinet-level Department of In-
Atomic Energy Conunission and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Now the President pulls Helms out
and puts in one of the authors of the
report - Schlesinger.
One complaint that the President is
said to have against the CIA under
helms is that the CIA often has been
realistic about Vietnam. For example,
the CIA didn't think bombing North
Vietnam `would be effective, or that it
was effective after it started.
Ousting Helms for being right is
wrong.
On the other hand. Senator J. William
Fulbright's Foreign Relations Com-
mittee has been hassling the CIA for its
private wars in Laos and Cambodia,
which either violate U.S. law or come
close to it. Ousting Helms for making
war against the will of Congress Would
be proper - but it is clear Helms w As
only carrying, out Nixon's policy there.
James Schlesinger is an economist
who spent 12 yeau?s in the RAND Corpo-
ration, an Air Force think tank, then
three years as a Nixon appointee in the
,Bureau of the Budget and the White
telligencc.
In November, 1971. the White House et, then a year as Nixon's choice as
ordered a reorganisation of intelligence chairman of the Atomic Energy Com-
activities to give llelms more leadership mission, His record in government is
over the rival intelligence agencies in good, but lie is a weapons man and a
the State and Defense Departments, the hardliner.
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/16. I .I?80A .601, 00R 0~ 01-
1n7')
C
DEC
By Richard E. Ward.
Last of a series
How will a potential Vietnam ceasefire affect
Cambodia?
Contrary to statements by the U.S.-sponsored
Phnom Penh administration about peace talks
with the "Khmer Rouge," the Royal Government
of National Union of Cambodia, headed by
Prince Norodom Sihanouk, has denied that there
have been any discussions between the resistance
.forces,and the puppet regime.
Although the government of National Union
has given its full support to the nine-point peace
agreement for Vietnam, after it was announced
by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the
Cambodian resistance is determined to fight until
the ' U.S.-sponsored Lon Nol regime is over-
thrown. Recent Western press reports imply that
this may well be within, the capacity of the
resistance forces within the foreseeable future.
The position of the National Union govern-
ment in no way conflicts with the position of its
Indochinese allies, which would be able to
furnish greater assistance to the Cambodian
resistance if there were a cease-fire in Vietnam
and the U.S. persisted in prolonging the war in
Cambodia.
In the short run, the U.S. could bolster the
Phnom Penh regime for a time, but the days of its
Cambodian clients appear to be numbered,
despite the approximately $350 million in
military aid annually being sent to Phnom Penh,
the clandestine presence of U.S. military advisors
and continued heavy U.S. air attacks against the
patriotic forces.
Rapid growth
Two-and-one-half years after the U.S.-
promoted coup ousting Sihanouk in Phnom
Penh, the resistance forces in Cambodia are
growing more rapidly than ever, controlling 85
percent of the national territory, according to an
Oct. 23 report by A.P. correspondent Holger
Jensen who also wrote:
"Khmer Rouge (the name used by the Western
press for the Cambodian resistance forces)
strength has jumped from little more than 5000 in
March to about 40,000 combat-honed troops... .
"U.S. officials . . . concede they 'drastically
underestimated' the Khmer Rouge, which means
Cambodian Reds.
" 'They grew more, rapidly than anyone
realized or reported; it's as simple as that,' said
one high-ranking American here. 'They're not
dependent on the North Vietnamese any more.
The Khmer Rouge are actively engaged in
combat against Cambodian government forces
and they're making a maximum effort."
This assessment was corroborated by the Far
Eastern Economic Review's Phnom Penh
correspondent Nayan Chandra, who wrote in the
to open Highway 6 and lift the siege of Kompong
Thom, the Cambodian army has not recovered its
morale. 'Chenla 11, has been as decisive for
Cambodia,' estimates one diplomat, 'as
Stalingrad was to the Germans.'
Not only was there heavy loss of men and
material, but the credibility of Lon Nol as a
strategist and leader suffered a grievous setback.
Since then the army has launched a few half-
hearted operations, with claims of initial victories
followed by disastrous defeats.
"Taking full advantage of the political
demoralization and popular malaise (toward the
Lon ' Nol regime), pro-Sihanouk forces have
considerably strengthened their position. One
knowledgeable observer says looting by
South Vietnam (Saigon) and Cambodian troops,
plus American bombing, has given the Khmer
Rouge an audience that did not exist a year ago."
While the American bombing continues to
devastate the liberated zone, Saigon troops are
no longer in a position to be sent in significant
numbers to Cambodia, as the Nguyen Van Thieu
regime needs every soldier available to him to
meet the continuing offensive by the Liberation
Armed Forces of the PRG.
In reply to questions posed by a correspon-
dent, Sihanouk explained on Oct. 29 that- the
Cambodian resistance forces "sometimes have
combined operations with our North Vietnamese;.
and NLF friends along the Cambodian-
Vietnamese common border, but our armed
forces, alone, have responsibility for all military
operations in the interior of Cambodia. We give
the troops of our north Vietnamese and NLF
friends the right to cross our national territory
but these friendly Vietnamese troops do not
possess any permanent base in the interior of the
country. The question of their evacuation from
Cambodia is not an issue and will never be an
issue."
In answer to another question during the same
interview Sihanouk noted that "the only route
between Peking and the liberated zone of
Cambodia is- the Ho Chi Minh trail" on which
travel would be much easier if there were cease-
fires in Vietnam and Laos. Although the Cam-
bodian leader was referring to the possibility of
returning to his homeland, the military im-
plications are quite clear and must be discon-
certing to the Nixon administration which once
called U.S.-supported operations in Cambodia
the best example of the "Nixon doctrine" in-
action. ,
The realities of the Nixon doctrine in Cam-
bodia are quite different than Washington.
originally envisaged when the CIA promoted the
coup by Lon Nol and Sirak Matak, now bitter
rivals, like most other "leaders" of Phnom Penh's
pro-American camp. The regime now barely
extends its authority outside of Phnom Penh and
t ven subjected to military attacks within its
Nov. lei ~6ye '06lerea CIA-RM, M~, ~}Q40020001-8
never b n gloomier. tree t o rout o
ambitious 'Chenla II' operation earlier this year
t/
continued
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Virtually all traffic arteries from Phnom Penh
have been cut on a more or less permanent basis.
Route 5 going to the rice-rich Battambang
-province have been held by liberation forces
since August, which cut off the capital city from
its main source of rice. Since September there
have been periodic "riots" over rice shortages in
which troops of the Lon Not army have par-
ticipated.
Apparently a large segment of U.S. aid goes
into the pockets of corrupt officials and military
officers. Interviewing some soldiers early in
November, Times correspondent Schanberg
noted that they were lucky to be receiving their
pay, for "corruption has permeated the Cam-
bodian army ever since the U.S. began pumping
. military aid into the country.
"Many commanders keel) dead men on their
unit payrolls and put the dead men's pay into
their own pockets. Other commanders even keep
the pay of their own troops, which leaves the
troops penri,iless and demoralized and results in
their looting and pillaging the nearest village for
food and other wants."
Selling rope for their own noose
On the point of the regime's total corruption,
all Western observers in Phnom Penh agree. Lon
Not's personal doctor who was appointed
minister of commerce earlier this year had to quit
after a scandal" involving sales of rice to the
patriots. _
Although most of Lon Nol's military forces are
demoralized and unreliable and there is not the.
slightest prospect of broadening the base of the
puppet regime, the U.S. has accelerated its arms
shipments to Phnom Penh in recent weeks, which
raises several questions, including the probable
violation of congressional limitations on U.S. aid
to Cambodia and the presence of U.S. advisors,
also prohibited by congressional enactments. It is
also conceivable that at least some of the military
equipment, especially aircraft, is destined not for
Lon. Nol's forces but for America and other
clandestine U.S. operations which are
burgeoning throughout Indochina.
It is understandable that Sihanouk does not
desire to negotiate with the traitors who serve the
U.S. imperialists, as they represent nothing in tite
country, so.the probability is continued conflict
in Cambodia as long as the U.S. seeks to maintain
its Phnom Penh retainers. The Vietnamese
liberation forces have expressed full support for
the refusal of the Royal Cambodian Government
of National Union to negotiate with the puppet
regime.
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 _ NA~z4ty
(~( 1972,
Approved For Release 2000/08/1-62 CI DP80-01g1jj &
PYRRHIC PLOY
Tf CIO V-3 TN rT rn T"% "'W", 'I"
E. W. P ElF 'Ef
Mr. Pfei/3er is professor of zoology at the University of
Montana and a co-author of Harvest of Death: Chemical
Warfare in Indochina (Free Press/Macmillan). Ile visited
Cambodia in 1969.and 1971 and was in Hanoi in 1970,
While on a visit to Hanoi in June 1970 my two compan-
ions and I met with Premier Pham Van Dong. During the
conversation, I asked the Premier to evaluate Nixon's in-
vasion of Cambodia which had occurred one month ear-
lier. His ,answer was straightforward: "It makes things
very favorable for the success of our revolution." By
"our revolution" I suppgsed him to mean the revolution
of the Indochinese people against foreign invaders.
How well does Premier Pham Van bong's 1970 evalu-
ation accord with the situation of Cambodia in late 1972?
Recent dispatches from Indochina suggest that he knew
what lie was talking about. According to the A.P. (Sep-
tember 1), only one-third of Cambodia is still under
"Khmer Republic" control. It has been revealed that the
tanks used in the fall offensive against the An Loc area,
(only a short distance from Saigon) came from the Chup
Rubber Plantation and nearby areas in Cambodia. These
are the very areas that President Nixon characterized
in April 1970 as "Communist sanctuaries" that must be
cleaned out.
Two factors have been principally responsible for the
failure of Ni}.on's Cambodian policies. First, the Presi-
dent was badly misinformed about past U.S.-Cambodian
d b t the situation on the Vict-
I received some months later from Sen.Frank' Church,
the raid was carried out by Air America, a CIA airline,
for what purposes we still do not know. After the raid,
the Sihanouk regime asked that American officials visit
the region, with a view to making reparations for the
'damage. Although the U.S. Government to this day offi-
cially denies having carried out this operation, it did send
a team of experts, including Charles Minarik of the Chem-
ical Warfare Laboratories, U.S. Army, into the Mimot
region shortly after the raids. This team's report describes
how they were flown over the region, driven through it,
and how they walked in it-just as Westing and I did
some months later. It is inconceivable to me that the
North Vietnamese and Vietcong, who according to Nixon
controlled the area, would have permitted an official U.S.
Government team to wander through what Nixon called
"the headquarters for the entire Communist military op-
erations in South Vietnam." After the invasion began it
was widely reported that no key control center could
be found. Some arms caches were reportedly uncovered
and, of course, a great deal of rice. The rice did not
greatly surprise me, since at the time we were there, the
main occupation; in addition to tapping rubber, was liar-
vesting rice.
When speaking about the Cambodian "Communist
sanctuaries," Mr. Nixon failed to mention that, on orders
of Prince Sihanouk, troops of the Royal. Cambodian
Anny had in fact swept these areas about three months
before his invasion. The troops were led by Prince, Sirik
Matak, a loyal American protege and one of those later
involved in Sihanouk's overthrow. Sihanouk ordered
Vietnamese relations an . a ou
nainese-Cambodian border prior to the March 1970 Matak to search out and destroy all Cominunist-Viet-
change in the Cambodian Government. For instance, in namese positions in Cambodia. Paul Bennctt of the Cam-
his speech of April 30, 1970, announcing the U.S. -in- bodian desk of the State Department informed me in an
i
di
A
b
"
xon
vasion of the Fishhook region of Cambodia, Ivir. N
stated: "Tonight American and South Vietnamese units
will attack the headquarters for the entire Communist
military operation in South Vietnam. This key control
center has been occupied by the North Vietnamese and
Vietcong for five years in blatant violation of Can_bodia's
neutrality." Mr. Nixon, standing in front of a map of
Cambodia, put his finger on the little town of Mimot as
he made this accusation. That puzzled me a great deal,
for I had spent two days in and around Mimot about
four months before the U.S.' attack, and knew it to be
controlled by French and Cambodian rubber interests.
Mahy Europeans were working there, and some of them
(e.g., a Belgian plant pathologist) were in complete
sympathy with the American effort in South Vietnam.
These Europeans were living with their wives and chil-
dren in an environment of complete tranquillity. We
asked many of them whether they had seen any sign
of North Vietnamese or Vietcong activity and they all
answered no.
My colleague A. H. Westing and I had visited the re-
rmy opera-
o
an
A Cam
interview, March 22, 1971:
tion began in January of 1970 in a northeastern province
at approximately the time when Sihanouk left for France
and when Prince Sirik Matak was Acting Prime Minister.
They sent up a number of additional battalions, among
the better troops in the Cambodian Army, and carried
out a series of small sweeps generally in this area. They
did have, as I recall, a number of contacts with small
V.C. and North Vietnamese units. They found and de-
stroyed a number of small supply dumps, a relatively
small campsite, but there was no major contact with the
main North Vietnamese forces." Where were the thou-
sands of North Vietnamese troops that Nixon said had
occupied the area for five years?
Besides being mistaken about the nature of the
so-called Communist sanctuaries in eastern Cambodia,
Mr. Nixon grossly misrepresented the facts when he
stated that "American policy since 1954 has been to
scrupulously respect the neutrality of Cambodia. . . .
North Vietnam, however, has not respected that neutral-
gion to in lie ~aa d ne by clandestine defolia it ." The defoliation of vast sections of the rubber plan-
tion raid c rr e vo t ~ g _y ' 1~e1C~} PA&~1560A9RN4Q0 01~y4's one blatant violation of
200,000 acres of eastern Cambodia. According to a letter
 STATINTL
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Parallel to the case of the. two announced opposition
cAndidatds in the Saigon's presidential "elections" last
October Sirik Matak pulled out of the contest Aug. 3,
:l: t'tl;at
iiilI Is,
by Wilfred Burcltett
Guardian staff correspondent
top. The electoral farce is a classic example of alien
traitors fall' out."
A fourth and most dangerous rival remains in the
shadows for the three others to exhaust themselves while
he prepares to eventually knife the winner. and. take over.
This ambitious intrigucr.is Son .N goclhanh. former puppet
p.' set it by the Japanese during their World War.ll
r
I v _11
stating as his reason "the unconstitutional and anti-
democratic nature of the decrees governing the elections
adopted on July 15." Ile accused "the present gove.rnntcnt
of using the administrative apparatus to put pressure Oil its
employes to ensure that one-single party, sponsored by it,
gains the, victory'."
To complete the parallel with Thicu's one-man election,'
In Tam announced three days later his party would also
boycott the "elections" held under a system in which Lou
Nol's party would need to obtain only one eighth of the
- rotes needed by the opposition parties, to win,
In completely farcical presidential "elections" last June,
In Tani soundly'defeated Lon Nol in Phnom Penh, the only
place where any control' of voting and the counting of
votes could be effected. The July electoral decrees were to
Paris
'Brace'vourself for another "free election" in an Asiaie
country with special ties to the U.S.--Cambodia.,
When general now Pr-eniier, Lon Not overthrew Cant-
bodot s neutralist goveI'll utent of prince Norodom'
'Sihanouk _ in a military coup d'etat March ? 18, 1970,
Sihanouk quickly branded the usurper as a "puppet's.
puppet..,
Events quickly proved the term was exact. The Lon Nol-
Sirik Matak regime was demonstrably a sub puppet of the
Saigon puppet regime, propped up by Saigon mercenary
troops and U.S. air power.
A slavish imitator in all things,-Prentier'Lon Not is now
resorting to a one-matt electoral farce-with Saigon-
Washington blessing---similar. to that perpetrated by
dictator Nguyen Van Thieu in Saigon last October.. The
,object is to,keep himself in?power.
On Sept. 3, there will be "elections" in that fast
shrinking one fifth of the counts-y the lion Not regime still
controls to a new "National Assembly."
Since the U.S. prefers the facade of "democracy," three
main parties are "competing." Even under a microscope it
wotdd be impossible to distinguish any difference in their
programs. Each is headed by. one of the main plotters of
the' anti-Sihanouk coup.. .
The "Social-Republican party of Lon Not is led by
proxy by the dictator's younger brother, the fascist Col.
Lon Non, who master-minded the attacks on the embassies
of the'Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Provisional
Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam which
preceded the coup and the massacre of Cambodians and
Vietnamese that followed. The "Republican" party 'is
headed by chief co-plotter and former Premier, Sirik
Matak. The "Democratic" party is headed by In Tam, who
as vice president. of the National Assctt.bly-which was
surrounded by Lon Nol's tanks at the time-moved the
motion deposing Sihanouk is head of state.
The only thing that distinguishes the parties is the
deadly rivalry between the three leaders for power. at the
'guard against any such future "accidents.
Thus assured of a sweeping victory, Lon Not and "free
world democracy" will probably score another triumph
this month:
Sirik Matak and In Tam are just as ferocious enemies of
democracy as Lon Nol. If they had his power they would
'do exactly'the same thing. They had both played a leading
role in suppressing any shred of democracy following the
coup. This did not prevent In Tam however, from usmhing-
the name of the Democratic party which once had real
influence among progressive intellectuals in Cambodia.
No Democratic party
In a statement July 16, prince Phourissara-one of the
most distinguished Foreign Ministers in the pre-coup years
who recently escaped to the Liberated Zone-vigorously
denounced in Tarn's pretense of heading the Democratic
-party. After exposing the traitorous and double-puppet
role of Siril: Matak?and In Tam, Phourissara and two other
well-known personalities, in the name of the Democratic
tarty of which they had been leading members?'stated:
"(1) The Democratic party has ceased to exist for
several years following the unanimous decision of its
members. At the present time there is no Democratic
party. ?
"(2) The overwhelming majority of its members of
good reputation and faithful to the democratic ideals of
the. party categorically repudiated the traitors Lon Not,
Slrik Ma.tak and Son Ngoc Thant following the March 18
coup. At the present time a great number of members of
the ,former Democratic party play their part in working
within the ranks of the Cambodian National United Front
(NUFK) which is a broad organization of national unity
with a political program in conformity with the idea of the
whole nation and the whole of the Cambodian people.
"(3) The so-called ;Democratic party' of the In Tam,
Doue Rasy clique and a few other intellectuals who haye
.. p .
tt.nuc
oc?~pgi?t~7Srr~~l`~t~0~~d/JII` 0 01601R000400200001-8
puppet Premier. Ile is Washington,s 1` rs
Penh."
conGinuec.
6SEP1972
 2 2 JUL 1972
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not Says it Prfers McGove~
jack Anderson of Mr. Nixon seemed almost possible, at the same time a last year eroded these natures
paranoid, their trust in Mc POW settlement is reached. barriers. Thus, U.S. bombs ex-
Govern wary. The 60 to 100 Americans ploding near the dikes jar the
In their first comment on weakened bulwarks and cause
the U.S. presidential cam-
paign, the North Vietnamese
have Informed us they expect
President Nixon to win reelec-
tion, but they would prefer to
deal with George McGovern.
From their Paris embassy,
North Vietnamese spokesmen
have sent us an exclusive mes-
sage that they feel sure Mc-
Govern would pull U.S. troops
out of Vietnam as he has
promised. They also believe he
would keep his word not to
give more military backing to
the Saigon: regime.
Nixon Paranoia
They recited Mr. Nixon's
record back to his 1953-61
term as Vice President when
lie made saber-rattling
speeches about Indochina.
Nevertheless, they were ready
to negotiate with Mr. Nixon in
1971, they said, for the total
withdrawal of U.S. forces and
the immediate return of U.S.
urisoners.
President Thieu on Oct. -1 and
the escalated bombing of
North Vietnam a few days
later, they said exacerbated
their old suspicions of Mr.
Nixon.
Now they feared Mr. Nixon
would listen to Thicu's ap-
peals for renewed U.S. inter-
vention In the Vietnam war,
As evidence, they cited the
buildup of U.S. forces in
neighborhing Thailand and
the increase in air-naval units
around Vietnam.
