COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE: POST-STALIN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SATELLITES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01445R000100120001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 6, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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N?
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Senior Research Staff on International Communism
COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE:
Post-Stalin Developments in the Satellites
339
84-Q1L445_R
CIA/SRS-7
Part II/F
,,-,-".g
FU L;u_
6 July 1959
_j
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This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE:
Post-Stalin Developments in the Satellites
CIA/SRS-7
PART II/F BULGARIA - 1956-1958
This is a speculative study which
has been discussed with US Gov-
ernment intelligence officers but
has not been formally coordinated.
It is based on information avail-
able to SRS as of 15 June 1959.
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Page
Part II/F - BULGARIA - 1956-1958
1
The Year 1956
1
The Year 1957
10
Foreign Relations
37
Standard of Living
38
The Party
38
Conclusions and Outlook
42
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PART II/F
BULGARIA - 1956-1958
The Year 1956
1. Thanks to exceptionally favorable crop weather
in 1955, Bulgaria, like Rumania, entered the year 1956 in bet-
ter economic shape than in any year since the beginning of World
War II. The availability of food reserves apparently encouraged
the government to intensify the drive, begun in 1955, to hasten
the collectivization of agriculture which had stagnated since 1951,
By the end of February1956, about twice as many peasants were
reported to have joined collective farms as had joined in the en-
tire preceding year. This success was presumably owing> partly
to the economic advantages offered new collective farm members
- among them, by a decree promulgated in October 1955, the can-
cellation of certain debts - and partly to pressure. The methods
used must have been subtle, for much less was heard about them
than during the earlier drive, but they must, nevertheless, have
been effective, for the inducements offered could hardly alone
explain such a sudden change in peasant psychology.
2. The fact that the Bulgarian budget for 1956 allo-
cated almost as much to agriculture as to heavy industry - 21.4
percent and 23. 5 percent respectively - and that under an agree-
ment signed on 3 February 1956, Bulgaria obtained from the
USSR a $92. 5 million credit for agricultural machinery, and
fertilizer plants, appeared to confirm the opinion voiced in the
Economist of 25 February 1956, that Bulgaria was slated for
the role of "model of socialized agriculture" in the Balkans.
Full collectivization was to be achieved within three years.
Whether by coincidence with the Soviet credit or not, the govern-
ment on 5 February announced reductions in the prices of a large
number of foods and textiles.
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3. In view of later developments, it is interest-
ing to note that the Soviet credit to Bulgaria was granted one
day after the announcement of a grant to Yugoslavia bringing
the total which the latter country received within a month to
over $200 million, and that relations between the two neigh-
bors were once again strained. On 29 January 1956, Cher-
ve.nkov, the Bulgarian party boss, in a press interview had
defended the Cominform, and denied that it was an obstacle to
the improvement of Bulgarian- Yugoslav relations. This state-
ment, the Yugoslav newspaper Privredni Pregl.ed- 1 retorted,
"could not stand up to criticism or analysis, " and Cherven-
kov's views were again attacked by Radio Belgrade on 15 Feb.,
ruary.
4. The improvement in the situation on the eco-
nomic front was not matched on the political. Without explana-
tion for the delay, Radio Sofia on 2 February broadcast the text
of a speech made by Chervenkov to a meeting of the Writers'
Union on 28 December 1955, in which he said that the session
had been marked "by concentrated fire opened by some mem-
bers against the present management" which was tantamount
to attacking the Central Committee itself. He specifically
scored the writer Gocho Gochev who had written in Issue No.
37 of Literaturen Fronten that industrialization in Bulgaria
was being carried out at the expense of the people and that
"the people were grumbling against the policy of the Party.
5. Chervenkov was,. with Enver Hoxha of Albania,
the only satellite boss who had the courage - or the foresight -
to ignore the XX Party Congress and Khrushchev's denunciation
of Stalin. He made no public report on the proceedings he had
attended, nor did any Party organ even mention the name of
Stalin. Rabotnichesko Delo, in a 17 March editorial, merely
IReuters, 7 February 1956.
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scored the "cult of personality" aberration, which was also
evident in the Bulgarian Communist Party but would have to be
totally eliminated. In the meantime Stalin's pictures in Sofia
were as much in evidence as before, and the scheduled visit of
a Yugoslav parliamentary delegation was postponed without ex-
planation.
6. On April 6, however, the Bulgarian Central
Committee adopted a resolution censuring the Party boss for
having fostered a cult of personality centering on himself, to
the injury of the Party and state, and replaced him in the premi-
ership with Anton Yugov, the second ranking Bulgarian Commu-
nist.
7. Chervenkov's demotion was naturally widely
considered to be only the first of a series in Eastern Europe.
But as time passed and the other holdovers from the Stalin era
retained their jobs, it became obvious that neither extreme
ruthlessness nor an earlier anti-Tito attitude was sufficient to
make a satellite boss persona non grata in Moscow. What mat-
tered was close adherence to the sinuosities of the Party line.
In the majority of cases, verbal and purely token conformity
proved satisfactory, but in the case of Chervenkov, Khrush-
chev's policy of reconciliation with Tito also demanded con-
crete action which Cherve.nkov. r.efused:to: take. This conclusion
seems to be justified by the facts that it was not until after the
demotion of Chervenkov that the intention to rehabilitate Trai-
cho Kostov, executed in 1949 for Titoism, was announced, and
that the planned visit to Sofia of the Yugoslav delegation actually
took place.
8. Whatever the charges against Chervenkov, they
were obviously not grave enough to compromise him irremedia-
bly, for he retained his membership in the Politburo and was
appointed to one of the deputy premier ships. His Communist
colleagues apparently did not see any incongruity between Cher-
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venkov's membership in the government and the Party leader-
ship and a flow of speeches and newspaper articles in which
they belabored him for "brutal administration and ordering
about, " for "violations of socialist legality, " and for "one-man
leadership at all levels. "1 These attacks were obviously only
intended to provide an alibi in case of changes in Moscow, for
nothing was done to reform the system. Neither was anything
done to punish those guilty of the judicial murder of Kostov,
unless it be that the implied branding of Chervenkov as the
man responsible was considered sufficient atonement - by the
Party, at any rate. It was considered far from sufficient by
the population at large, which nursed the illusion of a far-
reaching change in methods as well as men. This disappoint-
ment was shared by the Yugoslavs, who gave it outward expre s
sion by refusing to grant visas to two members of a Bulgarian
delegation which was to have returned the Yugoslav visit in May,
an affront which led, as was to be expected, to the cancellation
of the return visit.
9. By the middle of May, the Bulgarian Party
leaders were in a position to read Moscow's mind more accur-
ately and realized that they were not really expected to let
liberalism go very fair. On 20 May, the Party organ Rabotni-
chesko Delo severely rebuked those guilty of "harmful criti-
cism, " among others the Fatherland Front organ Otechestven
Front, one of the regime's sharpest critics. The effect was,
however, not immediate, and Rabotnichesko Selo was obliged
to repeat its warnings in a series of editorials on 9, 10 and 11
June, and at the same: time to reveal the extent of popular feel-
ing against Stalinist methods. Among those branded as guilty
of harmful criticism figured members of the Sofia Party organ-
ization who had "wrong political opinions, " writers and artists,
who demanded an end to ideological control, . and the general
public, which questioned the regime's economic policy.
1Otechestven Front, 18 April 1956.
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10. The regime's defense followed the standard
pattern of admitting certain shortcomings, while denying they
were as serious as represented, and of claiming that steps to
correct the mistakes had already been taken. Rabotnichesko
Delo, in its 11 June editorial, admitted that there was "tempor.-
ary" urban unemployment, that the pay of workers in some
important industries such as textiles, food, and tobacco, was
well below average, that large families were hard up and pen-
sions too low, but it asserted that real income had been steadi-
ly rising' and promised further price reductions.
11. These optimistic expectations were presum-
ably based on the fact, announced by Premier Yugov in his
maiden speech, that industrialization in Bulgaria would in
future be carried out in line with plans for intra-bloc coordin-
ation, "on the basis of available raw materials. " Yugov at
the same time painted a rosy picture of agricultural prospects
which had greatly improved as a result of the recent Soviet
credit. Between January and April, he said, 282, 000 peasant
families had joined cooperative farms, so that now 77 percent
of the peasants were members as against 55 percent at the be-
ginning of the year. But Yugov certainly exaggerated the ef-
fect of the Soviet credits, for Party Secretary Dimitur Ganev,
in a speech on Lenin's anniversary, admitted that there had
been cases "where the principle of voluntariness had been
violated. "
12. The Rabotnichesko Delo editorials of 9, 10,
and 11 June 1956 - and perhaps other unpublicized arguments
.-. were extraordinarily successful in convincing dissatisfied
elements of the population of their errors. On 20 June -
presumably after the removal of chief editor Topencherov, a
1
Rabotnichesko Delo of 30 April had published figures purport-
ing to show that average annual income had increased by 13. 5
percent since 1952.
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brother-in-law of Kostov - Otechestven Front published a
full recantation of its "wrong and harmful" criticisms, and on
19 July, Literaturen Front, the organ of the Writers' Union,
revealed that the Union had, in its 12 July meeting, squelched
the -writers' revolt. The literary policy laid down by Cherven-
kov in December 1955 was to remain in force. In the local
Party election conferences in July, the rebellious spirit mani-
fest in similar meetings in April was absent. Indeed, outward-
ly at least, the malcontents had been so successfully cowed
that Rabotnichesko Delo found no occasion to revert to the sib-
ject of inadmissible criticism. With the renaming of institu-
tions named after Chervenkov, and the reversion of Stalingrad
to its old name of Varna, the leadership appeared to consider
the matter of de-Stalinization closed.
13. After the Poznan riots, the Party leadership
deemed it prudent to take steps to reduce some of the underly-
ing causes of discontent. Rabotnichesko Delo of 7 July admon-
ished local Party leaders to "strengthen their ties with the
working people and respond to their needs in time, " for many
of them displayed "a soulless attitude toward the people."
Industrial ministries and people's councils were ordered to
hire many of the unemployed, 1 prices in factory canteens
were reduced. By decree of 11 July, obligatory deliveries
of products of private plots, except wool, were abolished,
while the prices of obligatory deliveries of most products of
collective farms, and of some state purchases, were increased
by about 20 percent.
14. The decree also declared that full voluntary
collectivization was feasible within two or three years. Todor
Zhivkov, the First Party Secretary, in his report on the decree
Rabotnichesko Delo, 25 July 1956.
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to the National Assembly, added the information that kulaks
could in future be granted membership in collective farms,
if they had the "right" mentality.
15. But the latent unrest, even within the Party,
was apparently not allayed. On 19 September, the Central
Committee issued "decisions, " in which it admitted.that
alien, casual, and careerist elements have penetrat-
ed the ruling.-Party . . . they yield to hostile influ-
ence easily and become the propagators of alien,
bourgeois, and petit--bourgeois concepts. The weak
ideological and political training of a section of the
Party membership is another important reason for
the political instability of some Party members.
