RUSSIAN ANTI-COMMUNIST FORCES IN THE GERMAN WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01445R000100420001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 2, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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RUSSIAN ANTI-COMMUNIST FORCES IN THE GERMAN WAR
I INTRODUCTION
Once the German Army had been unable to win a complete
military victory in the East in the opening weeks of the
war, it became clear that Germany would have to fight a
long, hard struggle to crush Russian resistance. Further-
more, it was equally clear that Germany lacked the military
strength and manpower to impose such a decision by military
means alone. Even with the total mobilization of German
manpower and the use of all the available human resources
of the European continent, Germany was unable to raise
sufficient troops to carry out military operations and at
the same time guard its lines of communication and maintain
order in the occupied areas. It was obvious that military
action would have to be accompanied by parallel political
and psychological warfare.
The groundwork for psychological warfare already
existed in the hatred which a large portion of the Russian
population, and particularly the peasants, felt toward the
Soviet regime. They were prepared to side with the Germans
provided German leadership adopted a clear political policy
which would take into account the desire's of the population,
and the peculiarities of the Russian situation. Tens of
thousands of Russian prisoners-of-war volunteered for
service against the Red Army, while in the early fighting
the rate of desertion in the Red Army was exceptionally
high, and the peasant population in the villages welcomed
the Germans as liberators.
The Germans, however, were unable or unwilling to use
this opportunity, Hitler's colonial policy based on the
exploitation of the Russian areas as Germany's "India"
quickly turned the Russian population against the Germans.
The Hitler policy also necessitated the continuation of the
collective farm system in order to facilitate this exploi-
tation. The failure of the Germans to liquidate the
collective farms more,, than any other single factor turned
the peasants against the invaders and led to their support
of--the Partisan Movement. This revulsion on the part of
the peoples of the Soviet Union was further hastened by the
brutal and overbearing attitude of the Nazi occupation
authorities who treated them as inferior beings.
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Another factor in the German attitude which prevented
full utilization of anti-Soviet forces within the U.S.S.R.
was the basic Nazi fear that any Russian force which they
created to fight against Stalin might in the end turn
against them and become a defender of the Russian people
against Germany. Within even these limitations the Germans
might have made some headway had they ever been able to
establish any single policy toward Russia. Instead various
government agencies, as well as the German military author-
ities improvised policy as they went along, thus adding to
the confusion and hastening the German defeat. Only in
November, 1944, the Germans finally decided, far too late,
that the war in the East could only be won if the Russian
people were convinced that it was not a war directed
aggain~t them, but a war to free them from their Communist
le rship. The effort which Himmler made to use the move-
ment of the former Soviet General Andrei Vlassov for this
end proved abortive, and the Vlassov Movement was engulfed
and destroyed in the over-all German defeat.
II GERMANY'S LOST OPPORTUNITY
As early as October, 1942, Brautigam, a high official
in the Ostministerium (Ministry for the Eastern Territories)
headed by Alfred Rosenberg reported in a secret memorandum
that the feats of arms of our noble army have been
neutralized.... by an inadequate political policy" (in the
occupied areas and toward the Russian prisoners,) and that,
in consequence, *the possibility of a German defeat moves
into the immediate foreground."
This estimate of German operations in the U.S.S.R. is
confirmed by very considerable documentary evidence recovered
in Germany. Germany had an extraordinary opportunity to
secure the cooperation of a great number of Soviet subjects.
Not only did Germany fail to win such allies permanently,
but, on the contrary, converted those persons who were pre-
pared to be her friends into bitter enemies, a phenomenon
which was reflected in the steady growth of the Soviet
Partisan Movement. The Germans were both unwilling and
-unprepared to make use of the tremendous numbers of indi-
viduals in the U.S.S.R. who were ready to assist the Germans
in a fight to overthrown the Communists. The fate of the
movement of General Vlassov, a high-ranking Soviet military
leader, who later sided with the Germans, is an especially
instructive example of this phenomenon, but its significance
.cap only be understood when it is studied in relation to
actual German policy.
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For almost the whole period of the war in the East
there was never, in fact, a unified German policy with a
clear objective. Various Nazi leaders, ministries and
military authorities had divergent objectives and each
sought to carry out a corresponding policy. On the 6th of
June, 1942, for instance, Dr. Paul Goebbels, Minister for
Propaganda, wrote in his diary, "Concerning our Policies
in the Occupied Eastern Areas:- Here everybody is simply
governing recklessly, generally one against another, with-
out any clear objective.'1
In the final analysis, any policy decision was Hitler's
responsibi]?ity. But Hitler was not informed of everything,
and many questions were only brought to his attention after
protracted struggles between various Party leaders. On the
1st of June Goebbels wrote; "I have the impression that....
the Fuehrer has not been informed of the true situation by
the Ostministerium."
III HITLER'S COLONIAL POLICY
For Hitler and many of the old Nazis, especially for
men like Koch and Lohse, who ruled the occupied areas with
the title of "Reich Commissars," the German objective was
clear and simple. The struggle against Russia was for them
an out-and-out war of conquest. Although they also paid
lip service to the Orusade against Bolshevism, they would
.have waged a similar war against any government which was
in power in Russia.
Hitler had no detailed plan for the future organization
of Russia, but instead a general program in which he be-
lieved with unshakeable resolution. A few sentences from
his book "Mein Kampf" show what this program meant:
"Today there are eighty million Germans in Europe! Only
then will that f oreign`policy be acknowledged to be right
when in hardly a hundred years from now two hundred fifty
million Germans will live on this continent.... If we
today in Europe speak about new territory, land and soil,
we can only be thinking about Russia and its satellities.."
In September, 1941, Hitler said, in a conversation
with Otto Abetz, the German Ambassador in Paris, that, "the
new Russia will be our India, but a little bit better situ-
ated than the British one. The new German Empire will
comprise 135 millions and control a further 150 millions."