The Communist diplomats
said they trusted McGovern, if
he should be elected, not to
re-intervene in the war. But
one diplomat suggested that
they would make rapid ar-
rangements with McGovern to
return American prisoners so
he would have no excuse to
re-intervene.
They, therefore, not only
would negotiate the POW
issue with McGovern, but they
would move. fast, suggested
one North Vietnamese diplo-
mat, to return American pris-
oners.
But the North Vietnamese
conceded, in the end, they
probably will have to negoti-
ate with a re-elected Richard
Nixon. They couldn't afford,
therefore, to place all their
bets on McGovern, they said.
Hanoi's views on the elec-
tion were delivered to us by
an emissary who met with the
North Vietnamese three times
for a total of four and. one-half
hours. For diplomatic reasons,
we agreed to withhold the
names of the participants.
All the discussions were
held in French, so we can only
paraphrase what the North Vi-
etnamese said. Their suspicion
Bombing of Dikes
The North Vietnamese said
they would make an account.
in Laos, the North Vietnamese
said, could be returned as part
of a general U.S. agreement to
withdraw from Indochina.
They said the Americans held
in Cambodia could also be re-
turned as part of a general In-
dochina settlement.
A Cambodian Communist,
who was present during the
discussions, said the American
prisoners in Cambodia are sus-
pected CIA agents and specia
forces, not combat troops cap-
tured during the U.S. incur-
sion of May, 1970.
The North Vietnamese were
particularly emotional over
the alleged American bombing
of the dikes, which they
pleaded could lead to two mil-
lion deaths from drowning
and starvation.
We have seen secret Penta-
gon documents, which substan-
tiate the U.S. claim that the
Red River dikes and dams are
Some roads also.run directly
on top of dikes,, and U.S. at-
tacks on the military traffic
have blown holes in the dikes,
they said. A combination of
air raids, defoliation and arti-
ficial rain-making, they feared,
could turn their flood-control
system!nto a huge mudslide.
Footnote: Intelligence re-
ports suggest that 1110scow and
Peking, unlike Hanoi, would
,prefer to deal with Richard
Nixon than George McGovern.
The reason, apparently, is that
they feel more comfortable
with the known Nixon than
the unknown McGovern.
Appeal to Pope
Three priests imprisoned in
Brazil's dread Sao Paulo pene-
tentiary have smugg]ed out a
letter to Pope Paul begging
hive to intervene against the
torturing of political prisoners
by Brazilian authorities.
The priests' - letter, dated
June 29, said they had fasted
21 days in protest against
"atrocious tortures" that have
killed more than 200.Brazili-
ans. Although the priests
claim they and hundreds of
others are political prisoners,
they have been thrown into
common cells with rapists,
murderers-and other hardened
criminals.
? 1972, United Feature Syndicate
oft limits to our bombers. The
documents indicate, however,
that some flood-control instal.
lations have been hit acci-
dentally, because of the close
proximity of military targets.
.The North Vietnamese ex-
plained to our emissary that
1
-
they had bolstered the hi1
sides above the darns and
dikes with trees, grass and un-
derbrush. The torrential rains
ing of U.S. missing, insofar as
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 Approved For Release 20001
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L C Fs 01, L L
SIR: I refer to the letter of W. E. Colby, executive
director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who re-
butted the charges made by some American newspa-
permen that the CIA was involved in opium traf-
ficking. I do not question Colby's good faith, neither
do I say that the CIA, as an entity, traffics in opium;
but, I am sorry to say that there is more to these
charges than more "gossip, conjecture and,, old history."
I also know what I am talking about because'I was
involved in security matters for the South Vietnamese
government under President Ngo Dinh Diem. In effect,
one day, the President told me to investigate into the
activities of our chief of secret police, chief of our own
"CIA" and chief of military security, and to report, di-
rectly to him, because as he put it: "I cannot ask my
own chiefs of police, `CIA,' and military security to
investigate into themselves."
I found out the corruption of two. chiefs, ? and the
President took very drastic measures against them. I
have kept the contact with my security agents ever
since. They firmly confirm that a few CIA agents in
Indochina are involved in opium trafficking. But above
all, a line must be drawn between Indochina and the
rest of the world, because, due to the fact of the coun-
ter-instu'gency warfare, the operations of the American
CIA in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are extremely ira-
portant, when they are compared to operations of the
same agency in other countries. In Indochina, the CIA
is a real army with his own aerial fleet. A number of
CIA operatives deal directly with Vietnamese, Lao, or
Moo warlords or officials at the highest level with
whom they share the proceeds of the opium traffic. For
good American citizens in the United States, it is very
difficult to imagine the influence and power of those
operatives in Indochina, Their power, in fact., is un-
limited-they are the true rulers of Indochina; their
desires are orders-no Vietnamese, Laotian or Cambo-
i dian official would dare resist their orders. Corruption
growing from a do facto power-affects some of these
CIA operatives.
The traffic of opium involves a rely t.ively large num-
her of persons. Outside a few Americans, there are
Vietnamese Laotians and Aleo who are involved. Since
these personis have their clans, families and friends who
live from this traffic, the total number of persons con-
cerned become so great that it is impossible to keep
secret the operations.
I also do not question the good faith of CIA Director
Richard Helms when he said that "os an agency, in
fact, we are heavily engaged in tracing the foreign
roots of the drug traffic for the Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs. We hope we are helping with a
solution; we know we are not contributing to the prob-
lem ... -" However, as I said previously, a line must
be drawn and a distinction must he made; for circum-
stances are not the same-there is not the vaguest re-
semblance between CIA operatives in Indochina and
their colleagues operating in other countries.
In conclusion, CIA Director Helms and Colby, Miss
Randal, and McCoy said the truth and did not contra-.
diet one another; they perhaps did not talk about the
same country.
Tran Van Xlniein,
Attorney, Former Deputy,
Vietnamese National Assembly.
Chevy Chase, Md.
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 Ctll.C GO TR1_r1i `NN
18 JUL 1972
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es Def a eat of Red's .
BY DONALD KIRK
Far Eastern Correspondent
Chicago Tribune pass Service
PHNOM PENH, Cambodia-
In the demoralized atmosphere
of this war-weary capital, one
of the country's highest lead-
ers still maintains a sem-
blance of unabashed confi-
dence in the face of the worst
enemy threats.
He is Son Ngoc Thanh, a
revolutionary figure from
Cambodia's French colonial
ast and now prime minister
der the ailing President Lon
Nol. . .
"We are determined to push
out the enemy," said Thanh, a
peppery, slightly built man,
"We are now establishing a
true Khmer or Cambodian re-
public," said Thanh, who last
served as prime minister at
the end of the Japanese occu-
pation in 1945, "Now there are
no more quarrels. The people
can decide whom they want to
lead them."
Vote Fraud Charged
Thanh's faith in Cambodia's
fledgling efforts toward de-
0 0
mocracy remains unshaken by
a presidential election last
month in which Lon Nol easily
steamrollcd over two oppo-
actually have instigated his
ouster.
Thanh preferred not to dis-
cuss the CIA's role in the sud- I/
den turn of events in Phnom
Penh. Instead, he noted the
build-up of the Ca m b o d i a n
army over the last two years.
"At the beginning we had
only 30,000 men in Cambodia
and another 20,000 of my
men," he said. "Now we have
at least 170,000. We have a
broad army now."
He admitted that the quality
of his own forces, the best in
pressure and fraud. I tie '?,,pave declined since they were
p bases near the fronr. The
Instead the prime minister l American Central Intelli ene ampletely integrated . with
g
cited the elections for a Na- I FL
tional Assembly planned fo,,t, A;ency provided the funds, wCambodian units.
v,'hile the U. S. Army's Special 1? "We have so many men," he
gesturing excitedly as he
talked in Cambodian thru an
interpreter. "At the same time
we will strengthen the regime
we have built up."
Returned from Disgrace
If Thanh seems overly opti-
m i s t i c about Cambodia's
chances of success, it is partly
because he himself has re-
turned from disgrace and exile
since the overthrow of the
Leftist chief of state, Prince
Norodom Sihanouk, more, than
two years ago.
Appointed prime minister
early this year, Thanh doubles
as foreign minister and spends
most of his clays in his office
in the Foreign Ministry over-
looking a park beside the Me-
kong River.
August or September as evu- # Forces trained the men. said, "but we lack
mo-
d
t
'
e
s
ry
dence of the coun
cratic methods under its new
constitution. Critics charge
that Lon Nol will manipulate
the assembly election just as he
is accused of doing in the ballot-
ing for president-and that, in
any c a s e , the constitution
grants little real power to the
assembly.
For Thanh, however, almost
any alternative seems prefera-
ble to the rule of Sihanouk, his
most bitter foe since World
War II. The rivalry between
Thanh and Sihanouk dates to
the Japanese decision to ele-
vate,Thanh to national leader-
ship during the war while Si-
hanouk remained only a fig-
urehead'with little power.
French Dump Thanh
The French colonialists, re-
turning after the war, prompt-
ly dumped Thanh, who then
alternately fought and recon-
ciled with Sihanouk. Finally,
in the 1950s, Thanh organized
a guerrilla force that fought
against Sihanouk until fleeing
to Thailand and South Viet
Nam.
It was from Viet Nam, thru-
out the decade before Siha-
nouk's downfall, that Thanh
"We had our troops along
the , border before Sihanouk
was overthrown," said '? nanh.
,,He knew he would fall. I had
had contact in advance withi
Lon Nol and Lon Nol's young-
er brother, Col. Lon Non."
Almost immediately after Si-
hanouk's ouster, Thanh's
forces crossed the frontier into
Cambodia and began fighting
the Vietnamese Ccrninunists:
The speed-with which Thanh's
troops entered the war in
Camdodia has nonvinccd some
observers that the CIA may
have known in advance that
Sihanouk. would fall-and may
the leaders.
We have had some good offi-
cers, but they were not used
to war and lacked the train-
ing.))
As an
out the
Sosthene
example he pointed
case . of Maj. Gen.
Fernandez, a one-
time crony of Sihanouk's and
now the commander of a large
region south of Phnom Perh.
"Fern, dez, of course, was
t r a i n e d, in France," said
Thanh. "H1 6 has never fought
in the jungle or the mountains.
He had bad training."
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co, 7
` 'i
STATINTL
~, - 239,919
6-11 q
rph `t TIiE SPOIF people who gave the
(1 'ld the Gatlitlg bun, the A-bomb and plastic bombs oI'
ask a few
id City to
i
-
f Ra
l
,
p
nl
e o
tempt the peop
shrapnel we now have, once again, a new,
proved way of making war. more' questions about that cloud-seeding ex
The U.S. Air Force and the CIA can now periment that was conducted in the Black
make it rain on your parade, whether that hills on the day their city was flooded and
parade is a military convoy on the Ito Chi scores of their friends and relatives were
Minh. Trail or a political demonstration in killed.
Saigon (or Louisville?). The anonymous official's question also
We understand the Nixon administratiion's prompts a second question: Is the destruction
unwillingness to brag about the cloud-s?.ecung wrought by our bombing in Indochina as in
operations that the Unit.eck tates -ilas''been discriminate as that wrought by the forces
conducting,in;Indachitla. Any. bragging?low-=- of`'nature? If it is, then we've been lied to
or, even any -,admission that such operations again about the pinpoint accuracy of our at-
have, indeed, taken place-would make it ap tacks on war supporting industries 'and sup-
per that Defense Secretary Laird lied to the plies in North Vietnam, in which our "smart".
Senate Foreign Reiations Committee last bombs always seem to demolish' our targets
month when'.he was asked about Air Force but leave the civiliEins unharmed. If it isn't,
rainmaking activities. The Secretary said, then the rain could be far worse than the
"We have not engaged in any over North Viet: bombing especially during the two monsoon
gam." seasons when, as an official explained, the
Now at least a dozen present and former ' cloud-seeding amounts to "just trying to add
military and civilian officials tell The New on to something that you already got." One
York.. Times that our pl~ines have seeded thing the'Indoehinese peoples have got during
clouds over North Vietnam at least as late as those seasons is the strong danger that they'll
Cambodia and South be wiped out. by floods. And it's a safe bet that
1971-and over Laos
,
Vietnam as well. the soldiers in that American Special Forces
In addition to damaging Secretary Laird's camp that received seven inches of rain in
impeccable credibility, premature admissions two hours, courtesy of a CIA blunder, didn't
to rainnmal'irig might also lose Mr. Nixon the - laugh.
votes of those environmentalists, if any, who in addition to sizable quantities, the Ameri-
still take him seriously when he puts on his calls, never content to let nature go unirn-
mokey the-Bear hat and proclaims himself proved-upon, can now deliver two kinds of
hard to beat at admiring and protecting rain---either the plain, old-fashioned variety
Mother Nature. or a now, improved rain with an extra secret
For it appears that Mr. Nixon, who rarely ingredient. This new rain, according to' one
hesitates to rush in where angels and Demo- source, has "a'1 acidic quality to it and it
crats fear to tread, has outraincd-as well as would foul up mechanical equipment-like
outbonibed--the previous administration. radars, trucks and tanks."
State Department protests that our tinkering We're left to wonder whether it damages
with Indochina's rainfall was taking environ- other mechanisms, such as humans and trees.
mental risks of unknown proportions appar- But even if it doeen't, we hope the White
ently. persuaded former Defense Secretary . House reserves the fancy rain for, export only.
dcNa?rlarw to call off' cloud'Iseediny'. opera- If our government begins using rain to break
tions in 1967 up political demonstrations, as the CIA did
lint; it, the words of oni? pro-rainmaking in Selig; n when the Diem regime was totter-
official, "What's worse, dropping bombs or ing, we hope the protestors will be spared the
rain?',' additional indignity of having to hitch-hike
Added irlgre(1--ient possible
home.
Richard Jordan Gatling, the inventor of that
rimitive' machine gun that we see used with
p
if v; e overlook the fact that Mr. Nixon and such effectiveness against the l:idians in
as seems to be corn- Western movies from time to time, hoped that
1enerals (or
erha
s
p
p
,
1 n the generals without Mr. Nixon's con- by developing such a terrible weapon he
a fascinating
it
in
d op
y,.,_-,
g both,
'-' `-
s
p
f on. arms. If meteorological warfare fulfills its P0-
The residents of our drought-stricken tential, Mr. Gatling's dream might yet Co111e
4+,uth vest probably would. reply that bombs true. Our future disputes may be settled by
,arc worse than raid. However, the citizens a few wizards-Beads of state, maybe-at con-
of Rapid City, S.D., or our eastern seaboard trot panels, instructing Mother Nature where
1111ght n t a ttee. end tI e ti 1 y os t e ild- f1 s ' inds, earthquakes and
mouthsp~11L~1 ~R~xo O'M,t6 tl ~'0-0~ I R60040020001-8
There'll be .. need of arms then, and
"World War" will have. a new mealning.
hat's :worse,
 V
T7 :iTX VO LD
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ga In VIVO . V'.`, 0,
,
By LENORE WEISS
NEW YORK, July 4 - Returning from a three-clay meeting last week in Paris
with veterans of the Southeast Asia liberation forces, 15 delegates of the Vietnam
Veterans Against the War (VVAW), announced plans here to report their-finding.,;-
to their local areas.
This includes, said William
del Rosario, a national coordina-
tor of the ' VVAW, "'speaking
tours, articles, testimony to-Con-
gressmen and appearances on ra-
dio andTV."
The interview took 'place at
VVAW headquarters on West 2G
street.
They had to do their own pub- is last week, they had []let with
licity, 'the veterans said, because veterans of the South Vietn;cmese
their trip had been. ignored by National I.iber;ctinn front, the
the commercial press. Army of the` Uc nlnrratic iteputi-
The veterans brought back pho- lie of V ietn;uu. the I athet Lao
tos documenting the effects of and the (';inlhodian United Front
U.S. bombing raids on North to fine! ??;l voinnlon basis for
Vietnam. ending the war "
In their three-day talks in Par- The talks had been organized
by Frenc?ti pe;ice (;roues and rep-
resentatives of the 15.;ir Crimes
Coil) [III ssum, a citizens, group es-
tablished several years ago by
Bertrand Itussell. the late Brit-
ish philosopher.
..We achieved more in tlii ee
days than our f ovcrnment has
achieved in three years, said
John Boyc?huck, all active-duty
GI Who was due to return to
hit. Ilome Air Force Base in
Idaho. "We didn't have to de-
cide if we wanted round ash-
trays, square ashtrays or who
was going to sit where."
Precious minutes
Toby Hollander, of East St.
Louis, Ill., an Annapolis grad-
uate, said the PRG spokesman
in Paris, Ly Van Sau, expressed
the purpose of the meeting when
he said, "If our efforts cause
the war tb end one minute ear-
lier, this equals four tons of
bombs:,,
Veterans learned in Paris of
specifications by the U.S. mili-
tary for 40,000 new "tiger
cages," which are cells 8 by 10
feet on Con Son Island, for the
prisoners of the Saigon regime.
Laotian and Cambodian repre-
sentatives in Paris told the vet-
erans, said Paul Richard,
.Seattle, that the war, contrary
to U.S: State Department reports,
is not limited to Vietnam. They
cited the presence of U.S. ad-
visers and helicopters along
Routes 4 and 5, as well as a
training camp in Cambodia con-
ducted
by the CIA.
The Paris meeting, said Rich-
ards, demonstrated. the solidarity
of liberation forces in Southeast
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 R U'ARTS
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+~~..,rr..fx..~._~ 1a., a.~:aL::t;t..a:i....i.'s~ iia::+..~....:sus:~ar..~?~?-.i.;..~
[MOSCOW - PEKING)
OU MUST NOT GO, SAMD1CH SIIIANOUK. It's
Friday, the thirteenth." These words were
spoken to me, half in jest, by one of my aides
on the way to Orly Airport for the plane which
was to take me from Paris to Moscow. It was the morning
of March 13, 1970. Unlike many of my countrymen, I am
not superstitious, so I laughed, and flew off to meet the
Russian leaders. Five days later, while still in Moscow, I
was deposed as Cambodia's Head of State so it was an un-
lucky day after all.
]'resident Podgorny net my flight, but there were no
elaborate welcoming ceremonies, because mine was a po-
litical and not a state visit. After greeting nie he said there
was a plane waiting to take me straight home to Phnom
Pcn h.
"Take an overnight rest in Moscow, if you like," he
said, "but fly on to Phnom Penh in the morning. We have
confidence in you, Sihanouk. You are really the indispens-
able leader of your people. But you must go back and take
charge of Cambodia's affairs. See that they don't fall into
the hands of Lon Nol and Sirik Matak. You must ensure
that Cambodia doesn't drift into an American takeover,
prevent Lon No] and Sirik Matak from creating difficul-
ties for the South Vietnamese people who are waging a
heroic struggle for the liberation of their country." I re-
plied that I'd have to think things over very carefullyi
had been anti-Vietnamese demonstrations in Svay Rieng
Province-the reports reaching me showed that Lon Nol
was behind them. On March 11, a mob-ostensibly of
students and school children--attacked the cmbassy of the
Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of
South Vietnam (the NLF) and, a few hours later, that of
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Hanoi). My re-
ports showed it to be the work of the Army-specifically
Lon Nol. The nucleus of the attackers was, in both
cases, some fifty military men in civilian clothes, com-
nmanded by Lon Nol's younger brother, Colonel Lon Non.
This was a far cry from (lie "spontaneous demonstrations"
naively reported in the European press and on American
television. Signs had been prepared in English, a language
rarely used in public display in my country. Photographers
and TV crews had been alerted. Everything pointed to a
scenario drawn up well in advance.
As soon as I heard of the attacks on the embassies, I
sent a cablegram to my mother, the Queen, condemning
the violence as "acts of personalities attaching greater im-
portance to their personal and clan interests than to the
country's future and to the fate of the people." I warned
of the possibility of a rightist coup and said that I would
return for a confrontation with those responsible, but,
added that, if the people chose to follow them "along a
path that will turn Cambodia into a second Laos, they will
compel me to resign."