But, the Committee concluded, "there can be no place for
liberalism and conciliation . . . ".
16. Apparently as a result of prodding by Moscow,
the Party Central Committee further announced that the charges
of Titoism against the defendants in the 1949- 1950 trials had
been found groundless, that the role of Parliament would be
enhanced, and that control over the police by the courts, and
the powers of people's councVls would be increased. But these
concessions to liberalism were balanced by a stern warning to
"bourgeois elements" to refrain from "machinations and slan-
ders. "
17. Three days after the announcement of these
alleged proofs of Bulgarian anti-Stalinism, the Parliamentary
delegation which was to have visited Yugoslavia in May, ar-
rived in Belgrade, minus the two delegates to whom the Yugo-
slavs had objected. But the visit did little to effect a genuine
improvement in Bulgarian- Yugoslav relations, the Yugoslavs
apparently not being convinced of the sincerity of Bulgarian
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anti-Stalinism as long as Chervenkov continued to wield
influence in Sofia. The result was a vicious circle: the
more antipathy the Yugoslavs showed to Chervenkov, the
greater his popularity and influence among Bulgarians, and
vice versa.
18. On 9 October, the semi-official Yugopress
stated openly that there were basic disagreements between
the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Communist parties on "essential
questions of social theory and practice, " which the ambiguous
joint communique of 7 October had not mentioned. On 18
October, Yugqpress even expressed open dissatisfaction
with Bulgarian de-Stalinization and complained particularly
about the lack of information concerning the fate of surviving
Titoists. Unfortunately, in Bulgaria, Yugoslav encourage-
ment of Polish and Hungarian revisionism during these criti-
cal months of 1956 was, if anything, the kiss of death. Never-
theless, there can hardly be much doubt about the feelings of
the majority of Bulgarians at that time, especially since the
Polish and Hungarian developments coincided with a bread
shortage, part of the blame for which was naturally put on
to the excessive speed of collectivization. The authorities
themselves betrayed their fear of a revolt by sharply in-
creasing security precautions and by announcing on 31 Octo-
ber that restrictions on the buying of flour would be lifted
on 10 November, thank to "generous" Soviet wheat ship-
ments. The Bulgarians thus became the first of the satel
lites to be helped out by grain deliveries in 1956. .It also
happened to be the first time since World War I that Bulgaria
imported wheat instead of exporting it. There were numerous
- albeit unconfirmed. - reports that Soviet generosity went
even further, and that assistance to Bulgaria had included
Soviet troops, landed in the last ten days of October. The
authorities can have had no objection to the spreading of
these rumors -= or even to launching them.
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19. Nevertheless, the regime felt far from re-
assured. In November and December, a number of unrelia-
ble persons, particularly students, were arrested, and mas-
sive expulsions of Sofia inhabitants were effected. Some
30, 000 people are believed to have been forced to leave the
capital for the provinces, with only a few hours' notice at
dead of night, and allowed only to take with them as much
as they could carry. Opinions differ as to the reasons for
this typically Stalinist measure, some observers holding
that they were primarily economic, that is to relieve. the
over-crowding of the capital, to reduce unemployment, and
so forth, but while these considerations may have carried
weight, the timing alone points to preponderantly political
reasons, i. e., punishment and fear.
20. At the same time, the regime, following the
standard Bloc practice in such cases, proceeded to alleviate
the most crying economic hardships hoping to placate at least
one large section of the malcontents. On 27 November, the
government announced that cooperative farmers would be en-
titled to pensions, allowances for children tripled, wages for
low paid workers increased and a number of compulsory agri-
cultural deliveries abolished. - i or May 1957, an industry-
wide wage increase was promised.
21. The economic plan for 1957, approved by the
National Assembly on 30 December 1956, confirmed that most
of the funds for these improvements were to be obtained by
the simple expedient of reducing investments by 34 percent
below the 1956 plan. Further resources were presumably to
be made available by a 30 percent reduction in the State ad-
ministrative personnel, decided upon by the Central Com-
mittee Plenum of 17 January 1957.
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The Year 1957
22. Although no disinterested observer could
discern any signs that the Bulgarians, oblivious of the Buda-
pest tragedy, were contemplating an uprising against the
regime and its Soviet protectors, the Party leaders gave
every indication of continuing nervousness, manifesting
itself by appeals for vigilance against the internal enemy,
purges among students and a rather unexpected propaganda
campaign for deepening Russian-Bulgarian friendship.
Zhivkov, on 19 January, countermanded the decision taken
in February 1956 to merge the Bulgarian-Soviet Friendship
societies with the Fatherland Front and also urged that Bul-
garian-Soviet Friendship month should be observed anew,
after a three-year lapse. Zhivkov presumably felt that al-
though fear, rather than love, of the Russians was what he
should, but could not, stress if he wanted to curb rebel-
liousness, the next best thing was to make sure the people
were constantly reminded of their "close ties" with the
USSR. The rest could be safely left to their imaginations.
. 23. The curtailment of the Fatherland Front by
no means signified a demotion of that organization. On the
contrary, the proceedings of its Fourth Congress which
opened on 11 February revealed that the Party expected
great things from that organization, nothing less than to
succeed where the uncamouflaged Party had failed.
It is necessary for the FF (said Radio Sofia) to
consolidate and develop as the broadest national
autonomous political organization, to represent
a real unity between the working class, the peas-
ants, and the intelligentsia, to educate the people
in a patriotic spirit and be the broadest political
mass support for the regime. The FF must con-
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tinue to improve its educational, explanatory, and
cultural work for the political education of the people
in a patriotic and socialist spirit.
24. On the following day, (13 February 1957) the
replacement of Chervenkov as chairman of the FF Executive
Board by Demeter Ganev, a Central Committee Secretary,
was announced. The change did not mean a. further demotion
of Chervenkov, for he was at the same time appointed Minis-
ter of Culture and Education. Any doubts on the subject were
promptly dispelled when Chervenkov, although only a member
of the Bulgarian delegation headed by Yugov and Zhivkov,
which visited Moscow 15-21 February, was treated by the
Russians as the actual leader.
25. The final communique reflected the full agree-
ment of the two governments on the causes of the Hungarian
I tcounte r revolution' I and the Soviet "military assistance, " on
proletarian internationalism, revisionism - the USSR was once
again in_ conflict with Yugoslavia - and similar subjects. The
coma}unique also disclosed an economic agreement on trade,
which emphasized Bulgaria's role as truck gardener and pur-
veyor of non-ferrous metals for the Bloc, the USSR undertak-
ing to cover Bulgaria's wheat and cotton needs. Bulgaria ob-
tained a 200-million ruble credit for needed plant construction,
as well as contracts for building and repairing Soviet ships,
and for the production of clothes and shoes from Soviet mater-
ial, apparently intended to relieve serious Bulgarian unemploy-
ment. A secret agreement providing for the employment of
15-20, 000 Bulgarian laborers on the virgin lands in Siberia
also appears to have been signed at that time.
26. Presumably knowing their countrymen better
than foreign observers who could see no, portent of a Bulgarian
revolt, the Communist leadership not only continued but inten-
sified their precautions against such an eventuality. Policemen
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continued to be armed with machine guns instead of their
regular pistols and public buildings were under armed guard.
In March, April and May, there was a new wave of expulsions
of "undesirables" ., estimated to number between 10 and 20, 000
- from Sofia, the exact reasons for which remained as obscure
as before. This coincided with a further purge of "reactionary-
oriented" students and of Party members, "large numbers" of
whom had "blunted the militancy" of Party organizations by fail-
ing to implement Party decisions. (Rabotnichesko Delo, 21
March). Novo Vreme, the Party theoretical organ, explained
in its March issue that the purge was needed among other things
to sharpen "revolutionary vigilance, " the lack of which had
lowered Party morale and discipline. On 6 April Papazov, the
first secretary of the Sofia organization, confirmed that the
Sofia Party Committee had been "unable to ignore the incorrect
expressions and activities, and doubts about the correctness of
Party policies and the essentials of our unbreakable friendship
with the Soviet Union, " and that after the Hungarian events,
"the question of membership and the unity and militancy of the
Party organization was once again placed before us. "
27. Papazov, however, made the mistake of de-
manding that the cleansing of the Party ranks should be care
ried out "intelligently, peacefully, and in an orderly manner,
and that an improvement should be sought primarily by in-
creased indoctrination. Two days after his speech he was
demoted to deputy first secretary, for having "failed to analyze
facts correctly, " (Rabotnichesko Delo, .3 April).
28. The April Congress of the National Agrarian
Union was only remarkable for the further proof it gave of the
Peasant Party's total subservience to the Communist Party,
and the Trade Union Congress which followed, for its implied
admission of worker disaffection. Todor Prakhov, the Central
Council chairman, according to Rabotnichesko Delo of 17 April,
conceded the occurrence of. "brutal violations of the labor code, "
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failure to consult workers "on basic problems connected with
their production interests, for example in problems dealing
with urgent amendments in the norms and payment of labor, 11
and other shortcomings., which should of course be corrected.
In no case, however, by following the Yugoslav model, for
Prakhov told his listeners that they must "struggle against
attempts to undermine the role of the trade union in the pro-
gram to draw workers into more active participation in the
administration of economic enterprises. "
29. The unusually elaborate and gay decoration
of the capital for the 1957 May Day celebration was attributed
by foreign observers to the regime's desire to dispel the at-
mosphere of gloom and terror produced by the nocturnal ex-
pulsions of citizens. If that was the purpose, the increase in
the number of portraits of Stalin was a mistake, which may
explain the apathy of the large crowds watching the parade,
noted by foreign observers.
30. If Narodna Mladezh, the organ of the Dimitrov
Youth Union, is to be believed, the regime soon .found a means
to cheer up the Bulgarians. On 6 June it announced that the
recently launched campaign to sig4 up young men and women
for three years of work in Russian mines, building projects
and state farms, had "brought great joy, because it . . . is
the incarnation of their long years of dreaming of their love
for the Soviet Union. " Todor Zhikov told a New York Times
correspondent on 21. September that 10, 000 Bulgarians had
gone to work in the USSR, and 4, 000 more in Czechoslovakia.
As he further stated that 81 percent of the able-bodied popula-
tion were employed, it followed that 19 percent were unem-
ployed. in a socialist country, where unemployment was not
supposed to occur.