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The practical implementation of this program in the
occupied areas necessitated a colonial policy of the worst
sort, and such a policy was, in fact, carried out by both
the Reich Commissars in the East. Koch in the Ukraine was
particularly brutal. This policy prevented any effort to
obtain the voluntary cooperation of the population and any
local self-government. .
IV POLITICAL IDEAS OF ROSENBERG
Many German leaders and even some old Nazis such as
Rosenberg did not approve of the colonial policy. Rosenberg
believed the policy of the Reich'should have been to achieve
a breaking up of the East and its peoples. For him the war
against Russia waa a war for the destruction of the greater
Russian Empire, and for the dissolution of the greater
Russian Empire into its national components.
Instead of favoring a division of Russia into colonies,
however, Rosenberg wanted a collection of small national
states, whose independence was to be restricted but not
entirely vitiated by their integration into the European
Orbit (the Germans use the term "Grossraum" meaning liter-
ally "Great area".) Within the framework of this Orbital
concept Germany was not only to be a colonizing power but
the leading power of the European Orbit. "An orbital order
is essential to the concept of an Empire. Empires in this
sense are the leading and supporting powers whose political
ideas permeate a specific orbit, excluding the Intervention
of powers from other orbits." (Karl Schmidt. "Volkerrecht-
licke Grofsraumordnung," 4th Edition 1941, page 36.) In
practice Rosenberg?s whole policy was greatly affected by
his fear of a future reunification of the various peoples
of the U.S.,S.R. by the Great Russians.
Rosenberg was prepared to permit the formation of local
governments (in the Baltic.countries,)'and national commit-
tees and national armies in other parts of the U.SCS.R., and
he recommended such a step in a memorandum he gave to Hitler.
He was, however, opposed to any single all-Russian organiza-
tion, or any all-Russian Army, and was against the in.atalla-
t.ion of Great Russians in positions of leadership in any.
organization. H_e was more inclined to exploit the national
anlmositiea existing among the Great Russian and other ethnic
groups belonging to the Soviet Union. He did not succeed,
however, in making Hitler change his mind. When he suggested,
a change of policy in May, 1943, Hitler retorted that all
history proves that one cannot make allies out of conquered
peoples.
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V ATTITUDE OF GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC GROUPS
Various government economic bureaus, such as the
Wehrwirtschaftsstab (Military Economic Staff,) the Ver-
waltung des Vierjahresplans (the Four-Year Plan group
headed by Fieidmarshal Goering,) and the Reichsernahrungs-
mtnisterium (Reich Ministry of Food) considered the occupied
areas from the viewpoint of immediate exploitation, primarily
as a source of food for the Army and the German people.
The need to maintain Russian food production was of decisive
importance because it prevented the dissolution of the
rolkhozeB collective farms,) and the return of the land
to the ownership of the Individual peasants. Even during
the very first days of the war the great importance of this
question was realized, and the Russian experts in the German
Ministry for Foreign Affairs emphasized the need for a
solution.
One of these experts, Grosskopf, wrote anxiously on
the 12th of July, 1941, that 01 have just learned....
that the fundamentally opposed attitude of the Military
Economic Staff has so far prevented the exploitation of
the propaganda value of the agrarian problem." The decid-
ing factor, as far as the Military Economic Staff was
concerned,. was the fact that any break-up of the collective
farms would cause a reduction in agricultural products
available for the troops.. As a compromise, it was finally
decided to promise the peasants that the collective farms
would be broken up rather than actually returning the land
to private ownership.
However, the mere promise, not only did not quiet the
peasant population but, on the contrary, soon aroused a
bitter hatred among them against their German. liberators.
They were quick to note that actual and continued daily
operations of the collectives were a direct and complete
contradiction to the promised return of the land.
Early in August, 1941, one of the Russian specialists
of the Foreign Office, Ungern-Sternberg, wrote: "Division
of land among the peasants, or the reconstitution of private
property..., would be, beyond all doubt, the most effective
propaganda theme for both the Russian civil population and
the Red Army, However, it would be invidious to make pro-,
miles in these questions, which affect the masses most.
strongly, when, in the long run, there is no possibility of
fulfilling them, The Russian, owing to the conditions
under which he has lived for the last twenty years, has
become a very sober and materialistic thinker and would
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take it very hard, if he were to suffer new disappointments
in the question that for him is decisive."
Another German observer during the same period warned
that $orders._violence,, threats of execution, etc. no longer
have any"effect on the Russian, after all the years that he
has seen and heard nothing else anyway -- with the vital
difference that in that era there actually were executions
in every village and hamlet, because the Soviets had plenty
of people for the pursuit of their aims, while we, on the
other hand, never will have enough people for such a pro-
gram. And the Russian peasant today, even before we have
begun to make him really happy, has long since comprehended
that fact."'
In a report of the German Army High Command, dated
August 24th, 1941, future developments in the East were
foreseen with significant exactness.
"This population will reject everyone who appears to
them to be a representative of the Collective Farm System
and who therefore represents expropriation and poverty for
the individual peasant. It is therefore possible, with
very minor concessions, to organize a population which can
be very useful.
If this is not done, then there is the danger that
the peasants, especially in view of the hard winter and the
incipient war shortages, will fall prey to Communist
propaganda and support the Partisan Movement. That will
mean an additional heavy burden for the Reich in maintaining
the seeurity of these vast areas."
VI IMPLEMENTATION OF COLONIAL POLICY
There were far-reaching differences of opinion among
German leaders as to the best method of dealing with the
Eastern Peoples -- whether it was possible to achieve
better results through mild or through brutal treatment of
the population. The Reich Commissar in the Ukraine, Koch,
was more responsible than anyone else for the brutal treat-
ment and ruthless exploitation of the Ukrainain population,
a logical result of his view that all Slavs were sub-human
(Untermenschen.)