The answer to my message to the Queen came in the
There wA~ft le~PF4S't"' 049 We 2006)05)16: d1AQRDF*151104(66114000ft"W0 79U$ and outrageous attacks
 i3IILY ViOR D
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8JUN197Z
it,?
Lon Noll QC M ~fl e
ByTONI FOLEY
Puppet President Lon Not of-
Cambodia easily won his regime's
first presidential election Sunday,
with a comfortable but discreet 60
percent' of the vote. The actual
number of voters was nowhere
stated, only percentages were giv-
en,and this is not surprising.
Marshal Lon Nol's army cannot
go anywhere outside capital city
of Phnom Penh without being at-
tacked by the patriotic forces of
the Cambodian National United
Front.
NUF units are able to operate
within a few miles of the center
of Phnom Penh without any hin-
drance. A? conservative estimate
would place NUF control of the
country at around 80 percent. In
fact, while the votes were being
counted Monday, the NUF shelled
the Defense Ministry building in
downtown Phnom Penh, some.of
the shells landing only 50 yards
from Lon Nol's residence.
hard to see how Lon Not could
claim to have held elections at all.
Last Oct. 20, when he abolished his
own puppet National. Assembly
and announced he would rule by
decree, stating lie would no
longer "play the game of democ-
racy," he was being much more
time to form. But this inust have
disturbed his U.S. advisers, who
have an eye out for U.S. public
opinion, so in March, Lon Nol
simply declared himself the
President of Cambodia and an-
nounced there would be a presi-
dential election soon.
Interestingly enough, Lon Nol is
supposed to have gotten 60.76 per-
cent of the vote, a figure that was
"predicted" down to the last deci-
mal point by his regime's official
newspaper, Le Republicain.
Son Ngoc Thanh - who was ap-
pointed Premier by Lon Nol this
March- has a lurid past: lie was
born in South Vietnam, a member
of the Khmer Krom or ethnic
Under. 'these conditions it's , Cambodian minority of some two
o
million in the' Mekong Delta.
The Japanese appointed him their
puppet Premier of Cambodia in
World War II; after 1945, he was in
exile in Thailand until be was
picked up by the U.S. Central In-
telligence Agency and sent back to
South Vietnam.
The CIA had established what
it called the Khmer Serei ("Free
Cambodian") movement, made
up entirely of Khmer Kroln who
were carrying out armed raids
into Cambodia from South Viet-
nam. Son Ngoc Thanh was in-
stalled as the head of this "move-
ment."
In the past, LonNol was always
able to call in heavy U.S. air sup-
port plus invasions of his own
country by thousands of Saigon
puppet troops when things' got
really rough for him. Today,
things are different. The patriotic
offensive in South Vietnam made
the Saigon regime pull all its
troops out of Cambodia.
Lon Nol is thus left on his own.
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : C
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By William Worthy character, sections of the- W
rn "
Nut long after being restored to power in periodically invented."rifts e,ste press political independence to num erous
" between the two colonies during the 1950s and 1960s. One of
195& as the North African crisis in Algeria close friends.
deepened, French President Charles de Numerous assassination attempts, usual] the best-publicized examples, of course, was
y in Gaulle offered ?a so-called "choice" to traceable to outside intervention, dotted Both the former ect and in Congo (now is Zaire).
France's West African colonies: a place Nkrumah's years in power. In one instance, that r retrospect and angh est it is clear
up had
onot n the slightest intention
within the French Union (a euphemism for by unintentionally arriving a few 'minutes of giving Brussels
on
French neo-colonialism) or a total, abrupt late for a dedication ceremony, he avoided le up its control over that colony's
severance of all formal ties with the g by priceless resources. The quick, greased
rybetnkilled b a time-bomb planted in a downfall of Congo Premier Patrice
"mother" country. bouquet of flowers that had been'given to a Lumumba had been plotted long before the
After long and varying periods of plunder small child to present to hon. Knowing how" formal lowering of tie Belgian flag in June
by French imperialism, all but one colony eagerly the West sought his ouster because 1960 at so-called independence ceremonies.
decided they couldn't make a clean break of his strong anti-colonialism, Nkrumah was
with their dependent status. It was obvious naive to absent himself front home and Former UN diplomat Conor Cruse O'Brien
that de Gaulle had manipulated and counted thereby to make a coup that much easier and others have thoroughly documented the
on just that reaction. Some 14 years later, tostage. From reports at the time, British Secretary Gene BGene-Bral ritDag g Ha duplicity. ld
Dmmd
most of the countries that followed his script intelligence seemed to have played the l owed th
have
et t
i
ld
e usen
i
y
o ga
wor
n true national libeti major outside role ih /Z
organizatio t bd i
,raon.n te coup, with the CIAnoe usen
the
other.option was Guinea. To the surprise Those two closely meshed a
autumn of 1960, when events were closing in
encie
m
g
s
ay
. and fury of Paris, President Sekou Toure led well have instigated the naive and futile on the . trusting Lumumba--events that
his financially bankrupt people out of the Vietnam "peace mission" . that .Nkrumah culminated in his foul and brutal murder in
French embrace. For the colonial allowed the British prime minister and other president February of Ghana, wamwrotee to Nkrumah, as
metropolis. his decisipn was as intolerable Commonwealth leaders to talk him into hint with the
(as 'a precedent for others) as was 'Fidel undertaking. As long ago as 1966, both classic warning: "The only colonialist or
Castio's opting out of the U.S. empire in Hanoi and the National Liberation Front'of imperialist that "I The
is a dead one."
Latin' America. South Vietnam had already made clear the Believing that the UN would play a neutral.
Every conceivable measure was devised to basic terms on which the war could be role, Lnmumha fro f~t'sru?t sh's dismnvl had
make an example of the uppity upstart from settled and there was no role for the London called in UN forces after a Belgian-instigatea
Guinea. All programs .of economic aid in dominated British Commonwealth to play in rebellion in his own army.
.every field were abruptly terminated, reaching such a settlement. Had Nkrumah not died of cancer while
Teachers, doctors, technidians and other under medical ,treatment in Bucharest,
experts were summoned home to France, Knowledge of, neo-colonialism might he ultimately have regained power?
leaving behind a trail of economic sabotage By no means should it be implied that No one an say for sure. But an official
and a colonized people with almost none of Kwame Nkrumah had no understanding of invitation to return home to Ghana after the
the educated cadres needed to keep a the devious workings of imperialism. That recent overthrow of the repressive pro-
society afloat. Toure acceded to "power," he knew much about his enemies is clear Western regime amounted to a vindication
only to find that his treasury had been from his 1965 book "Nhis monies s: ea of his efforts, if not of his complete ad-
o-C
- rifled by the. departing French Last Stage of Imperialism," which 'he preside live record, as father and first
ci%ilizers" and that the free and in- dedicated to "the freedom fighters of Africa, president of his country. After six years, the
dependent 'country was on the verge of ? living and dead." right wing generals of Ghana and the no
collapse and imminent starvation. While Nkrumah was in power, his country socio-political-economic program to r,?reet
? , was a home away from home for countless the many problems of a new nation. The
Solidnrity In practice African exiles and liberation fighters. In the policy Ghana to Into this dire gap stepped President early 1960s, our -own W.E.B. DuBois and his western oveopeeing and exploitation unlimhad
Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, with $20 million wife gave up their U.S. citizenship to move worsened on investment and Ita of d
to tide Guinea over the immediate crisis. For. to Accra and to become highly P honored ihe the ecoscon and the condition e.
a country itself only a year or so out of the citizens of Ghana. Nkrumah personally people. Discontent was massive.
sponsored DuBois' last p Y Corruption was everywhere. Universities
grip of classic British colonialsm, $20 great scholarly were closed because the students were in
million was a good sized loan that probably undertaking (at age 90): the projected 10- active rebellion.
put a strain on Ghana's own treasury. near editorship of an encyclopedia of Africa. As with Indonesia after Sukarno's
But it saved the day for Sekou Toure, who (Shortly after the 1966 coup, DuBois widow, in 1965 by his army and the CIA, ~/
remained
remained eternally grateful. Not sir- , Shirley Graham, left Ghana.) as with Cambodia after the military-CIA
it was he who invited Nkrumah to As Nkrumah surveyed the neo-colonial coup in 1970 that deposed Prince Sihanouk,
come to live in exile in Guinea after the, pro- mess that much of Africa has become, he as with all the former colonies that enjoyed a
Western
Western 1966 army coup in Ghana deposed must have died with a broken heart. The brief respite of self-respect before being re-
Toure bestowed on him the honorary West has skillfully re-established its de facto
coloniz d Ghana lost a leader respected
title of "co-pre erdRseiriz`~~~'j9?`~(Af~?1~8AYOrbRfl6(t1~0}eA Africa, whatever his short
enya, a ter !raving granted nominal comings, as a true patriot. He failed to build
continue
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1
V" 77 WT
ovadau U00 0(2006va
CAMBODIA
"g,m has Piven the lie to P
'statement in- 1970 that Sihanouk's ouster
"surprised no nation more than the U.S."
According to Intercontinental Press, the
recently named prime minster Son Ngoc
1hanh revealed to Oxford University scholar
v T.D. Allman in a series of interviews that CIA
agents promised to do "everything possible"
to aid anti-Sihanouk forces in a coup. Allman,
who was in Asia last year on assignment for
the Manchester Guardian, said Thanh told him
the U.S. paid "millions of dollars" to train and
equip his own private forces, the "Khmer
Serei" ("Free" Cambodia) forces, which were
recruited from Cambodian mercenaries living
in South Vietnam. Shortly after the coup by
Lon Nol, the Intercontinental Press report
states, Thanh's group was air-lifted to Phnom
Penh where it played a key role in holding the
capital.... The Phnom Penh army is becoming
more unpdpular among youth in Cambodia.
According to a Feb. 2 AFP report: "The
Cambodian military authorities are having a
lot of trouble in recruitment, many youths
having crossed over to Thailand to dodge
service in the Phnom Penh army".... "News
from Cambodia," a feature in the Vietnam
Courier, published In Hanoi, reported in March
that Thai mercenary troops have pillaged
homes, shrines and temples in Cambodia-all
on the pretext of pursuing, "Co'mmunist
rebels". . "News from Cambodia" also
reported that the deputy manager of the
Sihanoukville branch of the National Bank
/crossed over to the liberated zone of the
country Feb. 13.
A celebration was held in Paris April 22 to
mark the second anniversary of the summit
conference of the Indochinese peoples. The
first meeting was held in the spring of 1970,
shortly after Norodom Sihanouk was over-
thrown from his position as head of Cambodia
by a CIA sponsored coup. The Paris meeting
last month, organized by the Paris Committee
of the National United Front of Cambodia; the
Union of Lao Students in France; and the
Union of Vietnamese in France, was attended
by over 4000 people. The meeting
unanimously adopted a resolution that ac-
claimed the victories of the Indochinese
peoples and condemned the U.S. war
escalation, especially the bombing of Hanoi
and Haiphong. A banner across the meeting
hall read: "Long live the fraternal 'militant
solidarity of the Cambodian, Lao and Viet-
namese peoples!'.'
The Women's International League for
Peace and Freedom (WILPF) is continuing its
efforts to get the Saigon regime to release
Mme. Ngo Ba Thanh from jail, where she has
been held for the last six months due to her
antiwar activities- When she collapsed on a
stretcher in a courtroom March 22, due to an
asthma attack, Thanh issued a statement
saying: "We don't want the Americans to
come here. I, want all the Americans to go
home and hand back our sovereignty and we
want to talk with the. other people from the
other side, about our business, among the
Vietnamese".. ..A letter from a Saigon puppet
soldier, written as he was retreating from the
demilitarized zone last month, was printed in
the Washington Post April 6. The letter said in
part: "We did not want to fight the Reds. What
for? They have never harmed us... we should
kill Instead the corrupted leaders in Saigon
and their dirty Saigon-American friends
(President Nixon's) withdrawal is in.
terminable. hence we have no independence.
His Vietnamization shall never work because
he is fighting not only the Communists but
also the whole Vietnamese population"... .
The Gaiphong Press Agency of the
revolutionary forces reported from Hue April
18 that puppet general Hoang Xuan Lam,
former commander of the I corps area, built an
"execution pole" in the center of the city of
Hue in order "to intimidate the people." Lam
also ordered his agents. the report said, to
murder those who propagandized in favor of
the. liberation forces. -o-
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NEW O1 LMNS, LA.
STATES ITEM
E - 134,707
'MAY 41972
ntiwar De
?. About 100 anti-war demon-
strator~ marched from Beaur-
egard Square to Lafayette
Square today where they
gathered under an oak tree
and listened to speeches con-
demning President Nixon's re-
cent "re-escalation" of the air
war in Vietnam.
The procession bristled with
signs that said things like
. "Smash . Imperialism, Not
Women and Children," or
"WhoProfits From This
War?"
The marchers chanted slo-
gans such as ."Stop the War
Now," and."Prices up, W'Vages
/Down, Why war?"
/ Willie Gunther, a Vietnam
veteran, led the list of speak-
ers recounting that when he
onstrators
worker as cryptographer in
'Vietnam he discovered son
"truths" about the war "that
the people of the United
States are not being told about
the war."
He said the government "is
telling a lie," when it says
North Vietnam is invading
South Vietnam. He said the
North Vietnamese troops com-
ing south are merely advisers
and support troops to the Viet
Cong.
Gunther said the President's
attempt to suppress the Pen-
tagon Papers indicates that.
Nixon does not want ?the
American people to know the
truth. "Because if the Ameri-
can people knew the truth,
Nixon would have the same
problem with them' as with
his own troops."
He. said that since he. ar-
rived in Vietnam hard drug
use has escalated and that the
Ce trral le lligep~eAZency,
working with poppy growers
in Cambodia who are friendly
to the U.S., is running "junk"
in Vietnam.
He said studies by the
Army have shown that troops
on hard dope don't resist the
army and that one general
has recommended that hard
drugs be allowed into dorr,?s-
tic and foreign posts to keep
Gi's from protesting the war.
State Rep.-elect Johnny
Jackson told the group the
continuing Vietnam war is
symptomatic of the U.S. con-
arch
tinuing to hold the wrong
priorities, particularly in re-,
gards to the black and poo_^
c mmunities. . ml
Steve Cohen, who said he is
with a group called "Air
War," spoke of the anti-per-
sonnel ,bombs he said are
being used in Vietnam. . -
He said the U.S. has used a
progression of more and more.
destructive anti-personnel
bombs. He said that recently
the Flechettes, which are tiny
nails with fins on the back;
which could be dispersed from
a bomb, strike humans and
cause gaping wounds, have
been replaced by plastic pel-
lets which Cohen said are
"even more nefarious."
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TARENTUM, PA.
VALLEY NEWS-DISPATCH
39.APg2201972'
? ,#r opinions
last to learn what the Central
The CIA
AMERICANS seem to be the
Intelligence Agency is up to, and
J now they are learning about the
CIA's role in Cambodia from a,
'CMMMM 'trwho had a part in it.
Prime Minister Thanh told a
British inter.viewer, before
attaining his present post, that the
United States paid millions after
1965 to train his own rebel troops.
He said CIA agents assigned to him
assured him of help if existing
government of Prince Norodom
Sihanouk were overthrown and the
rebels came under left-wing attack.
The government was
overthrown in 1970 and that led to a
leftist counter-attack joined by
Sihanouk and that in turn led to a
massive American-South
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.
So the Southeast Asia war engulfed
meddles
Cambodia, as it had Laos, where
the' CIA also was involved with its
private army. The results of all this
meddling have been to spread a war
without gaining a vestige of victory.
If the meddling alone were not bad
enough, the disasters following it
made it worse.
So far the CIA seems to have
done better in its strictly
intelligence operations than in its.
paramilitary and covert actions,
but not even Congress knows fore
sure. Congress might be expected
to approve a standing proposal to
require that the CIA report to it as
well as to the Executive branch.
Instead, Congress is voting what
amounts to a blank check, and
getting reports on Central
Intelligence Agency activity
through the prime minister of
Cambodia.
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 25X1A
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 BGSTONApp d For Release 2000/08/1? CIA-RDP8O-01601R000400
HERALD TRAVELER
M - 194,557
S - 260,961
APR 1 0.1.9r
Calls Nixon Policy `Fraud
Vieimn a '
By MARY TIERNEY
U.S. Rep. Michael J. Har-
rington, D-Beverly, yesterday
attacked President Nixon's
policy of Vietnamization as a
"fraud." He made the re-
marks following a visit to
South Vietnam last week,.
As a member of the House
Armed Services Committee,
the North Shore congressman
has been working for the past
month to force' the adminis-
tration to increase the flow of
public information about U.S.
military activities in South-
east Asia.
Yesterday, at a Parker
House press conference, Rep.
Harrington said that "Viet-
namization has been sold to
the American people as a way
of withdrawing our presence
from the Indochinese war.
"In fact," he continued,
"that policy, as it is now be-
ing pursued, requires a con-
tinued, massive American
military presence in Southeast
Asia for many years to come.
"It commits us to continue
to spend billions of taxpayers'
dollars for the support of the
armies of Laos. Cambodia
and South Vietnam.
"IT COMMITS US to spend
many billions to pay for an
air war as extensive as any
this country has ever engaged
in - even at the, height of.
World War II.. .
"It commits us to continued
direct involvement by the,
Central Intelligence Agency in
the groundTigliting in Laos
and Cambodia and to continue
to devastate four countries in
a war which has long since
lost any conceivable justifica-
tion - militarily, politically or
morally."
I
{ ?2
S
weapons will be deeply en-'
gaged in that war," he said.
Rep. Harrington. said that,
American involvement is
greater than the American
people have been told and that ;
it is time "to raise American
consciousness to the magni-
tude of our involvement."
He said he was "particular-
ly disturbed" about the
secrecy that surrounds the
military operation in Thailand
where the U.S. is "spending $5
million a day to maintain
25,000 Air Force men at five
large air bases in a country.
club atmosphere."
He said he would do every-
thing in his power to see that
all censorship of news from
.Thailand would be lifted so
that the American people
would know where their
money was going.
"When the full facts are
known there will be public
annoyance, anger and frustra-
tion in the inability to extri-
cate," he said. .
Rep. Harrington said that'
since the U.S. has broken off
peace talks, the South Vietna-
mese Army has been unable
to hold its ground without full-
scale American military sup-
port.
"Current American policy
requires us to maintain our
involvement in the Indo-
chinese War for the forseeable
future.
And, as long as we remain
committed to the maintenance
of a pro-American regime in
Saigon and as long as the pro-
American forces are unable to
sustain themselves in power,
American men, money and
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 More ttA. 1VIe ULU
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STATINTL
I
ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST-DISPATCH,
E - 326,376
S - 541,868 -
APR 7 1972
Americans seem to be the last to learn what bodia. So the Southeast'Asia war engulfed Cam-
the Central Intelligence Agency is up to, and
now they' are learning about the CIA's role in
Cambodia from a CarnLodian who had a part
in it.
Prime Minister Son Ngoc Thanh told a British
interviewer, before attaining his present post,
that the United States paid millions of dollars
after 1965 to train his own rebel troops. Ile said
CIA agents assigned to him ("they have three
names a month," he added) assured him of help
if the existing government of Prince Norodom
Sihanouk were overthrown and the rebels came
under loft-Nving attack..
The government was overthrown, in-1970, and
that led to a leftist counter-attack joined by
Sihanouk, and that in turn led to a massive
American-South Vietnamese invasion of Cam-
bodia, as it had Laos, where the CIA also was
involved with its private army. The results of
all this m addling have been to spread a war
without gaining a vestige of victory. El the med-
dling alone were not bad enough, the disasters
following it made it worse.
So far the CIA seems to have done better in
its strictly intelligence operations than in its
paramilitary and covert actions, but not even
Congress knows for sure. Congress night be ex-
pected to approve a standing proposal to require
that the CIA report to it as well as to the
Executive branch.