31. The Bulgarian Communist leaders were the
next, after the Rumanians, to follow the Russian example
and to get rid of troublesome Party members. On 15 July
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the expulsion of Georgi Chankov from the Politburo and the
deputy premiership, and of Labor Minister Dobri Terpeshev
and of Yonko Panov from the Central Committee by decision
of the 11- 12 July Plenum, was announced. The charge against
all three of them was "fractionalism, 'r that is, apposition to
the leaders, and against Chankov in particular, that he had
attempted to build up his own following among "unhealthy ele-
ments" in order to "attain the highest post in the Party. " How-
ever, unlike the victims of the Moscow purge, the Bulgarian
victims all belonged to the liberal wing of the party and were
credited with "Titoist" sympathies. Moreover, the men who
replaced them in the Politburo and the Central Committee, as
well as some additional new members, were all known Stalin-
ists, even extreme Stalinists like Dimitur Ganev and Todor
Pavlov, chairmen of the Academy of Sciences. But in such
matters "national" communism, i. e. a deviation from the
Moscow pattern, was apparently practiced with the approval
of Moscow, for Zhivkov and Yugov had been - incognito - in
the Soviet capital in the beginning of July, and two days after
the announcement of the Bulgarian purge, Zhivkov was back
again in Moscow, this time as guest at a reception in honor of
Albanian and Yugoslav leaders.
32. Chankov, Terpeshev, and Panov were of course
not the only black sheep in the BCP. Literaturen Fronten, the
organ of the Bulgarian Writers' Union, in its 18 July 1957 issue,
conceded that
obviously, the existence of such centrifugal forces in
the highest leadership of the Party had its repercus-
sions and gave rise to unhealthy, non-Party manifesta-
tions in some organizations and in some Party mem-
bers.
Members of the Writers' Union had of course not remained im-
mune to the disease which must have been very contagious, for
the article claimed no more than the existence within the union
of a "healthy nucleus. "
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It must be said (the article went on) that a great num-
ber of those who showed unhealthy tendencies have
influenced by proper criticis-m--
J lived down their sub-
jective errors or are now in the process of doing so.
The Hungarian events helped them to see what harm
their wrong behavior can cause to the unity of Com-
munist writers. Some others, however, continue to
be the bearers of sickly, alien, and non-Party mani-
festations, which they disseminate under the guise of
combatting dogmatism
It goes without saying that the 'article ended with an invitation
to wage "a merciless and irreconcilable struggle against per-
nicious petit bourgeois attitudes and dissatisfactions . . . "
33. In its fight against dissatisfaction the regime
was providentially supplied with a strong argument by an excep-
tionally bountiful harvest. This justified the chance it had tak-
en in May when it had decreed a general 10-18 percent wage
increase, which for an undisclosed reason was only announced
in August. As in the other satellites, the Bulgarian govern-
ment, pursuant to a Central Committee decision of September
1956, increased by a decree of 12 July 1957, the powers of
people's councils over minor industries and over their own
budgets, in an attempt to encourage local initiative and efficien-
cy. Further concessions to popular demands were made in Nov-
ember; a law increasing pensions was passed and the Labor Code
was amended to augment annual and mate;iaity leaves and over-
time pay and to grant survivors' benefits and funeral expenses
upon the death of a worker.
34. The opening at long last of a crossing point for
motor vehicles on the Bulgarian-Yugoslav frontier, announced
by Radio Sofia on 3 October, seemed to mark a definite im-
provement in relations between the two countries as a result
of the Tito-Khrushchev meeting in Bucharest in August. But
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how superficial the reconciliation was, soon became manifest
when the October issue, of Novo Vreme came out with a polem-
ic article on the subject of divided Macedonia, accusing Yugo-
slavia of coveting Bulgaria'.s share. The Yugoslavs naturally
retaliated by accusing the Bulgarians of similar designs on
Yugoslav Macedonia.
35. Although, outwardly at any rate, perfect calm
continued to reign in Bulgaria, the regime's uneasiness was
betrayed by such symptoms as the creation of a "workers'
militia" composed of the most reliable Party members, which
paraded publicly for the first time on. 7 November, the anni-
versary. of the Russian Revolution, and by a further attack on
recalcitrant writers. Literaturen Fronten of 17 October 1957
complained of the "persistent silence" with which writers had
met the opportunity to "discuss" the recent restrictive inter-
pretation of the XX Congress decisions on literature. But,
the. periodical explained, their silence was only in print, for
in private, they were loud in their denunciations of that develop-
ment. A month later, Zhivkov himself, addressing a joint elec-
toral rally of the Party and the Fatherland Front, found it neces-
sary to stress the need for the intelligentsia "to struggle even
more actively against bourgeois and petit-bourgeois influences
in its ranks. " As for the bourgeois themselves, he disclaimed
any desire for the intensification of the class struggle and even
asserted that he had nothing against their dreaming about their
past glories and property, but, plagiarizing Cyrankiewicz after
Poznan, he warned that if they dared to raise their hands against
the regime, they would be cut off,
36. On the economic front, alluding to the division
of labor among socialist countries, Zhivkov claimed that Bul-
garia would only develop those branches of industry which were
most suitable for her, but that priority would be granted to
heavy industry as before. "At the same time" he promised
"light industry and food production will be developed to satisfy
more completely the needs of the working people, " (Rabot-
nichesko Delo, 26 November 1957).
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37. The promise of a somewhat better life for the
Bulgarian people was borne out by the figures given by Russi
Khristozov, chairman of the State Planning Commission, to
the National Assembly on 8 December. The share of the na-
tional income allotted to consumption in 1958 was to be in-
creased over 1957 from 80 to 83 percent, and the share of
industrial investments allotted to light and food industries
was also to be substantially increased, while investments
as a whole would still remain below 1956 levels. Housing
credits were to be increased by 20 percent over the 1957
figure, and credits were to be made available to collective
farms to facilitate the extension of truck gardening.
38. At the Fifth National Conference of Agricul-
tural Cooperatives, 2-4 December 1957, Zhivkov announced
that land collectivization was virtually achieved, 86. 5 per-
cent of the arable land being now collectivized. He himself,
however, made the voluntariness of the operation seem very
questionable by berating some of the collective farm manage-
ments for allowing members to expand their private plots at
the expense of the collective. The complaint by Deputy Premi-
er Georgi Traikov, that farmers were overdoing specializa-
tion in truck gardening, even planting fertile flat fields to
grapevines, seems also to betray a preference for the more
individualistic forms of farming. Traikov also severely
criticized collective farms which did not honor their deliv-
ery contracts with the state or sold most of their produce on
the free market. Zhivkov added the specific complaint: "We
increased wool prices, we increased the number of sheep,
and now we must buy wool from the capitalist market for the
requirements of our industry! "
39. In spite of - or perhaps thanks to - these un-
socialist practices, and certainly as a result of good weather,
a marked improvement in living conditions had occurred in
1957. Food was now plentiful and a large variety of consumer
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goods - of- very poor quality it is true were available in the
shops. Better still, the Party's good dispositions toward the
people showed no signs of abating - far from it. The ratio
between expenditure in light and heavy industry which had
been 18:85 in 1957, jumped to 27:73 in the budget for 1958.
40. Although the regimels solicitude for the mater-
ial needs of the population no doubt reduced anti-regime senti-
ment in the country somewhat, opposition to its policies was
by no means extinct. According to the New York Times (25
January 1958), two villages on the outskirts of Sofia "were
surrounded by squads of Party stalwarts and policemen armed
with machine pistols" and the villagers were forced to join
collective farms. They were presumably included in the num-
ber of peasants who, according to the Sofia newspapers and
radio of January and February 1958, were "applying" to join
collectives.
41. The campaign against "revisionist" Bulgarian
writers which had been sharply intensified after the publica-
tion in August 1957 of Khrushchev's literary directives
achieved only limited success. The official position was
perhaps most clearly stated in Vecherni Noviny (29 October
1957). The paper denounced the "fallacious notion" of Emil
Manov, author of the novel An Unauthentic Case, of Todor
Genov, author of the play Fear, and of other writers, that
it is sufficient for a writer to proceed from "either Socialist
or sincere democratic positions. " A writer did not have to
be a Communist, the paper stated, but "his position must co-
incide with the Party position. " It was therefore obviously
inadmissible to portray people's leaders as evil, as those
writers had done.
42. The two lines of defense of the writers were,
in the words of Manov, that "sometimes a man is more
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important than the institution, r'1 and in those of Panteley
Zarev: "Revisionism would not have occurred if the Lenin-
ist norms of Party life had been observed. rr2
43. In an attempt to reestablish Party discipline,
a meeting of the Writers' Union Party organization was held
in Sofia from 29 November-1 December 1957, at which its
Secretary, Andrei Gulyashki, listed the writers' shortcom-
ings. He named ten who had, "to put it mildly, an attitude
of holding reservations about Sociallisin. " This was partic-
ularly disturbing, for their attitude found a sympathetic echo
among the young.
Some writersand critics (Gulyashki said) particu-
larly of the younger generation, wave in an inspired
manner the banner of petty bourgeois liberalism,
and flirt with their 'courage' to cast doubt on the
method of Socialist realism.
Deplorable was also the passivity of orthodox Communist
writers, and the complicity of editorial offices, which, Gul-
yashki admitted, were overflowing with works arousing
"misgivings about Socialism. " Among the more specific
charges presented by Gulyashki were the approval by some
writers of the "Polish-Hungarian experience, " and criticism
of the Party by others for "following a wrong line on collec-
tivization of farms. "
44. Perhaps the most important fact brought out
by the Writers' Union meeting was the inability of the Party
leadership so far to intimidate the rebellious writers.
1Literaturen Fronten, 24 October 1957.
2Ibid. , 8 January 1958.
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"There are Party members, " said Gulyashki, "who declare
that they are not going to obey the majority's decisions,
which are obligatory under the Party statute. " Three secre-
taries of the Union were criticized at the meeting for their
failure to take a stand against the offenders, and Literaturen
Fronten, in its report on the proceedings (26 December 1957)
complained that the culprits had not only refused to renounce
their errors, but had defended their writings. It is true,
however, that the sanctions threatened by the official spokes-
men were not very terrifying. Gulyashki merely warned that
the Party's patience was not limitless and that the leadership
of the Union might be reshuffled.
45. It must be admitted that Gulyashki was in a
rather embarrassing position, since he was also the chief
editor of Plamuk, which had published many of the incrimin-
ated works, including Manov's An Unauthentic Case. How-
ever, Gulyashki's rather mild speech to the Writers' Union
Party organization meeting and an equally mild self-critical
editorial in the December issue of the magazine were appar-
ently considered sufficient for his rehabilitation, for he was
one of the four editors retained on the board of the magazine.
Besides the other six editors of Plamuk, other writers known
to have been victims of the campaign were the editor-in.- chief
of Otechestven Front and a member of his staff, Topencharov,
who happened, however, to have been Traicho Kostov's btother-
in-law and a violent critic of Chervenkov.
46. There were also some victims in the scientific
world. A report to the Party organization of Stalin district in
Sofia charged members of the Academy of Sciences, the Insti-
tute of Political Economy, and a number of agricultural col-
leges with revisionism, and the entire board of the journal
Filosofska Misl with complacency toward bourgeois ideology.
The report approved the Party organization in the Academy
of Sciences for "expelling pseudo-scientific workers and alien,
hostile elements. "
1Rabotnichesko Delo, 16 February 1958.
