THE PROMOTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL STABILITY IN AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRIES: A WEAPON IN THE BATTLE AGAINST COMMUNISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01445R000100240001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 18, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Senior Research. Staff on International Communism
TIIE PRQMOTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL STABILITY
IN AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRIES:
A Weapon in the. Battle Against Communism _
1$ November 1957
JOB N(}, ~Q_~~~'~ L~
;.._...
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CENTRAL INTEI.'~IGENCE AGENCY
Senior Research Staff on International Communism
THE FROMtJTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL STABILITY
IN AFRO-ASIAN GOUNTRIFS:
A Weapon in the Battle Against Communism
Summary
Nearly all the Afro-Asian countries, some twenty of
them newly independent, have failed _to establish a constitu-
tional system that promises eontinued independence,
domestic orderx and progressive economic and social develop
rnent. The appeal of Commuxv.sm is strong .for a good many
of their leaders and for populations expecting rapid material
advancement, This paper suggests that, as complementary
to military, economic, and cult~zral assistance pxograrns,
the US' and its Western allies give more attention to the pro-
motion. of basic constitutional stability. While great obstacles
to change exist, and the risks of making bad situations worse
are considerable, there is need for the tactful advocacy of
constitutional systems having a higher resistance potential
to Communism than the regimes now found in many of the
Afro -A s.ian .countries .
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The combatting of Communism in Asia-.and ll~fxica,
it is generally recognized, m~u.st be carried on in a variety
of ways. The nature of the threat differs from area to area,
and the resources Which the United States anal its, allies- can
deploy are conditioned by many local factors,- Thus:, diplo-
matic~~.ctivity, mutual security agreements, military forces,
economic and technical aid, and cultural, informational, and
propaganda programs. have their proper roles in this struggle.
Less attention ha:s been given to the promotion of basic con-
stitutianal stability as a means of thwarting Communism in
the neW and underdeveloped countries, The purpose of this
paper is to stress the importance of this aspect of the prob-
lem and to suggest that political development must be viewed
as a necessary complement to the other measures which the
Western nations are employing.
1. 'I`he Appeal of Communism
The need for .achieving a stable constitutional order
ie almost universal among the countries ~-hich stretch in a
broad. arc from Morocco in the west to Korea in the east.
Some twenty of these countries are foxmer colonial depend-
encies which have won national freedom since T945o The
others., while recognized hefore World War ~ as sovereign
states, mere within the xnilitaxy-or economic sphere of
interest of one of the imperial powers... Thrust .into the
email of international affairs., often after the disruption
~f foreign or civil war, they have hard Little time in which
to develop solid foundations for constitutional. growth. More-
over, the population. bf .almost all. these countries. is composed
of a high proportion of illiterate citizens, unaccustomed to
political responsibility and excited by the prospects of rapid
material advancement.. In some cases they are divided by
age-old. racial, religious, and tribal loyalties. that impede
the development of a national consciousness> Their leaders,
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often only slightly more experienced than the people they
govern, have the problem of turning from agitation and
revolutionary zeal to the hard tasks of nation-building.
The appeal of Communism is powerful. Itx textbook
solutions for old grievances and new problems find a ready
acceptance among some intellectual circles -teachers, civil
servants, and professional men. There is a widespread
impression in the newly independent countries- that -the
methods. of rapid development pursued in the. US5R, and now
in the Eastern European satellites and Communist China,
are better suited to their conditions than those advocated by
the West: The transformation of a backward, largely agri-
cultural Russia into a strong economic and military power
within less than two generations is an example with a strong
a.tt~action for many Asians and Africans. That the cost
included untold misery and brutality seems relatively un-
important in lands where life has usually been .harsh.-and
where there is rarely a tradition in law or religion to sup-
port ~ concept of personal freedom.
Even where the climate is presently unfavorable to
the propagation of Communism ~:s an ideology, the USSR
arouses few fears. Until recently it- was little known except
as a champion of nationalism and anti-colonial sentiments;
now its emissaries come offering goodwill., unrestricted aid,
and strong support against the old imperialist powers. All
this sounds attractive, and warnings from the West are laid
to jealousy and pique.
