STUDY OF CORPORATE EMPIRES OMITS CONQUESTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000400160001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 25, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2oM64)b 9'9 t -RDP80-01601E 000400160001-3
2 J iO J 7372
Stud
coy : ah. '.~
INVISIBLE EMPIRES, Multina-
tional Companies and the Mod-
ern World, by Louis Turner.
Harcourt Brace Janovich, New
York, 1971.228 pp.
By VICTOR PERLO
This book. written by a young
Englishman. can be used as ref-
erence for sonic facts and partial
histories about multinational
corporations. There is even one
more or less valid. broad general-
ization:
--We shall argue in this book
that the typical transaction in
international commerce is no
longer simply exporting or im-
porting. Instead. it is increasing
ly the creation of manufacturing
facilities owned by multinational
companies."
Turner visited 'the offices of
International Business Machines
and was given some interesting
facts which he retails to his read-
ers:
IB\l operates in 104 countries.
through charging super monopoly
prices after buying materials at
prices below their value.
There is no examination. for
example. of IBM's pricing policy.
which in essence is to sell its
products at about five times the
factory cost of production: There
is no mention of how -paternal-
istic." anti-union IBM engages in
super exploitation of labor. Within
the United States it signs con-
tracts with service supply com-
panics for laborers. cleaning per-
sonnel. etc., who are largely
Black or members of other mi-
nority groups and get none of the
benefits of IBM's "regular" em-
ployees.Outside theUnitedStates,
it manufactures components in
the U.S. puppet state of Taiwan.
using workers paid one twentieth
the U.S. scale.
Turner minimizes the impor-
tance and scale of international
operations before World War II.
and, in particular, omits the long-
standing operations of 'the inter-
national oil trusts and cartels.
Incredibly. Turner doesn't even
mention the multinationa) banks.
which play a role in the interna-
tional operations . of monopoly
capital quite comparable to their
role within individual imperialist
countries. Nor is there any. sys-
tematic discussion - under any
name - of the elaborate inter-
twining of imperialist government
and private monopoly. of the man-
ifold means of assistance derived
from the home government by the
mulitnationals in their drive to
expand.
Turner notes the rapid growth
of U.S.-owned multinational cor-
porations in Europe since. WVorld
War H. How did they get there?
He attributes this to U.S. advan-
tages in research. development
and management. But he com-
pletely evades the main point:
The U.S. emerged ? unscathed
and enriched from World War II,
with an overwhelming advantage
over its imperialist rivals in
financial and material resources.
Achieving military occupation and
relatively permanent military
bases in Western Europe, it im-
posed anti-Communist govern-
ments there'. In effect, it made
with over 500 sales offices and pro-
duction facilities. All this is cen-
trally' coordinated through 307
communication centers. via some
10.000 teletype messages daily
letters are obsolete. Some 2.500
executives have desk-top micro-
film readers to get instantaneous-
ly any piece of information they
need. It employs 24.000 research
and development personnel in 26
laboratories, seven of them in
,Europe.One might add-it wasn't
-true vet when Turner wrote -
that IBM now makes more profits
from its foreign operations than
from its U.S. operations. and more.
from its foreign operations than
any other U.S. corporation.
Turner points out that IBM, de-
spite its "multinational" charac-
ter, is solidly U.S. in ownership,
control, and management. Only
1.6 percent of the executives are
non-U.S. citizens, which means
that in all the far-flung establish-
ments of IBM, the local workers
have U.S. bosses.
But there is nothing in this book
about the driving force behind
IBM and the other multinationals.
There is no realization that this.
is the modern expression of the
need of monopoly capital to ex-
pand anywhere and everywhere.
and especial ert su r e
profits Cram o eli~ eo r eleas 9
IPA
r"- ~t4trt1601 R000400160001-3
through payment of lower wages the socialist revolutions that were
than in the home country and inevitable at that time in .a num-
ber of these countries if the in-
ternal forces were permitted to
settle the issue without outside
interference. This resulted in an J
open door for U.S. capital and for
U.S. military power to ensure the
retention of privileges of U.S.-
owned corporations, among other
purposes.