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47. One of the explanations for the Party's rela-
tive forbearance in its conflict with the "revisionist" writers
was given by Ivan Martinov who, according to Literaturen
Fronten saw the real causes of ideological deviation "in the
unsatisfactory situation of the Party organizations and in the
frequent and, in most cases, unprincipled struggles, striv-
ings, and personal squabbles. " It is safe to assume that
the "deviationists" owed their relative immunity, both to dis-
unity in the Party ranks, among whom they undoubtedly had
many friends, and to their numerical and qualitative import-
48. Another problem which the Bulgarian regime
shared with other Communist governments was the spread of
"hooliganism, " On 26 January 1958, it made a determined
effort to control the situation by the arrests of two to three
thousand suspects, mostly young workers of peasant origin,
who had allegedly fallen victim to "rock and roll" and other
bourgeois influences. This was followed on 5 February by a
law for the repression of hooliganism passed by the National
Assembly. Among its provisions was the establishment of a
Juvenile Delinquency Commission to direct the campaign
against hooliganism, and of "labor educational schools. " An
attempt to curb the twin evil of drunkenness, a "remnant of
capitalism" which refused to wither away despite its lack of
justification under socialism, was made by a decree of 18
February 1958, which introduced severe restrictions on the
sale of liquor. At the same time, the authorities inaugurated
a policy of stricter enforcement of the laws against "economic
crimes" against the people, which were multiplying at an
alarming rate. Nine executions and many more jail sentences
were announced in the first quarter of 1958, as against four
in the entire preceding year.
126 December 1958.
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49. Political-ideological crimes were more dif-
ficult to combat in the post-Stalin era, in spite of the grow-
ing threat they seemed to represent. "Individual, unhealthy
and hesitant elements in the Party have started to develop
petty bourgeois concepts of 'freedom' and 'democracy' at
meetings, conferences, and in the press, " Novo Vreme
complained, (issue of February 1958). Otechestven Front
deplored the "shortcomings and omissions which have been
noted of late in the ideological-political education of the young
generation, " (13 March 1958), and Rabotnichesko Delo (ZZ
March 1958) pilloried "the bourgeois ideology manifested
among student youth. " But Otechestven Front could think of
nothing more concrete with which to correct the evil than a
joint "struggle" against bourgeois influences among the young
by all institutions and organizations "directly or indirectly
responsible for the education of the young generation, " (loc.
cit.) .
50. The disappointing orientation of the younger
generation of intellectuals was confirmed by Todor Zhivkov
himself at the annual meeting of the Writers' Union (7-9 April
1958). He deplored the "decadent tendencies" of young writers:
"We see young creators in our poetry, literature, cinemato-
graphic and pictorial art, music and theater who have lost their
way and thus become victims of harmful influences . . "
Obviously, then, the younger generation was proving "tougher"
than the older one, for the atmosphere at.the April meeting of
the Writers' Union was much more subdued than in the preced-
ing November. Some of the rebellious writers, among them
Emil Manov, still maintained a dignified silence - and were
not re-elected to the Presidium - some even delivered fresh
attacks on dogmatism but others, including Todor Genov,
apologized for their mistakes. "Gentle persuasion" had ap-
parently been successful. It was soon to score an even more
impressive victory when on 17 May Manov himself informed
an interviewer from the Bulgarian News Agency that he had
seen the light.
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51. The atmosphere for deviationists had indeed
become increasingly unhealthy during the weeks: which followed
the revival of the anti-Yugoslav campaign. In April, there
were persistent rumors that some thirty followers of Traicho
Kostov - who had been rehabilitated in September, 1956, in a
gesture to placate Tito - had once again lost favor and been
expelled from the Party. On 11 May Dimitur Ganev, a mem-
ber of the Politburo, formally accused the Yugoslav leaders
of treason. against Communism, a theme which was amply
developed in a Rabotnichesko Delo editorial of 15 May 1958.
A secondary theme was supplied by the familiar quarrel over
Macedonia which was revived for the occasion, Bulgaria and
Yugoslavia accusing each other of casting concupiscent glances
at the other country's slice of that area.
52. Moscow was presumably not at all displeased
by the prospect. of envenoming Bulgarian- Yugoslav relations
to the utmost, peaceful coexistence notwithstanding. Indeed,
the CPSU representative at the Seventh Congress of the BCP,
held in Sofia 2-7 June, was Khrushchev himself who delivered
the strongest attack yet against Bulgaria's recalcitrant neigh-
bor.
53. Why Khrushchev should have thought it neces-
sary or desirable to go to Bulgaria for that purpose is far
from clear, for the Bulgarian declarations of loyalty to the
Moscow Party line left nothing to be desired. In his report
to the Congress on Party activities since 1954, Todor Zhiv-
kov had claimed for the BCP the merit of having steered the
correct middle course between the Scylla of "mechanical im-
itation" of the USSR and the Charybdis of exaggeration of
"national peculiarities.'' Moreover, Zhivkov affirmed, the
BCP subscribed to every word of Mao Tse-tung's statement
at the Moscow Conference of November 1957, that the World
Communist Movement '; ,4 ,,1
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could not develop successfully without a center,
a head, that as the result of history the great
Soviet Union is the head of the Socialist camp
and that the head of the international Communist
and Workers' movement is the heroic Communist
Party of the Soviet Union.
54. Khrushchev, in the part of his speech deal-
ing with the concept of "many roads to socialism, " returned
the compliment, citing Bulgaria's success in land collectiv-
ization - 90 percent of agricultural land had been collectiv-
ized according to Zhivkov - as an example of "creative inter-
pretation" of Marxism-Leninism. Later in the proceedings
Chervenkov elaborated on this theme, pointing out, that, un-
like the USSR, Bulgaria had not nationalized the land or pro-
hibited private trade in land. The regime had, instead, pro-
moted cooperative farms in which the members theoretically
still owned their land. But, Chervenkov concluded, "in prac-
tice, the victory of cooperative agriculture means the aboli-
tion of private ownership of land in the villages. " Accord-
ing to Chervenkov,
the complete victory of labor-production coopera-
tives in our agriculture is a clear example of crea-
tive application of Marxism-, Leninism in the solu-
tion of the common international task by taking into
consideration the historical and national peculiar-
ities of the country.
It would follow that the "creative application" of Marxism-
Leninism consisted, in his opinion, in the use of misleading
labels and that gullibility was a Bulgarian characteristic.
55. It was, indeed, probably only a coincidence
that two days after the end of the Congress, Chervenkov was
relieved of his post of Minister of Education and Culture.
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It is true he himself had admitted that it was "unconditionally
necessary to improve the work of the Ministry of Education
and Culture, " but he may have meant to chide the Party for
insufficient appreciation of its importance, despite his own
efforts. This interpretation is by no means incompatible .
with the puzzling self-criticism for past failings which Cher-
venkov belatedly delivered more than two years after his de-
motion, at a time when Stalinism had long since ceased to be
a term of approbrium in the Soviet orbit, except perhaps in
Poland.
I consider it my duty (he said), to say to the Con-
gress that I have personally passed the school
severe public self-criticism of our Party at the
April 1956 Central Committee Plenu_m7, that in my
practical work I have drawn and am trying to draw'
all necessary conclusions from the decisions of the
Plenum . . . and that I am doing this as a faithful
soldier of the Communist Party.
56. It should be noted that while Chervenkov was
conceding some past shortcomings, he took advantage of the
opportunity to. give himself good marks for his present atti-
tude, which was more important. At any rate, he retained
his deputy premiership and membership in the eleven-man
Politburo and many competent observers thought he had been
relieved of his ministerial duties merely in order to be free
to play a more important political role. The only other change
of any importance was the demotion of General Peter Panchev-
ski, who lost his alternate membership in the Politburo and
the portfolio of Defense. He was undoubtedly considered res-
ponsible for the shortcomings in political work in the Army,
of which a former head of the Political Department in the
Ministry of Defense and member of the Politburo had com-
plained to the Congress.
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57. Economic data were supplied to the Congress
by the First Party Secretary and the Premier. Todor Zhiv-
kov said that industry now accounted for two-thirds of the
national product (as against less than one-fifth in 1939) and
that agricultural output had increased about 20 percent since
1948 - although livestock numbers had dropped. The number
of workers in State industry had grown from 92, 000 in 1929
to 386, 000 in 1956, while the number of working peasants had
decreased from 3, 325, 000 in 1948 to 2, 950, 000 in 1957, and
the "intelligentsia" had grown from 191, 000 in 1946 to 458,
000 in 1956. Zhivkov did not mention the problem of urban
unemployment, estimated at 14-18 percent of the labor force.
58. The report on the Third Five Year Plan,
which was to run from 1958 to 1962, was delivered by Prime
Minister Yugov. Its chief characteristic was renewed em-
phasis on the development of heavy industry, thus reversing
the policy followed since the death of Stalin, especially after
the Hungarian Revolution. 1 The amounts to be invested in
agriculture were surprisingly small, and perhaps even more
surprising was the fact that, in spite of practically total col-
lectivization, the increase planned for agricultural produc-
tion was only 35 percent, as against the 66 percent increase
called for by the Second :Five Year Plan - which, it is true,
had actually only amounted to 25 percent. Equally surpris-
ing was the failure of the plan to make any provision for the
intensification of truck gardening.
59. In spite of the priority enjoyed by heavy
industry, the Bulgarians were assured that the plan would
ensure an improvement of living standards, which were ad-
mittedly not yet "gat the desired level. " Real wages were
1"Accumulation, " that is, investments plus state reserves,
during the third Five Year Plan, was estimated to account for
23 percent of national income, as against 18.4 percent during
the second.
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expected to rise by 30 percent. Coincidentally, labor produc-
tivity in industry was expected to rise by 29 percent, and
production costs to drop by 12. 5 percent.
60. In the meantime, the Bulgarian regime had to
confess that, whether or not the old Bulgarian claim that they,
unlike some of their neighbors, were poor but honest, had been
justified in the past, it was not justified now. Like other
people's democracies, they found it necessary for economic
reasons to crack down on thieves, embezzlers agid squander-
ers of state property, and for political reasons to stop flagrant
abuses committed even by highly placed Party officials. Rabot-
nichesko Delo of 4 July accused four deputy ministers, the heads
of two national mass organizations, numerous presidents of
regional and district committees, and collective farm managers,
of "disgraceful violations of state discipline" in the acquisition
of automobiles. "A double violation is involved - illegal pur-
chase and the diversion of social funds from their real, intend-
ed destination, It the paper wrote, adding that the Council of Min-
isters "had taken the necessary steps to deal with the violations. "
61. Extended but unspecified powers to deal with the
small fry guilty of the simpler crimes against socialist property
were granted to the people's courts by a decree of 11 August 1958.
The decree also introduced the novel principle of awarding in-
creased pay to "responsible" - that is, presumably honest -
employees and officials. Steps to curb a widespread abuse in
another field were announced by Kooperativno Delo of 16 July.
