WHO ELSE WOULD BE FIRST TO PUBLISH A CHINA ATLAS?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 89
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 12, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

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JOURNAL
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E 2'4,3 60
TiVho else would be first
to is ublish
We sometimes get copies of memos
sent from wire service reporters to their
basses. They often contain interesting lit-
tle tidbits not significant enough to the
world to be included in stories.
For example, one of the first American
reporters into Red China during the
"ping pong diplomacy" stage mentioned
that he was finding his way around (and
learning facts about the country) from a
CIA atlas.
We knew the CIA was into a lot of
things (purely military operations, assas-
sinations, etc.) but: we never dreamed
that the successor to the puristic OSS
was competing with Rand McNally.. .
So just on the off-chance we sent a
note to the superintendent of documents
in Washington asking for a copy and a
bill, just as though we had a right to se-
cret documents.
? Then we forgot about it.
It arrived this week, price $5.25.
As is apparent in the photo of the
cover, there's Central Intelligence Agen-
cy imprinted as big as can be, and no
-secret or top secret stamp.
It was compiled and published well
prior to the first American visit, and
bears a November, 1971, printer's date.
There's no reason it should be stamped
as secret, but its obvious that it repre-
sents a workmanlike job in a library
well-stocked with publicatons from inside
then-closed China.
There's everything in it you've always
wanted to know about Red China but
didn't know how to ask. It doubtless is
the best thing out, and it's worth the
$5.25 several times over. Its maps, art-
work,. photos and text are magnificently
done. Chapters go into forms of govern-
ment by various levels, languages, dia-
lects and subdialects? climate, metals,
industries and the people themselves.
There's even a tourist's guide to Peking.
The last item is the only part that
gave us a start. The Peking guide is a
huge double-spread painting of the scenic
city. It apparently is drawn to scale and
looks much like an aerial photo. On it are
81 numbered circles ? just like a Stra-
tegic Air CAppinivecEFarRellease12001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5
closer look' we see that all 81 numbers
refer to palaces, .ancient temples, .gar-
China atlas?
denS, sacred gates and other points of
historic and sight-seeing interest, unless
someone considers the Soviet embassy to
be a target. You find out from reading
the skinny print hidden in the corner that
the painting itself is taken from a 1957
publication of Peking Publishing HoUse,
Inc., or whatever the Chinese version of
Inc. is.
We have three points to make:
(1) It's an excellent publication.
(2) The CIA shouldn't be in the pub-
lishing business, using taxpayer's' money
to put out fancy books (that obviously
cost more than $5.25 to make).
(3) The CIA, much to our surprise,
has the soul of a poet ? or at least one
CIA man, the editor of the atlas, has.
Between the terse preface and the
introduction is something in the nature of
a dedication. It's a Chinese poem, written
by r latter-day Communist about the
"c
goals of a commune. It urges hustle in ""L"-
harnessing the land and its wealth, and
ends wilh:
a
An inch of lime is an inch of gold,
That's the value of yesterday.
Time's word] today
Is an inch for ten thousand pieces of
gold.
Can it be that the anonymous editor is
spy-poet who came in from the
cold?
Asian
PEOPLE'S
EPUBUIC
OF
CHUKI,A
Atlas
? ...
Central Intelligence Agency
WASHINGTON POST
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STATI NTL
The Washimeton Itlerry-Go.Round
? Kissin,ler's Command Is a o pot
...., . , .... .
By Jack Anderson arch enemy, President Thieu. Soviet Shipments--A class!- a CIA report suggests all We /
In the secret truce talks, fied State Department analy- attention has merely enlarged:
Every day, coded messages 1 North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho sis charges that Israel's forays ego and
flood into Washington from , has emphasized that the Saigon across her borders against the his go made him more
our embassies, - military corn- regime must be dismantled and Palestinian guerrillas have difficult than ever. .
mands and intelligence out- replaced by a tripartite gov- given the Soviets a pretext for Castro "Uncouth" ? Intern:
posts all over the world. The ernment dominated by neither strengthening their foothold
most urgent telegrams are side. But he has indicated that in Syria and Iraq. Military gence reports acknowledge a
funneled into Henry Kissm- Saigon can choose anyone it shipment have been sent not rise in anti-U.S. feeling:
gees command post in the wishes to the new government, only to Syria and Iraq but to throughout Latin. America.
that neither side should have the Palestinian guerrillas
White House. Digests of over- But apparently Cuban Dicta-.
1 ch-
i night intelligence reports are a veto over the ether's an- rectly. Contrary to press re- tor Fidel Castro's attempts to'
delivered each morning to pointments. The implication is ports of a Soviet "airlift" to exploit U.S. unpopularity for
President Nixon. that Hanoi would not object if Syria, however, the airlift his own purposes have failed.
- From sources with access to Saigon appointed the hated co n s 1st e d of only four A typical message from our
this.intelligence flow, here are Thieu as a member of the tri- transport planes, which have defense attache in Ecuador,
some recent highlights: partite government, ceased to make regular deliv- where Castro visited last year,
New Offensive??Privately, Mao's Vow?China's supreme cries. But the shipments, describes the top Ecuadorean
Henry Kissinger is optimistic ruler, Mao Tse-tung, told visit- though no more than token military brass as anti-U.S. but
about the prospects . of a ind Japanese Prime Minister military aid, have had the ef- also anti-Castro. The message
cease-fire in Vietnam. Yet in- Kakuei Tanaka fiercely that feet of strengthening Soviet quotes them as calling Castro
tercepted messages indicate the Chinese would resist to
bonds with the Arab hotheads. "uncouth" and "not the great that North Vietnam is prepar- the death any encroachments
The analysis concludes, never- leader that many people con-
ing- for a renewed offensive. by Russia. A CIA ' report ontheless, that Russia wouldn't dider him to be."
Our military intelligence has the secret Mao-Tanaka talks likely risk war for Syria, Iraq
found no trace, however, that quotes old Mao as saying or any other Arab country.
Russia has replaced the tanks China would sacrifice its own African Wildman?The ef-
and artillery the North Viet- people to prevent soviet domi- forts to placate Uganda's wild-
namese lost in their spring of- nation. He cited the fate of his man, General Idi Amin, ap-
fensive. They were able last former heir apparent, Lin pear to have backfired. Ile has
spring to sneak heavy hard- Piao, who died in a plane ordered the Asians, who had
ware into . South Vietnam vir- crash fleeing to Russia after become the backbone of Ugan-
tually undetected. But the attempting a pro-Soviet coup da's economy, out of the coun-
best available intelligence sag- against Mao. try. He has made impossible
gests that both Russia and C h o u 's Opposition?The demands upon neighboring
China have cut back military Central Intelligence Agency Tanzania. IIe has made and
shipments to North Vietnam. reports that Chinese Premier broken promises to visiting
Hanoi's military preparations, Chou En-lai is still encounter- mediators. He has imposed
therefore, may be for a lim- ing opposition inside Peking's harsh martial law upon his
lied attack upon a political ruling circle. Chou's opPo- country, charging that Tanza-
target, perhaps even Saigon it- nents are upset over his policy nia, India and even Britain are
self. But no one really -knows of detente with the United planning to invade his small
whether the guns will be Si- States, Japan and the 'West. country. For the sake of black
lenced . or booming when the They contend that the detente African solidarity, a host of
voters go to the polls on Nov. 7. has hurt China's credibility black African leaders have
? Soft on Thea?Hanoi may with revolutionary forces made pilgrimages to Uganda
be softening slightly on its around the world, to placate General Amin. But
Cuba-Panama Friendship?
A secret CIA cable, reporting
on a conversation with a
Cuban intelligence officer
known only as "Alfredo "
quotes him as saying that "the
Cuban government generally
supports the RIG (Panama's
military junta) and General
Omar Torrijos, the head of
Panama, but wants to find
ways to encourage Torrijos to
move further to the left. 'Al-
fredo' suggested that ... left-
ists in Panama form a Pana-,
ma-Cuba Friendship Society,
which could promote friend-
ship with Cuba, put pressure
on Torrijos from the left and
possibly be. used as the center
for certain unspecified Cuban
activites."
0 1972, United Feature Syndicate
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STATINTL
-1\-1--- ,t- 4 ! ."' --:',f :,.! .,...?.:.7.,:?,:r:,',-,' ?.!;:.,
,
By U. lANI
MOSCOW
Imperialist circles are using
any and every expression of anti-
Sovietism in strngle against
socialism. The anti-Soviet policy
of Peking directly serves the
needs of imprialisin: and reac-
tionary Western propaganda is
using it to divert the attention
of the peoples from the contra-
dictions rending capitalism, to
justify imperialist ag4ression and
to slander the peaceful policy of
the Soviet Union and the other
countries of the socialist com-
munity.
In the United States the Pen-
tagon-reared news analyst Joseph
Alsop especially feeds on fabri-
cations about Soviet-Chinese re-
lations. A few days -ago he pub-
lished in the inetropolitan news-
paper Washington Post a loud.
article under the heading "Polit-
ical Hallucinations.- Whose and
what hallucinations? It turns out
that nearly all except the author
have them, and they consist in
that honest and decent world pub-
lic opinion is indignant at U.S.
.aggression in Indochina and the
U.S.-protected expansionist policy
of Israel in the Middle East:
whereas. says Alsop. the main
feature of the world landscape
is not at all the war in Vietnam
and not even the dangerous situ-
ation in the Middle East. ?
No. in the Alsop ''landscape'
the main feature is a Soviet "red
threat- to China. In the CIA and
the Pentagon there are very sen-
sible inen who have explained
everything to him and asked him
to give an account in public. And
this old hand at provocative
things tried his best to calumni-
ate the Soviet Union, accusing it
of nothing less than preparing a
"preventive attack- on the Peo-
ple's Republic of China.
The hallucination prompted by
the "sensible inert- so much
caught the turbulent imagination
of Alsop. the hater of socialism.
that he tried to present the im-
agined picture as a reality, in
%.1 I Fl I 1 1 `I I I-
front of which he and his friends
sat as the "third rejoicing... lie
even yelped v:ith rapture.
This patholcyical article of .\l-
sops is not unique. Back in Feb-
ruary this year he tried to fright-
en the woi.ld with his extravagant
fancy of t he "cast ration of
China.- Finally. two days after
the above-mentioned article, in
the same Washin;r,tun Post, Al-
sop made the crazy allegation
that Pravda was advocating a
"reduction ol Soviet support- for-
the heroic Vietnamese patriots.
This goes beyond all measures
of falsehood.
But then, apart from Alsop,
not so rudely and less noisily.
other U.S. journalists and news-
papers almost simultaneously
spoke out on the Soviet ''threat''
to China, also. apparently. on the
advice of "sensible men" of im-
perialist reaction.
As we see, there is a certain
strategy at the bottom of all this.
It consists. first of all, in an
attempt to discredit the actual
policy of the Soviet Union vis-a-
vis the People's Republic of
China. This policy rests on a de-
sire to normalize relations, to
restore good-neighborliness and
friendship between the Soviet. and
Chinese peoples. The reactionary
imperialist forces are well aware
of the fact that the improvement
of relations between the U.S.S.R.
and the PRC would accord with
the vital, long-term interests of
the two count ries, the interests
'of world socialism, the interests
of struggle against imperialism.
The Soviet Union has placed be-
fore the PRC concrete and con-
structive proposals on non-aggres-
sion, non-use of force, settlement
of border questions, improvement
of relations on the basis of mu-
tual advantage.
These proposals have not been
accepted by China as yet. The
Peking leaders think it ,unprofit-
able for themselves to speak the
truth about these proposals of tile
Soviet Union--that would be their
self-exposure as great-power ex-
pansionisls ;nut splitters ing..!ra-
vating international tensioas and
relations between the U.S.S.R.
and the Alsop and his col-
leagues are also aware of all
this. but deliberately pass it over
in order to warp the real state
of affairs.
The anti-Communists and anti-
Soviet propagandists. in pablish-
ing their inventions ibout th,., So-
viet "threat.- do not abai:cion
their attempts to discredit Soviet
foreign policy as a whole. They
are out to question the U.S.S.R.'s
consistency in the struggle for
stronger world peace. to present
the Soviet proposals on European
security, collective security in
Asia. bilateral declarations on
the non-use of . force and other
measures to ease internatienal
tension and to achieve disarma-
ment. put forward by the Soviet
Union, as allegedly prompted
only by: tactical considerations.
There is nothing new in these
methods, Imperialist propaganda
has long been resorting to slan-
der concerning a "red menace"
in its unsuccessful struggle against
socialism:
What has been new here in re-
cent years lies elsewhere. It con-
sists in :that the Peking leader-
ship willingly echoes slanderous
concoctions of all kinds concern-
ing Soviet foreign policy. Peking
brazenly -draws on and spreads
in from filthy sources
of imperialist propaganda, adding
to it its own inventions tbotit. the
Soviet Union and other countries
of the socialist community.
Therein lies the nutritive mc-
di urn for the hallucinations of
Joseph Alsop and the "sensible
men- froin the CIA and the Pen-
tagon, who are backing him. That
is the v.?ay the Peking "propagan-
dists.' and the poisoners of pub-
lic opinion, who are filling the
orders from the aggressive im-
perialist circles, are assiduous-
ly assisting each other.
(Pravda)
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frl
erlt- 11 1
ti , . n t
rti
By Stanley Karnow trol the Chinese fleet and re., replacement by a single sue-
wriir ftiEed, Chou explained. cessor was "one of the plots"
Chinese Premier Chou En-1 Chou svict tintChIna concocted by Marshal Lin
.lai has indictated that net
a collo> ? . ?..,. ? ,?
itestcit In up; Plan. a .named 7tran's offi-
powec in Pet,iinil aiter .1010t ifidtviirial develo111 e11:1 vial heir in the Chinese Com-
Commuitist. Party (ilinirtnzin I ventures s?vith the Unitedi munist Party constitution pro-
Tr,e,turt7, die? St-ates as a rest.tli, Q.:: its bad c!s..-1 mu rgated in .\pril 3f;139, is al
-
Chou has suggested,. Inr.v.i wjth ,rtoiects es-i le?e0 to have been killed in tn
ever, thiA a lt.ey tha ; , '
ti
future hk.ch to ttiJited wit n the Sovietl airplane crash after an abor-
tive attempt to seize )O iii
the Yao n'lailvc.h? Union.
young offieial ...vim The Wall Street Journal ati-I Despite this disclosure by
pilved It tr000rtai.it 1.4t1.-7. courit cited C1 i. rri,?yinli Chou, most Ch ' cpecialists
tuimilttiens Cnitorat
141 tho mon who plannedi here: believe that Mao person-
:Revolution. ii,Itto is 'hi run
the. ,tisiassi)tation" of riresIdentlaily supported Lin'A desi
Chou i;; 74. ,na-
The Premier discussed Ped -1-`7-"1c.?Y hita no,a?r been cap-1 tion 111 his fitleefor hut later
que.ilkni in aI turcid. Aecitiitdir.; to the ,lour?1 changed his mind ;01.10.v...int,/ an
,witle-rtni.t-tt rig converFatioll lifts rill's represmdative, Chou said ;internai power strit;gle that
?ict,u?crerle;et,;:idy. L
.ee y 0 v , a 1. in the 1.1llottot, of
n
Chou, t,tvii0 likes miL1 Ii I 'cunt dn't . . . the one %vholltrii.
ISome China experts: here
tallted tti his for ireaiI.C' him".
neatly lour hours until: past 1 Sptiaking in a litt.liter vein,' also believe that Chou's refer-
tWO o'clock on .bunday morn-
C,toti told the editors that tho i. c to Yao Wt7n?vuan as a
"Folio mostkooi-vied.,e-thie on key figure in the future rnay
pa
according to accounts or he ?
(liscussion y s Niy China's Conimuniq Party or-i4tho be related to internal ten-
by AV all Street jourilati Cl' it
islie thtit. Central; .101is still no.telm,, China. .As
1; ;I
s rl I .1'f-.)11,:, ix011,;. J. to ;,ut toat its set.. (...tiou may
t r.:toner, ,:g cy ert uni i
l ii
t ll, ,
PAs?:0ejete Sotc1:.!ti Linlon koew least tiveni L'a atiteratPitrt; to PL"teate
ham iul z," Gt-tier Cdi,05.;;I?titotigh it ims the largest ein-1 cal acti vists' vt-ho came to the
!tore during the Cultural lievo-
present, Chou discussed nlat-i in Pel!":.trr--:.
tors as divt,1,, as Pt (ii Clow jol;.cil that lut could itution.
econoilly, It(.?ti?ing's not vh.-,it the United s'uflos ;Is;
Yao, a young Shanghai pub
it the SlIVIC.t. Union ;Inci !Ion:: as Chiang
ntrA" about 40 who 111(1
New 'iTork trncrie. vivnt Iraxe Cl I
The edit( 0.6 rcl)un C(I milis Arnorien,. but oarned hino.,;,(?li ininoi. repo-
Chott thouwii a? si.411 P.nd tt memhor 101011 as a radical lilerztry
"Th :critic, Was apparently Wsenv-
pitcter, (11-hi:ied hits velum neo Ic pred hy \l to ? C'hi- rt.
Cit. and ellitrin throw:hunt TiAt premier s:tid that China i ?; ',`-- - ?
meeting. Whon e(i;ir:u Cva:) in no litorry to replace its tn ti a?
11-1;tt tney get do \Y!1 II) 1);cycj(!s th"t tilne
"soriete; ler ; coint-pelitine that -Iteltin.2.,:?.1` 11161'. to in1i'itel. ''111111111.1 rut.
