PEKING AND MOSCOW SI, HAVANA NO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300010002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 4, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2001 /0 /6*k'CdPA- '80-01601
4 SEP 1972
t. ~.~Ji\ . Irv
C', G4
a t" t i m.:
I ' jack Araclr=.r. sort:
President Nixon has re-
'jected suggestions that he fol-
low up his trips to Peking and
Moscow with an overture to
l:i avan a.
He has no intention of seek-
inL; better relations with Fidel
Castro its long as Cuba ex-
ports revolution to other Lat-
in-American countries and
Russia ? is permitted to use
Cuban territory for military
purposes.
There have been conflicting
signals from Havana. whether
Castro is really interested in
improving relations' with the
United -States. Secret Ines-
sages have been received in
Washington suggesting he is
.a fer I. restore normal r']?t-
c
"Acosta commented that ward him, He 'is particularly
there is some support in Cuba harsh upon Mr. Nixon, whose
training to revolutionary
movements throughot.it Latin
for the view that Cuba could 'rotate is spelled in the party America. 't'here is evidence
benefit from improved cut-
aural ties with the U.S., or newspaper with a swastika in that Russia sui)Pgris Cuba in
soiue realistic adjustment of place of the "x." spreading subversion.
differences ... These experts also believe' In another secret report to
"Later in the conversation, ?tlr Nixon has been infiti- the White )louse, for example,. /r
Acosta said]. that Cuban lead- cnecd by his Cuban friends,~ , the . CIA quoted a conficleenfial,
V
?
ens are doing some 1 e thiilkiil` such as Robe 3tebozo, to main- source as revcaluiig "that thc? ?
on basic revolutionary tactics, tail, a hard line toward Cas-
'i.'lnere is some theoretical op- tro. tiubans>avicts asked bride' Ca t
position to the 'Che C'ncvara 1,11e anti-Castro C, try to i egairl control of f i;-,,tio
theory, vo th favors support- who now live and vote in this Ai'tlerican revolutionary wove.,
country are almost solidly be- meats and to develop clo er
lag native insurrectionists and hind Nixon.
anarchists in poor countries. relations 11'i.tlt Latiir ',, lend;
' ?t tartieti~ rd their
i
"Instead, support is growing
for the Chilean formula,
which maintains that tradi-
tional. democratic procedures
are the best means of socialist
power in weak, backward
countries."
Ilions, '''here have been fol As it happened, Castro got
his signals- crossed. He was
'lowed,- almost invariably, i wrong about the possibility
e
attacks - upon ill(!
public
United States. that the United States might
Last fall, for example, Cas-
tro got word that the United
States 'might soften its atti-
tude toward Cuba. He hastily,
if cautiously, flashed back the
signal that he not only was re-'
ceptive but that be might even
be. willing to use "traditional
democratic procedures" to
spread "socialist power" in
Latin America.
Castro's message was re-
c
f 1 ' tl ''iht tl?r es at
ie ri
n
a
soften its line toward Havana.
The blunt truth is that Presi-
dent Nixon isn't the least in-
terested in an accommodation
with Castro.
Those who watch Havana
for the U.S. are convinced that
Castro would jump at a genu-
ine chance to normalize Cu-
ban-American relations. Be
would like nothing better,
they say, than to sit, down as
an equal with Mr. 'Nixon.
t,
ec '
.
pe
the United -i~Tal:ions by his dirt-~ Castro 's slashing attacks
lornatic-intelligence represent-I upon the U.S., they believe,
le
1'd f H t
ative, 'i'eofilo Acosta Rodri-
guez. The word quickly
reached the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, which sent a so-
x
are strict y e cilsivu. c. i
to appear, intractable toward
the United States, they say,
because he is convinced the
tractablr
to
it
d St
t
i
i
t3
,
e
a
n
es
n
s
crct report, dated Dec. 8, to
the White House.
Secret Message
"In the latter part of Nov- /
ember, 1971," reported the __V/
CIA, "Teofilo Acosta Rodri-
guez . . . said that Fidel Cas-
tro, Cuban prime minister,
had received a report before .
his departure for Chile that;
U.S. officials were considering
a reversal of the U.S. hard-line
policy toward Cuba.
"As a result, 13avan.a had re-
quested Cubans at the United
Nations to check the report.,
-Meanwhile, Castro had de- -
tided to mellow. his tone on
the United States during his ? - .
Chilean trip. .
Nixon's f"11.1iala Policy
A White. House aide as-
sued us, however, that Mr,
Nixon doesn't lister, to llcboro
on Cuban policy. 'i?]1e hide said
the President based his hard
line on three factors:
3.. U.S. policy toward Cuba
isn't unilateral, but multilat-
eral. The Organization of
American States voted in 300'2
to break diplomatic and com-
mer?ciail ties with Cuba. Until
this is reversed, the U.S. will
be bound by the OAS vote..
2. Russia uses Cuba as a
base to refuel its submarines
and for other military pur-
poses, 'f'ile argument has -been
made that this violates the
;Monroe Doctrine. Moscow also
gives Cuba an estimated $250
million a year in military aid,
not. to mention twice that
amount in economic aid.
3. Cuba continues to provide
arms, money and guerrilla
s . ] ' . .
comn,un
leaders ..
']']1e source quoted r Cuban
intelligence officer, l:nl'ique
llenavidcs, as saying "that.,lo-
viet Premier Aleksei. Kosyr;in
had promised to provide finatr-
eial aid to Castro's efforts to
regain control over these
movements.. .
"llenavides said that..ihi?ougli
Cuba the Soviets v,ill
support ar.riled revolution or,
political struggle, whichever
was deemed appropriate, in
given countries throughout`
Latin America. According to
13enavides, the Foviel s have
told Cuba they will ltay for
everything' in helping a11. revo-
lutionary groups, even Catho-
lic radical groups.