It appeared that the executive committees of many cooperative
farms, apparently despairing of preventing the peasants from
devoting most of their time to their private plots, had simply
seized them. The magazine invited the executive committees
to restore the plots to their owners, their abolition being il-
legal as well as uneconorrnic, for the vegetables, fruit and meat
they produced were badly needed. At the same time, the Party
press took up with renewed vigor the campaign for the recruit-
ment of youth brigades during the summer holidays to help with
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farm work, which had been revived in 1957 after a lapse of
seven years. On the other hand, the cities continued to be
plagued by the problem of unemployment, although, when the
authorities first admitted its existence (in June 1956) they
had asserted that it was only a "temporary" phenomenon due
to the influx of some 400, 000 peasants into the cities since
1944.
62. Any remaining uncertainty as to the reasons
for General Panchevski's dismissal was removed by an article
in Narodna Armiya of 23 July 1958, complaining that meetings
of Party activists in the armed forces were often nothing more
than conferences at which. "communists are abused without any-
one listening or paying attention to their opinions. " After the
2-4 October Plenum of the BCP Central Committee, a number
of high-ranking officers, including five generals, were said
to have been dismissed for political shortcomings; a rumor
which found adequate confirmation in a Narodna Armiya article
of 16 October, in which General Mishev, head of the Political
Administration in the Defense Ministry, revealed that the
Plenum had taken further steps to correct political shortcom-
ings in the Bulgarian army following the dismissal of Marshal
Zhukov in October 1957. The Plenum had decided, General
Mishev stated, that Party organizations must concern them-
selves with all aspects of military life, including training,
that the number of Party activists in the army must be in-
creased and receive better training, that military command-
ers must participate in political work, and that ideological
indoctrination of new recruits must be intensified. As the
Plenum had also decided that military orders and directives
must not be criticized at Party meetings, although criticism
and self-criticism were commended, it does not seem that
the conflict between military and political officers had been
satisfactorily resolved.
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63. Bulgarian preoccupation with revisionism
was once again confirmed by. the communique, issued on 10
October at the end of the visit of East German leaders; this
included a pledge to continue the "'irreconcilable" struggle
against "modern revisionism" which found clear expression
in the Yugoslav program .and had proved in 1956 to be the
harbinger of "counterrevolution. 11
64. More sensational was the resolution p.9sbd
by the 2-4 October Plenum that.the Third. Five Year Plan,
adopted only four months earlier, in June 1958, was to be ful-
filled one or two years ahead of schedule, in other words, was
being scrapped. As a preliminary n asure, the collective
farms were to be amalgamated into larger units. On 10 Nov-
ember, representatives of fifteen collective farms in. the neigh-
borhood of Varna announced that they had decided to merge
their farms into one large unit "in the image of the Chinese
commune s tt and to call it "Commune. " The next day, Zhivkov
gave a Plenum of the Central Committee details of the "great
leap forward" which would carry the country to the "threshold
of the building of communism, " mainly by trebling agricultur-
al production by 1960. This was to be achieved by a thorough-
going "mobilization" of idle manpower mainly carrying out
"do-it-yourself" projects. Peasants were to work on irriga-
tion and draint .ge projects .during the slack winter months,
white collar workers were to do manual labor thirty to forty
days a year and school children were to form labor brigades.
At the same time, toe efficiency of the cooperative farms was
to be greatly increased by their amalgamation into larger units.
65. Available investment funds were, contrary to
standard practice, to benefit light and food industry rather
than heavy industry. Light was thrown on the respective posi-
t-', ons of the USSR and the CPR by the mif.adventure of a Rabot-
nichesko Delo editor, who on 7 December announced that all
the collective farms in Botevgrad okolya (district) had been
merged into a single unit and that the chairman was at the
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same time okolya party secretary. But the next day, the news-
paper issued a denial of the information, adding that the guilty
editor had been 'punished. " This was followed by a Radio Sofia
broadcast on 16 December, denying that Chinese methods were
being adopted in Bulgaria. Bulgaria, Radio Sofia stated, learned
first of all from the Soviet Union, and experience from other
Socialist countries would be utilized "in a creative manner and
in accordance with our specific conditions. 11
66. Practical steps to implement the allegedly
specifically Bulgarian leap forward were taken without delay.
On 16 December a decision of the Council of Ministers intro-
ducing continuous workshifts in factories on weekdays was
announced. The Congress of People?s Youth Unions (27 Nov-
ember-2 December) was informed in a speech by Zhivkov that
"polytechnization" of education had not gone far enough and
that the programs must be revised to provide for alternate
days of classes and practical work. Ostensibly, the aim was,
as in other Communist countries, to give youth better prac-
tical training, but there were a remarkable number of speeches
in which the duty of young people to help fulfill the Five Year
Plan ahead of time was heavily stressed.
67. The amalgamation of cooperative farms pro-
ceeded with extraordinary rapidity. On 12 December the
authorities were able to announce that some 3, 300 farms had
been merged into 700 larger units.
68. A sweeping economic and administrative re-
organization was embodied in a number of theses spelt out
by Zhivkov to a Central Committee Plenum which approved
them on 17 January 1959. Their main feature was, a far-
reaching administrative decentralization achieved by the abol-
ition of seven economic ministries as well as of the thirteen
existing okrug s (regions) and their 117 subdivisions (okolyas)
which were replaced by thirty new "administrative-economic"
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okrugs representing "a unification of the entire political.,
state, economic and cultural life "within their territories. "
As Yugov explained in a subsequent speech, the "basic" unit
was to remain the obshtina (the smallest administrative unit,
equivalent to a "commune") coinciding with the territory of
each amalgamated collective farm, whose executive council
was to coordinate its activities with the cbshtina people's
council.
69. The main purpose of the reform was said to
be to reduce red tape by eliminating two administrative units
between the lowest, the obshtina, and the highest, the Coun-
cil of Ministers. At least that was the theory, for the Min-
istry of Agriculture was retained and a number of economic
and social committees were newly created. The Machine
Tractor Stations (MTS) were to be abolished and the farm
machinery sold to the collective farms. Land rent was to
disappear, compulsory deliveries to be abolished, and pay-
ment in cash was gradually to replace payment in kind, except
for minimum personal needs. The goal was to equalize labor
conditions in agriculture and industry, with the ultimate object
of eliminating the difference between "national and coopera-
tive ownership. "
70. Zhivkov also called for a revision of work
norms in industry, higher wages and, later one shorter work
days. He recognized, however., that a serious obstac]c in the
way of achieving a uniformly high standard of living was the
difference in the number of dependents the wage earner had
to support. Zhivkov proposed to eliminate this obstacle by
enabling all able-bodied members of a family, chiefly the
women, to work. For this it was necessary to provide more
jobs - which he expected the "economic leap" to do - and to
free women from housework "slavery, " by multiplying public
canteens, laundries, and other services, and expanding the
number of kindergartens and children's homes. This would
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not only help women to "overcome philistine bourgeois sur-
vivals about life and work" but would also "create a new,
healthy situation inside the family which will enable the com-
munist education of youth. "
71. To round out his picture of the Bulgaria of
the future, Zhivkov mentioned the need to "intensify" construc-
tion in towns and for "rapid planning's in villages, to "make
them like towns through water supplies, electrification, and
transportation" while inhabitants of "dispersed small vil-
lages" should be relocated. One of the "main ways" to over-
come the difference between intellectual and physical labor
was, Zhivkov asserted, the polytechnization of education
which included "participation in material production. " He
failed to explain why the fact that a student or white collar
worker worked one day a week with his hands would "wipe
out the difference between intellectual and physical labor. "
72. Industrial production by 1962 was to increase
by amounts varying between 50 and, 200 percent over the June
1958 directives, depending upon the industries, the "prefer-
ential status of branches making means of production" being
preserved - or rather, reintroduced.
73. In agriculture, the leap forward was to be
still more spectacular. Noting that the earlier directives
had envisaged."an average annual increase of about 8 per-
cent, " Zhivkov announced that "in 1962, the national income
in agriculture must be about 3. 5 times higher than that of
1958.''
74. Summing up, Zhivkov informed his audience
that by 1962,
industrial production will be more than doubled, as
against an increase of only 62 percent envisaged in
the directives . . . agricultural productions will
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attain 40 to 45 billion leva, or Z5 billion more . . .
national income will attain 80 or 85 billion or 30 to
35 billion leva more . . in 1965 national income
will total 100 to 110 billion leva . . . Labor produc-
tivity is expected to increase Z.4 times as compared
with 1957, instead of the 45 percent envisaged in the
directives. In 1965 it will be more than three times.
75. Observing that "socialism and science are
inseparable, " Zhivkov, discussed at considerable length "the
main shortcomings" of Bulgarian science and listed measures
that had to be taken for their correction. In this field, he
failed to give any figures indicating even approximately the
increases expected by 1962.
76. In his peroration, Zhivkov expressed the
customary unbounded devotion of Bulgaria to the Soviet Union
and promised to follow as always unswervingly in its wake.
77. The publication on 16 January 1959 of an
amendment increasing the number of crimes legally punish-
able by compulsory resettlement was undoubtedly not a coin-
cidence, including as it did among them the crime of "shun-
ning useful public work. " The laws embodying the various
administrative reforms, the new state plan, and the budget,
were passed by the National Assembly at its Third Session,
9-14'March 1959.
78. Perhaps as a result of Zhivkov's visit to
Moscow for the XXI Congress of the CPSU, some changes
were made in the original plan. The increase in agricultural
production planned for 1959 was reduced from 100 to 74 per-
cent. The number of amalgamated cooperatives was to be
increased from 650 to about 1, 000, some of them being, ac-
cording to Zhivkov, 1 too large for direct management by ad-
Report to National Assembly, 10 March 1959.
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ministrative councils. He also stressed that the
trends and expectations in many administrative
councils of cooperative farms that after the present
National Assembly session almost all labor-produc-
tion cooperatives in villages and all local industrial
enterprises in villages will be turned over to them
. . . are neither justified, nor present, nor realistic
at the present stage . . . The industrial enterprise
which is under the direct leadership of the okrug's
people's council is the basic production unit.
79. Presumably in order to lay the ghost of the
Chinese Communes once and for all, Rabotnichesko Delo
(19 March 1959) found it expedient to stress that "the Bulgar-
ian administrative-economic okrugs`r might indeed differ
from the Soviet "economic regions" and "the new organiza-
tional forms of industrial administration in the GDR and Czecho-
slovakia, " but that there were also "a number of essential dif-
ferences" between them and the people's communes in China.
The latter were being created primarily in the agricultural
regions of the country, and "under them, " there was a "fusing
of the administrative organs with administration of the economy, "
while in the former, "both the organizational independence of
the cooperative farms and the operative independence and pe-
culiarity of the state enterprises and other economic organiza-
tions" had been preserved. Moreover, in Bulgaria, the obsh-
tinas were the basic administrative unit within the (okra s,
whereas the Chinese communes had no smaller administrative
components.