Without this. all of the alleged
"managerial superiority." of the
U.S. corporate brass would have
counted for nought.
Turner does tell of the espion-
age operations of firms such as
Imperial Chemical. Monsanto. du
Pont: the relations of some U.S.
monopolies to the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, and connections
with military intelligence and
armed interventions. As an ex-
ample. he cites the role of the
United Fruit Co.. the Dulles
brothers and the CIA in the 1954
overthrow of the progressive Ar-
benz regime-in Guatemala.
But all this is in the past. says
Turner. Twenty }ears ago. at the
time of U.S. interventions in Iran
and Guatemala. the apologetic
professors were referring to the
supposedly extinct imperialism of
Teddy Roosevelt and Calvin Cool-
idge. Now Turner simply updates
the same, transparent technique
softened with sham naivete:
"This area is grossly under-
studied. The classic firms with in-
telligence links, like United Fruit.
are relics of the "bad old days of
open 'dollar imperialsm.' We need
to know more about how the man-
ufacturing newcomers to the
world scene.are conducting then-
selves."
Come now, Mr. Turner. What
about ITT and Chile? What about
the warfare of the Seven Sisters
of international oil against Iraq?
What about Union Carbide and
Rhodesia? What 'about the U.S.
sugar trust and the Marines in
Santo Domingo?And above all,
what about that most fierce and
on-going genocidal warfare of
U.S. imperialism, on behalf of
Standard Oil, Chase Manhattan
and the Bank of America, Ford
Motors and McDonnell Douglas -
coT1'
 Approved For Release 2001 8t'P80-01601 R0004
PAIL 1972
What Can Be Done
At Foggy Bottom (2)
OP RATION TOPSY
by John W. Tuthill
Everybody seems to talk-or write-about the
bureaucracy, but, like the weather, nobody does
anything about it. A faceless and pervasive force,
it overwhelms people, and few ever confront it.
One man who did was John W. Tuthill, a
career Foreign Service Officer who came to the
simple conclusion that in Brazil, where he was
appointed Ambassador in 1966, there were too
many official Americans. His remarkable attack
on the "system," or systems, had far-reaching con-
sequences for it helped set in motion successive
rounds of personnel cuts throughout the world-
by both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations-
which have actually resulted in an over-all reduc-
tion in U.S. officials overseas. Here, for the first
time, Ambassador Tuthill tells his own story. He
called his project "Operation Topsy," because, as
he puts it, "it sought to deal with an organization
that had not been constructed on the basis of a
comprehensive decision of the U.S. government,
but had `jest growed.' "-The Editors.
Operation Topsy resulted in considerable
budgetary and balance-of-payments advantage
for the U.S. government. These benefits,
however, were not the basic reason for its
being. Operation Topsy came about because
of a political judgment.
U.S. government personnel in Brazil had
increased 'steadily since the spring of 1964,
when the corrupt and ineffective Goulart
regime was overthrown and General Castelo
Branco was proclaimed President of Brazil. By
mid-1966, there were 920 U.S. citizens, plus
about a thousand Brazilian employees in the
American' mission.
This number did not
Corps volunteers. While Operation Topsy
was to involve all major U.S. government
agency operations in Brazil including the pro-
fessional staff of the Peace Corps, it did not
include the volunteers. This was the only im-
portant exception to the cut in personnel, and
it was based upon my conviction that a huge
country like Brazil could easily absorb several
hundred Peace Corps volunteers, who were
engaged in useful work, often in remote parts
of Brazil.
Castelo Branco, who was Put in office by
the military, nevertheless was an extraordi-
nary head of government. Intelligent, trained
to public service and of unquestioned integrity,
his interest was to bring his country out of the
disorder, the lack of growth, and the corrup-
tion that had existed during the immediately
preceding years of the Quadros and Goulart
regimes.