An official report of August, 1942, quotes him as
saying, "The Ukraine must deliver those things which Germany
needs.... The feeding of the Ukrainain civil population, in
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comparison with this task-, is a matter of. total indifference
The bearing of the Germans in this instance is
determined by the fact that we have to deal with a people
that is in every respect inferior. Association with
Ukrainains, therefore, is out of the question.... These
people must be ruled with an iron hand.... If these people
work ten hours a day, then they must work eight of those
ten hours for us. "
The Army leaders, who were well aware of what was
taking place, were forced to remain inactive while this
policy created the best possible soil for the growth of the
Soviet Partisan Movement. Even Rosenberg tried to influence
Koch to change his policy, but he regarded himself as
responsible only to the Fuehrer, and refused.
In July, 1943, Rosenberg took,the problem directly to
Hitler, who, however, supported the ideas of Koch: "The
situation compells us to such a rigorous course of action
that we can never secure the political support of the
Ukrainains.... We are subordinated to the merciless law
of war which decrees that we extract supplies and labor
from the Ukrainains. Only weak generals can believe that
we can secure workers with pretty speeches."
VII EFFORTS AND VIEWS OF MILITARY
The Army leaders, nowever, were influenced by the fact
that, unlike Hitler, they did not by any means consider the
German. victory a-certainty and sought ways to change the
balance of power in their favor. Specifically, they were
becoming alarmed by the steady growth of the Partisan Move-
ment. In his diary Goebbels noted under the date of May
28th, 1942, a report of the Commander of the Central Army
Group of May 14th.
"The situation is becoming constantly more serious,"
this report stated. "As a result of the daily increasing
cases of attempted and successful sabotage and mining of the
railroads, the guard over the railroad lines has had to be
further strengthened. The result of that is that the areas
between the railroad lines can no longer be keptin order.
From all sides one receives calls for help against plundering
and murdering by Partisans."
Goebbels wrote the following comment about these
alarming reports from the Front: "From the East we receive
reports of increasing Partisan activity. This has'gotten
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so far out of hand at the moment, that whole regions of the
occupied Eastern Territories must be regarded as imperiled.
"Here we ha4e the development of an extremely serious
crisis, which we. can only master, I believe, if we change
certain features of our Eastern Policy.*
A few. excerpt's from a situation-report compiled by
the Army High Command on January 3rd, 1943, reflect the
views which many military leaders held.
"The Red.Army9s will to resist remains unbroken. The
Soviets give evidence of increased strength with the slogan
?National War, ? $ the report stated. "The morale of those
parts of the population which are pro-German becomes worse
constantly. Guerrilla-controlled areas are growing
further.... Lines of communication vital to the war effort
are endangered.... Increasing anxiety on the part of our
own troops due to the obviously erroneous handling of the
population: ?We ourselves are creating the Partisans.9N
Am?ng others the following. reasons were given for
these developments: "Secret German directives concerning
the worthlessness of the Slav Peoples and the necessity for
their extermination have become widely known among the
Russian people, and provide a fertile soil for hostility
to Germany.... Increased Partisan activity and grave
errors In the management of the population are damaging
German prestige.... Insufficient carrying-out of the New
Agrarian Order, no return of former private property...."
Among high-ranking officers of the German Army the
conviotr n grew that "Russia can only be conquered by
Russians." 1Some Germans credit the origin of this theory
to-'General von Brauchitch, German Field Commander i{i the
East, in November, 1941. It was, however, shared from-the..
beginning of the war by a number of other military and
civilian leaders especially the Foreign Office experts on
Russia (Schulenburg, Hilger and Grosskopf.) It was these
experts, as well as the people of the Ministry for the
Eastern Territories, such as Brautigam, who most sharply
condemned the policy evolved by Koch for the occupied areas.
VIII RUSSIAN VOLUNTEERS IN 1941 - 1942
The lack of any fixed political policy also prevented
a uniform policy with regard to the employment of Russian
volunteers. To be sure, Hitler issued'a number of specific
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directives on the subject, but there is ample evidence that
in practice these orders were not alwayssfollowed strictly
and that many military units dealt with the problem on their
own initiative, without the approval of higher headquarters.'
An analysis of the measures adopted by such units is
necessary in order to gain a complete.insight into employ-
ment of'Russian volunteers by the German Army. Various Army
headquarters were inclined from the start to integrate
Russian volunteers into German formations. A good descrip-
tion is that given in a memorandum dated March 22nd, 1943,
written by the General of EasternTroops,'.Hellmich. "The
relationship between space and the available forces
compelled our people to help themselves," he wrote. "There
= came into existence the so-called Hilt swillige (those will-
ing to help) and in the course of time the Qettruppen
(Eastern Troops.) These were in themselves undesirable
expedients to which we were Forced by the shortage of
personnel, and finally led to a state of Affairs which
required guidance from above."
Hellmich emphasized that "the employment of local
inhabitants in the battle against Bolshevism was begun by
combat units, which fact should settle the question as: to
whether there was need for such assistance. The step was
considered a military necessity by the eobbat troops, and
the improvization was satisfactory because fox a time at
least the results were good.
For Hitler, on the contrary, the cusatIon was closely
linkedato the over-all political problem. In December,
1941,-he permitted the formation of pat Le ionen (Eastern
Legions.) To carry out this decision the OEW (High Command
of the Armed Forces) directed on'December 2.'2nd, 1941, that
the following legions be createdo a Turkistan Legion, a
Caucasian-Mohammedan Legion, a Georgian Legion and an.
Armenian Legion.