Pie, Chou replied: ..tylly rtct t,t ould lteecnie Ne,str York ?,??,'a?',.`v}"1 \?'.:111 1.1"11 0")1)uscci
kterions7" in terir.s oi- at.?3 itO , Communist Party apliara-
'1US11Pi .:king.
With apparent seriotisnoss.1 '\,`-'1'',111 1, 1'1- `11""' t() Itn" Accordinga
to ccounts puh-
fliout,th, Chou disi:10,ed ink.) s'...1:eots."
lislied in Chin Ch
a. iang Ching
(1101', III ,.tutptit 0.1 ; int 3.;j,sity,1,.er Is Crtib
delegiited Yao to write an al-j
3S
)C( (I If) e (1 (till his imprestitott of ir.ek against Ihir ilet)tity ntayor I
lion Int-'erie Ci 0 dcq'itr: P'"ii.! White lionsc foreli-4n 110111 ioc pttkittg,, wtt jrz-mi, who Ii 1(11
vcather conoitiors. out- t 1(11 CI It 11 1 ii unnroduccd a historical
Pot Inst. 2413 nuiIIiunwhom lie has seen i'requently t play that obliquely criticized
tonF; and 40 million in !
: over he past year. "ti no, The teat pin;p;ise of. the
Joint Navv that he -can trill; toll', atiack 1-4:11051 Ilan, how-
Chou also that fur..! you for hail on hotly and 110..! (.....:or, '1?55 to depti;111(P. Peng
mer Sot jet t'rentier 1nrim, the decade agreements wece sialle,t with the
for t tic const rutin of 1).91 nit jor inLlust inst it I-
int ions in ('Itina. lIy the end eiluipment vnitted
.1.3.) billion had 'wen yew,' and. about 130 were
completed. Agreements \Vero also signed Nvith Eastern Euro-
pean count rios l'or the const ruct ion ()I' at least WO major prot-
ects and about 11\-4)-thirds ()I' thei-q, tverc, completed by
fI addit Toll o ying (atuipment for those installat ions t.lie
Soviet Union orovided China vit Ii valuable 1(4111CP-ill aid in-
cluding: pr) bliworinls zind technical information. (b) some
10,000 Soviel technicialis and mh.ors. lll1 (r I raining f
"1:).00() Chinese technicians and academic sindent:i in the
( rsack and 1;;Itsavage,1). 34\4)
'Elie impact of Soviet ai(1 termination in mi(1-1 960 on Chinese in-
dustrial out pia Nt":1S SOoll in coining:
ID 1961, indust rial product ion fell sharply to a level slightly
above that of 19,',7 but only t \vo-thitals of the peal; reached in
net.' the wit hdriiNvitl of the Soviet technicians in mid-
1960, the t'llinese found that they could not operate 111.:111.1.
1110heuv111(111S1 1)11111s :IS Z-406(1 ;lit' project S, ;tiiI
(hey Were fOreed ell( prOdlIct loll drastically. ( Vield? p.641
Tfo?vever, the shift to non-Conurtunist sources of assist:Luce in the
19(30's took away part of the sting, as in the electronics industry:
The NVIll1(1111W:11 of Soviet aid in 19(;() force(1 China to turn
to the tion-t'ommititist countries for assistance. These coun-
tries, principally Japan. AVest German,v, the United King-
dom, France, and SA??itzerlancl, are currently the source of
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more t n four Hillis or ('Ilina's imports of elect runic prod-
ucts and product ion equipment. lit lut;t) -1970 more l '....2t H)
million or lerlinologically advanced elect runic product ion
Niniiiinetil was imported from 1110 114111-0111111111111:-41 '11'111'141. The
imports consisted primarily of modern military and indus-
trial elect ronics NV1111'11 (1111111 4.()11.141. !HIV(' 1/111(111red 4101110S1 I-
Calk 01113' a Nei. a long development period. These imports ;Is
%veil as imports from the \\rest of sin,?.ial ?leo rii mnierntis
and technological Iniow-how ta ht ('Itina to forego I he
lengthy and expensive process or prototype d,velopment and
to expand its 44(1 ronies produet ion hnse front (I1) 11111.161' elec-
t 'tonics plants in Wm) l 200 in 1971. Years %Vero saved in
establishing t lie pro(Itict ion of advanced elect Tonic products
ror industrial and military programs. ueiehm.s, p.p. 87-88)
Tdeallv, continual ion of Soviet a i(1 to 1967, that is, through three
yea r plans \'011141. 1111 yV. Se1.11'11 ( 'hinese economic interests best. Yet, as
Ileichers suggests, the fOrce(1 shift to 1Vestertt im1ustri;i1 sources had
tangible long-run benelits to the Chinese.
3. In r;en, of it. Imegeeminu popnlotion eon the ('hitiese eco.noin.y
RitNillin
With t eXript 1On of the 1 hree disaster years of 19:i9--61, C'hina has
fed its ..linge and growing population currently estimated to be 44S
million.1inappr()ach to ( neo-Ma It husian problem has
been Nvo-protiged --a ne?v investment st rategy for agrtetill
sporadic birth control proprams. 'rho ne\v investment st rategy
adopted in he Nvake of the Great I.eap ForNvard involved an increase,
in chemical fert ilizers, pumps for Nvater cont rol, improved t ranspor -
tation, and so fort and a concent ration of thes(. addit ional resources
on potentially high-yield rice land in the southOf ('hima :
The response of agricult itral product ion to the 11411' St 1'14-
egy including t he substant 11 I increases investments in
agriculture and the concent rat ion on high-yield acreage?
resulted in (it) t 1u restornt ion ()I t u 1957 level of grain pro-
duel ion by 196 I. and (1)) gri)wi or gra ,ii prodlic( ion at a
smliewhal Nst('l tHu Iit j t III i I 1.
a result or the (.11ii2v1 st rategy, a new t rend line
has been established ill it.,ricitlt tire. dist Met Iv higher and more
steeply pitched II that prevailim, H11111'1'1114) 10)X-111\'('S11111)111
1)4)114?\'ol 1114? 1111 1411V01' (111111 111z11 \\'111C11 could 1,0
readily realized given (wen lar,...,(rer and better-bid:l ured inputs.
Out put \yid exceed he t rend vain(' %dam weat her is better i
norma I and fall below t lit I rend value lo the extent \\Tallier
is unfavorable. Erisnutil, p.1.14?)
three birth con( 1.01 cam pit i(rils have luul no appreciable effect Ott
demographic rates. loreover- ;lilt' this is the iimst st ril;ing point in
I he popuhd ion paper a successful attempt at fert ility reduct i(m prob-
ably would have lilt le effect ort I he total size Of the populat ion over
the next wo decades. .1 ird's fonr population project ions for 1990
range only bet \\Tell 1,319 1111111011 111141 1,334) 1111111On
models imply t hal even a major and successful (dVort
al forl ility reduct ion in t ITC is 111)t. 111(4'1,1' 10 111111:11) 111111'11
1111rAn.i))1111? 4'111141' 111 111t. S1Z(' (if 111(' 101111 1/4/1/111A11111 4)1' 111 1110
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Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5
s:ize (d. the .voimgcr age groups. hence it cannot afford much
relief from population pressure iii ,general or from such spe-
cific problems ;is I nerd for etIoeutioll, (miployment. housing
and other services for .%.oung people. To escape from
Iiiitt mid rather discouraging prospects, the PIZC would
Iii to find H uIt some of the factors that have thus
Iii?detenliined defflographie experiein, in other developing
countries.
The principal reason ?vIly these models slioly so little differ-
ence even for successful ellorts ;it family limitation is that
they assume enrriat inn het wee!, Jei dit,y___.and mortality
I reildS. in faet, hard 1,'ffl1ttf
nioe 0.> flgel1C1';11 acccp1;111C(4 01 fit li)ily lii iii tu I iou V1licll (10
1101 :1180 in i1111)1'0V(111(111 in general health and a loNver-
Of 1111)11;111tV. The lliSS(.111111a(11)11 ralility t110
1)1\C tell ntiSOrinted and IS currently heing com-
bined with general 'drive for better medical care and sani-
tation Eliroughout t lio countryside. ( A i rd. p 330. )
,Insummary, the main line of thitilim, hi these papers k that ne)y
inveStment \vitt I:eep iigriculture up \vith population but that agricul-
tur(' \vitt i)rovide no extra margin for stopped-up economic groNvilt.
4. Wind /n/0/(7,x (hi 11117 ilftry (le cc f orei yn ,,l?the
/W P( ()pie n1 efl prof:Ira nix-- ',loot' on economic (I,' OCT!) l)/ne n I ,)
.1. rending of the papers suggests that- the Chinese have been gen-
erally successful both in building up a heavy industrial base and in
gradually modernizim, their armed forces. the major factors
c()ntriliiiiing to this success IN: (it) the (?ontrol of consumption at
relittive13-, VIIIS1(.1.(k. egalitarian levels: (6) the use of foreign trade to
got high-teclitioloiry nnichinery and materials. which could in' pro-
dur"1 t 11()"1(' erv Iligh cosi thul after lung delay: and (o) the.
partiaI insulation ()I (he nuclear an(1 ot her higli-technolo!).,y progt.ams
from political I urmoil. 'HIP military prmtranis command roughly one-
tenth of China's GNP .1shbrool;, p.45 faint the foreign aid programs
approximately11)1) million an or aliont one-third of 1 percent
or chinn.s cransky, p.371 Idurine- the next (leeade. when the c()st,
of series manufacture and 1:n7e-scale deployment of modern weapons
will rise sharply upward, 1 he leadership ma v face a 11111(.11 tighter
squeeze on resources needed for growth. This squeeze ?A-ould be com-
pounded hy the insistent pressure from the population to raise the
level 4)1' C1)118111111)6( ill.
T. 110 ?/' netY ??????,; 'tax Peki n y bee-n de owl() ping IhP ri0118 OW-
IlOn1141' Iry;(111.,: 01 (11;11(1.1
The allthill'S tgi.t.t? that Peking (aii point to substantial suceesses
in building up regional transportation an(1 industrial facilities:
When the Communists came to po\?-er, they inherited :III
In1(1d-()1"1 ;m11 1111(11Y (1:1111:1g1.41 tralls1")11:1t inn net \VW.k?
Ili.c011S11'11(1i011 of much of the old net \vorl: w;is undertalom
durinie and hold plans \veil, formulated for the exten-
sion of ip rail, higliwa,v, and inland Nvatenvay systems.
Sul's("1 .1"'"gr''N'' \vas made (Itiriti!, the Itwo's and. ,Ifter
a pause (1111111,o' ourly 19(.0)?S, ('XpallSiun V;- IIi11 i\('Ii
11.1,"11orLwiIv n (II(' 1;11(' 191;0*S. "nw wori: extended
into the soutlm-esiern and northwestern sections of. the.
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Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001.-5
could iv.IId111(iii colinerl 'mg. links w(.1%, 'wilt
norl lwast. Thi? highway nig \vol.!: \vas expandod and
inipruvi.(1 11 l'S10111 ;111N1-4 SI1V11 11S '1'11A?1 1V111?11? 110
1?1111?0ads proz,0111 iv .1?11e ?Vz111.1'?Vay net ?Vork \V;IS
1o4hm.(1, .m11)1.01'141, :111(1 vX11111111141. 11111111d :11111 i'MIS1:11
WVIV 1110(k1111Z141 :111(1 I heir illcrottseti.
and \\igv I 147 )
ti summary, the ( 'hinese hay() persisted hi their 1)1;111 for
111t, 11'g1011:11 (1011.101)1111111 01 OW C011111 l'y 1111'01111 1111C1 11111
111111. Tilt) original plan NN fir;-I (() repair flu) hull's-
rial centers damaged during \Vorld 1Var 11. then to build
ne?v Imses in North and ( 'ent rid Chinn. and tinnily
to develop the Southwest and the Nort li \vest has certainly
keen delayed, Init the dev,dopimsni Iv_
tainisd. roil and. \Vn-lian, for examplo, aro no\V
esialili:-,11),(1 'Indust ria.I liases, and a lar.ire muffingr of industrial
vonst ruct ION 1)1'0.1(`CIS :11V 111110111y 1111(101' ih.vt?11)pmen1 in
switim,,s/('liiita.1,.71)
PROSPErrS AND l'itont,Ints
The Papers in the vt-iltime. alnmst certainly will prove of value to
anyone interested in the relationship of the lJnited States with the
People's Republic. of China. 'rho authors have provided a surprising-
:11,1(unit of detailed information on the People's Republic of Chimi's
()commie history, ib-; current economic situation. and its future eco-
m)ntic prospects. Although it has not been the purpose of the authors
to spoil out the implicat ions of their findings for U.S. pc)licy, they have
iwovidedus \vith an informational and analytic basis relevant to that
important taslc Some future prospects and pm)blenis may thus be
idont
l'ast. ll'estern projections of Chinese performance. have ilften seri-
ously ()vorst ted or understated I he actual ruturo 1)er1.01110111e0. In 1"1111eS
of disrupt ion and poor performance the recuperative capabilities of
Chinese society ha NT, :1pp:111'111 ly, often liven undert.st invited. Now, in
fl period encouraging favorable birecasts it is \yell to be cautious. A
number of problems may :iris() to dist till) ;111 etilrapolation of currently
favorahle economic trends;
?N.111'111111 c;1 I:111111 is
111;IV 1)1:1V 1hvir roles as tlit)v hay() throughout
Chinese history: for isxample, floods, droughts, earthquakes, epi-
demics, and so fort I).
0. The lOod..1)0p111:111(111 1)1111)(1, 11111?' 1)0. (1iS1'111)1.0(1 cansing short or
'longer term (n.)noini4. retard:II ion.
O The military burden on economy may sharply rise in resp(ins()
pansimi. ;Ind ht mop' I i)i) Soviet
(0 "ed:11111.r wpa puns r(os in I heir nuch.:11. programs force ex_
border or in I he T:ii St (IT ()I lir porn?v ivasons.
?Leadership strtiggIcs pitlit)r It) develop lielter 'Maoist state or
choose successor to M:10 111:11. diS11111/1111' 4.111.11911 stability.
ci 1 list it ional changes, as 'hina proceeds on its course Id' 1 111S1.01.-
111;111011 rroil (IiiiIlII n, a 111.1,1.11 s,witsty, may
v11,11(.10,1,1. lwri()(1,- or and di,riipt ion. Tilt, ;-;ovio oxpori-
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,
t
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Nice hasleen mixed .blessing as a guide to Chinese institutional
accommodation to change. From the rejection of tlw Soviet model
the ('Itinese turned to a "search for a l'aoist model". (Jones p.
58) An assumption that the search has ended and institutional
saI)jhtv\vill now facilitate ('hinese economic development would
scent premature at this point.
liepublic of China has become an economically stroncr,
unified iffition. Its capability simultaneously to meet re(piirements ot
feeding its poptilat ion, modernizing its military forces, and expanding
its civilian eccutomic base must now be )issunted' from its recor(1 to date.
11foreover, its expanding ec(morny and military establishment provi(le,
a base for project 111(1V:14114r 1)0 \Ver ill COIISOMIllee with it V11011110118
littionn resources. (.'hblese nia:c ulso be felt both t 111.(nig1t
direct use a cron()Iiiie and iiinitm.y ;111(1 the indirect example of
its model of development?Thus China may in the next decade or IWO
join the 'nited States. the Soviet I 'ition?lopan. and the \Vest Euro-
:peatti. community ill a pentag(m ()I world powers.
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WASHIbl TON POST
Approved For Release 2001/013kOMYC12RDP80-016
L The Washington Nierry.Go-Ronnd STATINTL
0S0, Notes
By Jack Anderson
: There is evidence in the se-
cret U.S. cable traffic that
President Nixon's Military
moves .in Vietnam may be
driving the two great Commu-
nist antagonists, Russia and
China, bacietogether. ?
We.have been able to trace
the dismaying developments
through secret documents,.
which the White House has
carefully withheld from both
Congress and the public.
These. documents show that
the.. Kremlin reacted to the
Chinese-American rapproche-
ment by making its own secret
overtures to Peking 'last Au-
gust. The Soviets worked
through Lin Piao, the acerbic
defense minister, who has
been designated by Mao Tse-
tung to become his successor.
Encouraged by his Soviet
contacts, Lin opposed inviting
President Nixon to Peking and
advocated restoring the
Chinese-Russian. p artnerihip-
This put .Lin ire direct conflict
with Premier Chou En-lai,
who had issued the invitation
to Nixon.
Lin lost the showdown and
mysteriously disappeared. The
crafty Chou spread the word
to the party faithful that Lin
had died in a plane crash after
attempting to assassinate Mao.
Chou's version, which was
whispered around China and
reached CIA ears, had it that
Lin attempted to waylay Mao
on the way home from South
China by train last August.
%????=1MINIMINN, JIISMINarwl
? Knowing Mao's itinerary
would take him through
Shanghai and Wuhsi, Lin al-
legedly arranged an assassina-
tion party in Shanghai?and aft-
erward planned to blOw tip a
bridge in Wuhsi to wreck
Mao',s train. Both plots failed,
according to the story, and
Lin attempted to flee to Rus-
sia by jet on Sept.-13. The
plane supposedly crashed in
the Wenteukhan area of Mon-
golia.
The whispers of the plot to
kill Mao, who has deity status
in China, apparently was in-
tended to cow Lin Piao's sup-
porters. So monstrous was the
thought of assassinating, the
great Mao, in Chinese minds,
that the Lin faction was sup-
posed to be intimidated into
silence.