After years of corruption, drift and infla-
tion (at rates up to and above 100 percent a
year) the American government welcomed
with enthusiasm-some thought. with exces-
sive enthusiasm-the Castelo Branco govern-
ment. The result was a staggering expansion
of the role and personnel of the American
government between 1964 and 1966.
The U.S. government assured Castelo
Branco of a very considerable increase in
economic aid along the lines of the Alliance
for Progress. Previously, U.S. aid had pretty
much been limited to local "islands" within
Brazil, in an effort to be of help to the Bra-
zilian people, but at the same time, to avoid
giving support to a corrupt and inefficient gov-
ernment. In addition-and this of course was
more controversial-the U.S. government
agreed to increase its military aid and im-
plicitly to increase the number of military
advisers in Brazil.
Like most governments, the U.S. govern-
ment is hard to move. However, once the
governmental mass begins to move, it is ex-
tremely difficult to change its direction. It is
also almost impossible to prevent bureaucratic
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`continued
 Approved For Release 20 IeFlAgRDP80-01.601 P,dR#'80r1a i4, more authoritar
R ,. tan, and less concerned about main-
Richard Barnet
LETT
taining a constitutional facade) CvTAT
.felo Branco assumed extensive dicta-
{itorial powers. In 1968 a leftist. move-
ment began to grow in the universi
'ties, and there was a blight of bank
robberies and urban terrorism that
culminated in the kidna aping of the
"Fairly cruel but sensible policies American ambassador. The govern
A few months ago, I would hear major .competing forces in Brazilian nlent of Costa e Silva, in poser since
every week of sonic personal friend or life by listening . to what people say 1966; responded with the suspension
of habeas corpus and the blatant use
acquaintance who had just been tor- about torture.
~overinment attitude of torture.
Lured. Many of my former students The -official g d with a prominent ban}:cr
have been.subjected to electric shock, concedes that some "excesses" may I talked
plantation wit owner was en
beaten and had their. bones broken by have occurred but insists that torture liusia c about the tough wasuen-
the police, and they killed m best is. not a policy. Indeed, Jarbas Pas- -the antic had et employed to curb
friend in an interrogation session. But sarinho, the Minister of Education, ?~ 1 ye
now you hear less about torture. well over a year ago publicly 'de- inflation, defeat terrorism. and pro-
There are not many people left worth nouncecl torture, and at least one mole growth. I~ or him there was no
torturing. -An intellectual critic brigadier general was transferred in doubt that anyone who had suffered,
mild disgrace' because lie had author- any unpleasantness at the hands of the'
s
nce deserved it. None his friends
tP Of course the economic miracle ized the use of electric shock treat police.
deserercd the ne of his fin
.will continue. T'his is a next. country meat on political prisoners: At the p ha a~reccl that the novetest fro had
with' tremendous opportunities and same time the generals ]pith whonn I :, z
we have f6itrid the way to develop. talked stook obvious pride in the keen able to keep inflation down only
-A retired admiral "stability" that had been achieved by by breaking the power of the unions
their "strong measures." "In 1961?," and controlling wages. (There has
one admiral said, "-our couittry.was on been no legal strike in Brazil since
? illegal strikes were
HE T3ItAZ1LIANV REFOT:UTION, Which the brink of collapse: terrorism 1961.
, ruthless! 'T'he f reew w ill ga "Ekes wens
recently celebrated its eighth bank robberies, Communists ?in the y 1
'birthday, 'is a unique political pile- zovernffic lt, and a 9.1 per cent rate of don't understand that we need a
stronmnovernnncnt here. The people
nonSe non1. Although Brazil is now run inflation. '1 he Revolution brought the ot readfor ow' };ind of denloc
largely by the Army with the aid of discipline and order essential for. aIrree;dn At liii), fogyouion that perhaps
the police, it is neither a COI1uCntional economic progress. the inent was now secure
.police state nor a traditional Latin There arc signs that the rulers of thou goveovtrnreturn to a s ten] of direct
American military govcrnnunt. Nor, Brazil are divided about the most g }
for most of the people who live there, effective techniques of social control.- elections, he became agitated. "There
be elections
is it an "economi:c miracle." Between Some favor putting more emphasis on 11 won't lectidoons f fo'rfh~ aloCnog time and
the torture rate and the growth rate the rack, others on the TV tube. One win." shouldn't l be.
