REPORT OF THE QUANTICO VULNERABILITIES PANEL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01446R000100160004-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 170
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 10, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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REPORT OF THE QUANTIO0 VULNERABILITIES PANEL
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Quantico, Virginia
June 101 1955
The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Dear Mr. Rockefeller:
At your invitation, a group of eleven persons
knowledgeable in many fields important to the American-Soviet
Struggle: have met as a Panel at Quantico, Virginia, from 5-10
June, to explore methods of exploiting Communist bloc vulnera-
bilities at this crucial state of world affairs. As your
designated Chairman, and on behalf of my colleagues, I am
herewith transmitting the reports and recommendations of our
group.
All of us appreciate the freedom of action you gave us
to develop our own guidelines of investigation. We soon
discovered that several significant vulnerabilities could be
identified and that fruitful courses of action could be
ieveloped cnly if we looked at the total political and security
problems facing the U.S. at this juncture.
We have no expectation that we have produced either a magic
formula for positive U.S. action or a substitute for the staff
considerations currently under way in the responsible Government
Departments. We offer these recommendations and the papers
that underlie them as a supplement to those considerations. It
is our hope that responsible officials will find our efforts
constructive and that use can be made of the many concrete
suggestions included in the Panel results.
The over-all report of the Panel and its four appendices
represent a general group consensus. We had neither the time
nor the data to make, as individuals, definitive commitments
of judgment on all the recommendations and on every line of text.
But we forwarded these documents confident th-t they deserve serious
consideration by the Government. We are also submitting ten
papers prepared by individu -1 Panel members. Many ideas from
them have found their way into our joint recommendations; but
time did not permit the Panel to evaluate the texts fully. I
personally deem them an extremely interesting product of the
week's work.
All of us appreciate the contributions made by govern-
mental representatives toward this Panel and, in particular,
the willing help of the responsible officials from your office,
the Departments of State and Defense, of CIA, USIA, NSC, and
00B, who took of their precious time to join us periodically
in our discussions.
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The one impression which stands out in my mind is the
unanimous belief of the Panel members that the U.S. now en-
joys a significant but transitory period of over-all strength
vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc. The next two or three years afford
MI United States the opportunity to negotiate from a strong
position for genuine concessions by the enemy without sacrifice
of essential positions of strength, Such negotiation, along
with a vigorous and urgent development of potential Free World
strengths could create the conditions for victory in the cold
war.
May I express our appreciation for having had this
opportunity to serve.
Dr. Frederick Dunn
Director, Center of International Studies
Mr. C. D, Jackson
TIME LIFE
Dr, Ellis A, Johnson
Director, Operations Research Office
Dr. Paul Lineberger
School of Advanced International Studies
Dr, Max Milliken
Center of international Studies, MIT
Dr. Philip Mosely
Director, Russian Institute
Dr, George Pettee
Deputy Director, Operations Research Office
Dr. Stefan Possony
Air Intelligence Specialist, Department of the Air Force
Dr, Hans Speier
RAND Corporation
Dr. Charles A. H. Thomson
Brookings Institution
) )
I
A 1\
W. W. Rostow
(Center of International Studies, MIT)
Panel Chairman
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SUMMARY OF RECOMENDATIONS
MNTICO VULNERABILITIES PANEL
PURPOSE. This report (1) makes recommendations regarding operational
positLons and actions the U.S. might take vis-a-vis the WSR (as for
example at the coming round of East-West conferences) that will permit
the exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities, and (2) offers suggestions
for related actions advantageous to the U.S.
The Panel assessed the current strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet
Bloc and the Free Aorld. It concluded that the next several years afford
the United States the opportunity to act from a strong position and to
exact from the enemy genuine concessions without sacrifice of deterrent
strength by us. A full exploitation of the enemy's transitory position
of relative weakness and the Free World's actuAl and potential foundations
for strength requires a wide range of U, S. initiatives and actions which
transcend the area of negotiation with the Soviet Union.
RECOMMENDATIONS
In the light of this assessment we develop in our submissions a
strategy and a broad tactical line for the forthcoming conferences and
we submit the following specific recommendations:
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A. Actions Prior to the Conference.
1. The United States should insist that the Soviets
lift the Berlin toll blockade prior to the conference.
2. Suggestions should be made to the USSR, to the UK, and to
France, that they should be prepared to exchange ratifications of the
Austrian Treaty on the occasion of the conference.
B. Actions Durin tha.s2agumLag.
1. The United States should be prepared to make a series of
proposals designed to MVO towards the control of armaments, These include:
a. Discussions of:
(1) A proposed agreement for mutual inspection of
military installations, forces and armaments, without limitations
provisions.
(2) A convention insuring the right of aircraft of any
nationality to fly over the territory of any country for peaceful purposes.
(Proposed with reservations noted in the text.)
b. Proposal of a disarmament plan to the USSR;after rejection
of the plan, the U.S. to make every effort to win the arms race as the
safest way of forcing the Soviet Union to accept a satisfactory arms
convention.
2. The United States should be prepared to make a series of
proposals concerning exchange of persons, information and goods, covering:
a. An agreement for the expansion of East-West trade,
b. An agreement greatly increasing the freedom of persons
to travel anywhere in the world for peaceful purposes.
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c. A convention providing for free and unhampered inter-
national communications for the exchange of information and ideas,
conditioned on conclusion of an anti-jamming agreement.
d. Further exploration of peaceful uses of atomic energy
and a world-wide fund for cooperative economic development of the under-
developed areas.
3. The United States should pursue the following sequence in
dealing with German matters:
a. Rapid- implementation of rearmament provisions.
b. Proper conditions for free elections.
c. Free elections.
d. Unification of government.
e. Conclusion of a peace treaty not predetermining Germany's
international status.
f. Withdrawal of troops only after a unified Germany has
reemerged as a strong military power and has become an integral part of
NATO. If Germany abstains from joining NATO, she should be permitted to
rearm to a level sufficient to meet her security needs.
4. The United States should take the following actions to bring
about greater Allied unity on Far Eastern policy, and to worsen difficulties
between the Soviet Union and Red China:
a. Take steps to put strains on the Moscow-Peiping alliance.
b. Keep the Japanese fully informed of progress at the
conference.
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c. At least once during the conference, the Department of
State should obtain for the President the advice of the Japanese Govern-
ment on a specific Far Eastern point at issue in the Conference.
C. Actions Outside of the Conference,
Outside of the conference, either concurrently with it or subsequent
to it the United States should take the following actions:
1. General
a. Propose an international scientific conference of all
powers producing atomic weapons on the problem of reducing the danger of
radioactive fallout.
b. The United States should convene at an early date an
exploratory conference to discuss implementation of the economic and
other non-military provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty.
0. Accelerate the revival of Japan as a great power and
treat her as a diplomatic equal in developing Far Eastern policy.
2. In relation to Europe, the United States should:
a. Invoke the peace treaties with Bulgaria, Rumania, and
Hungary, and the provisions of other wartime and postwar agreements
relating to the limitations of arms in Eastern Europe, demanding
inspection to determine compliance with the limitations of these agreements.
b. Take early and forceful steps to assure improved air
defense, passive and active, for our European allies.
c. Seek the establishment, organization and support of
research and development in the TO countries on an ambitious scale.
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d. Relax to the maximum restrictions preventing the flow
of necessary technical intelligence to European scientists working in
behalf of a Free World.
e. Request SHAM to make a maximum effort to find tactical
solutions to NATO defense which minimize the possibilities of civilian
casualties.
f, Explore seriously concrete recommendations dosigned to
reduce present fears in NATO nations concerning atomic weapons.
g. Develop with NATO countries a joint policy for accelerated
economic growth in the underdeveloped countries of the Free World.
3. In relation to Asia, the United States should:
a. Greatly increase the flow of investment resources to
the underdeveloped countries, including Japan, South Asia and Southeast
Asia.
b. Advise the Chinese Nationalist Government that its good
relations in the South and Southeast Asia are a matter of interest
to the U.S. U.S. diplomatic and other authorities in Formosa should
openly sponsor informal yaews and cultural connections there.
e. Convince Asians that the U.S. is capable and willing to
deal by means short of major war, with Communist military aggression.
d. Prevent a Communist take-over in Southern Vietnam.
e. In order to convert a major free world problem into an
assetllauneh a positive U.S. politieal and economic program for Formosa.
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REPORT OF THE QUANTICO VULNERABILITIES PANEL
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PURPOSE 1
II THE GENERAL SETTING 1
III THE OBJECTS OF AN LERICAN STRATEGY 7
IV GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STRATEGY 8
V RECONMENDATIOM 13
Appendix A - Estimate of the Situation
Appendix B Pr000sals_to Test Soviet Willinqness to
A:palc.p Concessions and to IiL)prove the U.S.
Position
Appendix C - The German Question
l.- Preliminary Diplomatic Action in
Preparation for the Summit Conference
2.- U.S. Guidelines for a German
Settlement
3 - German Elections
4 - Possible Proposals for German Unity
Appendix D - A Proposal for Graduated Disarmament
Summary of Individual Supporting Papers
Tab 1 - "Soviet Estimate of the Situation"
Tab 2 - "The Requirements for U.S.-NATO to Win in the Arms
Race with the uasan
Tab 3 - "Alliance and Coalition Problems"
(a) "Does NATO Have a Position of Strength?"
(b) "Asia Policy"
(c) "Japan"
(d) "Measures to Cope with Free-World Fears
of the Bomb"
(e) "Air Defense of the United States and Western
Europe"
(f) "Factors Influencing the Morale of Allies"
Tab 4 - "Straining the Sino-Soviet Alliance" with Annex
Tab 5 - "An Institute for the Study of Peace"
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June 10 1955
ToRrag___LQZ_TEL.,z,Lig' 11.41 1EL
I. PURPOSE
The purpose of this report is (1) to make recommendations regarding
operational positions and actions the U. S. might take vis-a-vis the USSR
(as for example at the coming round of East-West conferences) that will
permit the exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities, and (2) to offer sugges-
tions for related actions advantageous to the U. S.
II. ITEE!agigIgLilaITING
A. The current disposition of the Soviet leaders to sit down at the
"summit" cannot be traced to a genuine interest on their part to ease any
tensions for the sake of peace and harmony. It must be traced to a specific
Communist interest in improving the Soviet position in the international
struggle for power.
They are afraid of the transitory. American superiority in strategic
airpower, stockpile, and delivery capabilities. They have realized that,
this superiority is sufficient to be a guarantee of victory in a major war.
In addition, they may be afraid that American strategic airpower will be
used in the form of a surprise attack against the Soviet Union. (There is
evidence that in recent months Soviet leaders have abandoned the time-honored
principle of Soviet military doctrine that mass rather than surprise is the
decisive factor in war.) The Soviet leaders may be ready to attribute to
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the U. S. the intention of preventive war which they might indeed hold
themselves, if the balance of power were reversed. The apprehension of the
Soviet leaders is aggravated by their estimate that a lost war would mean
the end of Communism.
In view of this grave outlook, the Soviet leaders are interested
in gaining time. They need time to acbiove nuclear parity--a goal which
they can hope to achieve, for all practical purposes, within three to
five years. More generally, they need time to shore up their political
position, repair their agricultural difficulties, and develop their economic
organization.
B. Assuming that this evaluation of the situation is correct, the
United States would play into the hands of the Soviet Union if it were to
approach the conference with the primary purpose of easing tension. It
should meet the Soviet leaders with the intention to force them to retreat.
Even if the foregoing evaluation of the situation is not correct,
the United States cannot lose anything by acting at the beginning in the
conviction that the Soviet Union is prepared to make concessions.
For years it has been United States policy that we will negotiate
with the Soviet Union only from positions of strength. It is not only true
that we now occupy such a transitory position of strength vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union but also likely that the Soviet leaders act at the present
from fear of this position of strength. We should, therefore, exploit this
strength by pressing resolutely for an improvement of our position in the
international struggle of power.
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For years, it has been United States policy that we are ready to
negotiate with the Soviet Union only if its leaders show by action rather
than words that they are willing to work with us toward the preservation of
peace. The Soviets did this in the case of Austria; we should no press
this policy further.
Instead of meeting the Soviet leaders on their terms and permitting
them to center the discussion around issues of primary interest to them,
such as the delay of German rearmament and the splitting of NATO, and
reduction of the U.S. atomic advantage through disarmament, the United States
should seize the initiative by Presenting the Soviet Union with heavy
demands for major concessions on their part at a price that is tolerable to
US.
The conference may present a unique opportunity to the United States
for inflicting a diplomatic defeat upon the Soviet Union, to reassert the
ideals of the Free World and to buttress peace under American leadership.
Q. Iloscow's possible private estimate of military weakness is
accompanied by public evidence of Soviet internal difficulties.. Soviet
leaders may find this profoundly disturbing, since it could lead to the
weakening or even the destruction of Communism's ideological momentum and
mystique both in Russia and abroad.
Latagicallv:
1. Communist agricultural policy, a key element in Communist theory
and practice, is proving ineffective or worse from one end of the Bloc to
the other.
2. The withdrawal from Austria, the performance in Belgrade,
unusually rapid vacillations in Soviet policy, and improvements in the
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relative military, economic, and political position in Western Europe have
sharply raised expectations in Eastern Europe that the satellite structure
might change and Soviet power recede from Eastern Europe.
3. The performance of Soviet leadership since Stalin's death has
muddied the Stalinist image of inevitable advance aid of Communism as the
wave of the future an inpression strongly reinforced by recent Soviet
diplomatic actions.
4. It is fundamental that the U.S. should seek in the coming
months to exploit to the hilt this perhaps transitory position of Soviet
political vulnerability, together with weaknesses in the Soviet's own
estimate of their position of which we are not aware, but which we may be
able to probe out and capitalize by negotiations from an attitude of
strength. Yet our actions must be tempered by realization of the facts
that there is no indication that the top Soviet leadership has lost
effective control over the Russian or the satellite peoples, and that
Soviet military strength is great and on the rise.
D. Schematically, the purposes of Moscow's current moves appear to
be:
1. To weaken the American military and political position in Europe
and Asia by inducing further U.S. troop withdrawals and depriving us of the
use of our present air bases;
2. To weaken or destroy NATQ;
3, To induce a out in military outlays of the U.S. and its allies;
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4, To separate us from our allies by widening the area of
"neutrality"; and
5. To maximize the gap between the American and the allied policy
positions in Europe and in Asia.
E. The major lines of aotion the Soviets may attempt to follow
are:
1. With respect to German unification:
at, To propose German unification through free elections
coupled with the withdrawal of occupation troops, and to put the
blame of failure on supposed American unwillingness to withdraw
troops;
To accept Western terms for free elections in Germany
at the price of German withdrawal from WEU and from NATO and to
confront us if not now, at some time in the future, with the
possibility of German acceptance; or
In any case, to present proposals for German unity designed
to unhinge the American military position in Europe, including
NATO and our air bases.
2. With respect to international control of armaments, either:
as. To press hard their current position on control of armaments
in an effort to separate the United States from the British and
the French; or
4 To offer more complete inspection terms of a kind difficult
for the U.S. to refuse.
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3. To press for recognition of Communist China and support
Communist Chinese steps in the Far East designed to separate the
United States from ether countries.
F. An appreciation of the opportunities open to the United States
in the coming months requires an understanding of the following strengths
and weaknesses. Strengths include our present decisive superiority
in the arms reed; satisfaction on balance in Western Europe with the
present NATO.WEU structure; a desire in the Free World that the U.S.
should net withdraw its forces from Germany and Europe; relatively
greater progress in Western than in Eastern Europe; our "open society";
the continued improvement in the Free World position in the Philippines,
Malaya, and Burma; the potentialities of strengthening the political,
economic, and military position of Japan and Formosa and the SEATO
powers; and the potentialities of strengthening the political and
economic position of India and the other Colombo powers.
G. Free World weaknesses include a sense of vulnerability to atomic
attack brought about by the fear that the U.S. might initiate or stumble
Into atomic war as a result of Communist provocation; a sense that the
U.S. must respond to Communist aggression either by total war or by
inaction; the possible attraction to the opposition in Germany of a
Soviet proposal that Germany be reunified by truly free elections at
a cost unacceptable to us; lack of an agreed allied position on the
Far East; Japanese economic uncertainties; seeming Soviet possession of
the initiative in easing tensions; disagreemnt in the Free World over
economic policies and strategic matters; economic uncertainties arising
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in raw materials and food-producing countries from U.S. commodity
price fluctuations; and imperfect confidence in U.S. policies and
plans.
(The foregoing appraisal of purposes, strengths and weaknesses is
expanded in Appendix A.)
III. THE OBJECTS OF AN AORRICAV STRAyEGY
A. The next two years afford the U.S. the opportunity to negotiate
from a strong positicn for genuine concessions by the enemy without
sacrifice of deterrent strength by us. Such negotiation can create
the essential conditions for the winning of the Cold War.
In the conduct of its negotiations, the U.S. should keep in mind
the continuing objectives of United States foreign policy:
1. To continue to hold the Ailitary balance of power in our
favor which requires not only that we neutralize our adversaries'
striking power in weapons of mass destruction and the many implementing
weapons systems, including air defense and electronic warfare, but
also that we continue to develop flexible capabilities to undertake
military action short of total war and maintain the will to do So.
2. To increase the military, economic and politica strength
and unity of the Free World and thus be prepared to forestall, check or
defeat Communist efforts at erosion conducted by limited military means,
and through propaganda, subversion, and diplomacy.
3. To determine and execute our policies in such a way as to
maximize the possibUfty of changes within the Soviet bloc favorable to the
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U. S. interest) by effectively denying to Moscow the possibilities of
consolidation and by steadily holding out peaceful alternatives not
incompatible with the Russian national security interest, and at the
same time encouraging the Soviet satellites and Communist China to
support their own national interests wherever the latter come into
conflict with Soviet demands on them.
4. To appreciate and act upon the dramatic new opportunities for
maneuver opened to us by the current Soviet defensive posture so that
our constant goal, a roll?back of Soviet power in Eastern and Central
Europe and in Asia is steadily brought nearer and a Free Europe is
brought to life.
IV. GENERAL PRINCIPLES ,F TIh STRATEGY
In pursuing the objectives outlined above, we should be guided by
the following general principles, which govern the mood and attitude
with which we approach the conference. Some of these principles should
probably be enunciated by the President early in the course of the
meeting at the summit. Others relate to our behavior as the conference
and the negotiations, which presumably will follow it, proceed. The
decision as to how much of what follows should be explicit from the
start must depend on professional detailed staff work and the judgment
of the responsible negotiators.
1. We will achieve the maximum political and psychological impact
from this conference if the U. S. delegation contributes at the outset
and maintains throughout a mood and positions of high diplomatic
seriousness,
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2. The Cold War has not been a contest of our choosing. We
disarmed after the war in the hone that we could place reliance for
our security on a system of international agreements. Bitter experience
has taught us that this hope was illusory, and that for the present
our security would have to be based on our own strength and that of
those who allied themselves with us. We should speak and act from
our conviction that we are now in a position of relative strength.
We should stubbornly maintain and expand this position of strength
in cooperation with our allies and other friendly countries until the
very day that effective measures are actually in operation which give
us solid assurance that we and our allies are safe from the threat of
attack. However tempting the prospect of a relaxation of tensions
may be, we shall not again make the mistake of confusing talk about
a relaxation of tensions with rogress toward a fundamental solution
of world problems. We should take concrete measures to emphasize our
strength and confidence, such as those suggested below.
3. While we are quite prepared to live with the Cold War indefinitely,
if necessary, we are determined to explore seriously every real possibility
of moving, whether by large or small steps, toward reduction of funda?
mental conflicts. Continuation of the arms race is imposing heavy
costs on the entire world. A large fraction of the world's resources
are being diverted from serving the welfare of the peoples of the world
to building military eseblishwents which we, and perhaps the Soviets,
regard as necessary to security. There are many constructive tasks
of building the Soviet civilian economy an: raising the standard of
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living of the Soviet people which they have been unable to get on with
because so large a part of their energies have gone into the production
of weapons. With the further development of modern methods of warfare,
these burdens will increase.
44 Even more important, the world has hanging over it the shadow
of destructive nuclear warfare, which, as Mr. Malenkov has rightly said,
could destroy modern civilization. We shall leave no stone unturned
in the pursuit of ways to effect a real reduction in this threat.
We have a series of proposals we shculd make at the appropriate time
for taking what we believe to be constructive first steps toward a
system of arms limitation. As explained in more detail in Appendix D.
we are prepared to accept certain of the May 10 proposals of the Soviets;
for example, a reduction of ground forces. We have proposals for the
development of a workable inspeotion system for control of armaments.
We also have proposals for considering alleviation of the effects of
radioactive fall-out.
5. A fundamental solution to the problem of freeing the world from
the spectre of atomic holocaust must be based on a genuinely free
Europe, with no occupation troops and no interference ln the internal
affairs of any country by any outside power. Such a Free Europe,
composed of the countries from Turkey to Norway, from Poland to Spain,
is a long-run goal of American policy. Only when such a community of
nations exists, each free to determine its own course in accord with
its own culture and historic traditions, each free to engage in
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economic and cultural intercourse and political association with all
other members of the European comunity of nations, will it be possible
to attain European security and cooperation based on common trust and
interest.
6. The United States wishes to move toward such a Free Europe
just as rapidly as possible. The question is how fast and far the
Soviet Union iv prepared to go and to what extent our Allies are prepared
to support such a policy. We still hold to U.S. policy :that the wartilne
and postwar agreements concornine the Soviet satellites for the with-
drawal of Soviet troops and the lidding of free elections in all the
countries should be honored. It is our hope that in agreeing to' the
conference the Soviet Union had in mind the discussion of serious
steps toward a Free Europe.
[-Some members of the group believe that there is a real possibility,
that the Soviets will concede the withdrawal of some or all of their
forces even though we are unwilling to discuss the abandonment of NATO.
Others believe the likelihood of this is negligible, and any attempt to
force this issue diplomatically may lead to a successful concentration
of attention by the Soviets on the issue of the withdrawal of all U.S.
forces from Europe which would be most dalagine, to American interests.
There is, therefore, some disagreement among the members of the
group on how far to proceed diplomatically beyond the enunciation of
lone range American purposes. Some feel we should press diplomatically
for the withdrawal of Soviet troops only frad Eastern Geriany and not
from. Eastern Europe; others for a total withdrawal from both areas. In
connection with withdrawal froe either area, we shall press for free
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elections. Some Suggest a diplomatic initiative on free
elections only. Others hold that to raise this issue at the conference
would be unworkable and possibly damaging to Allied unity,07
7. The Soviets are likely to raise suggestions for the unification
of Germany. A recommended position for the U. S. to take is formulated
in Appendix G.
8. With respect to the control of armaments, we should emphasize
that some degree of understanding and even trust is essential to any
effective armaments control scheme. We suggest a series of proposals
for the control of armaments which take into account the Russian pro-
posals of May 10, 1955. Our proposals also look to the improvement of
relations and the free exchange of people, ideas, and goods. These
proposals call first for the initiation of a system of mutual inspection
of armaments, including forces and production :facilities without, in
the first instance, any provisions for arms limitation. UltimatelY,
an inspection system, to be effective, should provide for free over-
flights of aircraft by reciprocally inspected aircraft, however sensitive
the UM may be on this subject.* Proposals also include those for an
expansion of economic relations and for free exchange of information
and ideas, both by the flow of written materials and by unobstructed
radio broadcasting, and a proposal for the freer access of persons to
all countries. These are all spelled out in more detail in Appendixes
B and D.
