CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SENIOR RESEARCH STAFF ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM: STATUS AND PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM: THE DIALECTIC OF CRISIS AND STABILIZATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01445R000100060001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 69
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 16, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Senior Research Staff on International Communism
STATUS AND PROSPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
The Dialectic of Crisis and Stabilization
CIA / SRS-6
16 September 1957
N? 390
.1'7' NO.
BOX NO. 1
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TOTAL ECC: HEREIN
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DECLASFiEC)
CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEKTF-317..,PEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
D AT
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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STATUS AND PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
The Dialectic of Crisis and Stabilization
CIA/ SRS- 6
This is a speculative study which
ha s been discussed with US Govern-
ment intelligence officers but has
not been formally coordinated. It
is based on information available
to SRS as of 1 September 1957.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
II. THE BACKGROUND
Page
1
5
III. NATURE AND OBJECTIVES OF
COMMUNIST STABILIZATION 8
A. General Considerations 8
B. Goals of Stabilization 10
C. Ideological Premises 15
D. The Psychological Climate 17
E. The "Operational Code" 18
F. Organizational Considerations 20
G. Stabilization and the "Nuclear Stalemate" 20
IV. STABILIZATION MEASURES TO DATE 22
A. Within the USSR 22
Political Stabilization 22
Social Stabilization 25
Economic Stabilization 29
Military Stabilization 34
B. Stabilization of the Satellite Area 36
C. Titoism and Communist Stabilization 44
D. The Role of Communist China in
the Stabilization Campaign 47
E. The Stabilization of the International
Position of the USSR 49
F. The Stabilization of Communist Parties
and Front Organizations in
the Free World
52
V. CONCLUSIONS 61
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omons..iiggp'
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The entire history of the movement known as
International Communism may be described as a dialectic
or interplay of dynamic advance, of crisis and of efforts to
achieve stabilization as a basis for further progress toward
an unchanging goal. During the four years following the death
of Stalin, the elements of crisis accumulated, reaching a peak
in the second half of 1956. Two sets of factors dominated this
process: the continuing rise in power of the Soviet Union, and
the emergence of new forces within International Communism
which called for a revision of the directing role hitherto mo-
nopolized by the CPSU, whether under temporary "collective
leadership" or, as appears normal to it, under an autocratic
General or First Secretary.
2. The crisis of the USSR, as was made clear by the
purge of June-July 1957, consisted both of a struggle for the
mantle of Stalin, and of a conscious attempt to modify the
basis of "Stalinism" as a system of government. Thus a
naked power conflict was played against the counterpoint of a
fundamental policy reappraisal. It was a grim battle, partly
fought under a gangsters' code with deadly blows delivered
and received in stoical silence, partly conducted in an almost
ritualistic manipulation of public actions and statements,
charged with meaning for the initiate but largely incompre-
hensible outside the ruling circles of Communism.
3, The crisis of International Communism came to
a head in 1956 in two major developments creating grave con-
fusion among Party ranks throughout the world. The denigra-
tion of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU shattered
the myth of infallibility, and the rebellions in Poland and Hun-
gary proved that Stalin's system could no longer be adminis-
tered in its full rigidity, except with the sanction of military
force,
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4.. The crisis of 1956 also demonstrated that a new
power had arisen in the movement: Communist China.
Accorded a titular role in the leadership of the "socialist
camp" as early as 1955, Peiping has emerged as a force
within the Bloc, sharing in considerable measure the hegern-
onyrof the Soviet Union. . At the same time, Tito and Gomul-
ka have successfully demonstrated that Communism can no
longer be completely "unicentric"; some measure of diversity,
of "polycentrism" - a concept introduced by the Italian Com-
munist leader, Togliatti - must henceforth be reckoned with
by the hitherto unchallenged Moscow leaders.
5.. This study attempts to interpret the post-Stalin
years in terms of Communist dialectics, rather than of
Western thought. It seeks primarily to establish the thesis
that the leadership of the USSR and of International Commun-
ism, faction-ridden though it may be, has consistently strug-
gled to achieve unity of action in the name of the Marxist-
Leninist dispensation. Whether this campaign be interpreted
as a sheer power struggle - "Kremlinology" - or as the
attempt to actualize an ideological vision, it has the force of
a world-conquering movement, a crusading "secular religion",
or, as it has been called, a "Twentieth Century Islam".
Whether it will triumph, or maintain its present strength, or
go down in defeat is problematical and depends as much on
the countering dynamism of the Free World as on its own.
6. The terminology used in this paper may require
some clarification. The term "stabilization" has been adopted,
rather than others such as "consolidationTM, "compensation",
"readjustment", etc. because it seems best to convey the sense
of that process which the Communist leaders have sought to
further during the period under review. As indicated in the
subtitle, this form of stabilization is dynamic rather than
static. It is implicit in the Marxist concept of dialectics as
the basic principle of social evolution. Classic Marxism
insists on the Hegelian c1ich6: thesis-antithesis-synthesis;
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ossilkikawa,
Peiping in its "rectification campaign" has stressed the role
of "contradictions" under the formula: unity-criticism-unity.
This paper adopts a slightly different triad: stability-crisis-
stability, The sense of these different formulae is believed
to be the same,
7. It is recognized that this "dialectic" approach, if
applied too rigidly, raises numerous difficulties. But it
conveys the belief, developed in the truly revolutionary phase
of Bolshevism and nurtured by the epigoni of that "heroic" era,
that the road to Communist victory can progress only through
the confrontation and resolution of crises. Obviously, such a
process cannot be uniform. Crises can arise from either ex-
ternal or internal factors, or from both simultaneously. They
can be major or minor, with long or short range implications.
Similarly, the resolution or stabilization of these critical
situations may require different approaches in different parts
of the world, even though the basic Communist goals remain
unchanged. The dedicated Communist knows that crises will
occur and that they must and can be overcome through efforts
commensurate in their strenuousness with the gravity of the
threat presented. These efforts constitute for him the
supreme personal fulfillment.
8. Thus, while in a sense this paper is perhaps
little more than an analysis of the broad course of events in
the Communist world since the death of Stalin, it seeks to
deepen this analysis by filtering it through a basic facet of
Communist thought and action habit. The formula of "sta-
bilization" embraces such diverse factors as a continuing
power struggle at the fountainhead of World Communism, a
major historic phase of the Bolshevik Revolution, an unprec-
edented drive toward world dominance, and an endeavor, both
fumbling and bold, to steer a modern state through turbulent
and uncharted economic and social waters, It is obvious that
such a pattern defies terminological tidiness, and this paper
makes no claim to have achieved such an effect. It is intended
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p1IMMONIF*11.
solely as a contribution to the immense effort of research
and speculation which will have to be made in order to com-
prehend the threat posed to the Free World by International
Communism.
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THE BACKGROUND
9.. By the time of Stalin's death, it had become
apparent that his post-war rule had ended in sterility.
Although Stalin had imposed himself on World Communism
as the sole interpreter of Marxism-Leninism, he had pro-
gressively distorted the "pure" doctrine. Within the Soviet
Union, his absolute dictatorship had sapped the power and
authority of the Party and had pauperized and demoralized
large segments of the population. In the Satellites, little
Stalins had followed his example with similar results. Out-
side the Bloc, Stalin's insistence on Soviet supremacy had
exacerbated mounting national sentiments. His contempt
for small nations and his mistreatment of national minorities
had disturbed even convinced Communists, who remembered
the more realistic approach of Lenin. His rigid, blustering
foreign policy had alarmed the Western Powers, rallying
them to a common defense against the threat of Communist
aggression, and leading to the creation of NATO, SEATO and
the Baghdad Pact. Against this background of Communist
losses, the fact that Stalin had forged the USSR into a great
industrial and military power, dominating a mighty World
Communist movement, was played down by his successors.
The "collective leadership" which, on the surface, appeared
to have closed ranks after the elimination of the threat from
Beria, seemed inclined to reduce Stalin's memory to proper
proportions, while it moved toward the correction of his
excesses.
10, The three years between the death of Stalin and
the 20th Party Congress reflect the cautious and tentative
groping toward a new policy by the badly divided "collective"
leadership. In 1954, under Malenkov's guidance, a "New
Course" was launched in both the USSR and the Satellites,
emphasizing a relaxation of coercive methods and police
terror and bolding forth the prospect of a general increase
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in consumers' goods. Execution of the "New Course",
however, was sluggish and uneven. After Malenkov's de-
motion in early 1955, the absolute priority of heavy indus-
try was vigorously reaffirmed, albeit without repudiating
the promises of improvement in living standard which he
had made. Throughout the Satellites, Stalinism was still
rampant, and most of the CPs of the Free World continued
to display the pattern of autocratic personal leadership.
11.. By the end of 1955 it must have become apparent
to the Soviet leadership that, however difficult to agree upon
under the circumstances of a deadly power struggle, a major
redefinition of policy and strategy was required. The cen-
tral feature gradually became clear, the attack on the "per-
sonality cult" of Stalin and the proclamation of a "return to
Leninism". The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU (February
1956) provided the setting for this weighty drama which cul-
minated in the sensaticnal "secret report" of Khrushchev.
