MULTIPLE 1964-68 PEACE EFFORTS AND THEIR CODE NAMES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300350035-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: June 27, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

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By rim O'Brien and John Thorncr bons for (a) solution" could be cre_ if the U.S, would cease bombing and
Washfnaton.t',ost Staff WrIters ated if the U.S. would accept the all other nets of war against North
The Seaborn "Initiative" "Four Points" of North Vietnam's Vietnam.
I3etween June, FOG', and June, announced position. Neither the U.S. nor North.Viet-
1965, J. Blair eaborn, the Canadian There was no reply from the nam was enthusiastic about a return
member of the International Control Americans until August, 1965, when trip but, Henning (lid arrange to visit
Commission M Southeast Asia, met Edmund Cutlion, a retired foreign Hanoi again in June. He was not
five times with North Vietnamese service officer who is now at Tufts Permitted to see Pitam Van Dong
officials. He carried, accorrting to University, was sent to Paris to talk this-time, and was told by a lesser
diplomatic history says, represented halt.
"the most serious mutual effort to
resolve matters of substance be. Marigold: The Polish Channel
tween the U.S. and DRV before and
since:" Marigold was the code name for
Gullion (known as "X") and Bo negotiating efforts that involved
("It") discussed the possibility for Janusz Lewandowski, the Polish
reconvening the 7954 Geneva Con- member of the International Con-
ference on Southeast Asia and trot. Commission in Vietnam. These
seemed to be heading toward agree. efforts began in Julie 1966 in Sai-
ments on some of the Hanoi "}!'our gon and also involved the Italian
Points." Then suddenly Bo failed to Ambassador there.
show up for a scheduled meeting Lewandowski made several visits
(Sept. 7, 1965) and the initiative to Hanoi in succeeding months,
ended. The diplomatic section of carrying with hint a 10-point formu-
the Pentagon papers called the epi- ration of his own interpretation of
sode "as mysterious in its ending the American attitude, toward a
as it was fruitful and suggestive in settlement.
its beginnings." North Vietnam agreed to meet a
* * * * U.S. representative in 1Varsaw, but
Pinta: the llangoon Contact canceled all further discussion of
On Dec. 24, 7965, the U.S, began the matter after U.S. bombing raids
a 3'7-day bombing on Hanoi. pause. It came The Pentagon history concluded
after Soviet Embassy Counsellor
Linchuk in Washington told White that Marigold gave each side a
House aide McGeorge Bundy that glimpse of Possible areas of negotia-
Hanoi was unlikely to respond, al- t.ion' It added that the Poles "acted
though a pause might possibly inn- as friends of Hanoi, not neutrals"
prove the atmosphere for the long and "applied pressure in good faith
run. by the ever-present threat of dis-
J7urirng the pause, the U.S, met closing their version of the matter
with the North Vietnamese counsel to influential world leaders or the
and sub- public at large." Nothing came of
general in Rangoon
Burma
,
,
over to the Soviet government. The pitted an aide memoire. No reply the Marigold exercise and it did leak
Soviets refused to act as intermedi- came until 12 hours after the bomb- out to the world.
* * * *
aries and "Lectured Kohler at length ing was resumed. It amounted to a Packers: The Romanian Channel
upon the U.S. misconception of the rebuttel - of the U. S. position.
conflict in Vietnam." e * * * From October 1966 through Feb-
The failure of this initiative had The Ronning Missions ruary 1968 the Romanians made ef-
been anticipated by the CIA and forts to take a part in the negotiat-
other Administration officials but Retired Canadian diplomat Ches- ing picture. Acting on the suggestion
was regarded within the government ter Ronning visited Hanoi in March of Ambassador Averell Harriman,
as a productive gesture toward and June of 19f)0. Ronning had Deputy Foreign Minister Gheorghe
world and domestic opinion even friendly relations) with the Chinese Macovescu went to Hanoi in Decem-
if it failed. and was known to be critical of U.S. her, 1967, and came to Washington
* * * * policies toward China and Vietnam, early in January, 1968, to convey
of-
The XYZ Channel but the U.S. nevertheless gave its North Vietnam's position. In an f.ormal support. fort to seek clarification
he return-
,
Mal Van Bo, head of the DRV During his first visit Ronning was cd to Iianoi in the third week of.
delegation In Paris, had three con- unable to sway North Vietnamese. January - just before the Com-
tacts with the U.S. government be-' leaders from their'insistence on the munist launched the Tot Offensive.
tween May, 1965, and February, previously announced "Your Points" His report reached Washington after.
1966. as the only basis for settling the Tot.
The firstm~'ll"a#t ~t~li~l -~i~OQ??3E~0~5-6
French gov r t o a 1, av. r, to t. le was wt lie historian o he I cn .agon papers,
The French notified the U.S. that to enter into some form of prelim- the Romanians were "very -poor re-
Bo believed that "favorable condi- inary contact with the United States porters; they did not pick up distine-.
the official diplomatic history of the
.period, "unusually substantive and
dramatic" messages.
", . The main subject stressed
repeatedly by each (side) was its
determination to do and endure
whatever might be necessary to see
the war to a conclusion satisfactory
to it.
"To the extent they believed each.
other, the two sides were amply fore-
warned that a painful contest lay
ahead.. Even so, they were not in-
clined to compromise their way out "
Accordingly, nothing came of the
Scaborn missions.
* * a *
'Protect Mayflower
In May, 1965, President.Johnson
ordered a pause in the bombing of
North Vietnam in an effort to per-
suade the North Vietnamese to take
some reciprocal action toward do-
escalation. U.S. Ambassador Foy
Kohler in Aloscow was. instructed
to inform the North Vietnamese
Ambassador there that the halt
would be indefinite and. could lead
to "a permanent end to ... attacks
on North Vietnam."
The Ambassador of- the Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)
refused to transmit the message to
Iianoi and suggested it be turned