fficial
only- an o
there is a profound and subtle con indication of this tension is the his- woAlld
overn wme ]ant and an official o
neetion. The generals who !told Brazil tory of the Revolution itself. The first government
erim min part)' and tho C -
peneration of generals, who seized posit }
in a more effective grip than exists in generation gist ptar[ illegal, his fears seemed
any government elsewhere in Latin power in 1961?, were, within' the spec- }
America worship economic develop- from of Brazilian military politics, irrational, but the emotion in his voice
meat. They are prepared to achieve it -liberals. The first president, General .1cf taro doubt that they were real.
through a judicious mixture of official Castelo 'Branco; though prepared to For intellectuals, would-be political
terrorism, modern techniques of take stronaction against any polit- activists, and students, the police 'tor-
Z3
and social control, and ical activity identified as "subver- ture has succeeded in imposing a code
what former Minister of Economic sion," looked fjorward to-the relaxa- of behavior. After almost four years
of systematic sadism, the litres are
Planning Roberto Campos calls "but- lion of military rule. of elem.. systematic
one in Brerli are
cancer capitalism." The state elections of 1965 de- 'low ,a r No oneil do t is
In every conversation I had in stroyed those hopes. The opposition social in is s a a 1. rsu sine inaz
icial tc strums iof ntro Brazil, whether. with generals, high candidates die} too well; under pros- socsocceedon brilliantly for two reasons.
government officials, corporation su1e from the right using generals
First, the government has made it
presidents, professors, or students, it
Richard Barnet, codirector- of the destitute clear that it will resort to any met}nods,
!was evident. that police torture was for Policy Studies in Washington, has written no matter how barbarous, to discour-
{ much on their minds. One can gatn ? sereral books on foreign and military policy, agc a?sociatiotts it considers daIlget'-
an instant and, I suspect, reasonably the rnoSt recent of which is The Roots
of War ous. It has used such spectacular
accurate impression "of some pf the (Atheneum). methods as loosing a live alligator on
a young woman who would not talk.-
Approved The deterrent effect is obvious. People
For Release 2006/01/03 :CIA-RDP80-01601R0QO4QQOc6Q00de8ftde in their closest
friends for fear that they Will reveal
 ~~AASSxg T
Approved For Release 2UUN~~ 3 I, C - P80-016018000
26 A U G 1972
By RAGNAR LANGE
A Brazilian joke goes, "Cabral dis-
covered Brazil in 1500 - Tad Szulc
discovered the Northeast in 1960." In=
deed; Szulc's front-page articles in the
New York Times catapulted the area
out of. 200 year. of obscurity into inter-
national renown. Szulc wrote of the
shocking deprivation 'and inequities of
the Northeast and described the rise of
Francisco Juliao`s Peasant Leagues.
And he concluded with the warning that
"the makings of a revolutionary situa-
tion are increasingly. apparent."
Szulc's article found many avid
readers, among, them John F. Kennedy,
who was just winding up his campaign
for the presidency. After his inaugura-
tion, Kennedy dispatched Arthur H.
Schlesinger Jr. to make a first-hand
investigation of the situation in the
Northeast. Schlesinger returned con-
vinced that something must be done to
prevent the area from falling prey to a
Communist revolution. According to the
domino theory, if Northeast Brazil went
Communist, Brazil would go; and if
Brazil went, Latin America would, go;
and if Latin America went ... obvious-
ly, emergency action was indicated.
THE "EXPLOSIVE" situation there
made the Northeast an obligatory
stop-off on everybody's trip through
South America. Within' two years the
list of visitors included George Mc-
Govern, Sargent Shriver, Edward Ken-
nedy, Henry Kissinger, Ralph Nader
and Yuri Gagarin. Unfortunately, none
of them was able to offer a solution to
the Northeast's problems.