But the opposition to Chou
continued to simmer under
the surface, and the Russians
quietly pressed for better rela-
tions. The plenum of the &v.
viet Central Committee, in an
unpublished action last No-
vember, sought to restrain the
ideological struggle against
the Chinese.
Still, other events inflamed
Chinese-Russian relations
until the State Department re-
ported in a confidential sum-
mary last December: "Sino-So-
viet international polemics as
distinct from domestic propa-
ganda have risen to the
highest level since 1969
. . . Peking, however, has
so far avoided whipping up
a war scare within China,
and it appears to be attempt-
ing to restrict increased ten-
sion. with Moscow to verbal
fireworks on international
questions."
Significantly, Chou is in
charge of China's interna-
tional affairs and,. therefore,
was responsible for the rising
rhetciric. President Nixon's air
attacks upon North Vietnam,
however, have made it awk-
ward for Chou. .
China and Russia have been
competing for Hanoi's favor,
as the two titans of commu-
nism maneuver for influence
in Southeast Asia.
Rivalry in Hanoi
The Central Intelligence
Agency, in a secret report, has
declared: "Following Dr.
Henry Kissinger's July. visit to
Peking, Chinese Premier Chou
En-lai made a Secret visit to
Hanoi to reassure the Govern-
ment of the Democratic Re-
public of Vietnam, (DRV) of
continued Chinese support.
"The Chinese emphasized
their support by increasing
their assistance to the DRV_
for the 1971-72 period. This in
turn resulted in an increase ity
Soviet assistance to the DRV
for the same period. ...
"The DRV expressed its ap-
prehension to Chou regarding
a ' U.S.-Chinese detente, and
stated that the DRV is still
suspicious about President'.
Nixon's visit to Peking."
In view of the Chinese-Rus-
sian rivalry in Hanoi, Nixon
undermined Chou and justi-
gna
lied Lin's poSition by .orclers
air strikes against North Viet-
nam, Thi i has strengthened
Lin's - survivors inside the
Chinese policy councils.
As a result, Lin's idea of re-
pairing Chinese-Russian rela-
tions is gaining support. At
the United Nations, for exam-
ple, the relations between
Chinese and Russian delegates
are warming. . .
A Soviet delegation, on: tour
of China, has Also been re-
ceived with unaccustomed
cordiality, in realm, there was
no Soviet denunciation of the
hinese at the Lenin Day cele-
ration on April 21. .
There are now hints of
Chinese-Russian cooperation
to route war supplies overland
to North Vietnam. If this de-
velops, ? the mining of the
North Vietnamese harbors will
cost the U.S. far more in
world strategy than is likely
to be gained on the Vietnam-
ese fighting fronts. -
1972, United Feature 82ridieate
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? OicsHINCTON POST,
? Approved For Release 200/0314 INA-RDpRiC111\16/111
The Washington Merry-Goatound
jIy Jack Anderson
Secret intelligence reports
declare that President Nixon's
high-risk military moves in
Vietnam have undermined
those in both Moscow and Pe-
king who want to ease ten-
sions with the United States.
Although there had been no
visible opposition to the Presi-
dent's trip to Peking and invi-
tation to visit Moscow, the
Central Intelligence Agency
claims the detente was fierce-
ly resisted inside the policy
councils of both governments.
To protect our sources, we
cannot quete directly from the
CIA documents. The CIA
maintains, however, that the
decision to invite Nixon was
by no 'means unanimous in
'Moscow or Peking.
Citing "reliable" sources,
the CIA claim's the Soviet mil-
itary hierarchy has opposed
doing business with Nixon. De-
fense Minister Andrei
Grechko, apparently, has be-
come the principal spokesman
for this faction inside the
Kremlin.
The Russian marshals, .ac-
cording to the CIA, are eager
to share credit in Hanoi for
the North Vietnamese sue-
t fiFr Nixo
cesses. For the military equip-
ment, which has smashed the
South Vietnamese defenses,
was made in Russia.
The Soviets, in the bidding
against the Chinese for influ-
ence in Hanoi, had offered the
North Vietnamese a $110 mil-
lion military loan. Gen. Vo
Nguyen Giap, the North Viet-
cided to spend it for tanks,
heavy artillery and anti-air-
names? military genius, deci-
craft missiles.
The Soviet military brass
would like to see a setback for
U.S. interests not only in Viet-
nam but the Middle East. The
CIA warns that the Russians
may counter U.S. moves in
Vietnam with new initiatives
in the Mediterranean.
The CIA offers fewer specif-
ics about the opposition within
the Chinese leadership to the
Chinese-American detente.
But bitter opposition, says the
CIA, is simmering beneath the
surface.
Laird's Good Humor
Our recent columns on the
misuse of the Pentagon .auto
fleet has drawn a good-humor-
ed reaction from Defense
Secretary Mel Laird and or-
ders from on high to start
obeying the regulations.
Slightly 1
But the Pentagon bigshots,
as usual, are reading the regu-
lations to suit their expensive
tastes, not to save the taxpay-
ers' money. Result: most of
the staggering waste contin-
ues. ?
We told, for example, how
gon cars, intended for use
only on pressing official busi-
ness, had become a luxury lim-
ousine service for military po-
tentates and their congres-
sional friends.
Laird, meanwhile, still has
two limousines at his constant
call in case one should de-
velop motor trouble. His spe-
alai assistant, Carl Wabace, is
also picked up each morning
and delivefed hoine each eve-
ning by a military chauffeur.
The men who toil in the
Pentagon garage, however,
were getting the word to put
an end to excursions that vio-
late regulations. This, presum-
ably, riseant stopping the prac-
tice of routinely chauffeuring
members of Congress around
Washington.
But when the motor 'pool
tried to follow orders, it found
itself in hot water with She
Pentagon's congressional liai-
son office which is resisansi
popularity rating high on
Capitol Hill,
The clash between military
regulations and congressional
relations was quickly resolved
in favor of keeping the Con-
gressmen happy. The soldiers
who man the motor pool were
ordered to provide whatever
the congressional liaison of-
fice wanted. -
So military vehicles con-
tinue, for example, to bring in
large quantitieS of liquor from.
the Pentagon's Washington
supplier so there will be
plenty to serve to thirsty Con-
gressmen when they attend a
military reception or take a
military flight.
.
The fact that such trips in-
volve an apparently illegal.
transportation of liquor across
the Vieginia border from
Washington doesn't bother the
Pentagon brass.
Apparently, the abuse of
military cars is not confined
to Washington. At the U.S.
naval base in Bermuda, for 'ex-
ample, the brass ride around
in full-size American sedans
despite the fact that such
large cars are legally forbid-
den to other residents of the
resort island._ ,
ble for keeping the military's 41;? 1972, United Feature Syndioete
. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5
-oa../ear3x2s
Approved For Releage zuui/u /04- C1A-RDP80-01601R
14 MAY 9/2
CIA SPY KIT
?
CHINA ATLAS
PUT ON SALE
WASHINGTON (UPI)
? --7-For $5.25, any citizen
can have his own Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency
document.
7:The Government
. Printing Office in Wash-
ington iS offering for -
sale 30,000 copies of the
CIA's new 82-page, mul-
ticolored atlas of the
People's Republic of
-China.
Officials at the GPO
said that except for an
annual four-volume se-
-.ries listing the broad-
casting stations' of the
? world, the atlas was the
only CIA document they
had produced for sale to
the public.
? In addition to maps of
? modern China, the atlas,
with the CIA's seal on
the cover, also contains
? historical maps, a num-
ber of charts describing
the growth of the Chi-
nese economy and a nar-
.:...r a tiv e accompanying
the maps and charts.
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5
? '17/151,-IIIKITOIT T,'03T?
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001433/W: taTA-RDP80-01601R00
Mines Divert
More Ships,
,U.S. Reports
The ma-verrient. of 'tile. two
ships, however, could repre-
sent the start of a gradual So-
viet naval buildup.
Contrary to some reports
from Hanoi, Friedheim said
the North Vietnamese have
? ?..4,... . made no effort to clear the
. By Michael Getler tinines from their harbors and
',. ? Washington Post Staff Writer 'reiterated that Hanoi has no I
The Pentagon reported yes.; ships actually equipped to get I
these deadly and hard to re-'
terday that "several more
ships" that were. en route to harbors. , :
North , Vietnam have . appar-
, Another sign that .Commu?
ently been "diverted" because I nist ships bringing supplies to
of the U.S. mine barrier. the North may go to China in-
Pentagon spokesman Jerry stead was reported by The As-
W. Friedheim announced the sociated Press from London
changes in the ship move- yesterday.
ments, but refused to provide According to the AP, senior
any information on their : Communist diplomats 1 there?
courses. unidentified in the report?
Other sources said, however,' named two South China ports
'
that "it is possible, and it is le-
that could, handle the ship-
- gitimate speculation"
tba,t ' ments. They forecast that de-
- . some Soviethloe ships may be 1 spite the continuing Sino-So-
vie feud, mining
will lead
move explosives out of their
'headed for Chinese ports near : ' pal
d
, 'North Vietnam to union their
? cargoes for transshipment to:
icy almostcertainly
North Vietnamese offensic7e":
which relies heavily on tanks,
trucks and mobile artillery'
and air defenses.
A Soviet end-run around the
Haiphong mibe fields would
get the fuel intolhe area just
north of the border and sub-
ject it to bombing?the less
effective of the two-pronged
U.S. effort to shut off the sup-
plies. - .?
There were about 25 ships
heading toward North Viet-
nam before the mines were
laid, about half of them So-
viet. About five or six turned
back toward the Soviet Far,
East port of Vladivostok.
Friedheim also disclosed
yesterday that two and possi-
bly three more ships got out
of Haiphong just before the
'mines were activated at 7 a.m.
I (EDT) Thursday. These are in
addition to five ships that .
were previously reported as:
having left. That means that
- 28 or 29 shivs are .trapped by
to extension of the existing the mines in Haiphong.
%their original destination, rail-supply agreement among At least one and possibly
. .These sources caution that "it China, Russia and North Viet-, two of the three and,
Is too early to tell" -with cer- nam ? to include use of Chinese that also got out are Russian. .
;tainty. ports. The other was flying a Somali'
. If the ships do head for The Soviets for years have flag.
-
China, it could signify a So- made extensive use of two Friedheim also revealed .
viet intent to outflank the U.S. main rail lines through China that two Chinese vessels were ,
. .
mining operations while avoid- ,to North vietnam bottled up in Vinh, and two
ing a naval confrontation with
The two ports named by the Soviet ships at Campha be-,
? the Americans. C ininunists are Peihai and cause of the mines. Thesd are I
. Two Soviet warships--a
cruiser and a missile-equipped
.? destroyer?were reported yes-
terday by the Japanese Self-
Defense Agency to be steam-
ing southward through the
Tsushima Stfait between
Japan . and South Korea, an
area more than 1,500 miles
north of hanoi.-
The ships, from the Soviet
port of Vladivostok, were said
to be the first Russian naval
vessels seen going south
through the strait. since the
Pakistani-Indian war last De-
' cember.
But officials here said there
was no way to tell where they
were headed. They noted that
Ch'irihsien, both near major smaller coastal type freight-1
road and rail networks about ers, The two ports are among '
100 miles north of Hanoi.
six other relatively small Mr-
'
Peihai was mentioned along
bdrs that were mined in.addi-
.
with the larger ports of Can-
tion to Haiphong. _
ton and Fort Bayard by the
U.S. Central ? Intelligence
Agency in its report to Presi-
dent Nixon's National Security
Councl in early 1969 on Viet-
nam
The CIA estimated then
that "all of the war essential
imports could be brought into
Vietnam over rail lines or
roads from China in the event
that imports by sea were suc-
cessfully denied."
The United States is now
heavily bombing those over-
the ships were steaming at 10 land lines, but defense anti-
. knots, .far less than their top , lysts are far less convinced
speed of about 30 knots. ; that the bombing will work- as
. ?To pose any' serious dial- . well aS the mining to shut off
lenge to the mine barrier and supplies.
the vast U.S. armada in the ! The CIA still contends that
area the Soviets would have most of the actual arms?guns
to send scores of ships, planes, and ammunition?continues to
submarines and, most impor- arrive overland.
The major fuel, food and
So far, informed sources say
tantly, minesweepers. ?
no major Soviet naval move- truck shipments arrive by sea
ment is underway nor do So- through Haiphong. The fuel,
however, is viewed as
. PaPKRN,Ri trMd tSrticu4-
viet ofC libiof?,
IA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5
appear t
the area.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000
CLEI/FLAND, OHIO
PLAIN DEALER
MAY 1 2 1972
m - 409,414
S ? 5 4 5 , 03 2
CIA Atlas on China'
'Looks Like 'Sellout'
The first Centr..@LIL14,11
gence_4groner-. publication
el/17T? be sold by the U.S.
Government Printing Office
"looks like it might be a
sellout," Robert Kling, su-
perintendent of documents,
told The Plain Dealer
yesterday.
? The Government Printing
Office already has received
more than 6,000 orders for
"The. People's Republic of
China Atlas," an 82-page,
six-color book, designed ori-
ginally as briefing material
for President Nixon's trip to
Mainland China. It was put
on public sale a week ago.
? GPO ordered 30,878 copies
o f - the atlas printed, with
delivery slated for late
? May.
? Kling, phoned in Washing-
ton, said he now believes
advance orders could total
25,000, and, ? if, so, "We'll
have to go back to press
with it."
The atlas, priced at $5.25,
measures 101/4 by 17 inches,
and contains foldout maps
as big as 101/4 x 34.
It employes a number of
unconventional graphic
techniques, in addition to
standard regional and the-
matic maps, charts and
photographs, . and "is de-
signed as an introduction
and general reference aid
for those interested in the
People's
China."
The atlas
parisons of
States and
Republic o
contains corn.
the United
mainland
(Communist) China to
make its statistics more
meaningful to the? average
American.
A CIA spokesman said the
agency had never before of-
fered ally such publication
to the American public.
But, he said, President
Nixon showed the atlas to
reporters and before live
TV cameras before his trip.
So the CIA decided to make
iI public.
Orders for the atlas can
be sent to the Superintend-
ent of Documents, Govern- ,
ment Printing office,
Washington, D.C. 20402.,
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5
NEW N,ORK TIUES
2
Approved For Release 200/_
i_.0Fc . _It17.R.FRM1601
-A C.I.A. Atlas of China
,Goes on Sale for $5.25
WASHING? TON, May 6 (UPI)
.?For $5.25, any citizen Can
have his own Central Intelli-
gence Agency document,.
? The. Government Printing
Office is offering for sale .
30,000 copies of the C.I.A.'s
. new 82-page, multicolored at-
las of the People's Republic
of China.
Officials at the printing of-
fice said .that except for an,
annual four-volume series
listing the broadcasting sta-
tions of the world, the atlas
;was the only C.I.A. document
they had produced for sale
to the public.
" In addition to detailed maps.'
of modern China, the atlas; :
which has the C.I.A.'s seal ??
on the cover, also contains
historical maps, a number of.
charts depicting the growth ?
of the Chinese economy, and ".
a narrative accompanying the
.:maps And charts. .
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5
6
I MAY 1972 STATINTL
ADVANCE ORDER FORM
Approved For Release 2001/%0VEME86-VSTRO
PEOPLE
ATLAS
Issued by the Central intelligence Agency, this colorful publication goes beyond the scope of a
conventional atlas. It represents a wider variety of information, including geographic, economic, historical,
and cultural data. In the interest of simplicity and clarity, it employs a number of unconventional graphic
techniques in addition to standard regional and thematic maps, charts, and photographs. This publication
is designed as an introduction and general reference aid for those interested in the People's Republic of
China. To make so much information about such a complex and little-known country as meaningful as
possible, a great deal of it is placed in a familiar context?that is, by drawing comparisons between China
and the United States. 1971. 82 p.
'
$5.25
Place your order now for copies to be mailed about the latter part of May 1972.
"wiLav
?
a
Approved For Reiease 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP8a-.01601R000200340001-5
? MAIL ORDER FORM To:
Pu bfigircro veal frtrit' rThelipagen20,CP14611104LtsOMPRDP86413016100a2ocom000l:5
Fun uSE OF SUPT. DOCS.
Enclosed find $ (check, money order, or Supt. of Documents coupons). Please send me
copies of the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ATLAS, at $5.25 per copy.
(Prex 3.10:C 44/3) (S/N4108-0112) ?
PLEASE NOTE: Copies are scheduled to be mailed about the iptter part of May 1972.
Please charge this order
to my Deposit Account
No.
Name
Street addtess
Enclosed
To be mailed
_later
-_-_Subscription
Refund
Coupon refund
Postage_
*GPO 780-984
City and State ZIP Code
FOR PROMPT SHIPMENT, PLEASE VERIFY ADDRESS ON LABEL BELOW, INCLUDING YOUR ZIP CODE
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS DISTRIBUTION CENTER
PUEBLO INDUSTRIAL PARK POSTAGE
PUEBLO, COLORADO 81001 AND FEES PAID
U.S. GOVERNMENT
OFFICIAL BUSINESS PRINTING OFFICE
e
?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: ClArRDP80-01601R000200340001-5
? WASHINGTONIAN
?972
Approved For Release 2001/03
AY 3.=4 : cIA-RDP80-01
STATINTL
The Voice of
? Toe Alsop Power
Glory
By Tom Kelly
it Joe Alsop's pleasant garden room
I four plump caged doves are cooing.
Joe says when asked that he does
not like doves?that out of their cages
, they are dirty, mean, and hard to man-
age.
Joe sits under the skylight sipping a
tisane from a huge blue and white china
cup and the doves in two large, elaborate
cages pay him no mind.
