LBJ RECALLS KOSYGIN BACKDOWN IN '67

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300300012-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: October 7, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 20011
PA/914 ii9t4UA-RDP80-01601
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-In 3113 zlheinoirs, Lyndon
Johnson describes In harrow-
ing detail hot he maneuvered
the Sixtll Fleet In response to
a hot-11i1o threat of Soviet 111ili-
tary actiolr against Israel in
1967 and 13ow he faced down
Premier Alexel Nosy g:tn over
the Middle East during their
subsequent maeting` aft Glass,
I bore, N.J.
Hera are the highlights
from out bootleg copy of the
Johnson memoirs:
Al the height of the Arab-Is-
raeli six-day war, the Presi-
dent received a grim, hot-line
message front Kosygin threat-
ening "necessary actions, in-
eludiilg military" unless Israel
halted its operations uncolhdi-
tione lly within. a few hours.
There was other provocative
language In the message, JDe-
clames 'Jr. Johnson: "In an ex-
change between heads of i ov-
ernment, these were serious
words: 'very crucial 1noillent,"
lcatastrophe,' 'independent do-
eLsiolla,' 'Illilitary actions.!
'The room was deathly still
as we carefully studied this
grave communication. I turned
1to (Defense Secretary) McNa?
mare, 'Where Is the Sixth
Fleet now?' I asked him."
The fleet had orders to stay
at least 100 relies froni the Sy-
rian coast. The President told
McNamara "to Issue orders at
once to change the course and
cut the restriction to 50 miles.
'The Secretary of l)efehhr.re
,gave the orders over the
Ij) , /rya a,%~f~r
phone., No one else said a with arms if they had them
word. Some of the men In the ancl, if not, with bare
Situation Room later recorded hands .. .
their memories of that morn- "If they fight tvith?i;eapons,
ing. (Ambassador to Russia)
I replied, we `votilrl kno:v
Llewellyn Tilonlpson recalled where they got-t.henl. Then I
it as a 'time of great concern caned forward and said
and utmost ,gravit.y,' (CIA D1- slowly and quietly: 'Let us un-
rector) Richard 1-Ielrns rc-mem- derstand one another. I hope
bered that 'the atmosphere there will he no war,. If there
was tense' and That coihversa- is a v ar, I hope it will not be a
Lion was conducted 'in the low- big war. If they fight, I hope
est voices I had ever heard In they fight with fists and not
a meeting of that kind.' with guns.'
"We all knew the Russians "I told him that I hoped
would get the message as soon hoth our countries could keep
as their monitors ohisevcri the out of any Middle East explo-
change in the fleet's pattern. sion because 'if we do get into
That message, which no trans- it, it will be a most serious
kator would need to interpret matter' . .
to the Kremlin leadership, was "Kosygin noted thhat 1ve nov,~
that the United States was had the 'hot Iine' and could
prepared to resist Soviet in- use that whenever necessary
trusion in the Middle East." as we had to good effect dt r-
1.'lhe crisis faded and, not ing the recent six-day war. Ko-
long .tied ard, Mr. .Johnson sygin apologized for having
and Kosygin held ai friendly, wakened me so early- in the
face-to-fdco :Meeting in Glass- morning through the 'Trot line.'
born, N.J. Put, he t;cidcct, together ire
"At only one point In our had 'accomplished more an
first session did Kosygin seem that one clay than others could
close to becoming really accomplish in three years.' "
heated," recalls L,l3J. "Ile said Kcsypin was also involved,
we had to lked about territorial indirectly, in an earlier crisis.
integrity before the Middle He was in Hanoi on Feb, 0,
East war, but we had ended 1065, when Communist guei'i'il-
by protecting aggression. He las struck: a U.S. barracks at
insisted that Isi'neii troops go Pleiku. This led to President
back to tl:e original armistice Johnson's decision to bomb
lines ... North Vietnam. He recalls:
"At that point, he came "As we talked, there was an
close to issuing a threat. Un- electric tension. in th^ air. Ev-
less we agreed to his formula, cryone in the room was deadly
,he declared, there would be a serious as ho considered the
war----'a very great war.' Ile possible " crnSequeill,e3 of this
said the Arabs would fight .decision. Each man around
that table knew hors crucial.
such action could be. i-low
would Hanoi react? lVoulci tile
Chinese Communists use it 2s
l~, cyst for involving thorn.
.elves? `Vihaa,t about Wosy;in
and the Russians in Ilanoi?
"Someone suggested that He
Chi.lIinil had rnousetrapped
the Soviet leader by attacking
us during his &R- 14 we failed
to respond, we were 'paper ti-
gors'; if we hit back, Soviet
prestige might be further in-
volved."
The President went ahead.
with the first bombing attack
while Kosygin was still in
Hanoi. 1,3J explained at a C~e-
cret briefing for congre_sional
leaders: "We have kept our
gun over the mantel and our
shells in the cupboard for a
long time not'. And what was
the result? They are killing
our men while they sleep in
the night. I can't ask our
American soldiers - out theio
to continue to fight: with one
hand tied behind their beks.,,
More than three years Tutor,.
llr. Johnson ordered the futile
bombing stopped, Hi :yecollec-
tion of the rnont~,nt:
"I looked, one by one, r,t the
-men assembled -arouncl tile
long cabinet table and asked
their judr nlellt on ;ny deci-
Sion. who r'C3etie1ls 17Gie
quick and unanimous. 'Abso-
lutely; said one. 'The t;l.iltg' to
do,' said another . . . I had
the' feeling that. I was pe 'nap.
the most doubtful hilall i,,l t_ e
room, -
? nemJ -!Selina eynd!a3t~
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000300300012-6