*Note: Aside from our general assumption that before implementation %e
all these suggestions will be considered carefully by the Department;
it is recommended that this proposal be examined with particular
ekepticism by the Department Of Defense.
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V. RECOMMDATIONS
On the whole range of questions we examined in accordance with
the objectives defined in para. III A above,we wish to make the following
suggestions for action related to the forthcoming Four Power conference:
A. Actions Illat....L11,14.1agamanu
1, The United States should insist that the Soviets lift the
Berlin toll blockade prior to the conference.
2. Suggestions should be made to the USSR, to the UK and to
France that they should be prepared to exchange ratifications of the
Austrian Treaty on the occasion of the conference.
B. Actions Durilla_the Conference
1. The United States should be prepared to make a series of
proposals designed to move towards the control of armaments.
include:
These
a. Discussions of:
(1) A proposed agreement for mutual inspection of
military installations, forces, and armaments, without limitations
provisions. (Appendix B).
(2) A convention insuring the right of aircraft of
any nationality to fly over the territory of any country for peaceful
purposes. (Proposed with reservations noted in the text. See Appendix B.)
b. Proposal of a disarmament plan to the USSR (Appendix D);
after rejection of the plan, the U.S. to make every effort to win the
arms race as the safest way of forcing the Soviet Union to accept a
satisfactory arms convention.
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2. The United States should be prepared to make a series
of proposals concerning exchange of persons, information and goods,
covering:
a. An agreement for the expansion of East-West trade.
(Appenetx B),
b. An agreement greatly increasing the freedom of persons
to travel anywhere in the world for peaceful purposes. (Appendix
B).
0. A convention providing for free and unhampered international
communications for the exchange of information and ideas, conditioned
on conclusion of an anti-jamming agreement. (Appendix B).
d. Further exploration of peaceful uses of atomic energy and
a world-wide fund for cooperative economic development of the under-
developed areas. (Appendix B).
3. The United States should pursue the following sequence
in dealing with German matters:
a. Rapid implementation of rearmament provisions.
b. Proper conditions for free elections.
c. Free elections.
d. Unification of government.
e. Conclusion of a peace treaty not predetermining Germanyts
international status.
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f. Withdrawal of troops only after a unificd Germa4Y
has reemerged as a strong military power and has become an integral
part of NATO. If Germany abstains from joining NATO, she should be
permitted to rearm to a level sufficient to meet her security needs
(Appendix O).
4, The United States should take the following actions
to bring about greater Allied unity on Far Eastern policy, and to worsen
difficulties between the Soviet Union and Red China:
a. Take steps to put strains on the Moscow?Peiping
alliance. (Tab 4)
b. Keep the Japanese fully informed of progress at the
conference (Tab 3c).
c. At least once during the conference, the Department of
State should obtain for the President the advice of the Japanese
Government on a specific Far Eastern point at issue in the Conference.
(Tab 30).
C. Actions od=eLof the Conference,
Outside of the conference, either concurrently with it or
subsequent to it, the United States shoaJd take the following actions:
1. Genera
a. Propose an international scientific conference of all
powers producing atomic weapons on the problem of reducing the danger
of radioactive fallout (Para IV above. See also Tab 3(d)),
b. The United States should convene at an early date an
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exploratory conference to discuss implementation of the economic and
other nor-military provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty;
Accelerate the revival of Japan as a great power
and treat her as a diplomatic equal in developing Far Eastern policy.
(Tab 3(c)).
2. In relation to Europe, the United States should:
a, Invoke the peace treaties with Bulgaria, Romania, and
Hungary, and the provisions of other wartime and pcetwar'agreements
relating to the limitations of arms in Eastern Europe, demanding inspec?
tion to determine compliance with the limitations of these agreements
(Appendix B).
b. Take early and forceful steps to assure improved air
defense, passive and active, for our European allies (Tab 3(a), 3(d), 3(e)),
e. Seek the establishment, organization and support of
research and development in the NATO countries on an ambitious scale
(Tabs 2, 3a and 3 c);
d. Relax to the maximum restrictions preventing the flow
of necessary technical intelligence to European scientists working in
behalf of a Free World (Tab 2).
e.Requeot SHAPE to make a maximum effort to find tactical
solutions to NATO defense which minimize the possibilities of civilian
casualties (Tab3e).
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f. Explore seriously concrete recommendations designed
to reduce present fears in NATO nations concerning atomic weapons.
,U11:111itreeol Pee Tab 3(b)).
g. Develop with NATO countries a joint policy for acceler?
ate0?economic growth in the underdeveloped counLries in the free world.
(See Tab 3(b))
3. In relation to Asia, the United States should:
a. GrcAtly increase the flow of investment resources to
the underdeveloped countries; including Japan South Asia and Southeast
Asia (Tab 3(b))0
b. Advise the Chinese Nationalist Government that its
good relations in the South and Southeast Psia are a matter of interest
to the U.S. U. S. diplomatic and other authorities in Formosa should
openly sponsor informal news; and cultural connections there. (Tab 3(b)).
c. Convince Asians that the U.S. is capable and willing
to deal by means short of major war, with Communist military aggression
(Tab 3b).
(Tab 3(0).
Prevent a Communist take?over in Southern Vietnam
e. It order to convert a major free world problem into
an asset., launch a positive U.
Formosa (Tab 3(b)).
. political and economic program for
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EST LTE OF THE SITUATION
111
Panel
614AROV-Wit of
o
The following estimate is consistent with and supports
the general strategy set forth in the basic paper.
I. AMERICAN OBJECTIVES AND SECURITY PROBLEMS.
The forthcoming period of several months, during which several
East-West conferences will occur, must be viewed in relation to longer-
run American objectives, to the general character of the security problems
we confront, and to the specific conditions now prevailing.
1. It is the object of U.S. foreign policy to protect American
society, not merely by protecting American territory but also by denying
to any hostile power superiority of military and ideological power in
Eurasia (and ultimately, perhaps, Africa and Latin America.) The USSR
and Communist China actively seek, as a continuing goal, to gain that
superiority by reducing or eliminating US influence and power in both
European and Asian fringes of the Eurasian land-mass.
2, The whole of our effort to meet this challenge proceeds in the
context of the arms race, spearheaded by the development and large-scale
production of weapons of mass destruction and by the development of ever
greater capabilities both for delivery and defense. This arms race is
now at a particularly acute stage, and will remain so for many years.*
It is probable that for the present and for a relatively brief future
period we hold important advantages. Our adversary's atonic stockpile
and delivery system are tomporari1y limited, and therefore he is extremely
anxious to avoid a major war because we might win it if it broke outs
*See Tab 2 - The Re uirements. for US-NATO to Win in the Arms
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eVen though at the risk of grave damage to us and certainly at the cost
of extremely serious damage to our allies? Because of the technological
acceleration of the arms race and the nature of our adversary, we run
the risk that he may, at Some stage, achieve a technological break-
through, and that at that time he would be prepared to exploit his
advantage by initiating an attack on the United States. Or he might
use his superiority for large-scale atomic blackmail, against the
United States or other powers,, Even without a technological break-
through, our opponent could gain such superiority if he maintains his
effort and we relax ours.
The United States will not exploit its current advantage by initiating
general war. If with great energy and imagination we maintain our
superiority in the arms race, we may be able to neutralize the enemyts
developing striking power and to best his defenses by further advances
of our striking power, thereby continuing to make major war unattractive
to him. This is a minimum condition for assuring our security, not a
policy for winning the cold warO
3, In its effort to win the cold war, United States foreign policy
faces four major tasks%
(a) To continue to ho-2,1 the military balance of power in our
favor which requiroe not onIe that we neutralize our adversaries' striking
power in weapons of mass destruction and the many implementing weapons
systems, including air defense and electronic warfare, but also that We
continue to develop flexible capabilities to undertake military action
short of to:-,e1,14f.r and maintain the will to do so,,
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(b) To increase the military, ebonomic and political strength
and unity of the Free World and thus be prepared to forestall, check
or defeat communist efforts at erosion conducted by limited military
means, and through propaganda, subversion and diplomacy.
(c) To determine and execute our policies in such a way as to
maximize the possibility of changes within the Soviet bloc favorable
to the U.S. interest, by effectively denying to Moscow the possibilities
of consolidation and expansion, and by steadily holding out peaceful
alternatives not incompatible with the Russian national security
interest, and at the same time encouraging the Soviet satellites and
Communist China to support their own national interests wherever the
latter comes into conflict with Soviet demands on them.
(11) To bring about, and systematically work toward, a roll-back
of Soviet power in Eastern and Central Europe, and in Asia.
II. PROBABLE SOVIET MOTIVES
The converging factors which have probably led Moscow to undertake
the current diplomatic offensive are the following:
1. Present Soviet inferiority in strategic air power in conjunc-
tion with their realization that for a limited period of time US
air power is able to win a major war and to destroy Communism in Russia
by surprise attack.
2. Conflicting economic demands and strains within the Soviet
satellite economies and societies.
3. The possibility of an effective WEU, including Western Germany.
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4. Conceivably, the unsettled state of the top leadership position
in Russia*
5. Soviet desire to stabilize the situation in Europe in antici-
pation of a crisis in the Far East.
The purposes of this offensive appear to be these: to weaken
the American military and political position in Europe and Asia by
inducing further U.S. troop withdrawals or depriving us of the use of
our present air bases; to weaken or destroy NATO; to induce a cut in
military outlays of the U.S. and its allies; to separate us from our
allies by widening the area of "neutrality"; and to maximize the gap
between the American power positions in Europe and in Asia,
For the present phase it seems likely that Moscow judges the
possibilities of expansion of Communist power to be more favorable
in Asia and in other underdeveloped parts of the world than in Europe.
A softening of Soviet-engendered tensions in Europe may be the prelude
to more vigorous Communist Chinese expansion efforts in Asia, where
Moscow and Peiping may judge Free World capabilities and cohesion to be
inadequate. By lowering the temperature in Europe in advance of a new
crisis in Asia, the Soviet leadership may hope to strain the free world
alliance system, possibly to the breaking point; perhaps to isolate the
U.S or2 in the case of armed conflict between Communist China and the
U.S., to make sure that the Soviet Union will not be militarily involved.
In any case, the current phase of Soviet policy seems designed to
buy time to build up a future position of greater strength based on
atomic parity with, or superiority over the U. S., from which a more
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effective political offensive might be launched.
III, POSSIBLE SOVIET MOTIVES
1. The possibility that the present Soviet diplomatic offensive
is a cover for an early surprise military attack on the U.S. is relatively
less likely than any of the foregoing, but it can not be ruled out.
2. It is even less likely that Moscow now seriously intends to
seek security by collective means and to devote resources so released
to long-term strengthening of the Soviet systems and the Soviet bloc.
Within the Soviet Union there may be some leaders who would prefer to
devote marginal disposable resources to strengthening the Soviet Bloc
within its present territories, and therefore to restrain the rising
tempo of the arms race by limiting immediate Soviet ambitions and risks.
While these leaders may have some influence, there is no valid evidence
that their tactics will be followed. It is judged to be one major
American purpose at the forthcoming conferences to explore the existence
of such motives or elements in the Soviet camp and to take actions,
compatible with the U.S. interest, to encourage the ascendancy of those
devoted to collective security.
IV. FREE WORLD VULNERABILITY TO PROBABLE SOVIET STRATEGY
1. The sense of vulnerability to atomic attack; the fear of the
U.S. initiating or stumbling into atomic war particularly in view of the
fact that its weapons superiority may be short-lived; the susceptibility
to "atomic blackmail"; and dependence on allies for the use of U.S. air
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bases and atomic weapons in case of war.
2. The sense that the United States is caught up in a position
where it must respond to Communist aggression either by total war or
by inaction.
3. Seeming Soviet posture of initiative in easing tensions.
4. The attraction to the opposition in the Federal Republic of a
Soviet proposal that Germany be reunified on the basis of truly free
elections but that foreign troops be withdrawn.
5. Disagreements in the Free World over East-West trade.
6. Lack of an agreed position on steps that must be taken regarding
the Far East.
7. The uncertainty of the Japanese economic situation.
8. Disparity in strategic and tactical thinking between the U.S.
and its allies due to security restrictions on weapons data required for
responsible thinking.
9. Lack of confidence among many Free World elements in the U.S.
policies and plans due to the appearance of purely empirical improvisa-
tion on our side: lacking in any general or logical purpose except to
oppose our adversary.
V. FREE WORLD STRENGTHS
1. Our present superiority in the arms race$ which may be transitory
unless the U.S. takes correotive measures.
2. Increasing strength of*NATO and satisfaction in Western Europe
with the present NATO-WUstructure.
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3. Free World desire that U.S. not withdraw forces from Germany
and Western Europe.
4. Relatively greater progress in Western than in Eastern
Europe.
5. Our "open" society--we can accept many kinds of relaxation and
normalization they can not accept.
6. Consolidation of internal security in the Philippines, Malaya,
and Burma) leaving only the Associated States currently vulnerable in
Southeast Asia.
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Report of Quantico
- Vulnerabilities Panel
Proposals to Test Soviet Willingness
To Make Concessions And to Improve the U. S. Position
The following proposals are consistent with the general policy
advocated in the basi,: report. They are premised on the belief that
both the United States and the Soviet Union have a mutual interest in
avoiding an all-out nuclear conflict. Justification for the possible
use of these proposals at the forthcoming conference is set forth in
Section III.
I. The Proposals
The long-run objective of both East and West is a system of
arms control and collective security on which we can all rely and in
which we can all have confidence. It will take time to devise and con-
struct such a system. At its core must lie a free exchange of informa-
tion on armaments and a comprehensive system of inspection tested by
tritil and error.
The following specific proposals are suggested:
1. An agreement for mutual inspection of military installations,
weapons, and armaments. Until experience has been developed on the
feasibility of such inspection, this agreement would make no provision
for arms limitation. Its purpose would be to provide knowledge and
evidence on the basis of which a control plan could be devised.
2. A convention insuring the right of aircraft of any nationality
to fly freely over the territory of any country for peaceful purposes.
The possibility of abuse of this right could be prevented by the estab-
lishment of safely located control points for the international inspection
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and registration of aircraft for flights across international boundaries.*
The convention would be so drawn as not to interfere in any way with
any nation's right to control for economic reasons commercial activities
of foreign ak.craft?
3. An agreement for the expansion of East-West trade. We are eager
to explore proposals for an expansion of economic relations between
nations in the Soviet orbit and those in the rest of the world. We
take it as agreed that there should be some control over international
traffic in strictly military items, but we are prepared to re-examine
existing policies with respect to other items in an attempt to normalize
international economic relations, The welfare of the Soviet peoples
could be materially advanced if the Soviet Union and the nations of
Eastern Europe took more advantage of opportunities to secure food,
consumers goods, and the like through trade with the res.t, of the world.
L. An agreement for greatly increasing the freedom of persons to
travel anywhere in the world for peaceful purposes. We are ready to
affirm our willingness freely to grant visas to Soviet citizens and in
other ways to encourage those private exchanges of views and experiences
on which international understanding rests if the Soviet Union is pre-
pared to consider similar measures,
5. A convention providing for free and unhampered international
communication for the exchange of information and ideas. We will give
up all restrictions now in effect in the West on the import of printed
.???????.....??????????????????.???????=1
* While it is assumed that all suggestions will be carefully staffed it
is recommended that this particular proposal be examined thoroughly by
the Department of Defense.
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materials and other communications if you will enter into an anti-
jamming agreement,
In addition we would like to press forward with other proposals
already made including:
6. The plan for pooling information and facilities for the explora-
tion of peaceful uses of atomic energy,
7. A worldwide plan for a fund for economic development of under-
developed areas in which both we and the Soviets would participate.
The idea here would be to render this kind of aid cooperative rather
than competitive between East and West as it now threatens to become.
(Reference should be made to the Presidents speech of April 19, 1953).
II, Comment
1, Our problem at the forthcoming conference is to achieve for
the United States a posture of pushing aggressively and realistically
for the reduction of international conflict without abandoning any
positions of strength irportant to our security,
2. It is virtually certain that we would have to reject as unsafe
any proposals for the limitation of atomic armaments made by the Russians
at the conference since such proposals could -,./) acceptable
to us only if a complex inspection scheme were fully worked out and
tested in advance,
30 A key political problem of the conference is thus to find a
posture which wil1 convince our allies and the neutral nations that we have
a positive program for promoting real steps toward the reduction of con-
flict in general and some progress toward disarmament in particular.
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It is submitted that these proposals could have this effect.
The stage should be set for them by an opening statement explaining
.1,;?0;?.1,: ?
persuasively why, after a period of mutual distrust such as we have been
through, a prerequisite to the consideration of areal as against a paper
security system for Europe is the development of normalized relations be-
tween the East and West in a number of matters not directly affecting
security. We must each develop confidence that we know and understand the
position and purposes of the other. A helpful factor in achieving this would
be a much more extensive interchange of persons, goods, and ideas than has
been possible in the face of the restrictions on such interchange both of us
have set up since the war.
The tone of the opening statement should be cool and serious, avoiding
ail propaganda flavor. It should try to evoke sympathetic responses in some
Soviet minds by suggesting that we can understand that they have some of
the same doubts and worries about the arms race that we have. It should
make clear that initially we are making these suggestions bilaterally with-
out fanfare, and with the intent of securing serious consideration of them
by the Soviets, not of putting propaganda pressure on them.
The proposals should be put forward not as a package, but as a
collection of ideas any or all of which we would be glad to talk about. *
The Soviets should be put in a position of either rejecting
them"; tone
by one, or agreeing to talk about one or more of them. Every one of them
involves concessions the Soviets will, for a variety of reasons,
find it difficult to make. All of them involve concessions on our part
* FOOTNOTE: No agreement was reached on the point that the proposals
should be put forward "as a collection of ideas any or all of which we would
be glad to talk about." Some members felt that the trade proposal will be
a basis to obtain concessions on the other proposals, and that a soluti..
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SECRET APPENDIX B
but in in no case do these concessions threaten our security. Each will
be regarded by large and important segments of world public opinion as
reasonable and their rejection by the Soviets as evidence that they
are not really ready to work toward international agreements favoring
p ea.c8,
These proposals are set forth here without reference to the
difficulties that might arise in trying to make them acceptable to the
American public. Although there may serious difficulties in this
respect, it is believed that if the President supports the proposals
vigorously and makes plain that what we get for these concessions is
major concessions in returns he should be able to carry the country with
him.
The proposals are designed to accomplish the following effects:
1. They should help to reverse in many quarters in Western Europe
and in Asia the unfavorable image of the U.S. as a trigger-happy mili-
taristic power, uninterested in resolving the cold war and abandoning
its liberal tradition of dedication to an open society. Whereas our
actual policies have not been as restrictive as many persons in Europe
and Asia believe, the impression is widespread that we are hysterically
restricting reasonable travel to the U.S, that it was interfering with
freedom of communication by the seizure of what we designate as subversive
material, that our policies are a major obstacle to the substantial expan-
sion of East-West trade which would occur in the absence of this barrier,
etc.
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.
If the Soviets reject all of these proposals, it will be possible
for us to thake abundantly clear where the responsibility for restrictions
on free movement of peoples ideas, and goods really lies. If they ac-
cept any of these proposals, we will be credited with important steps
forward in lifting the Iron Curtain, With specific reference to the
East-West trade issue, it is our conviction that if the Soviets agree
to discuss expanded cast-West trade, it will rapidly become apparent
that there is very much less in this for our allies than some of than
may have thought,
2. At some point, not during the conference, perhaps, but after
its we should make every effort to spread the knowledge of these pro-
posals through the USSR and especially the Satellites, The things we
are proposing are in part actually and in part in a symbolical sense
some of the things that the peoples of the Iron Curtain area most desire.
3. If these proposals are put forward in a serious vein and so
designed as to have the maximum possible chance of acceptance, their
presentation may have great intelligence value in revealing to us just
how far the Soviet regime is prepared to go to establish its willingness
to make concessions in each of a number of directions. These proposals
lie along a continuum of acceptability, It is almost certain that the
Soviets would have to respond favorably to a proposal for expanded trade.
It is entirely possible that they would consider some form of agreement
for increased freedom of movement of persons. It is not at all incon-
ceivable that they would accept some form of inspection system, although
we would probably have to insist on a system unacceptable to them. It
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is almost certain that they will reject the free overflight proposal.
Nor are they likely to abandon their jamming program. By testing them
all along this line we can get some impressions as to how far they are
prepared to go. In addition, we may be able to observe in the details
of the Soviet reaction some differences of view among various elements
of the Soviet leadership which would be most useful to us in appraising
to what extent there are policy disagreements in the upper levels.
4. Finally, these proposals, if made with this end in view, might
have some effect in widening the actual perception of possible alternative
courses of action amongst the Soviet bureaucracy itself. Even if the
very top leadership is completely unified in its conception of the proper
strategy, these proposals are bound to come to the attention of persons
further down in the hierarchy who may, at some later date achieve
positions of great responsibility in the USSR. If any such persons
entertain in the backs of their minds conceptions of how the Soviet
Union might conduct itself which are more liberal and 'e as restrictive
than those characterizing currEnt policy, it is to our advantage to take
every opportunity-to bring such speculation into the forefront of their
attention. We cannot, of course, be sure that proposals of this kind
would have any such effect but it is at least a possibility which we
should exploit if it exists.
(Note - As stated in the main report at p. 11, there was not complete
agreement among the panel on all issues, and the lack of unanimity
applies to some parts of this Appendix.)
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Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel
The German_alestion
This appendix consists of four companion papers relating to
various aspects of the German unification issue. These are:
Preliminary Diplomatic Action in Preparation for
the Summit Conference.
U. S. Guidelines for a German Settlement.
Ill. German Elections.
;VI Possible Proposals. for German Unity.
These proposals are consistent with the general strategy ad-
vocated in the basic paper.
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SECRET APPENDIX C
I. A ,PRELIPJINARY,DIPIOMATIC ACTION IN PREPARATION FOR
THE SUEMIT CONFERENCE
Very frequently in preparation for a strong position at inter-
national conferences, the Soviet Union has made systematic displays of
strength, and it is doing the same at the present time. These demon-
strations of strength have included fly-bys in Moscow, and particularaY,
the imposition of a camouflaged blockade on the free sectors of Berlin.
These actions are designed to put the U.S. on the defensive and to wear
out American negotiators even beforehand. A secondary consideration in
imposing the blockade was to force bilateral conversations between Bonn
and Pankow.
Tt is, therefore, necessary even before the commencement of the
conference, for the U.S. to make it clear that it will not assume a defensive
posture; but that, on the contrary, it will put the Soviets into a defensive
frame of mind. Since Germany may be a central topic at the conference, it
is indispensable that the U.S. demonstrate from the very beginning that
it will not tolerate Soviet skullduggery. Without such an American
demonstration of strength, public opinion support in Germany may not be
entirely secure.
It is suggested that without delay a secret, preferably three-power,
note be dispatched to 'Moscow demanding that the various blockade measures
inhibiting the Berlin traffic be lifted forthwith and that any payments
made in eomplianee with those restrictions be reimbursed. (It may be
possible to ask that such a reimbursement take the form of financial
support to East German refugees in Western Germany.) The note should state
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APPENDIX C
that the fate of the conference will depend upon Soviet compliance and
it should intimate that if no such compliance were forthcoming, the U,S.
may not attend the conference. Concurrently with the secret note, we
might state Lalka that the U.S. is willing to use its engineer forces
to rehabilitate the road into Berlin, the alleged poor condition of which
furnished the justification for the toll.
