SPECULATIVE OBSERVATIONS ON THE XXI CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01445R000100140001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 31, 1997
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 2, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
N? 276
Senior Research Staff on International Communism
SPECULATIVE OBSERVATIONS ON THE
XXI CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF THE SOVIET UNION
(27 January 1959)
CIA/SRS-9
.i s N'11H K~( wQM~ S..d~AL.
2 January 1959
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Senior Research Staff on International Communism
SPECULATIVE OBSERVATIONS ON THE XXI CONGRESS
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION
(27 January 1959)
CIA/SRS-9
This is a speculative study which
has been discussed with US Gov-
ernment intelligence officers but
has not been formally coordinated.
It is based on information avail-
able to SRS as of 28 Dec ember 1958 .
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SPECULATIVE OBSERVATIONS ON THE XXI CONGRESS
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION
(27 January 1959)
1. The XX Congress of the CPSU (14-25 February 1956)
was a landmark in the history, not only of the Party, but of
the modern world. From it emerged one of the most spec-
tacular actions of the post-war period, the "secret" speech
of Nikita Khrushchev, denouncing the "cult of personality" of
Stalin and the "criminal" actions of the dictator against the
Party itself. Several doctrinal "modifications" were set forth,
notably the "non-inevitability" of war between the capitalist
and the socialist "systems, " the possibility of a non-violent
"parliamentary takeover" of political power in certain -
unspecified countries, and the legitimacy of "different roads
to socialism. " The immediate consequences of the XX Con-
gress were devastating; a wave:-of confusion spread through-
out International Communism, culminating in October in the
effort of Poland to take up its "national road" and in the Hun-
garian revolt against Communist domination. The year 1957
was marked by a determined drive on the part of the Soviet
Union, aided by Communist China, to restore stability to the
shaken movement, an effort which by the middle of 1958 was
largely successful. The second half of 1958 may be charac-
terized as a period of preparation for a new dynamic surge
of the "socialist system, " the "Great Leap Forward" in China
and the Seven Year Plan (1959??65) of the Soviet Union.
2. The XXI Party Congress, which will begin on 27
January 1959, ushers in a "new historical period of a gradual
passage from socialism to communism. " With what may be
regarded as a certain measure of elasticity, Khrushchev has
declared that "the long term plan of development of the Soviet
Union for the next fifteen years provides for the creation of
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the indispensable conditions for the completion of the transi-
tion to communism." The magnitude and significance of this
program invest the Congress with a gravity and moment which
the Free World cannot afford to disregard.
3. It should be noted that the XXI Congress, unlike the
XX, is not a regular Party Congress, which according to CPSU
statutes should be held every four years. Rather this is desig-
nated as '1neocherednoi" - not in the regular series - hence,
extraordinary rather than statutory. Since there is no estab-
lished precedent for a Congress of this type, it is not possible
to determine precisely the proceedings which will be followed.
It seems probable, however, that this Congress, unlike those
in the regular series, will not be the occasion for announcing
major changes in the Party structure, the Central Committee,
or the Presidium. There is a parallel to earlier practice in
the holding of preparatory sessions at the Republic level, but
these are not being used for the development of an agenda.
Indeed, the agenda is already specifically laid down in two
cardinal documents: Khrushchev's Seven Year Plan Theses
and the Theses of the Central Committee on Education. These
have been amplified and underlined by other documents and
utterances, notably Khrushchev's Report on Agriculture to
the Central Committee (15 December).
4. In attempting a speculative forecast of the XXI Con-
gress, we must be mindful of the possibility that it will yield
a number of surprises. The two sets of Theses will undoubted-
ly be the framework of the proceedings, but, if the pattern of
the XX Congress is followed, there will be other themes, doc-
trinal and pragmatic, some of which may be electrifying to
Communists and even to ourselves. These, of course, are
difficult to forecast, and we must recognize that no amount
of speculative ingenuity can cope with the initiatives of a
dynamic directing group which knows how to exploit the vir-
tues of surprise and manipulation under a mantle of consum-
mate secrecy.
