KEY TEXTS FROM PENTAGON'S VIETNAM STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300350114-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 114
• Publication Date: July 3, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

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NEW YORK TIMES
Approved-For Release 200$tQ$/Q4l97cIA-RDP8
STATINTL
Following are texts of key docu7ncnts a6com2i.jx4-ajbly the
.Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, covering the period late
1966 to mid-1967, in which Secreturr,~ of Defense Robert S.
McNamara. began to express disillusionment with the ef fec-
tiveness of the war effort. Except where, ixcerptiny is specified,
the documents are printed verbatim, with, only mint stakable
typographical e'r?rors.correcteil.
~ ~ A ~ ~ Oct. 14,1966,
Opposing Increase in War EAU ort
case In 1961 and 1963 and 1965, we
have not found the formula, the catalyst,
for training and inspiring them , into
effective action.
2. Recommended actions. In such an
unpromising state of affairs, what
should we do? We must continue to
press the enemy militarily; we must
make demonstrable progress in pacifi-.
cation; at the same time, we must add
a 'now Ingredient forced on us by. the
facts. Specifically, we must improve our
position by getting ourselves into a
military posture that we credibly would
maintain indefinitely-a posture that
makes trying to "wait us out" less at-
-tractive. I recommend a five-pronged
course of action to achieve those ends.
a. Stabilize US force-levels In Viet-
nam. It is my judgment that, barring
a dramatic change in the war, we should
limit the increase in US forces in SVN
in 1907 to 70,000 men and we should
level off at the total of 470,000 which
such an increase would provide.* It is
my view that this is enough to punish
the enemy at the large-unit operations
level, and to keep the enemy's main
forces from interrupting pacification. I
believe also that even many more than
470,000 would not kill the enemy off in
such numbers as to break their- morale
so long as they think they can wait us
out. It is possible that such a 40 per-
cent increase over our present level of
325,000 will break the enemy's morale
in the short term; but if it does not,
we must, I believe, be prepared for
and have underway a long-term program
premised on more than breaking the
morale of main force units. A stabilized
US force level would be part of such
.My concern continues, however, rn cut; the rice crop expected to come
other respects. This is because I see no to market is smaller; we control little, if "Admiral Sharp has recommended a
reasonable way to bring the war to an
any, more of the population; the VC 12/31/67 strength. of 570,000. However, I
end soon. Enemy morale has not broken infrastructure thrives in most belleve both he and General Westmoreland
-- he apparently has adjusted to our political recognize that the danger of inflation will
stopping his drive for military victory, of the country, continuing to give ,the probably force an end 1967 deployment limit,
and has adopted a strategy of keep- enemy his enormous intelligence ad- of about 470,000.
-
Ing us busy and waiting -us out (a vantage; fill security exists nowhere
strategy of attriting our national will). (now even behind the US Marines' 'a long-tern program. It would put us
He knows that we have not been, and lines and in Saigon); in the countryside, in a position where negotiations would
he believes we probably will not be, the enemy. almost completely, controls be more likely to be productive, but
able to translate our military successes the night. T if they were not we could pursue the
into the "end products"?-broken enemy Nor has the ROLLING THUNDER all-important pacification task. with
morale and political achievements by program of bombing the North either proper attention and resources and
the GVN. significantly affected infiltration or 'without the spectre of apparently end-
The one thing demonstrably going for cracked the. morale of Hanoi. There is aess escalation of US deployments.
us' in Vietnam over the past year has agreement in the intelligence community, b. Install a barrier. A portion of the
been the large number of enemy killed- on these facts (see the. attached Ap- 470,000 troops -- perhaps 10,000 to
in-action resulting from the big military. pendix). .. 20,000 --- should be devoted to the con.
operations. Allowing for possible exag- In essence, we find ourselves -- from struction and maintenance of an
geration in reports, the enemy must be the point of view of the important war infiltration barrier. Such a barrier would
taking losses -- deaths in and after (for the complicity of the people) - no lie near the 17th parallel. -- would run
battle - at the rate of more than better, and if anything worse off. This from the sea, across the neck of South
60,000 a year. The infiltration routes important war must be fought and won Vietnam (choking off the now infiltra-
would seem to be one-way trails to by the Vietnamese themselves. We have tion routes through the DMZ) and across
death fort z } ~ ~ q t y k n o w e r t ro i he b e g i n n i n g But the the trails in Laos. This interdiction sys-
there1s no r 4440d l,'I lease Q> / 4 :t1 Ais -046( $ s ' bil.
Draft memorandum for President Lyndon B. Johnson, "Actions Recommended
for Vietnam," from Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Oct. 14, 1966.
1. Evaluation of the situation. In the in enemy morale and, it appears that
report of my last trip to Vietnam al- he can more than replace his losses by
most a year ago, .I stated that the odds infiltration from North Vietnam and re-
were about even that, even with the crr,itnient in -South Vietnam.
then-recommended deployments, we Pacification is a bad disappointment.
would be faced in early 1967 with a We have good grounds to be pleased
military stand-off at a much higher level by the recent elections, by Ky's 16
of conflict and with "pacification" still months in power, and by the faint signs
stalled. I am' a little less pessimistic of development of national political in-
now in one respect. We have done stitutions and of a legitimate civil gov-
somewhat better militarily than I antic- self into But none of this has translated
ipated. We have by and large blunted itself nto political achievements at
the communist military initiative --- any Province level or below. Pacification
military victory. in South Vietnam the has if anything gone backward. As corn-
Viet Conk may have had in mind 18 pared ? with -two,' or four, years ago,
months ago has been thwarted by our enemy full-time regional forces and
emergency deployments . and actions. part-time guerrilla forces are larger; at-
And our program of bombing the North tacks, terrorism and sabotage have in..
has exacted a price. creased in scope and intensity;
more railroads are closed and highways