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SECRET APPENDIX C
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II. u.s. GUIDELLIES FOR A GLRMAN SETTLIIENT
There are a number of basic issues affecting unification of Germany.
The combinations of solutions to each of these issues, including the
sequential order in which individual issues may be solved, are so numerous
that greatest care is required to prevent the Soviets from exploiting
the complexity of an opaque situation.
What are the Basic Issues?
1. Elections
This problem is discussed in detail in a companion paper.
Desirable - The elections are to be held after an initial democratiza-
tion of the East German Government, and after the means of pressure by the
Soviets and the East German Communists have been reduced or eliminated.
The electoral system which is in force in West Germany should be applied
throughout the entire country, and the East German electoral system should
be scrapped. International supervision is another indispensable condition.
The elections are to be held as a first step in the unification of Germany.
Acceptable - The initial democratization of the East German govern-
ment, including the reconstitution of parties, is an essential condition of
free elections, but does not require a reconstitution of the East German
Government. If the Western German electoral system is inaceeptable, an
entirely new election law should be negotiated.
Unacceptable - Any situation in which the full freedom of elections
is impaired. The principle of free elections cannot be bargained away
with the Soviets for any purpose.
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iin - During the negotiations for elections and during the
election period, the rearming of West Germany must be pursued actively
and American troops must not be withdrawn.
2. The Rearmin of West German and All German staTuy.
Desirable - West Germany must be rearmed as presently planned. It
is imperative that enabling legislation in the German Bundestag provide
for the implementation of the Paris Agreements to the full. If possible,
the time schedule for West German rearmament should be accelerated. More-
over, a strong NATO air defense system must be created with dispatch and
the German component of this system be recognized as erucial. Provision
shall be made upon unification to integrate individual members of the growing
East German forces into an all-German military establishment.
Acceptable - In general, even ninor reductions of the rearmament
program and minor stretch-outs should be resisted, not encouraged, although
their effect would not be disastrous. It is a matter of quantities.
Unacs.atable - A substantial stretch-out or the abandonment of the
present program for West German rearmament must be resisted strongly, as
this night eneourage Kremlin belief that Western German rearmament could be
blociced by repeated negotiations.
Timing - The fastest West German rearmament is the most desirable.
Any discussion of limiting or slowing down the West German rearmament effort
prior to, or as condition of, free elections is to be avoided. The rearma-
ment of West Germany should be completed in the period of clear-cut American
military-air superiority.
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APPENDIX C
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3. Status of Fore 4t; Forces in German
Desirable - Any change in deployment levels (except as outlined
in the accompanying proposal concerning the establishment of a free corridor
to Berlin) should be rejected. The Western allies must decide firmly that
during the transition period their forces will not be reduced, let alone
vithdrawn.
kag2Etal_21..e - Within each zone the foreign forces may be redeployed
to limited areas. All sides agree to a proportionate relation of total force
levels in both East and West Germany, based on the area and population of
each of the two zones. It would be less desirable but still acceptable,
if there were an eventuul agreement to reduce foreign forces to token
strengthpprovided that German rearmament proceeds at a rapid pace and that
this reduction in goreign forces be delayed until a large, German Force
has come into existence.
Unacceptable A reduction of foreign forces and involving the
de facto elimination of American and other Western armed strength from
the German rearmament, is totally unacceptable. (Due to geographical
conditions, a Western withdrawal from Germany cannot be paired with a
Russian withdrawal from Eastern Germany to Poland but must be paired with
a Russian withdrawal behind the Russian border.)
IlakE - Western deployment in Germany in whatever form decided
upon, must be mainQained until the formation of a unified government with
which a peace treaty can be signed.
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4. The National Structure of Germany
Desirable - Germany should be reconstituted as a free, sovereign,
democratic, self-reliant and fully unified nation'
4.99.2p.kup. - As a temporary measure, the existence of two Germanies
is acceptable, especially if it should be possible to hold democratic
elections in East Germany. The maintenance of the nresent status is
acceptable for a limited period, provided the United States gives con-
vincing evidence that it favors the early unification of Germany, and
will work actively for this objective.
.1114z2zable - Any direct or indirect encroachment by East Germany
or Soviet Russia on the West German Republic, including any attempts to
limit the West German Goverment's freedom of action and interfere with
the German participation in the NATO alliance, must be guarded against.
TiArja - The unification of the two German governments must follow
and should not precede all-German free elections. Bowever, it would be
desirable if the East German Government, prior to elections, would assume
gradually the character of a coalition government.
5. German Borders
- The U.S. does not recognize present East German boundaries
as fixed. The definitive daineation of German borders must take into
account both Polish and German national interests. The Saar also poses
a difficat question but no comments on this issue will be made in this
Paper.
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A22.9ztall - The present Eastern frontier is loft intact, provided
the unified German government consents to a provisional status quo. In
this case, a stipulation should be made that the frontier will be subject
to future negotiations within a specified time limit.
Unacceptable - Any permanent acceptance and legalization of Germany's
Eastern frontier.
Ti - The frontier question should be brought up only after Germany
has been unified and an all-German government is able to assume respon-
sibility for any settlement.
6. Limitations op Gorman Sovereignty
2211111212 - Ultimately, German sovereignty must be fully restored.
Limitations on this sovereignty, if any, should be highly temporary or be
identical with limitations placed upon the sovereignty of other nations by
mutual consent. No sovQreignty limitations should be placed on Germany with-
out the German Government concurring as a full and free partner.
Ac9.2LIalle - The Western powers, acting jointly with the West German
Government, might undertake to offer some security safeguards subject to
ratification by an all-German parliament. Such safeguards would be designed
to aDay Russian fears about the reconstitution of German offensive mili-
tary strength. However, it is important to protect the right of the all-
German government to participate in NATO. As a variant, if Germany were to
abstain from joining NATO, it must not be prevented from acquiring defense
forces deemed adequate by her to satisfy all German security needs. Faced
by this alternative, the Soviets might prefer a relatively weakly-armed
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Germany as a member of NATO, as against a very strongly armed but neutral
Germany.
Unacceptable - Any limitations imposed upon Germany unilaterally
precluding German rearmament or limiting her freedom of political choice
should be rejected flatly. Similarly, any temporary limitations on armaments
designed largely to allow the Soviets to gain or increase technological
time lead must be rejected.
mum - The question of armaments limitations of any form should not
be considered before the formation of an all.-GerLan govertment.
7. The Timin of the Peace Treaty
The peace treaty should be negotiated after the reconstitution of a
unified German government. Preferably, in order to avoid pressure, the
peace treaty should be negotiated after the levels of foreign troops
stationed in Germany have been balanced by prior agreement. (See above under
Status of Foreign Military Forces in Germany)
General Timing
The following sequence seems to lie in the Russian interest: abandon-
ment of West German rearmament plans -- the immediate end of occupation
-- elections without prior establishment of proper conditions -- the
unification of the two governments without prior elections -- the
establishment of a unified government with strong Communist participation
--the right to reoccupy Germany and the conclusion of a peace treaty
\w, predetermining and limiting the international status of Germany, and
imposing stringent armaments limitations.
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The following sequence seems to lie in the American interest: rapid
implementation of the Western German rearmament program (Paris agreement)
-- creation of proper conditions for free elections (including, perhaps,
the creation of a free zone around Berlin) -- free elections - the
unification of the government -- the conclusion of a peace treaty which does
not predetermine the international status of Germany -- the end of the
occupation at a time when Germany has reemerged as a strong military power
and has become an integral port of NATO.
The above U.S. conditions for 'settlement could possibly be abandoned
if the Soviet Union were willing to pay a heavy price for the prevention
of German rearmament. With the concurrence of West Germany, the United
States, Britain and France could agree to release Germany from it NATO
obligations and to consent to a strongly rearmed and neutral Germany,
apx2yided the Soviet Union evacuates the territory of the European satellites
and commits itself not to interfere in the political affairs of the re-
constituted satellite governments. Further, the Soviet Union must consent
to genuinely free elections throughout the satellite areas, leading to
the establishment of demncratic and sovereign governments (these elections
to be organized in a similar way as outlined in the paper on German Elections),
and it must give up all reoccupation rights.
It is doubtful whether the Soviets would agree to such a massive
reversal. It is more likely that they will try to achieve a Western with-
drawal from West Germany and merely agree to withdraw to the Polish border.
This "solution" would be contrary to American interests.
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III. GERNLN EJECTIONS
The more proclamation of free elections will not, by itself, insure
that elections will be held in such a way as to reflect the true opinions
of the voters. The East Germans at the present moment are unaccustomed
to vote. Despite the absence of Soviet pressure, if this could be
achieved, they may be psychologically handicapped and fearful of reprisals,
may vote the Soviet ticket, Furthermore, there are many technical diffi-
culties which must be faced explicitly in order to avoid Soviet traps.
In view of these difficulties it is considered inadvisable simply
to agree on free elections and to disregard the prior establishment of proper
conditions. It is believed that the elements outlined below may serve
in the development of a U.S. plan.
As a first step, the occupying powers should declare that they will
not interfere in the domestic affairs of Germany, either East or West,
and that during the pro-election month they will enforce very stringent
curfew regulations preventing free circuldtion of troops among the German
population?
Both German governments (which in practice means the East German
Government) should promulgate a bill of rights, including strong safeguards
against arbitrary police actions and unwarranted arrest.
Elections should be preceded by the establishment of a Four Power
Commission which shall have the right to review the cases of all imprisoned
persons under sentence or detained for investigation, and to order the
release of those imprisoned for political motives. Simultaneously, a
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general political amnesty and the dissolution of all detention camps will
be put into effect. Al]. subsequent political arrests and all complaints
of pressure and discrimin,tion will be reported and adjudicated by this
Four Fewer Commission voting by majority, and not unanimity.
Concurrent with the elaboration of such a protective system, political
parties should be reestablished in Eastern Germany, with the right to hold
meetings, publish and distribute political literature, use free radio
time,? etc. It would be necessary to allow those political pertics to become
going concerns before elections can be held in fact. Candidates and other
spokesmen certified by the Commission shall receive full freedom of move-
ment and be guaranteed immunity against unreasonable restrictions in all
parts of Germany.
It would be useful to grant immunity not only to those candidates who
are actually elected, but even to candidates so that they cannot be punished
for political acts perpetrated in the period of their candidacy, even if
they should fail to get elected:
As a most desirable variant, it may be suggested that the East German
Government should be enlarged to include members of other parties. In
particular, the ministries of justice and interior, and the police shall be
responsible to the government as a whole and be administered by impartial
civil servants appointed by the government as a whole.
It night be inadvisable to hold political elections without testing
first the safeguards of the new machinery, Hence, prior to all-Gorman
parliamentary elections, free elections for municipalities and Zander
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governments, etc., should be held.
All-German elections must not only be free but also secret. They
should be supervised by the occupying powers jointly, each supervisory
commission operating under the chairmanship of a neutral power who also
would be in charge of counting the ballots and certifying the results.
(Prior to election, those commissions should be in charge of drawing up
the lists of persons eligible to vote; this census will make it possible
to identify persona detained by the Soviets and, subsequently, to ask
for their release.)
Although the procedure, as outlined, scorns cumbersome, it ought to be
recognized that intermediary steps will have to be taken between the date
of the agreement on free elections and the elections themselves. According
to this procedure the negetiations for a basic agreement will be lengthy,
and this time should be utilized fully to speed the re-arming of Western
Germany. However, once the agreement on free elections has been reached,
it should be implemented as rapidly as possible, at the latest within six
months; provided that all the required preparatory steps be accomplished
before the elections, and according to a tight timetable.
As a further variant to be proposed only in the event that agreement
cannot be reached on the holding of all-German elections, consideration
should be given to the question of holding elections for two German parlia-
ments, under the same safeguards as outlined above. Once there are two
democratic Germn governments and leoi.slatures, the modality of the unifica-
tion of Germany could be left up to them for determination.
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113 to the electoral system, the United States should press for the
adoption of the electoral law valid in the Federal Republic. In case
of determined resistance, a different electoral system might be con-
sidered.
Tho Four Power Commission shall establish schools for the training
of German officials in the conduct of free elections.
It must be understood that the agreement on elections will be in-
validated by the Four Power Commission voting by majority if and when
the various steps stipulated are not being carried out.
The United States should leave no doubt that it will accept the
results of those elections only if they were genuinely free and not
vitiated by fraudulent practices.
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SLORET APPEN0IN C
POSSIBLE PROPOSALS FOR GERMAN UNITY'
1. The problem of German unification probably cannot be unravelled by
one spectacular diplomatic stroke. The problem is to bring about, by a
series of orderly steps, the establishment of a unified, free, sovereign
and self-reliant Germany without endangering the present security position
of the United States and the Western Allies in Europe. The United States
should propose a program containing the precise steps through which the
orderly and democratic unification of Germany can be accomplished.
On the assumption that a general solution for German unity will not
be reached, the United States might have available several fall-back
2,2pitions designed to demonstrate our intention to proceed with a realistic
program for German unification. Two such eroposels follow.
2. A Limited Aaroach to German Unification
Evacuation of Berlin
Berlin shall be evacuated by the military forces of the West
and the Soviet Union. Berlin is defined to mean the city within its
historical limits plus an area of 5 to 10 kilometers beyond the city limits.
A corridor, 50 km in width, shall be established between Western
Germany and Berlin, and all Soviet forces shall be withdrawn from this
corridor in which free circulation of Germans shall be alloped.
The corridor and the Berlin enclave shall be declared a free zone in
which neither the government of Western Germany nor that of Eastern Germany,
nor any occupying power, shall have any jurisdiction. (While there is
agreement that it would be in the U.S. and German interests if
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the Russians permitted the establishment of a free corridor to Berlin,
no agreement was reached on the evacuation of military forces from Berlin.
Some hold that the withdrawal of Western forces from Berlin would under-
mine German confidence in U.S. intentions to stay in Germany. Some hold
that the establishment of a free Berlin would be hailed as a symbol and
token of the future reunification of Germany.)
Establishment of an All-German Commerce and Postal AuEaL
j___Wirtaitskainch shall have iu.r....A.RsLiction,ovey domestic trade,
transportation apda_lsoartraunication.
Membership in the Assembly should be determined by universal,
nationwide suffrage and secret ballot. (See separate propos,ls on
elections.)
The All-German Commerce and Postal Assembly should not possess
jurisdiction over any matter except domestic trade, transportation, com-
munications and similar purely practical fields, and must not interfere
with the prerogatives in all other, and particularly political matters
of the governments of Western Germany and Eastern Germany.
Administration of the Berlin Free Zone
The All-German Commerce and Postal Assembly shall have the
responsibility of organizing the administration of the Berlin free zone
and supervising the administration of the municipalities located therein,
with due regard for the traditional autonomous rights of those municipali-
ties.
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The relations between the free zone and the governments of
Western Germany and Eastern Germany, respectively) shall be conducted
through non-political organs established by the All-German Commerce and
Postal Assembly,
Levels of the combined Western-West German and
East German hilitar Forces in Germa/z.
Combined
Russian-
The combined Western-West German and Russian-East German
military forces in Germany shall be brought into an equilibrium designed
to stabilize the respective forces on a numerical basis proportionate to
the population and area of each of the two parts of Germany. If, as a
result of these negotiations, force quotas are established, they will give
Western Germany considerable leeway to build up its military forces in
fulfillment with the Paris Agreements.
After tho. combined forces have been brought into a proportionate
equilibrium, the agreed-upon fixed quotas shall not curtail the freedom
of each party to increase the proportion of the German component within
the force levels authorized; for example, for an American division or
aerial unit withdrawn, a German division or aerial unit may be substituted;
a Soviet division or aerial unit may be replaced by an East German division
or aerial unit.
3: The Two-GovelBEDILALIpspach
A second compromise solution could be as follows; A minor slew
down in West German rearmament -- the possible establishment of a free zone
of Berlin -- free elections for a German Economic and Postal Assembly --
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after a lapse of time, all-German free elections -- the establishment of
two democratic rather than one unified democratic German government, with
the proviso that unification _m_az be accomplished through negotiations
between these two governments -- after such hypothetical unification,
conclusion of a peaco treaty and predetermination of the German international
status in the form of strongly armed neutrality
.1?1?10
end of the occupation.
Whatever compromise solutions the U.S. suggests, it should be made
clear that these solutions are provisional. The United States must
continue to press for German unification and the reconstitution of German
sovereignty, and must do so in such a manner that the U.S. policy would
be recognized clearly by the population of both Germaniess
sEpa
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APPENDIX DQ
REPORT OF QUANTIGO
LLTML3QSILIES PANEL
A PROPOSAL FOR GRADUATED DISARMAMENT
THE PROBLEM
The objective of this proposed disarmament system is to develop by a
series of agreements the long-range basis through which a system of limited
national military forces can be established gradually at a level low enough
so that the feasibility of a surprise conquest of one principal power by
another is drastically reduced without eliminating capabilities for strategic
defense, defense against minor aggression, and domestic control.
ASSUMPTIONS
1. That the objective of the Soviet Union is to convert or conquer
the world;
2. That the USSR is now extremely hostile to the United States, and
at best, this hostility can be expected to decrease only slowly.
3. That the United States cannot trust the Soviet Union $o long as
she has military superiority, equality, or even inferiority unless this is
below a certain minimum level.
4. That the Soviet Union equally distrusts the United States and
suspects us of equally evil aggressive intentions.
5. That the United States will not initiate a preventive war.
6. That the Soviet Union, if convinced that it possessed decisive
military superiority, would either launch a war without warning, or resort
to large-scale blackmail.
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APPENDIX D
7. That the U. S. can win an ideological-political-economic cold
war if the Soviet Union cannot support subversion with military force.
FACTS
1. U. S. atomic stockpile and delivery systems are sufficient now to
destroy iie Soviet Union and are likely to remain so for about three years.
2. The Soviet atomic stockpile and delivery system are marginal now;
unless opposed by a very effective air defense system better than is now
planned, it will be sufficient to destroy for all intents and purposes the
U. S. in the period from 1958-1960.
3. The race for atomic stockpile and delivery means is nearly over,
i.e., both sides will have adequate capability by 1960 although intensive
research and development for superiority should continue on U. S. side.
A desperate race for air defense is just beginning. A good air defense
is difficult and unpredictable but not impossible because of advances in
electronic warfare and new hard-to-counter long-range missiles.
4. A U. S. air defense system capable of keeping the damage to
the U. S. below 5% of total destruction is possible by 1958-60 at a cost
of $7 billion each fiscal year provided FY-56 funds of 2 billion are
committed for a Nike local missile defense by July 1955. Delay after that
will retard initiation of the proposed system by a time equal to the delay.
There is a 50% chance that the system will fail because of advances in
Soviet electronic counter-measures. This fault can be corrected by
intensive research and development effort. This air defense can probably
be maintained indefinitely, if continuously rejuvenated save for rare
intervals when it may be ineffective for limited periods due to superior
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Soviet technology. It will, therefore, be a defense in which "now you have
it" and "now you don't", depends on the interplay and quality of U.S. and
Soviet technology.
5. The Soviets probably have an equal air defense capability, with
about the same timing.
There is aj_esser chance that we can currently jam
their system due to recent U.S. comparative neglect of electronic warfare
and counter-measures. This can be corrected.
6% An air defense of NATO can be provided by 1958-60 at a cost of a
minimum of $4 billion per year. It is not likely to be effective against
surface-to-surface missiles until about 1963-65.
7. An effective air defense of Japan would cost about W. billion
a year.
8. The Soviet Union now has a superiority of about 2.5 to 1 over NATO
in ground force equipment and 16 to 1 in tactical air support aircraft.
9. The Soviet Union has the potential geographical advantage of interior
surface lines of communications and therefore of potential superior flexibility
in use of these forces against territories adjacent to her perimeter. At
low levels of world-wide armaments, it may require an appreciable numerical
superiority of US-NATO-SEATO forces to match Soviet ground forces. The
United States is handicapped by exterior lines of communications which include
easily interdicted sea lines, and inflexibility of most national forces. For
example, South Korean and Nationalist China divisions are an asset and usable
only in the Far East.
10. The present estimate is that U.S. overseas lines of communications
will be eble to transport only a fraction of army, air force, and NATO
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APPENDIX D
requirements during the first year of a general war. Overseas stockpiles
and indigenous manufacture are needed to solve the problem, but inflexibility
limits transfer between theaters, until a genuine strategic air lift
capability comes into existence.
11. The Soviet Union was three yors behind the United_211.121...millIaa
technology in 1946, il_Iangina_k_1222m2_0.01_in_allgliz_ip_the United
States in 1222.
The quality and quantity of Soviet technical graduates is superior to that
of the United States in 1955. This will continue if the U.S. does not take
drastic action to remedy our technical education system in the primary and
secondary schools and in the colleges. After 1960, the Soviet Union will
have more living trained engineers than the United States, with present
trends. As a result, the Soviet Union is expected to surpass the United
States in military technology from now on and should have a two year lead
or more by 1965, unless drastic U.S. action is taken.
12. Western Europe is the world's single greatest resource in technical
invention, and is now only meagerly mobilized on behalf of NATO. Fully
mobilized in aid of NATO, the combined US-NATO technology should surpass
that of the Soviet Union.
aggIMI2H
One course of action in the struggle for U.S. survival is an arms race
with the USSR. The technical-military solutions will be unstable since they
are influenced by unpredictable technical breakthroughs as 'tell as by
national military choices. This means that from now on it will not be
possible to predict reliably whether the U.S. or the USSR will have the
4
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APPENDIX D
advantage during any particular year. Furthermore, equipment, tactics, and
strategy will become obsolete at a very rapid rate. Replacement and
obsolescence costs will be very high and will require increasingly high
military budgets in every category. The military budget to provide reasonable
security is estimated at 50 billion dollars a year.
Under the above circumstances, and provided that the United States is
never willing to initiate an aggressive war in surprise, at some unknown
time in the future the military technical dynamics will favor the Soviet
Union enough so that she can destroy us with relative impunity. Whether
the Soviet Union will be able to take advantage of her technical breakthrough
will depend on the quality of her intelligence, and the corresponding accuracy
in evaluation of the US-NATO military weapons systems. This evaluation
must be good enough to establish the fact that there is the required necessary
over-all superiority which in turn must be adequate to ensure success
despite partial failure of the surprise attack on the part of the Soviet
aggressor. Thus, an arms lace does not provide a dependable or stable
solution for the United States if she remains unwilling to initiate a prevent-
ive war, but may favor in the long run the Soviet Union who would be willing
to initiate a war by surprise on through blackmail.
Alternatively, disarmament cannot be considered a dependable or stable
solution by either side unless the chance of success of one principal power
of detecting and preventing ..aggression by another principal power under
disarmament is better than under the arms race. Partial disarmament might
be possible, but would be desirable for the United States only if the Soviet
bloc were willing to yield substantial numerical superiority to US-NATO-SEATO,
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this superiority being, of course, in purely defensive forces. It appears
highly improbable that the Soviet Union would agree to this. At some very
low level, however, the respective forces would become so small that major
campaigns could not be immediately conducted, and no campaign could long
endure without further detectable large-scale production, yet small scale
aggression could still be countered. Major or long campaigns would require
detectable and large scale logistic preparation including manufacture.