2 e
Oror`4
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5. Accordingly this essay seeks primarily to interpret
the program which has been announced, adding, wherever pos-
sible, a few adumbrations of what may be unveiled. The best
we can hope for is to be caught somewhat less off balance than
we were in. February 1956.
GENERAL THEME
6. The central theme of the XXI Congress will be the
transition within the USSR from the completed state of "social-
ism" to building the foundations of "communism. " This is
clearly held by the USSR to be a step in which it, alone among
the ''sokiali-st" states, can take the lead. Firmly, if politely,
Communist China is being relegated to a following role. In
fact, it has actually been demoted from the relatively advanced
stage in the process of development which had previously been
accorded to it. This is subtly brought out in the October 1958
slogans of the CPSU, the latest in the series of semi-annual
formulations which authoritatively set forth the hierarchical
relations within the Bloc. Thus, as recently as the slogans
of May 1958, China had been hailed as a "builder of socialism,
a slightly ambiguous term which tends to imply that the process
of "building" has been completed. But in the October slogans,
China is grouped along with most of the European satellites as
"building socialism, " a process clearly not yet completed. The
significance of this downgrading is pointed up by the recent
anx,ouncemellt that lowly Bulgaria has now virtually completed
the "building of socialism" and is nearly ready for the higher
step of "transition to communism. " It seems probable that
Czechoslovakia will soon be added as a third member of the
elect group, possibly at the Congress itself. Both these satel-
lites, of course, will follow the leadership of the Soviet Union
in this transition.
7'. China, in the meantime, appears to have accepted
the tactful admonitions of the USSR to slow the pace of com-
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munalization and to moderate the "utopian" claims and prom-
ises which accompanied the process in its first moments of
enthusiasm. It is not certain whether the XXI Congress will
attempt any further steps to reaffirm Soviet leadership. Prob-
ably it will be content to express friendly approval of the Chinese
experiment, acknowledging that it may be more useful as a model
to the underdeveloped countries than Soviet experience, which
has now reached such a high stage as to be beyond the reach of
imitation except in advanced industrial economies.
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION
8. The XXI Congress will be predominantly an occasion
of great programmatic significance for the USSR itself. It will
unfold in an. aura of self-congratulation for mighty achievements
and of self-exhortation to vastly greater efforts in the future.
9. At the same time a dialectical counterpoint on the
dominant theme will be woven from the relations of the Soviet
Union with the other members of the Communist Bloc. There
is now in being, according to Moscow, a united world "system"
of socialist states, confronting the hostile and aggressive
"system" of capitalism and imperialism, headed by the USA.
The development of the "socialist system, " which emerged
after World War II, is alternatively described under two terms:
"camp" (lager') and "commonwealth" (sodruzhestvo). The
"camp" is usually portrayed in an externa- context of militancy,
might and monolithic unity. It corresponds to the aggre,ssive-
defensive aspects of Soviet and Bloc foreign policy, and, as
such, is the more insistent note. The "commonwealth" is
represented more loosely, a unity of equal, independent, sov-
ereign states, motivated by the Five Principles of Bandung in
the spirit of brotherly cooperation and mutual assistance. The
root of the word sodruzhestvo itself connotes friendship; hence
the term sets forth the benign, pacific image with which Mos-
cow seeks to soften the defiant implications of the "camp" -
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including perhaps the Germanic military origin of the Rus-
sian word. 1
10.' The unfolding of the concept of the socialist
"system" must be set in. a context of organization, the cardi-
nal principle of Leninist-Bolshevik revolutionary activity.
International Communism has twice established and dissolved
a mechanism for the governance of the relations between the
national parties. the Comintern (1919-43) and the Cominform
(1947-56). The crisis and stabilization of the movement in
the second half of 1956 and the beginning of 1957, raised in
a new form the requirement for some mechanism to insure
doctrinal unity, After much public -arid-secrf*t; discussion,
a successor to the Cominform journal was launched in Prague
(August 1958) and published in fifteen languages, of which the
English edition is entitled World.Marxist Review. It remains
to be seen whether this journal will fully meet the requirements
of the movement. Quite possibly the Party Congress will can-
vass the matter further, though not openly.
