NIXON SEEMS TO BE IGNORING LESSON: BOMBING DIDN'T WORK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300350089-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 89
• Publication Date: December 28, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH
Approved For Release 2001/O%PCClA-IDP80-01601 R00
By RICHARD DUDMAN
Chief Washington Correspondent
of the Post-Dispatch
WASHINGTON, D e c. 28-As
President Richard M. Nixon re-
lies increasingly on U n i t e d
States air power in Indochina,
he appears to be ignoring a les-
son learned by the Johnson Ad-
ministration: it didn't work.
T h e generalized explanation
of the current round of heavy
bombing r a i d s against North
Vietnam given yesterday by
Secretary of Defense Melvin R.
Laird served, moreover, to de-
flect public discussion from the
key question of effectiveness.
All he would say in his year-
end p r e s s conference, which'
turned out to be largely a dis-
cussion of current bombing at-
tacks, was that they were "nec-
essary military actions to pro-
tect the remaining f?o r c e s in
South Vietnam."
Other military sources added
little. to Laird's explanation. An
-unidentified senior Pentagon of-
ficial was, quoted by the New
York Times as saying:
"Look, these so-called rein-
f o r c e d protective-reaction
strikes amount to a limited
s e l e c t i v e resumption of the
bombing. They are limited in
time and in geographic area.
But, as the President and Mr.
Laird have said repeatedly, we
don't intend to allow Hanoi to
take advantage of our t r o o p
drawdown to threaten a rout
against those who remain. Ev-
ery once in a while we feel we
have to remind Hanoi of this."
Two crucial issues that fig-
ured in the failure of the John-
son Administration's -Rolling
Thunder program, which start-
ed in 1965 and was halted in
1968, have not yet been subject-
ed to serious public discussion'
in connection with Mr. Nixon's
intermittent raids against the
North. bombing program directed both, tribal forces, the Communists.
First, there is the question of against closing the port of Hai- have been pushing forward with
-Whether such raids can stem phong and continuously cutting increasing success.
the infiltration of men and sup- the rail lines to China could
plies from North Vietnam or have a significant impact," Car-
b r e a k the will of the North ver wrote.
Vietnamese t~ ttbvedt`
war. or Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000300350089-7
. ..:__
STATINTL
As the Pentagon Papers have But the Johnson Administra-
disclosed, then Secretary of tion was not prepared to risk
Defense Robert S. McNamara war with. China and Russia by
returned from one of his so substantial an escalation,
periodic trips to Vietnam in A second issue that figured in
October 1966 with the gloomy the failure of Rolling Thunder
report to President Lyndon B. was the m o r a 1 question of
Johnson that the bombing had bombing civilians.
neither significantly reduced in- President Johnson denied at
filtration nor diminished Hanoi's first that the American war-
will to continue the fight. lanes were hitting anything
Analysts at the Central Intelli- Other than steel and concrete.
gence Agency and a group of North Vietnamese charges that
independent scientists brought the targets included hospitals,
together by the Institute for De- ? churches and civilian communi-
fense Analyses supported Mc- ties were largely discounted un- /
Namara's view that the bombing til Harrison Salisbury of the J
tended to strengthen morale in New York Times obtained a
North Vietnam rather than visa to North Vietnam and re-
weaken it. ported the results of the bomb-
They concluded also that, al- ing from eyewitness observa-
though the bombing could re- tion.
duce somewhat the capacity of In the present raids, Hanoi
North Vietnam's supply lines to radio has reported that U.S.
the South, the remaining capa- bombs have struck a hospital,
city still would be more than schools and many civilian areas.
enough to supply communist Whether these results, if con-.
troop needs. firmed, were intended or not
McNamara stated his conclu. is beside the point. Bombing is
sion publicly before a joint an inexact operation and inno-
f
ten are
session of the Senate Appropria- cent bystanders o
tions and Armed Services Com- When evidence of substantial
mittees: civilian casualties mounted in
"I don't believe that the the 1960s, officials of the John-
bombing up to the present has son Administration shifted from
significantly reduced, nor any saying, "We're not doing it,"
bombing that I could contem- to "They'd better get out of
plate in the future would sig- the way."
nificantly reduce, the actual Whether Nixon bombs can be
flow, of men and materiel to the more effective than Johnson
South." bombs remains to be seen, of
There was some dissent at the course, but the indications thus'
CIA. George Carver, the CIA's /far are not promising.
Tl'Fitt}~-"~nutoc7i5ma"""S r alist,1/ In the current raids, ordered
wrote a memorandum for Di- partly in retaliation against the
rector Richard Helms generally shooting down of four U.S. war-
concurring with McNamara's planes, the North Vietnamese
view that the number of sorties have claimed six more U.S.
should not be increased further planes.
but differing with his judgment. And in Cambodia and Laos,
that nothing could help the where U.S' air power is being
bombing program. I used to back up Cambodian,