If disarmament to a low level in surface forces was accompanied by
elimination of purely aggressive atomic forces, establishment by US-NATO-SEATO
of strong air defense systems, and by agreed on specified limited military
national equipment reserves controlled by UN and mutual inspection, then
there would be assured domestic internal control, ability to withstand limited
aggression, ability of each country to expand military production if the
covenants were broken, and heavy defense against sneak air attacks carried
by commercial aircraft, and employing thermonuclear bombs or other mass
destruction weapons acquired surreptitiously.
A disarmament plan would need to be put into effect gradually.
Accordingly, a relatively safe disarmament plan could be based on the
following guiding ideas:
1. A permanent disarmament commission would be established to
survey continuously new requirements rising from changing military technology.
The basic armament convention will be revised annually so that it will be
continuously up to date.
2. An inspection system is instituted on an experimental basis
to determine methods and requirements of, and to train personnel for a
dependable inspection system including aerial supervision.
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APPENDIX D
3. Concurrent with the installation of an improved inspection
system the powers agree to limit the size of their land forces and to
eliminate certain armaments from their arsenals as follows:
Land Forces
U.S.
USSR
NATO
CHINA
JAPAN
Sufficient for 5 divisions
tt
It
No ground-to-ground missiles, atomic weapons, or fighter aircraft permitted
to ground forces.
4. It also will be provided that all presently known strategic
weapons systems including bombers, fighters, missiles, submarines, missile
ships, surface naval vessels over 10,000 tons, and their atomic explosives
will be prohibited. However, since no assurance can be obtained against
technical discoveries, surreptitions production and adaptation of civilian
equipment each country will be permitted to:
a. Maintain a stockpile of immediately usable nuclear
weapons. Special provision for the inspection and defense of the
stockpiles should be made.
b. Maintain a full fledged air defense system using
ground to air systems with associated ground control and warning nets.
Atomic warheads are permitted provided the range of the missiles is
controlled.
c. Maintain naval forces to defend against submarines and
mines.
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APPENDIX D
5. It Lust be recognized explicitly that a disarmament scheme
of the above type does not necessarily provide safety against subversive
military operations, guerrilla attack, biological warfare, etc. Most of
these forms of war are, at present, marginal but may become important in
a state of general disarmament. Hence, so long as effective safeguards against
these forms of war cannot be devised, military precautions must be allowed
in these fields. Should safeguards become practical, additional disarmament
agreements can be negotiated.
6. Disarmament agreements should not prohibit the production and
use of nuclear materials, aircraft, etc., for civilian and peaceful uses.
In particular, nuclear production shobld be continued and the development of
a nuclear industrial technology encouraged. Agreements must be concluded
concerning the types of nuclear materials which may be used by the civilian
economy. Likewise, civilian aircraft may have to conform to performance
limiting specifications.
7. There should be no limitation on military research and develop-
ment; R&D prototypes should be included in scheduled levels of equipment;
U.S. industry should be constantly tooled up and be ready for conv6rsion
to war production; nuclear materials should be in a shape that permits easy
refabrication; finally, U.S. weapons systems should be kept up to date.
CONCLUSIONS:
1. A prolonged arms race will be unsafe, unstable, and costly to the
United States.
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APPENDIX D
2. A graduated disarmament will still be costly but it may reduce
the areas of risk and instability.
3. Specifically, if the Soviet Union were deprived by disarmament of
the ability to destroy the United States and to invade free nations in
Eurasia, their strategy would have to be based solely on their psychological,
political, and subversive strength which the United States should be able
to match.
RECOMMENDATION
1. That U.S. propc,se this disarmament plan to USSR.
2. That upon rejection of this plan, the U.S. make every effort to
win the technological armaments race as the safest way of forcing the
Soviet Union to ultimately accept satisfactory arms convention.
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SUNMARY OF INDIVIDUAL PAPERS
SUPPORTING.CTANTICO VULNERABILITIES PANEL REPORT
(As indicated in the Chairman's letter of transmittal, several
individual participants each undertook to write a paper on those forth-
coming problems which were within his particular areas of concern. Drafts
of each paper benefitted in varying degrees by comments of the author's
colleagues and in many cases recommendations from these papers were accepted
in the agreed report; but unlike the report proper these papers represent
the views of the participant indicated since there was no time for
detailed joint examination. A substantive index follows.)
TAB 1: "Soviet Estimate of the Situation -- The Development of the
World Political and Military Situation and the Tasks of
the People's Democracies" - Dr. George Pettee
An appreciation of the position of the Communist
orbit vis-a-vis the Free World, in the form of an address
by a high Soviet official to his civil and military
colleagues.
TAB 2: "The Requirements for U.S.-NATO to Win in the Arms Race with
the USSR" with two Annexes: "The Comparative Military
Technology of the U.S. and USSR" and "Scientific and
Technical Personnel" - Dr. Ellis A. Johnson
The relative status and trends of the U.S. vs. USSR
military technology indicate present equality and a Soviet
3-5 year lead by 1965, unless U.S. and NATO undertake
maximum efforts.
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TAB 3: "Alliance and Coalition Problems" -Dr, Frederick S. Dunn
The advantages and costs to the U.S. of the Free gorld
system of alliances and coalitions; some ways in which the
Soviets have tried to break down this system, and how
these might be countered.
(a) "Does NATO Have A Position of Strength?" -
Dr. George Pettee
NATO forces constitute a present position of
strength but have four latent weaknesses which
can be corrected by timely action. '
"Asia Policy" - Dr. W. W. Rostow
Relations between the European and Asian
situations are outlined and U.S. courses of
action suggested to maximize free world strength
in Asia and to put effective pressure on
Communist China conducive to changes in the
U.S. interest.
"Japan" - Dr. Paul Linebarger
The restoration of Japan as a great power,
best developed through bilateral Washington-
Tokyo arrangements, must be founded on national
honor and real power for Japan. Once effective,
Japanese power will exercise a significant
restraint on Communist power in the Western
Pacific.
(b)
(e)
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(d) "Measures to Cope with Free-World Fears of the Bomb" -
Dr. Stefan Possony
Seven specific proposals to effect calmer
attitudes and allay irrational apprehensions in NATO
nations, concerning atomic warfare.
(e) "Air Defense of the United States and Western Europe" -
Dr. Ellis A. Johnson
A tight air defense is essential to maintain
motivations and reduce resentment toward the U.S.,
and such defense is practical.
(f) "Factors Influencing the Morale of Allies" - Dr, George
Pettee
There are many obvious questions which an ally
can ask, all concerned with the basic question:
"Why be an ally instead of a neutral?"
TAB 4: "Straining the Sine-Soviet Alliance" with Annex: "Chinese
Political Behavior" - Dr. Paul Linebarger
The Sino-Sovietalliance may be subjected to strain
by American psychological strategy threatening Peiping with
a Moscow-Washington arrangement at Peiping's expense. Red
China's strategy seeks the immediate humiliation of the U.S.
before Asia; this the U.S0 must avoid.
TAB 5: "An Institute for the Study of Peace" - Dr. George Pettee
Proposes as an aid to unwinding the cold war, to establish
a "Peace College" to organize knowledge and train experts
comparable to like institutions applied to techniques of war.
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Dr. George Pettee QUAMICO VULik,LUIdTIES PANEL
Soviet Estimate of the Situation
(An appreciation of::he Position of the Communist Orbit Vis7a-Vis the
Free Werrld 1 in the form of an address by a high Sovietofficials to
his civil and military colleagues.)
THE DEVELOPENT OF THE WORLD POLITICAL AND lyiILITAICI SITUATION
AND THE TASKS OF THE PEOPuIS D}1OOIACJES
(Note: The following is a digest of the important address made by
Bozhemoiski at the Yaroslavl conference of leading personnel of the
CP-USSR with officials of the government and representatives of the staffs
of the Red Army, Red Navy and Red Air Force, 20 April 1955. It was im-
possible to obtain the entire text, and it is apparent that some subjects
of importance which must have been covered in this speech have been
omitted from the digest, and that the analysis of the present situation of
capitalism, and of internal conditions in the Soviet Union, were especially
emasculated, and the data on Soviet arms production was wholly omitted).
Comrades1 The development of the military, political and economic
situation in the world has brought us at this time to a very critical point.
Many developments which have been commenced and which have continued in
the period since the end of the war with Germany, or of the Japanese war,
have reached a stage of maturity. Some other developments necessary for
the security of the USSR and the other People's Democratic Governments will
re(iuire several years of further development. In order to furnish the most
favorable conditions for the further development of the strength of the
Communist nations, so that at a time not more than four years hence they
can face all issues with calmness and assurance of freedom of action, it
is necessary to adopt a very important line of policy which has certain
major differences from that of the previous eight years.
It is very important that the reasons for the new policy line should
be understood by the leading cadres of the Party, of the Government, and
of the Glorious Armed Services of the USSR. The objective bases for this
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policy, and the essential features of the line to be followed for the
next three to four years will also of course be communicated to the
earefully selected leading cadres of the parties, governments and armed
forces of the other peoplesi democratic states which are associated
with us.
In order to understand the present situation with clarity one must
examine the characteristics of the situation of the world, that is, of the
Communist and Capitalist countries, from the time of 1946. At that time
the German and Italian fascist powers had been crushed by the great coali-
tion of the capitalist democracies and of the Soviet Union, with the
Soviet Union and its Glorious Armed Forces playing the predominant part.
(Interrupted by Cheers)
In 1946 we can say that the leading capitalist power, the US, had
come out of the war with a greatly strengthened industry, although with
an economic system containing many weaknesses. The second cTitalist
country, England, had come out very much weakened. The rest of the capital-
ist countries, excluding the defeated former enemy countries, were
economically and politically weak, and the objective conditions existed,
so far as the purely internal conditions are concerned, for the rapid
and successful evolution of governments of peoples democratic form. This
was true in France in Belgium, in the Netherlands, in the Scandinavian
countries which had been in the war, and in the countries of Eastern Europe
in which such a development was actually successful. It was also true of
China and of other areas in the East.
The will to peace of the peoples of the world was extremely strong at
that time, and there was some appearance, although we did not at any time
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believe that this was an actual fact, that the government of the US would
heed the will of the peoples and would permit the development of people&
democracy to go forward in Europe and in Asia.
It was in the latter part of 1946 and the first part of 1947 that
the possibility of a direct and peaceful development of the world was
turned about into a renewed period of crises, of attempts to encircle and
strangle the socialist countries, and of preparation for war by the capital-
ist powers.
The important developments in this connection were the decision in
China for war against the Communists and the rejection of a coalition with
the Communists which had been the only possible course for peaceful develop-
ment. After the London Conference of October 1946 the series of moves by
which the capitalist world resumed its posture of enmity to Communism was
continuous.
There were, at this time, and during the years up to this year,
several systems of tactical measures, of economic, political or military
order, by which either side has been able to accomplish the capture of
positions which were in doubt, or the consolidation of positions in which
either side held already an advantage.
The first important measures of consolidation by the capitalist enemy
was the exclusion of Comunists 4mm the coalition governments of Italy and
France, in the months of May and June 1947. This had however already been
preceded by the decision in Washington to undertake large measures of finan-
cial aid to many of the countries of Europe, in the form not of United Nations
Relief but of unilateral economic support with the objective of the resto-
ration and consolidation of capitalism. In June the US put forward the
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so-called Marshall Plan under a smoke screen of beneficence and sham
good will: Comrade Molotov/ and our great Politburo had, at that time,
to make a very quick decision. Was this move compatible with the peace-
ful development of a peoples democratic world system and with the aboli-
tion of the struggle between Communism and Capitalism/ or was it the
beginning of the restoration of capitalism and the first move in capitalist
plans for the encirclement and destruction of Communism? Our great leaders
were not unequal to this occasion and they promptly made the correct
decisions. Since that time the principal enemy power, the US, has utilized
its surplus economic capacity as its chief weapon or tool in all its plans,
and has sought at all times to combine the stabilization of its own
economy through this means of shipping its surpluses to the world of
weaker capitalist states whieh it has reduced to the role of colonies.
As incidental methods it has also employed all measures of chicanery, of
sabotage, of secret agencies, to attack Communist elements in the trade
unions, to attack Communist influence in the governments, and to leave no
stone unturned in general to consolidute capitalism and to arm the capitalist
coalition against us. In 1949 it changed openly from the pretense of
beneficent economic aid including food relief, and began to base its aid
overtly upon the armament of all states surrounding the Communist bloc.
The US also began in about 1948 a far more energetic program for
attaining what it hoped would be a permanent and overwhelming superiority
in the new category of atomic weapons. It is to be noted that it at no
time, even in 1946/ ceased to maintain the development of its atomic and
strategic air power. It also put forward the slogan of union in Europe
against us, and in 1950 it organized the military alliance of NATO as the
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first step toward an attack upon the Soviet Union,
The only other major course utilized by the US which need be mentioned
is the cynical attempt to utilize the United Nations as an instrument in
the renewed struggle of the capitalist world against the socialist world.
This had its example par excellence in the unscrupulous manner in which
the US utilized illegal proceedings to obtain a pretended endorsement
by the United Nations of its intended intervention in the domestic conflict
in Korea, so as to prevent the peoples democratic government of North Korea
from uniting that unfortunate nation.
On our side also, as the canitalists have learned, there have been
certain means and tactical methods available to make sure that the gains
were not all theirs. We were able) without difficulty, to make the step
from coalition government to peoples democratic government in Hungary, and
in Czechoslovakia) having already accomplished this step in Poland, Rumania
and Bulgaria. We were able to establish a state government of approximately
our type in the eastern zone of Germany.
There were several different situations in the world in 1946 where
local wars were in progress and in which the Communist patriotic elements of
the area concerned had a fair prospect of success in stabilizing the area
on the side of socialism and peace. Each of these situations was decided,
one way or the other, by 1950. In Iran it was impossible for us to
support the Communist elements because of the situation as to the United
Nations and as to the difficulty of providing direct Russian support under
the legal and political difficulties without too quickly arousing the
further antaonism of the US, at a time when there was still hope that the
US might be dominated by the peace-loving elements. It was only after the
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nefarious Byrnes and Truman had committed the US to its present course, and
Wallace, for example, had been excluded from the Cabinet, that this
became no longer a consideration for our policy.
We were at this time unable to complete successfully the attainment
of state power in Greece, in Malaya, and in the Philippines. We were,
however, able to carry to a successful conclusion the destruction of the
corrupt and rotten Kuomintang faction in China, and this was the great single
success for us, as the temporary reestablishment of capitalist systems in
Western Europe was the greatest success on the side of the enemy. This
great achievement in China was accomplished under the wonderful leadership
of Comrade Mao, and of a number of Chinese Communist generals who proved,
once again, that the workers and peasants can produce military loaders
whose intelligence and energy can surpass that of the most redoubtable of
the capitalist militarists.
BY 1950 decisions had been reached as to the form that stabilization
would take in almost all of the areas left in doubt at the close of the
war against Germany and Japan. There was one area left in which some
initiative could be taken in that year, namely Korea. It was not yet
possible to make further headway in any short time al ywhere else. The
hypocritical government of the US had stated in apparent good faith the
objective truth that Korea was not an essential to the security of the US.
Under energetic Communist rule it had been possible to develop social and
economic and military strength in North Korea, under the leadership of the
great Kim il Sung, which far surpassed the feeble capabilities of the
corrupt semi-colonial system in South Korea. It was therefore correctly
decided that Korea should be united as a nation, since this could be done
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in an action of great simplicity and quickness, and at negligible cost
and with great benefit to the human elements concerned. It was at this
point that the true intentions of the US became thoroughly revealed,
when they moved instantaneously to intervene, at considerable cost, and
through nefarious misuse of the United Nations. The Americans were, as
we know, well able to overcome the heroic fighting of the North Korean
Army through the moves of the infamous MacArthur, but the Chinese Commu-
nist Government, which they despised, was also able to frustrate the hopes
of the capitalist world and to restore the situation to substantially where
It had stood. This was one more proof of the power that can be mobilized
by the patriotic Communist workers and peasants and of the equality or
superiority of military skill and heroism.
Since 1950 we have had only one major project affecting the division
of the world into Communist and CapitUist camps, the suceessful comple-
tion of the defeat of the French in Indochina. The US has also had only
one such project in hand, the addition of Western Germany to the armed
capitalist circle. Except for these two situations, which remain open,
the situation of Capitalism and of Communism has been stabilized for the
present, under conditions of extreme effort and tension. The effort en-
tailed for the capitalist powers has taken the form of a great program of
armaments. This has had certain economic consequences which have to be
examined, but has also become the basis for an orientation of world opinion
and of feelings in many places against the US or against the continuation
of the armaments program.
The arms race, kept up in its most essential elements, at small
expense, by the US through the continued production of fission materials
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and through the development of a long-range air force, entered a new .
phase in 1951. It is a curious evidence of the emotional instability
and irrationality of the US ruling circles that, although the success at'
Communism in China was followed by reductions in the military budget of
the US, the events in Korea led them to more than triple that budget.
An important factor was undoubtedly the American recession in the level of
economic activity Which occurred in 1949 and early 1950, and which no
doubt convinced the ruling circles that as always, capitalist industry
could not be kept at a stable high level of activity without a large
armament program.
In spite of the great scale of the US military budget for the last -
five years the US has plainly counted upon its atomic superiority as the
factor which enabled it to face the possibility of war without defeat.
The capitalist governments find it easy and economically advantageous to
utilize money and to produce munitions of war, but they find it far more
difficult in the face of the sentiments of the people toward peace, to use
large numbers of men in their armed services. This being so, it has been
natural that the Americans, having developed with the help of many
scientists from other countries, the atomic weapon, have lovingly cultivated
this most barbarous of all means of war as their main reliance, and have
hoped at all times that with it they could dominate the world in a way that
would be cheapest for themselves.
You all know how they have been frustrated. As soon as our great
leaders knew of the nature of this new weapon they undertook to reduce
to the minimum the time during which it would represent a one-sided advantage
to the capitalist military ambitiens. The Americans did not fail to predict
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that we could never make the atom bomb. Their more sensible elements
said that we could make it, but only in a very long time. We made it in a
very short time! (Interrupted by cheers). We now have enough of these
weapons, and enough very modern bombers, so that if the capitalists wish
to undertake mass murder they too will be hit.
It remains true that at present, and for about three more years, they
will have the advantage of us in the scale with which they can use atomic
weapons. However, within three years we will be able to use them on such
a scale that relative ecuality will exist. At that time, having the welfare
of the peoples of the world in interest, we will be able to take the lead
in demanding the elimination of the use of such weapons, and the military
balance will then be placed on the basis of other weapons, in which we
are inferior in no respectl (Cheers)
The great Red Army has
developed,. quicker than the
methods of organization, of
been fully maintained in all
arms. It has
enemy, the tactical doctrine and the appropriate
command
priate for the future conditions if
in which atomic weapons will remain
used. Our tanks' are
equal to that of the
socialist Fatherland
US,5R.
and for the conduct of battle, appro-
atomic weapons are used., or for the war
a latent threat but not actually be
superior to those of the enemy. Our artillery is fully
enemy. The fled Army stands ready as always to defend the
and all the peoples t democracies associated with the
The Red Air Force, except for very long-rrange modern air craft, is
now fully equal to the enemy. Even in the very long-range type, we are
actually ahead, although the possession by the enemy of many bases relatively
close to the US6R gives him still some advantage for what he calls strategic
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air war. For the proper air battle as distinguished from the war against
civilians we are superior in types and numbers of planes., and have the
greatest air. force ever seen. The Red Fleet is growing in strength.
It is equal to its tasks in the waters adjoining our coasts, in. the Black
Seal in the Baltic, in the North, and in the Far East. We are ready to
conduct submarine warfare on a scale far superior to that reached by the
Germans. For the war against enemy use of the oceans in his attack on the
socialist countries, we have also a sea mine capability which can deny
him the possibility of the use of most of the foreshore of Europe, and if
atomic weapons are used we can make it impossible for him to use ay
European or other port upon which he may depend. The flow of his supplies
from North America to this hemisphere can really be denied to him. With-
out this, as is plain, the US could never have played any effective mili-
tary role in the First World War or the Second World War.. Whether atomic
means are used or not we can prevent his use of the seas.
A most important consideration is the economic position, of the
capitalist world. This is characterized by the temporary stabilization of
industrial and general economic conditions. This staLIJAation rests for
the time being upon the armament effort. We already have in the recessions
in the US in 1949 and again in 1953 the evidence of the fundamental
instability of the capitalist economy. We have also ample evidence, for
which one need only read the capitalist commercial press, for the rapid
intensification of the struggle for markets, and for the incompatibility
of the stability of the economies of the various capitalist countries. German
merchants are already gaining trade opportunities formally claimed by the
English, in South America, in Africa, in the Middle East. The lessons taught
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by Lenin's Imperialism remain valid. Only the large scale arms effort
constitutes the glue to hold the incompatible elements together.
In this situation the position of the colonial and former colonial
areas is of prime importance. Here the ability of the US to give various
forms of assistance plays a role of covering and cloaking the objective
economic realities and the arms boom also contributes. The fundamental
factor in which is revealed the reality of capitalist exploitation of
these areas is the disparity in the terms of trade by which the capitalist
world acquires the material products of the colonial areas as ridiculously
low prices based upon starvation wages, while selling the products of
industry at high prices. This was altered temporarily through the dis-
orderly and unregulated rise of colonial material prices in 1951 and 1952
to meet the needs of the enemy armaments program. Any relaxation of the
armaments program will make this an acute source of disturbance to prices,
to US popularity in the areas of raw material supply, and to the stabiliza-
tion of anti-Communist governments in these areas. Conditions in South
Asia, in Africa, and in all of Latin America, will reflect fundamentally
this objective relationshipo
It is therefore evident, Comrades, that we are at the commencement of
a new period. This period will not be a long one. It will last for three
or four years. But it will have a character of its own, as the time after
the substantial stabilization of the two worlds and before it will be
wise for the Communist powers to accept the risk of a major
tar.
The great objective characteristics of this period are as follows:
I. The USSR has not yet attained such a degree of capability of
large-scale use of atomic weapons that it can force the enemy
to accept the outlawing of the use of such weapons, or can use
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them without fear of any disadvantage. This will require two
to four years.
2. The technical armaments race in all other weapons is one in which
we are fully equal to the capitalist countries, and in which we
may expect to have a general and definite advantage by 1960.
3. The normal contradictions of the capitalist system, internally
within the major capitalist countries, and between them as
competitors in trade, and between the major industrial
countries in general and the former colonial countries, are
glossed over temporarily by inflation financing in the US and
by
the spill over of the effects of the armaments
program in the form of high prices for colonial materials.
4. As long as the armaments effort continues at its present scale,
or slightly higher, the capitalist industrial systems will continue
to exhibit considerable stability and vitality. This is in accord-
ance with the estimates made some years ago by Comrade Varga,
but tends to extend the duration of capit,list stabilization
longer than could be done without the armaments.
The world division into two camps is now nearly eomplete, and
tension between the two camps is at a maximum. There is very
little flexibility left in the entire situation.
6. We have exhausted the systems of economic and political and
military tactics available to us for increasing the area of
Communist control and for stabilizing Communist power, short
of those which we can apply only when a major war is an accept-
able risk.
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7. Germany and Southeast Asia are the only points of flexibility
where either side may expect to gain or lose anything sub-
stantial without major war, and for the time being.
The general and specific objectives of the Communist powers must
therefore be as follows during the next few years.
1. We must seek to exploit the opportunities in Germany and
Southeast Asia and to prevent the enemy from gaining any further
advantages at these two points.
