DEBRIEFING THE PRESS: 'EXCLUSIVE TO THE CIA'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300010001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 7, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

V
1'tiE VJLLAtzh; VUIU.h;
7 Dec 1972STATIN
N vv rv~ icaac cvv ._ti.i nf~IM6r~:~9r4t~
e 10 1.fi , e press: you, Bill. President gukarno and
the Indonesian government know
`Exclusive to the CIA' all about this, and they are partic-
y William Worthy
In April 1961, a few days after
'the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs in-
vasion of Cuba, Allen Dulles, at
that time the director of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, met in
off-the-record session with the
American Society of Newspaper
Editors at their annual conven-
tion.
Given the Cuba intelligence, by
'then obviously faulty, that had en-
tered into Washington's rosy ad-
vance calculations, he inevitably
was pressed to tell: "Just what
are the sources of the CIA's infor-
mation about other countries?"
One source, Dulles replied, was
U. S. foreign correspondents who
are "debriefed" by the CIA on
their return home. The usual
debriefing
,practice is to hole up in a hotel a on out-of-
room for several days of intense bounds newsman's China. lie thought for a
interrogation. moment and then replied: "Oh,
Much of they debriefing, I've about $10,000." Out of the CIA's
-learned over the years, is agreed petty cash drawer.
to freely and willingly by individu- My first awareness of the CIA's
al newsmen untroubled by the special use of minority-group
world's image of them as spies. In newsmen abroad came at the
' time of the 1955 Afro-Asian
at least one case, as admitted to
me by the. Latin-American ' spe-
cialist on one of our mass-circula-
jtion weekly newsmagazines, the
Idebriefing took, place very reluc-
tantly after his initial, refusal to
cooperate was vetoed by his supe-
riors. But depending on the par-
ticular foreign crises or obses-
sions at the moment, some of the
eager sessions with the CIA
debriefers bring handsome re-
muneralion. Anyone recently re-
turned from the erupted Philip-
pines can probably name his
price,
Despite its great power and its
general unaccountability, the CIA
dreads- exposes. Perhaps because
of a "prickly rebel" family repu-
tation stretching over three gen-
erations, the CIA has never
approached me about any of the
48 countries I. have visited,
including four (China, Hungary,
Cuba, and North Vietnam) that
had been placed off-limits by the
State Department. But the secret
agency showed intense interest in
my travels to those "verboten"
lands. In fact in those dark days,
Eric Sevareid once told me that of governmental ties, I relayed
Allen Dulles, the intelligence this information to the American
Civil Liberties Union. I also told"
Theodore Brown, one of A. Philip
Randolph's union associates in
the AFL-CIO Brotherhood of
Sleeping Car Porters. Ted's re-'
Approved For 4ice`86a1dwrl 1nCIA.
ularly incensed at having a man
or color sent to spy in ineir
gatherer, differed with brother country."
Foster Dulles, the Calvinist, diplo- Cold-war readiness to "cooper-
mat about the wisdom of the self-! ate" with spy agencies, whether
defeating travel bans. ' motivated by quick and easy
Years later, I learned that the money (I've often wondered if
U. S. "vice-consul" in Budapest' under-the-counter CIA payments
who twice came to my hotel to have to be reported on income tax
demand (unsuccessfully) my returns!) or spurred by a miscon-
passport as I transited Hungary ceived patriotism, had its pre-
en route home from China in 1957 cedent in World War I and in the
was, in fact, a CIA agent revolutionary-counterrevolu-
operating under a Foreign Ser- tionary aftermath. In the summer
vice cover. During a subsequent of 1920 Walter Lippmann, his
lecture tour, I met socially in wife, and Charles Merz published
Kansas City a man who had in the New Republic an exhaus-
served his Army tour of duty in tive survey of how the New York
mufti, on detached service in Times had reported the first two
North Africa and elsewhere with years of the Russian revolution.
the National Security Agency. Out They found that on 91 occasions-
r an average of twice a week-
of curiosity I asked him what
I
would be the "premium" price for Times dispatches out of Riga,
summit conference at Bandung,
Indonesia. Through Washington
sources (including Marquis
Childs of the St. Louis Post
Dispatch), Cliff Mackay, then edi-
tor of the Baltimore Afro-
American, discovered-and- told'
me--that the government was
planning to send at least one
black correspondent to "cover"
the historic gathering.