Whether this bold iconoclasm was conceived and directed
primarily by Khrushchev, whether it proceeded according
to plan or was from the outset fraught with improvisation,
may still be debated. Certainly, the reaction of the Con-
gress to the first tentative attacks on Stalin by Mikoyan
forced the pace and perhaps dictated the form of the full,
smashing denigration. Khrushchev is reported to have con-
fessed, several months later, to a foreign Communist lead-
er, that, had he foreseen all the consequences, he would
have handled the entire affair quite differently. Be that as
it may, the decision to topple the Stalin idol must have been
taken with full awareness by all members of the Prosidixim
that its consequences would be, at the very least, unsettling
to the Communist world,.
12. The first phase of the inevitable crisis reached a
climax in the month of June 1956. The publication by the
United States government of the text of Khrushchev's secret
speech produced a wave of uneasiness among CPs throughout
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the world, and led to pointed questions and even, in the case
of Togliatti, to doubts concerning the "system" itself.
Everywhere there was a demand - which seemed almost con-
certed - for a "Marxist explanation" of the deplorable Stalin-
1st record. The Kremlin reacted quickly in the 30 June Resol-
ution, followed by a series of interpretive articles in Pravda.
The effect of these statements was gradually to play down the
denigration of Stalin, and to curb the libertarian interpretation
of the Twentieth Congress theses - in short, a "harder" Lenin-
ist line.
13. On the surface at least, this complex maneuver
was successful. Most of the foreign CPs accepted the "Marx-
ist explanation" without reservation. Even Togliatti, after
receiving a mild wrist slapping, acknowledged the 30 June
Resolution as a "contribution" to an "explanation", and from
then on, troubled with repercussions in his own Party, he
hewed to the Moscow line which for more than 25 years he
had always faithfully followed. The alacrity with which the
foreign parties took up the Kremlin rationalization suggested
to some observers that the whole turmoil had been part of a
"master plan". This appears to impute too much prevision
to the Soviet leaders, especially in view of their internal dif-
ferences. In any case, whatever their intentions and their
tactics, they had set in motion long suppressed national fer-
ments among the Satellites which were not easily to be con-
tained. Stimulated by the reactivation of the Leninist formula
of "different roads to Socialism", which began with the Khrush-
chev-Bulganin visit to Belgrade in May-June 1955, CPs and
front organizations on both sides of the Iron Curtain were boil-
ing with heresies and "deviations".
14. While the Soviet leaders were trying to cope with
this agitation which they had started, events in Poland and
Hungary flared up with revolutionary violence. In the eyes
of many in the Free World, this turmoil looked for a moment
like the beginning of the end of the Communist movement. But
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in the face of the greatest peacetime threat since the 1917
Revolution, the Soviet leaders, following their time-tested
principles of counter-attack, launched a major world-wide
effort to recoup their losses and re-establish their control.
With the qualified support of Communist China, they set
out to restore their position as the uncontested leaders of
International Communism, to solidify the USSR as the base
of Communism, to wipe out tendencies toward "national
Communism", and to consolidate their hold over the non-
Orbit parties and the fellow-traveling organizations - all
within the framework of "peaceful coexistence".
NATURE AND OBJECTIVES OF COMMUNIST
STABILIZATION
A. General Considerations
15. Communist ideology does not regard permanent
stability as an end achievable in the present stage of "social-
ist construction". Only in the ultimate stage of the world
revolution, the achievement of full Communism, will this
dynamic process come to rest in a classless society, the
state having withered away, and with it all conflicts and
"contradictions". Until then, the Communisit Party must
wage unending struggle to maintain its course toward the
predetermined goal.
16. Stabilization, in Communist terms, thus involves
a constant process of shifting, a perpetual adjustment of sail
and rudder. The line between strategy and tactics often
becomes indistinguishable. Within an integrated concept,
specific goals are striven for, usually by a combination of
specific methods, some of which may even appear to be self-
contradictory, or to have more than one end in view. The
campaign is conducted simultaneously, but flexibly, along
all fronts: ideological, political, socio-economic, diplomatic,
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military, propaganda. It is the totality of the effort which
constitutes the unique aspect of Communist stabilization.
Because it is the very principle of their being, Communists,
at least the leaders and the dedicated cadres, do not tire or
despair in this quest for equilibrium, precedent to further
advance. They need fear only stagnation, which dulls the
edge of militancy, and isolation, which removes the pos sir
bility of engaging the enemy.
17. The history of the Soviet Union reveals a sequence
of internal and external crises and of stabilization efforts
hardly paralleled in any other modern state. When Lenin
introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the early twen-
ties, he was countering an economic and political dislocation,
the aftermath of "War Communism", which threatened the
survival of the Revolution. This was followed in the late
twenties by a profound power struggle, resolved by Stalin's
ruthless elimination of Trotsky, Bukharin, Kamenev and
Zinoviev. His position as dictator established, Stalin took
the first steps in his grandiose design of "building Socialism
in one country": the bloody suppression of the Kulaks and the
forcible collectivization of agriculture as a prelude to indus-
trial expansion on an unparalleled scale. In the early thirties
the international position of Communism was threatened by the
triumphal advances of Hitler and Mussolini, forcing the Comin-
tern to reverse the anti-Socialist ("Social Fascist") line which
it had pursued under Stalin's orders and to woo the Socialists
into United Fronts against the common enemy. This relative-
ly successful external campaign was combined with major
political, economic and cultural consolidation within the USSR,
of which the 1936 Constitution is a symbol. This phase, how-
ever, led directly into the bloody purges - the Yezhovshchina -
which nearly incapacitated Russia for facing the Second World
War. The Hitler-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, shattering faithful
Communists far more than the Hungarian uprising, was a
desperate effort to restore temporary stability so as to strength-
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n'afts"1146
en the militarily weakened state. The devastation and de-
population of the War, whose full magnitude (probably 40
million deaths) was only revealed in 1956 by the publication
of the vital statistics of the USSR, was partially compensated
by the satellization of Eastern Europe, providing the booty
from which the Soviet economy was restored. The hard
aggressive line followed after 1947 - the civil war in Greece,
the 6eizure of Czechoslovakia, the expulsion of Tito from the
Cominform, the Berlin Blockade and the Korean war - brought
about that rallying of Free World resistance, which, together
with other factors, impelled the Soviet leaders to launch the
present stabilization campaign. Whether it will prove more
enduring and fruitful than earlier efforts, or whether it, too,
will issue in abrupt reversals and new crises, cannot, at
this time, be predicted with confidence. The history and
dynamics of Communism, however, suggest a somber pro-
jection which is set forth at the end of this paper.
B. Goals of Stabilization
.18, Strengthening the Position of the USSR as the
Fountainhead of Communist Power. It is an unshakeable
premise of the Soviet leadership that the USSR must remain
the base and the citadel of World Communism. The political
and organizational health of the Soviet Union, its Government
and its Party, demands unquestioned priority. Replacing the
"cult of personality" with the refurbished Leninist tenets of
"collective leadership" and "Socialist legality", the Kremlin
seeks to retain the principle of monolithic totalitarian author-
ity and to restore the power of the CPSU, which had tended
under Stalin to become his personal instrument. The 2 July
1957 Communique.of the Central Committee, with its accom-
panying rallying cry in Pravda, affirmed that unity has been
achieved and the Party is triumphant. The subsequent actions
of Khrushchev have been calculated to reinforce this claim.
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19. Reinvigoration of Marxist-Leninist Doctrine.
Communist doctrine or ideology is the bond which holds
together the parties of the "Socialist" camp and the Com-
munist parties and front organizations throughout the world.
"Marxism-Leninism" (Stalinism has been dropped, though
many of its features are retained with attribution to Lenin)
is literally the gospel of a "secular religion". Whatever
role this gospel may play in determining concrete courses
of action (a point of perennial dispute among students of
Communism), its commandments and doctrine must be
held inviolate and purged of heresy. Thus the present
stabilization campaign has some of the aspects of a "Reform-
ation", a return to a traditional orthodoxy which had been cor-
rupted by the aberrations of a "Babylonian" pontiff and a few
of his disciples. The fact that another false pope, Tito, has
been propagating a persuasive heresy further emphasizes the
need for doctrinal concentration. "Under the banner of Marx-
ism-Leninism" held aloft by Moscow, widely separated peoples
are called upon to rally in a common course of action.
20. Strengthening the Economy of the Bloc. Basically,
this goal centers in strengthening the economy of the USSR.
Lenin recognized at the outset that this backward country must
be wrought into a highly industrialized modern state, if Com-
munism was to advance throughout the world. Stalin, repudiat-
ing the Trotskyite program of simultaneous revolutions in many
countries, set about the "construction of Socialism in one coun-
try". "Socialism" or a facsimile thereof was "constructed" -
on the graves of millions and the forfeited happiness of a gen-
eration - but a new goal has been superimposed on the original
one of fortifying the base of World Communism. A competitive,
emulative motif has been increasingly stressed: outstripping
the economies of the West, particularly that of the United States.
Here, too, it is the strength of the Soviet Union and the ultimate
material well-being of its citizens which is held forth as the
incentive to increased productivity.
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21. Reaffirming the Military Might of the USSR.
Ever since the end of World War II, the Red Army has been
the silent but visible partner, strengthening the hand of the
Soviet diplomat and propagandist in the Cold War. Prior to
1956, the West gradually came to accept the Satellite mili-
tary establishments as a substantial component of the Bloc's
power agglomeration. Hungary dispelled the myth of Satel-
lite reliability, probably for years to come, and thereby re-
dressed somewhat the balance of conventional armed force
between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The USSR probably
considers that the role of its military might as an instrument
of its power politics must again be accented. Although nuclear
deterrence and disarmament negotiations (see below, paras.