2. We must seek a relaxation of tensions, so far as these exist
in the mind or psychology of the enemy capitalist leading
elements.
3. Because the objectives in Asia, namely to gain
the rest of the former French controlled area and Formosa,
cannot be pursued in a way to contribute to relaxed tension
mediately, they will be continued by the means already
planned for the next year.
4. Because our objective of a neutral Germany is an objective which
we can seek only through relaxation of tension, we will make all
European issues the field of a policy a Is. Litvinov, or in the
guise of what the world once called "the spirit of Locarno",
immediately. The objective is that Germany must not be added
to NATO, since NATO without Germany will be small danger to us
under the military conditions of 1960 or later, while NATO with
Germany would constitute a great threat,
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5. The objective of inducing a spirit of relaxation in the
capitalist world should be pursued with the objective of
inducing the Americans to cut their armaments budget by at
least one-quarter, if possible by one-half. Further foreign
aid by the US should be brought to an end through the resur-
gence of all elements in American opinion inclined to peace,
or inclined to economy in the budget.
two forces in American opinion may be
powerful.
6. If it proves impossible to make progress with relaxation
An alliance of these
counted upon to be very
in
Europe while maintaining tension in the Far E,ast on Formosa
and Indochina, it may be necessary to accept stabilization in
the East also. This decision will be made in the first instance
in the highest circles of the CP-USSR and of the Government of
the USSR.
7. Since an unarmed Germany will be of no military importance
for at least four years after it joins one aide or the other,
we will accept an arrangement by -which Germany is united and by
which it becomes a capitalist "democracy', with the agreement
that it is neutralized for throe years, and that thereafter it
will be free to join any side, including joining NATO and
commencing its rearmament.
8. We will open a new tough policy line in 1959 when it will be
too late for Germany to matter as a military factor.
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9. We will in the near future undertake a series of diplomatic
or other political gambits, including:
A. visit by Nehru to Moscow.
A visit by high Soviet authorlties to Balkan states
including Yugoslavia.
The restoration of Austrian sovereignty.
An invitation to Adenauer to visit Moscow for exploratory
talks before the meeting of heads of state.
Proposals to be made at the meeting of heads of state
meant to induce an optimistic wave of relaxation in US
and Western opinion.
All of these policies or measures constitute a major direction
contrary to that which had to be taken during the nine years in which the
world has been consolid,:ted between the, two camps. It is in accordance
with the teachings of the great Lenin and the great Stalin, and the
teachings of the Communist Party. In contrast to minor shifts in the
laat nine years, this will constitute a major shift in the Leninist line.
The great objective is to establish the conditions for a period com-
parable to the period 1924-1929 during which relaxation, disarmament, and
the contradictions. of capitalism combined to smash up the capitalist worldi,
In the former case there was one great danger for us, the emergence of
Nazism in Germany at a time when ths relative power of Germany and of Russia
was if anything in favor of Germany. Now the development of fascism in a
form comparable to the form which it took in Germany under Hitler would
make no difference in the degree of our danger or security..
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The tactics of the next three or four years are to permit the now
etahilized capitalist vorld to became unstable, to develop severe trouble
in the colonial areas, to develop acute rivalries between the industrial
nations, and to create the conditions for internal economic collapse in
the US.
The same period will be utilized, of course, in the Soviet Union and
the other Communist countries toJ
Attain equality in atomic military power.
Attain superiority in non-atomic military power:
Strengthen the industrial and agricultural basis of the national
economy.
Create an improving living standard for the peoples so as to maximize
their loyalty to a system which promises an expanding life in
the immediate following years.
Establish the strongest possible industrial base, dispersed for
better survival against enemy attacks.
Prepare to exploit the opportunity of the period after 1959 for the
final showdown with capitalism, either through progressive severe
concessions obtained rapidly enough to permit no renewed
stabilization, or through general war, preferably without atomic
weapons.
The fundamental elements of the new line will be made known through
conferences of the leading party, government and military cadres in each
of the Communist countries'. Party discipline will be maintained in all
Communist parties in implementing this line until further decisions are made.
Communiats who fail to understand the"elarxist reasoning which makes this
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line necessary will be charged with Trotskyism and leftism. Comrade Mao
has concurred in the analysis and has assisted in stipulating the
criteria governing the continuation or cessation of pressure in the East.
Comrades: This is probably the last occasion in Communist history
when it will be necessary to adopt a policy of apparent accommodation with
the capitalist powers. If necessary to accomplish the objective results
which are soughtivery substantial concessions may be necessary. Even very
substantial concessions are quite acceptable for the objectives in view.
Forward under the banner of I,arx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, and the banner
of the Communist Fatherland,
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Quantico Vulnerabilities
Panel
Dr. E. A. Johnson
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR US-NATO TO WIN
IN THE ARMS RACE WITH THE USSR
FROBLEM.
To determine the requirements which must be met if the US
and NATO are to win the arms race.
FACTS AND DISCUSSION
The dynamics of the development of military weapons systems must
be recognized as having gone through an extraordinary revolution which
began during World War II. This was primarily a revolution resulting
from advances in the art of management of research and development. It
occurred almost simultaneously in Germany, Britain, and the United States,
with Germany having an edge of a year or two. This was one of the
important factors which permitted Germany to hold off most of the rest
of the military world in spite of tremendous economic and population
inferiority.
The nature of the new dynamics can be contrasted with the past by
observing that weapons systems in ancient times endured for almost one
thousand years without any drastic change. Changes over a decade or
century seldom had more than a relatively small effect on the outcome
of battle. Prior to World War II, major elements of weapons systems
lasted from 20 to 50 years without important change. Since World War
II and at an increasingly accelerated rate, many weapons last only for
a few years. In ground-to-air missiles, for example, the rate of techno-
logical advance is so rapid that missiles and missile systems are
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usually obsolescent, if not obsolete, by the time they become
operational. U. S.',4; armaments programs have not yet been geared to this
fundamentally new fact$ but are still geared to the pre-World War 11
technological pace.
This exacerbates the whole nature of the arms race. The rate of
progress that occurs within a 5-15 year period is illustrated by the
following advances:
1. Atomic bombs and warheads have changed effectiveness by a
factor of 10,000 times over World War 11 H.E. bombs of similar weight;
2. Ground-to-air missiles have improved the effectiveness of
defense against air attack between 5,000 to 200,000 times;
3. Ground-to-ground missiles have improved the range of artillery
by a factor of ten times and will extend this to a factor of 200 within
the next five years;
4. The ceiling of bomber aircraft has been lifted from 20,000
feet to 75,000 feet;
5. Capacity of cargo aircraft has been lifted from 20 tons to
50 tons pay load;
6. The effectiveness of high explosive ammunition has been
improved by a factor of 20;
7. The effectiveness of poison gases have been improved by a
factor of 20;
8. The effectiveness of infantry rifles has been improved by 50
to 100 per cent in spite of the long-established nature of the rifle
technology;
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9. Anti-crop and anti-animal BW have the capability of bringing
to starvation all of Russia with the expenditure of only a few hundred
heavy bomber sorties.
The improvements of this type are not due to the creativeness of
single individuals acting as isolated men, but result primarily from
the use of large teams of technical experts highly organized, using
intricate and expensive laboratory facilities, and guided by a sophis-
ticated management system which relates the material machines of war
to the strategic and tactical requirements of the military campaign and
of the nation. Because of the sensitive and critical relation of the
weapon to the weapons system, to the tactics and to the strategy, the
choice of military characteristics tends to be the most important single
factor determining tactical military superiority. The inevitable con-
sequence of great research and development systems and the related gui-
dance by the strategic and technical planning groups leads to rapid
changes in the relative positions of the competing US and USSR military
weapons systems. Both systems operate from the same basic foundations
of knowledge of the laws of the natural sciences and of the commonly held
knowledge of the arts of engineering. The two systems obviously react
not only to the long-range guidance of the strategic and tactical planners
but also react very rapidly and often violently to intelligence which
indicates favorable progress on the part of the opponent who must be
matched. The intelligence information which indicates the development
of an opposing weapons system requires the invention of the defensive
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weapons system that each combatant must always employ simultaneously with
his use of weapons in attack.?
There are still important effects due to the lucky technological
breakthrough, Such a breakthrough may require extensive revision of
weapons systems in which there has been a heavy investment of production
and of our research and development programs and establishments. For
example, the recent unclassified French invention of the carcinitron
has importantly improved the capabilities of electronic counter-measures,
(jamming and interference) and requires redesign and review of the entire
warning and control system for air defense, as well as for all electronics
fire control equipment of strategic bombers, medium bombers and air
interceptors, and ground force radio communications. The effect of
such highly organized R&D systems, therefore, is to make the tactical
military solutions short-lived, and to produce an unstable situation
with respect to strategy and technical planning, and to the obsolescence
cost of military production. In a race for military superiority, however,
there is no way to stabilize the situation, rather there is an increasing
requirement for improvement in the quality of research personnel and
their facilities and in the management systems which guide the military
research and development system. Annex A and Annex B present the
evidence which shows that the United States has lost a 3-year lead during
the last 10 years, that the Soviet Union is now the . equal of
the U.S. in military technology, that the quality and numbers of the
technical labor force of the U.S. will become inferior to that of the
Soviet Union from 1960 onwards, and that as a consequence, it can be
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expected that unless drastic action is taken on a national scale, the
Soviet Union will be from two or more years ahead of the United States
in military technology by 1965. A lead of two years by the Soviet
Union could be absolutely mortal to the United States. On the other
hand, the United States has the capability of preventing this contingency,
albeit this would require a strenuous and costly effort.
The actions which must be taken to improve the internal situation of
the U.S. in military technology are:
1. Cut down the lead time in political decision-making affecting
military technology;
2, Improve the budgetary cycle and decision-making system to
prevent continued fiscal stretch out and starvation of forward-looking
and indispensible technological programs.
3. Streamline and unify further the military management systems
which provide guidance on the basis of strategio and tactical planning.
4.
control,
exchange
5.
Overhaul the technical information system including security,
rapidity of transmission and distribution, channels for free
of ideas, and data storing.
Take action which will improve technical education in the
secondary schools) and in the technical colleges and universities. It
is most critical to improve technical educ,tion in the secondary schools,
The other great immediate step that can be taken is to incorporate
the technical manpower capabilities of Western Europe into a U. S.-NATO
complex for the development of modern weapons systems. It is important
to remember that, except for Britain, most of the great technical talent
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of Europe, i.e., France, the Benelux countries, Germany and Italy, are
unorganized and are not supported by either adequate facilities or
adequate research and development funds. Thus, the military-technical
contributions from these countries are unimportant since research and
development efforts are poorly organized, there is no adequate strategic
and tactical guidance and these countries are not permitted to consider
jointly with the United States -uhe tactics required by modern weapons
systems, especially atomic weapons. They contribute only by lucky
chance and, therefore, with very low effectiveness as in pre-World War II
technical systems. This efficiency is a fraction of their full capability.
It is well to remember the great German creativeness that existed
just prior to and during World War II when German research and development
was highly organized. In that time the Germans developed the first
guided missiles, the first jets, the new types of high speed submarines,
the homing torpedoes, the aircraft-laid influence mines, the new poison
gases (G-agents), as well as a host of other new firsts, most of which
we have not as yet been able to improve in any fundamental way, although
such improvement is now beginning to take place.
The British work in jets and in aircraft is one of the primary
bases for the Russian progress in turbo-jet engines which the Russians
added to the basic work provided by World War II German technology.
The French carcinitron, their zero length aircraft bombers, new
guided anti-tank weapons, and light armored vehicles indicate the good
capabilities of the French.
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The Dutch capabilities in electronics is outstanding. For example,
they have produced an unclassified VT fuse and are able, in general, to
export electronics to the United states in spite of high tariffs.
The Italians have the only industrial-academic complex which relates
military transportation to fundamental problems of soil mechanics.
In summary of the NATO icchnical capabilities, it is clear that
the large number of creative scientists and engineers in Europe, with
their excellent record of invention and productivity will, if fully
mobilized and supported, double and probably triple, the US-NATO research
and development capabilities.
If such a US-NATO tactical-military development system could not
only be established but could retain its cohesiveness- for the next two
'decades, there appears to be no question but that it would by far
exceed in quality the technical capabilities of the equivalent Soviet
system. The US-NATO system would again lead the Soviet system by two
years or moreby 1965 if action were taken immediately. This should be
sufficient to meet, and with the much greater NATO productiveness, to
on the average maintain indefinitely US-NATO military superiority.
We need to mention the danger of subversion if NATO scientists are
employed. It may certainly be true that there is a greater danger of
subversion and security leaks to the USSR if there is extensive ereployment
of NATO scientists and engineers, even if greatest care were to be
taken by the NATO countries who participate. It must be remembered a
security system is costly. The great value added by NATO scientists
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will be somewhat reduced by the increased leakage of technical informa-
tion to the Soviet Union. However, it is well known that there is always
an apprecible time lag from the time that intelligence information is
received and the time when the new ideas or new concepts can be incor-
porated in a fruitful way into the existing and complicated weapons
systems which have been based upon strategic and tactical guidance from
one's own planners. The increasing rapid pace of research and development
leads to less danger from subversion. Since the use of espionage and
intelligence information is subject to an inherent time lag of its own,
in general the imitator usually finds himself at a disadvantage if he
overemphasizes imitation.
Taking into account the fact that the U.S. has lost or is losing
its leadership in the race for armaments, the 20 or 30 percent degrada-
tion which night be expected from subversion amongst NATO scientists
will not seriously reduce the great value to be gained by adding them
to a cooperative system since the addition of the full strength of NATO
scientists which might improve performance by 100 percent or more.
ZEUILLUil
1. Since 1946 the U.S. has lost a 3-year lead over the Soviet
Union and the Soviet Union is now tending to become equal in military
technology to the United States.,
2. The quality of the Soviet technical labor force and the number
of personnel in the Soviet technical labor force will exceed that of the
similar U.S. technical labor force from now on. It is expected that this
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will result in a 3-5 year lead by the Soviet Union over the U.S. by
1965.
3. The internal situation of the U.S. with respect to military
technology can be improved by more rapid decision making, better
management and guidance of military research and development, by
improved budgetary procedures, and by educational reforms.
4. The over-all situation of American technology can be improved
only by broad spread improvement in technical education in the secondary
schools and also in technical colleges and universities of the United
States.
56 The US-NATO position and military technology can be improved
by 100 to 200 percent (minus security leaks) by organizing and supporting
NATO research and development at a high budget level.
6. The combined effect of internal improvements in the U.S. and
the addition of NATO scientists could lead to a situation in which
U.S.-NATO had a lead of 2 years or more over the Soviet Union by 1965.
This could be just the difference between victory and defeat in cold
war or hot war.
RECOMUUDATIONS
1. A maximum effort be made to improve management of the research
and development..%systems in the United States*
2. Maximum action be taken to improve technical education in the
secondary schools and colleges of the United States.
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3. A substantial budget should be provided to establish, organize
and support research and development in the NATO countries. Preliminary
costing indicates the price tag might ultimately reach two billion
dollars a year which could be profitably spent to improve the security
situation of the United States.
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Report of Quantico
Vulnerabilities Panel
Dr. B., A. Johnson
THE CCMFARATIVE MILITARY TECHNOLOGY OF THE US AND USSR
shp Problem
The problem is to establish the relative status and trends of US vs.
USSR military technology.
Facts
Immediately following World War II, W. B. Shockley surveyed the tech-
nological advancement of the two eountries and presented his findings in a
memorandum dated 30 January 1946.1/ The objective of the Shockley study
and of the current one is to determine the existence of the time lags in
the introduction of new military items as indicators of the current and
future relative positions of the US and the USSR in research and technological
development.
The method introduced by Shockley is followed in large measure in a
study by ORO, ORO-T-322. This is directed to determining the time lag or
lead in the introduction of new items or of particular characteristics of
weapons judged militarily desirable by the U.S. and the USSR. In this
approach, the probabilistic future work of the research and development
agencies is excluded from consideration since it is impossible to identify
which developments will actually culminate in successful application.
Progress and trends shown by agtual introduction of end items is a better
measure of the relative state of the technology of the two countries.
Where data for a specific item permit, US and USSR achievements are
charted on a time scale basis and the chart provides the pattern of time lag
1/-77;571771=7;71731 Achievements in Weapon Characteristics in the US
and USSR," Memorandum, Office of the Secretary of War, 30 January 1946,
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for a particular weapon characteristic. The composite pictures of time lag
Patterns for the several characteristics of specific weapons are then
subject to analysis as to over-all comparability of US and USSR achieve-
ments in technology.
Lack of substantive data on USSR military items and disparities in
US and USSR development programs during the 1945-1955 period have necessi-
tated a more general interpretation of less specific evidence in some
instances than in Shockley's study. This is true, for example in the area
of electronics. Available information on USSR achievements together with
data on US achievements provide a basis for general conclusions as to time
lag between the two countries. There are not sufficient supporting data on
USSR electronics to warrant a time scale comparison of the developments
in the two countries. For armor, there are only fragmentary pieces of
intelligence on developments in the USSR. As of 1954-55, assumptions based
on limited evidence represent the only basis for comparison of USSR tank
developments with US developments.
In two respects, 1945-46 was a more propitious time than 1954-55 to
make such an analysis and to obtain reliable indicators. The first applies
te the accessibility and reliability of data. At the close of World War II,
the US military services had possession d' sufficient data pertaining to
Russian weapons achievements to assure valid comparisons with US achievements.
At the present time, the extent of reliable data from the USSR is indeed
limited. US Intelligence estimates represent the bulk of our current infor-
mation on Russian achievements. The tight Soviet security security cloak
may well have hidden advancements which would be particularly pertinent in
a comparison of technological achievements. Estimates of dates for production
and operational used' USSR equipment may be considerably later ones than the
true dates.
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The second factor in timing that favors the 1945-46 over the 1954-55
study pertains to the opportunity for national choice in the selection of
and emphasis on specific developments during the periods covered. During
World War II the US and the USSR directed their national scientific and
technological effort toward the single objective of winning a war. Hence,
technological effort was largely expended on weapons and the development
of these weapons served as a valid index of the technological potential of
the nations, as analyzed by Dr. Shealy in 1946.
The past ten years has been a period of so-called peace and the focus
of weapons development in the US and USSR has been less consistent. The
emphasis on military research and development has been geared to the national
requirements established for the respective military programs. For example,
the Russians placed greater emphasis on the development of fighter planes
at a time when Americans were stressing bomber developments. In general, the
Soviets have not put much effort on marginal improvements with the intent
that simplicity and numbers offset possible benefits to be gained from
further refinement. The US on the other hand has emphasized the need for
research to meet specific and detailed requirements such as safety measures
for the protection of personnel, in aircraft, tanks, etc.
This element of choice reflected in the over-all programs and in
specific developments makes it difficult to compare directly currently
available data on US and USSR technological achievements. A comparison of
the specific characteristics in the development of a single weapon must
allow for a greater number of influencing factors than was the case in
1945-46.
For example, in the absence of immediate requirements for US aircraft
to excel in any specific area, the US has chosen to trade other performance
for range in both its fighters and bombers. Hence, the US is found to have a
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comparative technological advantage for this characteristic and corresponding
lags for other characteristics. In this case, both the lead in fighter range
and the lags in fighter speed and rate of climb may be regarded as the
result of US choice. In tanks, the USSR has adopted the diesel engine that
provides far greater combat range for the USSR tanks than the gasoline
engine provides for US tanks. This difference in range capability is the
result of choice.
Weakness in U.S. development is so much due to poor choice as any
other factor and the elements of choices should be reviewed. It may be
that one of the major values of a study of comparative technological
achievements is the clues it provides toward pointing up shortcomings in
our own design philosophy.
Notwithstanding possible discrepancies in the data, the indeterminate
factors related to the element of choice, and the limited number of items
covered, the comparisons of achievements presented in this study are con-
sidered to be sufficiently representative of time lag trends to serve as
indicators of the relative status of technological developments in the US
and the USSR. The consideration of validity is supported by the inclusion
of an analysis of the most controlling factor of all research, development
and production capabilities in both the US and USSR--that is the volume
and rate of development of scientific and technical manpower in the two
countries. The analysis of this factor contributes to the analyses of
weapons characteristics and the deductions on technological development.
Comparisons of the relative development status of the US and the USSR
for the specific items included in this study in the mid-forties and the
mid-fifties are presented in Table 1, grouped under headings "aircraft",
"armor", "ordnance", "electronics", and "scientific and technical personnel".
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This table represents a general summary drawn from the lag-times on a
large number of items covered in ORO-7-322.
Conclusions
On balance, the Soviet military technology had a lag of about three
years behind the US at the close of WWII', but by 1954 this lag had
been eliminated and the Soviet Union is now at least our equal in military
technology especially in the air and on the land. Within the past decade
the Soviet not only caught up to the US but in some cases passed us. The
trend is such as to indicate over-all superiority of Soviet military
technology in the not too distant future. This prediction is based not
only upon specific achievement rates in military end items but upon the
volume and rate of increase of USSR scientific and technical personnel and
labor force which is now approaching numerical equality with that of the
US and is increasing at a rate at least 50% faster.
Recommendations
The recommendations are implicit in the conclusions. With our
present level of research and development effort the US since TOT' has lost
a three-year lead and the trend indicates a future over-all superiority
of Soviet military technology unless actions are taken to strengthen our
own and NATO research efforts in funds, management, and personnel. By
support of NATO science we can add almost immediately a great new reservoir
of skill to the US-NATO system.
1/The weighting includes Shockloy's ceLclusions that the USSR in 1946 was
"at least 5 years behind the US" in oil refining capability with a
development rate of one-half the US rate.
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SljRET
-a
TBT E 1
(Summary Table)
SECRET>
(page 1 oiP)
0
CD
0-
11 ESTIMATED UG
0
AiRCRFT
CD
-TIME IN SCIENTIFiC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS USSRCL
MID-1950s Nit)- 940s -n
0
Year
Lagging Estimated Time Lag Year
Country
US 6 mos behind 1952
USSR 3 nos behind 1949
us 3 yrs behind 1949
USSR 4 yrs behind 1948
USSR 1 1/2 yrs behind 1947
us 6 yrs behind 1947
US 2 1/2 yrs behind 1949
us 4 3/4 yrs behind 1948
us 3 3/4 yrs behind 1948
us 5 Yrs behind 1948
USSR 2 yrs behind
USSR 3 yrs behind
US-USSR equal
US-USSR equal
1945
US-USSR equal
us lag
US-USSR equal
USSR (marginal)
US-USSR equal
us 1944
us (15-20% disadvantage)1944
ussR rq1P1)
US - isadvantage)1944
Lagging Estimated Time Lag
Country
ET
US 1 1/2 yrs behind
US-USSR equal
US 1 1/3 yrs behind Is)
C)
C)
C)
US 6 mos behind
US-USSR equal 01
US-USSR equal.
US-USSR equal
US 4 mos behind 0
US 1 ym behind
US 9 mos behind
13
Co
a
cb
co)
USSR ranging from 2 yrs behto3
to 2 yrs ahead of US a
a
a
a
a
co)
a
a
a
US
US 3 1/2 yrs behind*
US
1955
1952
1954
1954
1955
1954
1955
1954
1954
1954
1951
1954
1954
1953
1955
1955
1955
1955
1955
1955
1955
1955
1955
aL,ircr-ft Engines
u2.Turboortvecteddtated shaft horsepower
CD Turbojets-aentrirugal comnressors-thrust
K.)
c) Turbonrops-axial comnressors-thuust
aet Fighters
a Combat radius
0 Thrust
Ch) Weight/Thrust ratio
.. Service ceiling
0 Rate of climb at sea level
5; Sneed in level flight at 30,000 ft.