11. There is considerable evidence that this Congress,
like its predecessors, will take advantage of the presence of
"fraternal delegations" to discuss - behind the scenes - prob-
lems' of central guidance and regional diversity. It is unlikely
that anything comparable to a new Comintern will be announced,
but we may be sure that directing elements in the Foreign Sec-
tion of the Central Committee of the CPSU will lay down broad
and. detailed programs for action. The concept of "proletarian
internationalism" will be applied elastically to insure the sta-
bility and unity of the socialist "system, it and the way will be
held open to the creation of a tighter mechanism of control if
the flexible approach proves inadequate.
1SRS is preparing a more detailed study of the concept of
the Commonwealth and its prospective role in the governance
of the socialist "system. 11
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rflN1'Tr P'TT'?`'?' A T
INTERNATIONAL THEMES
12. It is probable that the triad - "system, If "camp, If
"commonwealth" - will figure prominently in the XXI Congress
speeches, with the weight of emphasis on the "camp. " Despite
the atmosphere of confidence, growing out of the successful
stabilization campaign of 1957, the mood of the Soviet leaders
is still tense, vigilant and stern. Nevertheless, "peaceful co-
existence" and "relaxation of tensions" will be proclaimed as
the goals of Soviet foreign policy, and the record of offers and
proposals on disarmament, cessation of nuclear testing, dis-
engagement and mutual security arrangements will be con.
trasted with the obdurate "warmongering" of the "aggressive"
Free World alliances.
13. Within this dialectic of peaceful professions and
rugged defiance, the Congress will seek to advance the gains
which Moscow and Peking have reaped from the recent series
of international crises which they have provoked. Whether the
provocation of crises such as Quemoy and Berlin is to be re-
garded as intrinsic to the advance of Bloc foreign policy inter-
ests or as primarily designed to stimulate energies for the
great internal. programs which are being launched, must be
regarded as moot. Judging solely by external evidence of
recent months, we would be inclined to anticipate that the gen-
eral tone of the Congress, in the foreign political field, will
be predominantly "hard. " Motions in the direction of concilia-
tion, if they are made at all, are more likely to come outside
the Congress in the form of dramatic gestures, a personal
offer of Khrushchev to, change the basis of negotiation over
Berlin, or the dispatch of a special emissary with an un-
announced mission, as in the case of Mikoyan's visit to the
14. If, however, specific new themes of international
relations are set forth at the Congress, it is difficult to see
in what respects they are likely to be of an accommodating
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nature. We would not anticipate any new positions with res-
pect to disarmament which would "relax tensions" maintained
at the two Geneva conferences, although there might be an-
other commitment on the part of the USSR to cease nuclear
testing without the condition of reciprocity by the US and UK.
While recent criticism of the UN as ineffectual and as US-
dominated might be repeated, theme might also: be new pro-
posals to utilize its office s for negotiations, for example, on
the Middle East or Berlin, or even on Korea and Vietnam.
Despite recent sharp criticism of Nehru on the ideological
level, Khrushchev might revert to the earlier theme of urg-
ing a summit meeting including India. The Congress will
probably reiterate the willingness of the Soviet Union to aid
backward countries in their struggle for national "liberation,
but it will also be careful not to promise too much in the way ,t
of economic assistance, since such offers might be interpreted
as inconsistent with the calls for heightened efforts to construct
the material base of communism within the USSR. Neverthe-
less, there will undoubtedly be considerable flexing of econom-
ic muscle in the foreign field, and the attitude toward coopera-
tion with Western powers in development programs will prob-
ably remain negative.
INTERNAL THEMES THE TRANSITION TO "COMMUNISM"
15. Against the background of sustained world crisis,
the Congress will unfold and expound the great mission of the
CPSU in transforming the Soviet Union from a "socialist" to
a "communist" society. This will be set forth as nothing
less than the task of creating a new type of man - who might
be called the "homo communisticus" - a new type of economy
and a new type of society. The energizing force of this trans-
fd mation is "placed on the agenda by life itself, to whose poten-
tiality is to be actualized through the genius and will of the
Communist Party. The process itself involves indoctrination,
economic construction and psychological conditioning.
