REFLECTIONS ON THE ITALIAN POLITICAL CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01446R000100050007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 1998
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: June 14, 1957
• Content Type: MF

CON IAL
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14 June 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Direct /Intelligence
SUBJECT: Reflections on the Italian Political Crisis
propo
During e past year thts Staff has advanced the
one;
ng
A. The Italian Communist Party (PCI) though it has no
prospects of coming to power, Is a major danger to democratic Italy.
As in France, the existence of a large Communist electorate awl par-
liamentary representation imposes a permanent deformation on the body
politic and seriously hampers responsible deliberation 41.nd decision. By
sheer arithmetic, government by simple majority is impossible; in
general a coalition is mandatory, which, if it is to avoid immobilism,
must command the support of at least 60-70% of the non-extremist
deputies. It is clear, in both countries, that this cannot be achieved
under existing circumstances, and therefore the Communists are able
to vitiate orderly, progressive government. There is no easy way out
of this impasse. Hopes that the PCI and PCF would decline in elector-
al strength as a result of the 1956 crisis have proven illusory, WI could
have been (and, by SRS) was foreseen.
between
growing. The DC
which has been held together
politician, through US support, and through e relative firmness of
the Catholic Church. The present crisis has exposed the precarious-
ness of DC solidarity, at the same time that Zoli's (and presumably
Fanfani's) tactics have destroyed whatever prospect for survival the
quadripartite coalition may have had. The gratuitous insult to Sarigat,
amply merited by his own vacillations, has confirmed the suepicion that
the DC ultimately is contemptuous of its minor allies and cherishes the
illusion that it can "go it alone". That it could win a majority of votes
in the next elections is doubtful; that it could govern effectively, even if
it did, is even more so,
e tendency polar
e oUtics
s been
C.
The only, effe live way to break the debilitatin/ hold of
Italian politic is to create a broad based democratic
by a merger of the PSI and the PSDI. The essential 7
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weakness of Italian political life as pointed out in NIE 24-56
and by many competentstudents of the subject, is the lack of a viable
alternative to the DC hegemony. Unless there exists the possibility
of a "loyal opposition" within the democratic sector of the Italian
Parliament the polarisation, referred to above, can not be avoided.
D. A. merger of the two Socialist parties is feasible, There
are many obstacles and flifficulties confronting Socialist reunification,
and since February 1957 these have, at times, seemed insuperable.
Nevertheless, as a recent public opinion poll has shown, the majority
of the electorate of the two parties favor reunification. even though they
are uncertain as to whether and how it can be achieved. It is the con-
tention of this staff that the rank and file aspiration to restore socialism
to unity an a democratic base is a healthy force which will grow and
flourish if its leaders show willingness to make the necessary personal
and political accommodations.
by the PSDL The internal situation of the
ure and confusing, owing in part to inadequate political
to tendentious and provocative efforts by outside interests
(to the right eft of Nenno, to intensify the overwhelming pressures
with which ho has to contend. Nevertheless, we believe that a renewal
of the favorable attitude displayed by the ?SDI in the Fall of 1956 would
enable Nonni eventually to bring all but the crypto-Communist faction of
his party (probably not more thin 20%) into a democratic merger.
dete
F. The prin?l force preventing this rayprocherneut is the
rrnlnation of Staragats and those who are backing hlrrt, not to accept
but o o C ATO
or these two points is n ral. but, In the opinionof
been pushed too far. Some compromise on both points
an safely be made, counting on a progressive evolution of the PSI in a
democratic and pro-Western direction, once it is confronted with the
prospect of political responsibility,
It
hr
dderable division within the Socialist Inter
sues, there is little doubt that the great majority
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Furopean Socialist leaders would welcome reunification on the basis of
detachment of the PSI from the. PC/. They would not be so concerned
with the adoption of a specifically anti-Communist and pro-NATO posi-
tion. Their general interest in the merger outcome is heightened by the
prospect of a great poli deal struggle for dominance in a United Western
Europe which wilt be fought out between the forces of Social Democracy
and Chzistian Democracy. The role of the Italian Socialists, in confron-
tation with the Dernocrasia Cristiana might be decisive in this conflict.
2.. The cur
t political crisio has clearly demonstrated that the
cannot govern alone. It cannot accept the support of the right
ut danger of internal cleavage and it cannot restore the quadripar
enter coalition formula. It apparently cannot successfully enlist
the support of the PSI for an opening to the left. Indeed, probably even
a "non-political" -caretaker government is excluded, in view of the not
illogical contention of the PSI and PCI that the issues it would have to
face, leach as budget and the European integration treaties, are "poli-
tical".
in
to
3. inthelightc
e fall seems yin
iscast the elect%
of unpleasant possibili
weakness of the DC, of its hesitation and confusion, of its dependence
on
clerical and rightist elements, may have weakened it far beyond expecta-
tions. There iv little prospect that the PSDI will gain strength; rather it
is seriously threatened by a split of its left wing, further fragmenting
the badly demoralized socialist sector. The PSI is also likely to split,
perhaps the larger part reverting officially or de facto to unity of action
with the PCI. The PCI, as matters now stand, is the only party which
is likely to profit by the crisis. In the event the DC achieves a plurality
of the order of 45%, the polarisation of the two leading parties will become
alarming,
4. There remains the question whether,late stage of
the
anything would be gained by the US in modifying its attitude toward
*list merger. It is the opinion of this staff, that had the US in
957 adopted a policy of detachment, coupled with discreet approaches
the present crisis might have been averted, or at least assured
of a favorable prognosis. This is obviously an =demonstrable contention,
teak realities the prospect of elections
tam. It is not the purpose of this paper
.It is suggested however, that a number
ie ahead. The exposure of the internal
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though c tain facts support it. The critical problem remaine, as
it has been in the past, the extent to which we would be able to infbuence
the course of Saragat and FAL/dant If, as is widely believed in Italy,
US influence on these two leaders is not inconsiderable, it might not
be too late to bring some of it to bear. While this is a political judg-
ment beyond the ken of SILS, we venture to suggest again that the US
adopt a favorable or at least a detached attitude toward Socialist unifi-
cation. Otherwise, we feel that Italy will face another five years of
C ammunist cancer.
25X1A9a
Chief, SRS DDI
-4-
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Although this paper must undoubtedly be regarded as the official
DIP position) it is worth noting that it does not bear the concurrence of
Chief of the PP Staff. It is quite possible that he would, in fact, concur
in this paper; nevertheless it remains my personal judgment that the DIP
position is ranged essentially on an axis of the CI Staff, WEA Division
and certain elements (I believe not all) of the Rome station. While the
CI Staff, with its primary field of reference being the combattbg of
Communism, has undoubtedly a major equity in policy determination on the
subject of the Italian Socialist merger, it hardly seems to have the
desired political detachment with respect to the purely Socialist aspect
of this difficult problem. As I have previously indicated to you, I feel
strongly that the primary staff responsibility for all matters bearing on
Socialism should rest with the PP and not the CI Staff. This is of course)
a DEP matter but I feel that the Director should be aware of the policy
implications of this assignment of primary staff responsibility for Socialism,
which, I submit) should be regarded essentially as a mutual political matter,
to a staff whose raison d'etre is that of countering the hostile target
of International Communism.
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