35-36) have complicated the exploitation of this instrument,
the Kremlin clearly views the reaffirmation of its military
prestige as a significant goal of stabilization.
22. Strengthening Control of the European Satellites.
Prior to the events of Poland and Hungary it was generally
estimated that the USSR regarded the maintenance of effective
control over the European Satellites as vital to its security,
and would, if necessary, use force and face the risk of gen-
eral war to that end. The suppression of the Hungarian re-
volt confirmed that estimate. Nevertheless, Moscow appears
to have concluded that tactics less coercive than those of the
Stalin era may be more productive, and may, if flexibly and
imaginatively applied, make possible the eventual political,
economic and military integration of the Satellite area into
the USSR itself. Stabilization in this area is sought by a judi-
cious balancing of concessions with reaffirmations of essen-
tially Stalinist principles. Formal instruments of this process
are the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) in the
economic field and the Warsaw Pact in the military. To these
may eventually be added a political organization replacing the
Cominform (see below, Para. 66).
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23. Strengthening Communist China. The USSR
appears firmly determined to keep Communist China within
the Orbit, sharing with it, to whatever degree required by
circumstances, the leadership of the "Socialist camp". To
this end, Moscow is continuing to help China's military and
economic buildup and to maintain strong ideological ties,
despite Mao's methodological "deviations". Presumably the
Soviet leaders discount, at least for the time being, the pos-
sibility that Mao will assume the role of a greater Tito, a
prophet of "national Communism". The moderating role
which China appears willing to play was set forth authori-
tatively in the 29 December 1956 statement "More on the
Historical Role of the International Proletariat", a docu-
ment subtly permeated with ambivalence, but basically ac-
ceptable to the Kremlin as a manifesto of stabilization and
solidarity.
24. Restoring a Favorable Climate of Foreign Policy.
The "relaxation of tensions" and establishment of "mutual
confidence", which the Kremlin had successfully advanced in
1955, were jeopardized as tactical instrumentalities by the
crisis of 1956. The resumption of Cold War polarization,
largely as a result of Hungary and Suez, threatened to cancel
much that had been gained by International Communism through
the Summit Conference, the rapprochement with Yugoslavia,
the Austrian State Treaty and other conciliatory moves. A
mounting curve of indicators during the first months of 1957
pointed to the urgent need for restoring prestige, allaying
fears, and cancelling the memory of Soviet brutality in Hun-
gary. Above all, it was essential to consolidate the area of
"neutralism". The Twentieth CPSU Congress had hailed the
emergence of a great "zone of peace" alongside the "camp of
Socialism", comprising for the most part the former "colonial
and semi-colonial" countries of Africa and Asia. Resentful of
Western domination, vibrant with nationalism, these lands
seemed ripe to the Kremlin for geopolitical manipulation and
subversion. A major tactic is, through offers of economic,
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technological and military assistance, to encourage "non-
alignment" or "positive neutrality", advancing Soviet
imperialistic aims by denying trade, raw materials and
military bases to the Western alliance.
z5, Restoring Free World Communist Parties and
Fronts. The Twentieth CPSU Congress presented the thesis
that Communism might be achieved in certain countries by
"parliamentary means". Although the areas in which this
was to take place were not specified, it was presumed that
countries with unstable democratic coalitions, notably France
and Italy, were included among the possibilities. In the
spring of 1956 a vigorous campaign was undertaken to lure
the Socialist parties into a United Front, De-Stalinization,
Poland and Hungary, administered a sharp setback to these
efforts. Initially at least, parties and front organizations
were demoralized and lost many members and supporters.
The extent of this reverse, however, should not be exag-
gerated, since leadership, hard core membership, and or-
ganization remained largely intact, and in general, also,
electoral support in the countries where mass parties were
flourishing. In the numerous countries of Western Europe
where the Communist followings have traditionally been
small, losses were probably accepted with a philosophical
shrug; the usefulness of these parties had long been rated
low by Moscow. Nevertheless, a compensatory effort was
clearly required and has been undertaken. Its aims are
probably limited: rekindling enthusiasm for Marxism-
Leninism, reaffirmation of the leadership of the USSR in
"proletarian internationalism" and maintenance of the prin-
ciple of class struggle. Although the Kremlin probably enter-
tains few illusions concerning the prospects of the minor
Western European parties, it cannot afford to neglect them
as assets in its broad drive against NATO and US influence
in Europe.
26. The international front organizations of Commun-
ism are probably considered of great, though uneven, value
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by the Kremlin. The stabilization campaign, therefore,
must include a major effort to check losses and restore
initiatives among the fronts, especially in countries where
there is little prospect for the development of a revolution-
ary situation, and where the local parties need support from
ostensibly non-Communist quarters.
C. Ideological Premises
27. Although the period since the death of Stalin,
and particularly the year 1956, presents the aspect of an
ideological Sturm und Drang within World Communism, the
basic thought structure of Marxism-Leninism has remained
intact. The dropping of "Stalinism" from the classic Bol-
shevik doctrinal triad, and the emphasis on "Leninism" as
the "pure" extension of basic Marxism were clearly intended
to restore and reinvigorate the Communist gospel. Prior to
the 20th Party Congress a process of "liberalization" - a
doctrinal as well as a political, social and cultural "thaw" -
was allowed to develop without specific ideological under-
pinning. The tactical modifications, known as the "New
Course", implied a dissociation from the harsher features
of the Stalinist era. When, as we have noted above, it be-
came apparent that this course was not achieving the anti-
cipated results, and indeed was leading to confusion, divided
counsel and exacerbated struggle for power, the Soviet leader-
ship decided that a reinterpretation of doctrine was required;
the Twentieth Party Congress attempted to provide the author-
itative formulation. The convulsions which this event produced
throughout the body of Communism, especially the violent re-
percussions of the Khrushchev secret speech, convinced the
Soviet leaders that they had gone too far. Apparently without
even a meeting of the Central Committee Plenum, the 30 June
Resolution was drafted in haste, ushering in a phase of doc-
trinal retrenchment. At the same time a vigorous campaign
was launched to raise the quality and the intensity of ideologi-
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cal indoctrination and to combat the danger of "revisionism".
It may be said that the actions taken during the last twelve
months constitute a progressive stabilization of the dialectic
between the "liberalizing" platform of the Twentieth Party
Congress and the corrective restrictions which were required
to prevent "Stalinist" or "revisionist" excesses.
28.. The program of ideological stabilization, as it
developed since the Twentieth Congress, can now be seen
distinctly under its shibboleth, "back to Leninism". To
restore the supreme authority of the Party, which had be-
come identified with the personal will of Stalin, the Lenin-
ist principle of "democratic centralism" - which was undeni-
ably "central" but far from democratic - was refurbished.
The "cult of personality" was denounced as foreign to Lenin-
ism, but the cult of Lenin in effect replaced that of Stalin.
Other Leninist concepts were modified: war was no longer
"fatally" inevitable, and Communism could come to power
through parliamentary means. "Peaceful coexistence", often
propagated by Stalin, was reaffirmed by Khrushchev. After
the East European uprisings it was described by Shepilov
(12 February 1957) as "a political struggle, an economic
struggle, an ideological struggle". Lenin's implacable battle
against "imperialism" was pledged anew. The revolutionary
sine qua non remained class conflict and the "dictatorship of
the proletariat" led by the "vanguard" of the Communist Party.
"Different roads to Socialism" were declared legitimate, while
simultaneously the immutability of "proletarian international-
ism", with its Stalinist implications of Soviet supremacy over
World Communism? was proclaimed. Nationalism was treated
ambivalently; its "bourgeois" form was condemned as "ideal-
ism" but that of the neutralist countries was hailed as a pro-
gressive force, which could be used to advance the cause of
"socialism". "National Communism", after some hesitation,
was openly attacked as a capitalist i nvention or as "opportun-
ism", and Tito was alternately cast into limbo or vigorously
denounced. In sum, a complex tactic has been elaborated
around the central theme of "different roads to Socialism",
involving persuasion and inducement, admonition and threat;
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the ideological legacy of Lenin is freely manipulated in the
interest of Communist hegemony and raison d'etat of the
Soviet Union.
D. The Psychological Climate
29. Although the validity of the concept is denied by
both Communists and their Catholic adversaries, the phenom-
enon of World Communism (as we have noted above, Para. 19)
may appropriately be called a "secular religion". Organized
Marxism, in its Leninist and Stalinist form, is not a political
movement in the Western sense. Nor is it merely a manifesta-
tion of classic imperialism with a different ideological base.
If it were, its objectives would be far more limited. The mili-
tant goal of a Communist world imperium has been regarded as
the fulfillment of ancient Russian messianic universalist dreams
or as the vision of a "Twentieth Century Islam".
3O. This secular religion is based upon a unique atheistic
revelation; it has evolved its own "theology" which displays some
of the characteristics of a scholasticism. It purports to be
"scientific", yet it encompasses the domain of morality and
appeals to human passions and desires. It hypostatizes Matter,
and seeks, not without success, to derive from that abstract
principle the power-charged forces of enthusiasm, sacrifice,
and dedication. The inherent duality of "scientific" objectivity
and mass emotion, of myth and reality, of theory and practice,
creates a psychological condition which almost automatically
favors the practice of "doublethink". The state of mind revealed
in Shepilov's statement that "peaceful coexistence is struggle" is
extended in many characteristic Communist distortions: "democ-
racy" is rule of the working class; "patriotism" is dedication to
the motherland of socialism, the USSR; "international proletarian-
ism" is patriotism; "idealism" is used by the exploiting class to
repress the proletariat, etc.