It is. perhaps well to remember that~a good many of
the new Asian and -African. states passed much of their his-
torical experience under the rule of an or.ieiital despotism.
As Professor Wittfogel has pointed out, this kind of political
and social system bears striking resemblances to the Com-
munist regimes of the U5SR and China. A party bureaucracy
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under a dictator rules in the same arbitrary manner as the
royal bureaucracy of the oriental despot, .and in neither
system are there to be found the restraints of property and
corporative institutions that checked total tyranny in both
feudal and capitalist- Europe. In effect, Communist regimes
in the Middle- East or southern Asia, while- representing
political regression in Western eyes, .may be accepted by
the people. involved as a reversion .to a tradita.onal order,
with new names and symbols substituted for the old.
2. The Extent of the Problem
A brief survey of the situation will indicate, we
believe, that the problem of establishing a stable constitu-
tional order is present in nearly a.ll the countries. from
North Afry.c~, .to the Far East. In Morocco the withdrawal
of the French p~?otectorate has: devolved power- upon an
absolute monarch. Currently pagu.lar as the symbol of
independence, he is }xnder increasing pressure to cede
control of the government and the army to the Istiglal party.
A period, of instability in this: strategically located country
is the likely result of the developing contest for power.
France?.s other lately freed protectorate, 'T`unisia, has
deposed its reigning bey, and the hero of independence,
M. Bourghiba, has. assumed the office of president as v~ell
as premier. Recognizing that a const~.tutional system
regna.res more than the presence of one patriot-statesman,
M< Bourghiba seems perplexed as to how to create a strong
yet democratic state,
'Phe instability of the political systems in the Mid~1e
East is advertised in the headlines of the daily press. With
the .exception of Israel-and 'T`urkey, none of the countries
of the area can be said to have achieved a settled political
order. -Some of them, like Saudi Arabia., Yemen, and Libya
have been. thrust onto the stage of world .affairs. with govern-
ments so primitive that an advance into feudalism would
represent progress. Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Iran are
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ruled, behind a thin facade of parliamentary institutions,
by small oligarchies of politicians. and military officers.
Coups d'etat, revolts, and assassinations are endemic.
India, Pakistani, and Ceylon were fortunate in having
at the time of independence considerable groups of politicians
who, by education and experience, were familiar with western
polit9.ca1 principles. and practices. Furthermore, they in-
herited a well organized administrative s-ystem and a body
of trained civil servants-. Even with these advantages, how-
ever, they face serious. problems in establishing effective
governmental systems.. Pakistan has had difficulty in draft-
ing aconstitution and has yet to hold a national election. It
remains to be seen whether the successors- to the compara-
tively competent political leaders and their principal civil
servants- will be able to carry forward the construction of
the era of independence. India has. been governed for ten
years. by the well organized Congress-Party, popular. among
all classes as the vehicle of national independence> But the
party now faces the problem of retaining voter loyalty while
it deals with the serious and complex issues which trouble
and divide the vast Indian population. No responsible opposi-
tion party has. devel?.ped, and it is ominous that the Comrnu-- ~~
nists are the largest minority group in. the- natiana.l parlia-
ment and have won control of one state government.
In Southeast Asia the need for a stable constitutional
order is most vividly illustrated in the case of .Indonesia.
Starting as a federation of the principal areas of the former
Dutch East Indies, Indonesia was transformed by its revolu-
tionary political leaders. into a centralized unitary state.
This development has. proved unsatisfactory to the non-
Javanese parts. of the ar.cliipola~q, and within the past year
rebel movements-. have arisen. in Sumatra, Borneo and the
Celebes. In the face of this disintegration the President,
Sukarno, advocates a vague authoritarian regime, while
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the Communis.ta enhance their influence by enthusiastically
supporting him and making large electoral.. gains. in Java.
Dictatorship, civil war, or a dissolution of the state are
al.l possibilities in the present situation.