Meanwhile, Francisco Juliao, Per-
nambucan lawyer turned peasant orga-
nizer, basked in the fame Szulc's arti-
cles had brought him. Enthusiastic
throngs of farm laborers gathered to
cheer him wherever he spoke and to
give him assurances of their readiness
for action. However, as it turned out,
action was not Juliao's strong point. For
one thing, he lacked a program; for
another, he was ideologically inconsist-
ent, one day espousing violent methods
and the next day eschewing them. The
only point he madc.absolutely clear was
that if there were any violence, he
didn't want to be involved.
Nevertheless, despite his ambiva-
lence, there could be no doubt that Ju-
liao was amassing. considerable. poten-
tial political power - potential because
under Brazilian law illiterates could not
vote, and in Northeast Brazil almost all
peasants are illiterate. However, at this
time there was a movement underway
to enfranchise them and the various
leftist parties set about courting Juliao
in the hope of guaranteeing themselves
the peasant vote, if it materialized.
Both the Brazilian Communist par-
ty and President Joao Goulart's Brazili-
an Labor party made overtures, but
Juliao was carried away by dreams of a
grandiose scheme for a nationwide
peasant-worker alliance of which he
himself would be "maximum leader."
This plan put him on a collision course
with Goulart, who had visions of filling
the void left in Brazilian politics by the
suicide of his mentor, Getulio Vargas,
by assuming the Vargas role himself.
Goulart made Juliao a concrete offer,
the exact terms of which never have
been disclosed, and, when Juliao reject-
..ed it, Goulart turned on him with all the
fury of an avenging angel. the workers nor the peasants but wholly
Juliao did not fare much better with with his own personal ambitions.
the Communists. Ile became entangled None of the Northeastern peasant
in,the web of the Sino-Soviet dispute, organizations offered the slightest re-
and because he felt that the Brazilian sistance to the military takeover. Fol-
situation more closely approximated the lowing the coup, Juliao was seized and
Chinese c x p e r i e n c e of revolution
spreading from the countryside' to the
cities, he earned the undying enmity of
the Moscow-controlled party leadership.
His ideas were derided by the party's
Central Committee as a manifestation
of "leftist extremism - the infantile
disease of communism."
By now, Juliao was facing yet an- 10- years ago. Or 100 years ago, for that
other challenge. Among the stream of matter. "The peasants," Page writes,
visitors to the Northeast had -been a "were imbued with a sense of fatalism
respectable number of CIA operatives. toward the travails of their earthly
Having analyzed the situation as one in . life." Their feeling of hopelessness is
which the deep-seated influence of the abviously well justified.
Catholic Church could be used to turn
the tide in favor of democracy, freedom
and the status quo, the CIA proceeded
to lend 'unlimited assistance - finan-
cial, organizational and otherwise - to
Church-sponsored unions. According to
Joseph Page, the padres were so naive
that they did not realize they were re-
ceiving CIA support. Be that as it may,
the CIA funding soon enabled the .
Church-affiliated unions to make deep
.inroads into Juliao's Leagues. Alarmed
by the growing power of the Catholic
unions, Goulart moved to close them
down through federal "intervention." At
the same time, a group, of young
Trotskyists and a Maoist splinter group
entered the competition to unionize
Northeastern farmworkers. By the end
of 1963, the situation in Pernambuco
wad one of utter chaos.
AGAINST THIS backdrop USAID
and SUDENE, the Brazilian regional
development. agency, were trying to
bring about some kind of economic inir-
acle that would significantly alleviate
the .plight of the Northeastern peasants.
Given the circumstances, it seems hard-
ly surprising that their plans failed to
produce any substantive results.
Nor does it really seem surprising
that the Brazilian Army finally tired of
Goulart's ineptitude and decided to re-
move him from office. Ile had long
since degenerated into a political demo-
gogue of the worst variety, and Page's
thrown into a dungeon where he was
kept in solitary confinement for two
months. He was freed on a writ of
habeas corpus in September, 1965, and
now lives in Mexico.