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ECONOMIC
16. Inseparable from the ideal of a transfigured "com-
munist man" is the economy which forms him. The essence
of history, conceived in Leninist-Marxist dialectical terms,
is the triumph of ever higher forms of material production.
Without a greatly expanded material base, the "spiritual"
values of communism cannot be attained. Hence, the Theses
of the Seven Year Plan, like those of Education, are a procla-
mation of faith. The language and tone in which they are pre-
sented is calculated to foster enthusiasm and dedication.
17. It is difficult to see what the Congress speakers can
say in the economic field which will go beyond the development
of the themes already stated. Production goals and comparative
statistics will undoubtedly be repeated ad nauseam. 1
18. It is possible, nevertheless, that a note of super-
erogation will be introduced. It may be stated that these are
the projectible goals on the basis of existing curves of produc-
tive capacity, but that they can be surpassed. A new impetus
to economic construction will be sought in the heightened in-
tensity of life and work according to "Communist" principles
("zhit' i rabotat' po kommunisticheski") as opposed to the pre-
vailing level of mere "socialist labor. " Discipline and incentive
go hand in hand. Already the press abounds in stories of height-
ened zeal in organizing communist labor brigades. To the his-
torically minded outsider these bear a suspicious similarity
to the homely "pep talks" of the Stakhanovite era, and possibly
their energizing effect will prove little greater. , Never-
1The credibility of Soviet statistics with respect to past produc-
tion and the possibility of realizing projected goals is analyzed
by a number of experts in Soviet Survey No 26, October-
December 1958.
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theless, it would be a mistake to view this new campaign too
lightly. Endless repetition of the "catch up with and outstrip
America" theme, according to the"reports of many Western
observers, has produced an electrifying effect on managers
and workers alike. The "Great Leap Forward" of China has
introduced a note of "brotherly" competition from abroad
which may be enhanced by the very real fear that. the "leaper"
may eventually do the "outstripping.
19. We should not, therefore, be surprised if Khrush-
chev and the other speakers at the Congress proclaim that
even the formidable goals of the Seven Year Plan are mutable
and may be subject to upward revision before the seven year
period is completed. The CPSU is seeking to renew its charge
of dynamism with an act of will, drawing from sources which
it believes to be undepleted. We should not assume that this
is impossible.
EDUCATION
20. The theses on Education are organically related to
-the Seven Year Plan in-laying down the course of the transi-
tion to communism. Since these have already stated clearly
the methods and goals to be pursued, the proceedings of the
Congress can actually do little more than repeat and exhort
the Party to carry them out.
21. Nevertheless, the rationale of the program may
become more explicit, and a serious effort may be made to
evoke heightened popular support. For the program will not
be un !vrersally popular. It restricts some of the advantages.
which the more privileged strata of Soviet society have en-
joyed in procuring higher education for their children.. More-
over, it injects a hard note of discipline and competition into
a situation where relatively easy advance has been possible
in the past.
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22. The central theme is the unity of education with
the process of productive labor. This is derived from basic
Marxist-Leninist doctrine on "polytechnical" education which
iq admitted to have eroded somewhat in recent years.. Khrush-
chev on a number of occasions has conceded that an intellectual
elite has emerged, often indifferent, if not hostile to manual
labor. There has been a certain tendency to perpetuate the
privileges of the higher party and professional cadres in their
children through the process of education. itself. It might al.'
most seem as though Kh:rushchev had been stung by the critique
of Milovan Djilas, whose picture of the "New Class" has not
been disposed of by mere denunciation. The Congress speeches
will certainly echo the theme of social levelling - upward, of
course - through the combination of intellectual and manual
work in the process of secondary education, as well. as in
more mundane ways such as the reduction of wage differentials.
23. But this process will not be presented as one of
mere restraint on the ambitigns of the more advanced social
strata. It will also be described -glowingly as the means of
positive formation and transformation of man himself under
the slogan of a new Soviet "humanism. " Here, as in other
instances, the Communists are attempting to seize and appro-
priate to their own purposes a lofty concept of the Western
Free World tradition. They distinguish between the corrupted
legacy of classic and Renaissance humanism which has sur-
vived in the ethos of the exploiting bourgeoisie and their own
"true" form of humanism which is rooted in the "scientific"
ideology of "historical materialism. "
24. Nevertheless, there will probably be a certainl
ambivalence in the treatment of this "humanistic" motif.