33 Time to climb to 30,000 ft.
aomber i_rcraft
13 Jet light bombers-Initial Production
oo
c) Jet medium bombers-Initial Production
4) Heavy bombers-Initial Production
lir craft Guns
OgiNANCE
antiaircraft Guns
around Rockets
around Missiles
AOOR
almagnE
4* Hit Probability
Penetration
Mobility
Weight
Ugnouver'DilitY
Range
StRET
1:51
0
a
-n
0
TABLE 1
(Summary Table)
ESTIMATED LAG-TIME IN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL
NID-1950s
74MOR (Continued from page 1)
ZDArmor Protection
m ? Slope
O ? Quality
NRCTRONICS
c)
on
BIENTIFIC and TECHNICAL PERSONNEL
CJ4 Profes-donall Technical and Kindred
,lorkers
Graduates of Institutions of Higher
Learning
Professionally Active Engineers
Engineering Graduates
0
0
Co
a
cb
Schockley op cit.
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
DEVELOITENTS-USSR
MID-1940S
--p
.r LaggiAg Estimated
SECRET
13>
Time Las
0
2 yrs beiPind
CD
C,)
CD
2 yrs belgad
a
C)1
G4
. .
C)
33
Co
4)
_&
0)
-a
-a
ZD
Year Lagging Estimated Time Lag Yee
Country
1955 US-USSR
1955 USSR-US
1955 USSR
1955 USSR
1953 US lag
1956 US lag
1953 USSR lag
1954 US lag
equal
oqa
(marginal)
Ranging from 0-2
yrs behind
(page 2 of 2)
Countr7
US 3"2. 1/2 to
1945 USSR At leaot
1945 USSR lag
1945 USSR lag
1945 USSR lag
1948 US-USSR equal
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Annex B to Tab 2 to
Report of Quantico
Vulnerabilities Panel
Dr. E. A. Johnson
SCIENTIFIC AND ,TECHNICAL PERSONNEL
More important perhaps, than any othei single factor in measuring
the power potential of a nation are the number of highly trained
scientists and engineers and the capability of the nation in training
more. In the U.S. this group represents appro:ximate4r one percent of
the total labor force; for the USSR the percentage is Slightly higher.
These small groups are the key contributors to the technological
developments of both war and peace and to the reservoir of basic n.
scientific knowledge on which technology rests.
For the past two centuries the nations of Western Europe have
been the source of most of the major advances in the basic sciences.
Until World War II the contributions of the U.S. were primarily
technological in character as, so far as is known, have also been those
of the USSR since World War II.
The snrprise manifested in this country that the USE was able to
develop so rapidly the hydrogen bomb and long-range heavy bombers, both
of which require a high order of technical skills, is hardly justified
if one looks at Russia's resources of professional, technical, and
kindred workers. In the past 15 years the USSR has more than doubled
its professional labor force while the U.S. has had only a 50 percent
increase. (Table 1) The USSR now exceeds the U.S. in the total number
of professional and technical personnel, and the rates of increase
indicate a continuing Russian superiority inrambers in the limmediate
future.
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SECRET
TABLE 1
TOTAL LABOR FORCE AND TOTAL PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL
US - USSR
Total ',Torkers Professional, Technical, and Kindred
Workers
(Excluding armed forces)
US1/
(millions)
USSW
(millions)
US/'
(millions)
( 2es)
1940
46.1
31.5
3.5
2.5
1950
58.6
4.5
1953
61.2
44.8
5.4
59
Percent Change 1940-1953
32.8
42.2
54.3
136
2../ Office of Defense Mobil.ization, "Manpower Resources for National
Security - A Report to the President by the Director ofthe Office
of Defense Mobilization," 6 January 1954.
Nicholas DeWitt, "Professional and Scientific Personnel in the USSR,"
Science, 2 July 1954.
- 2 -
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The rates of increase Of the professional group in the two countries
reflect the differences in basic educational philosophy. In contrast to
the educational system of the U.S. in which motivation for the support
of education has been the benefit of the individual, in Russia education
is provided for the benefit of the state and is intended to serve the
purpose of the state alone.
In the praglatic development of Soviet education, the emphasis has
been on the Sciences and, practical arts. Since 1930 the Soviet leaders
have stressed the key role of education of specialists in the development
of the communist state.. The purpose of higher education as expressed in
a Soviet encyclopedia is "To prepare highly qualified politidally trained
engineering personnel with well rounded education, cultured, whole-
heartedly devoted to the motherland and the cause of Lenin-Stalin,
capable of mastering and using the newest accomplishments of advanced
science and technology and of merging scientific theory with the
practical work of building a communist society." This is in sharp ,
contrast with educational philosophy in the U.S. where a large number
of college students, particularly women, are enrolled for a general
and cultural education with no emphasis on special training.
Following a 1933 decree concerning placement of trained personnel,
Soviet authorities established the legal practice of placing
professionals and subprofessionals involuntarily, as well as voluntarily,
within the occupational fields that coincide with the formal specialized
training completed by them in academic institutions. Hence, the planned
educational system provides the technical cadres for the specific needs
of the economy. The result is that even though the sciences in Soviet
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Russia may be less well developed than in the West, the USSR can and
does concentrate its resources and its effort on items of strategic
significance in the Soviet national program.
The needs of the national program are the determinants of Soviet
educational requirements.. Following seven years of compulsory
elementary school training in which about a third of the curriculum is
devoted to arithmetic, algebra, geometry and the natural sciences
superior students are admitted to the secondary schools. Here the
student has no choice of courses and 40% of his three year curriculum
is devoted to science and mathematics. The steady increment of
acceptances into higher educational institutions during the past few
years has been maintained because of the spectacular increases in
numbers of graduates from secondary schools. In 1954, for the first
time, there was a surplus of secondary school graduates over the avail-
able admission vacancies in institutions of higher learning.
The current rate of growth in professional and subprofessional
classes in the Soviet Union exceeds that in the U.S. In 1953 there were
200,000 graduates from institutions of higher education in the Soviet
Union and the figure for 1954 has been put at 230,000 (Table 2). It is
estimated that the number of graduates in 1956 will approximate 330,000,
an increase of 43 percent over the size of the 1954 class. Forecasts
for the U.S. are far more modest as shown in Table 2.
Backing up the professional class in the Soviet economy is a large
body ef well-trained subprofessionals. They represent the core of the
supporting and intermediate level technical personnel who in America
-4
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come from technical institutes, junior colleges and even from regular
four-year colleges. The Soviet subprofessionals are trained at
"technikums," three or four year schools somewhat above the level of
our junior college. Training is provided for engineering aides,
agricultural., medical, legal, and pedagogical workers. The courses are
about 40% theorttical; the engineering course, for example, includes
mathematics through calculus. Since part of the training is on-the-job,
the students are prepared to enter industry immediately on graduation.
-5-
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TABLE 2
NUMBERS GRADUATED FROM INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCTION
United States2/ USSR'
1940 .186,500,
1942 185,300
1944 125,900
1946 136,200
1948 272,100
1949 366.,600
1950 433,700 (postwar peak) 185,000
1951 3840400
1952 331,900 220,000
1953 304,900 200,000
1954 292,900 230-1900'
1955 264,000*
1956 303,000 330,000
1957 321,000
1958 324,000
*Figures for 1955 and subsequent years are preliminary projections made
by Wm. A. Jaracz, Head, Statistical Services Unit, Research and Statistical
Standards Sections, U.S. Office of Education, and transmitted in a private
communication.
- 6 -
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In 1952 there were 3500 technikums with a, total enrollment of
about 1,000,000 students. Graduates numbered about 350,000 that year,
and of these about 50,000 had taken their training in engineering..4/
The U.S. on the other hand has only 1,000 two year technical institutes
with a total enrollment of 50,000 students and approximately 10,000
annual graduates.
The rate of growth of the aubprofessional class in the USSR is
keeping pace with that of the professional class as shown in Table 3.
The relative increases in the subprofessional group ensures an adequate,
necessary support for the professional group.
TABLE 3
USSR PROFESSIONAL AND SUBPROFESSIONAL WORKERS3/
Total Professional Professional workers Subprofessionals
and Kindred Workers With Higher Education Change With Specialized Change
(millions) (millions) Secondary Educ
(millions)
1940
2.5
0.$5
1.65
1952
5.5
1.79
+110%
3.72
+125%
1953
5.9
1.99
4. 11%
3.96
4.6.3%
Of paramount importance to the U.S. currently is the comparison of the
scientific and technical manpower pools of the U.S. and the USSR and
their respective rates of growth. In the USSR the growth of the
scientific and technical manpower pools has come about as a result of
direct actions taken by the government, such as the setting of higher
pay scales for scientists and engineers and the use of the governmentls
occupational assignment powers. In the U.S. the corresponding growth
has been influenced by factors of a much more indirect and much less
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TABLE 4
1947
5/
Us-
19,300
USSR-41
1948
28,900
29,000
1949
45,200
1950
52,700
28,000
1951
41,900
30)000
1952
30,300
30)000
1953
24,200
40,000
1954
22,200
50,000
1955
24,000
1956
30,000
1957
34,000
In 1954 about 22,000 new engineers were graduated in the US and
approximately twice that number in the USSR. Virtually all Soviet
engineering school students are granted five year deferments and some-
times even exemptions from military service. All the evidence indicates
that the Russian engineers have a sound training lasting five and a half
years with a 5,000 hour curriculum. The result is a training equivalent
to a point between the US bachelor's and master's degrees.
On the numbers of professionally active engineers in the two countries
current estimates place the US ahead by approximately 100,000. Estimates
for several years since 1930 are shown in Table 4,
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TABLE 4
PROFESSIONALLY ACTIVE ENGINEERS
us6/
-
_2/
1930
215,000
Las000
4.940
278,000
283,000
1950
543,000
1952
467l000
1953 633,000
Although the US currently leads in the number of professionally
active engineers j this lead is being cut at the rate of about 20,000
per year on the basis of present rates of training and, assuming a con-
tinuation of these rates, the USSR Fill achieve parity with the US in
numbers of engineers in about 1960. One bright spot in the picture is
the upturn in the number of new US engineering graduates expected to
occur in the current academic year (1954-55) which is the result both
of an increase in total college enrollments and in the percentage of
students enrolling in engineering curricula. The number of first year
engineering students expressed as a percentage of high school graduates
of the preceding academie year is shown for each year since 1947 in
Table 5,
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TABIE 5
PERCENTAGE OF US HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES ENROLLING
IN ENGINEERING COURSES-7/
rear
Percent
1947
5 9
1948
4.5
1949
3.3
1950
2.9
1951
3?14
1952
1953
4.7
While reliable data on the number of professionally active natural
scientists in the USSR are not available and figures on US scientists
are not as well substantiated as are those for engineers: there is reason
to believe that the US also enjoys a lead at the present time in the
number of trained scientists. The Commission on Human Resources and
Advanced Trainingt/ placed the number of scientists in the US in 1953
at 237:000. The number of Russian scientists is estimated by the Scien-
tific IvIar4Dower Commission to be somewhere in the neighborhood of 150:000
to 175,000.
The numb' of degrees granted in the US to students completing
curricula in the natural sciences has been declining since the postwar
peak was reached in 1950 in a manner somewhat parallel to that exhibited
in engineering. There i$ reason to believe that the low point was reached
in 1954 and that the number of natural sol-ence degrees will show an upturn
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beginning in 1955.. Table 6 shows the total number of degrees granted
(bachelors, masters, and, doctors) in the major branches of natural
science in each of the years since 1951.
TABLE 6
NATURAL SCIENCE DEGREES GRANTED IN US
Biological Sciences Mathematics Physical Sciences
Totals
1951
16,300
7,000
20,200
43,5oo
3,952
14,300
5,700
16,900
36,900
1953
12,600
5,300
14,800
32,700
19%
12,100
50000
13,900
31,000
At the most advanced level of training in the sciences, comparable
to our doctorate, the USSR appears to be stepping up considerably the
numbers being trained. While there is no exact equivalent to the Ph.D.
in the Russian educational system, the degree which seems to come closest
to the dootorate is that of uKandidat" which requires three years of study
and research. In 1952 there were about 51500 Kandidat degrees granted
aa against 7,700 doctorates in the US. The distribution of these degrees
between the scientific and technical fields and other fields of study
appears to be considerably different in the two countries, however. In
the US approximately 40%0 of the doctorates granted are in the fields of
science, engineering, and mathematics while these same fields account for
about 80% of the USSR's Kandidat degrees.
A major obstacle to the accomplishment of a significant increase in
the US rate of training of scientists and engineers ia the acute shortage
of science teachers at the high school level; a shortage which is expected
to become more severe in the immediate future. Since 1950 when college
graduations reached their postwar peak the number of college graduates
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prepared to teach in high school has fallen more rapidly than has the
total number of graduates and the number prepared to teach science or
mathematios has fallen more rapidly still. While the number of bachelor's
degrees in all fields has dropped 34%, the number prepared to teach in
high school has dropped 42%, and the numbers prepared to teach mathematics
and science have dropped 51% and 56%, respectively. In chemistry the
number prepared to teach at the high school level dropped from 1:700 to
600 between 1950 and 1954 and in physics the drop has been from 950 to
300. The numbers trained for high school teaching in science and mathe-
matics for each of the years 1950 to 1954 are shown in Table 7.
TABLE 7
NUMBER PREPARED TO TEACH HIGH SCHOOL
MATHEMATICS AND SCIENCEY
1950
Mathematics
4,618
Percent change
from 1950
Science
93096
Percent change
from 1950
1951
44118
.. 10.8
7,507
. 17.5
1952
3,142
. 32.0
5,246
4?0
1953
2,573
??? 44.3
4,381..;
51.8
1954
2,281
- 50.6
3)978
- 56.3
The significance of the rapidly diminishing flew of trained high
school teachers of science and mathematics becomes more apparent when
viewed in the light of high school enrollment which will increase from
a total of 6,600,000 pupils in 1952-53 to 9,300,000 by 19$9.60 and to
somewhere between 11 and 12 million by 1965. The number of science
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teachers needed in the schools will rise from 67,000 in 1952-53 to an
estimated 84,000;'- in 1959-060. By 19650 this number will probably reach
100,000. The current annual need for new science teachers is placed at
more than 7000 and is expected to approach 10,000 within the next few
years. The fewer than 5000 potential replacements now graduating an-
nually fall far short of satisfying requirements.
The effects on the quality and quantity of training in science and
engineering of current and prospective shortages of high school teachers
of science and mathematics are, of course, impossible to predict with any
accuracy but since students are often introduced to the sciences at the
secondary school level and acquire their interest in preparing for scien-
tific careers at this stage in their education the results of a daortage
of well trained high school science teachers cannot help but be a deterior-
ation in the qpnlity of science education and a constriction in the flow
of scientists in training.
In summary, available data on scientific and technical personnel in
the USSR and comparable data for the US show that the US is leading the
USSR in the number of professionally active, trained engineers and scienr
tists but that Russia's higher rates of training in these fields will
result in USSR parity with the US about 1960 and superiority thereafter.
If all professional, technical, and Icindred fields are included, the USSR
appears already to be ahead in the total number of trained workers.
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Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel
Dr. F. S. Durin
ALLIANCE, AND COALITION PROBLEM
A primary objective of the U.S. at the forthcoming conference will
be to block all attempts to the Soviets to weaken or destroy the system
of alliances and coalitions existing in the Free World. A related
objective will be to gain greater support among the uncommitted nations
for our position and to provide them with a better image of our inten-
tions and capabilities.
The advantages of our alliances and coalitions are obvious. They
are the means for maintaining abroad the bases which are essential in
the present state of military technology. The most important alliance,
NATO, is an indispensable prerequisite to the present security system
of Europe. The coalitions serve to check the spread of Communist
influence and of neutralism. They likewise provide an operational
framework for working toward the common aims of the non-Communist world.
At the same time, it must be realized that these alliance and
coalition arrangements are purchased at considerable cost to the
United States. They require us to give up a certain amount of our
freedom in making policy. We are bound to pay serious attention to
the views, demands and special interests of our allies, even though this
is often inconvenient and costly. To tarry allies with us involves
compromise and bargaining, as well as delays in action.
If at the present time the U.S. should decide on a bold and strong
program in dealing with the Soviets, one of the chief problems will be
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SECRET TilL2
-2-
to get our allies to go along with us. At the same time the Soviets,
in seeking their own objectives, will undoubtedly try to work through
the members of the coalitions and through the uncommitted nations.
It must be kept in mind that these arrangements are unstable in
nature, and that their members usually have little military strength
to offer to the common effort. The U.S. is constantly faced with the
necessity of providing substantial foreign aid to keep the allies in
line and is also confronted with the risk that a change in government or
some maneuvers by the Soviets might lead particular members to lapse
into neutralism or, at the worst, to go over to the other side.
An adaitional difficulty must be kept in mind. In a time of crisis,
coalition systems tend to convert little disputes into big ones. Their
purpose, of course, is deterrence by confrontation of a potential opponent
with a superior force, but if this does not succeed, a general war may
be the outcome. In an atomic age, coalitions tend to diminish the chances
of localizing disputes and taking care of them by limited and conventional
military action.
But in spite of these heavy costs there can be little doubt that
a wisely administered system of alliances and coalitions is an indispen-
sable aid in the present crisis. The total gain in strength appears
clearly to outweigh the disadvantages. If there were any doubt about
this, it should be removed by the persistent and almost desperate efforts
of the Soviets to break up the system by any means.
Among the ways in which the Soviets seek to lure our allies away
from us two seem to offer particularly strong appeal. One of these
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arises out of the widespread fear of atomic warfare, and the other is
based on economic aspirations.
The first takes advantage of the fact that the atom bomb has become,
in the minds of vast numbers of people in Europe and Asia, a horror weapon.
This is a response which can exist with or without a rational foundation,
and is frequently accompanied by a feeling of distrust of the U.S. as
the originator and chief possessor of nuclear weapons. The resulting
fears have been effectively played upon by the Soviets through the sugges-
tion that in an atomic war between the U.S. and the USSR, the states
which are member e of alliances and coalitions with the United States
will be among the first to be bombed whereas those which have remained
neutral will be spared. The inhabitants of the perimeter states are
especially sensitive to this suggestion since they as a rule lack the
depth in territory which might lessen the effect of atomic attack.
This feeling of horror may in time give way somewhat to more rational
attitudes. But perhaps the most effective way to deal with it would be
to assist our allies to acquire at the earliest possible moment the best
available defense apparatus against nuclear weapons. This would be costly
and would take time, but the dimensions of the problem are not outside the
range of prudent calculation, and sufficient progress has been made in
perfecting defense methods so that they can generate some feelings of
confidence.
The second method of luring our allies into neutralism or indifference
is through tempting economic offers. These are especially effective in
regard to two pivotal allies, Germany and Japan. Unless the Free World
can present to them the prospect of expanding markets without excessive
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competition and the chance of acquiring their supplies without leaving
them in a condition of chronic dollar shortage, it will be increasingly
difficult to hold them as effective allies.
At the moment the problem ts particularly acute with regard to
Japan which faces a bad and steadily worsening economic condition, and
is being subjected to tempting luxes of large trade with Communist China.
Fortunately for us, the arrangements made thus far have been executed by
the Chinese in a slipshod manner or in bad faith. One promising way to
meet the situation would seem to lie in the direction of encouraging a
much more rapid rate of industrial growth in the underdeveloped countries
than now exists. This could be done by a greatly increased flow of
investment resources to these parts of the world. The result would be
the opening up of new markets for the industrial products of Japan, and
a reduction in the attractions of trade with the Communist mainland.
The main point to remember is that the alliances have been brought
into existence to further the basic objectives of the U.S., which are
also presumably the objectives of the Free World. The structure of an
alliance should never be allowed to hinder attainment of the objectives
of the alliance. It is quite possible that by skillful diplomacy the
U,S. can present its views to its allies in such a way as to carry them
through without substantial opposition. A forceful and elear statement
of the U.S. position should leave little room for bargaining on behalf
of special interests. Opportunity to be heard should of course be given,
but effective leadership can be counted on to avoid fruitless discussion.
The important thing is not to worry in advance about all the possible
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objections which Our allies Might raise to various courses of action but
to make out' OWn policy deCisions and then to proceed to the business of
persuading our allies of their cogency4
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Dr. George Pettee
Tab 3 (a) to Report of
Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel
DOES NATO HAVE A POSITION OF STRENGTH?
In discucsing this subject, it is necessary to speak from impressions
and opinions on some matters. What is said about the attitudes of the
NATO soldiers is based on direct contacts. What is said on military
Matters will be said without documentation, but is believed to be in
general conformity with military views.
1. What Do the NATO Soldiers Think About it?
The good soldiers in NATO have a great sense of positive
accomplishment. They have worked very hard for years now, under some
very frustrating conditions.
They believe thL:t they have fairly sub-
stantial forces now, and that these forces could really fight. They
also feel that some of the things that the enemy has been doing this
year are things that he would not have to do if NATO had pat
attained a position of strength.
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2. Present Status of NATO in Military Terms
The present force of European NATO, beginning with the army force,
based upon elements receiving MDAP support and in D to D -plus -30 status,
amount to about 3 million men. For European NATO, together with Spain and
Yugoslavia, the total is about 3,2000000.
The airforces are fairly strong in fighters and light bombers and
reconnaissance, and taken on the basis of squadrons and by planes irLD4?Day
readiness, they may be measured as something like 1/3 of the U. S. Air Force.
The navies have large numbers of ships for work in coastal waters in
wartime, including mine-sweepers and all types of escort vessels.
These forces have now been equipped, in addition to the pre -MDAP
equipment, with about 08 billion of delivered MDAP equipment together with
012 billion covered by national expenditure; these figures being for all
services. Out of this total, the armies have received about 5 billion in
delivered MDAP hardware and about 7 billion for equipment from national
expenditure. The equipment of the armies by conventional standards is
approximately complete, although there are specific shortages in trucks,
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same types of electronics and in ammunition.
The planning and programming of equipment for the NATO forces is con-
ducted under a peculiar system in certain respects. Only part of the forces
in any country is subject to MDAP support, these normally being that part
of the forces committed to NATO command and in fl-Day to D -plus -30 state of
readiness, However, the three criteria, MDAP supported as against non-
supported, NATO committed as against national committed, and D-plus,30
as against lower military readiness, are not exactly parallel. One result
of this is that the major bodies of data involved in the flow of information
for the planning processes are not comprehensive, either in terms of military
capabilities or by available supplies. There is no such consistent and
integrated sequence of strategic, logistic and budget plans as is required
in a fairly systematic planning sequence.
The entire arming of NATO has also been conducted in accordance with
an initial concept of arming up to a static or "level-off" strength. The
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rapid evolution of newer armaments, and the consequent adaptation of tactics
and force organizations, have made such a "level-off" concept fallacious.
The capabilities of the NATO armies at present will include stopping
the Russian Army at the Rhine) on the condition that tactical atomic weapons
would be used in large quantities, and by large quantities one means at least
four figures. This would hold good for a war commencing in 1956 or 1957.
Taking this as a fact and the confidence of the soldiers that it is a sensible
fact, this has been enough to give Europe some sense of having military
security for the time being) and, of course, subject to many qualifications.