On January 18th, 1942, Hitler authorized the unrestricted
formation of~Tartar units involving primarily Tartars from
the Crimea. However, on February 10th.,1942, he expressly
forbade the formation of volunteer units from prisoners of
war or inhabitants of any occupied areas, except those
specified above.
On the 23rd of March the High Command of the Armed'
Forces issued a decree which gave the basic reason for this
policy.
"It is intended that the Turkish peoples and inhabitants
of the Caucasus be permitted, after the war, to obtain
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far-reaching independence," the observer stated. "For
that reason the formation of volunteer legions actively
participating in the war of liberation against the
Bolsheviks from the citizens of these countries is per-
mitted, whereas citizens of the Baltic countries, the
Ukraine, etc., may only be considered for the police
services and not for employment at the.fronts"
In August, 1942, the Army High Command issued a secret
pamphlet entitled, "Directive concerning Employment of
Local Inhabitants in the East." The first sentence readso:
"The vastness of the Eastern Area and the absolute neces-
sity for,economy in the employment of Germans have compelled
us to employ the manpower of the conquered Eastern Countries
in the most varied capacities in the service of the Armed
Forces especially in the army in the field and in the
service of the war economy."
The various nationalities were, however, to be employed
in different ways. Members of the Turkish races and
Cossacks,, who were fighting beside the German troops as
allies against the Bolshevist enemy, constituted a special
group with the same privileges as German soldiers. Other
nationalities -- with the exception of Great Russians --
could be placed in para-military formations to, combat
Partisans. There was also further discussion of the
utilization of persons of all ethnic groups for police and
various auxiliary services. On paper, everything was in
order, but in the field the various decrees produced a far
different result.
IX FAILURE OF EASTERN TROOPS
In September, 1943, a Commander of an Eastern
Battalion wrote a letter to the Commander of Eastern Troops
stating that conspiracies had been uncovered and mutinies
and desertions of whole companies had taken place.
"The recruiting, which was originally conducted in
1941 and early 1942 carefully and accurately by a few
politically gifted officers, was undertaken on a mass
basis in the course. of 1942...? Errors in recruiting have
continued to date.... The Eastern Battalions are set to
work from the day of their organization. So-called training
periods have existed only on paper..,. etc."
The Germans who undertook the organization of these
battalions were not, according to the author of this letter,
able to distinguish between good and bad elements. According
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to this report, the ignorance of these German organizers,
who had not the faintest knowledge of Eastern peoples,
Bolshevism or Jewry, led to the recruiting of "purely
Soviet products."
This criticism is sharp, but it does n9t get at the
roots of the difficulty. The defects in recruiting were
not only due to the shortcomings of the recruiters but, to
an even greater degree to German policy or lack of policy.
It was, of course, not stated publicly that only the so-
called Turkish peoples and the inhabitants of the Caucasus
were to receive far-reaching independence after the war,
but the special handling and preferential treatment of the
mentioned ethnic groups could hardly go unnoticed by the
other peoples of the occupied areas.
The members of the other groups of necessity must
have felt that they were being considered and treated as
inferior beings. How could they, then, consider their
service In the German Army as a battle for their own liberty
and that of their homeland?
It was only natural that many of the volunteers were
only induced to enter the German service for material
reasons -- to escape the horrors of the prisoner-of-war
camps, and even in many cases only to get an opportunity
to plunder. No wonder, as the Eastern Battalion Commander
wrote, that as one battalion after another was organized,
the good elements were constantly diluted until we were
confronted by an unsupervisable, impenetrable, incalculable
mass.
His last comment refers to the year 1943 (organization
of the independent Eastern Battalions -- in contradistinc-
tion to the earlier Eastern Legions -- started in January
1943.) The increasingly threatening manner in which the
situation was developing had already become easily
discernible during the course of 1942.
X SEARCH FOR NEW POLICY
In his memorandum of the 25th of October, 1942,
including a discussion of the Eastern Battalions, Dr.
Brautigam wrote that. With the instinct inherent in
Eastern peoples the ordinary man had soon found out also
that for Germany the slogan: 'Liberation from Bolshevism'
was only a pretext to enslave the Eastern peoples according
to her own methods."
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He added that in order that there should exist no
doubt at all on the German war aims, however, German propa-
ganda referred openly to this intention in increasing
measure. The conquered territory was claimed publicly
not only for Germany as an area of colonization, but even
for Germany?s bitter enemies, the Dutch, the Norwegians,
and others. The economic exploitation was proclaimed
verbally and in print and carried out with almost total
disregard for the requirements of the indigenous population,
and with the greatest lack of consideration.
Dr. Brautigam went on to point out that the populace
in the U.S.S.R. had more of an understanding of the measures
and duties necessitated by war than the conquered peoples
of the West. He added that the Soviet laborer and peasant,
who were educated to the highest degree of self-conscious-
ness by Bolshevism, soon perceived that Germany did not
regard them as partners with equal rights, but considered
them only as objectives of her political and economic aims.
This, he said, had disillusioned them indescribably, all
the more, since they had placed great hope in Germany.
As early as June 6th, 1942, Goebbels wrote in his
diary: "Our policy in the conquered Eastern territories
is still not decided.... Fundamentally, in private con-
versations, everyone is of the opinion that we must seek,
by erecting puppet-governments, to secure a more favorable
attitude on the part of the population of the occupied
Eastern areas. Our attack -- of this all are convinced --
should be directed mainly against Bolshevism and not against
Russia.*
,by chance, Goebbels wrote on the same day that, "the
enemy has attempted to break out of the ?Volkov Encircle-
ment? -- a very tense battled indeed." In the Volkov
pocket a Russian Army, the Second Assault Army, commanded
by General Vlassov, was surrounded by the Germans. Vlassov
himself was captured somewhat later, and his army destroyed.