Instead, Congress is voting what amounts to
a blank check, and getting reports on Central
Intelligence Agency activity through the prime
minister of Cambodia.
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 ST..LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
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More CIA Meddling
Americans se^m to be the last to learn what
the Central Intelligence Agency is up to, and
now they are learning about the CIA's role in
/ Cambodia from a Cambodian who had a part
in it.
Prime Minister Son NgocThanh told a British
Interviewer, before attaining his present post,
that the United States paid millions of dollars
after 1965 to train his own rebel troops. He said
,CIA agents assigned to him ("they have three
names a month," he added) assured him of help
if the existing government of Prince Norodom
Sihanouk were overthrown and the rebels came
under left-wing attack.
The government was overthrown, in 1970, and
that led to a leftist counter-attack joined by
Sihanouk; and that in turn led to a massive
American-South Vietnamese invasion of Cam-
STATI NTL
bodia. So the Southeast Asia war engulfed Cam-
bodia, as it had Laos, where the CIA also was!
involved with its private army. The results of
all this meddling have been to spread a war
.without gaining a vestige of victory. If the med
dling alone-were not bad enough, the disasters
following it made it worse.
So far the CIA seems to have done better in
its strictly intelligence operations than in its
paramilitary and covert actions, but not even
Congress knows for sure. Congress might be ex-
pected to approve a standing proposal to require
that the CIA report to it as well as -to the.
Executive branch.
Instead, Congress is voting what amounts to
a blank check, and getting reports -on Central
Intelligence Agency activity through the prime
minister of Cambodia.
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 Approved For Release 2000/08V
ole B a-red
Dispatch News Service,
.the source of the following
article,. was the first news
agency to disclose details of
the killings at My Lai; South
Vietnam.
By RICHARD A. FINEBERG
Copyright 1979 Dispatch News
Service Interuatioval
WASHINGTON.-The Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA)
played a crucial role in en-
couraging the coup that top-
pled Prince Norodom Sihan-.
ouk and plunged Cambodia
into the Indochina war, ac-
cording to Cambodia's re-
ently named prime. minister,
Son Ngoc Thanh.
vv Describing Sihanouk's over-
throw in a series of interviews
last year with Oxford Univer-
. sit}?- scholar T. D. Allman,
Thanh said that CIA agents
promised they would do "ev=
.erything possible" to help if
the Cambodian plotters suc-
,cessfully mounted a coup and
.then-found themselves under
attack by pro-Sihanouk and
Communist forces.
Shortly after the March 1970
coup, Thanh's own forces,
trained by U. S. Special
Forces in Vietnam, were dis-
patched by plane to Phnom
Penh, where they played a
vital role in defending the
Cambodian capital for Gen.
Lon Nol.
THE WHITE HOUSE main-
tains that ? the U. S. had no
prior knowledge of the coup
and that "no American mili-
tary or civilian officers" were
ever involved officially or un-
officially with the plotters. Si-'
hanouk's ouster "surprised no
nation more than the United
States," President Nixon said
after the coup.
Sen. Mike Gravel (D.,
Alaska) said on Tuesday that
White House denials of U. S.
involvement in the 1970 coup
are "incredible" and he called
for full disclosure of the U. S.
T1 -
(0040
Q ho"n3s1k, Ous-t';e/
on assignment for the (Man- Nol coup. The CIA, he saia,
ssible would
Chester) Guardian, that in promised that the poU
" to
do "everything p
1969 a U.S. agent assigned to help.
Thanh's staff gave assurances The 63-year-old Thanh was
that the U.S. would support a named prime minister by the
two pronged invasion of Cam- ailing Lon Nol on March 21. A
bodia by Thanh's partisans. devout Buddhist and an early
Cambodian nationalist leader,
TIIE PLEDGE, Thanh said, Thanh was prime minister for
`came from a CIA operative f a brief period in 1.995 when he
identified only as Fred. "They staged a coup prior to the
have three names a month," Japanese surrender. Ile was
kl arrested by British oc-
c
PRINCE SIHANOUK
.. toppled by CIA
role in Cambodia prior to
said Thanh referring to his
American collaborators. "We
never knew their real
the names."
s
id
, wa
coup. The plan, Thanh sa
,,it is incredible to take the ,to penetrate the country"
position-as the White House from the South Vietnam and
has done-that the U. S. con- Thai borders. "Our hope was
ducted continuous clandestine that the Cambodian army
incursions into Cambodia, would rally to us. We would
hired and trained members of. negotiate with Sihanouk, to
a sect avowedly dedicated to avoid bloodshed. He could ei-
Sihanouk's overthrow, and ther leave the country or
still did not know that a coup agree to become a constitu-
was being planned, Gravel tional monarch."
said. Lar ge-scale Khmer Serci
ALTHOUGH TIIE Sihanouk -defections to the Cambodian
regime was
faltering, Gravel . government were reported in
said, "It i; doubtful that the
prince could have been bver-
thrown without clandestine
U. S. support for the coup."
According to Son Ngoc
Thanh, CIA agents assigned to
Thanh's staff were kept aware
of developments concerning
the coup including secret
meetings b' t:veen Thanh and
aides of Gen. Lon Nol.
At that time, Lon Nol was
Sihanouk's prime minister,
while Thanh, who had been
sentenced to death by Sihan-
ouk,. headed a rebel sect
known as the Khmer Screi
("Free Cambodia") from a
jungle post near the Viet-
narn- Cambodia border.
According to Thanh, begin-
ning in 1965 the U. S. paid
"millions of dollars" to train,
arm and support his forces,
most of whom were recruited
from the Cambodian minority
living in South Vietnam's
Delta region. -
Thanh told Allman, who was
1969 and may have been part
of Thanh's invasion plan to
overthrow Sihanouk. Accord-
ing to reliable sources, the re-
patriated Khmer Serei units
were serving in the royal
army under Lon Not and
spearheaded political demon-
o
and the war that had
strations in Phnom Penh just bodia
,
before the coup. raged on its borders for two
Thanh's invasion plan was decades finally engulfed Cam-
shelved - overtaken by SIf~t INTL
events," as Thanh put it -
early in 1970 when Lon Nol's.
aides sought Thanh's support
in the event of- a coup.
THANII TOLD Allman that
Lon Nol's officers asked him
"If the Vietcong attack Phnom
Penh the way they attacked
Saigon in 1968, could Lon Nol
expect the help of Son Ngoc
Thanh's forces in defending
the capital?"
After checking with his
"American friends," Thanh
committed his U.S.-trained
and financed forces to the Lon
y <
q>,i
cupyi:no forces, however, and
exiled` to France.
Tha-)li ; returned to 'Cam-
bodial,in 1951 and joined the
milit'.,,t Issarek (Independ-
ence; movement. At that time
he allied with the Communist
Vietminh to oppose Sihanouk.
whose strategy of cooperation
with the French to achieve in-
-dependence was too "lode. -
for the militant nationalist.
From that time until the
March 1970 coup, Thanh en-
gaged in anti-Sihanouk guer-
illa efforts from rural Cam-
bodia, Thailand and Vietnam.
In July 1970, Thanh re-
turned to Phnom Penh to be-
come an advesir to Lon Nol.
By that time, Cambodian left-
ists had become allied wittt
Sihanouk and Vietnam Com-
munist forces to fiiht -Lon
Nol, the combined U. S.-Saigon
rces had swept into Cam-
f
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Nixon's Peace Offer
HE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE at stake political structures in which the indig-
in the Indochina war has always enous resistance is rooted, what is
been a relatively simple one; is called "nation-building" by some of the
d
i
bl
h
tes spawne
e
ypocr
the United States (or the French be- more contempti
fore it) to have a predominant voice in the course of this endeavor, for ex-
in determining the political and social ample, Robert Komer, chief President
structure of Indochina, or will this tial advisor on "pacification" in the
question be settled by the Indochinese . Johnson Administration. Five years
peoples themselves, relatively free from ago, he held out the hope that "ero-
outside intervention? It has been fairly sion of southern VC strength" may be
clear from the outset that, if external feasible because, though none of the
force were withdrawn, Vietnam would American programs are very efficient,
ultimately be unified under commun- "we are grinding the enemy down by
ist leadership, since the Viet Minh and sheer weight and mass" (Pentagon
its successors had "captured" the na- Papers, Beacon, volume IV). After the
tionalist movement, as U.S. govern- Tet offensive of 1968, it became clear
the that the American public- would not
' Laos
it
I
,
.
n
ment analysts express
Pathet Lao have been unmatched in
their ability to construct a popular na-
tionalist political movement, in this
case, too, with revolutionary social con-
tent. U.S. intervention from the late
1950s has drawn North Vietnam in-
creasingly into Laotian affairs, much
as in South Vietnam and more recently
Cambodia, where the March 1970
coup, very likely with a CIA hand, and
the US-ARVN invasion that followed,
shattered a fragile though conceivably
stable neutralism and increased the
probability that Cambodia too will be
brought ultimately into a communist-
led federation of. some sort if outside
force is withdrawn.
For reasons that need not detain us
here, the United States has never been
willing to tolerate the "loss" of Indo-
china, and remains unwilling today.
The conditions of U.S. intervention
have changed over the years, but not
the essential goals. Furthermore, the
basic problem facing the Western in-
vaders has also changed little during
the past quarter century. Several years
ago, an American military spokesman
formulated the problem clearly: the
U.S. has enormous military force but
littl.: political power and must defeat
an adversary with enormous political
power but only modest military force.
To this problem the U.S. must find the
"proper response"-in Vietnam and
elsewhere in the third world as well.
(Jean Lacouture, Vietnam: Between
Two Truces, 1966).
This problem dictates American
strategy. The basic strategy has been,
necessarily,?to demolish the social and
Approved For Release
long tolerate the costs of a continuing
military occupation in South Vietnam,
coupled with a costly air war against
the North. Consequently, the direct
U.S. troop commitment was leveled off
and then gradually lowered through
"Vietnamization"-a policy suggested
by Pentagon systems analysts in 1967
-while a sharply expanded techno-
logical war reached its peak in the early
months of the Nixon Administration.
Nixon and Kissinger are gambling
that the massive destruction and forced
population concentration in the South,
with its devastating impact on the rural
society, may create conditions under
which the U.S.-imposed regime can
survive. To use Robert Komer's terms,
"thanks to massive U.S. military in-
tervention at horrendous cost," a "fa-
vorable military environment" has been
created "in which the largely political
competition for control and support of
the key rural population could begin
again" in this "revolutionary, largely
political conflict" (!. of International
A(jairs, 1971, no. 1). He fails to add
that control of the "key rural popu-
lation" may be facilitated by the fact
that at least half the population, 85
percent rural in 1960, now lives in
urban ghettoes (J-C Pomonti, Foreign
Affairs, Jan. 1972), part of the "hor-
rendous cost" of "massive U.S. mil-
itary intervention." Much the same is
military and police apparatus, an'd
gradually absorbed within the U.S.-
Japan Pacific system. The vast areas
ceded to ' the resistance will be sub-
jected to intensive bombardment which
will continue to make an organized so-
cial life virtually impossible. Parts of
Laos may be effectively incorporated
within Thailand, as George Ball sug-
gested years ago. It may be that the
willingness of the Administration to
concede the presence of Thai mer- STATINTL
cenaries in Laos (in conflict with ex-
plicit legislation designed to prevent
this) reflects the need to prepare the
public for this outcome.
As the very knowledgeable Austra-
lian analyst Peter King observes; such
"successes" as have been achieved in
this program are "no mystery": "It re-
quires more than ordinary courage for
civilians to maintain their political al-
legiances openly in the face of a semi-
genocidal counter-insurgent strategy"
(Pacific Affairs, Fall 1971), the pre-
requisite for Komer-style "nation-
building." It is this counter-insurgent
strategy and its results that lead Gen-
eral Westmoreland to believe: "I think
particularly significant is that the en-
emy does not have the strong infra-
structure and the guerrilla forces in
large numbers, well equipped and high-
ly motivated, that he had in 1963"
(Peter Osnos, Washington Post-Bos-
ton Globe, Feb. 1, 1972). However, as
King and many others recognize, "the
durability of that success may be
doubted."
Given the insistence of the U.S. pub-
lic on scaling down the direct Amer-
ican involvement, it has been obvious
for several years that it would become
necessary for the U.S. to engage in
some sort of political manipulations
within the areas'of South Vietnam that
remain tinder U.S. control, or to "get
ready for political competition in South
Vietnam," as Harvard Professor Sam-
uel Huntington put it in a paper be-
fore the May 1969 meeting of the
Council on Vietnamese Studies of SEA-
This collection of scholars, who
DAG
.
true in Laos and Cambodia. Nixon and claim to be concerned with support
Kissinger appear to be moving towards -for research on Vietnam, struggled
an effective partition of Indochina: the manfully with the problem of how tc
heavily settled areas of Laos, South ensure control at the national level for
Vietnam and Cambodia will, it is "our side," given that the NLF re-
hoped, be separated from the resist- mains "the most powerful purely po-
2on/J146 b7ClI44q1Dpt&9."1d10W 1209Qtt organization," "the
struction, controlled by an elaborate
ocnx t`5nucd
 Approved For Release 2000/08%'16;AA F d&- l601R00040020
SHT0,V'0'rt for
on' T611
washington Post Foreign Service the capital, have of in PHNOM PE'VH 1% IF themselves made "++.,, hanouk was toppled. Ile has one current theory is that
, arch become a focus of their dis- he plans slowly to gather
30-Th.e broad popular sup- dramatically worse, enchantment.
port for the Lon Not govern- But the disorder and fear en power to himself and chal-
Contributions to the un- lenge Lon Not.
deepened the disillusio
ment that made it
s
ibl
po
s
e
n-
to marshal the will of pas- ment that first became evi- easiness is the fact that the
sive Cambodians to resist a dent after a series of battle- government, as it now
fierce and disciplined 'en. stands, has legal basis. Lon
field reverses in November Not is a self-declared presi-
emy is now, perhaps irrc- and December. Then it was dent: a dictator, in effect.
tr
ievably, a thing of the the army that was discred- Not that the nicities matter
nnct
It is not only that Phnom
Penh's university and high
school.' students have been
on strike for three weeks or
that a political split has de-
veloped a m o n g senior
Buddhist monks. It is that,
the malaise seems to have
ited; this time it is the poli- a great deal here, but too
ticians. much symbolic importance
Making the rounds of dip- has been given to the trap-
lomats and various Cambo- pings of the Republic for
dians one hears as never be. them not to be missed.
fore that the government is Apparently sensing that,
unpopular. Lon Not has appointed a
"It is staggering and
ood ' caprobhi- committee headed by the
abl
no damn
a
y
g
,
spread everywhere. minister told an rector of Phnom Penh Uni-
Ameri-
What Is vocal discontent net
t
t
h
when expressed by student
leaders is. merely apathy
(coming from simple farmers
and soldiers, but it amounts
to degrees of the same
thing: an unhappy recogni.
tion that this regime is in
most respects no different
from the one it replaced two
years ago, only now there is
war.
Sophisticated Cambodians
from all walks of life, who a
year ago spoke hopefully
about progress being made
on the drafting of the new
republican constitution and
about the high-spirited brav-
ery of the Khmer army, now
see only corruption and mil-
itary weakness.
"The corruption is worse
than under Sihanouk," said
an English-speaking Cambo-
dian,. cheerful by nature,
who fled the countryside in
June 1970, three months
after the prince was over-
thrown. "Then the officials
had motorbikes, now the
army officers have cars and
.villas"
"The soldiers don't pay at-
tention," he went on. "They
,sit in their barracks and
,play cards. The Communists
must laugh."
The latest round of politi.
cal maneuvering by Lon
Nol-which produced gov-
ernment by decree and scut-
tled, at least temporarily,
'the almost-completed consti-
tution-plus. the worst rocket
attack ever made against
y
o
ave another go
can friend the other day, Veisi
but he agreed to rejoin the at the constitution he has re-
cabinet because he though it jected: (His chief objection
was his responsibility. was that it would give too
Lon Nol, an unpredicta- much authority to the legis-
ble, invalided mystic, retains lature and not enough to the
a special status, a kind of executive.)
benign father image diffi-
cult for outsiders to under-
stand. This puts him largely
above public criticism,
which falls heavily on those
around him, although he is
criticized privately.
The biggest loser has been
Sisowath Sirik itiatak, who
for months was the day-to-
day head of government, ad-
miret`i far above all others
by the U.S. embassy, but dis-
liked by many Cambodians,
especially the students.
He has been forced out al-
together, a major concession
by Lon Not who counted on
Alatak as his closest aide.
The U.S. Embassy hopes
that some way can be found
to bring Matak back, per-
haps as an unofficial ad-
viser.
For the moment that
looks unlikely. Banners still
hang on the walls of Phnom
Penh University's law school
proclaiming that "Sirik
Matak is the source of all
that is bad." - a CIA supported movement only drops of tears and
blood that can be promised
ainst Prince Sihanouk
i
st a
h
h
.
g
arges aga
n
e c
T
to
Matak, an aloof aristocrat, ' It is not at all clear why you."
are vague. To'the students, Thanh, who has supporters lobs'
however, he apparently rep- among the students and whose shhinining g patriotism
resents the old order that monks and some In the once so impressed and
they thought ended when Si- army, took the job, although touched foreign visitors,
were not stirred enough to
-dig, a single trench.
The commitce is to report
in two weeks or so. Then-
in a matter of months, Lon
Not has said-there will be
a referendum and election,
probably for a new National
Assembly. Whether it will
go as smoothly as that is
considered doubtful.
In a radio speech last
night, Lon Not drew a fine.
distinction between freedom.
in a democracy and anarchy.
"I ask you to understand the
difference," lie said, in ex-
plaining why he seized com-
plete power.
"Our constitution is soon
to be finished," he said.
"Afterward we will have a
referendum as we all wish
and we will have a good sys-
The rest of the govern-
ment consists of a half-
dozen holdovers from the
last cabinet, a new defense
minister who is apparently
well thought 'of, a few non-
political functionaries and
as minister of commerce--
said to be a particularly lu-
crative post-Lon Nol's per-
sonal physician.
The selection of the new
government has not ended
the student strike, which is
desultory in the late-;March
heat but completely effec-
tive. Nor has it stopped the
dispute between two of
Cambodia's most important
monks over the right to crit-
icize the government.
One of the monks, Khiew
Chum, has a long record of
opposing the monarchy.
Like the students, he speaks
out for some undefined prin-
ciples of freedom that were
supposedly embodied in the
coup against Sihanouk: The
monk has been warned by
his superior to desist or be
punished.
There is no evidence that
a significant number of the
students of Khiew Chum
and his followers are leftists
or that their outspoken op-
position could trigger large
demonstrations. But their
activities are symptomatic
of the sapping of the public
spirit.
Last weekend, the govern-
ment called on the people of
Phnom Penh to prepare for-
tem..'' future attacks by digging
In the -meantime, after 'a trenches and arming them
number of public figures
turned down the post, Lon
Not has retained as his prin-
and spears."
The message ended with a
cipal deputy, Son ' Ngoe paraphrase of what Winston
Thanh, a 64-year-old former J-Churchill told the British in
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HARTFORD, CONN.
TIMl,1R 2 9 't9
E & S - 135,812
Is Son Ngoc Thanh
our next albatross?,
Most Americans pay little at-
tention to changes of government in
small and volatile nations like Cam-
bodia. Political leaders come and go,
and it is difficult to remember their
names.
The name of Son Ngoc Thanh is
worth remembering.
He would appear to be, at the
moment, the real power in Cam-
bodia. He has been for more than
two generations a leader of the na-
tionalist movement in Cambodia.
But he has also been, for the last
twenty years or more, in nearly con-
stant opposition to the now-exiled
Prince Sihanouk, and his opposition
has in recent years been heavily
financed by the American Central
Intelligence A.
In a very real sense, the CIA's
man is now in power in Phnom Penh.