The "conduit" for the expense
money and "fee" was the director
of a "moderate" New York-based
national organization, 'supported
by many big corporations, that
has long worked against employ-
ment discrimination. The CIA
cash was passe] to the organiza-
tion's dire;:tor by a highly placed
Eisenhower adminisiration of-
ficial overseeing Latin-American
affairs who later became gover-
nor of a populous Middle Atlantic
state, and whose brothers and
family foundation have long been
heavy contributors to the job op-
portunity organization.
Because of the serious implica-
tions for a press supposedly free
Latvia, buttressed by cdrtorrals,
had "informed" readers that the,
revolution had either collapsed or
was about to collapse, while at the
same time constituting. a "mortal
menace" to non-Communist
Europe. Lippmann and his as-.
sociates attributed the misleading
coverage to a number of factors.
Especially cited in the survey
were the transcending win-the-
war and anti-Bolshevik passions
their classrooms an
women where they shop.
On one such occasion a bon
went off at 9.08'p. m. Five minut(
earlier, at 9.03 p. in., an ambitiot
U. S. wire-service corresponder
filed an ;`urgent press" dispatc
from the Western Union tel
printer in his bureau office, r porting the explosion that, awl
wardly for him, came five mil
utes after the CIA's schedul(
time. When that corresponde and most of his U. S. colleague
were locked up. fora week or tv
during the CIA-directed Bay
Pigs invasion and were then e
pelled, many U. S. editorial wr.
ers were predictably indignant.
Except perhaps in Washingt(
itself and in the United Natioi
delegates' lounge, the CIA
department on journalism
probably busier abroad than tc,
newsmen at home. In 1961, durin
a televised interview, Walt
Lippmann referred casually
the CIA's bribing of foreii
newsmen (editors as well as ti
working press), especially at ti
time of critical elections. All ov
the world governments and poll
cal leaders, in power and in c
position, can usually name th(
journalistic compatriots who a
known to be or strongly suspect
of being on the CIA's bounlil
payroll. I believe it was Le
Trotsky who once observed th
1---- 14
with telligence work is always \u
"undue intimacy" Western rn intelligence agencies. covered sooner or later.
After 1959, when Fidel Castro I Even neutralist countri(
came to power after having learned to become distrustful r
ousted the corrupt pro-American, U. S. newsmen. In early 196
Batista regime, Miami became a Prince Norodom Sihanouk c:
modern-day Riga: a wild rumor pelled a black reporter after ju:
factory from where Castro's 24 hours. In an official stateme
"death" and imminent overthrow the 'Ministry of Information a
were repeatedly reported for sev- leged that he "is known to be nr
eral years. Both in that city of ex- only a journalist but also an age[
patriates and also in Havana, of the CIA." In a number of Afro
"undue intimacy" with the CIA Asian countries, entry visas for l
caused most North American re- S. correspondents, particularly
porters covering the Cuban revo- on a first visit, can be approve
lotion to echo and to parrot of- only by the prime minister
ficial U. S. optimism about the other high official.
Bay of Pigs invasion. As recently as a generation ag
In the summer of 1961, on my it would have been unthinkab
fourth visit to that revolutionary for most U. S. editors, publisher
island, a Ministry of Telecom- newscasters, and reporters to a
rnunications official told me of a quiesce in intelligence d
not untypical incident shortly briefings, not to mention le
before the invasion. Through mer- "passive" operations. What I
cenaries and through thoroughly Murrow denounced as the col
discredited Batistianos, the CIA war concept of press and univer:
was masterminding extensive ty as instruments of foreign polir
sabotage inside Cuba-a policy had not yet spread over the lan
doomed to failure not only In the years before the Secor
because anti-Castro endeavors World War, if any governme
lacked a popular base, but also a t ^~ d to solicit the c
because kindergartens, depart- r0`e William All,
merit stores during shopping
-hours, and similar public places
~b Eb PI 10 isotiRRy does one
mobilize mass support by killing
 NEW YORK TIES
Approved For Release 2001 /0i/6 ~b !-7RDP80-01601R00
Hanoi and Th
Cuban specter
By C. L. Sulzberger
PARIS----Historians may eventually
decide the most slgniflcent aspect of
the Indochina war was that it never
produced a superpower confrontation
resembling, the nuclear showdown over
Cuba just ten years ago.
It may be arguable that what oc-
curred in the Caribbean at the end
of October, 1962, had a profound if
indirect influence on what was to
happen in Vietnam during the sub-
sequent decade.
