DEAR BOB:

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01446R000100080004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 25, 1960
• Content Type: LETTER

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25 July 1960
The purpose of this letter is to raise with you a group of
thoughts, leading to a proposal for action, which I personally feel are
timely; indeed, imperative. These fall into two parts: an out-Cassandra-
ing of all our previous Cassandra forebodings, and a reminder of what the
United States can do now, of a positive nature, to avert the disaster on thd,
instalment plan, especially in Asia, which, I am convinced, is otherwise
impending.
The past three months, I think we would agree, have been some-
thing of a debacle. They have demonstrated the inadequacy, in the face of
Soviet PROPOL, of a foreign policy structure anchored on a defensive prin-
ciple of "containment" and without a convincing propaganda support. I be-
lieve we have not seen the end of the setbacks. In this connection, I am
reminded of "Murphy's Law, " which I once noticed pasted on the wall of a
laboratory at MIT: "If anything can go wrong, it will!"
In accordance with a basic tactic of PROPOL, it seems likely
that the focus of crisis will shift to a new area, other than Africa or Latin
America. It might be Berlin or the Middle East, but more likely it will be
Asia, especially the perimeter from Korea to Burma.
I am not suggesting that the intelligence community has failed to
highlight the dangers of this area, or that the policy makers are unaware
of them. I do suggest, however, that their aggregate magnitude and their
imminence have been obscured by the bewildering display of crises else-
whe.re.
This area constitutes a sort of chain, which has the natural
property of being no stronger than its weakest link, and all links are weak.
Furthermore, it is under constant tension, so that if one link gives, the
chain will flail about in all directions and almost certainly disintegrate.
I need hardly apply a metal stethoscope to the individual links.
It may be worthwhile, however, to present what seem to me the instances
in which Murph 's Law could be verified in the not too distant future.
1L/&_I I Igo 10_
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South Korea, not only is politically unstable, but no visible
steps are being taken either by the regime or ourselves, to remedy its
frightening economic weakness and the corruption which is prevalent.
Above all, there is no indication to my knowledge that we are facing the
hard, but inevitable decision of cutting back the monstrously swollen
ROK army, which serves no useful purpose and drains the blood of the
country. Meantime, North Korea is steadily and quietly forging ahead
economically toward the day when its image may become irresistibly
attractive to its Southern sister. (More than a year ago, 5X1A9a
predicted that, in a free election, under the circumstances o t e ee
regime, South Korea would opt for union, even on communist terms.
The overthrow of Rhee has bought a temporary release of pressure,
but time is not on our side here.)
Japan still appears to have a balance of stability in its ties
with us. But we should at least contemplate such unpleasant possibili-
ties as the recurrence of student and left wing disorders, the heighten-
ing of anti-US sentiment, especially on the issue of atomic warfare, and
the steady drift to accommodation with Communist China. An economic
recession, which is always possible in such a "forced" flowering as
present day Japanese prosperity, would have incalculable consequences.
Politically, Japan presents a certain analogy with Italy - there are of
course differences as well - in that Communist manipulation of a divided
Socialist left, against an equally divided, dominant conservative party,
can at any moment acquire massive leverage in the trade unions, and in
the other elements of society which harbor resentment, frustration and
potential fanaticism.
Taiwan is a complex of insecurity. The anachronistic Kuo-
mintang is taking steps to placate native sentiment, but these may be
too little and too late. So long as the concept of a "return to the main-
land" is not formally buried, it will leave us in an ambiguous position.
In effect, we are the unilateral guarantors of a status quo which masks
a sort of revanchism that can only serve the purposes of the Mainland.
A renewal of military pressure seems probable. The possibility of a
dramatic subversion, a "ideal" of Chiang Ching-kuo, after, or even
before his fathers death, cannot be ruled out. So far, we are unable
or unwilling to face the inevitable and logical step of transferring our
interest and our responsibility for the preservation of Free Taiwan to
the United Nations, where it belongs.
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In some respects the Philippines look stronger, but they
too are not free from corruption. They have their internal Commu-
nist situation in hand, but they too are rather shaky in confidence in
their international position. They sense the general need of the area
for some form of regional unity which will go beyond the military com-
mitment of SEATO, and seek to achieve strong economic and political
ties among all the lands threatened by the Chinese colossus. (This
point was recently made to me by
who feels strongly that SEATO is not enough).