His arch-enemy - and still the most
popular, beloved, and nearly-deified
Cambodian, Norodom Sihanouk - is
in exile in Peking.
That Js hardly a recipe for
stability.
a politician nearly as popular at
times, as Sihanouk himself.
Son was exiled; recalled briefly;
exiled again. He has since the early
1950s organized several nationalist,
anti-Sihanouk guerrilla organiza-,
tions, backed variously by Saigon
and Bangkok (both historic an-
tagonists of Cambodia) and the CIA.
Ile comes to power in Phnom
Penh now by a curious route.
Lon Nol, the general who drove
Sihanouk into exile, this month
abrogated all semblance of
democratic process in Cambodia: He
cancelled the nearly-completed draf-
ting of a new constitution, declared
himself president, ousted the titular
"chief of state" and assumed that
role as well; and surrounded himself
by a "cabinet" of Army men loyal
to him, with only one token member
of the democratic opposition.
From a man who has suffered a
crippling stroke, who apparently can-
not walk without support, and who
has never in several previous stints
as head of government been con-
sidered anything but -a figurehead, it
was a remarkable show of decisiveness
- remarkable enough to make one
wonder who was behind it.
He then named Son Ngoc Thanh
-as premier and prime minister.
AMERICAN POLICY in Indochin ,,
has, on previous occasions, single
out nationalist leaders whom we coul
trust, and helped to install them in
power, Ngo Dinh Diem was only the
first of many such men in Vietnam.
It is, at best, a risky business.
Today's American-sponsored national
hero can be tomorrow's albatross.
SUPPORT FOR Son Ngoc Thanh
is not unreasonable. He began his
career as a crusading anti-colonial
editor (in Cambodia's first newspaper
in the Cambodian. language) in 1937.
He worked with the Japanese in the
latter stages of World War II to drive
the French out. His pressures pro-
bably made Sihanouk, then a very.
young (and French-sponsored) king,
hasten Cambodia's independence.
Sihanouk's hostility toward Son
can be seen as personal jealousy of
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 MW YOE C AIML.r
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Lon Nol Gets Full Control in Cambodia
By FOX BUTTERFIELD (raised in a tradition of rev-(continued their protests. against
lomats here agree, having re-!the West, said one former op-I
American officials here, who
position member of the nation-shad developed great respect for
moved the last legal opposition al assembly today. "We mavtGeneral Sirik Matak, say that
to him and, in,tle process, the not like what Lon Nol does?his loss to the Government will
last COMM " f '
c
d
b
PNOMPENH Cambodiaihas been little real protest over
March' 22-President Lon NollPresident Lon Nol's assumption
has emerged from Cambodia's l of power.
latest political crisis with vir. "We do not look at things
tuaIly unchallenged power, dip- lascategorically as you do in 11
e o
emo?_racy,
ut he is our leader and most
There had been some., :.aubt of the people believe in him."
in Pnompenh that he wc:::d be "Besides," he explained with
able to form an effective govla deep sigh, "Cambodia is at
ernment after he abruptly dis-,war and we cannot afford the
. But his official announcement Cabinet appear to have been!izs presence in the Cabinet is
last. night that he had formed part of . Cambodia's annual !regarded as token representa-
la 17-man Cabinet, including;frame 'Of 'musical chairs in tion for the opposition bloc thati
only one member known as an which members of the small had formed in the assembly be-
opponent, dispelled the linger- Political elite shuffle the. im- fore it was dismissed..
Ing hopes of some who thought portant Government posts Mr. Thanh, who was first
the President might be forced among themselves. made Premier by the Japanese
to back down. The new premier, Son during their occupation of Cam-
? The army, which is believed Ngoc Thanh, a longtime guer-Ibodia during World War II has
to be completely loyal to Pres- rilla leader in the fight to oustla reputation as an ardent na-
ident Lon Nol and the basic !Prince Sihanouk, represents altionalist and an eccentric. The
source, of his power, has two!sharp change from the fo.nner guerrilla forces he led, which:
important representatives in Premier, Lieut. Gen. Sisowathiwere reportedly financed by the
the new Government, the Min-(Sirik Matak. The latter, a mem- American.., Central Intelligence
ister of Defense, Maj. Gen. Sak!ber of the royal family and a Agency' fc,aht Prince ihan?
Suthsakhan, and the Minister close associate of President{ouk's army for manyvearSs dur-
+of Interior, Alai. Gen. Thapana Lon Nol, was widely regardedling the ninteen fifties and nine-
: Nginn. Two other members of!asaCambodia's most energetic!teen sixties, and many Cambo-
missed the constituent assem-(luxury of too much politics."
bly,- canceled the constitution_ Musical Chairs
1it was preparing and proclaimed
himself president 12 days. ago) Most of the changes in the
With the removal of the con-
stituent assembly, which had
been the national assembly un-
til Lon Nni fhon .-ti,i
tions that has made foreign
diplomats here fond of saving
Cambodia's politics sound like
a story from Alice in Wonder-
changed its role by decree last land, thousands of students at
October, only PnomDenh's stu-1pnompenh University and the
gents remain as a possible dis-
sident voice.
But In a country that has
known only monarchy and
French colonial rule, and in
which the people have been
demonstrating for two weeks
for the ouster of General Sirik
Alatak.
The students have accused
him of corruption and of being
undemocratic for denying them
freedom of speech. They have
even after he announced his
withdrawal from political life
last week and after President
Lon . Not failed to reappoint
1.:..- .
be a serious one.
One Opposition Minister
The only member of the new
Government who has been as.
sociated with the opposition is
the new Minister of Justice,
Yem Sambaur, a former presi-
las a result. ?
Despite Mr. Thanh's reputed
close relations with Americans
over the years, he is not be-
lieved to be as highly regardedi
as General Sirik Matak by the!
American Embassy. But the
students have said--they favor
Mr. Thanh's appointment.
Many longtime observers of
Cambodian politics say that
there will probably be another
political crisis within a few
months and that the Cabinet is
likely to change again.
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 NGTO
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felligenrP Agency.
Lon Rol Aide
Accepts Post
PHNOM PENH (UPI) -
Elder statesman Son Ngoc
Thanh, senior adviser to presi-
dent Lon Nol, said yesterday
that he had agreed to accept
the post of prime minister,
ending Cambodia's govern-
mental crisis.
Son Ngoc Thanh served as
prime minister during the Jap-
anese occupation . in World
War H. He is known to hve
kept in close contact with U.S.
officials in recent years, and
was repeatedly accused by
deposed chief of state Prince
Norodom Sihanouk of being an
agent for the U.S. Central In-
came as the regime was cele-
brating the second anniversa-
ry of the overthrow of Sihan-
ouk, who has set up a govern-
ment-in-exile in Peking.
Cambodia has been without
.a government for four days,
during which five other candi-
dates for prime minister re-
portedly have turned down of-
fers of the post,
Thanh told reporters he had
"imposed no conditions, but
s coun-
only wanted to ser74
try." He said his job would be that
of "coordinator" of the council
of ministers, all of whom
would be chosen and headed
by Lon Nol.
He also said there would be
an executive council and a se-
curity council in the new gov-
ernment, but added that "as
yet no decision has been made
on filling the post of vice presi-
dent."
Thanh's acceptance was re-
portedly welcomed by Phnom
Penh's protesting students,
whose main target was former
Prime. Minister-Delegate Siso-
wath Sirik Matak. He is ap-
parently now completely out of
top positions in the govern-
ment after acting as Lon Nol's
right-hand man in the first two
years of the war.
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/1 iI V T P?80-01601 R000400200001
14 MAR 1972
Goc9mpe
~ oG
c
~~
Daily World Foreign Department
from combined news sources
The World Council of Peace has called on more _ than ' 100' of its national peat
committees to implement the program for a worldwide Week of Solidarity with the In<
dochina Peoples.
? The Week of Solidarity. being
held this week is to include dem-
onstrations, meetings, rallies and
campaigns protesting the contin-
uation of the U.S. aggression
against Vietnam, Laos and Cam-
bodia and demanding the with-
drawal of U.S. and allied forces.
. Meanwhile a massive drive to
annihilate the Khmer Rouge, or
Cambodian patriotic forces, en-
tered its fourth day, with more
than 50,000 Saigon puppet troops
supported by U.S. aerial and ar-
tillery forces conducting a
"search - and destroy" operation
in Cambodia.
Puppet regime near collapse
The puppet Saigon trbops were
ordered into Cambodia as a po-
litical crisis threatened to topple
the puppet government in that
country headed by Prime Min-
ister delegate Gen. Sisowath
Sirik Matak, a. compradore cap-.
italist and arch conspirator
against the Cambodian people.
The gavernmental crisis came
to a head Friday when the inval-
ided Lon Nol, crippled by a
stroke, took over from Cheng
Heng as chief of state and dis-
solved the National Assembly.
Lon Nol, who had seized pow-
er with the aid of the U.S. Cen-
t/ tral Intelligence Agency while
former head-of-state Prince No-
rodom Sihanouk was out of the
country, today proclaimed him-
self president; commander-in-
chief of the armed forces, and
prime minister:
Last week the Cambodian Stu-
dent Association precipitated the
crisis when it voted "absolutely
no confidence" in Sirik Matak.
Lon Nol claimed that he had act-
ed "according to the wishes- of
Buddhist monks and all compat-
riots."
Khmer Rouge attacked
The seriousness of the Cambod-
ian situation was evident in the
size of the puppet Saigon force
sent to buttress the Cambodian
puppets. U.S. jets and helicopters
were reported to be backing the
Saigon forces. U.S. B-52 bombers
pounded areas.believed to. be oc-
cupied by the Khmer Rouge.
U.S. and Saigon military spokes-
men apparently got their lines
crossed in reported details of
the operations. One dispatch from
Saigon claimed the' invasion of
Cambodia had been launched to
head off an attack by "North
Vietnamese" troops. This is the
standard jargon used by the U.S.
and puppet regimes, which pur-
port to see "North Vietnamese"
as the only fighters in the three
Indochina countries.
A second dispatch from Saigon
admitted, however, that the inva-
sion was ordered to prevent a
"guerrilla attack on Saigon,"
which apparently referred to the
Khmer Rouge forces. This dis-
patch said a force of about 25
U.S. helicopters was flying a
"search and destroy" mission at
tree-top level in advance" of the
Saigon puppet forces.
Neither dispatch admitted, how-
ever, the real motive for the new
invasion of Cambodia-the need
to protect the Cambodian puppets
from the Cambodian people.
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 EARTH
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C I A DOPE CALYPSO.
by Allen Ginsberg (for Peter. Dale Scott)
IN NINETEEN HUNDRED FORTY SIX
CHINA WAS WON BY MAO TSE-TUNG
CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S ARMY RAN AWAY
AND THEY'RE WAITING THERE IN THAILAND TODAY
THE WHOLE OPERATION FELL INTO CHAOS
TIL THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE CAME INTO LAOS
I'LL TELL YOU NO LIE I'LL SPREAD NO RUMOR
OUR BIG PUSHER THERE WAS SOUVANNA PHOUMA
SUPPORTED BY THE C I A
PUSHING JUNK DOWN _AqAY
FIRST THEY STOLE FROM THE MEO TRIBES
UP IN THE HILLS THEY STARTED TAKING BRIBES
THEN THEY SENT THEIR. SOLDIERS UP TO SHAN
COLLECTING OPIUM TO SELL TO THE MAN
PUSHING JUNK. IN BANGKOK TODAY
SUPPORTED BY THE C I A
BROUGHT THEIR JAM ON MULE TRAINS DOWN
TO CIIIENG MAI THAT'S A RAILROAD TOWN
SOLD IT NEXT TO POLICE CHIEF BRAIN
Ht TOOK IT TO TOWN IN THE CHOOCHOO TRAIN
TRAFFICKING DOPE TO BANGKOK ALL DAY
SUPPORTED BY THE C I A
THE POLICEMAN'S NAME WAS MR. PHAO
HE PEDDLED DOPE GRAND SCALE AND HOW
CHIEF OF BORDER CUSTOMS PAID
BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE'S U.S. AID
THE WHOLE OPERATION NEWSPAPERS SAY
SUPPORTED BY THE C I A
HE GOT SO SLOPPY & PEDDLED SO LOOSE
HE BUSTED HIMSELF & COOKED HIS GOOSE
TOOK THE REWARD FOR AN OPIUM LOAD
SEIZING.HIS OWN HAUL WHICH SAME HE RESOLD
BIG TIME PUSHER ADECADE TURNED GREY
WORKING FOR THE C I A
THREE STRONG PRINCES IN A POWER PLAY
BUT PHOUMA WAS THE MAN FOR THE C I A
TOUBY LYFONG HAD WORKED FOR THE FRENCH
BIG FAT MAN LIKED WINE AND WENCH
-PRINCE OF THE MEOS GREW BLACK MUD
OPIUM FLOWED THROUGH THE LAND LIKE A FLOOD
COMMUNISTS CAME AND CHASED THE- FRENCH AWAY,
SO TOUBY TOOK A JOB WITH THE C ' A
AND HIS BEST-FRIEND GENERAL VANG PHAO
RAN OUR MEO ARMY LIKE A SACRED COW
HELICOPTER SMUGGLERS FILLED LONG TIENG'S BARS
IN XIENG QUANG PROVINCE ON THE PLAIN OF JARS
IT'STARTED IN SECRET THEY WERE FIGHTING
YESTERDAY
CLANDESTINE SECRET ARMY OF THE C I A
ALL THROUGH THE 'SIXTIES-THE DOPE FLEW FREE
THRU TAN SON NHUT SAIGON TO MARSHALL KY
AIR AMERICA FOLLOWING' THROUGH
TRANSPORTING CONFITURE FOR PRESIDENT THIEU
ALL THESE DEALERS WERE DECADES AND TODAY
THE INDOCHINESE MOB OF THE C I A
-- January 5, 1972
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R00040020
MONTGOMERY, ALA.
ADVE~W 11972
t~
M - 61,769
S - 80,831
THE CENTRAL Intelligence It includes t h eIA in t
A Light Checkrein On The CIA
agency's budget to be kited by a
A favorite method is for another
Agency gets a large chunk of its
funds through hidden channels. .
oversight panel are angry. They
contend CIA activities around the
world have a decisive effect on the
conduct of U.S. diplomatic policy.
They have taken action to by-
?pass Stennis and to gain some
measure of control over CIA funds,
personnel and activities by writing
new curbs into the foreign aid
certain amount, then that amount
is declor-ed surplus and
transferred to the CIA.
In this manner, only a handful of
people know what has occurred,
most. of them in the Executive
branch. There is an oversight
committee of the Senate made up
of senior members of the Armed
Services and Appropriations
Committees, plus four members of
the Foreign Relations Committee.
As chairman of the Armed
Services Committee, Sen. John
Stennis of Miss. presides over the
group, which is supposed to
monitor all CIA activities. Last
year the oversight committee
didn't meet a single time.
The Foreign Relations
Committee members on. the
Laos.
authorization bill.
The bill, signed by President
Nixon the other day, requires for
the first time a reduction in
military personnel working for the
CIA in activities similar to the
assistance and advisory groups
now operating in Cambodia and
$341,000,000 ceiling on aid o
Cambodia and requires'CIA ar s
transfers to be counted against the
military aid appropriation. The
CIA is reported to have
warehouses filled with arms at
various points in Southeast Asia
for distribution-to anti-communist
guerrillas.
The CIA will be forbidden to pay
foreign troops - such as the 4,800
"volunteers" in Laos - more than
their' counterparts in the U.S.
armed forces. The bill specifical-
ly, places the CIA under existing
restrictions on giving arms to
forces in Asia.
It will require quarterly reports
to Congress on Cambodia and
annual reports on foreign aid. CIA
assistance will. be included in the
totals, althoughit will probably not
be pinpointed.
These regulations will increase
congressional supervision over,
shadow wars, but the language is
not so tight as to prevent some
circumvention, if the CIA. is
supported by the White House.
The National Security Council,
the President's consultative
committee to which the CIA
reports, has the final decision on
the agency's activities.
However, the new controls
should require the CIA to think
twice before committing the U.S.
to clandestine wars, as it has done,
years.
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CHARLOTTE, N.C.
013SERVER
M -.174,906
- 204,225.
'Congress And CIA Control.
The Central Intelligence Agency, a
sat of world power unto itself these
many years, is going to have to join the
Union at last.
The Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee put its foot down recently and
slopped some new controls on the CIA
when it prepared the foreign aid authori-
za.ion bill. President Nixon signed the bill
last week.
The controls mean the CIA will be
limited in the number of military person-
?r nel it can use for its projects; in how
.. much it can pay foreign troops; and in
the amount of arms it can distribute i
other countries.
One objective of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee was to curb CIA activity
to Cambodia, where the committee
feared the agency might generate anoth-
er war, as it helped to do in Laos. Thus,
aid to Combodia is limited and the CIA
must make quarterly reports on that
country to Congress.
The new limitations are not air-tight.
More are probably needed. But the Con-
gress has at last put a firm hand on the
reins for the first time since the CIA was
created in 1947.
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- : Ea 1 ?_197Z
 STATINTL
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YORK, PA.
RECORDFEB . 1 7 1972;
M - 33,894
Through the efforts of a handful of
U.S. senators, controls have at long last
been placed on the operations, cost and
i personnel of the Central Intelligence
Agency. These cui bs are contained in
t1 Toreign aid authorization bill.signed
last week by President Nixon.
{
Credited with providing the controls
are Senators Clifford Case of New
Jersey, Frank Church of Idaho and
Stuart Symington of Missouri. All are
{members of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. Together with
? -Sen. William Fulbrfght, committee
chairman, they have protested in-
.creasingly that Congress has too little
knowledge of the CIA's activities,
particularly in Southeast Asia.
According to the New York Times,
Senator Case urged last summer a
tightening of restrictions over the
Defense Department's use of its funds
overseas and over its power to transfer
"surplus" military material' to other
;,U.S. agencies. Senator Case, the Times
said, insisted that the CIA be included
it U.S. involvement in Cambodia
.develop surreptitiously, as he said it
had in Laos.
Such restrictions, the senator said,.
N e A007
- -Curbs,on th (L
"would prevent the circumvention of-
congressional intent in funding of
activities such as the Thai troops in'
Laos through the CIA rather than!
through more open government
agencies."
. A number 'of senators, particularly.
those serving on the Foreign Relations
Committee, have complained. over the
years regarding the lack of
congressional knowledge and control
over military action abroad. The
disastrous "Bay of Pigs" invasion of
Cuba soon after John F. Kennedy
assumed the presidency in 1961 was one
of the major operations planned
secretly by the Central Intelligence
Agency. Since 'then the agency has
been blamed or received credit for
masterminding various coups and
revolts in various parts of the world.
The CIA, by the nature of its in-
telligence work, must indeed have
privacy. But when it comes to involving
the nation in military operations
abroad, and otherwise affecting
foreign policy, the CIA should be
responsible to Congress as well as the
President for its actions. The curbs
that were placed on the agency last
week are a start iu that direction.
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12 FEB 1972
ommumsts ff"orce Hah
Washington Post Foreign Service among the ruins were provid-
11- ing intelligence to the govern
Feb
PHNO1tiI PENH
.
,
For the first time since the an- ment on enemy movements
clent city of Angkor was occu. and supply routes.
,pled .. by Communist forces in . As many as 10,000 Cambodl-'
June, 1970, conservationists ans flocked to the temples in
have been forced to give up the past. 20 months because
the ? never-ending struggle to there was so little likeihood of
preserve the temple ruins, fighting there. Market places
French archeologist Bernard
Groslier, the only Westerner sprouted amid the old pillars
m;++e,d to and peace prevailed.
h
d b
n
h
a
ee
per
w
o
cross , enemy lines and super- j
vise the work of 1100 Cambo-i
than laborers and technicians,
'bodian soldiers are reported to the ground that some of their
have fanned out south, east, money was supplied by the
and west of the temples from government of Marshal Lon
the nearby town of Siem Riep. Nol.