80. Zhivkov ended his speech with a restatement
of the Moscow Party line, as laid down by Khrushchev at the
XXI Congress, on the laws governing the transition from
socialism to communism. He ended with full concurrence in
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the principle of the "almost simultaneous" passage to com-
munism of all the countries of the socialist camp.
81. Considerable surprise was caused by Premier
Yugov's unusual request - which was naturally granted by the
National Assembly - that a minister be. relieved of his post
because "of his failure to cope with his work. " The victim
was Boris Taskov, Minister of Trade. On 24 April, Radio
Sofia announced that "the work and conduct" of comrade Taskov
had been considered by the Central Committee of the BCP.
which had decided to "release him" from the Politburo and
to demote him to candidate membership of the Central Com-,
mittee. The most important reason for his failure, a Partien
Zhivot editorial, broadcast by Radio Sofia on 12 June, ex-
plained, was "his lack of conviction in the correctness of
our party policy for the rapid development of our country. "
He was, moreover, believed to have argued that there was
no way of balancing the 1959 budget unless Bulgarian exports
to the West were increased considerably.
.82. The reaction of the Bulgarian people to the
ambitious aims of. the regime leadership can only be gauged
from the intensity of their efforts to perform the necessary
work. One can hardly take at face value Zhivkov's assurance
to the Pleven Okrug Party aktiv on 28 February 1959, that
"prefulfillment of the Five Year Plan . . . has been whole-
heartedly approved and supported by the Bulgarian people, "
especially since he himself proceeded to mention facts diffi-
cult to reconcile with that claim.
The fulfillment of the production plan by our indus=-
try is 102 percent (he said). However, a number
of weaknesses lie behind this success. Certain
important enterprises are . . lagging behind the
general upsurge . . . (agricultural) work in the
okrugs is moving slowly. It is planned to build new
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irrigation projects for about 230, 000 decares of
land (by the end of March?) but so far only 50, 000
can be irrigated. As for the reclamation of a planned
100, 000 decares so far only 50 percent has been re-
claimed . . . the insufficient rainfall during the win-
ter and spring may cause additional difficulties.
83. The situation in Pleven county,- was by no
means unusual, for a Kooperativno Selo editorial of 3 Febru-
ary had reported that of the 1. 5 million decares of degraded
land to be reclaimed by 30 March, less than one-third had
actually been reclaimed in the first two-thirds of the allotted
period. Radio Sofia on 29 January complained that seed
preparation for spring sowing was lagging alarmingly.
84. All this did not bespeak great popular enthu-
siasm or augur well for the success of the plan, in agricul-
ture at any rate. There must, however, have been a radical.
change in the popular attitude in March, if one is to believe
the Central Statistical Administration announcement on 21
April that "Tt'he plan concerning total industrial output during
the first quarter of 1959 was fulfilled 101 percent. Compared
with the first quarter of 1958, the volume increased 18 per--
cent. " In agriculture, too, great progress was claimed over
1958 in the early tilling of land, in irrigation and in fertiliz-
ing.
85. Apparently, all that had been needed in order
to make the Bulgarians work twice as hard and twice as
efficiently was the First Party Secretary's word, a decrease
in the size of thekrugs, and an increase in the size of the
collective farms. Even more remarkable was the fact that
their beneficial effects extended also to the animals: the
Statistical Administration announcement reported an increase
in, livestock productivity during the first quarter on collective
and state farms.
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Foreign Relations
86. In the foreign political field the most strik-
ing development in 1958 was the sudden dropping in October
of the territorial claim on Yugoslav Macedonia, although the
campaign against Yugoslav revisionism continued unabated.
As late as on 23 September, Rabotnichesko Delo carried a
speech by Dimitur Ganev, one of the foremost, if not the
foremost Party theoretician and future chief of state, in
which he declared:
The wonderful day will come when the (Macedonian)
population on the other side of the border will suc-
ceed in escaping from the impasse in which it
presently'finds itself, in order to build a socialist
society in Bulgaria . . .
87. But only a few weeks later, Premier Yugov,
in a newspaper interview broadcast by Radio Sofia on 10
October 1958, denied the existence of any special anti-
Yugoslav campaign in Bulgaria, claiming that the differences
with Tito were purely ideological. Since that time, Bulgaria
has lived up to the claim and has refrained from mentioning
the territorial issue - as distinct from alleged oppression
of Yugoslav Macedonians. It does not seem far-fetched to
assume that the order came from Moscow. Raising claims
to parts of Macedonia on irredentist grounds was bound to
alarm the Greeks at a time when the Cyprus issue seemed
to offer favorable prospects for a Soviet Bloc-Greek rap-
prochement. Furthermore, Moscow has very good reason:
to discourage irredentism in general. It would, for example,
be difficult to prevent Hungarians from taking up the cry,
with disastrous results for the Socialist "commonwealth"
of nations. 1
1Cf. SRS-10, The "Socialist Commonwealth of Nations
Pattern for Communist World Organizations, (12 June 1959)..
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Standard of Living
88. Observers of the Bulgarian scene agree
that as a result of the lowering of industrial investments
the standard of living has improved somewhat during these
last three or four years, 1 although it is still low and con-
siderably below pre-war levels. Food supplies are still
surprisingly limited for an agricultural country, and the
improvement in the consumer goods situation is evident
much more in the quantity than in the quality and price of
the products offered for sale. Wages are very low. The
housing situation in Bulgaria is among the worst in'th.e Bloc.
Unemployment must still be considerable. Politburo mem-
ber, Rayko Damianov, in his speech to the January 1959
Plenum, conceded implicitly that even the "great leap for-
ward" may not provide work for all unemployed, and he
predicted that "by the end of the year, a.total of 140, 000
new workers will be employed, " whereas competent ob-
servers have put the number of unemployed at a minimum
of 200, 000.. Moreover, the number of people seeking em-
ployment will be swollen by part at least of the white collar
workers slated to be transferred from their desks to "pro-
ductive work", if the planned 45 percent cut in administra-
tive personnel is carried out - not to mention the annual
natural growth of the labor force.
The Party
89. Party membership in Bulgaria is close to
the general satellite average. Zhivkov reported to the
Seventh Congress in June 1958 a total membership of 485,
000 - a gain of 29, 000 since the last Congress. Since 1948
the percentage of workers had risen from 26 to 36 percent,
of white collar workers from 16 to 22 percent, while that
1The accumulation: consumption fund ratio was 28:72 in
1953 and 18. 5:81.5 in 1957. Kooperativno._Selq, 6 February
1959.
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of peasants had dropped from 45 to 36 percent.
90. Although there is no reason to assume that
all Party members in Bulgaria agree as to the correct Party
line any more than in other communist countries - or that
they are even all loyal Communists during these recent
years there has been no outward evidence of the existence of
identifiable factions. Differences of opinion have no doubt
arisen but the minority seems with few exceptions to have
bowed to the decision of the majority, or at any rate of the
leaders. If Chankov, Tcherpetchev and Panov were disci-
plined on account of ideological as distinct from personal
differences, all one can say is that they must either have
had no followers, or, if they did, they were abandoned by
them without much ado.
91. Apparently, "Kostovism" is still rampant
in the BCP. But Kostovism is described as a very mild form
of national communism which can be easily kept under control.
92. What lends interest to the Party situation in
Bulgaria is the Chervenkov enigma. Since his dismissal as
Premier in April 1956, on the charge of excessive fostering
of the cult of personality, of Stalinism in other words, a
charge he implicitly justified in his "self critical" speech to
the Seventh Party Congress in June 1958, the opinions of
"well informed" observers haves. been about equally divided.
Some claim he is still the power behind the throne, on good
terms with its present occupants and former proteges, Zhiv-
kov and Yugov, and presumably in the good graces of Khrush-
chev, while others claim that he is Zhivkov's and Yugov's dis-
gruntled rival, is unfavorably looked upon by Khrushchev,
that his influence is continually declining, and that he owes
his continued membership in the Politburo and various tem-
porary official assignments, -~ such.as'..-the po:rtfalio 'of Edu--
dation.and.his :mis'lion...to:China?i-n Oct6ber,1958. r only to his
outstanding personality and to his continued influence over a
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considerable number of crypto-Stalinist members of the BCP.
Of late, Chervenkov has also been depicted by a number of
observers as the prime mover of the "great leap forward"
and even as the head of a so-called "Chinese" faction, in al-
leged opposition to a "Moscow" faction.
93. Since Chervenkov was no worse than other
holdovers from the Stalinist era such as Ulbricht, Rakosi,
Gheorghiu-Dej, or Enver Hoxha, and since anti-Stalinism
was not exceptionally violent in Bulgaria, the reasons for
his ouster remain as obscure as ever. Considering the fact
that it took Chervenkov ever two years to make up his mind
to perform the rite of public self-criticism and that there
seems little doubt that he adamantly opposed the policy of
advances to Tito, it is possible that he had been more out-
spoken than his colleagues in his private exchanges with
Khrushchev on this subject and had thereby aroused the lat-
ter's displeasure. That was all that was needed to ensure
Chervenkov's demotion by the BCP. On the other hand, he
was presumably wiser than Molotov, his Soviet counterpart,
and refrained from active opposition to Khrushchev and his
policies, as carried out by Zhivkov and Yugov. Chervenkov
could be content with the satisfaction of having been proved
right by events: the Hungarian Revolution and the second
break with Tito. And Khrushchev seems to have been mag-
nanimous enough to forgive him for having been right, but
not to the extent of publicly acknowledging the fact by having
him reinstated in his former dominant position.
94. Very possibly, Chervenkov is perfectly con-
tent with his present position in which he seems to enjoy
considerable influence with little responsibility. There is
nothing to prevent harmonious collaboration with Zhivkov
and Yugov, especially since, short of an unlikely reversion
to unbridled police terror, it is difficult to imagine Cherven-
kov acting very differently from them. As for the "great
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leap forward, " this seems to be one of those cases in which
paternity will be impossible to establish. Chervenkov certain-
ly spoke and wrote approvingly of the Chinese developments,
but he was always extremely careful to stress their peculiar
suitability to Chinese conditions and to avoid the appearance
of advocating their adoption in Bulgaria. In general, the team-
work between Chervenkov, Zhivkov, and Yugov seems to have
been excellent, although that does of course not preclude dif-
ferences of approach in initial policy discussions.
95. The selection of Chervenkov to address the
official Party meeting in. Sofia to celebrate Lenin's birthday
anniversary on 21 April, which was attended by the Soviet
Ambassador, and his appointment two weeks. later to head
the State Scientific Council, do not indicate any loss of influ-
ence or any hostility toward him either on the part of Moscow
or of his official superiors. in Sofia. The occasion was seized
by Chervenkov to stress his unreserved devotion to pure Len-
inism. He even went so far as to assert that 'the task assigned
to our people - to prefulfill the Five Year Plan - is integrally
connected with Lenin's teaching. " If the attribution to Lenin
of responsibility for the assignment of the heavy burdens of
the great leap forward seems to contradict official assertions
that they had been demanded by the people, this only tends to
prove Chervenkov's privileged position. On 11 June, Cherven-
kov addressed a meeting devoted to Soviet-Bulgarian friend-
ship and peace. The speech, dealing almost exclusively with
the former topic, was described as "ardent" by Radio Sofia.