The lot of the Northeastern farm
laborer today probably remains sub-
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 THE, NATIOli
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1.L
7-, Z
li J'LU 2 J V A
2, . I i;wAD OMD 19, T`3I15
Mr. Burns, professor of Latin American history at UCLA,
has traveled extensively in Brazil during the last twelve years.
Ile has written five books on that country, of winch the most
recent are Nationalism in Brazil (Praeger) and A History of
Brazil (Columbia University Press).
Ond hundred fifty years ago, Brazil broke its political
ties with Portugal. While serving as regent of Brazil, Prince
Pedro, the young Braganza heir to the Portuguese throne,
unilaterally declared Brazil's independence. With most of
the Western Hemisphere independent of Europe by 1822,
Pedro had little choice. Ile could declare Brazil's independ-
ence and'become its emperor, or he could stand by while
the restive Brazilian elite declared their own independence
and established a new government without the guiding hand
of the I3raganzas. The former course was obviously his'
preference, and.the I3raganzas ruled until the republic was
established in 1889. Although nominally independent,
Brazil changed little throughout most of the 19th century.
True, a small Brazilian elite exercised political power in
place of the Portuguese, but institutions, customs and so-
cial patterns remained much as they had been in the
colonial past. Great Britain dominated the economic life
of the new nation at least as much as Portugal had during'
the colonial period.
Fifty years ago, a group of writers, poets and artists,
weary of Brazil's slavish imitation of European culture,
gathered at the Municipal Theatre in Sao Paulo to pro-
claim their country's intellectual independence. During the
"Modern Art Week" of 1922, they pleaded with their com-
patriots to forget the marble temples and Gothic churches
of Europe and contemplate the lush vegetation and nat-
ural wealth of Brazil. They turned the eyes of the nation
inward,.an introspection which produced a series of fasci-
nating studies of the Brazilian character and soul. A new
type of writer-of whom Gilberto Freyre and Jorge Ama-
do are best known in the United States-created a .style,
language and-subject matter that were uniquely Brazilian.
Having achieved their new intellectual; insight, the Bra-
zilians became increasingly aware of their economic de-
pendency. If Great, Britain had dominated the economy
in the 19th century, the United States did so.after World
War I. The great . financial debacle in Western Europe
and the United States in. 1929 adversely affected brazil
and prompted the new government of Getulio Vargas, the
man who, alive or dead, shaped Brazil in the 1930-64
period, to take measures to reduce Brazil's economic
dependency. Ile increased governmental planning and par-
ticipation in the economy. A steel'company was founded
in the 1940s; a national oil monopoly, Petrobras, was
authorized in 1953; a company to encourage and control
the production of electrical energy, Eletrobras, came into
being in 1962, the same year in which the government
promulgated a law to limit profit remissions abroad.
Those measures, taken to increase Brazil's polit-
ical, intellectual and economic independence, v,'ere dra-
matically reversed after April 1, 1961. On that day the
miliiary swept into. power, deposing the constitutionally
selected President, Joao Goulart, and ending nineteen
years of successful experimentation with democracy.
Vocal and powerful elements of the upper and middle
classes, fearing the Populist tendencies of the Goulart
government, had called upon the military to put an end
to further reform. The officers had intervened in politics
before but customarily withdrew after a short tir,te, leav-
ing the government in civilian hands. Not so in 1965. The
officers resolved to exercise power themselves and they
have done so with increasing harshness ever since.
One of the most surprising results of these eight years
of military rule has been the surrender of much of Brazil's
independence of action and choice, so painfully won dur-
ing the preceding decades. The originality characteristic
of Brazilian political and intellectual life during the 1950s
and early 1960s has disappeared, smothered by an official
disapproval of trends prevalent in that period and de-
nounced by an insecure middle class that is eager to
imitate as superior whatever originates abroad.