Military sources here stressed The workers left in such a
that the troops are moving hurry that they left behind
slowly and very cautiously. some $2 million worth of equip-
The temples are occupied by ment at the sites and in ? a
the 204th North Vietnamese I
suspended, the Cambodian I 114$LltGllb, 111UUU Uil U1 1VV1611
Vietnamese a n d Vietcong
e C
di
b
.lon
am
o
an %JV111munists.? the- conservation worx there
quietly left for Paris in late ~ militar b aerations in the vicin- are also '
Januar ++ i present, but relations has been a new spate of re-
y. I ity of the temples. The possi- between the Cambodians and
He left after receiving a been ports that the temples are
warning that the Communists!, bility that there might be an Vi Vieettnamese mere sources have not m Penh being looted by Communist
, in
had accused him of being a effort to retake the area with soy
troops and artwork smuggled
-CIA agent and were planning force is not ruled out. to Hong Kong and Bangkok.
On Thursday, the Just how tangled the gala-
ze i m that morning as y, govern tions are was illustrated by The government dispatched
he rode to the Angkor Vat ment announced it had exam-1 one Cambodian official who experts, including the director
ruins on his bicycle. Five of fined the 1954 Hague Conven-; said that of the national museum, to
on the night of Jan.
his team leaders actually were tion on protection of historic 20 the Vietcong organized a both places. They reported time and abducrted, and
are. it is unknown deci d monuments
that it wasinot barred demonstration
lagers -aamong the vii h earls valuede frond $other 10,000rto
lagers against the presence of
.v Government sources here! from taking military action if Cambodian Communists and i $2 million missing.
said Groslier told them he it decides such steps are abso- then, when it was over, ac- 1 Western experts, while not
would seek the help of nego-j lutely necessary. cused the villagers of making i disputing that some smuggling
tiators at the Paris peace talks;{ Arguing against such aitrouhle. is evidently going on, pointed
Since the first incident,
.,other Cambodian workers-es-
timates vary from 20 to more
than 100-have been seized.
Many others have fled with
The shift in the Cemmu- an artillery round damaging
nists' attitude towards the res- Angkor Wat.
toration project clearly in- "We do not even send in pa-
creases the danger that the his. trols in this area" the spokes-
toric ruins may be damaged man, Col. Am Ron,, said, "be-
by natural causes. Experts in cause we are afraid the other
Phnom Penh say that the mostiside would take the opportu-
immediate threat is the rainy nity to destroy our temples."
season, now three months off. In the meantime, an esti-
Eventuall'y, according to the 'mated four brigades of - -- ? Cam-
experts, weak scaffoldings
could tumble from around the
nearly 1,000-year-old walls and
bat guano, among other
things, could turn the stone to
dust if allowed to grow thick
with time.
But the end of the restora- -
tion work has important politi.
cal and military implications
as well, raising the liossibilityj
that the North Vietnamese;
and their Cambodian allies'
may be planning to put the -
ruins to some new use.
Diplomats also suggested
that the Communists may -
have acted because they de-
cided that some of the Cambo-
in reopening the temples and move is the very strong emo It was early the next morn. out that the statues turned up
tional attachment Cambodians ing that the Vietcong went outside Cambodia even before
profess to feel for the ruins. through the temples with a the war.
"We value those temples as loud speaker denouncing Gros- The Cambodians have ex-
much as our lives," a govern-.liar and his "coolies" as Am- pressed their concern about
ment spokesmen said last erican spies and saying that the end of the restoration
spring in denying a report the villagers would support work and the looting in nu-
Cambodian forces when they merous cables to the United
invaded the grounds. Nations calling on the world
The Communists also at- body to declare the temple
tacked the conservationists on area a neutral zone.
WOT, k-
at An"?- or
Coincidental to the end of
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Unquote
Regular listeners to the Agence Khmer
d'Information, take note. This is the
rebel radio station in Cambodia that
emits a stream of propaganda calcu-
lated to damp the ardour of General
Lon Nol's soldiers. Lots of people quote
The Economist, but you can trust the
AKI to quote it in its own way. On
December Loth, for instance, the AKI
broadcast this passage ' supposedly
culled from our pages :
The Cambodian puppet army has
lost a great battle. This is undeniable.
Puppet General Lon Nol's situation
is worsening. . . . Thus, the Lon Nol-
Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh traitors
cannot hide their defeat. .
The only article ,in The Economist
on that subject, and at about . that
time, had been published nearly a
fortnight earlier and had expressed a
cautious optimism about the Cambo-
dians' chances of holding their own.
And The Economist, sorely afflicted by
British reticence,, is not in the habit of
dubbing politicians puppets and trait.
ors. But then it pays to take anything
you hear on the radio in that part of
the world with a pinch of salt. The
Central Intelligence Agency is said to
be practising "disinformation " on the
sound waves on a considerable scale,
using an actor who can mimic Prince
Sihanouk perfectly. And just to com-
plete the confusion, the English initials
used by our friends of the Agence
Khmer are CIA.
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 CSNII CT0?I kOS~,
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34Dd
m L I vo,
By Peter Osnos
Washington Post Foreign Service
PHNOM PENI-I, Dec. 18--,
While enemy forces make
damaging advances in the
countryside, an important
contest for leadership is cur-
rently taking place among
Cambodia's senior political
and military leaders, accord-
ing to diplomatic sources
here.
.Deals are bean; struck
and alle:;ianccs spitted that
ebuld when completed pro-
duce a dramatic overhaul,
even the equivalent of a
coup d'etat, or perhaps noth-
ing more than a reshuffling
of some of the old personali-
ties.
The departure of Marshal
Lon Nol, the ailing ]lead of
government whose primacy
is being increasingly criti-
~ized by those beneath him,
would certainly be the most
significant change. It is be-
lieved a strong possibility.
The marshal tried to re-
tire last spring, but was
then persuaded to stay on.
Now there are signs he
doesn't want to go. This
week' he promoted to gen-
eral eight officers in an ap-
parent effort to consolidate
his position,
Logical Successor
break with the past, there Tacit Agreement
are indications that each is 'For the first time since
promising to deal at long the fighting began in Cam-
last with the problems of cor? podia such a prospect is
ruption and inefficiency being seriously discussed, at
that are crippling the coun- least in certain small circles
try. and always in whispers. If it
Thanh, who led a CIA su 1 Jcame to pass, more likely
1 tl,- nnf the agreement
ported movement against
Prince Sihanouk for many
years, has support among
many younger military offi-
cers and is courting major
Buddhist monks. In Tani has
proved himself an able ad-
ministrator. and talks much
about organizing the coun-
tryside.
Details of the leadership
struggle are difficult to fol-
low day to clay for even the
most astute foreign observ-
ers who only know that it is
going on because Cambo-
dian friends and contacts
privately tell them so.
Morale Low
From these and other con-
versatians they sense also
that public and official mo-
rale has fallen sharply in re-
cent weeks-lower, it is said,
than at any time since war
spread to the country in
March, 1-970.
While the decline may
merely be a passing phe-
nomenon, brought on by a
series of military defeats, it
is stall serious in a country
major asset in a war
Tho logical successor to
be virtually
d
Lon Nol would be Caen. Siso- doer control is has
ar-
wath Sirik 1llatak, his pow- co ndl has been an pr-
erful number two (officially de ent and enthusiastic pa-
erful t1'1Ot15n1.
p r i m e minister-delegate) Many of the young intellcc-
and the man favored by the tuals and professionals who
U.S. embassy as the most flocked to the government
pragmatic and W'estern?ori- after the toppling of Prince
ented of Cambodia's top Sihanouk are now said to be
echelon. quietly bowing cut as they
Others prominently men- the regime to carry on.
tioned are In Tani, a former As for the beleaguered
deputy prime minister dis Cambodian army, some ana-
missed by Lon Nol in Octo-
]!,,St., believe that if its f
would be a tacit one, never
made public, to' stop fight-
ing.
One diplomat who is espe-
cially sensitive to the cur-
rent manucvei'in-s believeti
the Cambodians, under such
an arrangement., would
effectively cede control over
that part of the country cast
of the Mekong River where
North Vietnamese are bat-
tling; South Vietnamese.
This would leave a neu-
tralized Cambodia consist-
ing essentially` of the major
towns and 'the rice-rich
Western provinces, with the
Communists retaining con-
trol over the sparsely popu-
lated northeast where they
have held sway since the
early days of the war.
Critical events in Cam-
bodia never seem to have
the urgency they might else-
where, but in the jockeying
now going on there is an ap-
parent awareness that while
the malaise in Phnom Penh
deepens the Communists are
making headway.
Depressing Picture`
Military successes are one
aspect. of the energy ad-
vance. But in the depressing
picture painted this week by
both Cambodians and for-
eig_ ners there was also talk
of limited Comninnist politi-
cal progress in organizing
the population and recruit-
ing cadres.
The principal handicap of
the Sihanoukists now in Pe-
king exile and their North
Vietnamese mentors has
been the Cambodians' abid-
ing nationalism demon-
n
' to sinx under strated in the raising of a
--
/dues; and Son Ngoc Thane; lips __
t/ ti+n was a Son minister 30 the pressure of a deter- 1130,000 man volunteer force
Mined Communist offensive, in a matter of months.
years ago and then went a overnment might emerge The nationalism remains
into exile. lie is now an ad- -, rt ,
that is prepared to negotiate but: as the fighting drags on
viscr to the government. with the Communists to pie- and tens of thousands of
(largely to-avoid U.S., South
Vietnamese and Cambodian
government strikes) the.
Communists solicit support
by pledging peace, agricul-
tural aid, an end to corrup
tion and lower prices.
In their favor are tight or-
ganization and rigid disci-
pline which elminate the de-
pradatioiis so often commit-
ted by South Vietnamese
soldiers and ,Cambodian gov-
ernment troops. The North
Vietnamese army and Viet-
cong are ordered to pay for
their food rather than steal
it and keep out of the vil-
lages as much as possible.
While there were no more
than a few thousand Cambo-
dian Communists--Khmer
Rouge--20 months ago; the
prevailing estimates now.
range from 15,000 to 20,000,
fully one-third of the Com
niunist forces.
Loyal Recruits
Most of these recruits are
nominally at least, loyal to
Sihanouk's' National United
Front of Cambodia.
For the most part they
play a military role subordi-
nate to the North Vietnam-
ese and Viefeong but that
too is said by intelligence
gained from defectors to be
slowly changing with some
Cambodians now being
given commands.
The U.S. embassy is
acutely aware of the present
situation and is sending
word back to Washington in
what surely must be the
gloomiest cables since the
very early days of the Lon
Nol government.
While none of these on vent an outright defeat. people become refugees
the' surfacc_ civo be
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OIL CITY., PA.
DERRIC& a 197
- 14,890 -
own
ifld4J
In the last five years we have heard various
reasons for our violent presence in Vietnam. We
had commitments; we wanted self-determination
for the South Viets.
And our GIs were told that they were fighting in
Southeast Asia to keep war from the beaches of
California.
So we have not felt this war's outrageous im-
mensities. Unless one of ours was a casualty. And
we sit satisfied that our President is "winding down
the war." Some say he is merely substituting
brown bodies for white.
But how much longer will we keep converting
their "green earth" into brown dust?
In one of those wind-down years, April 1969, one
"clandestine raid" (so described by Paul It.
Ehrlich and John P. Holdren in Saturday Review)
by Air America, an airline of the U.S. Central In-
telligence Agency defoliated 173,000 acres in
eastern Cambodia. It damaged about one-third of
Cambodia's rubber crop and damage to local fdod
production was severe.
Presumably the defoliation of 173,000 Cam-
bodian acres prevents this same from happening to
104,000 Crawford, 24,300 Venango, 28,600 Warren,
and 2,800 Forest county crop-producing acres.
By late 1969, more than five million acres of
Indo China had been treated with defoliants applied
at an average of 13 times the dose recommended by
the USDA for the domestic use.
Those millions represent, more acres than all
Pennsylvania farms used for crop production in
1967, according to the Pennsylvania Statistical
Abstract of 1969.
For Southeast Asians it's often fatal to be down-
wind from the "wind down."
J.
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CHICAGO, ILL.
SUNS-TIMES
1d _.536,103
S 709,123 ___--
~ 61>,t> 4 if
Many of its seem to believe President Nix-
on's protestations that the Vietnam war is
being wound down. We see casually figures of
-five to eight a week and we tend to think it is
all over. Alt of which shows how callous and
arrogant we have become, as a people,
recent New York Times story told of a
military hospital in South Vietnam with 1,800
'beds that currently cares for 4,500 wounded
`soldiers --- two to a bed, hundreds on the
floor. The carnage obviously is far from over.
Unfortunately, because the dead have yel-
low.instead, of white or black skins, far too
many Americans drink the htvar is over. Out of
sight, it seems, out of mind. If the news-
papers have buried the war on Page 3I the
readers don't think it exists. Yet Mr. Nixon
'continues to rain =50,000 bombs on Indochina,
a year--almost half the bombs dropped by
.the U.S.Air Force in all of World War II. And
by all the evidence, the American stir force
intends tbstay on in Vietnam indefinitely.
Thicu recently said there would be a residual
force of 50,000 U.S. troops glus two combat
divisions by the end of 1972. That's about 110,-
000 troops. Defense Sec. Melvin R. ),aircl and
President Nixon have both made it?clear that
despite all the talk of withdrawal a large resid-
ual force will Continue to occupy Vietnaiii.
I 'now that the President has said he will
keep his word about ending the war. Do you
remember what he said in April, 1970, when
he invaded Cainbocbn? That all troops would
be out within 30 clays and that there would be
no air action in Cambodia in support of the
Canibodian army? What of the pledge not to'
conduct military campaignsin Laos or to pay
:for mercenary foreign armies? We are cur-
rently up to our ears in a CIA war in that
little Country.' V'~a c"r
We have a long way to go before America
turns around and the American government
begins to respond to the wishes of its people
-:to stop' the war and shed our militarism.
Many of its are tired from years of shouting,
-demonstrating, writing letters, picketing. But
isn't it clear that when we relax our pressures,
the Nixon administration .and the Pentagon
continue to flout the undisputed desire of the,
people for peace?
Chicago area chairman,
- Women for Peace t
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 11O1MlGII POLICY
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01800040020000
f ~1 +~ T,f~.i~~ 7il}j0.ri1pm
1~\ t?iii~eEl~ U' iJi[ A
by John 1'. Leacacos
operates within the NSC systcnl and , als
utilizes it as a forum to establish whatev
policy position is preferred by his Stat
Department; but he side-steps the r:sc o
occasion to carry his demurrer, dissent
alternate position to the President privatel
Atop WYWashiilgton's complex foreign affairs -Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird
bureaucracy sits the National Security Coun-
cil, a 24-year-old body given new status in
1969, when President Nixon moved to make
it a kind of command and control center for
his foreign policy. The new Nixon Nsc sys-
tem, run from the White House by Henry, A.
Kissinger, has now existed for nearly three
less personally involved in. the -,,-Sc proces
having apparent indifference to wJiat
believes is unnecessary nsc paperwork, whic
he leaves to his deputy, David Packar
Laird's main clay-to-day operational preocc
pation is with the exit of U.S. forces fro
Vietnam. His International Security Affai
Bureau in the Pentagon performs poorly
Washington bureaucratic standards.
years, producing 138 numbered study memo-
randa, reaching 127 formal decisions, and
employing a permanent staff of -about 120
personnel (more than double the pre-Nixon
figure). Though the substance of its opera-
tions are necessarily secret, interviews with
officials permit tentative evaluation of the
strengths and weaknesses of the Kissinger
rise. There is broad agreement on the follow-
ing seven points-
--The NSC has served President Nixon
more or less as he desired, that is, in Iiie
ordered style of formal ans~~?ers to detailed
questionnaires. The volume of this paperwork
has at times been staggering, but it has
sharpened focus ot1 the search for policy
Choices.
--The answers and alternatives for action.
"corning up through the irse" have produced
few panaceas, but have contributed greater
coherence of outlook in foreign affairs man-
anement. NSC recommendations are more
-The influence on foreign policy of tl'
military, including the joint Chiefs of Staff,
who are usually represented in the rrsc proc-
ess, is at the lowest point in several years.
This has been attributed to the anticlimactic
winding-down atmosphere of the Vicfliam
war, and to the fact that the Chiefs' once die-
hard views and abstract argumentation on
strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviet
Union have been successfully emulsified into
the Nixon-Kissinger basic prinCipleS for SALT
negotiations- with Russia. Kissinger has com-
meilted: "In, my experience with the military,
they are more likely to accept *d ecisions they
do not like than 'any other group."
From time to time, gears have clashed
within the system. The State. Department has
complained bitterly of the "Procrustean bed"
fashioned by the .Kissinger staff. Meeting
excessive White House demands, bureaucrats
pragmatic than academic, reflecting Kis- allege, robs State and Defense of manpower
singer's view: "We don't make foreigU I? n policy hours needed for day-to-day'operations. After
by logical syllogism." his first year; Kissinger conceded: "Making
Explicit insistence on the "limited" foreign policy is easy; what is difficult is its
nature of U.S. power and the need for coordination and implementation."
greater -restraint and cautious deliberation White Howe r SC staffers, on the other
about its exercise have been reinforced at the hand, exuberant at their top-dog status, ex-.
highest level by Nixon's habit of withdrawing :, cl,,aree of condescension for the work
d
of
to make final decisions in solitude an
of the traditional departments. In 1969 Kis-.
frequently deciding on no-action rather than singer staffers rated State-chaired studies and
accepting advice to initiate new action. recommendations only "50 to 70 percent
-By being close to the President and keep- acceptable" and based on ' mediocre reporting
?ing his fingers on all aspects of the rise which failed to sift wheat from chaff in the
process personally, Kissinger without question political cables constantly arriving from 117
is the prime mover in the NSC System. The U.S. embassies' overseas. The Kissinger staff
question arises whether the NSC would fund- say that they. have to hammer out the real
tion as effectively without Kissinger, and choices on the hard issues, since a cynical and
whether it can bequeath a heritage of.accom- sometimes bored bureaucracy offers up too
plishnlent to be absorbed by the permanent really "straw o )tions"State's planners, for
.'machinery oP KPLy 1- or Release 2000/08/i1 ; ql#.
-Secretary of State William P. Rogers
 Approved For Release 2000/0
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 CH USTIAl S CI EI4CE } O-NUTOR
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Ty George V1. Ashw6ytli
The Christian Science Monitor
With Senate passage of drastically chopped
foreign-aid legislation, the future prospects
for the Nixon doctrine remain very much in
'doubt.
Beyond that, it is clear now that there is a
widening willingness on Capitol Hill to try to
exercise steadily more control over U.S.
handling of overseas involvement.
In the past several days, the Senate has
approved $2.65 billion in economic and -mili-
tary aid. While still a substantial sum, the
figure is about $267 million less than in the
bill defeated by the Senate two weeks ago
and about $000 million less than the admin-
istration wanted.
Close vote studied
It remains to be worked out just how the
.reduced funds are to be allocated, but it is
clear now that the administration faces the
very real prospect of seeing some of its most
--1 cherished programs drastically curtailed
unless agreement can be worked out in
conference.
'Seen here as highly significant was the
narrow passage of an amendment raising
military aid from $1.2 billion to $1.5 billion.
That was still less by about a half billion
dollars ? than the administration desired
originally. And the closeness of the vote,
even in the light of the reduction, did not
appear here to portend well for the future
of military aid at present levels.
