(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01446R000100150006-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: October 27, 1952
• Content Type: HW

Approved For Release 2000/09/12 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100150006-5
wa-ieot
Approved For Release 2000/09/12 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100150006-5
Approved For Release 20004R:1etWg80-01446ROOQA5
3EORET
October 23, 1952
? Rorace S. Craig
FROM; John Flliott
SUBJECTI Talk with Charles F. ("Chip") Bohlen
d a talk last night with Charles F. ("Chip") Bohlen, Counsellor
tate Department, on the subject of the latest developments in
et Russian policy.
Mr. Bohlen thought that Stalin's article on political and economic
affairs printed in the magasine."Bolshevie on the eve Of the recent
meeting of the nineteenth congress of the Soviet Communist Party heralded
a striking and arresting change in the Kremlin's strategy.
The Soviet objectiveness remains now as before the same?world
demination?according to Mr. Bohlen?and the danger ,of war is as great
as it ever was?but Soviet tactics have changed once more as they have
many times in the past and as they are apt to do many times in the future.
What is currently happening is that the masters of the Kremlin are
reverting to the "popular front" methods. This course of action will
doubtless be on a less formal basis than was the case in 1935 since the
Communists no longer enjoy the confidence of the European Socialists that
made possible the Leon Blum cabinet in France in 1936-1947 and the alliance
that victoriously swept the Spanish elections early in 1936.
The new change of front, calling for cooperation with the bourgeois
on certain issues such as the "peace crusade", marks the third shift in
Soviet policy :duce 1945. At the end of World War II, the Kremlin
ordered the European Communists to cooperate with bourgeois parties and
they did enter into ministerial coalitions in France and Italy and worked
with the Social Democrats on an "anti-Fascist" basis in Germany.
Bat this policy changed abruptly in 1947 with the introduction of
the Marshall Plan. The Communist parties were ordered to embark on An
outright policy of hostility to the existing order in democratic coun-
tries and the Cominform arose as Moscow's reply to Europe Economic
Cooperation.
roved For Release 2000/0MO-RDP80-01446R000100150006-5
SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For Release 2000/09/12 80-01446R000100150006-5
The failure of the general itriki in
the fiasco of the Ridgway demonstration in
have convinced fb/COW apparently that the hs
Resent developments in Europe have disclosed
and
,/above all,
night af Ney 28
d again.
ttern of
Soviet diploma:. They include such events* for instanne as (1) the Kremlin's
courting of Pietro Nenni, Italian left-wing Socialist leaders and the
cent erring on him of the Stalin Peace Prise in order to win him over to
cooperate elth the Italian Communistr 7q1',1 ??.arliamentary elections;
(2) the purge of Andre Marty and Cherie-4' Xliion 'tom the high posts they
occupied in the French Communist part.--- ;m7race inflicted on them by
direct orders, from Ptecov--because thr:: r.,:r,TInt,(1 a policy of direct action
as opposed to the more subtle and crefty r.,111.7 of cooperation with bourgeois
elements favored by Maurice ?bores and Jacquee Duclos; (3) the Stalin article
and speeches delivered before the nineteenth nest= of the Soviet Communist
Party in which the emphasis was laid on future conflicts between capitaliat
nations instesd of a war between Soviet Russia and democratic countries.
Other recent developments which Ht. lohlen thought also pointed in the
direction Imre (I) the appointment of a high-ranking man as ilndrei A.
myto to become Soviet Ambassador to London which has been interpreted as
to WNW Great Britain away from the United Staten and the reported
tl,on t1,1 7,Jttnferm.
AIL1 the developments clearly. point in one direction,
s $ti now is, above all, to break up the Orand Alliance
solate the United State' by working on the hopes
Italy, and Western Germany and so detaching them
a policy is the classic /ne f "divide and role and he
the cepitalistic nations an themselves and in this wily
wiett?assiass conquest of the world.
held that in this crisis a grtat paychological effort
forth br the United States for the purpose or maintaining
e of the democratic nations. He thought that to accomp-
e attention in the future should be paid to prepeganda
de our allies as our target.
the past, he felt, United States propaganda aimed at the Soviet
tendency to be too strident and shrill. The reeult of these
e believed, had been to alarm our allies more than to intimi-
lin.
These sharp attacks on the Soviet n, Mr fi1snteen
te reinforce the incipient impression bnting in the minds of the peopiee
of the democratic vorld that the United tee was a warmonge tion,
trying to incite hostilities with the Soviet Union. This was an image of
the United States that Soviet propaganda was sedulously trying to create
in the democratic world and some of our past propaganda had aided them.
SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For Release 2000/09/12.: CIA-RDP80-01446R000100150006-5
SECURITY INFORMATION
Approve, For Release 2000/09/12e04-epP80-01446R000100150006-5
-- uLtiniLi
Ate an emaxple of the sort of thing he had in mind, Mt. Bohlen
d propaganda barrage released in connection with the investigation
e
Katyn massacree. He felt that this propaganda had back-fired and,
ndeed, mey perhaps have been responsible for the launching of the Com-
munist bacteriological warfare charges against the United States in
reprisal
hien how he interpreted the recent constitutional
the nineteenth Soviet Congress. Hs expressed the
created Presidium, presumed to be instituted to
Politburo, was only eye-wash. It was too big and
Lly supreme governing body. On the other hand, the
ladcd only three members of the old Politburo seemed
to be too inSienificant.
What the change signified, Mr. Bohlen was inclined to believe,was
the virtual disappearance of the Soviet Communist Party as a govering
body and its merger with the State. Some organ of the soviet State is
probably the real source of goverronental authority in the USSR today*
This change had been going on over many years and had now been consummated.
Mito Bohlen also questioned the current newspaper assumption that
Georgi H. Malenkov was now the gCrown Prince because he had been selected
to deliver the report of the Central Committee to the Communist Party Con
gress--an aseignment in post years discharged by Stalin. Since the Soviet
Premier VAS not delivering this report himself in 1952, this duty fell em-
officio on Malenkov by virtue of the fact that he is general secretary of
the party.
When Stalin dies, Mr. Bohlen thinks, it will be found that he has
left behind a solemn will and testament, naming the triumvirate of
VYacheslav M. Molotov, Malenkov and Lavrenti P. Beria as his successors.
ch
view that the
replace the A
clumsy to be
Secretariat v
gc
Dietribution:
Orig. - Dr Craig
20 - Mr. E. L. Taylor"
3, - Mallory Browne
4, JElliott chrono
5. - JElliott subject
Approved For Release 2008581 TY linS1380-01446R000100150006-5
ma.