Looking back on events that led
Chairman Khrushchev to the Cuban
gamble, it is now possible to discern
his growing overconfidence. After hav-
ing met Mr. Kennedy in Vienna, lie-
t:old me the American President im-
pressed him as being unable to face
up to the Berlin crisis then festering.
"Kennedy is too young," he said
(Sept. 8, 1961). "Ile lacks the author-
ity and prestige to settle the issue
correctly. He is afraid to take up that
position and that is why he has in-
troduced mobilization measures." Mr.
Khrushchev gave two clues to his pos-
sible behavior although I was not
shrewd enough to realize this.
He said: "If Cuba were subjected
to attack, it would have every riflit
to expect assistance from other peaee-
loving countries. ... We would cer-
tainly not ignore a request for assist-
ance." Ile also indicated exaggerated
faith in Russia's nuclear arsenal, say-
ing it was being armed with "several"
100-megaton warheads of such de-
structive power as "to make would-be
aggressors think twice."
Khrushchev probably didn't then
contemplate the possibility that thir-
teen months later he would have dis-
patched missiles and nuclear warheads
secretly to Cuba, S.D.E.C.L., the
French intelligence service, reported
some clues early in 0?1ober and the
C.I.A. established overwhelming con-
firmation through aerial surv-eyance.
The result is history. Mr. Kennedy
reacted with calm toughness and sent
Dean Acheson abroad to alert our
allies. France's President de Gaulle
told Acheson it was unnecessary to
show him photographs of, the Soviet
missiles "because obviously a great
Government like yours would not risk
war for nothing." lie assured Wash-
irigton of French support.
Some lesser allies suggested dis-
mantling U.S. missile bases in Turkey
to save Mr. Khrushchev's face. Sevy
oral suspected what Moscow really
sought was Western abandonment of
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
On Nov. 9, 1962, Mr. Kennedy told
me he was "astonished" at the speed
with which the Russians managed to
pull their missiles out of Cuba but
added that - he couldn't understand
why Khrushchev had gone there in
the first place. If he had thought
America wasn't going. to fight in the
heart of an area of its own vital
interest (the President speculated), he
surely must have assumed we weren't
going to fight in Berlin. Therefore, he
asked: "Why didn't lie go straight for
Berlin?"
On Nov. 20 the President said in an-
other conversation that he had learned
much from the terrible episode. At the
start "you don't k>,iow whom to believe
and whom to disbelieve. But I can do
the job much better now." ,
The crisis produced several repercus-
sions. Mr. Khrushchev sent a message
to British Prime Minister Macmillan
saying the West should not try to push
Russia around on J3lcrlin or make the
mistake of thinking the. Cuba show-
down proved Moscow was "soft."
NATO endorsed President Kennedy's
desire to increase the Alliance's con-
ventional strength because Cuba had
demonstrated that the use of such
strength in a crisis area could force an
advesary to be the first to explode
nuclear weapons and thereby risk
mas -destruction.
The Russians vastly accelerated their
naval building program and began to
move persistently into the Mediter-
ranean. This process coincided with
dismantling of the U.S. missile sites
in Turkey.
Washington' promised to take no
physical action against Cuba's regime
and this in turn strengthened the hand
of Latin-American revolutionary move-
ments for some time to come. De
Gaulle decided he would never again
allow France to be drawn into crises
outside the European area and loosened
French NATO ties.
This historical effect of the Cuban
confrontation on Vietnam was indirect.
President Kennedy certainly didn't re-
duce American intervention; he souped
it up. But the lesson of 1962 wasn't
lost. Despite U.S. attacks on Hanoi,
even while Kosygin was there, or
bombings right up to China, and de-
sliite the U.S. blockade of Haiphong,
Moscow and Peking reacted with cal-
culated calm..
STATINTL
ApprovedlcFmrRelease 2001103/04k: ClA~RDP8e0+01604iR000300010001-0
by a U.S. naval blockade and the
threat of holocaust, Khrushchev
1"'(1--nd flown
ter of nuclear war was too dangerous
to contemplate. Ultimately, Cuba thus
 WASHINGTON POST
Approved For Release 20011041f:1 . t-RDP8
The Washington Merry-Co-Itound
STATINT
Kissinger's . s a-Hot Command spot
By Jack Anderson arch enemy, President Thieu. I Soviet Shipments-A class:- aCIA report suggests all WE
y In the secret truce talks, fled State Department analy- attention has merely enlarged-
Every day, coded messages ! North Vietnam's Le Due Tho sis charges that Israel's forays his ego and made him more
flood into Washington from; has emphasized that the Saigon across her borders against the
our embassies, military com- regime must be dismantled and Palestinian guerrillas have difficult than ever.
mands and intelligence out- replaced by a tripartite gov- given the Soviets a pretext for Castro "Uncouth" - Intellf
posts all over the world. The ernment dominated by neither! strengthening their foothold pence reports acknowledge a
most urgent telegrams are side. But lie has indicated that in Syria and Iraq. Military
funneled into IIenry Kissin- 5ai~on can choose anyone it shipment have been sent not rise in anti-U.S. feeling
ger's command post in the wishes to the new government, only to Syria and Iraq but to the oughout Latin America..