After his capture, General Vlassov became one of the most
controversial figures in German policy in the East. A
number of German groups sought to use the anti-Soviet move-
ment which he later headed in Germany in their efforts to
change German policy so. as to permit the use of Russians in
the war against the U.S.S.R. The so-called "Vlassov Action,"
his movement, must be carefully considered because it is of
far more than historical interest, since it shows the basic
Veaknesses of the U.S.S.R.
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XI GENERAL VLASSOV: THE MAN AND HIS PROGRAM
Many Russian generals were taken prisoner in 1941 and
1942, including several army commanders, but none of these
made the same impression as that created by General Vlassov
a p his captors. Soon after he was taken prisoner, his
capture came to be considered an event of great significance.
One official observer, Edwin Erich Dwinger of the German
Ministry for Foreign Affalre, stated in a secret memorandum:
"I have not the least doubt that this man was sent to us by
Fate at the decisive moment and that his employment can
turn the course of the war completely in,our favor." After
his first conversation with Vlassov (August 7th, 1942)
Hilger wrote that-he appeared to be a. strong and forthright
person, with calm and balanced judgment. On closer acquaint-
ance with Vlassov, Hilger wrote in June, 1943: "General
Vlassov is inspired by a burning hatred of the Bolshevik
system and Stalin personally. Because of his prestige in
the U.S.S.R., and because of his whole background and his
spiritual force, Vlassov is certainly a suitable instrument
to serve as a counter-balance to Stalin to weaken Stalin's
position decisively in favor of the German War Effort."
In another document, Dwinger made the following
appraisal, probably somewhat colored by his personal
views: "General Vlassov is a farmer, that is to say he
comes from that stratum of Russian society which is the
most typically Russian.. He is a man of high intelligence
and also a very loyal person.... The basis and drive for
his effectiveness area in the genuinely Russian sense,
religious. Even though he is not, naturally, a member of
any church, there can be no doubt that he is motivated far
less by political considerations than by a kind of Messianic
vision of Redemption (for his people) which has its origin
in his sympathy with the terrible suffering of his people
which he has had to witness all his?life. In spite of this
he is very clear-headed, and modest -- although stiffening
proudly when one mentions ?Russian slaves.' He is not,
consequemtly, a mere seeker after political glory and
accordingly will never become a purchasable hireling and
will never be willing to lead hirelings."
Nor was Vlassov an unknown quantity to the German Army
High Command, Hilger points out that, "as a soldier he
enjoyed the reputation of having played an outstanding. and
decisive role in the military operations which led to the
preservation of Moscow from the German assault in the fall
of 1941.0
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From October, 1941, on Vlassov commanded the 20th
Army, which later counter-attacked and advanced northwest
of Moscow. In the spring of 1942 his resistance in the
"Volkov Encirclement" east of Leningrad was energetic and
stubborn. He remained hidden in the forest and swamps
after the destruction of his army until he was forced to
surrender.
His career in the U.S.S.R. was most successful, in
spite of the handicap of his origin as the son of a
prosperous peasant who was liquidated as a Kulak during
the organization of the collective farms. Vlassov was born
in 1901, and completed training for the priesthood, but
entered the Red Army during the Civil War. After that, he
adopted a military career. He spent about two years as one
of the military advisers of Chiang Kai Shek, and then was
made Commander of the 99th Infantry Division stationed in
Kiev Military District late in 1939 or early in 1940. In
the Fall of 1940 his division was decorated for being the
best disciplined and best led In the Soviet Union. He was
promoted to the rank of "Major General" about January, 1941,
and, after his participation in the defense of Moscow, to
the rank of "Lieutenant General."
In a conversation with Dwinger, Vlassov quoted Stalin
as saying to him In the Spring of 1942 that the Germans were
"thank God making so many political errors that he (Stalin)
could subsist on their consequences forever, but that this
war would be won by the man whom the masses would support
the longest.* It was Vlassoves Idea to win the masses away
from Stalin
Vlassov.?s ideas, as he presented them to the Germans,
are described in many documents, but because of the condi-
tions under .,which they were written they must be studied
carefully. Vlassov wanted to persuade the Germans to adopt
his program. Therefore, he had to be guided by his own
judgment or that of trusted Germain in order to avoid ideas
which were unacceptable to the German Government.
Without some modification of his ideas he could not
have achieved anything. Moreover, those Germans who shared
Vlassovos ideas sought to make these ideas as palatable for
those in power as possible. Thus, for example, Dwinger
wrote that Vlassov was "anti-Bolshevist and anti-capitalist,"
which was quite correct, but he added, "in our sense of the
word, therefore, really a National Socialist," which was a
false conclusion.
14 Wlsffi~
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Apparently Vlassov talked frankly to Hilger, a man
who had spent forty-seven years in Russia, was entirely
familiar with the language and the country, and warmly
sympathetic to the Russians. Hilger, quite naturally, did
not report officially everything'that Vlassov told him.
In a recently written study on Vlassov, Hilger summarizes
Vlassov's fundamental ideas as follows: "Vlassov's case
was the same as that of many other Russians: not until the
catastrophe of 1941-42 ,had taken place did they become aware
of the fact that there were still possibilities of freeing
the Russian people from despotism and making available to
them the blessings of a democractic regime.
For this purpose, Vlassov allied himself with the
Germans, but not because he felt any sympathy for the
regime which existed in Germany at that time. He honestly
believed that a decisive defeat inflicted upon the Red Army
would cause the overthrow of the Soviet Government and that
the Germans would achieve this goal.
On the other hand, however, he was deeply convinced
that the Germans would never succeed without the active
help of the Russian people. Thus, for the time being the
Germans and Russians were natural allies. In his view,
such an alliance did not represent a danger for a future
Russia because he was convinced that, although the Germans
could defeat the Red Army with the help of.the anti-
Communist part of the Russian population, they would never
be in a position to conquer the whole vast country and
subjugate it."