The former Freneh. empire in Southeast Asia has
dissolved into the four states of CambocU.a; Laos, North
Vietnam and South Vietnam. North Vietnam ha. s achieved
political st~.bility -that of a Carnmunist cctatorship. South
Vietnam, under the vigorous leadership of .President Diern
and with. substantial American economic and military aid,
has: established a high degree of internal order and has. made
progress in meeting its serious problems. as an .independent
state. More time is needed, however, before concluding
that a politically and economically viable country is in the
making. The same may be said for Laos. and. Cambodia.
The former has. the problem of regaining control over a
part of the country novtr ruled by a Cc~mmuna,st rnovezn~nt.
supported by the neighboring Viet Minh. There is a danger
that the royal government in .its effort to absorb the terri-
tory and military forces of .the Pathet Lao will itself be
subverted. The goveicnrnent of Cambodia is in forma con-
- stitutional monarchy. However, no settled political system
has developed, partly because of the capricious actions of
its. actual ruler, Prince Norodom S%h,a.i~:ouk, in moving from
the throne to the premier"s office or to political retirement.
Thailand, also a constitutional monarchy, has main-
tained more stability than most. of its neighbors despite
periodic coups d'etat. These usually bloodless revolutions
reflect cha.n,ging con, figurations of political and rilitary
power among a few leaders: who compete for the spoils of
office in a relatively wealthy country.
On 31 August 1957 the independent states. of Southeast
Aeia were joined by a -new member, the Federation of Malaya.
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It begins its independent existence with the advantag-es that
other foxmer colonies :of the British Empire have inherited,
namely, a cadre of leaders familiar with Western political
principles and practices and an effective adrrainistrative
system. Endowed with rubber ar~d tin, -A~4alaya's prospects
for stability and progress would be bright but for two major
uncertainties, The first is the question of whether a
Iutalayan nationality can be developed out of the diverse
communities of Malays-, Chinese, and Indians. The other
concerns the insurrection carried. on since 1948 by Com-
monist guerrillas. Now contained and probably reduced
to less than two thousand, these guerrillas, mostly Chinese,
force-the country to bear a heavy cost for policing, and they
-could again threaten its security if revived and .supported by
the Communist Bloe.
Two states. in the Far East, the Republic of China
anal the Republic of Korea, have governments batilt around
their respective presidents, Chiang -Kai-shek and Syngrnan
Rhee, In both, predictions- concerning tlae prospects for a
stable political order probably must await the demise of
these elderly men, who not only symbolize the independence
of their countries brat provide the effective leadership. These
prospects will be affected by both .internal conditions and the
exposed positions. of Taiwan and South Korea between the
Communist Bloc and the Free World.
The 1~Teec3, fog Camtsti:ttxtia~x. Reform
tt ~,s easier 'ta describe a~.d a.n-Irze the weaknesses
of the new Asian. and African states than. to :prescribe
remedies., Time, of course, -will help soave of them to
achieve a reasonable degree- of political stability. Habit,
practice, -and experience wi1L deepen grooves to--guide the
machinery of state..- The considerable numbers Qf young
people being trained at home and abroad will add to the
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efficiency of public_ and private services.. Technical
assistance programs. provided by the United 1Vations, the
U5 Intexnational Cooperation Administration, the C?lombo
Plan, and other governmental and private agencies. gill
raise .standards and performance in industry, agriculture,
and social services. And yet neither tame, experience, nor
technical assis..tance is Tikely to provide a good proportion
of these countries with. the basic constitutional structures
that they need. Before these factors: can become influential,
some countries. will probably be gobbled up by aggressive
neighbors, succ~zmb to Communism, or suffer a series of
dictatorial. seizures by rival cliques and strong-men. Rapid
progress tows.rd a .settled political order is the requirement
in a goodly number of these countries.,
It is suggested that the US and the Western. European
countries, which have such a vital stake in the stability of
the Afro-Asis.n countries, should concern. themselves with
how they can help develop political systems that give prom-
ise of domestic peace and that offer hope of orderly progress
to people often bewildered, frustrated, or embittered by
their present regimes. efforts along this- line should be
pursued in conjunction with essential programs. of economic,
military, and technical assistance, the +gurpose being to
promote conditions in which these programs vvi11 have last-
ing and beneficial effects.