White House. Digests of over- that neither side should have i the Palestinian guerrillas di- But apparently Cuban Dicta
night intelligence reports are I a veto over the other's ap- I rectly. Contrary to press re- for Fidel Castro's attempts to
delivered each . morning to pointments. The implication is; ports of a Soviet "airlift" to exploit U.S. unpopularity for.
President Nixon. that 1-Ianoi would not object ifSyria, however, the airlift his own purposes have failed.
Flom sources with access to Saigon appointed the hated Ic o n s i s t e d of only four A typical message from our
this, intelligence flow, here are Thieu as a member of the tri-transport planes, which have defense attache in Ecuador,
some recent highlights: partite government. ceased to make regular deliv- where Castro visited last year,
> cries. But the shipments, describes the top Ecuadorean
I New Offensive?-Privately, Liao sVow-China s supreme military brass as anti-U.S. but
Henry Kissinger is optimistic ruler, Mao Tse-tung, told visit- though no more than token
about the prospects . of a in Japanese Prime Minister j military aid, have had the ef- also anti-Castro, The message
cease-fire in Vietnam. Yet in- Kakuci Tanaka fiercely that feet of strengthening Soviet quotes them as calling Castro
tercepted messages indicate the Chinese would resist to I bonds with the Arab hotheads, "uncouth" and "not the great
that North Vietnam is prepar- the death any encroachments The analysis concludes, never- leader that many people con-
'
Ing for a renewed offensive. by Russia. A CIA' report on theless, that Russia wouldn't dider him to be."
Our military intelligence has the secret Mao-Tanaka talks likely risk war for Syria, Iraq Cuba-Panama Friendship-
found no trace, however, that quotes old Mao as saying or any other Arab country. A secret CIA cable, reporting
Russia has replaced the tanks China would sacrifice Its own African Wildman-The ef. on a conversation with a
and artillery the North Viet- people to prevent Soviet domi- forts to placate Uganda's wild- Cuban intelligence officer
namese lost In their spring of- nation. He cited the fate of his man, General Idi Amin, ap- known only as "Alfredo"
fensive. They were able last former heir apparent, Lin pear to have backfired. Ile has quotes him as saying that "the
spring to sneak heavy hard- Piao, who died in a plane ordered the Asians, who had Cuban government generally
ware into South Vietnam vir- crash fleeing to Russia after become the backbone of Ugan- supports the PJG (Panama's
tually undetected. But the attempting a pro-Soviet coup da's economy, out of the coup- military junta) and General
best available intelligence sug- I against Mao. try. He has made impossible Omar Torrijos, the head of
gests that both Russia and C li o it 's Opposition-The demands upon neighboring Panama, but wants to find
China have cut back military Central Intelligence Agency Tanzania. He has made and ways to encourage Torrijos to
shipments to North Vietnam. reports that Chinese Premier broken promises to visiting move further to the left. 'Al-
Hanoi's military preparations, Chou En-tai is still encounter- mediators. He has imposed fredo' suggested that ... left-
therefore, may be for a lim- tng opposition inside Peking's harsh martial law upon hisiists in Panama form a Pana-
ited attack upon a political ruling circle. Chou's oppo- country, charging that Tanza- nia-Cuba Friendship Society,
target, perhaps even Saigon it- nents are upset over his policy nia, India and even Britain are which could promote friend-
self. But no one really knows of detente with the United 1planning to invade his small ship with Cuba, put pressure
whether the guns will be si-States, Japan and the tit'est. $ country. For the sake of black on Torrijos from the left and
lensed or booming when the They contend that the detente African solidarity, a host of possibly be. used as the center
I voters go to the polls on Nov. 7. has hurt China's credibility black African leaders have for certain unspecified Cuban
Soft on Thieu-lIanoi may; with revolutionary f o r c e s made pilgrimages to Uganda activites."
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000300010001-0