They're in and Joe's Out but nobody's
free.
Joe i a blue blooded falcon, a rare
and endangered species. He is a falcon
by inheritance, .a member of the estab-
lishment, a natural born leader, a cousin
? of leaders, a classmate of leaders, a for-
mer roommate of leaders, and the chosen
voice of the pedigreed "first-rate men"
for thirty years.
For generations we've all been run by
the East Coast cousins. The first cousins
went to Groton and the second cousins
to St, Paul's. The Irish Catholic fifth
cousins were named Kennedy?but that ?
was later. First they were coachmen and
named Pat and Mike. They went to
Choate.
It is difficult to tell the cousins without
an alumni bulletin. Cousins are not mea-
sured by blood alone, but establishment
cousins do tend to marry establishment
cousins and produce geneological cousins.
There are several (de facto) Jewish
cousins named Lehmann, Ochs, and Mor-
genthau, but there are no Italian or
Polish or Bulgarian cousins. Black people
.are not ready to be cousins though some
can be classmates. It is customary to
speak well of the late Frederick Doug-
lass.
Some cousins chuckle a lot and Joe's
blood cousin Teddy Roosevelt grinned
and shouted "Bully" but most were
serious faced and did not laugh out loud.
This was partly because many were from
New England but also because they
were born to assume the awful responsi-
bility .of running the world. ,
?
Running the world' is not easy. Joe
took up the burden in 1932. He was a
strange youth?fat, an honor graduate
of Groton and Harvard, son of a roar-
ing Connecticut reactionary father and
a mother who was as well connected
as the Connecticut Light & Power Co. -
He was cousined to everyone important
south of Portland and north of Phila-
delphia. He was literally a cousin to all t
the Roosevelts?Teddy, Franklin, Elea-
nor, and Alice Blue Gown.
When Joe was ready for the profes-
sional world his grandmother (a cousin
of God's) decided that he was not to be
a businessman, diplomat, banker, Episco-
pal bishop, or president of Harvard. It
was suggested that he get a job on a
newspaper, a startling idea. Cousins and
classmates owned newspapers, of course,
but they didn't work on them. Joe had
a few precedents. Alexander Woollcott,
who if not a cousin was at least invited
to cousins' homes, was cutting a choleric
swath through New York culture, and
Bob Benchley, a blithe spirit but a Har-
vard boy, was working for magazines.
Ogden Reid hired Joe at Joe's grand-
mother's suggestion and sent him to re-
port to the Herald Tribune's city editor,
a disenchanted man. named. Stanley
Walker. City editors are all low-born.
Stanley had difficulty believing his own
? eyes since Joe, though only twenty-two,
was 245 pounds, dressed in well-cut vest
and watch chain, and possessed of an
extraordinarily arch accent that sug-
gested simultaneously the Queen Mother,
Cardinal Newman, and the fatigue of a
gentleman who'd just swum the English
Channel backwards.
He also couldn't type.
Still, no one is perfect. Joe was broadly
read and he could write a clear, ominous
sentence. Alex Woollcott decided that
Joe was the only educated youth he'd
met since his own college days. Alex was
given to extraordinary judgments?he
was against sex and he believed Louisa
May Alcott was a great writer.
Joe was soon a featured byline writer
at the Herald Tribune and in less. time \
than it takes to add up the Vietnam elec-
tion. returns he was the co-proprietor
'Of a Washington column?his partner
being a gentleman named Robert Kint-
ner, a non-cousin, who would in time
become head of NBC and an advisor to
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: bIA-RDP80-016011T-000200340001-5
Go
loom
Doom
-
,4?1-
7?Slf ?
Maw
r".
.006**?????1101111?11??
continued
Approved For Release 200M3
naTIM3158194114-611
THE TAU OF THE TOWN
!Studies
,ON it recent Tuesday evening, we
spent an hour in the Grand Ball-
room of the Waldorf-Astoria listening
to graduate students, lecturers, pro-
fessors, and an assortment of scholars
. and specialists unwind from a day's
work. It was the end of the second ,
day of the twenty-fourth 'annual meet-
ing of the Association for Asian Stud- ,
ies?with headquarters in Ann Ar-.
bor?and more than half of the two
thousand conferees- were relaxing at a
reception after spending the day in such
seminars as "The Emperor's New
Clothes: Symposium on Interpreting
the Meiji Restoration," "Continuity
and Change in Princely India," "Lu
listin: The Man, the Artist, and His
Ambiguities," "Judicial Conscience in
Modern Japan," "Wang Yang-Ming
(1472-1529): In Commemoration of
the 500th Anniversary of His Birth,"
. .
and "Yogaciira Buddhism." .
When we got there, at about five-
thirty, the ballroom was teeming with
white Americans (who were easily in
the majority), a handful of black
Americans, and a liberal sprinkling of
Chinese, Filipinos, Koreans, Japanese,
Indians, Burmese, and other Asians.
At the center of the large stage that is
a fixture of the ballroom was an elfin
young Japanese lady?Fusako Yoshida,
. we learned?plucking
classical Japanese music
from a long stringed in-
strument, whose ends
were resting on wooden
horses covered; with red
cloth. There was nothing
on the stage but Miss Yo-
shida and her instrument.
She had on a sea-green
kimono with a broad gold-
colored obi; her hair was piled high in
what looked like a spiral of buns; and
her feet were shod. in a pair of wooden
clogs. Miss Yoshida was treated as a
pleasant background to the evening,
her music competing with the babble
of .chatter, though in her demureness,
the delicacy of the sonnds she brought
from the instrument, and the economy
of her physical stature she .quite domi-
nated the stage. . . ?
So as ilk to look to_so, puch,4 stran-
ger in afnPIRTCP(19uEFsgcnNaigaS
pherc, we went over to a bar, bought a
bourbon-and-water, and, glass in hand,
walked around, either listening to what
people were saying or talking to them
ourself. The first man we went up to
was a short, middle-aged American
who was sitting at a table in the vicinity
)f the stage, seemingly engrossed in
the music. He was a Bostonian, he told
us, who had studied at the University
of Wisconsin and was now .a professor
in East-West relations at Cheyney
State College, in Pennsylvania.
"What instrument is that?" we
asked.
"A koto," he replied. "It belongs
to a large family of traditional Jap-
anese stringed instruments, one of
Which is the samisen?considerably
smaller."
"Good music," we observed.
"Exquisite," he replied. "You know,
I adore Orientals, feel very much at
home in their company, and am just
as fond of their culture. I even took up
karate. Not to use it, mind you?or, at
least, I hope I'll never have to?but to
keep in touch with the Oriental spirit
and sensibility." . ?
We told the professor that the meet-
ing seemed remarkably well attended
and asked him what had brought so
many people out.
"All sorts of things," he said.
"There are some people here looking
for jobs; some looking to change jobs,
some looking for intellectual rejuvena-
tion, some just looking for old friends,
and some, like me, hoping to meet
scholars whose work we've
admired. You might even
find people from the federal
government here. Take the
C.I.A.?they have an inter- V
est in what goes on here."
"Scholarly?" we asked.
"Sure, scholarly?why
not? Some of my best friends
are in the C.I.A."
At this point, seeking to
broaden our acquaintance,
we turned to a man standing
nearby, who may or may not
have overheard the conver-
sation. We hadn't broad-
ened things very much, it
turned out, for there on the
man's lapel badge along with his
? CC
a
he was wearing a black suit' and a
narrow, red-and-gray striped tie, and
under tortoiseshell glasses was the
gentlest pair of eyes we had seen that
day. We asked him what he did for
the C.I.A., and he said he was a
China-studies specialist, doing research
and analysis in the Agency's geography
department. He had been there since
the end of the Second World War,
after he came back from New Guinea,
the Philippines, and Japan, .where he
had served in the armed forces.
"What is the C.I.A.'s interest in this
meeting?" we asked.
"This is where you find the best
minds in Asian studies," he replied.
"They are my brethren. From time to
time, We have to get in touch with
them to find out what the new fron-
tiers in research are. In our business,
accuracy is the name of the game. We
can't afford not to keep up with what's
going on."
We said "Fair enough," thanked
him, and moved on.
Sauntering in the direction of Miss
Yoshida, who, we had noticed, was
taking a breather at a table near the
stage, we passed two happy-go-lucky-
looking young men in cfumpled sports
jackets, battered old suede boots, and
collars open at. the neck?a uniform
identifying them as graduate students.
"Why are all the attractive girls in
South Asian studies?" one of the young
men said. The other laughed before he
answered, and we didn't wait to bear
what he said.
Next,
we
overheard
a fragment of
another conversation, among a nearby
foursome consisting of a Japanese,
an Indian, and two white Americans.
One of the Americans was saying,
"Did you See all those professors run-
ning around with their bright graduate
students in tow? I hear the job pick-
-.ings are slim this year. In
fact, they seem to be getting
slimmer every year. A few
years ago, there was a great
demand for Asian scholars,
but apparently that was in
anticipation of the postwar
baby boom, and the boom has.
trailed off now, leaving
smaller classes and a surplus
iiiilottigett-1;relyi to-131601R000400340001aecrs."
tlF1?vine- m E
ired nian in is ear y ties,
Miss Yoshida smiled Mod-
ac#PeOtrAa?fPant ki9uiceese 2001/03/04: C IA-RDP80-01601 R000200340001-5
ourself.- She seemed to be in
her early-thirties, and her
mouth and eyes were lovely
and expressive. She told us
she was not in Asian Studies but was
appearing at the reception under the
auspices of the Japan Society. We
asked what she had been playing, and
she said, "A number of modern and
traditional Japanese pieces." She hand-
us the program of .a recital she had
gen at Carnegie Hall last November,
alo lg with Sumiko Murashima, a
vou lg Japanese soprano. Most of the
pee s she was playing at the reception
vver on the program, she said.
NN4 chatted -next with a tall, be.
spectacled, clerical-looking man, who,
indeed, turned out to be a Presbyterian
minister, and also the Southeast Asia
:specialist at Illinois College, in Jack-
sonville. He had returned a while ago
:from Chiang Mai, Thailand, where,
he said, he had done community-de-
veropment work for more than twenty
years. We asked him what had brought
him back to the States after a lifetime
in the East.
"Success," he said. "I worked my-
self out of a job." ?
"Is that success?" we asked.
"For me it is," he replied. "As a
foreigner M community-development
work, you are not doing very. well if
the local people can't get alongwithout
you after a reasonable time. You are
expected to train them to the point
where they will literally take over your
job."
We helded for ? an exit, slowing
down to follow a conversation be-
tween a couple walking alongside us?a
smiling, open-faced Chinese girl and
a short white American with a tooth-
brush mustache and a pair of granny
glasses.
"I've about had it," .the man said to
the girl. "The first-day was great, but
around about now I just want to go
home. I'm tired of running around
talking to people."
? "Ah," the girl said, smiling. "You
miss your wife, perhaps?"
"No, I don't miss my wife," he re-
plied. "As a matter of fact, my books
are what I miss. I'm dying to get back
to them.".
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WASHINGT0.3 Pc.):ST
Approved For Release 2001/031644t1Aa#DP80-
STATINTL
The Washington Illerry.Go-Round
Chineseder Ab
By Jack An4orson
t?-?
A confidential Senate mem-
oranda, citing a source in-
side the Central Intelligence
Agency, reports that the Red
hinese are "wondering"
about American Ambassador
Arthur Watson.
He is the International Busi-
ness Machine's heir and big
Republican contributor whom
President Nixon has put in
'charge of exploring diplomatic
relations with the Chinese in
Paris, We reported that ? he
had become gloriously drunk
on at least two trans-Atlantic
flights. On the plane that
brought him to Washington to
confer with the President
about his sensitive new assign-
ment, Watson tried to stuff
'money down the blouses of
:stewardesses. And on an ear-
lier flight he petulantly pelted
,a stewardess with grapes from
the fruit basket after she
turned down his invitation to
become a mistress for his
.teen-age son.
Such drunken conduct of-
fends the Chinese and could
jeopardize the Chinese-Ameri-
can negotiations in Paris. For
in the Chinese culture, anyone
who becomes drunk in public
would be ashamed to associate
again with his former friends.
The confidental memo, writ-
ten by Senate aide Torn Din
to Senator Frank Church (D-
Idaho) declares: "From people
who know Watson at IBM and
those who have dealt with him
in France, no -one says he can
handle the important, sensi-
tive and delicate job that the
President has now placed in
his less than steady hands."
Dine urges the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee to
phone foreign policy adviser
Henry Kissinger and urge him
to encourage the President to
"bring Watson home swiftly
and send a very top, man in his
place."
Explains. the Senate 'aide
"A CIA source in contact with
the Chinese delegation at the
United Nations and with oth-
ers who are in contact with
the Chinese in Paris, talked
with me about the charges
that Jack Anderson has made
against Ambassador Watson:.
?
t Elra,VOy Wa1son
sonaily onght to do something
Watson relieved from his posi-
viftly and effectively to have
ion. The charges are correct;
more important, the Chinese
are wondering what this all
means...
"Several Chinese diplomats
have approached our people in
Henry Kissinger and rge him
New York and in Paris want-
ing to know what Watson's be-
havior means. If Watson is not
very smart, if he is a drunk-
ard, and if he is licentious,
too, then are the Chinese
being used in the negotiations
in Paris?
"While President Nixon was
in China, he found negotiating
with Chou En-lai and' others
most grueling experience.
Each detail is discussed and
only the fop man discusses
them.
"For instance, in Paris, the
Chinese will not deal with any-
one but the ambassador. Our
negotiator, therefore, must be
persistent, tough, of sound
mind, highly respected and
show physical endurance as
well."
Instead of removing Watson
from the delicate negotiations,
however, the Nixon adminstra-
tion has decided to cover up
`Well?Cminected'
"This source, whom I have
checked out and found well-
connected and straight, be-
lives the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee or you per-
his inadequacies. CIA Director- /
Richard Helms wrote a hasty,
private letter to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee
Insisting "We can find no in-
formation in this agency" to.
support Dine's claims.
"In fact," added Helms,
"there has been no report of-
any PRC (Chinese Commu-
nist) reaction to the publicity:
on Ambassador Watson's con-..i
duct." -
Watson himself wrote let-
ters of apology for his "rude"
conduct on the PanArn flight
to Washington. Finally, Secre-
tary of State Bill Rogers, the
nicest guy in Washington,
used his amiable relations on
Capitol Hill to persuade both
the Senate and House to call
off their investigations of Wat-.
son.
Footnote: Members of the
PanAm flight crew, who were
questioned privately on Capi-
tol Hill about the Watson inci-
dents, completely confirmed
our charges. State Department
aides Robert Aylmer and
Frank Dempsey, who picked
up Watson at the airport, also
wrote a confidential report
saying he was "heavily intoxi-
cated."
0 1912, United Fetture GT:idle-Os
? ?
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5
for-siinslFoT-Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-016
cLE1IFT,
PLAIN DEALER . STATINTL
!AAR 6197a
? 409,414
? 545,032
Ccriu
tit osils
mons
sunAe
'
?. By Russell VV. Kane " being' paddled across water on structure below his level and that in
:()Well, President Nixon should be barges, rioting dragging out land- the shakeout .the bad elements
back from China by now (we write lords and other backward types, would be disco)iered and destroyed
Way. ahead, so we are never really painting slogan posters?but never a or re-educated.
,sure of anything). It is too bad that word about the .why of what was So he closed the schools down and
?
i he has so little time for reading other really going on there. Ken Ling and millions of other kids
-
than the CIA advisory and the other ? Now, and I believe only now, is a started raising hell up and down that
little condensations that his aides comprehensive version available, or vast land. It was just what Mao want-
poke toward him, hoping he will be at least available to. those who do not ed, "continual revolution," but it
able to at least glance before he read Chinese, because got out of hand, naturally, and even-
there was tually the Red Guard "little gener-
finally nods off of an evening after a some source material available to als" themselves had to be repressed
busy top executivish day. Chinese scholars. earlier, and there . d even.killed.
a , ?
If he did in fact have lots of time to was even some scholarly work availa-
Pd
read he alight have read "The Re- ble on a narrow basis to persons who From the evidence it would ap-
venge Of Heaven" by Ken. Ling. Its do not read Chinese but who were pear that Ken Ling was one of few
subtitle is "Journal of a Young interested. (We must also assume the young defectors, that most of the
Chinese." It contains about 400 State Department and CIA were in-
Red Guards never realized that they
,pages (lots of them are forewords terested, and perhaprrnew what had only been used by Mao to rid
, and notes), it came out in January, was happening in mainland China at ? himself of potential opposition, and
"Putnam published it and you can buy that time. they and their youngei brothers and
'tone for $8.95 from your friendly Ken Ling, author of "Revenge,"is a sisters. are ready to go again whenev-
neighborhood bookseller or per- pseudonym. But there is no reason er they get the word. It is the sort of
haps you can borrow one at, the to question the authenticity of the profligate politics that can be afford-
library. Or wait for it to emerge in book because it took its U.S. transla- ed only by a backward nation with
paperback. tors and perfecters three years to 800 million persons. ... .
Anyway, it could be worth your wade through the 500,000 Chinese Here are some passages from the
while, because it covers that most characters that made up the journal, book, which is the expansion of a
confusing period of modern Chinese They also conducted many inter.- daily journal Ken Ling kept up dur-
history, the Great Cultural Revolu- views with Ken Ling and his brother, ing the Cultural Revolution.
tion of 1966-67. That convulsion was both of whom fled Amoy in Fukien When the students began to ex-
reported by the western press, but province for Taiwan after the Cultur- pose their teachers as revisionists
"inadequately, and we never -quite al Revolution. and "capitalist road followers":
knew what was going on, particularly Ken Ling was only 16 when the "Beatings and tortures followed. 1
since the Chinese were uncommuni- revolution erupted, instigated, it had never seen such tortures before:
. .