31. Communist materialism, going far beyond pragmatic,
mechanistic or deterministic concepts, negates not only Christian,
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but all non-Communist spiritual values. Implanted by un-
remitting indoctrination, it achieves a single-mindedness
which is extraordinarily efficacious in promoting the ends
of power. Utilizing frustrations and persecution complexes
it creates a new reality, which is not that of the Western
mind. A certain political paranoia is formed, which is im-
pervious to reason, logic, or evidence. Even more striking
than the effect on the individual is the collective impact. The
Movement binds its members in a "collective passion", instill-
ing in each "a good social conscience". True Communists are
in a sense addicts or devotees who see in their secular religion
only the good, beautiful, true - and scientific. Despite hereti-
cal inroads and confusion, forty years of orthodoxy have pro-
duced a state of mind which "confers certain neurotic charac-
teristics upon all its new adherents,i no matter what their
individual predispositions may be". Those who may emerge
from this spell are faced with the dilemma of cynical resigna-
tion or defection, real or virtual. The tragedy which this
presents can only be grasped inferentially by those who have
not experienced it.
E. The "Operational Code"
3Z1 The Communist leaders are governed in action by
what has been called an "Operational Code". This is a com-
plex set of principles derived from the writings and experience
of the early revolutionary leaders, which are seldom given
explicit formulation, and are followed almost instinctively.
Three of these principles have been conspicuous in the motiva-
tion of the Kremlin in the present stabilization campaign:
1Cf. Jean Monnerot, Sociology and Psychology of Communism
(Boston, 1953) pp. 139-144.
2
Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo (N. Y.
1951).
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(a) The Communist expects to encounter setbacks in the
struggle, and. he reacts to adversity positively and with
vigor; (b) tactical retreat is a normal maneuver in the face
of overwhelming odds; there is no need to be ashamed of it;
(c) compromise and temporary "relaxation of tensions" must
be employed whenever necessary to prepare for a new
counterattack.
35? The following quotations from Lenin are still
valid and significant guide lines of Communist operational
behavior.
ft. . . compromises are often unavoidably forced
upon a fighting party by circumstances, and it is
absurd once and for all to refuse 'to stop at inter-
mediate stations'. The task of a truly revolutionary
party is not to renounce compromises once and for
all, but to be able throughout all compromises, when
they are unavoidable, to remain true to its principles,
to its class, to its revolutionary purpose, to its task
of preparing the way for the revolution and of educat-
ing the masses for victory in the revolution,"
V.I. Lenin,
Selected Works,
Vol. VI, p. 208.
"Only one thing is lacking to enable us to march for-
ward more surely and more firmly to victory, namely,
the full and completely thought out appreciation by all
Communists in all countries of the necessity of dis-
playing the utmost flexibility in their tactics . . .
The strictest loyalty to the ideas of Communism must
be combined with the ability to make all the necessary
practical compromises, to tack, to make agreements,
zigzags, retreats and so on
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V.I. Lenin,
Selected Works,
Vol. X, pp. 138-145.
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F. Organizational Considerations
34. A principal problem for the Kremlin in launching
the stabilization program has been how to exercise control
over Communist parties outside the Orbit. The most effect-
ive instrument of International Communist control, the Com-
intern, had been dissolved in 1943, ostensibly as a gesture
to Russia's allies in the War, but in reality because it had
outlived its practical usefulness. Its successor, the Comin-
form, operating less authoritatively through its Journal
(For a Lasting Peace! For a People's Democracy!) had
likewise been abolished - in 1956. Even before Stalin's death
it was a moribund rump organization, and its abolition was
timed to please Tito and to demonstrate Soviet goodwill.
Since the dissolution of the Cominform, the principal means
of coordinating International Communism has been the exten-
sive use of bilateral meetings and contacts. As we shall see
below, the proliferation of such arrangements has been
remarkable. Direct contacts, at this stage of the stabiliza-
tion campaign, have probably been more effective than an
international organization such as the Cominform would have
been. Nevertheless, there have been several calls from
foreign CPs for the establishment of some international roof
organization, or at least for a central, authoritative period-
ical to guide World Communism. But even if Moscow were
in favor of such a move, it may be presumed that several
important parties, including probably the Polish and the
Italian, opposed it, and the attitude of Peiping has almost
certainly been negative. It seems likely, however, as the
stabilization campaign proceeds, that the matter will again
be raised.
G. Stabilization and the "Nuclear Stalemate"
35. The advent of the era of mutual deterrence from
war through parity of nuclear armament has probably been a
decisive factor impelling the Kremlin to seek "peaceful co-
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existence" with the great Western powers. The Soviet leaders
almost certainly recognize that only within this framework can
their struggle be conducted, unless the very future of civiliza-
tion is to be put in jeopardy. In the past the official Communist
line on nuclear warfare has seemed hesitant and confused. It
may be questioned whether Stalin had grasped its reality; in any
event, he appears to have been unable to find a plausible Marx-
ist-Leninist explanation of its significance. His successors,
after some sparring among themselves, now probably agree
that nuclear war would not spare socialism from the devastation
it would inflict on capitalism. Rather lamely they suggest that
the socialist remnants of such a holocaust would be preferable
to the capitalist ones. They probably impute to the West the
same unwillingness to risk destruction, which they themselves
feel. Hence, the Twentieth Party Congress advanced as a
principal doctrinal innovation the modification of the Leninist
thesis that "imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism" would
lead inevitably to war; war is no longer "fatally" inevitable.
36. It may be questioned whether the Communists have
in fact abandoned the conviction - deeply rooted in their Leninist
tradition - that the final settlement between Communism and its
foes cannot be achieved without violence. In a sense the Com-
munist doctrine of war is not a part of the basic gospel, but is
a tactical concept, subject to sharp alteration under strategic
pressure, Nevertheless, it is possible that, perhaps for the
first time, planning of the Soviet leaders has taken into account
the nuclear stalemate. Although Moscow now claims the posses-
sion of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile - the "ultimate
weapon" - it must expect that the US, too, will have this weapon
in short order and thus, in spite of its atomic war of nerves,
Soviet policy appears likely to remain cautious. To be sure,
force as an instrument of international "diplomacy" is not made
obsolete thereby, but the threats which can be brandished in the
shadow of nuclear weapons have become less substantial. The
recent series of menacing notes to certain NATO powers contem-
plating the acceptance of atomic arms appears to reflect a note
of real alarm and to constitute an experiment in a novel form of
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nerve-warfare. Despite the firmness with which these threats
have been brushed aside, the Soviet leaders may feel that they
have established a deposit of apprehension WI ich can be drawn
upon profitably in the future, perhaps with hidden increments.
In any case, they are challenging the Free World in the field
of nuclear diplomacy with the same blan they have displayed
in developing the-material instrumentt which impose the
engagement.
IV,.. STABILIZATION MEASURES TO DATE
A. Within the USSR
37. The primary object of the stabilization campaign
is to strengthen the USSR as the base of World Communism.
Central to the effort, since the death of Stalin, has been the
disposal of his estate. As we have seen, this involved in part
a struggle for the mantle of power among contending heirs, in
part an inventory of the assets and liabilities which he had left
in considerable disorder. Both of these appear now to have
been carried out. The succession has been determined, at
least for the time being; liabilities have been partially liqui-
dated; and assets are being consolidated. The estate has
been shown to be rich, both actually and potentially, but the
heir confronts a host of problems. In the following sections,
these are examined both as general tasks of the entire Com-
munist leadership and as specific undertakings of the new dic-
tator, Nikita Khrushchev, who must establish both successful
policies and personal popularity.
38. Political Stabilization. The first requirement for
stabilization within the USSR was to restore a firm base of
government. This could only be achieved through a resolution
of factional conflict in the leadership and a reinvigoration of
the CPSU, which, as we have noted, had declined under Stalin
to an instrument of his personal will, a lesser one, at that,
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than the Soviet State. It was necessary, after the Stalin
regnum, to restore weight and significance to the "legisla-
tive" bodies of both Party and State - the Central Committee,
the Party Congress, and the Supreme Soviet - to convene
them more often and to create at least the illusion that they
were being consulted by the executive - the Presidium of the
Party - and were free to discuss the measures which it pro-
posed. As early as 1955 Khrushchev undertook to hold more
frequent plenary sessions of the Central Committee, and this
1
has in fact been done. Discussion has been permitted and
even "encouraged", albeit within sharply circumscribed limits
and, to all appearance, by prearrangement. In short, "demo-
cratic centralism" still means the application of the rubber-
stamp.
3c.) More important than the formal consultation of
Party organs has been the effort to infuse new spirit through-
out the hierarchy. Soviet political exhortation, whether at
the theoretical level (Kommunist), the practical (Partiinaya
Zhizn) or the purely agitational (Bloknot Agitatora), has in-
cessantly hammered the old Leninist themes: "creative"
contact with the masses, flexibility, concreteness, and har-
mony of theory and practice. Tact and persuasion are
stressed, and bureaucratic arrogance and "formalism" are
severely reproved. To an outsider, this didactic reiteration
seems eminently sterile; to an initiate it may be somewhat
inspiring. At the least, it may help to convey to the mass of
party functionaries the sense of personal worth and purpose
which Stalinism had killed.