At the same time, the air defense system in Europe is wholly inadequate
for a war under present circumstances and is rapidly becoming even more so.
The ground-to-air anti-aircraft system is about as good as the Germans had
in 1944. The defense by fighter aircraft, although based upon fighters
much superior to those of World War II, is of dubious value in the light of
the short distances, short warning times, and small numbers of all-weather
fighters.
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It is probable that no substantial flow of military freight across the
ocean can be assured during the first six months of a war.
To sunmarize these capabilities, NATO forces now constitute a positive
and substantial asset on the Free World side. Assuming that the true
deterrent effect is the effect of the over?all balance between all of our
military assets on the one hand and all of theirs on the other, as measured in
the minds of the highest enemy political and military authorities, and that
it requires all of our assets to constitute the total, it would seam fair to
rate the NATO forces as something on the order of 10% of the total military
assets upon which we rely to deter the enemy from war.
3. What Does NATO Lack?
The first serious military weakness in the present NATO system is
the lack of an adequate air defense. It would appear impossible for NATO
to continue to have a position of strength as much as three or four years
ahead without a serious effort in this respect. Taking it that military
realities must be satisfied, if the position is to be really strong, and that
the satisfaction of military realttics must also be plausible to at least
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the central cadres if confidence is to be maintained in military and political
circles, it is vitally necessary that there be established for Europe a
thoroughly modern system of air defense. In this connection, it may be noted
that although the European publics may be much less well-informed than the
American public on this subject, the information available to the interested
groups in Europe is fully equal to U.S. public information and general
cognizance. Pictures of NIKE are printed in the European press, European
newsreels cover atomic shots in Nevada, etc.
The second essential is that the NATO armies be reconstructed so far as
required for the tactics of atomic warfare. Furthermore, since the period
is necessarily limited during which the use of tactical atomic weapons enables
weaker NATO forces to face otherwise stronger Russian forces, and given the
expectation that tactical atomic warfare will have to be excluded from ground
war or that both sides will use it equally, further very serious changes in
the scale or design of the army forces will be necessary.
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Thirdly, in order to reap the military profits which may be within reach
if and when the enemy ground forces are stopped on the continent, the NATO
forces must have a capability of rapid offensive follow-up of successful
ground battle. This imposes serious new requirements in terms of the systems
of forces, tactics and equipment.
Fourthly, the rapidly developing situation in regard to electronic
counter-measures demands a strenuous effort if the communications systems for
ground warfare under actual or latent atomic attack are to be satisfied.
4. The Conditions Required for the Maintenance of a Position of
Strength in NATO.
a. The ground space of Germany is indispensable to any highly
effective system. of NATO air defense.
b. A German army is essential for holding at any line east of the
Rhine even with large scale use of atomic weapons and even more so if
there is to be any prospect of holding without use of atomic weapons.
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c. German industry and scientific capability are urgently needed in
connection with the progressive re?equipment of the NATO forces for new
forms of warfare.
d. Active German support of the NATO military position is an
essential for the maintenance of military confidence and for the conviction
by the military cadres of NATO that the NATO system makes military sense,
and German neutralization would correspondingly be fatal both militarily
and morally.
e. The maintenance of a position of strength in NATO, even with
German participation, requires long continued American aid to avoid an
otherwise very rapid shrinkage in military strength relative to the
rapid technical evolution of war.
f. Energetic participation by European elements in the t.NATO 9f fort,
morally, politically and militarily, demands that US. policy be rationally
comprehensible to the European mind.
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ASIA POLICY
Tab 3(h)
to the Report of the
Quantico VulLerabilities
Panel
Dr. W. W. Rostow
It is altogether likely that the Soviet diplomatic offensive in
Europe is geared to its intentions in Asia. Moscow has consistently
demonstrated that its world policy is a unified program in which a
setting of Ipterlte in one region is used to minimize resistance to
aggression in other areas.
The United States is alone with Russia in having major vital
interests at both ends of the Eurasian continent; but we have been
less systematic in linking our European and Asian programs.
This brief appendix is designed briefly to outline some possible
relations between the European and Asian situations and to suggest
broadly the courses of American action which would maximize the American
and Free World strength in Asia, in the light of the developing European
situation.
The following appears true of the Soviet position concerning the
European-Asian link; over the current planning future (say, 3 to 4 years):
1. Moscow is more confident of making geographical gains for
Communism in Asia than in Europe;
2. There is more likely to be a situation of extreme tension,
threatening armed conflict, in Asia than in Europe;
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3, The schisms between the U.S. and the rest of the Free World
over policy in Asia are regarded as a major Free World vulnerability,
By and large, it appears to lie within United States capabilities
to prevent any significant Communist advance in Asia due to the following
potentially favorable factors:
1. The Chinese Communist internal situation is such that Peiping
is unlikely to undertake forms of aggression which would draw significant
resources away from its first five-year plan.
2. The regions of most likely military engagement in Southeast
Asia present the Coamunist bloc with an extraordinarily long and difficult
line of supply as well as extremely difficult terrain, excepting South
Vietnam and Laos. This line is met by Allied lines which are relatively
short in time and cheap in cost, because of Allied command of the
opem sea.
3, Aside from South Vietnam and possibly Laos, there are real
foundations within Free Asia on which the United States can build a
policy which could not only deny Communism's advance in Asia by means
short of major war, but which could bind Free Asia more closely into
the Free World and progressively eliminate the schisms which Moscow and
Peiping have hitherto exploited with considerable success. The main
headings for such a policy appear to be these:
(a) The development of the capability and the will to use American
military strength to deal with Communist military aggression short of
major war and a persuasive projection of that intent to Asians. On the
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basis of such a capability, we should seek to achieve the following
psychological atmosphere in Asia:
(i) The anticipation that the future will bring an eventual
Free World victory, and that wisely fatalistic Asians should therefore
join the winner as soon as they can.
(ii) The fact that Communism is wicked and that Communists will
sooner or later be punished or dishonored by the peoples whom they now
hold captive.
(b) A further development of our investment programs in Asia
on a scale sufficient both to outstrip Chinese Communist economic
development in Southeast Asia and to provide Japan with markets and
sources of supply sufficient to solve the acute and dangerous Japanese
balance-of-payments problem, and thus to give Japan the foundations for
a position of dignity and strength within the Free World.
(c) An increased American interest in emphasis on the problems
of Southeast Asia, accompanied by more vigorous efforts to align the
U. S. around the world with programs to accelerate the elimination of
colonialism.
(d) Prevention of a Communist take-over of Southern Vietnam both
for its own sake and to give the rest of Southeast Asia time to gain
further strength and confidence, since Peiping is unlikely to turn to
a major subversive effort elsewhere until its ambitions in Indochina
are achieved.
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(e) A positive U.S. program for Formosa which frankly acknowledges
that the U.S. does not intend to initiate a war to install the Cbinese
Nationalists on the mainland or to encourage military efforts by the
Naticnalists to initiate a major war with China, but which is designed
to achieve the following:
(i) A situation in which Free Asia supports a constructive
economic and political policy on Formosa; and
(ii) Transformation of Formosa into a forward-looking Chinese
political base, training the cadres for a technically modern, revolutionary
Sunyatsenist democracy and providing the political foundations for U.S.
and Free World action in China should major war arise from Communist
initiative or should a crisis develop on the mainland capable of
exploitation by the Chinese Nationalists with or without U. 8. support.
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fEDRET
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TAB 3(0
To Report of
.Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel
JAPAN
THE PROBLEM
The Soviet balance of power with NATO, including Germany, can be
dislocated against the USSR if the United States moves toward the
serious rearmament of Japan: what factors are needed to make Japan a
great power in fact, and to ensure that it is a great power closely
associated with the United States?
ASSJMPTIONS
1. If Japan has no strategic interests for which weapons are
needed, Japanese armament may exist in fact but the Japanese will lack
morale and national stpport.
2. Japanese strategic interests -,.. short of wars of conquest,
which are ruled out ab initio
Ow.
can at present exist only in concert
with other powers, such as the U.S.
3. Effective Japanese home air defense is the first precondition
to any Japanese military role in the world.
4. Japan has been the 21222, actual great power in East Asia in the
past century and is capable of being the predominant power in that area
once again.
FACTS
1. The Japanese have been omitted from all international lists of
great powers for the last ten years.
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2. The Japanese military and naval power did contain all of
Chinafs offensive capacity and restrict the entire Asiatic USSR for
thirty years before 1945.
3, The Japanese have never done well as a satellite nation. They
must be treated with real honor and seriousness as a principal if they
are to perform well, not with a feigned or psywar deference.
DISCUSSION
14 The Japanese Should not be disregarded during the "summit?
conference. Since they are not participants, they should be briefed by
priority channels.
2, Japanese advice to the Americans should be sought and obtained.
The Japanese should under no circumstances be allowed to play the role
of neutrals or observers.
3. If the real military potential of Japan is consideredl the
bilateral Washington-Tokyo complex is more powerful than any conglomer-
ation of minor Northeast Asian states. The American-Japanese alliance
already exists in all but name. The missing essential is to make it
actual by treating the Japanese as a great pouer, not as a mercenary
dependent of the U.S. forces in Western Pacific.
4.
crated
5.
Japanese military and naval technology can and should be re-
for the common defense of the U.S. and Japan.
The economic and military role of the Japanese should be re-
studied, first in the American government, and secondly in discussions
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between Tokyo and Washington, so as to find the maximum position of
weight, power, prestige and wealth uhich tbe Japanese people and em-
peror can earn with their own efforts in the next twenty years.
CONCLUSIONS
le A strong Japan may eventually relieve the U.S. military and
naval overcommitment in the Western Pacific; it will also relieve the
U.S. of involvement with minor political details (Cambodia; Laos; the
successor to Chiang) which are of vital interest to Japan but secondary
interest to the U.S.
2. A non-neutral Asian bloc led by Japan could eventually offset
both Nehruism and Maoism on the purely Asian scene.
3. U.S aid to Japan, economic or military, will be morally and
politically bad for Japan until we find methods for obtaining real Japan-
ese aid for the U.S. and then accept it. The U.S. cannot forever shame
the Japanese by "giving" them things.
RECOMENDATIONS
1. NO psywar on Japan's role should be used now.
2., Japan should be cut in on the conference by means of U.S.
communication with Japan.
3. The potential of Japan as a real great power should be re-
studied by the U.S. government in the first place and by the U.S. and
Japanese governments in the second place.
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4. Japan beat Russia once; the revival of Japan in fact is itself
a weapon Which does not require advertising or diplomatic promotion;
these steps should therefore neither be publicized nor kept secrets
but handled quietly and soberly.
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Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel
Dr. Stefan Possony
YEASURES TO COPE,WITH
FREE:7517CDF-4ARS OF THE BOMB
???????????PMW....../..1
General apprehension about nuclear warfare is one of the main weak-
nesses of the U.S.position in Europe, including the NATO countries. There
is a tendency to dismiss this apprehension as irrational or to take the
attitude that Europeans simply must readjust to neW conditions of war-
fare. However, their apprehension will not evaporate as a result of this
attitude. It must be recognized that European apprehensions -- which are
not entirely "irrational" -- pose a serious problem for American policy.
The following steps should be considered as possible means to come to
grips with this problem:
1. Europeans believe that they, practically alone, will be the
victims of nuclear war, and that the United States will not be seriously
hurt. This impression can be corrected by a suitable information program.
2. Europeans are fearful that they are particularly vulnerable to
nuclear attack. It is quite true that European countries possess
entirely inadequate air defenses. They also lack proper civilian defenses.
Moreover, it is true that due, for example, to short warning times, they
are more handicapped in some respects, than the U.S. It is suggested there-
fore that the build-up of a NATO military and civilian air defense system
be given a high priority and that it be based on the most recent tech-
nology, including, to the extent practical, on ground-to-air missiles
with atomic war heads.
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3. Since at this time, the European nations (except the UK) do not
possess nuclear weapons, it is not particularly surprising that they
take a negative attitude. Consideration should be given to the allocation
of a few small weapons to some of the NATO allies, assuming that such
nations comply with US security requirements. It is of primary importance
to transform some of our allies into "nuclear powers." Unless and until
we do, we shall not be able to convince them of the soundness of our
strategy.
4.. The unreasonable fear about atomic weapons may be alleviated
by having foreign troops participate in a troop indoctrination program,
such as was undertaken by the U.S. Army in Nevada. Participation in such
tests should take place outside of. the U.S. and within the NATO area.
5. Fear about fall-out -- which is the single most significant
component of the nuclear fear -- may be reduced by disclosing that
fall-out can be avoided and by stating that there is no intention on the
part of the U.S. to use nuclear weapons in such a way that large scale
fall-out will occur. It is particularly necessary to state that employ-
ment of nuclear weapons in defense of the NATO area yill not entail
massive fall-out -- and to adjust military plans accordingly. Since,
however, fall-out cannot be avoided entirely, there should be some safety
indoctrination in exposed areas.
6. An invitation may be issued to the Soviet Union asking them to
associate themselves with the U.S. policy on fall-out. This declaration
of intent should be followed up with an international scientific conference
on fall-out. (Note: It should be recognized that recent U.S. statements
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11.0,
on fall-out have done more harm than good. The U.S. should make up its
mind to get civil defense without frightening Americans and particularly
Congress into it: The truth is that Americans so far have not become
actively fearful, but the Europeans have succumbed to a fear almost
bordering on panic.)
7. Clarifying statements should be issued and strategic actions
engaged in -- or at least not shied away from -- to disprove the follow-
ing equations erroneously believed in by many Europeans:
Any nuclear bomb is excessively devastating;
The employment of a limited number of bombs means a full-fledged
nuclear war and extremely high casualties;
The employment of nuclear bombs in local war must bring about
global nuclear conflict.
Instead, the following points should sink in:
There are numerous differences between bombs and their employment;
The employment of bombs in war does not necessarily lead to
excessive damage and casualties, and under some circumstances, may reduce
the human cost of war.
The employment of nuclear weapons does not by itself lead to global
warp on the contrary it may prevent it; in any events between 1945 and
19550 the nuclear superiority of the U.S. has kept the peace and preserved
the independence of the NATO nations. Henceforthlfuture Western security
demands intimate and active nuclear cooperation among the NATO nations.
It is recognized that some of the above suggestions may increase
apprehension at least in the short-run. The "frightfulness" of the weapon
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cannot be conjured away, and any attempt to do so would backfire. It is
believed that, if the NATO nations became more familiar with the nuclear
probleml actively participate in nuclear defense and offense, and in the
process lose their present acute inferiority complex, they will take a calmer
attitude ultimately and may become less inclined to interfere irrationally
with U.S. strategy.
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TAB 3(e)
To Report of
Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel
Dr. Ellis Johnson
AIR DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE
Since 1946 the favored strategic solutions in a conflict between the
United States and Soviet Union have favored the war of annihilation ini-
tiated by surprise using atomic weapons delivered by manned strategic
bombers, and since 1954, in fancy, by intercontinental ballistic missiles.
The early lead of the United States which resulted from the intensive
effort of the Manhattan District during World War II was soon recaptured
by the Soviet Union, and the Soviet atomic program begun in 1946 is ex-
pected to culminate in a stockpile of thousands of atomic weapons by
1965 of which a large number can be thermonuclear weapons of the size of
10 megatons or greater.
At the same time the Soviet Union has concentrated with equal in-
tensity on delivery systems and now matches the U.S. in the quality of
its strategic bombing aircraft. It is at least at parity, if not well
ahead of the U.S. in the development of intercontinental missiles. There-
fore, although the present situation of the Soviet Union is one of in-
feriority in both atomic stockpile and air vehicles to deliver the
stockpile, this inferiority is in numbers alone. Their problem is
primarily one of production and is one which they will have solved for
all practical purposes by 1960. At that time so far as atomic weapons
are concerned and so far as air vehicles suitable for delivery of the
atomic weapons are concerned, the Soviet Union will have a sufficiency
more than adequate to destroy the U.S. many times over if their air attack
is unopposed. We can summarize this situation by stating that the race
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for atomic stockpiles and the race for strategic delivery is nearly
over so far as unopposed delivery is concerned,
This does not mean that there should not be a continuing and in-
tensive effort to improve the U.S0 strategic delivery systems. However,
since in quality the to opponents have reached equality the prognosis
is that the delivery systems and the stockpiles will for all practical
purposes remain on an equal basis rather than on a basis which gives
unilateral advantage to one or the other of the opponents,
This has resulted in an intensified race to achieve an air defense
which could nullify the delivery of the atomic weapons. Both the U.S.
and the Soviet Union acquired access to the German uWasserfallu technology
at the end of World War II, Each country acquired a captive set of German
scientists, each has exploited the technology as intensely as possible,
each is constructing almost simultaneously the anti-aircraft missile
sites to defend the most vulnerable targets in each target complex. The
most impartial intelligence analyses assign (within the limits of accuracy
of intelligence information) approximately equal capabilities to the two
nations, Since the air defense technologies involve the most intricate
and complex detection, control and communication systems and the most
complex problems of aerodynamics, physics, propulsion, electronics
guidance as well as tactics, the outcome of the technology race for an
air-tight defense, with respect to the time of identical capability, re-
mains uncertain,
What has been proven beyond question of doubt is that it is within
the realms of technical and economic possibility to establish an air defense
system tight enough so that not more than one or two or three bombers
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out of a force of a thousand bombers would ever be able to deliver their
atomic war load on the target city. This would be an incredible achieve-
ment compared to World War II anti-aircraft defenses, But just as the
technology has improved the effectiveness of atomin weapons by 10 thou-
sand times over World War II high explosive bombs, the same technology
has improved the effectiveness of air defense weapons by 200 thousand
times. The technology which gave us atomic weapons is now providing
the invulnerable defense against these weapons. Very long range, the
manned-strategic bomber appears to be doomed to ineffectiveness in the
face of surface to air missile technology*
The problem of anti-missile defense is not yet solved but the prog-
nosis of the most skilled technicians indicates that the defense against
the as yet unborn intercontinental missile already exists in embryo,
and will probably emergu in full scale capability before the inter-
continental missile itself becomes practical,
Yet the outcome of any technological contest is like that of the
military conflict. The outcome depends upon the good luck of the tech-
nological breakthrough of the creative inventor, of the good management
of research development and decision-making of the wise executive, of
the far-seeing Congress and Senate and indeed of the whole decision-
making system of the culture, The problem of who has an adequate defense ,
against the opposing delivery systems cannot be predicted with great
accuracy,
In 1955 the studies of such notable groups as that led by James
Killian who reported his findings to the President in the Killian Report,
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of Lamplight, another MIT study, the Operations Research Office of the
Army, of the RAND Corporation of the Air Force, of the Lincoln Laboratories,
and of the Weapons System Evaluation Group, all indicate that within the
period 1958-60, the U.S. has the capability, if it chooses to appropriate
the monies required, for having an air defense system which will keep the
damage to the country probably below 2 per cent and almost certainly below
5 per cent. This level of defense would cost not more than
billion
a year. Although this is a heavy cost and although the outcome of the
technological battle to provide this defense is probabilistic, especially
with respect to electronics jamming, the judgment of the most skilled
technical personnel indicates the eventual superiority of air defense
over air attack at least in the period after 1960.
Since the air attack and air defense systems will be in continuing
competition, the effort in both must be mainteined but it seems probable
that if the United States makes the wiee denizions and makes the best
use of its technical permnnel, it can by 1960 nullify the threat to the
U.S. posed by the gruwing Soviet ate pile and the growing Soviet bomber
forces.
Let us now address ourselves to the question of tee air defense of
NATO. There is no question bee that the morale and the motivations of the
populations and of the leaders of our allies in the NATO countries are very
adversely affected by the threat of atomic attack of their cities, lines
of transportation, and military establishment and on the NATO forces, both
domestic and allied, who support their respective countries. Both the
SECUT
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Germans and the French are especially sensitive to the dangers of atomic
use in their countries. They know one simple mathematical equation: one
times zero equals zero; that is to say that if the probability of survival
against an atomic air attack is small or zero then it makes little sense
to have an excellent ground defense good enough to be sure of repulsing
a Soviet ground attack if the country is destroyed from the air by atomic
air attack,
Our allies are especially aware of the large number of medium bombers
or intermediate range ground-to-ground missiles that the Soviet Union can
bring to bear on then, as well as the growing Soviet stockpile of atomic
weapons. We can tisrefore expect our allies to lose motivation more and
more as they become acquainted with the growth of the Soviet atomic stock-
pile. For this reason their investment and the investment of the U.S, in
defensive ground forces will be of no value if an air defense of the NATO
countries as good as that of the U.S4 is not provided.
Such a defense is possible. It can be achieved by 1958 against manned-
bombers and by 1961-65 against ground-to-ground missiles. The estimated
cost of this defense is at least $4 billion a year to include the defense
of England, and the Continent including Italy. Of this cost not more than
$3 or $4 billion will be required for the initial capital investment in
guided missiles systems.
The effect of geography is important in an air defense system in
Europe. The warning system must be so close in front of the anti-aircraft
weapons line or the line where the bomb is dropped that only a limited
warning time is available. This warning time is so short that there is
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absolutely no value in providing manned-interceptor aircraft. The only
possible system that could be effective would be a ground-air-missile
system.
The only modern ground-air-missile system that can be provided by
1958 is a Nike air defense aystem. Investigations of the procurement
capabilities show that these must be manufactured in the U.S. and that
this is easily- within the capability of the U.S. Nike production already
established and planned for.
This 1958 air defense system, because of the technical dynamics, will
have a relatively short life so far as providing a permanent and continuing
effective air defense system is concerned, and it must be re-phased to a
better system as rapidly as possible to meet improved enemy systems.
This improved air defense system is best provided by supporting re-
search and development in the NATO countries so that they can design an
air defense suited for indigenous manufacture. Their own inventiveness
and capability in research and development is extremely high; note for
example the fact that the Wasserfall technology now being exploited by
the U.S. and the Soviet Union was developed in Germany. After the initial
capital investment, therefore, the most economic way of developing a native
defense system would be to support a research and development system and
production in the NATO complex. The psychological effect of such an ef-
fective air defense system would be very great on both the NATO populations
and on the Soviet Union.
It is predicted that the present antagonism arising from the existence
of atomic weapons and fall-out now very- much directed towards the U.S, would
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then be turned around and directed towards the Soviet Union, and the
present unhealthy atomic psychosis which exists in the NATO countries
would be changed to a healthy resentment of the Soviet pressure. Further-
more, hope would be reborn in the value of defense against ground attack
which would still exist at the perimeter by the threat of the ground
forces of the Soviet Union.
It should be noted that even though an air-tight air defense system
was established the possibility of tactical use of atomic weapons within
the NATO countries themselves would leave a residue of serious resentment
and uneasiness which would be directed primarily toward the U.S. It is
essential therefore that SHAPE and the U.S. make a maximum effort to find
other technical solutions than in the use of atomic weapons within the
NATO countries, This appears to be entirely feasible since at a minimum
atomic weapons could be used in interdiction bombing in Russia and if
necessary in the Satellite countries in order to limit the attacking
forces mounted by the Soviet Union against. NATO. Such a ctratery and
tactic would re -establidl the confidence of the NATO populations in the
U.S. as a wise and firm leader.
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Dr. George Pettee
TAB 3(f)
To Report of
QUANT ICO VULNERABILITY
PANEL
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE MORALE OF ALLIES
In attempting to summarize some of the ways in which our conduct
toward our allies affects their attitudes toward the alliance, a major
point is to try to see the thing from the point of view of. the allies.'