The obstacles to instigating aa.tisfac-tort' changes are,
of course, formidable. No nation will admit that it is
incapable of governing itself, and newly independent states
are especially sensitive about foreign criticism and advice.
Moreover, present governing groups will usually resent
any suggestions that chs,nge is desirable and will consider
such advice as unfriendly. The pxoblem, therefore, must
be approached with tact and understanding. It must be
recognized, too, that constitutional systems.. cannot be
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mailed out in Bentham-like fashion as finished models. The
new states of Africa and Asia can borrow various institutions,
but in the main they must build with native materials. The
systems they develop probably will not satisfy all the criteria
of democxatic government as practiced in the advanced states
of the West, but they should be approved and supported if they
provide for governing organs that~re basically responsive to
the popular will, means for peaceful change and legitimate
succession, and guarantees ?f the more fundamental personal
and property rights.
4. Sorne Illustrative Cases
A few examples may make the above discussion less
theoretical. The Government of ..Iran is an oligarchy of
politicians and military officers-under the domination of
the Shah. It is basically unstable because the Shah's- death,
by a natural or a treacherous cause, would .leave both the
person and the qualifications of the successor an uncertainty.
Moreover, the personal interventions of the Shah in the daily
business of government discourage and frustrate the develop-
ment of capable civilian leadership. The transformation of
Iran into a constitutional monarchy with a parliament and a
responsible ministry seems a reasonable objective. The
throne would remain as the focal point of national loyalty,
and effective power would be located in the hands of civilian
ministers. There are reported to be politicians. of some
standing who desire this kind of constitutional development,
and. the. Shah has expressed hopes for the growth of a contin-
uing party system to replace the present cliques and #actions.
Admittedly, the problem of promoting constitutional change
without opening the door to another Mossadeq is serious, but
thexe is great risk, too, in banking upon the ability of a
strong man to preserve domestic order and national inde-
pendence.
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West of Iran lie the Arab states-, .aspiring to some
sort of unity-which they assert is-being thwarted by the
United States and its allies. Unjust as this complaint is.,
it might be removed by the American advocacy of a Pan-
Arab state. It is doubtful whethex the present community
of interest among these Dear Eastern countxies is as great
as they profess.. In any event, it probably could lead to
no more than a loose confederation, but that could be
announced as a goal of Western policy. Such a confedera-
tion could be empowered to handle foreign affairs, defense,
and basic economic development, and-the Western powers
could agree to deal with a central government on such
matters. The problem of constitutional farm might be
settled along the lines of the new Federation of Malaya,
with a Saudi and a Hashemite ruler alternating as the
nominal. head of state. Each state would retain its own
governmental institutions, choosing representatives to a
council of the confederacy. Jordan, whose life expectancy
under present conditions is short, might be divided among
its neighbors; or, joined in a :union? it might cease to be
the object of their Blotting. Israel would have to receive
strong Western guarantees:, but the existence of the Arab
confederacy should quiet much of the fear that now possesses
her neighbors.. And in economic development, supported by
large-~sc~tle Wester aid ~.nd some sharing ?f oil revenues,
lrher~ ~ni.g~;tbe a> e~utl.et-fear the Arab res-tiessnes:s and a
c~ol.'t~.'~i~+n c~~ the rafaxgee problem which contribute to the cur-
~~~t ~~s,b~.lit~r of the area. The advocacy of an Arab con-
~+sds~scy embracing Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, and. Egypt, plus any neighbors wishing to join,
would at worst remove a grievance, and at best would open
the way to orderly progress in the area. .Either result
would benefit the security interests. of the US and Western
Europe .
As a third. example, there is the case of Indonesia.