It is quite likely that in future years the
administration may find itself very hard-
pressed to do nearly as well in gaining ap-
o An amendment proposed by Sen. Clif It is probably true that the future of mili-
ford P. Case (R) of New Jersey to prohibit tary assistance and security-related cco-
nomic assistance will hinge largely, sources
Laos
in Thailand
ercenarie
th
,
,
s
e Ilse of m
-believe, tipon what happens between now
and North Vietnam was . approved. This and the next budget-consideration. time in
theoretically would bar, according to the the war in Vietnam. If between now and
wording of the amendment, the 'present then the American pullout is completed or
payment of Thai irregular forces for use. in.at,,,nst comn}eted without a ereat disaster,
try to have the amendment killed in con many on Capitol Hill who have been giving
ference and may not abide by it even if the administration a hard time this year
will be less belligerent as.the level of,friis-
proved.
apl tration falls.
o Another amendment removes service- Essentially, it is crucial to the Nixon doe-
funded military, assistance for Thailand trine that many of the present uncertainties
from the defense budget and puts it under over the level of aid disappear and be re-
foreign aid and., thus, 'surveillance by the placed by fairly widespread domestic and
Senate Foreign' Affairs Committee, rather foreign understanding of precisely where
than Armed . Services Committee. If the)tnerica can be expected 'to stand and what
d
d
'
o.
to
service it can be expecte
amendment survives conference,
spending for Laos and South Vietnam may
be shifted to the domain of the foreign ser-.
vice committees. This could place the Nixon
doctrine under very close scrutiny and criti-
cism each year, more so than in the armed
services committees, with their myriad
other military concerns.
o Another amendment, also by Senator
Case, would strengthen the present Cooper.
Church prohibition on advisers in Cambodia
by including the CIA in the prohibition.
Total pullout sought
The Senate also approved an-a.mendment
offered by Sen. Mike Mansfield (D) of Mon-
tana calling for a total pullout, from Viet-
nam within six months of final approval of
the foreign-aid legislation. Sources in the
administration and on Capitol Hill are gets-,
eraIly agreed that this limitation will fail
proval for heavy military assistance spend- to win-final approval: The most likely limi-
ing as was done this year. Ration will be the one approved with the
As finally passed by the Senate, the Mil. Military procurement authorization on call-
itary-assistance program was reduced from ing for an expeditious departure v.-ith the
the $705 million approved by the House to release of prisoners being the controlling
$452 million; supporting assistance, from factor.
the $S00 million approved by the House to There is little doubt that the administra-
$566 million, plus $35 million for Israel; and tion will come out of the present arguments
military credit sales from $510 approved somewhat more limited in a number of
by the House to -$400 million. ._ areas. And, it is clear- that no matter what
In one crucial test, the administration final decisions on money for economic and
won once again approval to spend $341 for military aid carne out of conference, the
military and economic assistance to Cam strictures will be much .tighter than 'the
bodia. But Senate doves saw as highly Sig administration would wish.
fact that the Senate had ap- -
t' th
ncan
e
proved a specific limitation of both Ameri
- ' ,can personndA0prb*ddoFc$6O2
for a country. Limitation agreed to for Laos
only covered money.
 / - The sources said that the. U. S.
ritelIigence teams, which are as-
signed to the American military
command in Saigon, are engaged
fir unannounced missions in Cam-
bodia in cooperation with the
Combodian army. Their activities
include securing and evaluating
intelligence information acquired
by the Cambodians. --
Tire teams are reassigned to
the missions from Phnom Penh,
the Cambodian, capital. U. S. offi-
cials have insisted that there are
no American military personnel
operating on the ground-in Cam-
turnover of, another U. S. Air
Force base,. at I'bu Cat; 270 miles
northeast of Saigon, to the South'
Vietnamese. But military sources'
said that the U.S. Air Force per-
sonnel would not be included in
withdrawals of American troops
from Vietnam. for at least the
uext-several months.
The closeout of the base. for
U. ? S. Air Force Phantom jets
also included deactivation of -the
base's 12th Tactical Fighter Tiling
headquarters, the conmrand said.
bodia except for. the U.S. rnili-J! The 150 men of tide unit will
tary equipment delivery teams. , be the last air force personnel
j'TH'r'J. Y.OR ( 1>.yILY Ptu',','S
Approved-For Release 2000/08/1P 7cH,e 2[ jq0-c 6Tl' Ob400
-Saigon, Nov. 16-The United States is sending Americali military intelligence
:teams secretly into Cambodia despite a declaration by Washington that only American
equipment: delivery teams are operating in Cambodia, sources disclosed tonight
On the battlefronts of I n d o-
china, a U.S. air force F-4 Phan-
tom jet attacked an antiaircraft
lartillerv site about 75 miles in-
side Nor th Vietnam.
The jet bombed the North Viet-
:namese gull emplacement after
_it was fired at during a mission
-over Laos. It was the 76th air.
strike against North Vietnam's
'defenses this year. Headquarters
said the jet damaged one rf the
:antiaircraft guns.
Two GIs were killed when their
patrol-walked into a mine field
s t up earlier by another U.S.
Army unit, a military spokesman
said.
- Transfer Another Base
The. accident vas the fourth
in a 48-hour period in which
seven Americans were killed and
nine were injured. The command
spokesman said that there were
no. other American casualties
during that period.
The,. command announced _the-,
By JOSEPH FRIED
Staff Correspondent of THE Nrws
to be included it the current pi'p
grans of withdrawal of American
servicemen from-the war none.
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 Approved For Release 2000/ 1 e8W-B160 "02000 ove~;2be? 971
that while attending school they should Vietnam it ,is {that the xceliti eosho ld bodia, un e n A r the aegis of the Contra
me nd
l
~~
vote their .dul
schooling. these days the executive branch has conic cone a , 1' g STATI
Mr. TALCOTT. I commend the chair- to assume that in matters of foreign china is laid waste in the process. Aud i
ecially foreign policy which. with the failure of Congress to effectively
li
esp
man and the ranking member and the po
cy- full committee for trying to save some may lead to wars the Congress is under prevent the President from conducting a A 'money. I think that we can save consi- the duty to accept the judgment of the secrl war mercenathrough his. f andom and thr can
derable amounts of money which are used executive - branch.
in developing flying schools and in cre- To frequently the executive branch tinue our tragic involvement in South-
ating flying facilities and in the main- has failed to follow the sage advice of east es A a rem ofns hisuncheck
Viet do policy is
teriance of aircraft and facilities if they the late Senator Vandenbur~ that the T fraud are not necessary to maintaining flying Congress should be informed and con- fiord thanhimatch d, policywever, by the
proficiency. suited before the takeoff and not merely
I simply wanted to be assured that at the end of the crash landing of an Ill- dented by disloca he billobef re us s owch w Theo
rated .personnel who become students fated venture. meconomic any millions of Americans are suffering
se of my amend-
that is the purp
And
ent
l
l
o
vem
,
, are the direct result of our invo
would be permitted, like other personne
to fly, to keep up their proficiency, if they ment: To bring the Congress into the pie-
ture before we are so overcommitted by in Southeast Asia and the continued
desired. the President that it almost impossible dominance of defense spending is our
-Mr. INTAHON, minutes to the gen e a afro I yield 5 to extricate ourselves. In this clay and first national priority. The defense ap-
(Mr.Y to gentleman from Illinois age when wars can break out anywhere propriatiolis bill on which we will soon
eaceful.fishermen and plr.nta-
tion wor.';ers and 90 percent t,oman Catholic. Icier reports indicated that
Lon Nol vios defiberohay trying to stir up anti-Vietnamese chauvinism in
an attempt to stay in power. It was also revealed that Lon Not carried out
his coup with the milifury help of "Khmer Krum,'! ethnic Cornbedions
from South Vietnam, who had been trained and organized by the U.S.
Central lr.telli gence r;c,'ency and who were infilircrted into Cambodia.
The fol!owing report shows what ton Not and his CIA bathers did to
implement their policy!lass than a month after they seized power.
- Drily t'?orldForeign D;:pnrt:'iont'
NEW YORK, June 1 (UPI) - craft and taken to Con Trung,
Cambodian soldiers rounded tip about 30 miles south of the Caln-
soine 3,000 Vietnamese and killed bodian capital.
them by shooting diem in the back At about 9 a.rn., the hostages
on an isolated sand dune near the were tied with their hands bo.hind
Mekong liver in Cambodia on their backs and marched "along;
April 12, 1970, according to a cor- the sand dunes where the soldiers
respondent for Look Magazine, were waiting with rifles, Warner
Denis Warner, who based in Asia reported.
for Look, said he was informed "At the sound of a whistle,'' the
of the slaughter by Lieu Van Tam survivor related to Warner, "the
a 00-year-old Vietnamese fisher- soldiers shot them down."
man, who was one of 23 surviv- Shot in the back
ors. He said Van Tani told hiin According to Warner, Van Tam
that all of the victims were men said the Vietnamese were shot in
and boys from the Roman Catho- the back. He said the 3,000 execu-
lie community in Phnorn Penh. tions took a very long tinge, since
Van Tani said he escaped with the Cambodians had only 20 rifles.
only a bullet crease in his skull. Van Tam told Warner he and
by feigning death with two dead about 27 others survived.
compatriots lying on top of him. "I 'fell with two dead men on
A knock on the door me," Van Tarn told Warner. "I
Van Tarn told ,'garner the itici- lay there, not moving. I did not
dent began "when I heard a knock dare move."
on the door, I went outisde. Im- Warner said Van Tam told him
mediately, the soldiers grabbed he left when he heard the firing
me and took me a?Nay. First they stop and the boats leave. Van Tani
told nie to lie on the ground with said he' was captured with the
tile other risen 'that they had' other survivors on -the outskirts of
taken." Phnom Penh and placed in a con-
"Then," Warner said Van Tani centration camp before being de-
told hirn, "they.told its to standup. ported to Vietnam.
with our hands over. our heads. At the time of the reported
Anyone who didn't, the soldiers massacre, hundreds of Vietnamese
said, would be shot." . ' . . ? t : nationals were found dead float-
The Vietnamese 'were. herded irig. down the Mekong: River into
aboard two Cambodian landing Vietnam from Cambodia,
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 Approved For Release 2000/08
6pi601 R00040020
few wceks?- encouraged by several promi-
nent Americans-he revealed clear political
intentions. Early in 1952 he began publish-
ing K]luu.r Krauk (Cambodians Awaken),
violating his repatriation agreement with
the French. By March he fled the city to
rejoin an underground resistance band in
northwest Sicnu'cap province. Ile had,
there, only a few hundred men and a radio
transmitter. His broadcasts called upon the
population to We up and overthrow colo-
nial rule under the French.
JD WS veith the CIA
In November 1953, Siliarioul:'s efforts
at influencing the French paid off and
Cambodia was grantccl formal indepen-
dence. Son tried to gain some control in
the new regime. at I'ilnonl Penh. Unsuccess
ful, he rein rued to the armed ha id in the
By Charles Meyer
1 icific Nec.'c'Serricc
Lou Nol's recent abdication of power in
Phnom Penh Iva once again brought into
the spotlight the man who in the CIA has
long sought to impose upon Cambodia.
Only three months after the coup of March
1970 which overthrew Prince Norodom
'Sihanouk, most pol]tic]ans in the Cambo-
dian capital were predicting a short term
for Premier Lon Not and naming as his
1/ probable successor Son bloc Thaull.
Son was born 1)ec. 7, 1908 ik Ky La,
South Victnam, of a Cambodian fattier and
a Vietnamese mother. After attending a
French high school, he moved to Phnom
Penh in 1937; a functionary in the govern-
ment there. The same year lie started a
nationalist gfoup which publishc-J the'. first
native language journal, Nagaravatta (Land
of the Pagodas).
In 1941, French Indochina', still techni-
cally ruled by the Vichy government,
granted the use of military facilities to the
Japanese, in exchange or maintaining
French sovereignty over Vietnam, Cambo-
dia and Laos. Soil immediately became all
active collaborator with the Japanese Black
Dragon Society, which aimed at owertlu'ow-
itlg the French. On the verge of arrest by
French authorities in the summer of 194t
Son. fled to Tokyo.
With defeat imminent, the Japanese.
aboheited the colonial administration in
March 1945 and imprisoned all French
citizens in Cambo;tia. A month later Son
appeared in Phnom Pcnh as a Japanese
captain. and became minister in charge of
rela?ticort" with the Japanese command. On
Aug. 10 a palace revolt inspired by Son and
supported by the Lempelai (Japanese po-
lice) forced Sihanouk, then king, to confer
upon Son the office of prime minister:
Following the collapse of Japanese pow-
er,,Sihanouk on Oct. 8 secretly delegated a
cabinet minister to go to Saigon for the
avowed purpose of discussing "certain
questions" with the French command. A
week later French Gen. Leclerc arrived in
Pllrlolll Penh and arrested Sou. Ile was put
in the Saigon jail a nd then sentenced to
forced labor for collaborating with the
Japanese. Soon, he was scant to France and
put under house arrest.
After several royal interventions, Son
was pardoned in October 1951. Ile re-
turned to Phnom Penh on the agreement
that he would abstain from all political
activities. Ile refused the, ministerial port-
folio Sihanouk offered to him, but within a
northwest, where defections during his
absence had weakened the ranks severely.
his political constituency gone, in the
wake of Fre.ix1; maneuverings, Son was
forced to ally himself with the CIA. In
January 1956 the final blow was struck, as
government troops a ttackecl his camp near
the Thai border Lillin 108 nlcn and
destroying the radio station. Son and a few
men escancct and entered the service of One
But Cambodian public opinion rernaius
very unfavorable to Son. The urban youth
is violently hostile to him. Ile therefore
continues to live in Saigon, where lie has
the solid support of the South Vietnamese
puppets and the entourage of U.S. Ambas-
sador Bunker. More importantly, he enjoys
the loyalty of the Cambodian armies
trained by American Special Forces units,
who consider him a "spiritual father." Son
has also renewed his tics with the Japanese
groups which carried him to power in
1945. Representatives from Tokyo consult
him on their Indochinese political and
economic questions.
Son Ngoc Tlianh wants to redeem the.
defeats that impeded his political life, and
now anxiously awaits his hour. "Tire CIA,
which has backed Son for fifteen years,
will be happy to make good his losses.
C'har/es Meer was edito -in-chkf of the tilaga-
Ai nc Ftt:dcs Cc. ml oclgiennes (Cambodian Studies)
and Nokor Khmer. From 1957 l/nolrgll 1970 he
tray a counselor to the cebinct of Silr^nouk and
cortinnued as such to Lou Nol until June' 1970,
(.'IA in Don~,ko!c.
Allhoug?n'his moot nicilt-now known as.
the 1; hmer Serai (Frei Cambodia)--lire]
been crushed, the CIA revived it steadily
and built it into an army of 5000 ethnic
Cambodians. Most of these men were
recruited from Cambodians living in Thai-
land and South Vietnam. The mercenary
army was based on Thai territory, from
which it launched' sabotage missions. Soil
became a front for these operations and
plots, mounted jointly by the CIA and U.S.
Army Intelligence in Bangkok and Saigon,
against Sihanouk and Cambodian neutral-
ity.
The Khmer Scrai, transformed into the
"National Liberation Front of Cambodia"
(sic), announced on May 15, 070, its
support for the regime which grew out of
the. coup'under Gen. Iron Nol. Son, how-
ever, secretly entered the capital as his
supporters began to prepare for a returrt to
power. Lon Not who had the full hacking
of the Pentagon, wasn't about to step
down for the CIA's roan. Son had to settle
for the post of principal advisor to the
premier.
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 ITP;1 N.01 "K TIME'S
Approved For Release 2000/08/16: CIA-RDP80-01601 R0004002
27 MAY 1971
CAMBODIAN FOR MS secret landing zones in Itatta-
k
BY SPIES REPORTED
PNOMPENIH,, Cambodia, May
26 (AP)-Twelve-nian teams of
Cambodian troops, trained by
v Central Intelligence Agency per-
sonnel at a base in Laos, suc-
cessfully infiltrated deep into
Communist-held territory in
Cambodia two months ago, ac-
ccrding to Western sources
here.
;' The sources said about 20
such intelligence teams were
flown last March from a base
near Pakse in southern Laos tol
na
i, i, Stuug bong and Preah
Vihear provinces in northern
Cambodia. The entire reL ion has
been controlled by North Viet-
namese and Vietcond forces
since early last month. The
teams. were said to have re-
turned' after a month.
The sources said the Cambo-
dians were flown aboard heli-
copters from the United States
air base at Udorn, Thailand.
American pilots and crewmen
in uniform were aboard some of
the aircraft, the sources stated,
Other helicopters were:
manned by Thai crews, accord
ing to the sources.
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 R ..v N
Approved For Release 2000f /A-.YCWDP80-01601 R000400
(AP)-A Green Beret officer
says he took part in a secret
mission in lyb( aesignea to
aid'in the overthrow of Cam-
ouk, the Norfolk Virginian-
Pilot reported in its Sunday
Capt. John McCarthy, 28,
who said today he will resign
his. Army commission. in Au-
gust, said the clandestine op-
Irected from South Vietnam by
/ the Central Intelligence
f Agency, the paper reported.
The mission was, known as
peration Cherry," the paper
said, and involved McCarthy,
;w=orking under cover, and
members of the Khmer Serai
:'. MarcIi1970,,a out a month lie-
fore American South Vietnam-
. .. ese troops entered the country
to bit Communist ' supply
bases...
consistently' :denied having
anything ' to'_ do with.. Sihan-
ouk's downfall. ..
McCarthy said he is leaving
the Army because the govern-
ment had suppressed defense .
"I have come to the conctu=
sion that.loyalty, silence and
:faith were to no avail," the
:Virginian-Pilot quoted him as
La society of Cambodians work CAPT. JOHN McCARTHY JR.
ng to oust Sihanouk. -.. alleges.ClA operation
t ??The Pentagon today denied
Aan.y> , riefused to elaborate on the
knowledgge of Operation
Cherry:' n e:wspaper article. .. 4
McCarthy 'served t< to years Asked if it was far-fetched;
to say Cambodians may have
Iin 'a
federal prison for the
:murder of a Cambodian mer-
;cenary before his conviction
been hired for . "Operation
Cherry," McCarthy said, "No."
was overturned by a military But he refused further com-,
~'ourt of appeals. Reached at! ment. He is now stationed at"
,home ir} Arizgna Saturday,M1heIFt_Huachuca, Ariz._
SIAIINIL
r. f
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 BALTIMORE, MD.
NEWS AMER Loved ForRe lease .2000/9-8/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000
E - 219,140
S - 316,275
FLAY 1 9 197,
':.By WILLIAM THEIS
Chlal News American
Washin
ton Bure u
g
WASHINGTON - One year
after his "40 days with the enemy" 1
as a
ti
i
? cap
ve
n Cambodia,
Washington correspondent
Richard Dudman is able to say of
the Communist guerrillas %Oho
were his guards:
. "Where their brand of morality
and ethics affected us' most
directly was that they always
respected our rights. We were
never coerced or even asked to
{,write or say anything we,
considered untrue, nor were we
kLsked to sign anything formulated
DUD31AN IN HIS new book, "40 ' tanks and planes of AmericanDays with th e Enemy " ' lmperalism. So you are not safe I
(Liveright), published today, among the Cambodians."
recalled that he and his friends The "task force" that was in
were "unmilitary" in appearance charge of Dudman, Morrow and
-carrying no arms and wearing Miss Pond included "two ex,
what amounted to western sport periencetl Vietnamese soldiers, a
clothes. Cambodian defector, a Viet.