Indochina is a powder keg. Laos is almost certain to flare
up again. Cambodia looks like a combination of a petty "King and I"
comedy and a bamboo version of a banana republic. Above all, South
Vietnam is at the eleventh hour. A recent ONE memorandum presents
the most alarming picture to date of a potential Korean replica. At
least the intelligence community has been warned, but are our policy
elements taking action? (I would suggest that this might be a good time
25X1A9a to send out for a heart-to-heart talk with Diem).
Malaya, and especially Singapore, as the center of the chain,
are under great tension. Thailand, with its baroque coterie of coup
artists, its flaccid political nerve, and its genial economic corruption
would elide into and through neutralism almost without a pause, at the
first, evidence that SEATO was in fact a "paper tiger. "
Burma, westernmost link before the Indian anchor, has been
the object of a relative failure in the PROPOL effort. But the Soviet
Union, facing the setbacks of successful and abortive defections, and
the fiascos of its hotel, hospital and other aid projects, is renewing the
attack with better discipline. U Nu is a more promising target than Ne
Will.
Finally, Indonesia. On this front, SRS has been and remains
even more pessimistic than the already gloomy consensus of the intelli-
gence community. It is true that the peculiar character of the Indonesian
people, and the seeming inconsequentiality of Sukarno, encourage the be-
lief that nothing very serious is likely to happen in that lethargic, steaming
"South Pacific" environment. But it: is precisely because of this inertia
that the Indonesian Communists are so alarming. Here is a young,
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disciplined, largely Moscow-trained group of activists. Like the steely
Chinese Communist leaders, who recognized the essential weakness of
a millemal culture and overthrew it in a few years, men like Aidit
combine loyalty to International Communism with a high degree of mani-
pulative skill among the grass roots. I do not venture to predict what
will happen, but I would hold out the possibility that a super-Cuba is in
the offing. Sukarno may already be a Castro. Nasution, the only "strong
man, " faces what could be, a fatal conflict with the Indonesian Air Force.
One could imagine what would happen, if shooting broke out, and the Soviet
Union offered to dispatch aircraft from Chinese bases with "volunteers"
to help the "struggle against the imperialist re-enslavers. " No Monroe
Doctrine would prevail here, and it is doubtful how far SEATO would dis-
play the necessary solidarity of all its members. The United States Seventh
Fleet might be our only instrument. Would we repeat Lebanon in Java?
The gloomy picture I have sketched is there for all to see.
SRS for the past several years has consistently advocated the
only action which can hope to "contain" Communism in Asia. It is not a
military but a political and economic course - the active promotion of
regional unity. The scattered links, which really are not a chain at all,
must be forged together, and strengthened at every point.
We recognize, of course, that US policy has already contem-
plated such a program. When the American ambassadors gathered at
Baguio, there was much discussion of regional unity. But in effect,
nothing is being done about it. The difficulties seem too great. This
congeries of immature nations, mostly newly "liberated" from "colonial-
ism, " and seething with expectations, passions and frustrations, seems
to defy all efforts to prevent centrifugal dispersion.
And yet, there is a strong movement for regional unity. Burma,
Thailand, the Philippines, Malaya, all have statesmen who yearn to
achieve some measure of political and economic community.
I believe that it is still possible to forge a cordon, anchored
in Japan and India, which could effectively "contain" the Communist
colossus. The one way in which this could be done is by creating a
"Marshall Plan" for the area.
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In a number of memoranda over the past four years, I have
urged the impelling necessity for a "global Marshall Plan" for the
underdeveloped areas, established within the framework of the United
Nations, and organized on a regional basis. This, of course, is no
invention of my own. Many persons, inside the government and out-
side, here and abroad, have advanced it. So, in a sense, there is
nothing new in what I bring up here.
What is, perhaps, timely, is the suggestion that this could
be launched in the immediate future. The promise of a "Marshall Plan"
for Latin Am erica was appropriate, but may have lost in effectiveness
because of a too obvious appearance of being a mere reaction to trouble
in Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America. This also may have been too
little and too late.
But it is not too late to do something much bigger and less
obviously designed to shore up a crisis in being.
What I would suggest is that the Director utilize his access
to Vice President Nixon and to Senator Kennedy to urge that they both
propose to President Eisenhower an action along the following lines.