With Brazil now exercising, less independence of action
than at any time in memory, it is ironic that in 1972 the
nation lavishly commemorates 150 years of political in-
dependence. The irony has not gone unnoticed. What
happened to a slogan posted on a wall in downtown Rio
de Janeiro indicates that at least some Brazilians are
aware of the absurdity of the commemorations: a vertical
line drawn in the appropriate place in "Viva Independ-
encia" (Long live independence) transformed the mean-
ing to "Viva In/dependencia" (Live in dependency).
Nearly every aspect of Brazilian life feels the weight of
the new dependency. In no 'realm is it more obvious or
heavier than in foreign policy. Hardly had the military
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Cdr t5.niaoci?
 cc>
MOSCOW., ZA RUBEZHOM
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Approved For Release VP31-RDP80-01601 R000
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP80-01601RO
THE STOCKTON RECORD
.4 may 1970
rUOP.PrOfeSSOrFrOm Brazil l+
lSays CIA '?
Debases Peace Corps
By MARJORIE FLAHERTY are involved in the shaping of
Of the Record Staff "the right way of behaving".
The U.S, Central Intelligence through programs in which?
Agency has debased the once "every course out I I n e is
/beautiful Peace Corps, Dr. Flor- checked for content." Peoplel
V -' tt,rh Villa_Alvarez a Coven r,.{_ Fare b e i n g labeled subversive
, lege p r o f e s s o r from Brazil, ~vua ;
is one of "cultural terrorism
aaaress at the university of the tures," Villa-Alvarez claimed.
P
ifi
ac
c. '85 FIRED'
"CIA agents play the role of ?: , P o I n t I n,g out that "85 out
anti-Americans in the P e a c e standing scholars were f I r e d
' Corps to find out what others last year in Sao Paulo alone," I
FF think," Villa-Alvarez declared. Villa-Alvarez said, "before theyl
The educator, who once removed me I left the'
trained Peace Corpsmen, indig 'colony."'
nantly reported that "some of_ Reflecting his frustration, the
t my former students at New ? professor, who has taught in the
E; ,York University are: being 'used ? U.S., Brazil and other countries,
by CIA to try to penetrate Bra- said he officially "denounced"
f 7ilian student ' grnnne A. -
gracing worx.'- opportunity, and has even been
'WORST KIND' ; praised .for his efforts, but his
Villa-Alvarez, who has worked. reports have been shunted aside
on socio-economic projects in. without action.
Latin America for the United' Warning that present tactics
Nations as well. as for his own.? in South America "will ?raise~
country, sees U.S. influgnce' as.- radicalism against the United 1
"cultural colonialism-the worst, States,' Villa-Alvarez "support-h
kind.' - ..ed every word" of Dr. Richard `
Thoroughly disenchanted' with,'' Shaull, Princeton professor whol
American and Brazilian ap- declared at UOP Monday nightql
h
proac
es. to progress, Villa that Latin America is ripe ford
?Alvaro7 asserted businneemen ...t..,: t._....
.L___
use
are
in both countries think only of viable political alternatives .for'4
their own Interests and have those who want reform,
"manipulated technical assist-?. Shaull also said the future of
t
d
.ante
o
is s e r v e both coun Latin America will be deter-
"
tries.
' mined by what basic changes {
Since the rise of the military' occur in the United States.
p a r a d I s e for foreign invest ' associate professor of commu=`
ments," Villa-Alvarez declared.:' nity development,' sociology and',
. The regime invited "an inva cultural anthropology at Covell
Sion, a take-over of Brazilian'in-.. since September, noted that ml-
dustries," he said, and the sub- norities in the U.S.- are "claim-
Sequent "denationalization I s' ing through violence ;what'
tragic and frightening." should have been given to them --
The government sought for- by right" but said he-does not-I
eign money by offering special .yet have a "complete grasp" of;~
'
rivileges . to foreign ' bu
i
ee2_?' `.
h
t._.-t -
._ ___
~.___ .
p
s
n
t
e
ene
ble
> men, he added. d i s c it s s the social, revolution.
$a said U.6. experts in Brazil ? tare i,?
Approved' For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400160001-3