? cattve and as mysterious and inscru- developed, by Chairman Mao him- eating nightsoil and insects; being
table as always. But even the close-up self. Mao apparently thought revi- subjected to electrical shocks;
' China watchers, such as those in s i 0 n ism, or the changing and forced to kneel on broken glass;
Hong Kong and japan, were baffled softening of the Marxist-Leninist being hanged 'airplane' by the legs
by developments. The picture agen- line, was rampant. He figured the and arms."
' cies mo vkriritottitti Fitn- ktrages tioeiolatitattpAo. octrildoitego# .
? hordes of ife . uards mare mg, ' make rebe lio-n""on : ..
power t ights:oi :ft:Lt.:471.1y, is
gr rribi snake de-
?
TIE AMERICAN MERCURY
Approved For Release 200936Y1641?aA-RDP80-0160
ockefellers
tile the Roost
Our new China policy is actually the same
old Rockefeller policy STATINTL
BY JOHN MITCHELL HENSHAW
HE ROLE of the Rockefellers
If
f
. in shaping America's Red China
policy rCveals an amazing story
'of behind-the-scenes power. The gene-
sis of. Rockefeller interests in China
dates' to around 1886. And around
1890 the "philanthropist" John D.
Rockefeller, Sr. gave the Chinese 300,-
000 small kerosene lamps to encourage
them to use his oil. At the turn of the
century, the Chinese were buying over
100 million gallons of kerosene annual-
ly, more than 90 percent of which came
.from Mr. Rockefeller's Standard Oil
Co. Rockefeller had already secured a'
monopoly. of the American oil market
? and was embarking on a. campaign of
world conquest of the oil market. He
had the 'help of the U.S. Department
of State. .
"One of our greatest helpers," Mr.
Rockefeller, Sr. candidly stated, "has
? been the State Department in Washing-
pan.' Our 'ambassadors, and ministers,
and consuls have ?aided to push our way
into new ?markets to the utmost corners
? of the world." The State Department-
Rockefeller partnership has continued
to this very day. The global expansion
of Mr. Rockefeller's Standard Oil Co.
has resulted in that company becoming
the dominant power in the internation-
al oil cartel, which controls develop-
ment, production and prices .in the
world oil market.
?
?
Access to Markets ?
At the behest of Mr. Rockefeller the
State Department established t h e
"Ch;na Open Door. Policy" warning
European nations against compromising
the territorial integrity of China and es-
tablished the principle 'of .free access to
her vast markets. Principal beneficiaries
of this policy were John D. Rockefeller's
'Standard Oil and his brother William
Rockefeller's fledgling banking firm
now known as' the First National City
Bank.
de-
scribedPresittagrefrsaoy
open. do& 'to ? the goods of America."
The elder Rockefeller and his descen-
dants are primarily responsible for the
internationalist policies of the United
States, which impels us to constantly
meddle into the internal affairs of other
countries. While many other American
firms entered into China trade field,
none became so well ensconced as the
two Rockefeller giant financial institu-
tions, First National City Bank and the
Chase Manhattan Bank, and the mighty
Standard Oil. Historians have failed to
adequately portray the Rockefeller sce-
nario in China affairs. Perhaps the de-
ficiency is due to the largesse of the
Rockefeller Foundation to the scholarly
gentlemen who write the academic text-
books of history. In fact, several widely
used textbooks of oil history have been
written without even mentioning the
Word "cartel."
State Department Coverup
There is a dearth of detailed infor-
mation about the Rockefellers' manipul-
ation of U.S. China policy due to a. de-
liberate coverup by the State Depart-
ment. Ironically, Japanese scholars are
more conversant with the Rockefeller
machinations in China than American
students of economics and history. But
it can be conclusively established that
the Rockefellers and their entourage
have definitely shaped and reshaped
U.S. China policy overa long period to
meet the exigencies of their operations.
For the sake of brevity, we will omit a
half - century of Rockefeller philan-
thropy, encroachment and aggrandize-
ment in China, and come down to the
third generation of the Rockefeller clan,
namely, the five sons of John D. Rocke-
feller, Jr. ? David, Winthrop, John .D.
3rd, Nelson A. and Laurance S. Each of
the five brothers are reputed to ? be
worth over one billion dollars. Their
grandfather, John D. Sr., was the world's
first billionaire. Collectively, the five
brothers control a . financial-industrial
?
Lions like politics, philanthropy and
conservation, but their principal occu-
pation .is to aggressively expand theit?
private empire.
In .late 1949 when Mao Tse-tung
seized control of Mainland China, John
D. Rockefeller III declared the Cold
War against Red China in these words:
"On U.S. trade with China, my own
'reaction is, that it should be limited. It
seems to we that the fastest way to con-
tain Conznitinisnz is to discredit it in the
eyes of the people of China. It seems to
me if the economy worsens, 'that this
will 'arouse opposition.to it, and as I see
it, the opposition is essential if new
leadership, is to develop in China, and
I do feel that this. new leadership is tre-
mendously important."
? Historically, this was the real begin-
ning of the Cold War and the 20-year
embargo of Red China.. While John D.
III modestly said he was speaking for
himsclf,. actually he had conferred with
his four brothers, whose own funds
were invested in the great Rockefeller
Trust. The Rockefellers never act im-
petuously in' making momentous deci-
sions. And in their deliberations they
always hold protracted consultations,
with their coterie of specialists. Usually
the Rockefeller concensus is accurate,,
but it is' not always infallible as was cer-
tainly proved in this instance.
Polig ? of "Containment"
It will be noted that John D. III
spoke of developing "new leadership"
in China, Which meant that the Rocke- ?
fellers were disenchanted with their old
friend, Chiang Kai-shek.
.It will also be noted that John D. III
said: "the fastest way to contain Com-
munism is to discredit it in the eyes
of the people of China." This Rocke-
feller advice quickly became the "pol-
icy of containment" of the State Depart-
ment in the Orient.
?
NOTE: The aforegoing quoted
Rockefeller advice was offered in a
roundtable discussion in the, office of
Secretary of State Acheson. (Minutes
of the meeting have now been declas-
sified). Others at this meeting included
Raymond B. Fosdick, president of the
Rockefeller Foundation, Philip C. Jes-
sup, an Ambassador-at-large, who was
connected with J, P. Morgan & Co., and
Everett N. Case. Both Jessup and Case
were tied in with the pro-Red Institute
of Pacific Relations, which had done so
200001/0Yr: tPAAEYPti-614011110013200340001a5g Kai-shek. Al-
door tO the rights of Chi na,but the
cot., n
?engage in a wide variety oT
avoca- so at the roundtable was leftist Prof.
BALTIMORF, 10;13 EIERICAI
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f), 8 i_Li3 1972
HENRY J. TAYL6R.
STATI NTL
e Sino.Sovielt
? .
?
President Nixon knows that his leverage on
the Soviet Union by his Peking trip has several
unrevealed limitations. The first is the
U.S.S.R.'s widely reported fear of China on
Russia's 4,150-mile border;
Nikon. regards this as hokey, hokus,
hokum.
In only the 31'years, '-'77,veen 1870 and 1901,
Great Britain acquired 4.7 million square miles
of territory; France, 3.6 million; Germany, one
million; Belgium, -one million ? 77 times
Belgium's own size. Most of these were in
Africa and Asia. But Russia had been in there
carving up China for nearly two centuries.
The result is today's 4,150-mile Russian-
Chinese border, the longest in the world. It runs
something like the distance from New York to
Honolulu.
WHAT PRESIDENT NIXON obtained from
Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard
M. Helms' final briefing at the White House
before he left is that Mao's military position on
the Russian border is much weaker than sup-
posed.
order -issue
I
War starts with terrain. The Soviet axis for
its position opposite China is Khabarovsk, 400
.miles north of Vladivostok. The bdtder friction
incidents have been . concentrated i n
Heilungkiang Province ''and along the Ussuri
River, which is a part of the border.
MR. HELMS told ?resident Nixon that the
Soviet has 22 crack divisions on this border,
' controlled from Khabarovsk. Nine are
mechanized. The terrain, he said, is excellent
for their deployment. We hear much about So-
viet intercontinental ballistic missiles and
bombers. But Mr. Helms emphasized that the
Soviet has a large and.extremely effective tac-
tical air force for troop support as well. Mao
has none. .. '
What Mr. Nixon is trying to determine in the
border issue is: Who is provoking whom?
China can do the shouting and talking and
street demonstrating, as. for a long ? time. But
President Nixon believes that if anybody is
really picking a fight in this situation the
weight of evidence is that the one who would
pick a fight as a precaution against the future
is the U,S.S.R.
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Approved For Releaseeirdaid/C4-iii51668-01
8 E.LIB 1972
Inum recupollateeo mote-N?34
By John Burns
Special to The Christian Science Monitor
? 1972 Toronto Globe and Mail
The writer is a resident correspondent in the Chinese capital.
Peking
To somebody seeing him for the first time Mr. Nixon is a sur-
prise. He seems to be taller, slimmer, and better tailored than he
looks on television, and altogether more relaxed.
He arrived in Peking with a healthy suntan, which reportedly he
has been careful to cultivate since 1960. On arrival in Peking,
and at several public functions since, he has appeared to be wear-
ing television makeup.
A A A
?
-The President's arrival was an occasion of disappointment for
several hundred Peking diplomats and
their families who were refused permis-
sion to drive to the airport to watch the
arrival. Some of the diplomats have
been in Peking for years and could
hardly believe that the Chinese would
bar them from the most exciting event
in all their time here, especially when
the whole world would be able-to see the
-arrival on television. .
Since Chinese television carried no
live coverage, the diplomats had to
rely on descriptions from resident corre-
spondents who were allowed to see the
;arrival.
? A A A
, It was no coincidence that Mr. Nixon
referred to the worldwide television au-
dience? "More people are seeing and
hearing what .we say than on any other
such obcasion in the whole history of
the world" his opening remarks at
the state banquet the night he arrived.
Throughout the visit he has seemed
very conscious of the television cam-
eras, and the banquet speech seemed
to have been written as much for con-
sumption by the television audience at
home as it was for the Chinese leaders
listening to him in the Great Hall of the
People. Certainly its delivery was tail-
ored for TV, with Mr. Nixon running
straight through the speech in English
first, rather than having the Chinese in-
terpreter translate it a paragraph at
a time.
A A A
According to Ronald L. Ziegler, the
President's press secretary, the banquet
speech was finalized only hours before it
was delivered, with the President sitting
down over the draft with Dr. Henry A.
Kissinger immediately after returning
from his epic meeting with Chairman
Mao. ?
Many observers here were critical of
the speech, feeling that its mixture of
sentimentality and heroics were ill-
suited to the situation. "A mixture of
Gettysb r r4GivAkg.r,C.Ica MO"
one di
to the President's borrowing of a phrase
from Abraham Lincoln's famed Civil
STATI NTL
War speech ("What we say here will not
be long remembered") and his television
address during the 1952 election cam-
paign when he mentioned his dog Check-
ers while defending himself against
charges of receiving improper financial
assistance frbm friends. ?
Whatever the Chinese leaders may
have thought of the speech it seemed
to be a hit with ordinary Chinese, many
of whom expressed pleasure at the
President's quotation?"seize the day,
seize the hour"?from a poem by Chair-
man Mao. "It's a good thing he should
do that," said one educated Chinese.
"The Chtlirman has written many great
things, and everybody can learn from
him."
It was noticeable that the quotation
brought one of only two bursts of ap-
plause from Chinese leaders which inter-
rupted the speech. The other came when
the President complimented the Army
band for its professional handling of old
American melodies.
The guest list at the banquet was led
by a galaxy of Chinese leaders includ-
ing Premier Chou and two other high-
-ranking members of the Chinese Polit-
buro, Yeh Chien-ying and Li Hsien-nien.
Other interesting guests were several
former generals in the Nationalist Army
of Generalissimo Chiang Xai-shek, in-
cluding Fu Tso-yi, the military governor
who surrendered Peking to the Red
Army in October, 1948.
The presence of the generals ? all old
men now, at least one of them on
crutches ? was seen as a means of
demonstrating to the world and to the
Nationalist leaders on Taiwan that the
Communists honor their word when they
say that Nationalists who ?repent and
give their allegiance to Peking will be
treated with honor and respect.
A?A A ?
One of the remarkable features of the
President's meeting with Chairman Mao
was the ublication in the Peoile's
Nixon relaxing with Mr. Mao in the
the first time in at least ,10 years that
the Chinese press has shown the Chair-
man at home, and it served to break the
silence Chinese officials have always
maintained on where the Chairman
lives.
A A A
Chinese officials have been candid and
relaxed toward correspondents during
the President's visit. Normally the offi-
cials are unfailingly courteous but are
careful not to encourage any familiarity.
While Mr. Nixon has been here, the
officials have been markedly more con-
vivials stopping the press center to chat
easily with correspondents and joking
with them in a manner that was previ-
ously .quite rare.
One official startled a correspondent
he had known for eight months when he
addressed him by his Christian name,
the first time it had happened. Another
sign of relaxation has been the absence
of Mao , badges from the tunics of the
officials from the Foreign Ministry's in-
formation department who are on duty
in the center.
A A
A ?
All week the U.S. correpsondents have
been leaving the green looseleaf briefing
books lying around the press center.
The books contain several hundred
pages of information compiled by the
White House, the State Department, and
the Central Intelligence Agency, includ-
ing a run-down on the Chinese leader-
ship.
It is intriguing to note that the section
omits all mention of Defense Minister
Lin Piao, Chairman Mao's nominated
successor, and of several high-ranking
military officers who disappeared with
him last fall.
One correspondent has a pamphlet on
the leadership, with the photographs of
all the missing men and women crossed
out in red ink by the CIA.
20011/02/6 4pheclAaRDPSIZInCi 201 R00026ti340001
library of the Chairman's home. It was
riLfl:O?E isAlr'.
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STATI NTL
111EIVErii7 J. TAYLOR
J .1 /-k I IIN IL
-ixon's Peking Talks Jolted
/ The CIA has reported to President Nixon in
/ Peking that, as we withdraw our troops, the
Red forces?are moving over Southeast Asia like
termites on a log. The current alarm concerns
Cambodia, Thailand and Burma, all three.
, Cambodia is only the size of Oklahoma but it
has 6.7 million people. The President's Vietnam
pull-out was threatened b.? ?30-,-000 North Viet-
namese in Cambodia. Our incursion into Cam-
bodia was a spoiling action covering our rear
guard in Vietnam. But since then the keystone
of the Nixon policy ? Vietnamization ? was
tested by the Vietnamese Army's protectionary
assault into Cambodia. And, as a demonstra-
tion to support the hope of Vietnamization, it
was tragically unpromising.
The CIA advised the President that the
disintegration heightens. The Cambodian Army
has only 33,000 men. Phnom Penh, the capital
Is Cut off, of course, except for a single uncer-
tain road, but the Reds have now finished for-
tifying even fabulous Angkor Wat apd corn-
pletley control strategic Tonle Sap, the great
lake of Cambodia. Premier Lon Nol is pressed
toward a cease-fire. .
THAILAND BORDERS on Cambodia; it
stands between Cambodia, Laos and Burma.
The Siamese (34.7 million people) call their
? country Muang Thai, meaning Land of the Free
People,
It has always been fiercely independent. In
fact, Thailand is the only nation in the entire
area that never has been ruled by a foreign
power.
But the CIA has notified Mr. Nixon that Thai
Army Commanding Gen. Prapas Charusathien
reports that his units have intercepted Red
Chinese and North Vietnamese soldiers cross-
ing into Thailand's Sisaket and Surin prov-
inces, 250 miles northeast of Bangkok. General
Charusathien has .only a 141,500-man force to
meet this expansion.
U." S. AMBASSADOR TO CAMBODIA
Emory C. Swank, in turn, apprised of this, is
urging General Charusathien to add an army of
ethnic Cambodians to meet Mao Tse-tung and
Chou en-lai's expansion.
? Burma, about the size of Texas, has a long
common border with Thailand on Burma's
Shan states. But ? Burma (27 million people),
fabled in Kipling's verses, is as different frpm
Thailand as day and night. The home country
of vacillating, mercurial former United Nations
Secretary General U Thant, Burma is one' of
Southeast Asia's most inaccessible and
mysterious countries
Its actual name is the Pyee-Daun,g-lu
Myanma Nainggan-Daw Union of Burma. The
country is utterly provincial, totally fatalistic
and unalterable Burmese. Neutralism, which
likewise mesmerizes U Thant, is a fixation and
isolationism a creed.
BURMA CIIIEF OF STATE Gen. Ne Win,
60, his lidded eyes as rich as jade in a face as
? pale as bread and a man as wily and suspicious
as U Thant himself, once told me in Mandalay,
"Only Buddha can help anyone." And, not sur-
prisingly, Burma's Marxist economy ? 'ap-
proaches absolute thrombosis. " ? '?
Burma has a wild, mountainous 1,200-Mile
frontier ? a third as long as our Canadian
border ? with Red China. Its armed forces
total 137,500 men ? 6,500 of them iu a .com-
pletely meaningless Air Force. ?
The. CIA reported to President Nixon In
Peking'that 20,000 China-armed insurgents 'are
now battling these forces. They are in a Major
engagement near Lashio, close to Red China's
border. And, . reported the CIA, 3,000 North
Vietnamese are heading into Burma ? Shan
state. ?.
