MR. ASHBROOK, MR. CHAIRMAN, LET

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300340015-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 8, 2001
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: August 18, 1972
• Content Type: OPEN

STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/0 R000
A.ucfust 18, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL RE I USE,
payers conservatively $250 million then
as best we can figure.
Now, that sounds astounding--but It
did happen in the context of the atmos-
phere of that time.
What I am saying Is-I just wonder if
we are fully charged with knowledge in
order to give our imprimatur to an agree-
ment that is far reaching insofar as the
national security is concerned.
Mr. HOLIFIELD, Mr. Chairman, I
move to strike out the last word.
Mr, Chairman, I want to place on the
record my position on this bill.
This is probably one of the most im-
portant documents that has faced this
Congress, at least in my 30 years of
experience here. Anyone can find some-
thing to criticize about anything. lean
find some things in the Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaty that are not exactly
to my liking. But I think this is a step
away from chaos and from the possible
total destruction of mankind.,
As the former chairman and vice
chairman, and as a member for 26 years,
of the Joint Committee on Atomic Ener-
'gy, I think I know a little something
about what I am speaking.
I have' watched the growth of the cap-
ability to wage nuclear destruction, both
of our country on other countries, and of
other countries on our country over the
years, with great concern and apprelieil-
sion in my mind.
I have sustained a strong capability
on the part of this country, and I will sus-
tain -that as long as I Rill a Member of
this House, because I con: dently believe
that In so sustaining that capability I
was and am sustaining the power of de-
terrence which would keep the other fel-
low from making a mistake.
I also -thought it was the only way we
could guarantee peace in this world dur-
ing this dangerous period, when the pco-
ple of the world were beginning to find
out what the total destructive capability
of nuclear weapons could be.
As far back as 19.59, I started hearings
on the effects of atomic warfare. You
can find it in several bbund volumes, each..
3 inches thick. We of the Joint Com-
lnitte.e brought out for the first time a
study by the experts of the Defense De
partm.cnt, as to what the exact capability
of destruction was at that time. That was
in 1959.
It said that a mild attack, a very rea-
sonably mild attack upon the United
States would destroy 60 million lives. To-
day each nation has many, many times
the number and megaton warheads we
had then.
One of my purposes in bringing these
facts out was that I wanted the people
of the United States to' know, and I
wanted the people of the world to know,
the destructive capability of nuclear
weapons. Tllat knowledge has grown now
to the point where I believe there is a
riew wind blowing in the world. I am not
naive about the Soviet purposes-about
their philosophy-about their dedication
some day to be the controller of the
world. But I am also not naive about the
fact that they know if they start a nu-
clear war, it will start the destruction of
the Soviet Union as well, as of Western
gurope and the United States.
history of mankind there Is the most
compelling motive in the hearts' and
minds of man--of every nation-to have
a more peaceful world than has ever ex-
isted before.
't'hat compelling motive Is based on
self interest-on the will to survive of
.the individual, which is the strongest in-
stinct in mankind. When that will to sur-
vive permeates the intelligence of the
leaders of nations of the world-that
they too will perish in a nuclear war for
that there is no place for the leaders to
hide. In the event of a nuclear'war ra-
diation from nuclear weapons will per-
meate this Chamber and every other
building in the United States. It would
kill the people sitting in this Chamber,
if it should occur-even though we were.
not in the blast area. This is the. reason
that there is growing throughout the
world a compelling instinct to survive.
It is causing the leaders of nations to
make up their minds that no longer can
we risk nuclear war. We cannot endure
a full-scale nuclear war. Military capa-
bility to destroy Is no longer partial, it Is
total.
Military capability to defend against
full-scale nuclear attack is negligible. It
is no longer credible. This applies to all
clear weapon powers as well as ourselves.
This situation has never existpci before
in the annals of recorded history.
This wind that is the wind that is
blowing in the minds of men throughout
the world-and it is blowing in the minds
of the leaders of the Soviet Union the
same as ~t is in- our Ininds. This is why.
I must pin my faith in some kind of
agreement, not a 'perfect agreement, but
all agreement that, inmy opinion, is a
step, is all important step, toward
recognition of this ofle fact: That if
mankind is to survive, mankind cannot
afford it nuclear- war. We cannot afford
to start one; they cannot afford to start
one. We cannot afford to retaliate; they
cannot afford to retaliate. The price is
too groat to pay, This is the first real
major power recognition of these prin-
ciples that I am talking about. It 13 not
perfect, but it is a building stone upon
which we can build an edifice of peace.
I believe we should all get behind this
and take this step forward.
I wish to pay my tribute to the Presi-
dent of the United States for his. work
In this field. It is far more important
than this coming election; I will tell you
that. It Is of importance to you and your
wife and your children and your chil-
dren's children, find it may be the first
Important step `fbri the preservation of
the human race.
What more can I say?
What more can any man say?
Mr. ASH.I3ROOIC, Mr. Chairman, I
move to strike the requisite number of
words.