These views coincide at all points with conclusions
which can be drawn from a careful and critical analysis- of
the available documentary material. It is of the utmost
importance to emphasize that, from the very beginning
Vlassov considered a German victory impossible without
the help of a Russian anti-Bolshevist army. In his report
of his first interview with Vlassov, Hilger wrote that the
R
i
uss
an could not conceive how, any victory could be won
by the German military forces alone. This statement was
made in August, 1942, at the time of the greatest German
successes and following a series of grave defeats of the
Red Army.
Vlassov warned against underestimating the Soviet
powers of resistance. In a letter of August 3rd, 1942,
intended for the German Commanders and jointly composed
by Vlassov and another Russian officer, Colonel Boyarski
they said: "While taking advantage of the peculiarities
of Russia -- the endless distances, the tremendous
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resources and the patriotism of the people -- and supported
by the Terror, Stalin will never voluntarily retire and
will not be prepared to compromise. He will continue the
war until he has exhausted all resources and possibilities
of defense. There is no possibility of an internal
revolution under the existing circumstances."
In that same letter Vlassov formulated his own proposals.'
The formation of a center for organizing a Russian Army and
the start of a Vlassov organization itself.
On the 13th of March 1943, that is to say during the
Allied offensive in Northern Africa and after Stalingrad,
Vlassov spoke in Mogilev much more frankly to a small circle
of Germans. There is a report of this speech made by a
representative of the Ministry for the Eastern Territories.
According to the report, Vlassov was of the opinion that
Germany would lose the war against Russia unless large
German armies came to grips with Stalin very soon, and an
effective pacification-policy brought about a fundamental
change in the occupied areas.
He believed that, without the cooperation of the
population of the occupied areas and a systematic undermining
of the Russian front based thereon, Germany must lose the
war in the course of time because of material and personnel
shortages. If Germany cherished no intentions to colonize
and enslave them this should be made clear to all concerned
by means of authoritative words and corresponding deeds.
There were still sufficient valuable non-Bolshevist forces
available. Vlassov felt it was still possible to use these
forces effectively and regarded this as his task. To
accomplish it, however, it was essential to explain the
German objectives clearly. The Russians who had a national
feeling of honor wanted to know what role they would play.
They would, however, under all circumstances oppose any
enslavement of the Russian people.
Vlassov believed that he could create an army of
2,000,000 using the anti-Soviet Russian prisoners and
civilians in German hands. With their help he believed it
would certainly be possible to liberate Russia from
Bolshevism. He felt that the fundamental basis for such a
Russian Renaissance, however, would be a clearly defined
policy which would satisfy the Russian national honor.
J
Vlassov was sharply critical of German methods in the
occupied areas. He had, however, had his own experiences
with the problem and knew there were "differences of opinion
among the German leadership." For that reason he wanted a
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favorable decision from the Fuehrero Obviously with this
objective in mind he called Hitler a "leader of great
genius." He added that he hoped Hitler would make possible
a rebirth of Russia. The Russians, having received back
their national honor, would crush Bolshevism at the side of
Germany and build a new Europe in close alliance with the
Reich.
Nevertheless, Vlassov realized even in August, 1942,
shortly after his capture that the prospect of the revival
of a great unified Russian state would not awaken much
enthusiasm among Germans. Hitler himself mentioned the
point in the course of the first conversation. "The Soviet
Officers (Vlassov and Boyarskiy)" he wrote, "replied that,
besides an independent Russian State and a colony there were
various other conceivable and acceptable. solutions, such as,
dominion status, a protectorate, or a protected state with
temporary or permanent German military occupation,"
To what extent these two officers were sincere it is
no longer possible to ascertain. In any event, Vlassov
clearly understood that to get permission for his project
he had to agree to some compromise solution acceptable to
the Germans.
XII FIRST VLASSOV PROJECT (VLASSOV ACTION)
In the Initial period, the opposition of the Ministry
for the Eastern Territories was quite effective, resulting
in several months? delay for the Vlassov Project. A
memorandum of the German General Staff dated June lst,1943,
and entitled. "Development and Situation of Military
Propaganda in the East since the Fall of 1942 (Vlassov
Project,)" discusses this situation.
It states that after Vlassov had placed himself at the
disposition of the Germans -- for the war against Bolshevism
-- "there appeared for the first time, in September, 1942,
a Vlassov tract which met with such success that Armed
Forces Operations Staff decided, with the full permission
of the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, to include
in the propaganda plan for the Winter 1942 - 1943 a major
propaganda project "from Russians to Russians." To provide
a basic platform for the project, Vlassov wrote a proclama-
tion in which a "Russian Committee" summoned all to fight
beside Germany against Bolshevism. It soon became apparent,
however, that more than the decision of the Armed Forces
High Command was necessary to carry out such a plan of
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propaganda. The memorandum of the Command Staff stated
that the Ministry for the Eastern Territories did not
authorize ,the project until the middle of January, after
the most favorable opportunity had passed. Since then, the
memorandum continued, it'had been in constant operation,
with striking success.
The opposition of the Ministry for the Eastern
Territories was closely linked to the political views of
Rosenberg. As far as Rosenberg was concerned Vlassov was
first and foremost a.Great Russian., and he was accordingly
afraid that the Vlassov Project would become a Great Russian
Project, making any future partition of Russia more
diff icultq
There was considerable negotiation between Vlassov and
the Germans concerning his program for a new order in
Russia. Vlassov himself maintained that every nationality
had an unlimited right to self-determination and should
decide for itself whether it wished to remain in a union
with the other peoples of Russia or become entirely inde-
pendent. Ir} March, 1943, he issued a declaration in which,
among other things, were the following words. "In the new
Russia.... there will be neither national suppression nor
rule by force. Each race will receive its national liberty
and. right to self-determination."