40, But the renaissance of "partyism" cannot be
accomplished merely programmatically. There are deep
currents of skepticism, boredom, indifference and cynicism
in the Soviet Union. A wave of protest has swept through
1
This policy repaid handsomely when the CC plenum (June 22-
29, 1957) supported Khrushchev against the "anti-party" group
which tried to destroy him.
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41PIIPIRSIMPOPIVIIIPL
recent literature: V. Dudintsev's Not for Bread Alone
ignores the Party altogether, D. A. Granin's The Seekers
scorns it, A. Yashints The Levers shows how party functions
turn human beings into mechanical instruments. These dissi-
dent expressions (which before the July purge must have had
some tolerance if not encouragement from on high) are being
more and more sharply criticized by the orthodox and have
recently been reproved by Khrushchev himself. It is possible
that the purge of the "Stalinist" elements in the Presidium may
further the political "thaw", but it seems more_ likely that new
lines will be established beyond which the sanctity of the Party
may not be touched.
41. Parallel to the stabilization of the Party, the posi-
tion of the nationality elements within the Soviet Union has also
been at least partially corrected. Historically, the Soviet
Union was welded together from a conglomerate of national
and ethni c groups of highly uneven size and development, in
a federation dominated by Great Russians who constitute about
half of the population. Much of the work of "colonization" had
been accomplished under the Czars, but it was extended and
consolidated by the Bolsheviks. Officially treated as equals,
the minority nationalities, including the lesser Slavic "brothers"
of the Ukraine and Belorussia, have been in fact second class
members of the Union. With the death of Stalin, who had
favored only his native Georgia among the non-Russian Repub-
lics, the aspirations of the nationalities found new defenders
against the"Great Russian Chauvinists'.'. Beria, himself a
Georgian, in his brief bid for power, cook up their cause.
Khrushchev, a son of the Ukrainian-Russian frontier, has
systematically emphasized the rights of the national minorities.
In January 1957, by a dramatic gesture, five minority groups
which had been deported under Stalin, were rehabilitated and
permitted to return to their homelands. By a decree of June
1956, greater judicial autonomy was granted to the individual
Union Republics. The climax of this reaffirmation of the fed-
erative basis of the Soviet Union was reached in July 1957,
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when the Presidium, purged of its Russian Stalinists, was
reinforced with no less than five representatives of non-
Russian republics, all, of course, personal proteges of
Khrushchev.
42. Social Stabilization . We may assume that the
Soviet leaders after the death of Stalin, however much they
may have been divided on other issues, were agreed that
certain excesses of his regime must be speedily corrected.
Perhaps their nearest approach to unanimity lay in the
recognition that the powers of the secret police must be
decisively curbed. At their level, this reflected not so
much a concern to do away with coercion and terror among
the masses, as a simple and overwhelming desire never
again to live under the nightmare of Stalin's arbitrary power.
The elimination of Beria reduced the "state within the state",
constituted by the MVD-MGB apparatus, to a manageable
instrument. Some of the benefits of relaxation which the
leaders had won for themselves were passed on to the people.
"Socialist legality" was proclaimed. The power of the secret
police appears to have been greatly curtailed, though the
massive central archives of the MVD are still fully staffed
and the informer system has not been dismantled. Prison
camps were almost depopulated by amnesties affecting mil-
lions, and ceased to be a major factor in the Soviet economic
system. The worst of Stalin's harsh labor laws were relaxed
by the simple process of announcing that they would no longer
be enforced, and in mid-1956 many were formally revoked. 1
Workers were no longer persecuted for leaving enterprises
without permission nor savagely punished for tardiness and
absenteeism.
1
The de facto non-enforcement of the most severe laws had
begun as far back as 1949-50.
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43. Although the benefits of these measures to the
common man were real, their impact was strongest at the
level of the Soviet elite. Under Stalin, every category of
leadership and management had been victimized by arbitrary
arrest and punishment. This was particularly resented by
the class of industrial managers who were subject to dis-
grace, fine, imprisonment and even worse, for failure to
meet output quotas or for other shortcomings, condemned
as sabotage or neglect of the people's interest. The fact
that their failures were often the result of a planning blunder
at a distant desk in Moscow aggravated the sense of injustice.
As a group, the industrial managers were determined to win
at least some of that legal protection which cushions the
impact of business failure in the "capitalist" world, and this
they have achieved.
44. It is frequently argued that the progressive
emancipation of the managerial elite in the USSR is a favor-
able development, leading toward the transfer of power from
party autocrats to a group of practical technicians who would
be amenable to "reasonable alternatives" to the tyrannical
system of Stalin. Concerned primarily with their enterprises,
they are sometimes compared to enlightened American indus-
trialists who have come to understand the important role of
human relations and of incentives to higher productivity of
labor. The "managerial revolution" is said to be at hand,
bringing with it the prospect of more "normal" relations with
the non-Communist world. Unfortunately, there is little
evidence to support this optimistic view, at least in the rather
extreme form in which it has usually been presented. It is
probably true that vested interests in an expanding economy
are being developed which will work for a more stable society
and resist "adventurism" which might lead the Soviet Union
into war. But this does not mean a withering away of the
supremacy of the Communist Party nor an abatement of the
drive to extend its dominion to the ends of the earth. Al-
though two hierarchies stand side by side, they are not
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mutually exclusive or hostile. Party functionaries and eco-
nomic technicians have interlocking careers and complement-
ing interests. It will remain a major concern of the leader-
ship to see that this continues to be the case. Factional insta-
bility- resulting from conflicting interests of "technocrats" and
"apparatchiks" hardly seems to constitute an exploitable vul-
nerability of the Soviet state.
45. Throughout society, then, forces of stabilization
have been at work, and the regime of Nikita Khrushche-v- is
committed to further them. The loyalties and morale of work-
ers will be strengthened by the reform of the wage structure
which has been initiated. A new pension plan will improve the
condition of retired workers; sickness benefits are being ex-
tended and shorter work hours have been promised. Although
housing remains deplorable throughout the Soviet Union,
serious efforts are being made to improve it, especially in
critical industrial areas such as the Donbas and in the "virgin
lands" developments. The prospects for an improved diet and
for an increase in consumers' goods are probably not so rosy
as Khrushchev has painted them, for heavy industry retains
its overriding priority. But the average Soviet citizen, es-
pecially in the cities, feels that he is already better off, and,
so long as some improvement is registered., he will not com-
plain unduly. Even the recent virtual repudiation of the com-
pulsory state loans appears hardly to have provoked any dis-
content.
46. Other significant stabilization moves have been
undertaken in the social field. The vast expansion of second-
ary and higher education, which was spurred by the need to
compensate for the slump in the demographic curve resulting
from World War II, is being consolidated at an advanced,
though slightly lower, level. Although the primary goal has
been to train scientists, engineers and technicians, heavy
political indoctrination has remained constant. It is true
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that there have been manifestations of student unrest, some
of a rather startling nature, which must cause considerable
concern to the regime. On the whole these have been coun-
tered, not violently, as they would have been under Stalin, but
firmly. Indoctrination is to be intensified, not only in quan-
tity but in quality. Restive students have been punished rela-
tively mildly, usually by expulsion. Greater emphasis is
placed on the "creative" role of youth, appealing to its en-
thusiasm, idealism and spirit of sacrifice, stressing the ex-
panding economic frontiers open before it. To what extent
these appeals will counteract the note of boredom, disillu-
sionment and cynicism which has recently become apparent
remains to be seen. It will be particularly interesting to
determine the long-range impact of the World Youth Festival
in Moscow, which had as a major objective the rededication
of Soviet youth to the strengthening of "socialist construction"
in the USSR.
47. Other steps have been taken in the field of educa-
tion. Special boarding schools have been opened on the ini-
tiative of Khrushchev. While it was first believed that these
would be a civilian version of the military Suvorov schools,
reminiscent of the Nazi Ordensburgen, they now appear
intended to become the basis of universal education.
48. In the cultural field, the liberalizing trend,
described by the title of Ilya Ehrenburg's novel The Thaw,
has done much to release the tensions of the intellectuals,
built up during the Stalin era. Here, too, stabilization is
being sought in a balance between creative freedom and dis-
cipline. The norm of art, the principle of "Socialist realism",
remains in force, but deviations from it are met with reproach
and temperate criticism rather than with repression. The
office of censorship, Glavlit, remains intact. The bureau-
cracy of the Soviet Writers' Union wields vast powers to re-
ward or disgrace. But these organs of control themselves
appear, at least until recently, to have been affected with a
certain hesitation, reflecting perhaps the division of counsel
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within the Party leadership. There have been alternations
of "hard" and"soft" lines. The revision of Soviet history,
which was ordained at the Twentieth Party Congress, after
a rather lively start, appears to have been temporarily
halted, pending the establishment of an authoritative new
"line". There is an understandable reluctance on the part
of critics, historians, philosophers, indeed of all categories
of intellectuals, to take exposed positions; too often in the
past they have proved disastrous. Indeed, many in whom
the stirrings of hope for a genuine "liberalization" have been
aroused must suspect from bitter experience that the whole
"thaw" is nothing but a clever move of entrapment. The
recent experience of "rectification" in China will hardly
reassure them on this point.