"Beyond that, we all had been, namese-Chinese Cambodian with
personally opposed to the Vietnam] limited experience," and Anh Hai,
a veteran, revolutionary and
war for a long time," the balding,
52-year-pld Dudman wrote.- "I am
optimistic by nature and felt
elated at the prospect of getting
my first look at'the other side of a
war I had been writing about for
10 years." r
Questioned at great length until.
the "enemy" was satisfied that
dman and his two journalist
mpanions were not oQ-I A
`blindfolded, from jungle shack to that hit him after his return to
village hut to escape Vietnamese, Washington.
and American troops-yes.
k_1 - 11 1 ~' HIS, FIRST SHOCK came,
...THREATENED, TOO, at the however
when the captured trio
,
outset by villagers angry at' was being raced blindfolded away
American invaders. _1 t from' a' village 'near where they
But Dudman's story makes had been taken prisoner: Dudman,
clear that his hardships were not, remembering the Communist
t those of punishment. His captors massacre at Hue, was "certain
suffered the -same poor food, that the same thing was going to
illnesses and brushes with death happen to us." He recalled:
as be. "The thought did not frighten
Dudman is Washington bureau me so much as it puzzled and
chief of the St. Louis Post- disappointed me. I thought to
Dispatch. He had been writing myself: 'I'm right in the midst of
Iftut the Indochina war for a my life. There are so many things
decade when he and his compa I still want to do. Now it, looks as, so they would "not be stranded"
Worts, Elizabeth (Beth) Pond of if the whole thing will be over in
I
the next minute or two'." on the way back to,Saigon.
,the Christian Science Monitor and
Mike Morrow of Dispatch News AU he got then wasaknockon Then,: after a final banquet oft
Service International were cap- the head, 'and many questions. Hisi dog, and. one false' start inter-
tured ,on the highway between Vietnamese interrogator told him: Irupted by a storm, they dropped-,
Saigon and Phnom Penh. 'IF YOU ARE truly interna-I
the reporters in the moonlight at a
It was just six days after Presi- tional journalists you will . bed village on Cambodia's Route 1. .dent Nixon had announced 'that released. If you are agents of they Back in Washington, ia Route 1. 's
U.S. and South Vietnamese forces CIA, you will be treated according)
had moved into Cambodia , to to the law of the count The concern was for other newsmen
destro Communist sanctuaries still in the,, hands of the Com-
Y Cambodian people do not know
near the frontier. monists. He advised U.S. officials
that there are good as well as bad not to- use military or diplomatic
Americans. They know.only. the[ pressure for their release, rather
I private groups of f o r e i g n
r intermediaries. He concluded that
the "good sense" of that advicel
Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA
He got the look, and with it he got out of their land rover
scares from low-sweeping -U S. during a roadside stop. "We had
political leader of the enemy
group.
DUDMIAN FIRST found trust in
the enemy when at one point Anh
Ba, the military leader, dropped
his loaded pistol 'and ammunition
=belt into the reporter's lap when
fles pointed at out heads that first
afternoon," Dudman wrote.
r$afsra4-their release, the
American trio had to write. a for-
mal statement on their experience
for the Communists and agreed to
make a tape recording of their
feelings. Hai admitted the latter
was for later broadcast use but
added, according to Dudman,
"only after we know that you are
safe."
THE COMMUNISTS turned
down small token farewell
presents, except for a set of crude
chessmen Dudman had carved
during their captivity. They gave
'I;U'R00=0 210001-8
 7: ST~INGTc D ILY NEWS
Approved For Release 2000/08/66 MR
@A80-01601 R00
- By KATE WEBB
United Press Intl; narlonal
The frankness of our cap-
tors amazed and puzzled
me. Toshiichi Suzuki of Ni-
hon Denpa News and I both
requested interviews and it
was we who subsequently
.,ran out of questions. The
Vietnamese never tired of
talking. It indicated, I per-
sonally concluded, the con-
fidence which they kept ex-
pressing that public opinion
was on their side thruout
the world. Thru the inter-
views and chats with
guards, as well as what we
saw, we obtained a glimpse
of what has puzzled the
world-how and why they
fight.
We, spent two weeks in a
place we called Plum Ka-
sat (Press V ill a g e.) It
seemed to be some kind of
transient camp, a collection
of thatched roof "hootches"
(huts) scattered under
thickets of trees between
two villages. We were con-
fined to two small huts, one
-built on the second day
when it became obvious the
six of us were too cramped
in the first.
They put Suzuki and me
.in one hootch, the Cambodians in the other. There was a
manger-type wooden water trough, small bamboo table,
hammocks and mosquito nets. We were permitted to walk
only to a "squat-hole" type toilet about 50 yards away
through some trees at the rear. A lean-to bath house, with,
a crock of water filled only three times before we were
released, backed onto the ~,;nali hut Suzuki and I shared
on those interminably long days and nights.
We had no idea why we were there or for how Ion-. We
sometimes lost track of the days and never saw our faces
In a mirror. I made a crude sun dial out of a stick in the
ground. We gauged when our twice daily. meals would
come by when the cows from the east village walked
past.
HALF A SHELL OF WINE
The monotony was broken only during our conversa-
tions with the officers and casual chats with our guards.
Otherwise, it was nightly Radio Hanoi broadcasts, rising
before dawn for exercises and speculating on the move-
ments of the villagers and 20 or so military personnel in
the camp. .
One night the guards gave Suzuki and me half a coco-
nut shell filled with rank, fiery rice wine. It was the only
night we slept well; One day we saw them pull a motorcy-
cie out of a haystack. There. were. days. we huddled in a
C 0 0
0. .. 10 ? ?
Arl
C'':JlJ
LjAj
bunker while U.S. "Cobra" helicopter gunships and
"slicks" (Hueys) circled overhead. Sweating, we were
aware that the black pajamas they had provided for me
and the green uniforms given the men would identify us
as part of the communist outfit if ever there was an
attack. -
There were daily visits from the camp doctor, a cheer-
ful young kid with a shock of black hair who lanced my
feet and cleaned Moonface's (Tea Kim Heang,. a free-
lance photographer) open wounds. He handed out pills for
fever and stomach upsets and warned us against becom-
ing seriously ill because, he 'said, nothing could be done
about it.
We came to know and study, the camp dogs, cats and
Kate Webb, 28, UPI bureau manager in Phnorn Penh,
Cambodia, was captured by the communists while cover-
ing military action in Cambodia last month. On Tuesday
and Wednesday, she told about her capture and the long.
walk to her place of captivity. In the following dispatch,
the third of four, she describes how she was interrogated.
and what her captors told about themselves and the Inda-?
china war.
chickens, the habits of ants, and made half-hearted at-
tempts to learn one another's languages. But most of the
time we sat, or lay, wrapped in our own thoughts and
deliberately avoiding talk of home or families, Phnom
Penh or freedom.
INTERROGATED ALL DAY
I made some diary entries on the back of a cigaret
package:
"Friday 19th. S. (Chhim Sarath, UPI driver interpret.
er) in depths of all-time low. After yesterday's interroga-
tion he sure he going to be zapped. He told me he told not
.to talk to me. But said I was English and always very
good. He huddles in corner silent all day. If had more
paper would write essay on prisoners as domestic pets.
New house means we must be in for long stay."
"Saturday 17th. Ten days now and days do not vary.
We told that interpreter fighting -at Pich Nil. My feet
worse. Suz and I questioned by "Dad", thin man with bad
eyes and girl in black pajamas, speaking bad French. We
told to answer in writing 29 questions, and asked if any-
thing want. Tailor measures us for clothes. What the
hell iS this? Hot, hot.
"Sunday 18th. Interrogated all day by young man with
screwed-up index finger with wound. I call him the Fin-
ger. Notice girl has wedding ring, tough face, soft voice.
Dad there and two old men, one in civilian clothes and
specs speaking very good French. The other squat in mil.
unif. They all laugh when I ask of their difficulties with
Sihanoukists. Splitting headache aster interrogation. All in
French."
We were given paper for the 29-question questionnaire
and I asked them for more to keep a journal. Suzuki also
was keeping notes, in Japanese. They made no attempt to
take them or read them, and gave us each two sheets of
a er for our personal use. The are b side me as I write
`
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RDPB?0-01601 R000400200001-8
 LOS 1C LEA
r, 110.1%1 10,A
Approved For Release 2000/08/14 nth kr d0-01601 R000
i ~~ 4hks ~~
Lorchme Fren
i
ar
rk
-
?
ri mDdo~d
BY ARTHUR J. DO,11,11EN
Times 5121r Writer '
C 1911, Los An;ales Times
PHNOM: PENH - The French
government was in touch with the
top leaders of the South Vietnam
National Liberation Front for at
least four years before the start of the
Paris peace talks, according to re-
liable French sources. The contact
points were in Cambodia.
Through these contacts with the
NLF leaders, the French govern-
ment received accurate advance in-
formation of such moves as the pre-
parations for the 1968 Tel. offensive
in South Vietnam and the decision
to transform the NLF into a provi-
sional government in June. 1060.
The French government was thus
In a unique position to make arse:ss-
ments of such matters as the
strengths and weaknesses of the
Communist effort in Vietnam, the
delicate and often ambiguous rela-
?tionship.between the NLF and Han-
oi, the Communist ' leadership's
readings of American willpower to
continue the war, and Communist
strategy..
These contacts took place on the
grounds of the several French-
owned rubber plantations in eastern
Cambodia not far from the border
of South Vietnam. They were fre-
quent and continued almost up to
the day Prince Norodon-r Sihanouk
was ousted as Cambodian head of
state.
The IT ii i t e d States deliberately
avoided trying, to make use of the
F r e n. c h channel to the 1 LF for
soundin;s? about a peace
settlement,. the sources
said, because President
Lyndon B. Johnson want-
ed to do nothing that
would obligate the United
States to French President
Charles de Gaulle, whose
hostility to American in-
tervention in Indochina
was Well known.
American diplomats and
other officials used highly
valued French channels,
however, on Vietnam mat-
ters. And ' American' e--
perts on the Tet offensive
say ample intelligence was
available at U.S. head-
quarters in Saigon that a
major offensive was corn-
ing One sourcAp13 m*ed
seen many of the official
documents says the top
command misread the in
tellience they had and
t h ereby underestimated
the magnitude of what the
enemy planned.).
The possibility that the
French would pass on con-
fidential information to
the top NLF leadership
through Cambodia ap-
pears to have been a major
reason why the American
delegation to the talks
w i t h North Vietnam,
which opened in Paris in
May, 19GS. consistently de-
clined to take the French
fully into confidence. In-
stead, the Americans
chose to deal with Russian
diplomats, thereby giving
the Soviet Union the cre-
dit for serving an interme-
diary role.
The French contacts in
Cambodia were estab-
lished on such a firm
working basis that when
the French wanted to find
out some important point
of NLF policy, or to dis-
cuss a minor detail such as
safe passage for a French
citizen driving from one
place to another within
South Vietnam on a par-
ticular day, they had. only
to pass a message to an
NLF agent and a meeting
with a high-ranking NLF
official.. would be arranged
-a day or two later.
The French-N
LF con-
tacts.-were directed by
French intelligence agents
who lived with the ma-
nagement staff of the
plantations at Chup, Krck.
llimot, Snuol and other
plantation towns in Cam-
bodia. The Quai d'Orsay,
French Foreign Ministry,
kept in touch through its
embassy in Phnom Penh
with the NLF's perma-
nent representation in the
Cambodian capital. But
this channel normally did
not afford the face-to-face
For ReleaMe i "1dt,IIat1~Mt`c
~'1
irel..
also learned about the ex-
the A in erican intelligence
iste'nce of the French-NLF
contacts;"'ac'cording to
French sources. This re-
porter has not been able to
confirm this information
f r o in official American
sources but if the Ameri-
cans knew about the con-
80-648Qt&WMA062OQOO 1ia8
the information derived
from them.
Known to Sihanouk
The contacts, according
to the. French sources
here, were known to
Prince Sihanouk. He did
not object to them because
he saw them as hastening
the end of the war in Viet-
nam through some kind of
negotiated solution that
would bring the NLF to
power in Saigon but spare
Cambodia from takeover
by the Vietnamese Com-
munists in the near fu-
ture. Sihanouk was so dis-
creet about the contacts
that he never once alluded
to them in public.
The contacts also be-
came known to South
Vietnam and the United
States, and they exerted
an influence on their di-
plomacy vis-a-vis France.
The French-NLF meet-
ings began on a systema-
tic basis after the Indochi
nese peoples' summit con-
ference hosted by Sihan-
ouk in Phnom Penh in
March, 1965, at which the,
NLF was represented. In-
formation about there was
passed to South Vietna-
mese intelligence by
South Vietnamese agents
in Cambodia.
The fear of. the Saigon
govern;ne'nt that the
French might be transmit-
ting information of tacti-
cal value to the NLF was
reportedly an unspoken
reason behind Saigon's
decision to break diploma-
tic relations with France
in 1965. After the break,
the French Embassy in
Saigon was reduced in sta-
tus to a consulate general
and its staff cut sharply.
. At the time of the -
killer-!can-South Vietnamese in-
cursion into Cambodia in
May, 1970, American mili-
tary intelligence in a i n-
tained that the Central Of-
fice for South Vietnam,
the Communist headquar-
ters for South Vietnam,
was located in the Fish-
hoo:c area of Cambodia not
far from the town of Mim-
ot.
This headquarters was
n e v e r uncovered, a n'd:
American officials a r e
now inclined to believe
that COSVN was located'
all along in the NLF Em-
bassy in Phnom Penh. The
French have never said
anything publicly about
COSVN, but their intelli-
gence information is be-
lieved to have been more
accurate.
Among the top leaders of
the NLF who are reported
to have had a, number of
secret meetings in Cambo-
dia with French intelli-
gence agents is Tran Bu'u
Kiem, a member of the
NLF Central Committee
who became the head of
the NLF delegation to the
enlarged Paris conference
after the bombing halt in
November, 1968. He is
presently listed by the
NLF as minister to the of-
fice of the chairman of thy;
Provisional Revolutionary'
Government of the Repub-
lic of South Vietnam.
From the point of view
of the NLF, the contacts
in Cambodia furnished the'
only available channel for
a continuing exchange of
information w i t h ' t h e
Western world-at least
until the start of the Paris
negotiations' - in condi-
tions as close to total se-
curitv as any that could be
obtained anywhere.
The American Embassy
in Phnom Penh had been
forced by Sihanouk to
Q4Z t ftiti~ cl
 - C
~' 1'i EW S
Approved For Release 2000/08/16 PWFJj80-01601 R
r>y KATE WEBB Our acquaintance with the communists began
at rifle point and ended 23 clays later with hand-
shakes and whispers at a pre-dawn release point.
Thruout, I found in them an odd mixture of
thoughtfulness. They called themselves the "Lib-
eration Front of Cambodia," with the same con-
scious humor that the Americans in South Viet-
nam call themselves a "Military Assistance Com-
-mand." They were Vietnamese, from the north
and south of Vietnam, and like American GIs,
they were homesick. They listened to radio Hanoi
as GIs listen to the Armed Forces Vietnam Net-
.work (AFVN). They complained that Cambodian
tea was not as good as the tea from the planta-
tions in the north.. They sang Vietnamese songs
and as he walked thru villages at night, we
sometimes heard Cambodian kids calling out
"Viet Cong Vietnam," much the same as I have
heard South Vietnamese youngsters," calling
"O.K- GI."
My notebook.entries for the clay of our capture
were lost when the- book was confiscated, but
Kate Webb, 23, UPI bureau manager in Phnom Penh,
disappeared on April 7whiie covering military action in
Cambodia yesterday, she told about her capture by the
Viet Cong. In the following dispatch, the second of four,
she tells about the long march to the place of captivity.
those first moments wilt
take -a long time to for-
get. ?
The two soldiers who
had captured us tied our
arms behind our backs
with t a p e , vines and
ropes. They ordered us,
into a nearby bunker
and a few moments lat-
er approached with a
green sack.
"It's plastique (an ex-
plosive widely used in
Indochina)," I thought,
and tried to scramble
out, passing the word
back to the others. We
all thought.we would be
blown to pieces.
But the sack was for
our cameras and per-
sonal effe ts. One'of the
soldiers sat methodical-
ly taking inventory on
-?~
in round North Vietnamese military canteen,, but
it was not enough. We grabbed at the canteens,
drained them and pleaded for more. They
brought more from a nearby command post that
we had passed without. seeing. -
Running .silently on his thick rubber Ho Chi
Minh sandals, one of the soldiers returned with
the first officer we were to meet. He wore no
rank insignia. Only a pistol on an American belt
identified him as a superior. His uiform, drab
brown shirt and green trousers, was the same as
those of the common soldier.
"You are invited to go to my place where there
will be food and water," he said, checking the
binds on our arms. "It is a short walk from
here."
It was the first of many walks which were nev-
er short, always long. It was the worst.
The trail was one we had crossed several times
while trying to elude the communists. It led back
to the Kirirom road, branching off from Das Kan
chor, the Cambodian outpost that had been our
hoped-for renclevous point with government
troops.
The guards stopped and hacked branches from
the trees around us. With difficulty, we each held
one with our bound hands. Like walking trees, we
set off down the roadside,
A Cambodian wearing a bright blue shirt and civilian
trousers appeared from somewhere and soon the other
five captives were brought back. That whispered that
they had simply undergone questioning by the Viet-
namese. The Cambodian, prompted by Vietnamese, an-
nounced in Cambodian that we were prisoners of the
Cambodian Liberation Forces. He said we were not to
fear for our lives and would be taken a short way to
another place. He said the Liberation Armed Forces were
"humane."
Our ropes were replaced with green plastic-covered
wire, Mine, I noticed, were looser than the others. Tied
in a chain and warned again not to run from the planes,
we marched off into the night.
I remember little of that walk, except that we had no
shoes. We were passed by shadowy groups of troops and
some girls with pony tail hair styles. Four litters moved
past shadows, their bearers running at a shuffling trot.
Two litters were closed, carrying dead. Groans. and
screams came from another and a guard told us it was a
malaria case.
We were moving deep into the mountains and an artil-
lery barrage started. We were herded into a three-man
bunker. The guards stayed outside. The bunker was typi-
cal, deep and thick with about three feet of overhead
cover. The six of us crammed inside, hardly able to
breathe for what seemed about 30 minutes. It also
smelled-of U.S. Our party moved across creek beds,
adways uphill. We were passed by 'two soliders carrying
the tube of a 75 millimeter recoiless rifle on a tree branch
and struggling and slithering under its weight,
our geaxA p1 v> do l R%11",30spd0#{e1 %etcf14s-RDP80-01601 R000400200001-8
They counted.the money
each of us had and not- on our I.D. cards.
 Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R0004
HARTFORD, CONN.
TIMES
APR 2 9
E & S - 135,812
S~akrvf Cmbodicrn. regime
The cabinet crisis that has af-
flicted Cambodia for the past _ two
weeks offers a discouraging glimpse
into the political health. of our coun-
try's newest Southeast Asian ally.
The premier, General Lon Nol,
who was swept into power in the
coup that preceded the American-
South Vietnamese invasion a year
ago, tried in vain to resign.
He has suffered a serious stroke;
has been hospitalized in Hawaii; has
returned, under doctor's orders to
spend no more than an hour a day
doing any kind of desk work; and
would obviously like to retire.
But if he were to retire, a clique
of colonels grouped around his
younger brother would lose in-
fluence, so they are urging him to
remain, in title at least, premier.
His deputy premier, General Sirik
Matak, is unpopular with some fac-
tions, so everyone prefers to have
Lon Nol remain formally premier -
even though the latest report on his
health is that he is too ill to make
important decisions, or to be told
bad news.
Meanwhile, some of the important,
.decisions will apparently include the
advice . and counsel of a long-time
Cambodian exile, Son Ngoc Thanh.
Thanh was briefly his nation's
premier in 1945. His ambitions clash-.
ed with those of Prince Norodom
Sihanouk, and Thanh fled into exile,
where he encouraged the view that
Sihanouk was a tool of Communism.
Thanh has spent most of the last
decade raising a clandestine guerrilla
army to overthrow Sihanouk, with.
support from the American CI;4 and
possibly the Green Berets as well.
With Sihanouk now overthrown,
Thanh obviously feels it safe to re-
appear, and the CIA is presumably
glad to see him back.
Whether his presence, Lon Nol's
tottering premiership, Sirik Matak's
enemies or the colonels and their
friends will bring stability to Cam-
bodia remains to be seen.
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 C{-;-T)1r} `} 5 I A I IN I L
Approved For Release 2000/0811'' :U~-'RD'80-01601R00
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