Developments there since independence indicate that the
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country is not ready far either a centralized .form of
national state ar a parliamentary democracy on the Western
European model, The leaders. sense this bkzt apparently
have nothing definite to offer instead. Thus baffled, they
are attracted by the apparent order, cliscipline, and progress
of the Communist states, An alternative. might be a federal
state which allowed a large measure of autonomy to the
constituent parts, thus: satisfying their particularism and
removing their dislike of Javanese dominance. The central
government might consist of a president anal a federal coun-
cil, the members of the latter chosen by the state governP
menu, Indirect election of the central authorities and
representation by area rather than population would hinder
the exploitation of the electoral system by radical parties
and the concentration. of political. power in populous Java.
The states or provinces might be permitted to experiment
in devising constitutions suited to their particular require-
ments:.
There are other possibilities- which merit expl~xation.
Some of the cotitntri.es of Southeast Asia, now that they have
achieved in-dependence, might be receptive to political and
economic arrangements that would enhance their viabila.ty.
The states of North. Africa, if and when there is a solution
to the Algerian problem, present another group of countries
whose ultimate destiny may lie in some kind of federal union.
5. A Proposal for US P~xlicy
By their nature, projects of constitutional reform are
ne~tler quickly accomplished nor immediately beneficiala
Nevertheless, we believe that the US Government in its
basic policy papers dealing-with. the Afro-Asian countries
should include a statement of the. kind of political develop-
ment it would like to sea take place. The statement should
be more definitive than one expressing a desire for a stable,
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democratic government! it should propose, at least in gen-
eral terms, a constitutional order that seems- practical in
-the light of the existing situation. This:-goal could then be
promoted as opportunity allows. US influence would almost
always- have to be exerted in inclirect and tangential ways,
but if consistently applied through all the contacts, between
the US and the various countries concerned, it should
gradually have some effect.
US views. abot~.t constitutional development might
profitably be discussed with our NAT(7 .allies, thus provid-
ing one field of the political consultation that has been
advocated. The members of the alliance have a common
interest in advancing the stability and development of the
Afro-Asian countries. Collectively they have a great deal
of experience to contribute, axed some of them have exten-
sive contacts with both the present and the emerging leaders
of the new states ..
After detexmination of-the general lines of develop-
ment that we think desirable, some practical steps which
we might take include the followingo
(1) The .inclusion in exchange progr~a.ms of persons.
who are known by US embassy- officers- to be seriously
interested in constitutional reform (public officials, pro-
fessors, publicists, party leaders), and their exposure to
i.nfluenees that should enlighten and educate.
~2) The sending of distinguished constitutional lawyers
and' authorities. on comparative government to Afro-Asian
countries to teach, lecture, and a.dviee.
(3) The organization, probably through private
foundations.-and professional societies, of conferences
and institutes- on basic governmental problems. facing the
new and under-developed countries...
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(4) The disaerrunation through professional societies,.
USIS libraries., and university contacts of authoritative
documents dealing with constitutional and governrn,~nta1
.subjects (e. g. papers on the drafting of the constitution of
the Malayan Federation).
(5) Instructions to US diplomatic representatives to
utilize opportunities that may arise to promote constitu-
tional reform,
(b) The enlistment of the cooperation of the fou,nda-
tiona and universities which leave extensive aid and advisory
progxarns in progress. in the under-developed. countries.
Admittedly, these measures- can have only minor
influence in comparison with. the domestic and external
pressures that will determine the course of events in the
countries of Africa and Asia.. Nevexthelesa, in view of
the security interest-which the US has in the development
of stable regimes in these states, more attention should
be given to the problems of constitutional structure and
practice. There are risks in opening: doors to change,
axed a nice balance must be maintained between. supporting
a currently satisfactory but backward political order and
advocating reform. In the end, however, a .mutually
fruitful relationship between the Atlantic Community and
the .new nations of Africa. and Aaia will .depend upon our
.sympathy for political advance as we11 as for economic
betterment. The Communists- are busy exhibiting a system
which. seems. to offer order and stability while giving new
..social classes the fulfillment of .their aspirations. With
all their political experience, the Western countries
should have some imaginative but practical ideas- to propose.
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