Ne Win incessantly travels abroad always
flamboyantly ? plays golf and hobnobs :With
world dignitaries whenever possible and 15re-
fers the city of Mandalay where "the dawn
comes up like thunder" to his capital' of
Rangoon. And until now Red China has adopted
a restrained role toward Burma. The CIA opin-
ion is that Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai felt
that they can wait until Ne Win dies or ,is
booted out, as he booted out predecessor 1.1
and then Red China will be sucked into Burnia
as in a vacuum.
The CIA message to .the President changes
this. Unrevealed, Cambodia, Thailand ,and
Burma alike suddenly jolt Mr. Nixon's Peking
talks and further complicate his success over
there.
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t.
'Bob Wiedrich
Richard M. Nixon is on Red Chinese
soil this morning, preparing to walk a
tight rope mankind hopes .can lead to
'convincing the leaders of some 800 mil-
lion people that capitalism and Com-
munism can live together in peace on.
the same globe.
Understandablv. the President is per-
haps tense. But olk route to Peking,
Nixon carefully guarded his thoughts,
whatever they may have been. His fa-
cade, if it was that, was one of good
humor.
While still in flight, someone showed
the 'President a map of mainland China
whose cover bore a legend indicating it
had been prepared by the CIA. ?
"I wonder if they'll let that map into
Red China," quipped an observer.
Nixon laughed and then exclaimed:
"That map probably will show how
much we don't know about China!"
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WAS1T,ING9ON POST
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wsmen
ne Up for
'Chin Ex
Washington Post Foreign Service
. tween ancient and context- Aboard the ' aircraft, for
HONOLULU, Feb. ? 18 ? porary China. _ instance, is Theodore H.
Most press airplanes accom- A select number of report- White, who was a cone-
panying the President on his, ers are also armed with a Ispondent for Time Maga-
trips look like holiday excur-
new atlas of China prepared zine in China during World
.. sions, with newsmen drink- by the Central Intelligencoj War II and afterward wrote
Ing, playing cards or joking Agency. A pool of newsmen the bestselling "T h u n d e r
`with the stewardesses. But
aboard the President's air- Out of China." Henry Hart-
the reporters currently going plane, the Spirit of '76, asked zenbusch of the Associated
with Mr. Nixon to Peking Mr. Nixon if he thought the Press was born in Shanghai
strangely resemble a class- Chinese would tolerate such and lived there for years,
'room of China students material in their country. and the Wall Street Jour-
cramming for their final
The President, who appar- nars Robert L. K e a t 1 e y
.exanis.
- ?ently had not seen 'the atlas spent a month in China in
? Instead of trading old anec- before, examined it, then May.
dotesabout previous presi- laughed loudly and quipped: The language capability
dential voyages, as reporters "This will probably show of the reporters is virtually.
'usually do on such journeys, how Much we don't know zero, however. To improve ,
the journalists on this flight about China." . this gap somewhat, news- '
aie talking about such eso-
The main collection of re. men have been issued man-
terie subjects as Mao Tse- search matter provided re. uals featuring such phrases ?
Tung's relations with Chou
porters by the administra. as "Wo Yau Yi Tau Mao
En-Lai, Sino-Japanese trade
tion is a handsome, loose. Jrfu," or "I would like a
and the composition of the
leaf volume containing in. Mao suit."
Chekiang Province Cornmu- formation about China rang- The manual also advises
Mgt Party. committee, whose ing from its literacy rate reporters how, to order
leaders,. the President will and Gross National Product bacon and eggs in Mandarin
meet when he visits the re- to the line-up of its leaders. Chinese. But it does not
sort city of Hangchow.
The roster of leaders has contain the phrase "Long,
' The newsmen on this trip
_ been carefully brought up Live President Nixon."
are also voraciously reading to date, since it does not
books and articles on China. Include Defense Minister
The most popular book on Lin Piao and 10 other full
the aircraft, a Pan American and alternate members of
Boeing-707 converted to con- the ' ruling politburo who
thin only first-class seats, is have been purged. This also
"the U n it e d States and suggests that the administra-
China" by Prof. John Fair- tion o f f i c i all y considers ;
bank, head of Harvard's East them to have been elimi-
Asia Research Center and nated?though the subject
dean of American China
? of domestic Chinese politics
cholars. t is rarely mentioned by
Another reading matter White House spokesmen. 1
being absorbed include the The' research' material
recent articles in the Atlan- provided by the administra-,
tic Monthly by Rose Terrill, tion also offers some po-
also a Harvard China sihol- litical details. Among other
ar, who spent 40 days tray- things, it says that high-heel
eling around China last shoes
"are extremely dan-
summer. , gerous" at the Great Wall,
In addition to these obvi- which the President and
ous works, more e x o t i c Mrs. Nixon will visit.
books are being studied by Most of the newsmen en
a few ambitious newsmen, route to Peking candidly
John Chancellor of the Na- concede to their ignorance
tional Broadcasting Corn- about China. But a hindful
pany, for example, is buried u" ,,, the
press airplane can
in the "I Ching," the classic
claim to varying degrees of
Chinese book of changes,
expertise or at least famili-
searching , or parallels be-1 ar..y
t with China. -\
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plart,z;
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i446eNDP80-
FEB 972
Briefly Peking ...
The President brought along an atlas of Chi-
na prepared by the CIA. On the plane he won-
dered whether he would be allowed into a
communist country with a book bearing the
CIA legend: ?
STATI NTL.
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irEvcomnikr17-11r.7.rg .
E9
,Approved For Release 20811c0
THE ROAD ? ?? STATINT
( TO PEKING
2
0
By STAN CARTER.
NEWS Diplomatic Correspondent
Fifth' of a series
UNE of the eight black-bound loose-leaf volunieS that
President Nixon studied in preparation for his journey
. to Peking contained a top secret analysis by the Central
j Intelligence Agency of the strange and still only parti-
s" -ally explained events in China last fall?and the effect
that the internal power struggle they revealed may
have on his summit talks with the surviving Communist
leaders.
What went on in China in mid-September is still shrouded
in mystery. Communist cadres in the provinces have been told
? that Defense Minister Lin Piao?until then the regime's no. 2
man?was involved in a conspiracy to assassinate party Chair-
man Mao Tse-tung and that when tee plot failed, Lin and his
cohorts were killed in a plane crash in Mongolia while trying
to flee to the Soviet Union.
A British-built Trident jetliner, one of four purchased by
-China from Pakistan and used exclusively by high-ranking
- Chinese officers, did indeed crash in Mongolia, 100 miles be-
yond the Chinese border, on the night of Sept. 12. But American
analysts doubt that Lin was among the seven men and two
women whose bodies were recovered from the airplane, burned
beyond recognition. . ?
But it is clear that the power struggle has ended?at least
.for the time being?and that a moderate faction led by Premier
Chou En-lid triumphed over a radical faction led by Lin Piao.
' ? 'Lin and hundreds of his followers have beenn purged, but are
though to be still alive.
Whatever the reasons for the purge, the timing for it seems
-to have been sparked by Chou's invitation to Nixon to Visit the
People's Republic of China.
? Quarrel over resources
Despite ApproviecifForaReleasTe'200410304n:
elusions are probably similar to those of analysts from other.
, government agencies and from experts outside the government,
-
For example, Rand Corp. Sinologist William' W. Whitson ?
has come up with a theory fitting the known facts. It suggests
that the power struggle was the culmination of a debate within
tho Chinese hierarchy over allocation of resources to China's
,? nuclear weapons program?and that Chou's victory - over Lin ?
will make China less of a threat to -U.S. allies in Asia in the
.immediate future than it has been considered in the past.
r-- Whitson, a military specialist, is one of those China ex-
perts who.does research for the government and also maintains
ties with the academic community. Ills new book, "The
Chinese High Command, 1927-1971?a History of Communist
Military Politics," will be published this spring.
According to Whitson, Lin Piao vigorously opposed last
year's decision by Chou?with Mao's concurrence?to reduce
tensions with the United States. .
-
The reason was that Lin and his supporters ? in the Air
Force and Navy needed the supposed American threat to
justify development of bigger and bigger nuclear weapons and
long-range missiles to deliver them.
The cost of China's nuclear and missile programs are 2%
of the still underdeveloped country's total national product? .
?so high that Whitson argues that "some peeple across the river
(a euphemism in Washington for CIA headquarters in Langley, ./
.Va.) say that we ought to encourage them to keep at it, because
it will make them go bankrupt."
Challenge fo Lin
; Whitson's contention is that Chou En-lai, in contrast to Lin,
;recognized that the real threat to China was from Russia?
! which had massed one million troops on China's northern border
?and threatened a "surgical strike" against Chinese nuclear in-
stallations?instead of from the United Sates, which the premier
'could see was in fact withdrawing from Southeast Asia.
To cope with the Soviet threat, China needed tactical nuclear
weapons as well as more modern conventional armament?not
necessarily long-range ICBMs. Therefore, it is Whitson's belief
that Chou wanted to slow down the costly advanced weapons
program and thus welcomed Nixon's overtures tn.end the 2:1-
year-old confrontation between the United States and China.
- But the invitation to Nixon presented a challenge to Lin and
the generals associated with part strategic planning. Whitson
ruts it this way:
many of the Senior officers of the .secOrid
2%4 ?
ation, probably including. Lin Piao, Wu Fa-hsien, Li Tso-p'eng
and Huang Yung-sherg, the? historical image of the United
States as the principal adversary most heavily armed with nu-
clear weapons targeted against China must have been the cor-
nerstone of their premises for strategic planning and weapons
development.
"President Nixon's visit to China could not have been a wel-
come shift in the image that had presumably guided their
strategic thinking for 20 years."
Smaller bangs
Since the mid-1960s, China has exploded 13 nuclear devices,
including three hydrogen bombs with yields of three megatons
each,-in 1968, 1969 and 1970. But the last two tests, in November,
1971 and January of -this year, were of smaller devices with
yields of 20 kilotons or less?the size of the Hiroshima A-bomb.
According to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, the
latest two tests could either have been of triggers or larger
thermonuclear weapons or of prototypes of comparatively small,
tactical nuclear warheads. If they were the latter, it would tend
to confirm Whitson's theory that 'Chou, after defeating Lin, has
shifted priorities ? to concentrate on medium and intermediate
range missiles instead of a costly intercontinental missile -
.
arsenal.
"Such an emphasis would provide an immediate deterrent
against the Soviet Union," Whitson says. "It would also promise
the greatest intercontinental utility once an appropriate sub- ?
marine or two had been built."
If Whitson is right; this will be disconcerting to U,S. mil- '
itary planners, who have advocated construction of an anti-'
ballistic missile defense system for protection of the United
States against Chinese ICBM's expected to be operational as
-early as 1975, as much as against the nuclear-tipped Soviet
intercontinental rockets already in their underground silos.
. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird acknowledged to Congress
this week that "it is difficult to asee i h_er the strategic
C IPliaFfa0 -10 *6 (MR0002003 ialtina, or how
that threat will evolve through the 1970s." But Laird said the
GOntinuod
RAI/WARTS
Approved For Release 20Eling ?"612A-RDP80-01
STATI NTL
The Chin Sch.
and
S. Intelli
'
EFORE ACTUALLY BOARDING AIR FORCE ONE for his
February meeting with Chairman Mao, Rich-
ard Nixon will be forced to run a gauntlet of in-
telligence briefing sessions designed to bring him
up to date on the latest Chinese developments. The cram
course on contemporary China, programmed by CIA direc-
tor Richard C. Flelms,will range from an elementary Who's
Who in the Chinese government and questions of unfamiliar
proletarian protocol?e.g., What should Pat Nixon say to
Mme. Mao, the militant leader of the Peking Red Guards?
?to more esoteric information not generally found in either
the New York Times or the Peking People's Daily Sunday
Supplement. More or less hard answers to questions like
"Whatever happened to Lin Piao, Chairman Mao's ex-close-
comrade-in-arms?" "What progress are Chinese rocket ex-
perts making with their long range missile systems?" "How
do the factions within the People's Army and Communist
Party line up in the present leadership struggle?"
In order to provide Nixon with the data he needs on this
trip, Helms is able to cull the output of hundreds of mil-
...what we have in China stud
ies is the clearest case yet in
which the big foundations and
the State Department founded,
funded, nurtured, and directed
an entire academic field.'
?
itary and civilian radio intercept operators, who listen-in on
a rotating shift, round-the-clock basis to Chinese radio trans-
missions. Also mobilized are the battalions of cryptog-
raphers at Fort Meade, Md., trying to break Chinese mil-
itary, diplomatic and commercial codes; the covert opera-
tors in such places as Hong Kong and Singapore, busily sub-
orning Asian journalists; and, more prosaically, the dozens
of linguistically trained Ph.D.'s hard at work in Langley,
Va., translating Chinese telephone books. But there is an-
Approved For Release 2001/03/
nce
by David Horowitz
other intelligence network on which Nixon will rely which
is just as vital, if somewhat smaller and more loosely artic-
ulated. This is the academic phalanx of American China
scholars: the once scorned and now twice-rewarded denizens
of a startling variety of scholarly and semi-scholarly institu-
tions. These range from conglomerate think tanks like the
RAND Corporation, and elite centers of corporate-academic
cross-fertilization like the Council on Foreign Relations to
seemingly more chaste academic set-ups like the East Asian
Institutes at Harvard and Columbia. But the distinctions
are more apparent than real, for what we have in China
studies is the clearest case yet in which the big foundations
and the State Department founded, funded, nurtured and
directed an entire academic field, providing at last a defin-
itive answer to the age-old question: "Who shall educate the
educators?"
?
[AN INTELLIGENCE WHO'S WHO]
"r""7 OLLOWING THE MC CARTHY FREEZEOUT China schol-
ars began to come in from the cold in the early
Kennedy years. Something of the origins of the
American China scholar intelligence network that
subsequently developed can be gleaned from a private letter
written in 1962 by the head of the State Department's Bu-
reau of Intelligence and Research (BIR), Dr. Allen Whit-
ing. This letter, made available by its recipient, who at that
time was the head of Berkeley's Center for China Studies,
aimed to recruit him to the BIR's "elite project." Who was
going to take over after Chairman Mao?, the BIR wanted
to know. "Experience with post-Stalin Russia," Whiting
wrote, "has shown the importance of anticipating succession
crises in communist countries and especially of understand-
ing the significance of their outcome in terms of changes in
communist policy." American intelligence had already sifted
prima facie evidence suggesting conflicts within the Chinese
leadership. Whiting complained, however, that inadequate
attention to the make-up of the factions "has left us with no
firm picture of attitudes held by competing groups on such
cont1nu-4
04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-6
HousTohPIKQW0d For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-016
STATINTL
POST
JAN 16 19-12-
294,677
s - 329,710
By DARRELL IIANCOCK
Post Reporter
? '"Although it probably did
not cross (Daniel) Ellsberg's
mind when he released the
Pentqgon papers to the New
/ York Times, he succeeded in
si doing what. the (Central In-
telligence) Agency, on its
own, has rarely been able to
do for more than 20 years:
? He made the?XIA, Joek good,"
?, writes Chester L. Cooper of
t h e: Institute for Defense
? :,
Analysis in the January "For-
eign Affairs."
. In is article,. "The CIA
and Decision-making," coop-
er describes the elite Office
of National Estimates org,a-
, nized within the CIA in 1930.
?. T h e small groiip of in?
analysts prepares
? about 50 "estimates" annual-
ly on foreign policy problems,
? . such as 'Chinese . communist
?nuelear, capabilities as they
may develop over the next
several years ..? *sti-
'mate is a projection, an opin-
? ion or a judgment, Cooper
fl2ut is lilt el_y_ to kg
make
The Pentagon papers revealed
that the government went on
to support Ngo Dinh Dieni in
South bUC-- the
:CIA . .....showed 'willingness
make (irztelligenC e) 'estimates
very much at variance with the
current policy line.
?.
- the best-informed and most.
objective view the decision-
maker can get."
? Citing 13 items from the
Pentagon papers, Cooper
shows that the policy-makers
were apparently warned
again and again against the
hope of easy U.S. military
victory in Vietnam. The re-
servation "apparently" is
necessary because, as Cooper
admits, the selection of esti-
mates by the writers and re-
porters of the Pentagon pa-
pers May have been highly
selective. But the evidence at
hand includes:
. ? _ ?
0 A 1954 report to the Eis- 0 A joint intelligence panel
dissent in 1964 to the view
enhower administration that that bombing would break
"even with American support
it was unlikely that the
French or Vietnamese would
be able to establish a strong
government and that the situ-
ation would probably continue
to deteriorate."
The government went on to
support Ngo Dinh Diem in
South Vietnam, but Cooper
says the CIA then and after'
wards showed a willingness
rrlUch
at variance with the current
policy line."
A 1961 warning to the
fledgling Kennedy adminis-
tration: Diem tolerated cor-
ruption and relied on one-man
rule, casting doubt on his
ability to lead the govern-
ment. ? ? ?.
A later 1961 report that
American military escalation
? in South Vietnam would be
matched by similar escalation
by Hanoi.
Ilanoi's will .to continue the
costly war. -
0 Repeated reports during
the bombing that the North
Vietnamese were continuing
the war with "resolute stoic-
ism" and with relatively un-
changed strategy and materi-
al resources..