49. Even in the field of religion, a certain effort
of stabilization has been required. In 1954, a Presidium
decree instructed party functionaries to observe modera-
tion in propagandizing the official atheistic line, and to re-
frain from outright persecution of the Church. This tactic
has not been altogether successful. Party journals com-
plain of the lack of atheistic militancy, especially among
the youth who are described as flocking to church festivals,
largely as a reaction to the boredom of party indoctrination.
The classic remedy is prescribed, intensification of the in-
doctrination effort, with emphasis on quality rather than
quantity. It would appear that the party leaders have little
fear of the Church as an organization or of religion as an
anti-Marxist doctrine, but they cannot ignore the social
challenge which it presents.
50. Economic Stabilization. Despite its impressive
expansion in the past and its great potential, the Soviet
economy has been increasingly plagued with difficulties. As
a result of the demographic catastrophe of World War II, a
serious manpower shortage looms for at least the next five
years. The pressing demands for an increase of agricultural
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production, which Khrushchey has undertaken to satisfy
promptly, will further limit the possibility of expanding the
industrial labor force. For years, Soviet economic planners
have been mortgaging future assets, ignoring the "capitalist"
principles of obsolescence, replacement and modernization.
The day of reckoning, as they have now been forced to admit,
is at hand. Increments of labor productivity are harder to
extract. Planning has proved overambitious, with the result
that many grandiose projects have had to be quietly shelved.
Basic Marxist economic principles have recently been cast
in some doubt, and there is currently being held in Soviet
economic journals a sort of Marxist "Great Debate" on the
role of price, commodity and market under "socialism", the
outcome of which may be sweeping changes. Heavy addition-
al strains have been laid on the military budget by the demon-
stration of Satellite =reliability and NATO firmness in the
armament race. The Satellite economies are in disorder,
especially in Poland and Hungary, and the demands of China
are unremitting. The opportunities for economic diplomacy
in the underdeveloped areas present a constant challenge to
increase commitments, while necessitating a certain prudence
in the face of growing domestic demands.
51. The aggregate of these strains, pressures and
demands has compelled the Soviet planners to lower their
goals for 1957 and probably for the entire Sixth. Five Year
Plan. Yet the fanatical determination to equa3 and surpass
the economic level of the West, especially the US, so as to
maintain a powerful base for World Communism, seems
stronger than ever. Whereas earlier, the competitive drive
to outstrip the US had centered in the expansion of heavy indus-
try, since 1955 the emphasis has shifted, at least in part, to
the renovation of agriculture. Khrashchev, having launched
(1950) an abortive scheme to merge villages into agricultural
towns, the agrogorods, has recently turned to other novel ideas,
notably increased production of corn. The visit of the Soviet
agricultural delegation to the US in 1955 probably contributed
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to the prestige of this new fad. Even more important, it
brought home to the Kremlin the possibility, by adopting
American methods, of greatly reducing the amount of man-
power involved in agriculture without loss of output. In the
meantime, the opening of the "virgin lands" - now claimed at
about 90, 000, 000 acres, an area greater than the entire wheat
growing section of Canada - offered the prospect of a quick
rise in output, linked, however, with a long-range climatologi-
cal gamble which might prove disastrous. Finally, in the first
half of 1957 Khrushchev threw out still another seemingly im-
pulsive challenge; he boasted that the USSR would outstrip the
US in the per capita production of meat, butter and milk, not
in the distant future as in the case of heavy industry, but with-
in two or three years. The immediate target of this demagogic
program is surely unrealistic; the ultimate goal probably is not.
In any case, the recent decision to cease forced collections
from the private plots of peasants will certainly facilitate its
achievement. Small though these plots are (under 1/2 acre),
they have accounted in some important areas for as much as
a quarter of the deliveries of meat, milk and vegetables. The
gratification of the individual peasant in relief from even a
fraction of the pressure of the state will be a potent incentive
for increase of production,
52. Even more impressive than the "virgin lands"
gamble is the industrial reorganization scheme developed by
Khrushchev in theses presented to the Plenum of the Central
Committee in February 1957. It aims at nothing short of the
eradication of the evils of bureaucratization and over-central-
ization which have proven endemic in the planned "Socialist"
economy of the USSR. The need for a major step in this direc-
tion was indeed apparent. During forty years of Bolshevism,
Moscow had become what William Cobbett called London a cen-
tury and a half ago, the great "Wen". As though under an iron
law of bureaucratization, a web .of administrative nerve lines
converged on a vast ganglion of desks in the capital. Economic
ministries proliferated, despite periodic recombinations. The
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looseness of the ministerial, structure, in turn, required
the improvisation of higher coordinating agencies, which,
like the ministries,were merged, dissolve& reintegrated,
combined and placed under different leadership without any
real gain in efficiency. Thus a situation had come about
which no mere juggling of Moscow mechanisms could put in
order. Radical decentralization appeared to be the only sol-
ution.
53. The reorganization scheme was presented as a
challenge to the entire people. That it was bitterly opposed
by a faction within the Presidium, and was a crucial issue
of the power struggle, is now apparent. After much "dis-
cussion" by regional deputies at the May Plenum, followed
by a characteristic "Bolshevik decision", the implementation
was carried out at a brisk tempo. By the target date of 1 July,
105 regional Councils of the National Economy (Sovnarkhozny)
had been established with staffs ranging from about 800 to
3, 000. Of some 35 all-Union Ministries in the Industrial field,
27 have been reorganized or abolished, leaving intact only 8,
devoted primarily to defense production. The USSR Council
of Ministers has been reshaped and slightly expanded, includ-
ing the Chairmen of the 15 Union Republic Councils of Minis-
ters. Decentralization of authority to the regional Councils
has been kept within bounds by the retention of substantial
powers of review, planning and control at the center, exer-
cised through the greatly strengthened USSR Gosplan.
54. It is too early to assess the prospects for this
massive reorganization. A number of deputy ministers have
already been moved out of Moscow to the capitals of the larger
republics. There is considerable resistance to rustication
(30-40, 000 persons are involved), but the regime has confi-
dently asserted that certain "inducements" will overcome this
inertia, perhaps in the form of additional perquisites. The
great danger is an upsurge of "localism", connivance between
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officials and managers at the regional level at the expense
of the national economy. According to recent reports, as
yet unconfirmed, many individual enterprises are at a stand-
still, capital equipment has been sold or hoarded and exces-
sive stockpiles are being accumulated. In the absence of the
accustomed strong central direction, a mild form of economic
chaos may be expected. Basic waste and inefficiency result-
ing from the forced draft pursuit of heavy industry expansion
will not be eliminated by the reorganization. Moreover, the
initial organizational changes within the government will neces-
sarily be followed by others in the Party structure, the trade
unions and the supporting mechanisms of technological and
scientific training and research. Indeed, as the discussion
of the Soviet price system (para. 50 above) shows, the entire
Marxist concept of "socialist" economy is in flux. New modi-
fications, planned and spontaneous, will almost certainly
emerge, in forms which are as yet unpredictable.
55. In sum, the effort at economic stabilization of
the USSR, which as we have said is the central problem of
the entire campaign, has now entered a critical stage. In
favor of ultimate success are the pr oven strength of the econ-
omy, the caliber and experience of the Party and industrial
leaders, and their apparent willingness to re-examine classic
methods and doctrines with some measure of critical objectiv-
ity. Against it are the nature of the system itself, the stubborn
ways of bureaucratism, the obsessive concern to outstrip the
West, the imbalance of industrial priorities and the failure to
provide adequate labor incentives and consumer goods. Over
and beyond all these factors lies a general imponderable, the
unpredictability of the evolutionary course of any complex,
modern super-economy, whether socialist or capitalist. It
would be a rash prophet who would undertake to say what the
economy of the Soviet Union, of Western Europe, of China or
India - not to mention the United States - will look like in 1980.
One can only continue to extrapolate existing curves, reserving
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a prudent judgment that, as in the case of the population
curve of the 1930s, they will confront us with surprising
turns.
56. Military Stabilization. The role of the Soviet
armed forces in the stabilization campaign may be considered
under two aspects, as object and as subject. On the one hand
the Kremlin has had to determine what measures are neces-
sary to maintain a level of military power which will guarantee
the security of the base of World Communism, and enable it
to conduct its aggressive diplomacy with a decisive trump in
reserve. On the other hand, it has also been obliged to reckon
with an internal power factor which is far from a passive object
of manipulation.
57. The modernization of the Red Army has been a
consistent objective of the Soviet Union since the Second World
War. The parallel strengthening of he Red Fleet and the tre-
mendous expansion of the Air Force have provided an armed
force second only to that of the United States - if indeed it be
second! Whether the primary purpose of this weapon, and of
the strategy which governs. it, be offensive or defensive - and
we may conjecture that it is a combination of both in nearly
equal degree - its maintenance at peak efficiency is an un-
assailable premise of Soviet policy, and an inviolable item
of the Soviet budget.
58. Against this central theme, a contrasting subject
has been developed in elaborate counterpoint: disarmament.
