SUGGESTIONS FOR DCI SPEECH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01446R000100020001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 3, 1960
• Content Type: OUTLINE

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3 November 1960
uggestiorus for DCI Speech
I. The rough outline seems satisfactory for a general survey
al US.Soviet relations.
Z. Probably the first decade is the most difficult to character-
ise. HConfz.iontt is perhaps the beet term to cover the mixture of Amer-
ican altitudes toward the Soviet regime during these early years. Never
since the period of the French Revolution had Americans observed a great
country experiencing the effects of a fundamental social revolution, and
it was difficult to arrive at a concensus tet views sts to how the US should
react to this strange phenomenon. A long history of good relations with
Russia, an early satisfaction at the overthrow of the Czarist autocracy,
revulsion at Bolshevik terror, the problems of dealing with so uncommon
a revolutionary regime - all were factors in shaping the American atti-
tudes. Concerning the problems in establishing relations, the policies
a the Soviet government made & reasonable approach difficult. The Soviet
refusal to recognise the validity of the former government's debts, the
practice of state trading, and especially the harboring of the Comintern,
with its advocacy of violent action against all bourgeois regimes, did
nothing to create a favorable climate. In the circumstances, a desire to
keep uninvolved was probably the dominant sentiment amid ill the confus-
ing counsel. This comported with the imotationist feeling in the country.
The Soviet Union was far away. the future of its Bolshevik regime was
uncertain, and the other great powers had a more immediate responsi-
bility for seeing if this disturbing member could be restored to the family
oI maims.
3. A few rernarke about the decade of the 1940's. In both gov-
ertunentel and unofficial circles, we were slow to realise the incompati-
bility of Soviet and American notions of what a satisfactory world order
should be. We were too ready to assume that communist definitions of
such terms as "peace, " "democracy," and "free elections" were similar
to our own. While in hindsight we can see that we were naive (and here
a lack of attention to communist ideology and Soviet practice contributed
to our unsophistication). it was probably necessary for the nation to go
through the periods of good faith and then disiilusionnient. Without them
there might well have been a long period of deep public division over
whether a r.a.souabty amicable relationship between the two countries
DOCJMTNT
NO C1N.GE N.!
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could have been established.. However, by trying to work with the
Soviets in the postwar occupation of enemy countries, by concessions
to Moscow's security demands, by offers of Marshall Plan participa-
tion, and by other attempts& at cooperation, we at least removed a
great question mark and laid the foundation for a basic foreign policy
which has overwhelming public support.
4. The Next Decade. Although the US and the USSR will re-
main the dominant world powers throughout the next ten years, it is
quite poisible that the confrontation may not be as stark as it has bean
during the past decade. Three probable developments in international
affairs euppost this hypothesis. One is the emergence of new centers
of power. Over the past few years several countries have gained in
strength relative to the two super powers. In Asia, Communist Chinas
Japan. and India are comparatively stronger, and they will probably
dispose more weight in the future configurations of world power. The
recovery of Western Europe from its immediate postwar prostration
has been proceeding steadily, and if integration continues this regime
will be a more considerable factor in the power equation. In Latin
America. Brasil might develop into a secondary power of greater than
regional importance. As a second consideration, both the US and the
USSR will probably be required to devote more attention and resources
to the areas where they have enjoyed an uncontested dominance. For
the ITS, Latin American problems almost certainly WILL take on a new
importance and urgency. The USSR will have to give increased atten-
tion to the Communist Bloc, particularly its relations with Peking. As
a third development, the Soviet Union will find that as it increases its
involvement in Asia. Africa. and Latin America the relatively simple
postures it has taken in foreign affairs will no longer suffice. Moscow
will have to recognise the complexities of international relations - the
tensions and rivalries of the Arab world, the explosive problems of
Black Africa, the demands of increasing claimants for aid of all kinds,
the handicaps of supporting subversive movements while trying to main-
tain amicable state-to-state relations. In short, the Kremlin will prob-
ably experience some of the frustrations and hard choices that other
great powers have learned to expect in their dealings with several scores
of countries, many politically immature and intensely nationalistic.
There are signs that the complexities inherent in conducting relations
with a great variety of states, all with their special problems and inter-
ests, are already complicating the Moscow-Peking axis. The commit-
ments and responsibilities which the USSR has assumed, and its hopes
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vaices, do not allow It to indulge in some of the free
seems to characterise Communist Chinese policy.
the coming decade will bring further problems
of communist dealings with the rest of the world.
25X1A9a
SRS/ DIX
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