Immediately after the re-convening of Congress in August, the Pres-
ident would deliver a special address to both houses, recommending a
joint resolution in favor of a world Marshall Plan, divided in four major
regions: Asia, Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. He would
inform the Congress that he has the support of both Presidential can-
didates, and their assurance that neither will use this aspect of foreign
Policy as a campaign issue. On the Republican side acceptance of such
an invitation by the President is virtually assured by the Nixon-Rocke-
feller agreement on a plank favoring regional confederation in the West-
ern hemisphere. If the resolution were passed, the President would
then address the General Assembly of the United Nations, as soon as
possible, committing the remainder of his administration to all-out
effort to lay the foundations of the program, which his successor has
pledged to pursue. He would invite the other members of the UN to
participate in the endeavor, whether as contributors or beneficiaries.
This would include the Communist Bloc, though it would almost certain-
ly refuse, and denounce the proposal.
I believe that such an action is feasible. Historically, it
would cancel any negative aspects of the last phase of the Eisenhower
regime, and might associate his name with a, great creative step for-
ward. Politically, it would guarantee that the election campaign did not
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provide aid and comfort to the Communist enemy. Economically,
it would lay one of the two cornerstones - the other being domestic -
of an era of growth to which both candidates are now committed.
It would free us from the shackles which we have placed on our own
unlimited productive capacity. It would disarm the charge of the
Communists that the United States is the leader of the "imperialist
camp, " and remove the taint which is widely imputed to us among
anti-communists as well, that we have profited by a "vicarious
imperialism, " enjoying sources of cheap raw material and easy
markets under the mantle of the past imperialism of other countries.
The concept of the on ginal Marshall Plan, of course, is
not identical with what is being proposed here. There is a big differ-
ence between an effort to rebuild war damaged but still advanced and
sound economies and the largely ab ovo construction required by the
backward lands. Certain guide lines mid t be suggested by the Pres-
ident for both the Congressional and the UN approach to the problem.
The basic control and direction of the program should be truly inter-
national through a combination of the World Bank and a greatly expand-
ed Development Agency, but major projects in many cases might be
left to individual nations, and identified as their contribution. For
example, there is much to be said for the communist practice of
delivering and supervising the assembly of complete "packages, "
fully equipped factories ready to run. This is something which we
can well do, and which has the advantage of minimizing the flow of
actual dollars abroad. For the time being at least, concern for our
adverse dollar balance may be both politically necessary and econom-
ically legitimate. In the long run, I believe the effects of this program,
and the world economic upsurge which it would create, would make the
gold outflow a thing of the past.
Another primary form of contribution to this Plan would
continue to be agricultural surplus food. In this, too, the separate
identity of the US contribution might be preserved, while utilizing
the mechanism of an International Food Reserve or Bank. It seems
desirable that the new administration embrace a medium range pro-
gram of planned agricultural surplus in this country, both to ease the
changes which are being imposed within our own agricultural structure,
and to guarantee that.food, at least, will not be lacking in the areas
where it is needed.
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Finally the American people, and others participating in the
plan, must be educated to understand that this is not charity, or even
n?aid. " It is long range enlightened investment from which positive
dividends will flow. Even if no provision is made for direct repayment,
it might be possible to develop the requirement that as profits flow in
from the development program, they either be re-invested locally, or
put back into a sort of revolving fund at the UN organizational center.
The contributing people s must also be shown that there will be perman-
ent dividends in the form of assured markets and sources of raw
materials, formerly maintained only by "imperialist" preeminence.
Finally the demonstrative benefits of such an effort in providing a work-
able economic model for backward countries to fol ow should be convinc-
ingly presented to the world by information and propaganda as a major
contribution to resisting the "anew imperialism" of International Commu-
nism.
A year ago (August 6, 1959, attached, see especially p. 5),
in connection with the pending Khrushchev visit, I addressed a memoran-
dum to the Director which, inter alia, made essentially the same propos-
al. The Director twice assured me that he found this suggestion "interest-
ing. " At the present moment, its timeliness seems even greater, and his
position, outside partisan politics, even better suited to enable him as a
citizen and leader to espouse it. If you perceive no objection, I should
like to send him another memorandum on the subject.
25X1A9a
Mr. Robert Amory, Jr.
"Suggestions concerning the visit of Khrushchev" - 6 Aug 59
'Interaction of Policy and Propaganda in Soviet Action Abroad" - 25 July 60
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20 July 60
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