Two considerations have been dominant, diplomacy and econ-
omy. The Kremlin was quick to recognize that the devastation
of World War U and the terror of nuclear warfare have impreg-
nated world opinion with a desire for peace, perhaps at any
price. On the other hand, it has also been forced to acknowl-
edge that the cost and manpower demands of modern armament,
pushed to the ultimate, are perhaps not more than any economy
can bear, but are nonetheless incompatible with the fulfillment
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of desires that allpeople hold. Compounding factors,
especially the inscrutable destiny of humanity under nuclear
fall-out, make the prospect of an armament race universally
unpopular. It was inevitable that the Kremlin should seize
on disarmament as an issue, desirable as an end in itself
but susceptible of almost infinite spinning out in tantalizing
negotiations.
59. It is not within the scope of this paper to evaluate
Soviet military intentions and capabilities. It is sufficient to
point out that the role of the Red Army as a final arbiter of
security policy was made clear in Hungary; nothing will be
allowed to jeopardize its forward positions and its lines of
communications. Indecision and conflict among the Party
leaders are pushed aside when vital interests are at stake.
Now that the unreliability of the Satellite armed forces has
been demonstrated to the world - it was probably always
accepted by the Soviet military - the untouchable status of
the Red Army and its junior services is more than ever
apparent.
60. The role of the military in the Soviet leadership
appears thus to have entered a new phase, symbolized by the
advancement of Marshal Zhukov to full membership in the
Presidium. For some time, it had been conjectured that
the military were assuming a new and more potent role in
the Kremlin, not in opposition to the Party but as an integral
part of it. During the past two or three years, a number of
steps have been taken to eliminate the duality of power and
influence between the military and the party hierarchies
which Stalin fostered as a means of strengthening his con-
trol. The era of nagging conflict between the politruk and
the line officer appears to have ended. Unity of command
is now an unchallenged principle.
61. It remains to be seen how far the extension of
military participation in policy decision will go. It is suffi-
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cient at this point to conclude that the course of action under
Khrushchev will proceed with substantial involvement of the
military as beneficiaries of increased concern with defense,
as arbiters of disarmament negotiations and as active collab-
orators in extending the Soviet and Communist imperium.
B. Stabilization of the Satellite Area.
62. As we have noted above, stabilization of Soviet
control in the European Satellites - a vital strategic and eco-
noriaic area for the USSR - has been one of the primary goals
of the present campaign. The need for such an effort was
recognized almost immediately by Stalin's successors, but a
profound difference on method divided them from the outset:
whether to intensify the harsh tactics of the Stalin era or to
adopt a more liberal and less coercive approach. We may
tentatively accept the view of Tito that "Stalinism" has lost
the battle, while reserving our judgment as to whether it has
lost the war.
63. The first phase of Satellite stabilization covered
the period from the death of Stalin and the execution of Beria
to the Twentieth Party Congress. Under the "New Course" of
Malenkov, beginning in 1954, political terror and economic
exploitation were relaxed, and the more obvious forms of
Soviet overlordship were concealed or removed. In certain
countries, especially Hungary, National or Patriotic Fronts
were constituted, invoking the support of thoroughly tamed
non-Communist elements. Efforts were made to correct the
gross imbalances in the economic plans, to cut back extrava-
gant and unrealistic expansion of heavy industry, to restore
a measure of health to agriculture and to provide more con-
sumer goods. There was a moment of hope among the Satel-
lite populations, but it soon faded. The "little Stalins", while
paying reluctant lip service to the New Course, either tacitly
sabotaged it or did little to implement it. Factionalism devel-
oped in the parties, and "National Communism" began to
emerge in outlines which Moscow could not be expected to
tolerate, let alone approve.
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64. In the second phase of stabilization, initiated at
the Twentieth Party Congress, the Kremlin reaffirmed the
thesis that "socialism" might be approached by "different
roads". The main purpose of this thesis probably was to
placate Tito and Mao, and to curb the excesses of Stalinist
party leaders throughout the world. The impact of the doc-
trine in the Satellites, accompanied as it -was by the destruc-
tion of the myth of Stalin's infallibility, was not reassuring
to the Kremlin. The Poznan riots and disturbing manifesta-
tions_ in Hungary and other Satellites indicated that Tito's
more liberal interpretation was contagious. The 30 June
1956 CPSU Resolution, besides providing a "Marxist explan-
ation" of de-Stalinization, was also designed to convince the
Satellites that they must not flirt with "National Communism".
The Kremlin leaders, on the one hand, attempted to persuade
Tito to drop his role as heresiarch, and on the other, to
expose him as such to the Satellite faithful. Both efforts
were unsuccessful. The secret CPSU letter of September
to the Satellite leaders, denouncing Titoism, soon became
public, exacerbating relations with Yugoslavia, and in the
meantime ominous clouds were gathering in Poland and Hun-
gary. On 30 October, Moscow issued a "Declaration on the
Foundations for the Development and Further Strengthening
of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and Other
Socialist States". The Declaration professed a conditional
willingness to consider withdrawal of Soviet forces from
Poland, Hungary and Rumania. It did not avert bloodshed
in Hungary, but, although its sincerity may be questioned,
it may have contributed to the more moderate resolution of
the Polish crisis. In any case, it did not appease Tito, who
in his November speech at Pula broke sharply with the doc-
trinal position of the Kremlin, resuming a polemic which has
continued - decrescendo indeed - to the present. The chief
practical consequence of the 30 October Declaration was to
lay the foundation for the Soviet interpretation of the Hungar-
ian Revolution as "counter-revolution" and to reaffirm the
inviolability of the Warsaw Pact commitments imposed on
the Satellites.
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65. The third phase of stabilization, following the
bloody pacification of Hungary, is still in progress and has
grown in intensity since the July purge. Its theme has been
the incessant reiteration of "proletarian internationalism",
and denunciation of "National Communism". This theme
has characterized the continuing bilateral party and govern-
mental meetings and visits, exchanged between the USSR and
individual Satellites and among the Satellites themselves. The
same theme has been echoed in many bilateral meetings of
Communist parties and front organizations outside the Bloc.
At no time in the history of International Communism has
there been such feverish "getting together".
66. Whether this experiment in coordination by bi-
lateral meetings has been satisfactory to the Kremlin may
be questioned. In the past, Moscow has usually had at its
disposal an international instrument to convey its orders,
whether by authoritative direction, as through the Comin-
tern, or by propaganda guidance, as through the Corninform.
The decisions to do away with these instruments were dic-
tated by overriding considerations of political appeasement:
in the first case, of Russia's wartime allies, especially the
United States; in the second case, of neutrals such as Tito
and Nehru. The dissolution of the Cominiorm likewise
served as a gesture of "relaxation of tensions" at a moment
when that policy enjoyed tactical priority. Moreover,. both
organizations, at the time of their demise, had outlived their
usefulness.
67. The complexity and inconvenience of the bilateral
system and the confusion experienced by some CPs have
already led to calls, within International Communism, for
the reconstitution of a central organization. The views of
the individual parties, however, vary considerably on the
advisability of such a step. Within the Bloc, China and Poland
almost certainly oppose it; the "Stalinist" parties such as those
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in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria appear to favor it. Abroad,
many of the Party leaders, especially in Western Europe,
would probably welcome the restoration of a visible guiding
hand to aid them in stabilizing their restless following. Even
in the Italian Party, whose leadership was cool to the idea,
at least some high officials would not be averse to this prin-
ciple. The balance of advantage would appear to lie, from
Moscow's viewpoint, in the re-establishment of an agency,
which could provide a loose multilateral association of al-
leged equals, while at the same time the CPSU maintained
tight bilateral relations with individual CPs.
68. Whatever the outcome, the Kremlin does not lack
means to enforce its will on the Satellites. Politically, it
continues to control the leadership of the local parties direct-
ly and indirectly. Economically, the USSR, while continuing
to develop a network of bilateral agreements among the Satel-
lites, still maintains basic coordination through the Council
of Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA). This mechanism,
which was set up under Stalin, has performed its tasks with
relatively little publicity, and there are differences of judg-
ment concerning its effectiveness. It is doubtful whether the
Satellites have found much "mutuality" in CEMA's operations,
which seem to have been directed to the long range goal of
fully integrating their economies with that of the USSR. Finally,
in the military field, the Warsaw Pact affords the continuing
justification for maintaining advanced positions in Eastern
Europe, essential both for the strategic defensive and offensive
posture toward NATO and for the internal security of the puppet
regimes. The 30 October 1956 Declaration and the suppression
of the Hungarian revolt have indicated unmistakably that the
Satellites may not secede from this Pact.
69. The course of the stabilization program during
the past nine months shows marked differences among the
individual Satellites. Poland stands at the extreme of the
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"liberalization" scale. Yet, even here, the Kremlin - and
Gomulka himself - have imposed limits which must be res-
pected. Poland lies athwart Soviet lines of communications
to East Germany, and the Red Army will risk general war,
rather than let them be cut. Polish fears of Germany act
as an internal counter to hatred of Russian domination. The
Polish economy, milked by the USSR through virtually forced
deliveries at artificially low prices, clearly demands some
relaxation of pressure, which Moscow has been obliged to
grant, Something like an NEP detente, reversing collectiv-
ization and restoring a measure of private enterprise, has
been allowed to go unchallenged. The Polish Party, divided
into several factions, is held in balance by the reluctance of
Gomulka and the Kremlin to force a showdown between the
"liberals" and the Natolin group. Criticism from the intel-
lectuals has been curbed but not eliminated. A hopeful eye
has been kept on the "rectification" campaign in Communist
China, but neither Moscow nor Warsaw has been able to lure
Peiping into an unequivocal support of its position, and the
latter's own troubles in maintaining stability may restrict
its moderating influence. In sum, although it is clear that,
from the Soviet point of view, Poland has not as yet been com-
pletely stabilized, it has passed beyond the stage at which an
eruption of the Hungarian type is to be feared.