It implies an element of "individualism, " difficult to reconcile
1Cf. Ladislav Stall, 'The Class Struggle and Humanism, "
World Marxist Review I, 3 (November 1958) pp. 27-3.0.
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by any propagandistic legerdemain with. the "collectivism"
which is basic to the ethos of the "communistic man. " More-
over, it has been associated too closely for comfort with dis-
sident and revisionist themes of what might be called the
"romantic socialism" of the Polish intellectuals. Thus we
may expect that the residual impact of. all the talk on educa-
tion will be pragmatic, the training of competent and willing
vessels for the advancement of the economic and political
objectives of communism. In this sense the new educational
program may imply an increasing element of anti-intellectual-
ism, perhaps attributable to Khrushchev's, own bias.
25. This does not mean that the inspirational themes
are insincere. The theses are eloquent in seeking to pro-
mote a sense of dedication. in youth.
Experiencing the great happiness of creation, of
giving birth to new life, our youth becomes enriched
spiritually, acquires. a, revolutionary steeling, learns
to value and to love what is most. important and valua-
ble in the We of the Soviet citizen - work for the good
of society.
Khrushchev probably does believe that Soviet education will
produce a society richer in "moral and spiritual" values,
and that there will be a sort. of Soviet Renaissance during
the very process of transition to Communism. The Educa-
tion Theses are careful to reserve an exception to the com-
mandment of manual labor but it is limited to the "gifted few"
in the creative and interpretive arts.
26. Khrushchev appears, also, to be convinced that
this cultural Renaissance will take.the form of a flowering
1S.even Year Plan Theses, p. 94.
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of the "nationalities" of the Soviet Union, in which local
traditions and art forms will be nurtured alongside the ever-
growing Great Russian influence which permeates all the na-
tionality areas. The Congress proceedings may thus turn
out to be the occasion for glorifying a new "melting pot" con-
ception, different from that of the United States in. that nation-
al characteristics and art forms are cherished and unfolded
rather than assimilated. The statement of the Education
Theses that Russian and the local mother tongue of the nation-
alities will be taught on a plane of equality should not be taken
as mere window-dressing, for the image of the Soviet Union
as, a multi-national state is intended to serve as the model of
the broader - eventually world - commonwealth.
TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIETY
27. The Education and the Economic Theses set the
frame for a radical transformation of socialist society.
Herein, perhaps, lies the unannounced agenda of the Con-
gress. The tone of many Party pronouncements in the post-
Stalin era has suggested that the creation of a communist
society cannot be accomplished through coercion alone. It
must, in the end, reflect the spontaneous, general will of
the people. Even as they have appropriated the concept of
"humanism, " the Communist leaders are claiming for their
program the virtues of justice and freedom in a "true" form,
contrasting essentially with their "bourgeois corruption" in
the West.
28. The development of a society in which each will
be provided for "according to his needs" is associated with
the growth of "socialist legality" in a continuing educational
process. In the past, the promised development of basic
principles of "legality" has frequently been postponed by
overriding considerations of "vigilance" against the'bncir-
cling" capitalist enemy. With the "decisive shift in the bal-
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ance of forces" between. capitalism and socialism, and the
emergence of a situation in which the latter may eventually
"encircle' the former, and with the gradual elimination of
'gbourgeois remnants, e the possibility of a "truly free" society
at last may seem to arise before the eyes of the dedicated Com-
munist. This would find its expression in an improved legal
system. For several years Soviet jurists have been working
on a set of draft principles for revising the criminal codes of
the various Soviet Republics. Whether or not the time taken
to complete their task denotes. a lack of enthusiasm in the Party
for the more "liberal" practices advocated by a substantial
group of the jurists, the set of principles has. been adopted by
the rubber-stamp Supreme Soviet (25 December 1958), and the
way is presumably cleared for its application in revising the
republic codes. A judgment. concerning the degree of liberal-
ization introduced by the new statement of judicial principles
must await. analysis of the changes made and of the future
practice of Soviet courts.