96. There also have been rumors of disagree-
ments between Zhivkov and Yugov, the latter being represent-
ed as critical of some of the more radical aspects of Zhivkov!s
January theses. If so, all one can. say is that the official
broadcasts of Yugov's speech on the subject gave no inkling
of disagreement, rather the opposite.
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97. At any rate, it hardly seems worth while to
devote too much time to the solution of the power problem
within the Bulgarian Communist Party. For Chervenkov,
Zhivkov, Yugov, and their friends and clients, it may or may
not be important what position each one of them holds, but it
is of little moment for the rest of the world or even for the
vast majority of Bulgarians. As far as one can tell, there is
today no significant difference between the policies or methods
that these men stand for, and none of them shows any indica-
tions of being a potential Nagy, Tito, or even Gomulka.
98. Although economic plans in the socialist
countries, for all their "scientific" foundation, have been re-
vised upwards or downwards more than once throughout their
history, the speed with which the Bulgarian Five-Year Plan,
adopted in June 1958, was scrapped and the ambitiousness of
the new goals were without parallel in the Soviet Bloc. Since
economic achievements of Communist countries have more
than once confounded the predictions of skeptics, one may
hesitate to prophesy the failure of the Bulgarian "great leap
forward. " There is, however, no need to go to the other ex-
treme and to take for granted that Communists never overrate
their capabilities. They have done so quite often in the past
and have not become infallible overnight. It seems, therefore,
that, while a successful implementation of the stepped-up plan,
or at least of parts of the plan, should not be completely ruled
out, strong doubts on the subject seem fully justified.
99. To a large extent, these doubts are based upon
what Zhivkov himself said or left unsaid. He declared cate-
gorically, for instance, at the January 1959 Plenum, that
"the reorganization and development of industry and agricul-
ture . . . cannot be accomplished without the all-round devel-
opment of science . . . " In view of the limited time avail-
able, one would have expected Zhivkov to announce that all
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Bulgarian scientists and institutions were ready to.go. Just
the opposite. Zhivkov bluntly accused Bulgarian science of
"seriously lagging behind" and proceeded to enumerate what
needed to be done, starting with the necessity to "solve the
basic issues in organization, problematics, and the material
basis of the individual branches of science. " Among the basic
issues were a discussion of necessary changes in the "organ,
izational. structure, methods, and style of leadership of the.
Bulgarian Academy of Science, " the construction of a well
equipped physics institute, "minimum funds necessary for
scientific institutes, comfortable premises and up to date
equipment" part of which should be made in Bulgaria if it
proved "possible and economically advantageous. " Another
problem still to be solved was the "selection and training of
scientific cadres." It was also rather surprising to hear,
after the announcement of the planned production figures,
our economic sciences . . . must analyze and the-
oretically sum up the experience of our socialist
development, bring to light and show the ways and
methods . . . for a steady increase in public pro-
duction, for a sharp rise in labor productivity, for
a reduction of costs . . for a correct development
of our trade, our finance and price policy, for a
rapid increase in our national income, and for rais-
ing our people's material prosperity . . On the
basis of their scientific research work, they must
make practical suggestions . . for the develop-
ment of our socialist economy..
No wonder the Planning Commission was reported to have
asked Zhivkov to give it more time before announcing the
target figures, a request which he did not heed.
100. Zhivkov's theses were completely silent. on
the subject of finances, although a sharp increase in produce
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tion obviously demanded a corresponding increase in funds. 1
101. Premier Yugov, in his speech to the January
Plenum, did say that it would demand. "large capital invest-
ments, " but subsequent references to the possible sources of
the necessary money, certainly a matter deserving serious
treatment, were almost haphazard. Yugov mentioned the need
for economy - a "state-conscious approach to the problem of
spending" to stretch the available resources, as he put it.
The chairman of the State Planning Commission, Rusi Khris-
tozov, stated over Radio Sofia on 19 February, that the planned
increases in the number of workers and in labor productivity
were the main factors in the growth of the national income,
but that "a certain increase in the relative share of the accum-
ulation fund of our national income is inevitable. f?
102. As it seems most unlikely that these internal
sources of additional capital will prove adequate, one might
have expected Bulgaria to be counting on foreign, that is Soviet,
credits. But all that has transpired on this subject so far are
two rather casual statements by Premier Yugov and First
Deputy Premier Damianov. Referring to a 130 million ruble
credit, announced on 27 December 1958, for the construction
of a thermo-electric station and an oil refinery - to process
Soviet crude oil, most of the refined products being shipped
back to the USSR, just as Bulgarian plants had been producing
clothes out of Soviet textiles for the Russians - Damianov
explained in an interview on 19 February that this credit would
help Bulgaria to carry out the "great leap forward. "
IIn order to attain a 12. 3 percent increase in agricultural
production, the Czechoslovak Government is increasing the
1959 allotment to agriculture by 12.4 percent. Statement by
Minister of Finance, Radio Prague, 19 February 1959.
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103. Yugov, in his address to the January Plenum,.
spoke about "the large amount of machines that will be im-
ported from the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist
countries" and ended with the statement that "close coopera-
tion.with the countries from the socialist camp and especially
the aid received from the Soviet Union, will be .an important
factor in the implementation of these great tasks. " On 13
March, he specified that 89.5 percent of the increase in na-
tional income in 1959 (31.8 percent) was to. be obtained from
the increase in labor productivity. Neither Zhivkov nor
Khristozov explained whether the promised reduction in
working hours and in the work week, and the improved stand.
and of living were to be achieved parallel with the great leap
forward in production or only after it had made substantial
progress. Assuming the latter to be the case it would appear
that Zhivkov relied on the increase in the labor force and a
temporarily reduced standard of living to. achieve the goal.
The increase in productivity can hardly. make itself felt for
quite some time, for on Zhivkov's own showing much of the
indispensable machinery still remains to be built. In agri-
culture, for example, where he laid great stress on land
reclamation and especially on expansion of irrigation, he
also said that "it is necessary to master as soon as possible
the production of machines for land improvement, irrigation,
fertilizing, livestock breeding and so forth. ". In other words,
the Bulgarian factories have still to master the techniques
for the production of needed machinery. Moreover, most
industries, before they can increase production, need a
greatly expanded "raw materials basis" for which in turn
many new machines are a prerequisite. It should also be
noted that spking of the second Five Year Plan period,
Khristozov claimed no more than a 21. 6 percent increase
in individual worker output in industry. It will have to be
many times larger over the next three or four years. In
the meantime, Rabotnichesko Delo reported on. 19 March
1959, that "labor production in a considerable number of .
Sofia enterprises in January 1959 was lower than the 1958
average. "
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104. As for additional labor resources, the regime
can undoubtedly count on the unemployed, numbering "more
than 100, 000, " according to Khristozov. How long it will take
to organize the canteens, nurseries, laundries and other ser-
vices needed to free most women from their household duties
- provided they agree that factory work is really more pleas-
ant than housework - is difficult to estimate, but there seems
little doubt that Zhivkov will be disappointed in his expecta-
tions of greatly intensified agricultural work during the winter
months. Even the strongest Communist faith cannot keep a
man warm or melt the snow or soften the soil in sub-dro
weather, nor dry it fast enough to be worked during warmer
spells - except perhaps in the southernmost parts of the coun-
try. It may also be pertinent to remark that, if after forty
years of socialism it was only by plowing up vast expanses of
virgin soil that the USSR managed to increase agricultural
production to any noticeable extent, and if the Soviet Seven-
Year Plan foresees an increase of only 70 percent, it seems
unlikely that Bulgaria which has no Kazakhstan can increase
agricultural production by 300 percent in four years merely
through merging small collective farms.
105. Surprisingly, fruit (except grapes) and Arege-
tables, high priced crops in which Bulgaria was supposed to
specialize according to the 1957 CEMA decision, received
little attention. It is true that vegetable production was to
increase 50 percent, but sugar beets were to increase 91 per-
cent, cotton 80 percent and corn 66 percent. Incidentally,
Khristozov, in his expose of the 1959 economic plan to the
National Assembly on 13 March, commented that adequate
amounts of fertilizer would not be available. The deficiency
was to be made up by stable manure, but for once he failed to
specify the prescribed increase in production.
106. Inevitably, the question arises what made the
Bulgarian leadership run the risk of damaging its prestige by
formally committing itself to such over-ambitious goals?
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Even if theoretically attainable, they would demand a degree
of coercion and austerity which already twice before, in 1953
and 1956, had proved extremely dangerous. Would it not have
been wiser to set the sights somewhat lower, and eventually
to overfulfill the plan?
107. It is indeed impossible to find a rational ex-
planation for the action of the Bulgarian leaders. One can
only fall back on the belief of the ancients that man is pun-
ished by the gods by fits of megalomania or h bris, which
blind him to realities. On the other hand, the inspiration for
the wishful thinking which culminated in the targets set for
the great leap forward is fairly obvious. It was undoubtedly
supplied by the Soviet Seven Year Plan which was accompan-
ied by clear allusions to the desirability of an allround rais-
ing of the economic sights. As internal socialist competition
is in. high favor in the communist world, and as - in the words
of the East German Tribuene pf 18 April 1959 - "every day's
pre schedule implementation of the plan in the socialist com-
petition Eith capitalism is a gain of time and therefore a
success for socialism, " the Bulgarian leaders, dizzy with
their victory in the race for collectivization, were naturally
eager to gain first place in the general rating of socialist
states. At the same time that the alleged successes of the
Chinese great leap forward were creating a world sensation
- that is, everywhere but in the USSR where they were ig-
nored - it is not surprising that the Bulgarian leaders, pre-
sumably prodded by Chervenkov, should have been tempted
to emulate them. Both countries were industrially backward,
but had an excess of manpower largely as a result of over-
rapid collectivization and had a generally docile population.
If the idea worked in China, why should it not in Bulgaria?
108. What was certainly even more important
than production figures themselves was their connection with
the problem of the achievement of communism, a matter
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which directly affected claims to leadership in the Communist
orbit. The Bulgarian leaders had some justification in con-
sidering their country the most advanced on the road to com.
munism, excepting the USSR, of course. Having very little
industry to socialize, and only a small urban population to
feed, they had been able to concentrate on agriculture, and
could rightfully boast that they were the first to have social-
ized both industry and agriculture.
109. The resolution of the Seventh Party Congress
in June 1958 boasted that ;'socialism is the completely domin-
ating and only commanding force in the entire national economy.
In our country the socialist construction of our economy.has
already been achieved. " But significantly, Khrushchev, while
full of praise for Bulgarian successes in collectivization, did
not echo the BCP's boast. B. Ponomarev, writing in the
October 1958 issue of Kommunist, endorsed the claim that
socialism had conquered in Bulgaria, but omitted any men-
tion of the claim that the construction of socialism had al-
ready been achieved.