But would the professorial
estimators lose their prized !
objectivity in the quest for
greater influence? Possibly,
Cooper concedes. But if that
issue can be resolved, a new
int014.tence arrangement
"would make available what
very President since Tru-
man has said he. wanted, but
what none of them has been
ble to obtain on a routine
- ? a
Events, to one -degree or basis ;??? the best possible
another, confirmed the "bear- ' first-hand intelligence. judg.
ish" intelligence estimates, rn cnts .on critical - int-crn.
Cooper noles,wondermg_aloud: _ational problems.
how the "yawning gap" be-
tween the intelligence struc-
ture : and the foreign . po-
licymakers could be?closed.
Basically, he proposes face-
to-face meetings between the
two groups, possibly by put-
ting the estimators within the
National Security Council,
.Which may have a ?stronger
Voice with the President.
"Clearly if the" are to play. a
more direct -Am; useful role,
thestimatOTS must be
brought ?out of their cleister
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-8
7th Fleet T rce Ends
Approved For Releasej2=03)9T4 : CIA-RE(WM
NEW YORK TIMES
-,Patrol in the Indian' Ocean
' By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Jan: 10 ? That statement was seen as
The United States Navy, task an assertion of principle that
force led by the nuclear-pow- the United States did not intend
efed carrier Enterprise sailed to leave the Indian Ocean to
Out of the Indian Ocean today the Russians, who normally
after a month of patrol duty have a squadron of 10 to 12
min war had blocked its pro-
gram. In the last year, however,
relatively unpublicized exer-
cises were carried out by ves-
sels of the Seventh Fleet includ-
ing the carrier Ticonderoga in
April and the Enterprise in
begun during the Indian Pakis-i ships there. P ?
The Nixon Administration has
tani war, the Defense Depart- Today, Mr. Friedheim said that never
i
publicly stated why t
A M Eastern standard
time, the task force had cleared
the Malacca Strait and had
ment announced. at 6:30 A. M.
The. return of the nine-ship
squadron to regular service
with the Seventh Fleet in
Southeast Asian waters ended a
controversial aspect of United
States actions during the war
on the subcontinent.
". The presence of the task
force in the Indian Ocean was
never fully explained by the
Nixon Administration. Because
of Washington's condemnation
of Indian actions during the
war, many Indians looked upon
the task force as a provocation,
a view that set off anti-Ameri-
can demonstrations, an official
Indian protest and a worsening
of Indian-American relations.
Pentagon sources and secret
cablegrams made publib by the
syndicated columnist Jack An-
derson indicated that the car-
rier -force . had at least three
objectives; possible evacuation
of Americans, showing the flag
in view of the presence of So-
viet naval forces in the area
and deterring India from any
6 combat vessels-2 light crius-
tbought of extending the war I ers and 3 or 4 destroyers. In ad-
40 West Pakistan once East Palt',-
istan fell.
Course Changed After Truce
S for the Enter-
was neces ary
prise to enter the Indian Ocean,
but Administration officials,
entered the South China Sea, re- who declined to be Identified
turning "to normal operating 'said the United States had relia-
control of the Commander, Sev-
enth Fleet."
The Enterprise is due to ar-
rive Wednesday at Subic Bay
In the Philippines, where the
crew is toreceive five days of
liberty.
For a month before going to
the Indian Ocean the Enterprise
had been in the Gulf of Tonkin
In the position known as
Yankee Station near North Viet-
nam.
Mr. Friedheim said that there
According to another C. . .
report, attributed to "reliable"
sources, Ambassador Nikolai
M. Pegov of the Soviet Union
on Dec. 13 told the Indian
government that the Soviet
Union "would open a diversion-
aryaction" again the Chinese
and "will not allow the Seventh
Fleet to intervene," Mr. Ander-
son said.
ble information that India, with
Soviet backing, had planned to
attack West Pakistan.
They contended that the
presence of the task force, as
well as a series of messages.
from President Nixon to Soviet
leaders, succeeded in restrain-
ing India. The Indian Govern-
ment has denied it had planned
an all-out attack on West
Pakistan.
-Mr. Anderson, in a column
published Dec. 31, disclosed
whaet he said were the top-
secret orders to the Enterprise's
were no immediate plans to teask force. The alleged orders
send in another task force, but said:
added: "I have every confidence "Situation U.S. citizens may
have to he eVacuated from the
U. S. Navy vessels will operate area affected by the ' present
In the Indian Ocean during the Indian-Pakistan conflict. The
next year to 18 months." situation may also arise which
"We will do that from time will require the presence and
to time; on no fixed schedule, utilization of a CVA [the Navy's
no fixed force level," he said. designation for an attack air-
Mr. Friedheim said that 15 to craft carrier] to insure the pro-
20 Soviet vessels remained in etection of U.S. interests in
the Indian Ocean, including 5 or the area.
"Mission: To form a con-
tingency evacuation force cap-
able of [helo] evacuation of
civilians, of self-protection, and
of conducting naval air and
surface operations as directed
by higher authority in order to
support U.S. interests in the
Indian Ocean area."
In his column today, Mr.
Anderson published what he
said were Central Intelligence
Agency reports about signs
that during the war the Chinese
might intervene on behalf of
the Pakistanis.
"The Chinese have been
passing weather data for loca-
tions in Tibet and along the
rines and support ships. 1S comber," the C.I.A. was said
' since 8 DC-?
,
dition, he said, there are subma-
ino-Indian border
Pentagon officials have said to have reported. "The con-
privately that the United States tinued passing of weather data
had plans as long ago as 1965 for these locations is considered
to seinadhips from the Seventh it5musuai and may indicate some
se 1103i000 'MLR P80 -0 1.601 RW0200340001 -5
urn of alert posture."
that requirements or tne .v let-
The task force entered the'
Thdian Ocean on Dec. 14 in the
direction of East Pakistan, but
after the cease-fire on Dec. 17.
the ships changed course and
patrolled at a distance.
Last Friday, when asked how
long the task force would re-
Main in the Indian Ocean, Jerry
W. Friedheim, the Defense De-
partment spokesman, declined
to give an exact time, stressing
that the United States intended
to send units of the Seventh
Fleet into the Indian Ocean
from time to time, now that
Britain was withdrawing from
tfipproved For Rele
$34..MACIVI
.mortas .. ,.
IS. . arraTcor INDotAsto.:.!
Indian Ocean
The New York Times/Jan. 11, 1972
'
(
?
BOSTON GLOBE
Approved For Release 20011Q3014.: 131A-FECTINIONRIl601R
? STATINTL
a o Jo n Gardner, head of
Common Cause; Richard Ellman, lit-
erary critic; Hugh Gregg, former gov-
ernor of New Hampshire; Dong King-
man, artist; Leroy Anderson, com-
poser; Eugene McCarthy, presiden-
tial candidate in 1968; George
Meany, president of the AFL-CIO and
Everett E. Hagan, head of MIT's Cen-
ter for International Studies and
Daniel Ellsberg's boss ?have in corn-
mon?
Well, they're all loyal Americans
and they all share space in a remark-
able reference work called "Who's
Who in CIA."
? For at least a decade, broad areas
of American intelligence operations
have been known intimately by mem-
bers of the press and by leading
newspaper, magazine and broadcast-
ing executives. Some of these people
.were iiv the service of the CIA them-
selves. Others presumably allowed
members of their staffs to cooperate
with and report to the CIA.
This information does not come
from The New York Times or the Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System. It does
not come directly from classified doc-
uments within the CIA. It does not
come from a gossip column or a late-
night news show. It does not come
from the Rand Corporation.
? It comes from a 605-page book ti-
lled Who's Who In CIA and subtitled
A Biographical Reference Work of
the Officers of the Civil and Military
Branches of the Secret Services of the
USA in 120 Countries.
Dan Pinck is a freelance writer, teacher
and education consultant who lives in
Belmont. Graphic art is by Herbert Ro-
9alski.
Who's Who's In CIA was pub-
lished in English, in 1968, by Julius
By Dan Pinck
In his introduction publisher
Mader refers to the United States'
"disposal-subversionist war" and he
writes that "the intelligence service in
the USA is the largest and most in-
fluential in the imperialist- world"
?and further observes that "the intelli-
gence service of the USA has always
been the domain of the fanatical ene-
mies of democracy and a stronghold
of the anti-communists." There's no
doubt where Mader's sympathies lie.
In his introduction he also notes
those who helpea him compile the
book. These include Mohamed Abdel-
nabi, of Beirut, Lebanon: Ambalal
Blib.tt, of Bombay, Fernando Gainar-
ro or Mexico City, and Shozo Oliashi,
of Yokohama. There are 3000 entries
in the reference work and they range
from US ambassadors, artists and
museum curators to the directors of
Asian and Russian research centers
at leading American universities to
political affairs officers,. cultural af-
fairs officers and AID controllers at
various US embassies overseas to em-
ployees of The New York Times and
CBS. The listing is an impressive one
and even allowing for errors that
even intelligence services can make,
it is likely a reasonably accurate ac-
counting of certain leading opera-
tives and associates of the CIA.
I bought my copy of Who's Who
in CIA in a book shop In Georgetown,
in Washington, D.C. for $4.95. The
bookshop is not a subversive one; its
main fare is academia, fiction and lit-
erary biographies. It was bought be-
cause of my curiosity about intelli-
gence services in general, an interest
that began when I was in the OSS in
China, as the nearest American to
Hong Kong. A cursory sampling of
names were recognizable to me, bear-
ing out my own personal knowledge
Mader, 1066 Berlin W66 Mauer-
of' selected C tiv
strasse Approved For Release 20011kga : e1A-RDP80-
In the intervening months I read
the book through, and with the publi-
cation of the Pentagon Papers, it be-
came a lively and fascinating re-
source and complement to the pub-
lished secret documents.
In one embassy with approxima-
tely 55 staff members, for example,
the book picked out one person as the
CIA operative. Since that particular
name was known to me it began to
give a ring of authenticity to the en-
tire listing. When it noted certain US
officials that I had met on several
tours in 16 African nations as being
CIA-associated, the sense of authen-
ticity grew firmer; when it listed the
name of Dan A. Mitrione, who was
kidnaped antl killed in Brazil several
years ago and who was identified at
that time as an AID official, as an op-
erative of the CIA, it's additional evi-
dence that the work is as legitimate
(and as nefarious) as it can reason-
ably be.
The book lists the operatives who
have served throughout the world.
The German Federal Republic leads
the roster with 264 operatives. Mona-
co and Antarctica bring up the end of
the list, with one each. In between:
Ghana (14); the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics (99); Mexico (90);
Barbados (22); Ireland (17); Nige-
ria (32); France (141); Uganda
(8); Vietnam (133); Ethiopia (24)
Chile (42); and Hong Kona (71).
The book lists operatives in news-
papers and magazines, including
Time, Life, Fortune, Newsweek,
Sports Illustrated, US News and
World Report; in a number of indus-
trial firms, including Bankers Trust,
First National City Bank, Westing-
house, RCA, NBC, CBS, Gulf Oil
Corp., Standard Oil Company, Bank
of America, Litton Industries, Kim-
01601 R00020U34II001-5
berley-Uark Cornoratinn:orif tcinuoil
an ada,
Approved For Release 2001
STON GLOBE
; 1?IFIRDP80-01601
STATI NTL
?w TfrumneoClii
shadow
William Worthy, correspondent of
The Baltimore Afro-American, was
the first US newsman (1956-57) to
defy the US travel ban on China. The
resulting legal hassle over his pass-
port, which was not renewed for 11
years, is recounted in "The Ballad of
William Worthy" by folksinger Phil
Ochs.
A year or two after returning
from China, while I was lecturing for
a day at Texas Southern University,
'a:Negro faculty member came up at
the end of a seminar and identified
himself to me as an economics pro-
fessor.
In a- voice audible to everyone,
and. with a broad "I know all about
? you" grin on his face, he said:
"You know, Mr. Worthy, when
you were in China, I was working on
the CIA's China desk in Washington.
Every morning, we used to receive a
top-secret report of your movements
in Chinn the day before."
. Presumably, CIA operatives still
function inside China?possibly in
the two-payrolls role that Khrushchev
once joked about with CIA Director
Allan Dulles.
"Oh, I know you," Khrushchev
kidded when they were introduced at
a Washington reception:
'We read the same reports from
-the same agents. Why don't we get to-
gether and pay those fellows just one
combined salary?'
So I can't help but wonder if the
(Or did the CI
r Kissinger, too
. By William Worthy
and filed hourly reports to the top-
level computers in Washington. The
speculation isn't entirely far-fetched.
After all, however politically primi-
tive, US spies are efficient in fact-
finding, and Lyndon Johnson did sus-
pect that the CIA tapped his Whit
House phones.
The day after Mr. Nixon an-
nounced his Peking travel plans,
NBC New g contacted Chinese author-
ities about the possibility of satellite
television coverage. Flow different
this journalistic initiative from the
time when I was there. In the 1950s,
the mass media consistently played
footsie with the Washington myth-
makers about the non-existence or
the "imminent collapse" of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China. (Ditto revo-
lutionary Cuba not long afterwards.)
The gospel according to Secretary
Dulles was that any journalistic visits
would "lend respectability" to what
he decreed to be a tottering, outlawed
regime.
Under this stern edict, CBS News,
which in its 1955 "Report to Stock-
holders" had cited me for having
made.. the first. broadcast from Mos-
cow in eight cold-war years, ada-
mantly refused to let me take along
to China any of their cameras or tape
recorders. This was to protect the net-
work from any official charge of "col-
lusion" in my going. But the under-
standing was that, if I could borrow
someone else's equipment and ship
back film and tapes, they would be
more proficient of them got 1.,2ii,s2f iisobaitgAii..Ttlavgiteoks
Dr. KissineePPRIFMer sar -.6dOs ylBreAli
Dulles. ?
Twice from Peking and once from
Shanghai I was also able to broadcast
for CBS. The first .voicecast was, of
course, a journalistic scoop, and the
cablegram from the New York news
desk several hours later expressed
professional delight. The signal to
Oakland had been clear, the content
satisfactory. But there was one prob-
lem. Not being attuned to the State
Department "non-recognition" non-
sense, I had used "Peking" in the
broadcast, instead of the old Kuomin-
tang name for China's capital. _
Thus the punch-line Suggestion.
In future voicecasts the news desk -
would prefer "Peiping?pronounced
B-A-Y-P-I-N-G".
If acted upon, the suggestion
would have been totally self-defeat-
ing, and I hadn't the slightest inten-
tion of heeding it. Justifiably, the
Chinese would have been offended.
and studios for future broadcasts
would not have been made available.
Knowing that David Chipp, the Reut-
ers correspondent in Peking, would
be both amused by and scornful of
this typical American childishness, I
let him read the cable.
"I'll tell you what you should do,
Bill," he said. "On your next broad-
cast, when you reach the return cue,
just say: 'This is Bill Worthy in Peip-
ing. Now back to CBS News in New
Amsterdam.'"
To be fair, the bad case of media
jitters was not wholly self-induced.
A
'l
?e s? "DPI o
A loll
ArcDulles. was
HAN foreign as-
' contiLuc.
iY.21SHIg,`T.0.11, P.OSZ
Approved For Release 20619/g6419.1A-RDFS81041100-11R0
-sr1(74,rr-
WASHINGTON, D.C.
7.41he most elaborate security precau-
tions ever devised for a Chief of
State will surround President Nixon
when he arrives in Peking for his
historic meeting with the mainland
Chinese leaders.
And this may come as something of
a surprise to many Americans: the
'United States Secret Service, traditional
guardian of the President's safety, is
leaning heavily on its Communist Chi-
nese counterpart to make certain that
Mr. Nixon's visit, however sensational
its diplomatic implications may be, is
absolutely uneventful from the stand-
point of his personal security.
"No matter how you slice it," a top
U.S. security official told PARADE, "we
must depend on the host country to
assume the major burden of protecting
our President. And the Chinese have
been cooperating magnificently."
Many of the details of the protective
measures arranged between the Secret
Service and Peking's -security forces
are wrapped in secrecy, but this much
can be told:
The advance security preparations
are not confined to the streets along
which Mr. Nixon's party will travel
through the Chinese capital or the
quarters in which he will stay?they ex-
tend around the world.
- Ever since the dramatic announce-
ment of the American President's forth-
coming journey burst upon the world
last August, U.S. and Chinese security
:experts behind the kenos have been
checking and cross-checking every-
thing and everyone he is likely to come
in contact with, from his drinking water
to the elevator operator in his Peking
guest house.
These are the key areas of security
concern:
TRANSPORTATION?Mr. Nixon will
It,, from 4Vashington to Guam aboard
"I 11.;r1rir rfInr
[
...v: ,
t;- 1 ij/Lk 1: f
./. .
by Fred Blumenthal
one Peking landing under his belt, hay:,
ing flown Presidential adviser Henry
Kissinger to the Chinese capital last
Oct: 20th. The President's 707, which
has a range of 7000 miles, an 11-man
crew, and room for 59 passengers, will
fly from Guam to Shanghai, where it
will pick up an English-speaking Chi-
nese navigator for the final leg. ?
. Navigator knows
Col. Albertazzie has no qualms about
the professional ability of the navigator,
the same officer who guided him into
Peking on the Kissinger flight.
"I was delighted with him; he's an
excellent navigator," the American
pilot told PARADE. "And the Peking
International Airport has all the neces-
sary facilities, including electronic
equipment. They have been handling
Air France and Pakistani 707s on a
regular basis, and they know what
they're doing."
Other American aircraft will precede
and follow "The Spirit of '76" into the
Peking Airport, including a still-un-
known number of press- planes and a
cargo jet carrying four White House
automobiles?one of them the armored
Lincoln limousine in which the Presi-
dent rides wherever he goes, at home
or abroad.