(Mr. ASHBROOIC asked and was
given permission to revise and extend
remarks.)
us take a closer look at the statement of
Senator Srazrfr which appears in her arti-
cle, "It's Time To Speak Up for National
Defense," from the March 1972, issue of
Reader's Digest. She stated:
battles of the cold war whtn we eutcred. into
the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with Ilse
Soviets. I was one of 10 in the Senate wlio
voted against the treaty. Now, after, nearly
nine years of reflection, tn.y.only regret is that
the American people still have not been told
the Whole story about how the treaty wonted
to the Russians' tremendous advantaryc and
to our own vast detriment.
Senators who voted against the treaty were
not popular, but we who did so acted on the
basis of information that was-wrongly, I
still believe=classified secret and given to us
behind closed doors. .. (Italic added.)
Note that Senator Slnisrirbeliet'es that
the American people should have been
given information which was classified
secret and which was withheld from
them during the Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty of 1963. Furtherinore, she states
that this information should today be
made available to the public.
Now let its consider the interim agree-
ment which we are debating today. House
Report 92-1324 of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs states that the interim
agreement is so closely linked with the
treaty limiting anti-ballistic-missile sys-
tems that "an understanding of both is
essential." The report states:
The SALT accords consist of (1) e treaty
limiting antiballistic missile systems and (2)
a five-year interim agreement which freezes
the overall levels of strategic offensive missile
forces pending further negotiations which
are to begin in October. There Is also a proto-
col to the interim agreement; and a number
of statements of "interpretation," Some
agreed and some unilateral. The 'texts nay
be found in house Document 92-311.
As Is customary, the treaty was sent to the
Senate for its "advice and consent,," while
the Interim agreement on offensive strategic
arms has been submitted to both houses for
approval. Although the House of Representa-
t.iveS is being called upon to pass on only
the Interim agreement, the two accords are
so closely linked that an understanding of
both is essential,
Remembering Senator SIvIITu's objec-
tion to the element of secrecy surround-
ing the Information. withheld in 1963,
consider the statement of Dr. Edward
Teller, the eminent nuclear weapons au-
thority, before the House Foreign Af-
fairs Committee on the subject of the
SALT Accords just a few days ago on
August 9:
The agreement on rocket deployment con-
tains an Article VI which Is similar to Arti-
cle XIII of the. ABM Treaty. In this case, as
well as In the ABM Treaty, it Is important to
pay attention to the national means of veri-
fication which is supposed to furnish prima
facie (Teller's emphasis) evidence of compli-
ance. These means of verification are secret.
It Is disturbing that on this vital point the
public cannot get detailed information. In
fact, even the Information available to Con-
gress is less than complete. One should raise,
the question whether these national means
of verification should be declassifiusl. (TItalic
added.)
br. Teller's objection to secrecy is
reminiscent of Senator SMITH's espc^.I'i-
once In 1963 although D7?. Teller goes a
step further and claims that the informa-
tion available to Congress was less than
complete. As with Senator SMITH, he
maintains that certain secret informa-
tion should at the present time be de-
classified. It is interesting to note that
information on the national means of
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 ter. STATJ NTL
17946 Approved For ReC~N ssz~1 ~4 P8 01 RO ./
to the hat interim
marks.) permission to revise and extend his re- oil f ensive related
the latter c cannot the strategic weapon of our NATO tllis,
marks)
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, today be understood completely with solve tut- In sum, the interim offensive agree-
the House will have its opportunity to derstandingg of the treaty. . . Mont will- keep the overall. number of
express its support of the interim agree- The ABM treaty allows each side to strategic ballistic missile launchers both
ment on offensive arms which was con- have one ABM site for the defense of its on land and sea within an agreed ceiling.
eluded between the United States and capital and another site for defense of That ceiling essentially is the current
the Soviet Union and signed by the Pres- intercontinental ballistic missiles- level of weapons, operational or finder
ident in Moscow last May. ICBM's. construction.
This agreement i5 one of two accords The two sites must be at least 800 miles The agreement.will stop the women-
to have been reaches} as a result of the apart in order to prevent the develop- turn of the Soviet strategic arms buildup
strategic arms limitation talks---better meat of a territorial defense. Each ABM and prevent any further increase in the
known as SALT-which began in No- ? site can have 100 missiles,, for a total of numerical' gap in missile launchers be-
vcrnber 1969. 200 for each side. tween the United States and Russia.
The other agreement limits the de- The treaty contains additional provi- At the same time it will not affect any
ployment of clef ensive missile systems. sions which prohibit either the establish- on-going American programs.