110. One can well imagine that the Bulgarian. lead-
ers were eager to proclaim that they were following immediate-
ly in the wake of the "Big Brother" and were starting to build
communism. What a feather in their cap if they were to over-
take the other more advanced satellites I But in the absence
of any encouragement from Moscow, the Bulgarian leaders
were certainly hesitant to take such a step alone and without
at least moral support from a powerful quarter. At this junc-
ture, on 29 August 1958, the CPR published a resolution which
concluded with the words: "The realization of Communism in
our country is already not something far away. We must
actively use the form of the people's communes and through
it find the concrete road of transition to Communism. " On
November 21st, General Chu Te-h,, China's deputy chief of
state and vice-chairman of the Party's Central Committee,
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told a youth rally that full-blown Communism would be
attained in this generation. Zhivkov practically paraphrased
Chu-Teh when he announced on 1 December 1958, in a speech
to the Komsomol Congress:
The building of Communism will begin much earlier
than we had imagined and certain fundamental objec-
tives of Communism will be achieved in the near
future by the present leaders of the Party and of
the Government . The children who will finish
school ten or twelve years from now will find. them-
selves in a purely communist country.
111, Two weeks later, the Chinese announced their
leap backwards. Life published Khrushchev's strictures on
Chinese claims, as reported by Senator Humphrey, and by
17 January 1958, Zhivkov claimed no more for Bulgaria than
to be entering on the stage of the completion of the construc-
tion of socialism and the preparation of the conditions for the .
transition to Communism. "
112. Whereas therefore in June the socialist con-
struction of the Bulgarian economy had been described as
already "achieved, " seven months later the construction of
socialism still remained to be "completed. " At the same
time Zhivkov stressed the leading role of the USSR more
heavily than ever, for it indicated "the only correct path for
the building of the Communist society. " Chervenkov in an
article on the Chinese communes, published by Rabotniches-
ko Delo of 15 January 1959, emphatically stressed that the
innovation was only suited to the specific conditions in China,
and in no case could enable a country to overleap the social-
ist stage.
113. At the end of the month, Khrushchev clinched
the matter by his statement to the X) Congress that after the
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fulfillment of the Seven Year Plan it would take the USSR
about five years more to "complete the initial stage of Com-
munist construction" and that in any case the socialist coun-
tries: '.'would more or less simultaneously pass to the higher
phase of Communist society. "
114. It would have been too much to expect the
Bulgarian leaders to practice the virtue of self-criticism to
the point of admitting they had been mistaken. In his report
to the National Assembly on 10 March, Zhivkov put the
blame for having jumped the gun on the anonymous authors
of "certain articles published in our press and periodicals
which expressed the incorrect views that we are now begin-
ning construction of the highest levels of the Communist
society . . . " He then proceeded to recapitulate and to
endorse Khrushhiev's dicta on the fundamental difference
between socialism and communism - reward according to
labor and allocation of goods according to need - and on the
continuity between socialism and communism, which made
it impossible to define when one came to an end and the other
began.
115. It maybe observed, however, that whereas
in January Zhivkov had retreated to the point of merely
claiming that Bulgaria was entering the stage of the "com-
pletion of the construction of socialism and the preparation
of the conditions for the transition to communism, t' in March
- after his visit to Moscow - he denied only that Bulgaria was
"beginning construction of the highest levels of the commu-
nist society. "1
116. Even without the indiscretions of the Bulgar-
ian newspapers, the Chinese inspiration for the Bulgarian
great leap forward seems apparent. The identical term used
to describe the new phase, its amplitude, far exceeding any
1
Our italics.
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plan revision within the Soviet Orbit, some features of the
administrative reorganization, the stress on "communaliza-
tion" of family life, all had a distinctly Chinese flavor. Nor
can Chervenkov's mission to China at the particular time it
took place have been a mere coincidence. And perhaps most
revealing were the excessive protestations of conformity
with the Soviet model.
117. Nevertheless, Zhivkov and his friends, know-
ing that one cannot be too careful when one has to do with Mos-
cow, and doubtless disturbed by the ominous absence of Soviet
praise for the Chinese developments, prudently lagged some
distance'behind Mao T.se-tung and refrained from openly com-
mitting themselves. Events amply justified their prudence.
118. But the fact remains that the Bulgarian lead-
ers did show an unusual amount of courage, one might even
say, of "national" communism, in going as far as they did.
Granted that they probably expected Moscow to swallow the
Chinese initiative with outward good grace and.to_,pernit. them
to ride on the Chinese coattails, the mere fact of embarking
on such a course without Moscow's prior approval betrays an
unwonted spirit of independence. It also betrays, besides a
surprising misunderstanding of Soviet motivations, the same
megalomania which was apparent in the economic targets of
the Bulgarian leap forward. Quod licet Jovi, non licet bovi.
It should have been obvious to the Bulgarians that Bulgaria
was not China and that for a satellite to out-perform the
USSR smacked of lese-majesty: What was more important,
Moscow was clearly not going to allow a satellite to decide
for itself how far it had progressed on the road to Commu-
nism. Moscow's claim to leadership of the communist camp
being ostensibly based on the fact that it has advanced fur-
thest on the road to Communism, it will not allow a satellite
to claim to have caught up with it. That would simply be an-
other road to Titoism. Hq.pce the importance of the thesis
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of the continuity between socialism and Communism, explicit-
ly accepted by Zhivkov. In the absence of objective criteria,
it is up to the leader of the most advanced communist party
to decide for each country when the moment to enter upon the
communist stage has come. Moreover, to avoid ill consid-
ered "great leaps forward, " or possible bad feeling, the
socialist states have been warned that progress will be "al-
most simultaneous. It
119. Although the Bulgarian leaders have undoubt-
edly been absolved b y the Kremlin of any disloyal intent, all
indications point to Soviet luke-warmness toward their econ-
omic plan and skepticism with regard to its chances of suc-
cess. It is true that Zhivkov, after his return from the XXI
Congress in Moscow, reduced the planned increase in agri-
cultural production to a more realistic figure. It is also true
that in March, Khristozov confirmed the grant of the Soviet
credit, but its modest proportion considering the magnitude
of the task was tantamount to damning with faint praise. In
Soviet articles dealing with economic progress in the Orbit,
the absence of the usual encomia for overfulfilling norms,
even of simple acknowledgement of the Bulgarian effort, is
remarkable. Izvestia, for example, in a 17 January 1959
article on the subject, bestowed no special praise on Bulgaria.
Pravda, in an article on'The Great Commonwealth (sodruzhest-
vo) of Socialist Countries" (28 April 1959) wrote:
In the seven-year period . . . the USSR plans to
increase the output of industrial production 1. 9
times. The growth of industrial production in
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the GDR will be ap-
proximately the same. The national economy of
the CPR and the other socialist lands will develop
at a fast pace.
Bulgaria, which plans to treble industrial production in four
years, is not even mentioned by name.
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120. Soviet skepticism with regard to Bulgaria's
prospects is not astonishing, considering that many Bulgar-
ians themselves are high y pessimistic, especially as the
most important prerequisite, popular enthusiasm, seems to
be entirely lacking. Talk as Zhivkov may of the compulsion
under which the planners allegedly found themselves to heed
the "indomitable striving of the people's masses to advance
their movement, aimed at fulfilling the tasks ahead of sched-
ule, "1 he sounds less convincing than other Central Commit-
tee members, Rada Todorov, for instance, who declared:
'None of us, including me, believes that the job will be very
easy or very smooth . . . But I believe that our people under-
stand and will understand that all this is happening for their
welfare, for their happiness . . . it 2 Vladimir Bonev,
another mer;ber, thought that in "implementing these gigan-
tic tasks . . . we will indisputably encounter great difficulties,
particularly in Sofia where these reorganizations affect a cone
siderable part of our national industry and whence the most
employees will be sent into material production. "3 P. Kuba-
dinski, Secretary of the Party's Central Committee, admitted
that "the nationwide movement for the prefulfillment of the
Five Year Plan also encounters serious difficulties of objec-
tive and subjective character. r'4
121. These statements hardly seem to confirm
Zhivkov's. claim that the great leap forward had been decided
in response to an irresistible popular demand. Chervenkov
1Report to National Assembly, 19 March 1959.
Rabotnichesko Delo, 12 January 1959.
3lbidem, 24 January 1959.
4Pravda (Moscow), 1 April 1959.
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appears to have been more honest when he placed the respon-
sibility on Lenin. Whether the, great leap succeeds or fails,
it will hardly improve the standing of the Party among, Bul-
garians in the coming years. Failure would do no good to
the Party's prestige and to public faith in Communist planning,
while success can only be at'the price of an exhausting phy~
sical effort, the material reward for which is bound to lag
considerably. There is no reason to assume Bulgarians will
like it any better in 1959 than in 1953.
122. It is therefore safe to predict a further drop.
in Communist Party popularity in Bulgaria, which, as a mat-
ter of fact, has never been as high as seems to be rather
widely assumed. It is true that collectivization has been
achieved in Bulgaria more rapidly and completely than in any.
other Communist ruled country, but there are no grounds for.
the assumption that the Bulgarian peasants were any less op-
posed to it than Polish, 'Yugoslav, or Hungarian peasants.
The difference seems to have been that the regime could af-
ford to disregard the inevitable drop in production. Nor does
the fact that in the cities there have been no large scale anti-
regime outbreaks as in East Germany, Hungary, or Poland
prove that the Bulgarian white and blue collar classes are
any less opposed to the regime. Their numerical weight is,
however, much smaller. As for the Bulgarian intelligentsia,
it has been one of the most outspoken in its opposition to the
regime.
123. On the other hand, in Bulgaria, practically
alone among the satellites there is no historic anti-Russian
as distinct from anti-communist sentiment. There was very
little fighting, and therefore plundering by the Russians after
World War II. No occupation troops remained to offend nation-
al pride, nor had Russia ever annexed any formerly Bulgarian
territory. Political and cultural ties with Russia, the "Pro-
tector" of the smaller Slav nations, had always been close.
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However, the fact that Russians are not generally hated and
feared by Bulgarians, as they are by Russia's immediate
neighbors, does not make present day Russian ideology any
more palatable to them. But it may help to explain - together
with the stolidity of e Bulgarian - why popular opposition
remained below the boiling point in 1956 and why, in the words
of the BCP Central Committee meeting of 5 December 1958,
the regime leaders were able, by a judicious display of "im-
placability" and "Communist principles, " to save the country
"from defeat at the hands of revisionism. if
124. Of equal, if not greater importance, for the
relative smoothness of the Bulgarian waters was the failure
of the BCP to produce another Kostov during the 1956 crisis.
Under present circumstances, even if one should emerge, it
would make little difference. The pendulum is now every-
where swinging away from revisionism, let alone from anti-
communist outbreaks. If and when it again swings in the op-
posite direction, the Bulgarian people can be counted upon to
be as eager as any other to take advantage of every favorable
opportunity to regain their freedom.
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