29. But the provision of a reformed code of law would
not in. itself be sufficient to assure that Soviet society would
become "free" in the Western sense. It is possible, indeed,
that the XXI Congress will provide some assurance of further
relief from police terror. The recent removal of Ivan Serov
as. head of the secret. police may have pointed in that direc-
tion, though more likely it was connected with CPSU power
factors, such as the elimination of the "anti-party group."
In any event, the choice, as Serov's successor, of Aleksandr
N. Shelepin - whose last position was directing the Commu-
nist youth organization, Komsomol conforms to Khrushchev's
practice of subordinating all potential centers of independent
strength to Party control. There may be some reshuffle of
the secret police - perhaps a new set of initials for the dread
MVD - but we may doubt that the prudence of the Communist
leaders. would permit them at this stage to weaken. the ultimate
means. of coercion. The adoption of the draft principles of
law reform will probably be interpreted positively by the Sov-
iet citizenry. Nevertheless, so long as. there is a powerful
secret police in being, permeating the whole of Soviet
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society with an informant system, formal "legality" cannot
protect the citizen from the fear which blights freedom.
30. Indeed, viewing the concept of "socialist legality"
objectively, we are entitled to conclude that it is neither a
precondition of the "good life" nor an end in itself. Rather,
we find in it a means to the end of "communist construction,
an incentive to full acceptance of the driving discipline which
must be imposed by the goals and pace of the program. More-
over, there is evidence that the Party itself is divided as to
how far "legality" should be permitted to assume classic West-
ern forms, emphasizing the sacred rights of the individual.
There is a strong current toward "collective " forms of judg-
ment and punishment. The experiment of the "anti-parasite
laws, '" which place, the sanctions against idleness, drunken-
ness, hooliganism, speculation and other anti-social acts in
the hands of the citizenry itself, has not been universally
adopted throughout the USSR, and it is probable that the more
conventional juridical procedures of the Revised Criminal
Code will eventually predominate. Failure of the Congress
to lay down a clear course in the direction of "legality" would
indicate that, in the minds of the CPSU leaders, no firm de-
cision has been reached on the balance of legal stringency
and relaxation in the march toward communism.
CONCLUSION
31. In conclusion, we may ask ourselves, if this should
prove to be the general outline of the Party Congress Program,
is it in fact something which will carry conviction and inspira-
ttion to the faithful of International Communism? Or will it,
like the innovations and bold ventures of the XX Congress,
precipitate an era of doubt and confusion throughout the move-
ment, leading perhaps to disturbances comparable to those of
October 1956?
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32. It is not within the. scope of this essay to answer
these questions. We may be confident that the eyes of Com-
munists throughout the world will search the speeches of the
Congress for light on what the process of "building communism"
will actually entail. Above all, they will seek for clues as to
the future position of man in a "communist" society. Will the
educational reforms do away with the predominantly individual-
istic and "Western" orientation in which Soviet man has hither-
to been formed? Or will the ideal, foreshadowed by the Chinese
communes, of a truly collective man be adopted?
33. At this stage of our knowledge of Soviet programming
for "communism" we may assume that a dialectical effort will
be made to resolve the two concepts in a new "synthesis. " The
theoretical pronouncements of Khrushchev and other Soviet
leaders indicate that they see no contradiction between the ful-
fillment of man as an individual through study of the humanities
and sciences and his absorption in the collective unfolding of
society through productive work.
34. Confronted with the necessity for taking at least a
provisional stand on the competing claims of the individual and
the collective, Khrushchev and the Party leaders probably will
indulge in a certain amount of equivocation. On the one hand,
they are aware that they still have to cope with remnants of
Western molds. The popularity of Western - and in many
cases specifically American art, fashions, and cgnsumer
goods is constantly reproved by the Party, yet grows apace.
The partial lifting of the Iron Curtain - which does not include
cessation of jamming foreign broadcasts - still must be viewed
by Khrushchev as a reversible gamble.