The Russian general declared in various conversations
that. he fully understood that Russia would have to make
great sacrifices. In particular the Ukraine and the
Caucasus were involved, since Rosenberg wanted these areas
separated from Greater Russia at all costs. In the end,
the Ministry for the Eastern Territories finally gave its
consent to the propaganda exploitation of Vlassov. A few
months later Rosenberg changed to a much more favorable
opinion of Vlassov and his movement -- after Vlassov had
made a declaration which parallelled Rosenberg?s Ideas.
On November 18, 1944, Rosenberg sent Hitler a report
dealing with a declaration entitled, Is a National Russia
a Danger for Europe?' which Vlassov had sent to the Armed
Forces High Command?s Propaganda Division in May, 1943.
According to Rosenberg, Vlassov acknowledged in this
declaration that "The East.," united in a single bloc, was
a menace to Europe. Vlassov considered that the menace
could only be nullified if the peoples and groups of
peoples who belong to the bloc entered into a new order as
members of a new and larger organization of the European
Family of Peoples.
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Under such circumstances, the Great Russians would be
prepared to surrender the Ukraine and the Caucasus -- in
reality this would be no surrender, since the economic and
cultural energies of these lands would then be available
not only to western Europe but to all Europe and hence also
to Russia. This declaration was an obvious adaptation of
Rosenberg?s ideas. Whether it was sincere or not, this
statement helped to win Rosenberg?s support for the Vlassov
Project.
,After an interruption of three or more months, the
Vlassov Project became active again in January, 1943? The
movement had been givin the means to publish a Russian
language newspaper called "ZARIA" ("The Dawn".) Vlassov
issued a manifesto in the form of an Open Letter in this
publication on the 3rd of March, 1943, and proclaimed the
formation of a Russian Committee. This committee, however,
only existed on paper.
Vlassov also disclosed his program for the future
Russian the so-called "Smolensk Program" or "Vlassov?s
13 Points." Finally, also in March, Vlassov was permitted
to speak in public assemblies in the occupied areas, and
his speeches made a very deep Impression on both the Germans
and Russians who heard them.
The June memorandum of the Armed Forces Command Staff
statedo "This Vlassov Project, which was begun as a
propaganda trick, has stimulated a movement which from the
enemy?s viewpoint, due to its threatening character, raises
before his eyes the spectre of civil war. 0
The memorandum included an appendix of some ten pages
of reports concerning the effect of the project, which
described how great the success of the Vlassov propaganda
had been.
"A large number of reports received from all fronts
show the deep impression that the Vlassov Manifesto has
made upon the Russian soldiers," the memorandum continued,
"and make it quite evident that material assistance has
been rendered toward the demoralization of the Russian will
to resist and that the enemy?s power has been weakened and
the tendency to desertion strengthened."
In order to suggest action which they did not dare to
recommend, the composers of the memorandum described the
effect of the propaganda abroad; "The Vlassov Project has
aroused the greatest attention among our allies, our
enemies, and neutrals in the months of April and May, and
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led to the general opinion among them that this project,
if skillfully continued by Germany could give a decisive
turn to the war in Germany?s favor."
The Vlassov Movement was not continued, however. At
the time that the memorandum of the Command Staff was
written, the movement started by the Vlassov Project had
run into very considerable difficulties, In order to
continue the project effectively it would have been necessary
to use Vlassov not only for propaganda purposes, but also
to give him a leading position in the field of political
activity with real influence upon recruitment, organization
and other activities of the Russian volunteers.
The propaganda itself, as mere propaganda, was
beginning to lose its effectiveness. The fact that public
discussion of the project was forbidden in Germany aroused
doubt among Russian prisoners-of-war as to German sincerity.
Moreover, Vlassov?s Manifesto was not allowed to circulate
in the occupied areas. The memorandum said that this
measure, which was "well known to-the enemy," had a negative
effect and was generally considered by the Russians as
proof that the whole project was only a propaganda trick.
The effect of broken promises also boomeranged on the
Germans, the Command Staff reported.
"Recently there has been an increase in the.... voices
that, because of the so far unfulfilled promises are ex-
pressing doubt as to the honesty of German claims," it
stated.
The memorandum warned that the opportunities offered
to enemy propaganda by any eventual collapse of the Vlassov-
Project are incalculable," and concluded that "the dangers
which a further delay or, perhaps, reversals in the Vlassov
Project. may bring are unmistakable, when one considers that
approximately 800,000 Russians are in German service as
Eastern Troops, that the propaganda for encouraging Russian
desertions is founded to a great extent on the Vlassov
Manifesto, and that the development of the guerrilla-warfare
situation is decisively dependent upon the realization of
the German promises."
XIII HITLER'S DECISION
Still, all these arguments did not serve to break down
the opposition of the Nazi exponents of a colonial policy.
The opinion of the High Command was ignored, as were the
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efforts of Ribbentrop, who was strongly influenced by his
Russian experts.
Rosenberg later, in November, 1944, pointed out. "At
that time, one of the greatest opponents of these efforts
was the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmlera He and other leading
figures of the Fuehreres Headquarters expressed the greatest
hostility toward the person and the 'employment of General
Vlassov.0
Vlassov was subjected to particularly strong attack
because of his statement that Russia could not be conquered
without the help of Russians. For that reason, support of
Vlassov seemed to both gimmler and Hitler a sign of
defeatism.
In April, 1943, Hitler, after listening to an
explanation by Ribbentrop of the. Vlassov Project, commented
that "such political actions were not to be undertaken;
they were not necessary and were worthless; their only
results would be fraternization between our people and the
Russians; moreover, they would be considered as weakness."
Finally in January, Hitler issued the following
directive.
1) "The national committees may not be used for the
recruitment of volunteers.