"Ilenavides strongly empha-
sized that. Cuba has not
changed its line but still fa-
vors armed revolution every-
where in Latin America."
Approv?d' o-~ Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000300010002-9
 Yrr sniL~u:LVta ZICa J UJ.ax
T 1972 STATINTL
Approved For Iease 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000
t
_-) t1ss. 4?.3 t~ "t.'ti
C
'r t \ ,i g., t y~
/ ~_: C ~+ was CJ i=a `ss
Ou Quid, Their Quo'
The question is: Flow (lid Kenned?
make Khruschev capitulate? The es
sense of the official answer is that h
stated his demand clearly, refused tI
budge even an inch, and thus lef
Khruschev with the last clear choice
between withdrawal on the one hand
and a path that could lead to nuclei.
war on the other.
The main points in this officia
interpretation include the following
On Friday, October 26, a secret letter
by Graham Allison from Khruschev arrived, proposing
-- resolution of the crisis on the follow-
The story of the Cuban `missile to arrange a private "deal." To appre_ ing terms: Soviet missiles would be
crisis, as told both by fans and critics, ciate the significance of these facts, withdrawn and, in return, the U. S.
is a tale of machismo. President Job11 and their implications for the dispute would Promise not to invade Cuba.
F. Kennedy stood "eyeball-to-eye- about machismo and JFK's perform- On Saturday,. this Soviet offer was
ball" with Chairman Khruschev, faced ante in the crisis, it is necessary to.. reversed by a second, much tougher
him down, and forced the Soviet reexamine carefully one slice of tIhis letter demanding U. S. withdrawal of
Union to withdraw its offensive Iris- fascinating story. American missiles in Turkey as the
sites from Cuba. Instant histories writ- The issue in question is that o>I' Price for Soviet withdrawal of missiles
tell in the .wake of President Ken- JFK's actions in resolving the Clisiis, in Cuba.
Graham A11ison teaches politics at 11a~vcrrcl Recall the background. In the fall Df To most members of the ExCom, a
1962, after Khruschev has given Keui` deal of this sort was simply out of the
nedy's assassination praised the Ad- nedy repeated assurances that fella question. Could the U. S. withdraw
ministration's bold moves in the mis- Soviet Union will not install offensive NATO missiles from Turkey under
silo crisis, Particularly JFK's guts in weapons in Cuba, an American 1-2 Soviet threat? Absolutely not. Dean
refusing to compromise American in- photographs the Soviet Union sneak- Acheson, a member of the ExCom,
terests, and his courage in sticking to ing missiles into Cuba. Kennei~ly found the idea outrageous. Ilaving just
the original demand that all Soviet assembles the Executive Committee of returned from Paris and Bonn, where
missiles be removed without a quid the National Sect,rily Council (E lie had briefed General Charles de
pro quo. More recently, revisionists Conn) to consider how he should Gaulle and Chancellor Conrad Aden
have criticized Kennedy's recklessness respond. On October 22, Keahnedy aver about the crisis, Acheson assured
and irresponsibility in insisting that announces a U. S. naval quarantine of the ExCom group that such a trade
Klrruschev capitulate and cry uncle Soviet weapons shipments to CUIIII. would undermine the faith of the
during a confrontation that JFK him- and demands that the Soviets witlln whole alliance in America's word.
self judged to have a one-in-three draw all strategic offensive 'missiles Soviet specialist Llewelyn Thompson
chance of nuclear war.. from the island. The next day, warded that "tile Russians would
In evaluating JFK 5 performance in 1 b Soviet that,
the lilis crisis , both those who give in ships steaming toward Cuba stop (lead certainly interpret acceptance as proof
on the water, just outside the block of weakness. According to presiden-
him high marks and those who say he ads. But work at the Cuban nlissille tial assistant Theodore Sorenson's failecl have accepted the official re-
vel'- sites proceeds at an accelerated. Pace, cord of the deliberations, "T
sion of the event as fact. III Particular, he Presi-
By Friday, October 26, it seems Clearer dent had no intention of destroying
no one (with the exception of Curtis that the alliance by backing down." As
LeMay) has questioned the theme of the blockade will not solve tll JFK had argued the previous week in
JFK's toughness under fire. But dur- problem: it prevents the Soviets from
ing the past decade a great deal of importing additional missiles but ft refeeting UN Ambassador Adlai
evidence has come' to light that casts cannot stop the rush to ready d. Stevenson's suggestion of a similar
serious doubt on this interpretation. missiles already on the island. The trade-off, he could not make "conces-
SPecifically, it now seems clear that b'xCorrl turns to the question of tack sions that could break up the alliance
next U. S. step. Most members see nc~ by confirming European suspicions
oil Saturday, October 27, the next to alternative to an air strike. The creel}- that
would nterei t their sar area o
last day of the crisis: 1) Soviet sur- sion will probably be made on Satur- to Protect our interests in all area of
face-to-air missilcs(SAMs) shot clown day no concern to them. Harold i.~1ac-
an America U-2 reconnaissance own o or Sunday and carried out the millan (Prime Minister of Britain at
the time} has recalled his support for
over Cuba, and Kennedy refused to But at these st minute, disaster is the Presidents ~s
retaliate; 2) Kennedy ordered U. S. avoided. Sunday morning, October esidents most difficult deci-
Missiles in Turkey defLized; and 3) 28, Khruschev announces that ti-av. sion... the refusal, against the advice
JFK sent his brother, Robert Ken- Soviet Union will with v r r of weaker brethren in America and
reedy, to So A~OfbVbd ~ WLa~*,ei2O,10a/~1.: CIA-Rb. 88 1lb1R 3VOd4dt 02i? the security of
coat =4ucd.