SECRET MEMO SHOWS BUREAUCRACY IN CONFLICT OVER VIET WAR POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300170008-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 1, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

WASHINGTON POST
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : PIA80-01601 R00
Secretllemo Shows
Iii Cos flact Over Viet
By Stanley Karnow
P, Washington Post Staff Writer,
Assign several govern.
ment agencies to, survey
Vietnam and, like the six
blind men describing the el-
ephant, they produce a re-
port filled with conflicting
observations. Give the re-
pott to the President, and
he largely ignores it as he
shapes his policies.
That is essentially the
story of National Security
Study Memorandum 1, a set
of documents on Vietnam
prepared by White House
adviser Henry Kissinger's
staff for Mr. Nixon soon
after the President entered
office in early 1969.
The memorandum, com-
posed of contributions from
eight U.S. agencies, indi-
cates that military and civil-
ian officials directly ' en-
gaged in war operations
were inclined to be optimis-
`tic about the current and fu-
ture prospects in Vietnam
while those primarily in-
volved in analyzing the con-
flict from afar took a more
pessimistic view.
Predictably, then, the
hawkish "optimists" were
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Pacific command in Hono-
lulu and the U.S. military
and diplomatic missions in
Saigon. The "pessimists," a
more detached group, were
the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Defense Depart-
ment's International Secu-
rity Affairs office, and two
State Department offices,
Judging from his subse-
quent actions, moreover, Mr.
Nixon apparently disre-
garded many of the assess-
ments and recommendations
contained in the memoran-
dum, and instead initiated
strategies based on a variety
of other considerations.
This suggests, as students
of presidential behavior
point out, that Mr. Nixon
was and still is less con-
cerned with Vietnam itself
than with the effects of the
war on domestic politics and
international relationships.
The President's decisions
also stem from his efforts to
balance. rivfll Washington
bureaucracies, all of which
are striving to assert their
own interests.
Evaluating the global im-
portance of Vietnam, for ex-
ample, contributors to the
National Security Study
Memorandum were sharply
divided on whether there
was any validity to various
versions of the so-called
"domino theory."
The hawkish ' military
agencies contended that an
"unfavorable settlement" in
Vietnam would prompt
"swift" Communist take-
overs elsewhere in Asia. The
Washington intelligence
community calculated,, in
contrast, that a Communist
victory in Vietnam might
push Cambodia and Laos
into Hanoi's orbit "at a
fairly early stage" but
"these developments would
not necessarily unhinge the
rest of Asia."
Intelligence and Research Seeking Accommodations
and the East Asia bureau. ' In April 1970, however,
An ex-member of Ibis: ; Mr. Nixon- affirmed that
?ger's staff, who participated . "the forces of totalitarian-
in compiling the documents,
now explains that the?diver-
gencies among the contrib-
uting agencies were deliber-
ately emphasized in order to
dramatize to the President
the extent to which percep-
.-tions of the Vietnam situa-
tion differed.
Balance Bureaucracies
".We wanted to show'him
how little anyone really
knows about Vietnam," the
ism and anarchy will
threaten free nations and
ureaucracy
ar P- olicy
and. elsewhere have been port said,' the Communists
seeking accommodations had constructed' shelters
with Communist China.'and early warning systems
Some have also edged closer to protect themselves
to North Vietnam. against "recurring patterns
Thus new, international in B-52 strikes."
alignments in Asia and n While asserting that the
other parts of the worid bombing above the 17th par-
seem to be evolving mainly allel had "adverse effects"
for reasons unrelated to the on the North Vietnamese
U.S. position in Vietnam. people by creating hard-
The contributors to the ships, the Pentagon eontri-
pearedandum generally ap- bution to the memorandum
pcared unable to reach ei- nevertheless concluded that
they firm or unanimous these difficulties had not re-
conclusions on the effective- duced "to a. critical level"
ness of B-52 strikes, called
"harassment, interdiction Hanoi's "willingness or re-
and strategic missions" in of- solve to continue the, con-
ficial bureaucratic terminol-
ogy.
The Joint Chiefs esti-
mated that the B-52 raids in-
side South Vietnam during
1968 killed 41,250 Comtnu-
nists, an average -of 2.5
enemy per sortie, wliile the
Defense Department's office
of International Security Af-
fairs put the total figure for
the period at 9,000, or 0.43
enemy killed per sortie. The
CIA placed the average
number of enemy killed by
B-52s at 3.5 per sortie, but
added that its evaluation
methods were open to ques-
tion.
filet."
Indeed, said the Pentagon
report, the bombing "may
have hardened the attitude
of the people" in North Viet-
nam, Conversely, the study
pointed out, "there is some
evidence ... indicating that
morale and support for the
war in North Vietnam has
declined significantly since
the bombing halt" in Nov-
ember 1968.
Ho Chi blink Trail
Further questioning the
value of the air operations,
the Pentagon study esti-
mated that the U.S. bomb-
ings had destroyed about
Protection Against Raids $770 million worth of enemy
With all this, however, the installations while North
agencies tended to be doubt- Vietnam received some $3
ful about the decisiveness of billion In military and cco-
the B-52 attacks in either nomic aid principally
halting or discouraging the .from the Soviet Union and
North Vietnamese and the China. Therefore, the study
Vietcong. said, North Vietnam is "bet.
The State Department re- ter off today than it was in
ported, for instance, that 1965."
"there is little evidence to similarly, the Pentagaon
contribution referred to U.S.
lions "have that
sucthe B-52 ce ceedded ed in min- In- bombings of the Ho Chi flicting - a scale of losses on blink Trail in Laos as "Im-
the Vietcong and North \'i- pressive in its destruction
of enemy supplies, but
etnamese sufficient to Big- of that this "is not -ii
a
free institutions throughout nificantly disrupt tactical
the world siiou1d the the
United States act like "a pit- Coperations ommunists lto palter ethe
iful helpless giant" in Indo- basic strategy for South
china. The President reietr- Vietnam."
ated that thesis last Wednes-
day, saying that "the risks
of war in other parts of the ment report added, nmorco.
world would be enormously ver, that the effectiveness of
increased" if the Commu-. the B-52 operations leve -
nists "win militarily in Viet- ashes "as the enemy (level-
nam,." ops tactics to adjust to their
But despite these warn- destructive p o t e n t i a l . "
y
what counts." Said. the
study:
"The critical factor is the
amount that reaches South
Vietnam ... and since we
have no control over imports
to North Vietnam or inputs
to Laos, it appears that the
enemy can push sufficient
supplies through Laos to
STATINTL
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