EFFECTS OF SOVIET REPRESSION IN HUNGARY ON COMMUNIST PARTIES IN ITALY AND FRANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01446R000100050010-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 1998
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: February 7, 1957
• Content Type: MEMO

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OR UM
SUPLrECT Effects of Soviet B. press
Parties in italy an r
7 ebruty 1957
I. There has beau, a rather wi4epread impression that e
Corn muniat parties of France and Italy have been seriously affected by
the Soviet repression of the Hungarian uprising. Undoubtedly this action
created serious strains within these parties. Nevertheless it does not
appear that they have been permanently damaged or that we ahould anti-
cipate a major decline in their hold on their respective electorates.
Z. The following considerations suggest that the future of these
pa es should not be too optimistically projected from our .viewpoint.
1. it should forgotten that the Communist operational
code dictates maximum effort to recover from adverse developments by
vigorous relftleeption of tactical initiatives along proven and established
lines. Both parties have already undertaken the counter-offensive. and
there is every reason to believe that they will have some SUCCOSS in
expioiting a variety of domestic issues.
Z. The long raztge impact of the Hungarian events may be some
discounted in view of the short memo e average voter and of
the ict that external events, no matter how dramadc1 have relatively
little influence Am the way the ordinary French or Italian working mai.
casts his vote.
3. In any case, th efforts which the Savt Unlo
tabilize the posit GD of World Communism will probably
ieawire of external detente which, will at least partially reduce the fer-
nt by the events a October and November This is not to say
that the impact of these events to ephemeral; it constitutes & lesion in the
bodya International Cormmmiam.
4. The I pact on iiiteUectuai has been serious1 and torn*have
permanently fallen out a rank. Nevertheless, the majority will probably
rationalize their oontinued inegiance either positively, like the French
poet Vercors. who reaffirms his loyalty to the ideal of
Uri in spite of ite past mistakes, or negatively. for
alternative.
N
omraun- 1
P.it?A0Iff*
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FR. lc 54 50
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5. The underlying roots of the Communist protest vote which
are largely social and economic have not been affected by these exter-
nal events and can be destroyed only by a much deeper and more pro-
longed process within the two countries the process of reform and
proves*.
6. it seems unlikely
the common market which is
ist press of all European count
ment. li, however, the common
f achievement or prove visibly di
'Lydon will be great.
e campaign against uratomand
onducted throughout Comnrmtn-
ii succeed in halting their develop
rket and Euratom should either fail
ppointing, the advantages to Cam
7. Dissident Communism, whether Reals or the Hervti
type, does not appear to have political viability. It seems likely that
at movements will be subject to the virtually universal law that
imnunist dissidence is doomed **best to protracted isolation and
orst to early death.
B.?epcific Developmenttin ltay
I. Although Togliatti 's authority was challenged at the ii
Congress, it may have emerged strengthened rather than weakens
This Is difficult to determine at this stage, but it should be noted that
the Central Committee and the directing bodies of the PCI have on the
whole been Invigorated by the addition of new blood and the rerr101/11 or
elimination of dissident elements.
Z. The PCI has effectively seised upon certain domestic poli
tical issues, notably the debate on the Agrarian Pact Law. it is not
certain that. It will be able to carry such campaigns to a successful
conclusion, but their disruptive impact on Italian political stability
should not be minimized.
3. The setback to the PCI in the labor union field its so
although not reflected in corresponding gains by the free trade unions.
The COL, under Communist domination, may represent a major trump
card in frustrating the mtrger of the PSI and PSI)I and may continue to
be a stumbling block to the establishment of a viable non-Communist
working class movement, . .
4.
munist hold
unshaken.
rtsdn loose (estimated at
operatives, which is a basic source of funds, is
e Com-
-4-
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5. It has been d that PCI etrengtlt has Lilian drastically,
and there have been a le number of group defections and
a general ag in renewal of Party- membership. Nevertheleas, even
non-Communist Italian newspapers speculate that by the end of its
membership drive the Party will claim, if not actually achieve. app
rnately the same membership as in 1956. Moreover, it may be sus-
pected that the PCI might have a tactical reason for keeping its rneut
ship figures relatively low at this stage.
C !ranee
1. It is icne rally agreed that the CF od
under the Thorez Leadership. its strength and oganiiatoni etability
von been diminiehed by the Hungarian
possible that a certain tendency toward atrophy, whith ha seen noted in
recent years and which has been the rem& of the one of prolonged
amd isolated opposition, may be in part overcome by the eock of the
Hungarian events4 leading to increased militancy and discipline.
Z. As noted above, the impact on the intellectuals has probably
csuse and may in fact now be producing a reverse reaction
r strengthening their dedication. EVea the spectacular revolt
tre should not be regarded as irreversible.
3. It is generally noted that econozuc .etbacks resulting from
the Sues crsia constitute a promising political issue for PCF expktita
tion. U ather factors lead to * slowing down in the rate of economic
prop e past few years, or even to a recession, the Communists
will have abundant material for propaganda and political agitation.
4. Unlike the situation in 1tay, Comrnwiiam in France is not
confronted with a major crisis arising out of te prospcttve emergence
of a large non-Communist socialist party. In Italy the successfid merger
of the two Socialist partiee would undoubtedly cost the PCI considerable
znexnb.rhip and voting strength. There is no corresponding possibility
visible in F ance at this time.
5. rhe recent by-electionParis, while It ked
triumph for the Rightist candidate, did not indicate any clear ioaa of
voting strength by the Comtmmists, and has even been specio inter-
preted in their own press as a sort of success.
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6, The probabitity that dev
Aigeria will prove adverse, if not digest
politics may soon face a period of intense *
and left extremism would be heightened and
Communist agitation would be increased.
pecially
s that Trench
oth right
ct for disruptive
7.
remedy de
and Lather
eta will vigarousl
lag made by responsible a
ticsl system. notably in the el*
ecutive to the legislative branch. The Corn
oppose these efforts. and may have consider-
success in frustrating moves to create a more stable polity. Thi
rn would encourage Right extremism and might lead to an attempted
coup or at least to greater political tension and violence.
25X1A9a
SRS/ DDI
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