35. On the other hand, the Soviet leaders probably also
feel that they can safely continue to impose collective forms of
discipline and austerity, appealing from pride in achievements
of the past to a powerful future glow of economic and political
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patriotism of a specifically Soviet nature. One may, indeed,
speculate that Khrushchev has embarked on a basically "Stalin-
ist" line of policy, calling for renewal of- endeavor and sacri-
fice for a still distant goal. A possible consequence of such
aline might be a new manifestation of the "permanent purge,
perhaps not fully "Stalinist" in totalitarian ruthlessness, but
"Leninist" in determination to eliminate laggard and apathetic
elements of the cadres. The crescendo of attack against the
anti-party faction, culminating in the classic device of Bulgan-
in's staged confession, suggests that the XXI Congress may
herald drastic measures, possibly even liquidation of "enemies
of the people. "
36 There are increasing signs of interest in determin-
ing some of the forms which a specifically Soviet form of Com-
munism might take. Thus, Khrushchev speaks with approval
of expanding creches, .kindergartens, communal eating and
catering, and other services which would free women from
the "drudgery" of housework to engage in productive labor,
and to enjoy greater opportunity for rest, culture and social
activity. There is increasing emphasis on the inspirational
and coercive role of labor brigades, peoples' militia and other
forms of social organization. The superiority of state over
collective farms is accented in Khrushchev's Agricultural
Report to the Central Committee, and the final disappearance
of the peasants' private garden plots and animals is fore-
shadowed. Throughout the Congress speeches we may antici-
pate repeated praise of the party and of Khrushchev himself
for approaching the creation of new institutional forms in the
spirit of harmonizing "theory and practice, 1' a euphemism
for the proposition that whatever changes the leadership may
decree are right because they represent an infallible applica-
tion of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.
37. The full pattern of Soviet "communism" has not yet
d
emerge
and, possibly, the Soviet leaders themselves are
waiting to see whether any valid lessons can be learned from
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the Chinese experiment. In any event, something further will
probably have to be said by the CPSU on the Chinese develop-
ment. Even among the satellites - Bulgaria and Albania
especially - there has been a cautious. expression of interest
in the communes, and the CP's of densely populated and under-
developed areas, such as India and Indonesia, are likely to
find the Chinese experience more pertinent to their stage of
evolution than the Soviet model. Possibly the answer will be
of a guarded and interim nature, calling for further. building.:
of the communes as an example of potentially creative -Marx-
ism. in the context of specific Chinese conditions. It is pos-
sible that Khrushchev will make some reference to the status
of Comrade Mao since his relinquishment of the ceremonial
office of Chairman of the CPR. Presumably Mao's ideolog-
ical authority and his preeminence in the Party will be ack-
nowledged and praised.
38. Whatever the clarifications or evasions on the criti-
cal question of China, there will be a major attempt to con-
found the ideological enemy, revisionism. This will be pre-
sented as a widespread dangerous heresy - far worse than its
opposite, "dogmatism" - and the chief heresiarch will continue
to be Tito. Lesser CP's will be adjured to maintain the purity
of the faith and to avoid deviations such as recently split the
Danish. party. The attitude toward cooperation with-Social
Democratic parties has been hardening, and it is. possible
that the Congress will endorse recent stipulations that United
Front efforts in the immediate future will have to come "from
below" rather than. at the level of the leadership.
3.9. On the whole, in spite of the inevitability of tirades,
we may anticipate that the tenor of the speeches at the Congress
will be hortatory and positive. Certainly, the proclamation
that the Soviet Union. is entering the transition from socialism
to communism, if serious, is little short of epochal. If, on
the other hand, it is merely a device to replenish the flagging
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zeal of a society which has struggled for forty years to become
"socialist, " the prospect of inevitable disillusionment and the
reaction which it would engender is equally sobering. We do
not know what the Soviet leaders, especially Khrushchev him-
self, really think they have crated and are creating. With no
model of historical experience and with only the doctrine of
''scientific Marxism" to guide it, the extraordinary XXI Con-
gress may prove to be either a sober act of faith or an irre-
sponsible gamble. In either outcome, our own future is peril-
ously involved, and we should. study its course with profound
concern.
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