2) "Vlassov must never again appear in the occupied
areas."
As for the propaganda side of the Vlassov Project,
Hitler further stated that he did not object to it but only
under the condition that "no German authority is to take
seriously the lures contained in the 13 points of the
Vlassov Program."
This ended the first Vlassov Project. Vlassov himself
was placed in house arrest and had to remain in a suburb of
Berlin. He was allowed only a very restricted number of
visitors, and was prohibited from engaging in any activity.
All further Vlassov propaganda, until the Autumn of 1944,
was merely a misuse of his name.
On the basis of his own views, Hitler had handled the
matter logically. An honorable collaboration with the
Russian opponents of Stalin and his regime, such as General
Vlassov, could not be reconciled with his political ideas.
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On the 19th of May, 1943, Hitler said to Rosenberg,
We dare not employ any members of foreign races in the
Ministry for the Eastern Territories as advisors, ford if
they are against their own people, then they are without
character; if they are for their own people, then they are
dangerous!"
The policy patently applied not only to the Ministry
but to all authorities. None of the Germans who knew Vlassov
had any doubt but that he was for and not against his own
people.
Until the time arrived when Vlassov himself was allowed
to be active, his work had been purely propagandistic.
There was no Vlassov Army until then. Only the name of the
R.O.A. (Russian Army of Liberation) existed, and that was
used by the German propaganda to designate Russian units
which were integrated into the German Army.
Some of these Russians were sent to France to work on
the fortifications with the Todt Construction Organization,
while units consisting of persons from the Caucasus and
Asia were used for punitive expeditions in non-Russian
areas (such as Yugoslavia) and against the French Resistance
Movement.
Others functioned as guerrilla bands against Soviet
Partisans and openly conducted themselves like bandits.
The latter were hated by the local population. Soviet
propaganda very cleverly held Vlassov and his movement
responsible for this last group, a charge which is still
current today among the Russian emigre groups, particularly
among the older group, and possibly even In the U.S.S.R.
itself.
XIV SECOND VLA$SOV PROJECT
A new situation developed after the Allied landing in
France in 1944. In Normandy, eight Eastern Battalions which
saw combat, according to the opinion of the Fuehrer?s
headquarters, "fully justified themselves and fought bravely
in the heavy battles." These battalions were integrated
into German regiments. Von Rundstedt and Rommel were both
very well satisfied with the showing they made. As a
consequence, interest in possible employment of Russian
volunteers was again awakened. For reasons which have not
yet become apparent, Rimmler now advised the employment of
Vlassov and the formation of the Russian Army of Liberation.
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Concerning this second Vlassov Project there-is
comparatively little documentary material available.
However, this lack is not of decisive importance because
this new Project was clearly undertaken far too late,
Since the course of the war could no longer have been
turned in Germanyes favor.
In November 1944, the Committee for the Liberation
of the Peoples of Russia was formed under the leadership
of Vlassov. On November 14th the Manifesto of the Committee
was published in Prague. This time it was not a fiction;
the Committee actually existed and built up a good organi-
zation, though once more certain difficulties arose,
because of German fears that Vlassov and his movement had
Great Russian tendencies.
Rosenberg and various committees of Russian national
minorities shared these apprehensions. This time, however,
the conduct of affairs in Germany lay in the hand of
Himmler, who was in a position to overcome all opposition.
Vlassov received permission and orders to organize
two divisions. Of these two only one was formed before the
war ended. It was in action only once on the German side,
in the defense of the Oder River Line. The division was
then sent to Czechoslovakia, where it changed sides and
liberated Prague from the Germans. Vlassov and his staff
went first to Karlsbad, and afterwards, as far as can be
ascertained, to Fues.sen in Bavaria on the 14th of April,
1945, where they remained until the American troops
arrived.
The question still. remains as to what motivated Vlassov
and his supporters to become active at a time when the
position of Germany was already hopeless. Certainly they
could not have shared'Hitler?s insane belief that help would
be forthcoming from Providence. Their situation was des-
perate. They knew what to expect from a victorious Soviet
Russia. Nevertheless one may assume that the last Vlassov
Project was not only a gesture of despair. Many sources
indicate that he hoped to establish connections with the
Western Allies and gain their support.
This is confirmed by Hilger, who remained in close
contact with Vlassov during the entire period. The libera-
tion of Prague by Vlassov?s division and Vlassovas own
bearing tend to further substantiate this assumption.
Finally there exists a document which must be treated with
great caution, but nevertheless very interesting. This
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document is a report made by a Russian who.' as a German
secret agent, collected information on Vlassov and his'
organization.
This report, which was written on the 22nd of March,
1945, describes a conversation which Vlassov had with a
German general in the presence of a.number of his own
officers. One of the officers is supposed to have told
about this conversation. According to the report, the
German general asked Vlassov his opinion concerning "our
common fight" against the "Entente,* i.e., the Western
Powers.
Vlassov is reported to have replied that he was not
even thinking of a fight against the Entente and that, on
the contrary, he expected that his interests and those of
the Western Powers would soon coincide on the ground of the
common fight against Bolshevism. Vlassov was even said to
have had the intention, in case of extreme emergency, to
lead his troops into Switzerland and to offer them to the
Allies from there.
It is clear that such a report cannot be regarded as
a dependable source, although it does have a certain value
because it is partially confirmed from other sources. What
is significant, in any case, is that there is no evidence
that Vlassov acted as a German agent, but on the contrary
only in accordance with his conception of what was necessary
in any struggle against the Stalin-regime and in the interests
of Russia., as he understood them.
It is a fact of great historical importance that, after
a quarter of a century of Soviet rule, such phenomena as
Vlassov and his movement were possible, and that they could
have grown to considerable proportions if they had not been
prevented from doing so by German policy.
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