Since it is to be a permanent--rather ment of a radar base for the defense of '.For example, it will not prevent,the
than intcrhn-=agreeiiient, it was sub= populated areas or the capability to in- continuation of the U.S. program to con-
mitted to the Senate as a treaty. tercept ballistic missiles by conversion of vert its ICBM's and SLBM's to multiple
The Senate on August 3 gave its ad- air defense missiles to antiballistic lnis- warheads.
vice and. consent to the treaty by a vote silThe treaty also bans sea-based, space- submarine Nor. Is g%ys enlb~ thin the purview of 88 to 2. w of
The interim agreement on offensive based or land-mobile A13M systems. the freeze.
arms was submitted to both houses by Each party will use its -own national THE INTGRPRETIVF. STATEMLNTS
the President, Ile has asked for an ex- technical means of ver?ifrcation-such as Ill addition to the agreements them-
pression of support from the Congress observation satellites-to monitor corn- selves, there were a number of fsttrpre-
thrdutth passage of a joint resolution. pliance with the accords. There is no on- tive wts. Those interpretations
f i erpre. This action by the Presiden.t is in ac- site inspection involved. been statements. 11 the Congress, along
cord with section 33 of the Arms Control A standing consultative commission have with the agreements.
and Disarmament Act which requires will be established to promote inlplenlen- The intgreeetations are in several
that all arms control agreements entered tation of tile agreements and handle forms:
into lry the United States must be ap- questions which arise in their impleulen- Agreed statements initialed by the
proved by COIggr'CSS either by treaty or tatiori-including questions of colzlpli- delegations;
authorization through further affirnga- ance.
Agreed interpretations or common ttrl-
.tive legislation. The treaty provides for withdrawal by rs which were not set down
After several weeks of hearings on the either party on 6 month's notice if "su- derstandin
subject, trio comngittec by. a vote of 23 promo national interests" are judged to formally and initialled; and to I voted to report the amended resolu- have been jeopardized by developments. Unilateral interpretations to make our
Lion which is before us today-House The interim agreement on offensive position clear in instances where it was
Joint Resolution 1227. arms is to run for 5 years, unless replaced not possible to get agreement.
earlier by a comprehensive permanent The most important of these unilateral
The committee approval of this very statements by the United States in-
. important arms limitation agreement agreement. Negotiations oil a permanent Volvo-
-was not a decision lightly taken. agreement are to begin in October. The right of the United States to with-
A subcommittee of the committee had The interim agreement essentially draw from the ABM treaty if an a?;ree-
followed the progress of the talks for freezes the numbers of strategic offensive mrnt for ?a mDr?e complete strategic of-
aliihost 3 years. During that period it missiles on both sidds at approximately fensive arias pact is not achieved within
.NNpas briefed by U.S. SALT negotiators the levels currently operational or under 5 years;
Mine tinges. ? construction. . definition of a "heavy" ICBM
Other briefings on SALT-related sub- For ICBM's, the number, is 1,054 for The
. from the viewpoint f the heavy" States;
sects were held with officials of the Be- the United States and 1,618 for- the So- and
partment of Defense and -Central Intel- viet Union. Within this overall limita The inconsistency
lfgence Agency during that period. tion, the Soviet Union has accepted It of thinconsistency agreement with which the hieh objecti es m W
rmed and consulted vir_ freeze of its heavy ICBM launchers at
ment of land-
lo
de
i
f
d i
l
y
o
p
e were
n
n any
ve
any
invo
every step of the way on these tree current level of those in operation mobile ICBM launchers by the Soviet
agreements. or under construction-a total of 313. Union.
There is a prohibition on conversion of
In addition, once the SALT accords light ICBM's into heavy missiles, includ- Dr. Henry Kissinger pointed out dur?
had been signed and the interim agree- ing a ban on. any significant enlargement lug his briefing to Members of Congress
ment had been submitted to us for ap- on the SALT agreements that in any
proval, the, committee took testimony of The missile silos. submarine limitations are more negotiation of such complexity there
from. highrallkin anking executive branch complicated. will inevitably be details upon which the
the Sec, etalyding the Secretary of airman Briefly, the Soviets are frozen to their parties cannot agree. The United States the the Secretary fs f Sthe Chair Director man claimed current .level, operational and made certain unilateral statements in
of the Joint Chiefs o 4f Staff, t and under construction; or about 740 sub- order to insure that its position on those
of the Central Intelligence SALT-Gerard at)Cl Inag?ine-launched maisslles-SUnle of them details was included in the negotiating
our chief negotiators at SALT-Gerard on an older type nuclear sub. record and understood by the Russians,
Smith, Director e the Arms Control and They are permitted to build to a coil- The committee believed that the sev-
I)isarma Agency,. lug of 62 boats and 950 missiles but only oral platters covered in the unilateral
Asa result esult of our deliberations, the if they dismantle older ICBM's or sub- declarations by the United States are
committee was convinced that the SALT marine-launched missiles to offset the important enough to warrant special at-
Records are' a significant stop toward new construction. This would mean dis- tention from the Congress.
arms limitation fully consistent with the mantling 210 ICBM's and.some 30 mis- Consequently, In the report on this
national security interests of the United silos on about nine older nuclear sub- resolution, it expressed the viewpoint
States. marines. that actions inconsistent with tT. In-
SUMMARY OF MAJOR PICOVISIONS The United States, by exercising simi- terpretatiOns would be considered grave
At this point let me summarize the lar options, could increase its SLBM natters affecting the national security
major provisions of the documents as launchers from 656 to 710, and its mod- interests of the United States.
signed.. ern nuclear submarines from 41 to 44. Our objective was to express coil "es-
Although the ABM'treaty Is not before. The agreement does not affect bomb- sional support for our SALT negotiators
this body today for approval, it is so ers and other aircraft. Not does it affect on those important points.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000360340015-9