This may be difficult, but there are some possibly effective approaches.'
While it might require a very learned man to imagine the workings of the
mind of another nation in its cultural patterns, it may be possible for
us, simply by recalling the quarrels a husband can have with a wife, or
th?irritations between a father and a son, to remind ourselves how
easily the same facts can appear differently to different points of view.
The starting point of this discussion will be in terms of some of
the questions which allies must ask themselves, or which anyone of us
might ask for them if WO were engaged as their counsel.' Thereafter there
will be a short treatment of the criteria of a strong ally', in terms
relevant to the present, and finally a short summary of principles or
measures which we should bear in mind if we wish our allies to be strong
in their alliance.
A. The Alliance from the Point. of View of an Ally.
1. Why is an alliance with the -United States not like the Monroe
Doctrine, requiring no effort by the protected countries?
2. If our security is essential to the security of the United
States, is that not simply a very nice thing for us?
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3. If the protective wing of the United States is enough to
make the "smart money" in this country confident as to the security
and stability of the country, does not this provide the opportunity
for hanging onto some of the good things we have, ranging from colonies
to big estates or mink coats.
4. If the United States really expects us to make serious efforts
for the aims of the alliance, how can it expect us to play on the team
when we cannot hear the signals.
5. It is difficult enough to make military plans based upon a
budget dependent upon the grace of one unpredictable legislature. How
can we pianindepehdence upon not one but two such legislatures?
6. If we are to be soldiers of the Free World coalition, are we
to be second class soldiers with second class equipment, expected "not
to reason why" on strategy or tactics?
7. If the enemy, with his advantage of numbers and of interior
lines, concentrates against us on our isolated sector of the great
perimeter, where are reinforcements for us to come from?
8. If we have lots of men, and are in a part of the world where
for geographic and logistic reasons neither side could fight with
great quantities of heavy equipment, what sort of force system, tactical
system and equipment system should we have on a rational basis, as
distinct from a merely skimped version of US TO&E.
9. Has the US no answer to the small war problem except the
massive all?out use of atomic weapons?
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10. If the United States will not give us the essential facts
about the effectiveness of some of the weapons which will be in the
battle, just how can we prepare our minds for the combat -- should
we stand on one foot and chew our nails?
11. If the U.S. is enmeshed in the complex organizations and
procedures of several alliances in addition to its own governmental
complexities, what is to assure us that decisions can be made on time
when the time isvery short.
12. (For some of the colonial areas) Why does the U.S.. subject
us to the economic fall?out of erratic supply and demand for the
exports of raw materials which are the basis of our livelihood?
13. If the U.S. makes such a clamor that only a NIKE defense
system or a better one is adequate for air defense, and makes no move
to assist our air defenses, are we to assume that we are expendible?
14. If one can have a free ride under the protection of the
United States why should one be an ally instead of a neutral?
B. What are the Criteria of Strength of an. Ally?
1. A large proportion of the vote in elections (90 % or so) cast
in favor of parties which support the status quo with its possibilities
of reform, and against the parties of revolution, Communist or Fascist.
2. The voting by the parldAment of a considerable portion of the
total budget for defense purposes, roughly speaking 40 percent of the
budget, and between 7 and 10 percent of the GNP, (though differing of
course for richer and poorer countries).
3
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3. The display of a practically effective will to accomplish
stable and democratic solutions to political and economic problems
in colonies, and such problems as land reform in countries where
such problems exist.
4. Furnish, pay and train military full?time manpower equal
to at least 1 percent of the population.
5. In NATO, and in continental Europe, the assignment to NATO
command of a large proportion of the total forces, and a show of
responsibility in maintaining such an assignment:
6. Some initiative and imagination by the leading military cadres
in learning the nature of modern war.
7. Self.-respect in the military and political cadres of our allies
and some capacity for spontaneous initiative in support of the alliance.
C. Principles and Measures Which Should Govern the U.S. Role Toward
Allies.
If our allies are in fact allies, what will make them bettor and
stronger allies?
1. We must undertake to underwrite the expensive initial equipment
of forces if they are willing to provide the men, commit the forces to
the common purpose, and cannot support the initial cost.
2. We must assist, on at least a catalytic scale in the establish?
ment of specific arms industry production capacity.
3. We must take great pains to keep the reasons clear why their
military effort makes military sense, and especially to be sure that
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their leading military and political cadres understand the rationale.
4. We must assure them that whereas they are in generar,locally
committed by theatre, the U.S. with some other UN or NATO support
accepts the role of inter-theatre reserve, deployable to meet enemy
strategic concentration.
5. We must initiate programs to provide, partly at our cost,
modern air defenses, espec411y in Europe and japan.
6. We should move rapidly to develop reasoned designs for the
force systems of countries of )reek, Turkish and Korean types, adapted
to the theatres and to the availability of men and of equipment.
7, We should commence the full mobilization of the great Western
European capacity for the development of weapons and counter-weapons.
8. We should provide them in permanence the essential military
and political conditions of elementary economic and business confidence.
9. We must assure them that the decision-making difficulties of a
very complex alliance will not prevent emergency action on time, since
we will accept the necessity for unilateral decisions in emergency.
10. We must show enough conviction to oppose our own firm judg-
ment to that of popular emotion when we deem the latter wrong, and enough
care for the peoples to accept the Obligation of leadership, to explain
and elucidate and persuade, time without end.
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SECRET TAB 4 to Report of
Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel
Paul Linebarger
STRAINING THE SINO -SOVIET ALLIANCE
THE PROBLEM
Can the United States so impair the relationship between the top
leaders in Peiping and those in Moscow as to make the worldwide strategy
of Communism more difficult and less efficient for Communists to execute?
ASSUMPTIONS
1. That pith or without recognition, the United States and the
"Chinese People's Republic" do not at the present reciprocate even that
minimum of trust and confidence which might permit American diplomats or
propagandists to seduce Chinese Communist leaders from their loyalty to
world Communism as represented by Moscow.
2. That the racialist chauvinism characteristic of part of Kuomintang
mentality persists in the CCP leadership, though somewhat beneath tile
surface, and that the Chinese Communists are suspicious of deals between
alien Westerners (e.g. "white merOat their expense.
3. That all Communist control systems engender the more or less dis-
tinct flavor of "a sense of conspiracy and persecution" reminiscent of
paranoia, that therefore the chronically suspicious emotional posture of
CCP leadership presents the antagonists of Red China with a Peiping
vulnerability.
FACTS
1. The United States cannot develop relations with Peiping rapidly
enough to do any serious wedge-driving from the Peiping end of the
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Peiping-Moscow alliance in the next few weeks.
2. In the continuation of long-established Chinese political habits,
the Chinese Communists in fact (though not in words) presumalAT despise
the British for being so weak as to recognize Red China and respect us
for having the strength not to recognize Red China.
3, The Chinese, both Nationalist and Communist, are concerned only
with right and wrong after the political facts supporting one morality or
the other have been determined by force, and therefore the Chinese Commu-
nists are primarily interested in establishing a de facto political system in
the Far East which will make the United States permanently and essentially
wrong; the fundamental ideological issue of recognizing or not recognizing
"People's China" is very little different from the earlier problem of U.S.
recognition of 1Manchoukuo."
DISCUSSION
1. The appended review of "Chinese Political Behavior" presents
some of the highlights of a necessary discussion of these points.
CONCLUSIONS
1. For the period 1955-1958, for the purpose of manipulating
12212.....1.32e (and without reference to other, concurrent policy), the United
States leaders should deal with the USSR concerning Red China but should
seek to minimize dealing with Red China concerning Red China.
2. The President should give the impression that a Washington -
Moscow bilateral deal might, with Russian willingness, settle the China
prablem.
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3. The Russians should be asked their advice on what to do about
"the two Chinas" at the summit meeting. News of the U.S. inquiry should
reach the world press: even if the inquiry is informal and off the agenda.
4. At some later date, U.S. policy can work directly on Red Chinese
leadership; this time has not yet come. The only practicable line of
approach is at present through the Russians.
5. As a principal anti-Communist power, the United States should
seek to make Russia, as the principal Communist power, responsible for
all the consequences of Communist leadership. This will impose a sus-
tained strain on Sine-Russian relations.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. That the U.S. initiate the problem of China at the summit and
attempt to make discussion of China both secret and bilateral.
2. That no real "solution" be sought to "the China problem" because
there is no problem which can be defined and solved; the many problems:
some almost unrelated to each other, will require years for their solution.
3. That at a meeting with Chou En -lai, most matters be referred
to American-Russian discussion for settlement.
4. That on no account the United Stutes should acquiesce in Red
China's pretensions to being the paramount power of all East Asia.
(ANNEX ATTACHED)
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to Report of
Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel
Paul Linebarger
CHINESE POLITICAL BLHAVIOR
(AMEX TO "STRAINING THE SINO?SOVIET ALLIANCE")
PRELIMINARY
If the subject of China is properly handled, there is a pretty good
chance of making the Communist Chinese regime, particularly its dozen top
leaders, feel that they have run a serious risk of being victimized by a
conference in which they are not participants. This is a major Chinese
Communist vulnerability. Sino-Soviet relations cannot be broken at this
time, but they can be strained. If the strain does not now show on the
surface, we will nevertheless stand a good chance of putting a deep strain
on the Russo-Chinese alliance which will show up later.
SOME CHINESE TRADITIONS TODAY
The Chinese Communists at the present time are trying to follow many
standard traditional political Chinese habits, thinking habits, talking
habits, with, however, the new context of Communism. One of the basic
bad features of Ch'ing-dynasty foreign policy, which exasperated British
and American diplanats in the 19th Century almost to the point of frus-
tration and insanity, was the Chinese habit of cold sustained affirmation
of things they wished to be true, whether or not they were. China (the
mandarins said) was the most civilized country on earth, and there was no
comparable power. Even in specific cases, the Chinese Imperial officials
blandly denied the merely factual truth: there had been no murder; there
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were no disturbances; there was a riot but it was caused by the foreign-
ers; there wasntt any riot, and therefore, it couldn't be discussed; and the
riot might occur later, but hadn't occurred then; furthermore, they had
already paid for it. In this respect, the Chinese negotiators in Korea
were doing the exact thing that their great-grandfathers did in 1839, in
18400 1851, in 1860. Modern Russians have been driven to the realization
that sheer outright symbolic lying was a daily requisite to getting along
in Communist China.
Symbolic affirmation is an inward necessity in a Chinese society. It
is something which the Chinese do to each other in a dispute between in-
dividuals, each man takes an extreme position and there is a bargaining
to fact itself before they meet each other intellectually.
Bargaining proceeds by means of known procedure so that there are
understandable steps. First, the affirmation; second, the ceremony of engaging
the conflict; third, the appeal to disinterested parties for approval or
disapproval; fourth, an actual settlement.
Since the Maoist leaders are attempting to repudiate their own Confucian
past, their present position leaves them both sheltered at the present and
vulnerable in the future to a wide variety of semantic and emotional attacks.
It is vital to them to make affirmations t that Chiang Kai-shek is not
Chinese, that he does not exist, that Taiwan is an American colony, that
American power is a "paper tiger." Each affirmation has for them the function
of attempting to force a response from us. Each is potentially a point of
strength on which to negotiate further.
as
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OUTSIDE VALIDATION
The CCP leaders need outside validation of what they say. The
Chinese Communists have been playing one particular propaganda game with
us. We have been playing an almost unrelated one back at them. Each gets
pleasure from his own communication and neither elite seems to need the
other.
CHICOM VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES
One of the major changing factors in Chinese Communist policy tactics
is their day-to-day, week-to-week, month-by-month estimate of the U.S.A.
That they are attempting to set up a political radar to determine named
individuals, identified cliques, particular groups (activist and non-
activist), winning people and non-winning people in our government, in
our Senate, in our executive is reasonably certain. On the basis of
their crudely "sociological" estimate of our leadership, part of their
decisions are reached. In many ways our propaganda, if it were capable
of being more subtle, could address itself to the specific task of feeding
material directly into the CCP estimate of us.
THE NEED FOR HONOR
In terms of what an American policy can do to China at the present
time, the present China of Communism is the same China which seven years
ago was the China of Chiang Kai-shek. China has many of the same needs.
One of the reasons that a Communist China won a considerable degree of
support from intellectuals and youths, while turning to the USSR, is
because of the fact that the USSR is more capable of exporting honor and
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has less tendency to export non-honorable, purely material aid than we.
In other words, American aid, physical aid sometimes combined with
political shame, can be a highly destructive mixture to be given to any
of our allies. China, 1945-1949, seems to be a case in point. The American
contribution to the destruction of Chiang's position was not a conspiracy
in the State Department but a great part of American destructiveness
arose from Chinese realization that what they got physically was not
accompanied by honor of themselves, of their country, their leaders, or
of their purposes.
There is nothing in the USSR to shame the Chinese Communists, nothing
humiliating. And this situation, so much to the Soviet advantage, reflects
on through to the simple hearts of the people.
Therefore, part of our policy toward the "Chinese People's Republic"
should be very carefully addressed to avoiding honor for that government.
We should not pay that government honor as we did Bonn, Germany, pay that
government honor as we did to General Wu Hsiu-Chluan when America recog-
nized the Chinese Communists somewhat and had him come to New York, pay
that government honor by making the fuss we made over Panmunjom.
Wherever we can ignore that government, addressing ourselves to Moscow,
.talking about that government to third parties or in general using whatever
is readily derogatory about the Peiping government, we will prod the
governing group, plus the hundreds of thousands immediately below them,
to do something about our "shaming of them." This will
complicate their policy and will cost us virtually nothing. In
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this social and psychological respect, we have several inexpensive points
of very real advantage in dealing with this Chinese Communist regime.
RECOGNITION OF MOSCOW
One point at which we can go on almost forever without serious loss
is, first, American insistence that Moscow is the top dog of the Soviet
world -- Moscow, not Peiping. We can hold that Peiping is responsible
to Moscow and that only Moscow (as an actual great power) can negotiate
directly with us on matters of substance. The more we hammer that point,
the less Peiping can respond directly to us.
Secondly, there is the threat of an American-Soviet agreement con-
cerning any aspect of Communist China. This poses a very real strain on
Sino-Soviet relations and on the "Chinese People's Government" internally.
There is a point of ceremony which Chinese Communists and Nationalists both
understand perfectly, and on which the United States has allowed itself to be
booby-trapped: the historic protocol of seniority.
If the senior powers of the Communist and non-Communist world meet,
that should be a Moscow-Washington meeting.
If the Chinese powers meet, it should be a Taiwan-Peiping meeting.
For the U.S. to deal with Chou En-id i is like one gentleman dealing
with another gentleman's valet. And, therefore, any attempt on their
part, either the Russian or Chinese, to make the United States deal with
Peiping is the reduction of the United States to the status of Peiping,
which is something which we should avoid.
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Finally, the weakness of Soviet controls over Chinese foreign policy,
over Chinese armament, etc., is a real one,
SPECIFIC VULNERABILITIES
Specific weaknesses in Chinese politics can affect Sino-Soviet
relations. There are three which are very compelling.
The first is the probability that the Chinese do not believe
in the A-bomb, do not take atomic weapons seriously, considering these
to be firecrackers or impressive mechanical gadgets capable of having a
strong emotional effect on persons from the West but not workable against
fanatic, dispersed Chinese infantry. Except for a few technicians, this
ignorant assumption covers governing cadres at the top. This belief may
lead to a rather sharp strain on Sine-Soviet relations, if at any point
the Chinese are willing to risk an A-bomb.
Secondly, the Chinese have many more naive illusions about "Asia" than
do the Russiahs. The Chinese are very poorly equipped to deal with
Indonesia, with Siam, with Malaya, with Burma. They do not have people
who know the languages, they do not know the geography, the economics
or the political backgrounds of these countries. A great deal of Chinese
Communist thinking on this subject is not really Communist but seems to be
second-hand Japanese thinking from the period of the last war. Here and
there one finds a shrewd individual but very few of these people are
writing or communicating their judgments, with the result that the Chinese
Communists' image of Asia is a much more unrealistically integrated
"Aja" than anything that the Soviet leadership has assumed. And so it is
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an "Asia" much more anti-American, anti-British than anything the Soviet
Union would trust. Here again there is an opportunity for long-range
U.S. political strategy.
The third issue is that when it comes to the responses of the Asian
governments, the Chinese can score only accidental successes. As two
exnmples one can suggest that Chou En-lai adopted at Bandung what might
be called his "George C. Marshall tactics." Al]. he had to remember was
what kind of a Ghou En-lai it was whom General Marshall once liked.
It was a charming, sweet, amiable Chou En-lai. This "Chou En-lai" he
replayed with the skill of a great dramatic actor.
MAJOR CHINESE TARGETS
There are two groups of targets which the Chinese seek. First, the
Chinese Communists wish to sustain the unique relationship they have with
the Soviet Union. This relationship is more than emotionally necessary to
them: it is religiously necessary.
cornerstone of the entire system of
at the present time. They are part
a portion of the modern world; they
This moral relationship provides the
Chinese Communist political survival
of one part of the West, and therewith
are a member of a 20th Century organi-
zation of civilized states. Many Chinese felt that if they could not
become a respectable member of the Western democratic camp, they would be
well mdvisod to become modern by joining the other Western "democratic" camp
The second problem involves the old Chinese "family of nations." This
family of nations includes those countries in which the Chinese written
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language, Confucian ideology, and Chinese literature were used between the
eighth and nineteenth centuries, A.D. One can almost draw it on the map
by asking which of these nations of the world have traditional Chinese
names which impress the Chinese as being genuine Chinese names, such as
Vietnam (Yuehnan), Korea (Chtaohsien)? or Tibet (Hsiklang). At its widest
colonial periphery, the Chinese family of nations would include (for
example) the Somali coast, Ceylon, most of Malaya, some of Luzon, parts
of Kashmir, Nepal and other points to the south, Formosa, Okinawa, and the
Spratly reefs.
THE TIME FACTOR
Finally, it must be underscored that it is the Chinese Communists
who seek to impose haste on their own recognition by the U.S., their
admission to the United Nations, and the like. The United States has
nothing to gain and everything to lose by giving the Chinese Communists
something for nothing at this time. We should not proceed at all unless
we derive a real American interest from the concession.
In form, the current working decision. on China should be to handle the
decision on China matters at the Washington-Moscow level or at the Peiping-
Taipei level.
In fact, there is no need to take up solutions to China issues until
Japan is ready and able to participate as a great power. Any bargain
reached by the United States in China will have to be lived with by the
Japanese, and if Japanese economic interests in China are not included in
a settlement with Peiping, the U.S. will have to foot the bill in the
long-run. A real concurrence of Washington and Tokyo is a precondition
to the definitive kind of settlement which the USSR is now demanding for
China.
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Dr. George Pettee
Tab 5 to
Report of Quantico
Vulnerabilities Panel
AN INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF MACE
The gradual "unwinding" of the cold war was a concept Which played
a central role in the thinking of the group durLng the week, Some such
concept was necessitated by any position which rejected the inevitability
of a great war between the US and the Soviet power. The general strategic
ideas advanced rest upon this concept. It was felt that the transformation
of the world situation from the present one of high tensions based upon
accumulated hates and fears and anxieties, into a situation in which the
abolition of major war would have been accomplished must be accepted as
a genuine possibility.
There was no tendency however to slip into optimism. It was
recognized that such a transformation of the present one into a peaceful
one would require most strenuous effort and a very long time, possibly
two decades, more or less. It was also recognized that the iniLial laying
down of foundations of accomplishment in mutual give and take with Russia,
and the creation of a basis of good faith in US-Russian dealings, would
demand enormous skill and patience, and everlasting realism.
It was implied, rather than explicitly stated, that this concept
of a process of transition from the presentslondition to a peaceful one
involves a variety of problems on which a great deal of the essential
logic is not now known. Differences of viewpoint were apparent within
the group, and these differences were difficult to reconcile because of
the sheer absence of a body of knowledge in the minds of the participants.
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None of us came to the conference in a state of being learned on the
aubjectof how to produce and maintain a peaceful state of the world,
since there is no man today who is an expert on this.
The nature of war, and the nature of peace, and the nature of a
as
peaceful order, not only within a state/is the familiar historical
phenomenon, but in a multi-state system, which is not a familiar
historical phenomenon, are all involved in this problem. So also is the
general concept of world revolution, and the problem as to how revolution-
ary are the US aims of a peaceful world, and how reactionary is the enemy
concept of inevitable conflict.
The existence of the problem area seems to be a reality. This
being so, the questions arise:
Have we an organized body of knowledge in this field?
If not, are there considerable bodies of knowledge that
are pertinent to the problem but awaiting organization?
Have we trained experts on the subject?
If the answers to the first and third questions above are
negative, what should we do about it?
Proposal:
It is proposed that the problem calls for the establishment,
soonest, of something like an Institute of Advanced Studies of Peace and
War.
It is further proposed that this Institute be established on the
following basis.
1. The study program of the Institute be based upon the
granting of full time appointments on a two years basis to a number of
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scholars or experts drawn from government, including military service
personnel.
2. The appointment be without specific assignment except
that the individual must spend full time for nine months of each year
at the institute engaged in self?directed studies related to the main
problem.
3. There be no bar to cooperative study among several
individuals who choose to work together upon a problem too large for
one man to deal with effectively in two years.
4. The Institute operate a series of conferences to be
attended by a small number of leading individuals drawn from all areas
of US life to hear, test and argue the tentative findings of the
Institute and to offer practical guidance in an informal manner.
5. The initial number of individual members of the Institute
be 100 with approximately 10 to be appointed each year, so as to maintain
a steady group of about 20.
6. The location of the Institute to be close to a center of
University life, with ample library facilities and other resources for
full use of existing knowledge resources.
7. The initial funding to be in the amount of $500,000 for
the first year, and $1,0000000 per year thereafter, until or unless
experience demonstrates that a larger sum could be effectively used or
that results do not justify continuation.
3
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It is submitted that the establishment of such an institute,
without publicity as to its exact scale and funding, would be a move
favorable to American interests in the world and would be viewed with
approval throughout the friendly world. It could serve, if well handled,
as an important counter to the picture of the US as a nation that can and
does spend at will a quarter of a billion for an aircraft carrier.
The all important factor in the success of the Institute will lie
in the administration of its program in the most complete spirit of
scientific freedom for the minds of its members. If complete intellectual
freedom to investigate the problem of peace by the most uninhibited
intellectual approaches can be established, and if the most powerful and
energetic minds can be attracted to the Institute, it can be expected that
the payoff may be of very radical importance within five years and that
the first important fruits may be obtained in less time than that.
The Institute would amount to an establishment, first in the world,
of a Peace College to match the War Colleeges. It is not at all meant
to imply that there would be a conflict of views as between the two types.
In fact the Peace College would probably find friendly sisters in the War
Colleges, concerned as they both would be in part with the analysis of
the basic human facts behind the great strategic issues.
It is conceivable that the effort should be conducted on a far
larger scale and in a greater variety of.institutes rather than in one
small one. At least at the start, and until experience should demonstrate
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the existence of a range of problem areas of undoubted significance,
and of undoubted feasibility for the application of large intellectual
and research resources, the effort should be to have the smallest number
of men of the highest intellectual calibre, and endowed with the most
dedicated sense of urgency, so long as the number is up to the minimum
required for intensive cross?stimulation of minds.
The Institute would represent the initiation of an R & D capability
for the mastery of the problem of peate: the first seed perhaps of an
appldcation of human brains to this problem comparable to the application
of human brains to the techniques of war.
5
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