Gasoline tested
On the ground, the Presidential
plane will be guarded around the clock
by U.S. Air Force police and Chinese
military detachments, as will the jet
fuel for all the U.S. aircraft and the
gasoline for the White House cars. The
Chinese will supply a full load of 24,-
000 gallons of fuel for the return flight,
but every drop will be tested and fil-
tered before it goes?under guard?
into the tanks. This is crucial to the
President's safety in the air, but it is no
slap at his Chinese hosts: the same pre-
PEKING PROBLEMS?The routes over
which President Nixon will travel from
the airport and to and from his various
official meetings and receptions in the
Chinese capital are still secret and may
not be divulged until the last minute?
if at all. But Secret Service agents, in
cooperation with their Chinese oppo-
site numbers, will go over the ground
many, many times before his arrival to
familiarize themselves with every inch
of the way. Every manhole the Presi-
dential party will pass over while driv-
ing through the streets of Peking will
be. inspected and the cover sealed to
make sure that no one has planted an
explosive device in his path (a routine
Secret Service precaution taken on
Presidential trips in the United States),
and even the utility poles lining the
streets will be examined at the very
last moment, just in case someone
might decide to saw three-quarters of
the way through a pole with a view to
toppling it into the street, thus block-
ing the cavalcade and "setting up" a
dangerous opportunity for an attack.
More routinely, Chinese security agents
will keep an eye on rooftops and win-
dows along the way.
Elevator feared
If plans call for Mr. Nixon to enter an
elevator at any time, the Secret Service
wants the Chinese to check not only the
mechanical equipment, but the oper-
ator, too.
"There can be nothing more hair-
raising," says one veteran security
agent, "than to have the President of
the United States stalled in the narrow
cOrifines of an elevator, especially if
the operator might turn out to be un-
friendly."
During its stay in Peking, the en-
tire American delegation, including
the President, will have its own drink-
ing water supply, not because they
"The S )irit of " cautions allidiecei4evele lime "The have reason Astispect the quality of
Ralph D. Albertazzie, who already has Force bases in the United States. that all experienced travelers are wary
of unfamiliar water.
ApilefiiettY rr els* 20 2003400tai-I5ason
One), piloted by Air Force veteran Col.
rY
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HONOLULU, H.!. ?1
STAR?BULLETIN
DEC 15 tazi
E ? 115,688 '
S ? 166,171
STATI NTL
_
Diplomats as Spies
Washington, with the welcome mat out for the Peking
Chinese, now on American soil for the first time in over 20
years, has been somewhat taken aback to learn that the
leader of the advance party is one of China's top spies.
He is Kao Liang, who with five other officials arrived in
New York last Monday and paid his first visit to the United
Nations Tuesday. Now out own intelligence people, pre-
sumably the CIA, have caused surprise and concern by let-
ting it be kn8rct'n that Kao has had the following assign-
ments:
Under the "cover" of being chief African correspondent
for the New China News Agency, he 'traveled extensively
through Africa in the early 1960s as Peking established it-
self on the continent.
He was the prime mover in the pro-Peking uprising in
Zanz'ibar in 1964, passing out arms and money to the insur-
gents. When it was over, the local agent Mr Kao's news
agency emerged as foreign minister of the new govern-
ment.
Nobody should be surprised. The Russians regularly use
' members of their diplomatic missions as spies. One such,.
recently revealed by the CIA, was Vladimir Pavlichenko,
director of external information of the United Nations Pub-
he Information Office. Pavlichenko, said the CIA, is a "vet-
eran officer" of the KGB, the Soviet intelligence agency.
Furthermore, it must be presumed that our own intelli-
gence agencies take advantage of the cloak of diplomatic
immunity in foreign countries. Just about everybody else
does it, so why shouldn't we?
On the ,other hand, there is no United Nations headquar-
ters in China to which we could send a mission including
spies. It is one more reason for establishing diplomatic re-
lations, so we can get our intelligence people in Peking. ,
. . " ...?
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Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601
MIAMI, FLA.
HERALD IDEc 1 3 i918.1
?
- 380,828
B - 479,025
;1,6#6?61.....,OillMIMAIIIIIITifii111111111111111,111113111111111111plillITIN-1111MIIII11111151;111171.31SIglIfft_...
? /?....01/
etO,Pki
M
._ ?
The Central Intelligence were supposed to know. '
Agency has laid off 5,000 And, what about the Bay
spies, and only 134,000 em- of Pigs? There was a perfect-
ployes are left on the payroll. ly fouled up job, based on
Nobody knows how much the completely unreliable intern.
CIA costs us, because it gence. We don't seem to be
doesn't have to account pub- getting adequate information
holy for its spending. The ex- for the billions we're spend-
penditures run into billions. ing.
The spies, who managed to
keep their methods secret for
years, haven't been success-
ful at that recently. It has
been disclosed in Vietnam
that torture is one of their 't
gimmicks for obtaining infor-
Illation from close-mouthed
people. They've ordered mur-
der, as in the case of a dou-,
ble-crossing agent in Viet.
nam. The CIA apparently is V
answerable to no one, which
makes?it the most dangerous
government agency the Unit-
ed States has ever known.
The intelligence beagles
haven't been as successful as
they'd have us believe. Pearl
)-larbor should have been an-
ticipated. Douglas MacAr-
thur scoffed at Chinese inter-
vention in Korea two days
before the Reds moved in.
Ws G2 should not be saddled
with all the blame, for the
buzle4,1111Elaris of the CIA.
Jack Hofoed
Says
STATINT
Is th,e Secretive C
orth the Expense?
a?
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 Appr9yed_egf,R,,91.e,
c ey,M7 )
re4P
-
v'f?jrsi'
- - ? ' '
'
,
Ed
?
?
?-?
0,kpptoved,For Release 20'01/03/0
k?A .1,%:.? 4 IA
:02K TIES
Approved For Release 2001/O3ipitpliv1RDP8TCOMIT4000 -
' C ird I Nt A S AID TO TELL - !-
, .and Premier Chou lin-lai have Political assassination is "out
. They note, however, i hat
,.won the battle against Mr. Lin of character" in China.
. . .
lir fr 111741171:.,1 intelligence community is that
- , , 0 ot Iko and, his civill.un and military The view in the American
,
. ._......_........____ ' The judgment in Washington the September crisis was, in
..
.. .
Officials Reported Informing
?
Party Units Across Nation
:4pcdal I 'rile N.' Yorl; TInm;
WASHINGTON, Nov. 16 ?
The United Ste es intelligence
community is cc 'dyinga grow-
ing volume of reports on spe-
cial meetings -throughout main-
land China in which leading
Communist warty groups are
said to be advised by top party
'delegates that Lin Piao "no
longer holds power." -
The White House has im-
posed a ban on public
t'omment by American officials
an political events in China.
fIowever, reliable intelligence
sources in Washington pri-
vately say the reports of the
Communist party briefings are
the most convincing evidence
so that Mr. Lin has fallen into
political disfavor. It is believed
that Mr. Lin has been re.: Little Red Books Vanish
moved as successor to Chair-i American officials' said that
is that M. Mao and Mr. Chou prat, an attempt by leftists
Ire in the process of con to regain positions they lost to
bolidatinri their power through Mr. Mao, the advocate of more
a reshuffling of key army and enigmatic policies, during the
narly posts. Cultural Revolution..
American specailists said,
however, I hat wide gaps re-
mained "in the knowledge on
what has happened and may
still be happening."
These specialists said that
further evidence of ,Mr. Lin's
downfall came on Monday at
the United Nations when the
Peking delegation made its
debut.. They pointed out that
chief delegates for Communist
countries and some of the so-
called "third world" nations,
close to Peking pointendly
omitted, any mention of Mr.
Lin in speeches welcoming the
Chinese, although greetings
were expressed to Mr. Mao and
Mr. Chou. Communist diplo-
mats said later that "word had
been deceived" from the Chi-
nese delegation that Mr. Lin's,
name should not be mentioned.
man Mao Tse-tung, as the sec-
ond-ranking member of the
party's Politburo and as 'De-
fense Minister.
The Administration is known
:to take the view that any pub-
'tic comment on Chinese inter-
nal problems may complicate
President Nixon's plans to visit
:Peking.
Mao and Chou Are Winners
But intelligence specialists
believe that the crisis around
l\lfr. Lin reached its climactic
, point between Sept. 11 and 13.
The A,(Iministration is reported
; to assume that Chairman Mao
Mr. 1,in s apparent elimination
was being indirectly communi-
cated to the populace in China
through what diplomatic and
intelligence sources described
as the sudden disappearance of
the little red books of Chair-
man Mao's thoughts from the
places where they were usually
kept or distributed. The book-
let carries an preface by Mr.
The specialists said that it
.was impossible to d etermine
whether the 64-year-old. Mr..
Lin, who had been ill for at
least a year, was dead of alive.
"We -incline to think that he
is physically alive but polit-
ically- dead," an expert here
said. .
have so'. far not mentioned Mr..
Lin, but the experts believe
that the Chinese people are
being prepared for a public
accusation through a series of
obliquely worded articles and
broadcasts.
, The version of Chinese
events most generally accept-
ed by American intelligence
specialists?although they ad-
mit it is highly speculative--
is that Mr. Mao and Mr. Chou.
deliberately brought about the
crisis on Sept. 11 to "smoke-
. out" Mr. Lin and his associ-
ates.
The offieialls say there are
.
unconfirmed reports that Mr.
Lin's group had planned to'
assassinate Chairman Mao and
probably. Premier Choq. They
then speculate that the Chair-
man and the Premier, on learn-
INCORRECTLY PRINTED
Ree
Associated Pressvo ,
Approved For lase 200 3' 4fzn-CfkrilaalP80:131i 01 R000200340001-5
tary men to panic."
CHICAGO, ILL.
SUN?TIMEtkPPrOVed .Fo
- 536,108
S ? 709,123
NOV 1 2 197t
STATINTL
Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP8O-01604
.-
t ....? i By Thomas B. Ross
F..
?
l'. -,. Sun-Times Bureau
?? , WASHINGTON -- Central ' Intelligence ,
Ageney documents describe a 'key2,Chinese ;
--. delegate to the United NEtti0115 as a "master
subverStve" who was invalved in maneuvers
.ttlat led to the assassination of ark African'
. ,
prime minISter in 1965. 1
. .
;:. The documents indicate that Kao Mang, ,1
' '?head of Peking's advance party at the UN,
? .mtty have secretly outranked all Chinese UM%
:.
:cials in. Africa during g his service?theiTe, as-
.
. Jensibly as a corre.spondont for the New
China News Agency, in the early 1960s.
..-: The documents carry the implication that
( -Tao may be One of the most important mem-
,. i bars of China's UN derogation even though he:
? Is listed as only a routine functionary.
- :,"Kao Mang," one of the documents de-
. , dares, ."deals in "disruption and chaos. . . .
7 The tough NCNA reporter has planted the
..
?
-seeds of subversion on three continents and
- has achieved some success In dealing with
, both recognized diplomats and furtive mal-
contents." --,...n . . ? ;
Prior to these new disclosures, Kao was
asked by NBC News in New York to comment
:? on the original story In The Sun-Times
Wednesday identifying him as "a leading
11 ' Chi-
_nese intelligence agent." He replied that the
' report was "entirely slanderous._"' '
'..--.. The thick CIA intelligence file on Kao con-
Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda and
7 Uganda.
Nepal, the Indian government refused to ex-
tend Kao's visa, demanded the closing of the
NCNA office? and ordered him out of the
country. _
"Although the spokesman- of India's 'Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs publicly accused Kao
'Nang only of 'tendentious .and malicious' re-
porting, the newsman's activities were known
to be regarded as serious interference in the
Internal affairs of the coulktry," according to
the CIA file,
Following a. brief stay in China, Ha() went,
to Geneva, Switzerland, in the spring of 1961
to represent the Peking People's Daily at the
International conference on Laos.
"During the Geneva sojourn, Hoe Limn, en-
tertained. generously and reportedly passed
along substantial funds (in Swiss francs) to
friendly African contacts."
_ Short stay in Mauritius
In July of 1961, Kao was assigned as
NCNA's chief African correspondent with a
base in Dar es Salaam, capital of Tanzania.
En route he tried to enter 1,1aUritius to make ? ?
"He is known to have Passed large sums of
money to antigovernment.. dissidents even
,while attending independence day celebra-
tions in new African capitals."
In 1964 he was judged the prime mover in
the pro-Peking coup in Zanzibar, passing out
money and arms to the insurgents, including
Sheik Abdul Rahrnan Muhammed (Sheik
Babu), a former NCNA stringer who emerged
as. foreign minister. ?
-? Implicated as plotter ?
Later that year, Kao served. as head of an
advance party that prepared the way for the
? establishment of a Chinese embassy in Bur-
undi. 1n.3965; Prime Minister Pierre Ngen-
dandumwe was :assassinated and Tung Chi-
? p'eng, a young defector .from the Chinese em-
bassy, implicated Rao in the maneuvering
that.led up to the assassination.
Burundi severed diplomatic, relations with
Peking and oradercd the Chinese mission out
nor the country. ? ,
contact with its "large 'overseas Chinese pop-7
'dation." Refused entry, he flew, to the nearby
island of Reunion and then returned to Mau-
ritius on the next flight. This time he man:: -
aged to stay oveniight before, being expelled
a second time. ? -
'During his five-year -stay in Africa, Kaowas involved ? in coups, countercoups, mu-
tinies, gun-running and straight-forward
tains this chronolon,y of his activities: plomacy in Angola; Burundi, 'the two Congos,
? By then, Kao was established in I3Kazzaville
in the former French Congo, teaching at ? an
ideological training school and providing aid
? for the insurgency in the neighboring Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo. ?. ?
? Kao returned to China at the time of the
)966 Cultural Revolution and dropped from
view until his appearance _Monday in New
? York at. the head of Peking's advance party i
to the .UN.
, He took up his first foreign assignment in ---
rIndia
?'
in .1956. i
? .
tnn- "He 'did a little reporting on India but his
main task was to cultivate India's Communist
and left-wing journalists, to, find suitable out-
tniets for propaganda and subversive literature,
,r'and to channel funds to dissident groups (es-
pecially in sensitive border areas)."
In the spring of 1960, Kao accompanied Pre-
mier Chou En-lal on his visit to Nepal and.
"paid certain sums to leftist. editnrs .of Nepali
t.-publications." - ? ? , . n ?
In July of 1960, shortly after his return from
. . . .
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vont inued
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77:1 7 0
? 'I
t.
Washington, Nov. 10 (NEWS Bureau)?Kao Liang, head of Red
China's advance party at the United Nations, is an espionage expert who
once sckcted African recruits for guerrilla training at ChineE,e camps in
Cuba, United States officials disclosed today..
These officials, revealing Kao's role as a top Chinese
intelligence agent, told THE NEWS that he was active in
East Africa between 1961 and 1967.
While ostensibly serving as a
. journalist for Peking's New China
news agency, they said, Kao was
a major figure in a pro-Peking
'coup in Zanzibar in 1961, then
moved to the French Congo
(Brazzaville), when he advised
the government's counterespion-
..age police and served as China's
chief guerrilla recruitey for East
- Africa.
-
Kao arrived in New York Mon-
day as head of a six-man advance
party for the offiCial. Peking UN
delegation scheduled to arrive to-
Morrow. He paid his first visit
to UN headquarters yesterday.
U.S. intelligence maintains a
fat file on the Chinese diplomat-
- journalist, who was kicked out of
India in 1960 for "tendentious
reporting."
Kao had arrived in New Delhi
as a New China news agency
correspondent four years earlier.
About a year after his expulsion,
he surfaced as a roving corre-
spondent in Africa.
Soon after, Western intelli-
gence identified . him as the
principal Chinese Communist es-
pionage agent in East Africa. Ile
was expelled from Mauritius, an
island nation in the Indian Ocean
off the African mainland, in 1961:.
He was reportedly active in
Nepal and in Switzerland, where
he attended the 1961 Geneva con- Chiao Koan-hua
ference in Laos. his most recent User to he newsman hirnself
public appearance was last
spring, when he accompanied the
ChineSe,Ping-Pcmg team to Japan
for a tommament that led to the
historic. invitation for a U.S. team
to visit Red China. .
. SourceS said that Xao pastexl
out Money and arms to pro-Chi-
nese insurgents in Zanzibar in
194. One of them was Shiek Ab-
dul Ralunan Muhammed, a New
China news agency stringer who
emerged as foreign minister after'
:the coup.
While in Africa, Kao lived lay-
.ishly, maintaining a large house'
and car and throwing expensive
parties. He left Africa in March
1967,
' - Began With New China
. The Chinese news agency, like
the Tass news agency, its Soviet
-counterpart, is considered by
United States intelligence as a
front for espionage activities in
some countries. Red China's dep-
"uty foreign Minister, Chiao'Kuan-
hua, who heads the official dele-
gttion . to the :UN, began his
career as a correspondent for the
agency before -entering the diplo-
matic service.
? Using the UN as a cover for
:espionage is not new, according to,
.U.S. sources. Last month, Ameri-
can intelligence sources leaked a
charge that Vladimir Pavlicheako,
. a director of the UN public in-
formation office, is an off jeer of
the Soviet intelligence agency, the-
. C'ClAin31.erican intelligence estimated ?
that at least half the Soviet of-
ficials at the UN are KGB agents.
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NKR DAILY. ITEiIIS
Approved For Release 260063/ail:STARD-F180-
-7.72.-n ,../..i.,. r -; . . ??:? I,
1, ft -4
...,,,
....n. I ' '