SPECULATIVE COMMENTS ON THE MERGER NEGOTIATIONS OF THE ITALIAN SOCIALIST PARTIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01446R000100050011-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 1998
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: January 24, 1957
• Content Type: MF

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24 January 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director/Intelligence
SUBJECT: Speculative Comments on the Merger Negotiations
of the Italian Socialist Parties
1. Negotiations for the merger of the Nenni Socialists (PSI)
and the Staragat Democratic Socialists (PSDI) have now been actively
in progress for at least half a year. The process has been both inten-
sified and complicated by developments in Hungary and Poland, and by
the crisis of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) which they induced. It
is generally recognized that the next major step will be the Congress
of the PS1 which is scheduled to take place in Venice, February 6-10.
2; There has been a widespread impression that the merger
process has entered into the doldrums, pending the outcome of the
Congress. This may be justified in the sense that no decisive steps
will be taken by any of the principals until the results cf the Congress
are known. Nevertheless it would be a mistake to suppose that this
is a period of inactivity. Rather, it should be recognized that import
ant moves are being made, not only by the two protagonists, Nenni and
Saragat, but by the Communists, by the Christian Democrats, and, in
all probability, by President Gronchi and by a number of the Socialist
leaderx of other Western European countries.
3. In this connection the following speculative reflections are
advanced:
a. Successful accomplishment of the merger on a. demo-
cratic basis is desirable. Only through it, can Italian political
life achieve a healthy balance between right and left of center
party groupings, making possible either a broad based coali-
tion, or a "government-loyal opposition" relationship, free
from effective Communist obstruction. A merged Socialist
party offers the best prospect of providing a democratic focus
for the great majority of the Italian working class vote.
D ;CU`v ENT NO.
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b. Fears that Pietro Nenni is a "Trojan Horse" for the
Communists should by now have been largely dissipated. That
he remains an opportunist may be granted, but the logic of his
political future - which, in view of his age, has only a limited
scale of possibility - appears to dictate a step-by-step detach-
ment from his past alliance with Communism and espousal of
democratic socialist principles. It is true that Nenni has.
consistently evaded taking an irreversible anti -Communist
position. To condemn him on this score, however, is to over-
look the political realities of the leadership situation within his
party and of his negotiating posture. Nenni has, in fact, rather
consistently placed himself as far to the right of the PSI leader-
ship as was feasible, and has taken advantage of the unexpected
Hungarian uprising to distance himself from Togliatti, who has
always threatened to overjump him in every move toward the
right (""salto alla quaglia").
c. The true position of the PCI has been gradually revealed
as one of irreducible hostility to the merger. Togliatti declared
on 20 January ". . . unification of the two Socialist parties is
harmful and dangerous. . . Under present conditions it would
only mean a new rift in the workers' movement, increased con-
fusion and a real weakening of the present position of the workers
and the people. Certainly, if this happened, we would energetically
work on the side of those Socialist comrades rebelling against this
shameful capitulation, and we would win. 1A The PCI has, indeed,
professed from time to time that it would favor the unification,
but there can be no doubt that it could only do so on a basis which
neither Nenni nor Saragat would accept.
d. Apart from the PCI, the chief enemy of the merger
appe ars to be the Christian Democratic party, or at least its
leader, Amintore Fanfani. Fanfani has seen in the ferment
created by the Hungarian uprising an opportunity to strengthen
his party at the expense of the left. He probably believes that,
in the event of early elections, his party might even achieve an
absolute majority, or at least a position from which it could
govern with only a minimum of dependence on its coalition
partners. Although Fanfani may be right inthis judgment, the
tactic which he is pursuing is fraaght with danger to the stability,
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not only of Italian political life in general, but to that of his
own party. It has. been reported that Fanfani and Segni -
and for that matter, Saragat - believe that the outcome of
the merger negotiations will be not one, but three Socialist
parties. Such a fragmentation of the left could, in the long
run, greatly benefit the Communists, who are clearly work-
ing toward this objective.
e. It would be a serious error to underestimate PCI
determination and strength at this juncture. The party lead-
ers are banking heavily-on the prospect that International
Communism, after the severe disturbances of October and
November, will succeed in stabilizing itself, and recent
events, such as the tour of Chou En-lai, suggest that they
may not be disappointed. Meantime with characteristic
resourcefulness they are taking advantage of "bourgeoise"
complacency to mend their organizational fences and re-
capture internal political initiative. The current debate
on the "giusta causal' provision of the "agrarian pact" law
provides the PCI with an excellent opportunity to reaffirm
the unity of the industrial and agricultural working class
and to place the Saragat Socialists and even substantial
liberal elements of the Christian Democratic Party in the
difficult position of compromising one of their accepted
principles in order to appease the conservative elements
of the coalition. In any event, even though it should prove
that the PCI had lost a substantial part of its voting strength,
it would retain far more than nuisance value in Italian
politics. Even at half its strength, if the Socialist Left
remained divided, the PCI would be able effectively to
obstruct necessary reforming legislation, and to impose
continuing immobilismo on the government, with attendant
exacerbation of political tensions.
f. There is no reason to believe that the Socialist leaders
of other Western European countries are indifferent to the
merger negotiations. The Bureau meeting of the Socialist
International (London, September 1956) wisely decided to
check what appeared to be an excess of enthusiasm on the
part of the French Socialists, especially Pierre Commin.
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It was also apparent that a number of West European
Socialist leaders had serious doubts about the sincerity
of Nenni and about the ultimate success of the merger.
It may be presumed, however, that they, like the Italian
political leaders, have been struck with the impact of
subsequent events on the merger negotiations, and by
such gestures of Nenni as his denunciation of Soviet
intervention in Hungary and the return of his Stalin
prize. Whatever consensus there may be among the
Socialist International leaders, there is every reason
to believe that in principle many of them would welcome
the return of Nenni to the fold. Deep issues are at stake.
Before them lies the vast perspective of European inte-
gration, within which, hegemony would be contested by the
almost evenly balanced political forces of Social Democ-
racy and of Christian Democracy. The weight of Italian
Socialism in this struggle might be decisive.
4. If the above analysis is correct, a number of speculative
conclusions may be drawn concerning the attitude which the United
States government should maintain toward the Italian Socialist merger
negotiations in the light of the current crisis of world and Italian Com-
munism. They are presented with the awareness that they may rest
on an incomplete knowledge of the existing policy and operational sit-
uation.
a. Little can be accomplished before the PSI Congress, and
therefore we are obliged to maintain, essentially, the position
which we have held hitherto. Nevertheless, certain adjustments
may still be possible which would insure maximum flexibility in
the face of an uncertain outcome.
b. We should adjust our position in the direction of detach-
ment, emphasizing that we are not opposed to Socialist merger,
per se. Furthermore, we regard it as a purely Italian and
European affair in which we have no vital interest. This is
important, since, whatever ouilactual policy in the past, there
is reason to believe that it has been widely interpreted as one
of considerable involvement and of basic disapproval.
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