70. In Hungary, the Kadar regime, established with
the backing of Soviet tanks, has sought to achieve stabiliza-
tion primarily by coercive measures; the objective, :indeed,
has been pacification rather than stabilization. There is no
immediate prospect that Hungary will be allowed to find its
own "road to Socialism". It will be excluded from a more
generous interpretation of the Twentieth CPSU Congress
theses until the rebellious spirit of its people has been broken.
If it cannot be broken now, it will be kept under a regime of
strict repression in the hope that a new generation will be
more submissive. The economy of the country, badly dis-
torted by years of unrealistic planning and further shaken by
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the uprising, can only be restored in complete dependence
on the dictates of Moscow and CEMA. Hungary's armed
forces, such as remain, will not be trusted for a long, i;irrie
to come. In a speech before the National Assembly on 9 May
1957, Kadar presented a picture of the achievements of his
regime, which was certainly exaggerated. Nevertheless,
from the Kremlin's viewpoint, his progress may seem satis-
factory and direct Soviet intervention has been kept at a
minimum.
7 1 . In the other Satellites, the events in Poland and
Hungary profoundly stirred the people and alarmed Commun-
ist governments and parties, but did not lead to major mani-
festations of unrest. Since then, the need has been for tran-
quilization rather than stabilization. In Czechoslovakia the
regime, outwardly unperturbed, clung to the "Stalinist" line,
avoiding even that degree of "liberalization" which the Twen-
tieth CPSU Congress appeared to encourage. Its "Stalinist"
leadership has been emphatically endorsed by Khrushchev as
a model of Bloc solidarity. Rumania has remained firmly in
the hands of a Muscovite governing clique, and a disturbance
among the Magyar minority of the Transylvanian border was
quickly suppressed. Unrest in Bulgaria, heightened by un-
employment and economic distress, has been met by deporta-
tions and police action. Stalinist Albania, apparently oblivious
to any change in the Communist atmosphere, at first sharpened
its attacks against Tito, and made fulsome protestations of
loyalty to the "fountainhead of Socialism", the USSR. Subse-
quently, the Kremlin appears to have undertaken a rapproche-
ment between the two antagonistic regimes.
72. East Germany has presented a more complex
problem. Despite 400, 000 occupation troops and the heavy
hand of the Ulbricht regime, the danger of an uprising has
always been latent. Although the East Germans have learned
from their own experience in June 1953, and from that of
Poland and Hungary, to respect the limits of the possible,
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they have shown no indication that they are resigned to
perpetual Communist domination. Unrest of students and
intellectuals has withstood all measures of pacification,
although discretion and subtlety in defiance have been the
watchword. The Ulbricht government, Stalinist in com-
plexion, displayed signs of uneasiness and sought with
indifferent success to align Gomulka with its policies, to
establish solidarity with Communist parties outside the Bloc,
especially the French and Italian. It awaited with some un-
easiness the repercussions of the Kremlin coup but has visibly
recovered its nerve since Khrushchev reaffirmed his faith in
Ulbricht during the August 1957 visit. The magnet of West
Germany, however, continues its unceasing pull on the East
German population. It is hard to see how any measures of
stabilization can be permanently effective in East Germany
except the maintenance in position of Soviet bayonets.
73. The total picture of stabilization in the Satellites
up to the present is seen to be uneven. On the whole "Stalin-
ist", or at least "Muscovite" elements have been favored in
the Communist parties and governments, and no great pres-
sure has been exercised by Moscow to interpret the Twentieth
Party Congress theses "liberally". The effort to neutralize
Tito or to persuade him to swerve from his independent ideo-
logical and political course has been inconclusive (see below,
paras. 77-81). One may speculate that prior to July 1957
the divided counsel within the Presidium, especially the rigid
views of Molotov, may have been the main cause of the failure
of the stabilization campaign to achieve more than it did. With
this division at an end, its prospects have probably improved.
74. With the exception of Poland, where the Gomulka
experiment will probably be allowed to continue, the stabili-
zation of the Satellites may be expected to follow the general
lines laid down by the Twentieth Party Congress and inter-
preted in the 30 June 1956 Resolution and other "explanatory"
statements. "National Communism" will be sternly rebuffed,
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and the course of "different roads to Socialism" will be
plotted largely by Moscow, not by the individual regimes.
There will be no autonomy in foreign policy, although efforts
will be made to preserve the illusion of Satellite "sovereign-
ty" within such international frameworks as the United
Nations. The solidarity of the "Sozialist camp" will be main-
tained with the benevolent support of Communist China. Econ-
omically, the USSR will probably continue the efforts of 1956
and early 1957 to abate the more extreme forms of exploita-
tion. The remission of debts (already on the order of one
billion dollars), the increase of exports to Eastern Europe
(scheduled at over $600 million) and decrease of imports
($265 million) may be accompanied by increasing latitude
to the Satellite regimes to seek economic assistance or ad-
vantageous trade arrangements in the West. The example
of Poland's loan from the US will be carefully watched both
in Moscow and the Satellite capitals and may have sequels.
75. This broad front stabilization effortwill be en-
veloped in short range agitprop themes, designed to create
an atmosphere exuding confidence in the USSR as the bulwark
of "socialism", the mainstay of "proletarian international-
ism". Concentrated efforts will be made to strengthen local
party organizations and to increase the weight of ideological
indoctrination. As far as possible, the memory of the Stalin
era will be blacked out, and its crimes and blunders will be
glossed over as violations of Leninism, rather than as faults
inherent in the Soviet system. Such guilt of participation in
Stalin's crimes as may be admitted will be imputed to the
purged trio, Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich. Hungary
will stubbornly and patiently be explained, in the face of the
highly damaging UN condemnation, as a horrible example of
the greatest of dangers, counter-revolution.
76. Such will be the Kremlin's studied effort. It
may fail to extinguish coals of the dissidence stirred into
flame in Hungary, but it will probably succeed in reducing
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la J. N .1.11 -La 1 I .L.C1 J..J
them on the surface to grey ashes of resignation and apathy.
Tito and Gomulka and perhaps Mao will be watched hopefully
by the Satellite peoples; the Soviet masters will be sullenly
hated. Aspirations for liberty and national fulfillment will
be cherished by all classes, but in the concerns of the pres-
ent, the future will be left to take care of itself.
C. Titoism and Communist Stabilization.
77. The improvement of Soviet-Yugoslav-relations,
which had deteriorated badly under Stalin, must have been
one of the most pressing concerns of his successors, and a
major source of discord among them. The first and most
dramatic initiative was the pilgrimage of Khrushchev and
Bulganin to Belgrade in May-June 1955. Despite the trans-
parent and almost undignified efforts of the Soviet leaders to
bring about a Party rapprochement, the Yugoslav leader firmly
kept the accord on the governmental level. During the ensuing
months a number of steps were taken by the Kremlin to promote
reconciliation. In February 1956 a substantial loan and com-
modity credit was granted. The Cominform - which had out-
lived its usefulness in any event - was abolished, and Molotov,
Titots old adversary, was removed from the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, The Twentieth Party Congress implicitly recog-
nized the right of Yugoslavia to proceed along its own "road
to Socialism". It is now clear that this concession, in its full
interpretation as a nihil obstat to "National Communism", was
intended to be a "Tito exclusive". Tito, for his part, showed
no inclination to restrict its application, and began enthusias-
tically to encourage the other Satellites to free themselves
from Stalinism and follow Yugoslavia's example.
78. This was clearly more than the Kremlin had bar-
gained for. Further steps were required to bring the process
under control. In June 1956, Tito visited Moscow; friendly
communiques were issued which confirmed the reconcilia-
tion on a governmental level and acknowledged the ideologi-
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cal independence of Yugoslavia,. But almost immediately the
Kremlin began a campaign within the Satellites to check the
ferment of Titoism; a secret letter, circulated to the Satel-
lite parties and governments in September, warning against
following the Yugoslav example of "National Communism"
soon became known to Tito, and relations again became
frosty. For reasons still not fully apparent, Khrushchev
flew alone to Belgrade on 19 September. On 27 September
both men flew to Yalta where they were joined by Bulganin
and other non-Stalinist officials. Probably much to Tito's
annoyance, the former Stalinist, Erno Ger8, who was Hun-
garian Party Secretary at the time, put in an appearance.
Whatever tactics of persuasion or pressure may have been
applied, Tito did not retreat from his firm position that the
Satellites must be allowed substantial freedom, and the meet-
ing broke up without apparent results. Meanwhile, the grow-
ing agitation in Poland and Hungary heightened the tension
between Moscow and Belgrade, and even Communist China
joined in criticizing Tito for "revisionism" and for splitting
the "socialist camp".
79. The climax of estrangement was reached in Nov-
ember. In a major speech at Pula (11 November) Tito drew
an ideological line which Moscow angrily rejected. He re-
vealed that a battle was raging within the Kremlin between
"Stalinists" and "anti-Stalinists", and predicted that the
latter would prevail. It appeared for a time that all the
ground gained during the previous months might be lost.
Nevertheless, at no point did either side display any real
desire to precipitate a total break. After a period of acid
exchanges, in which some of the Satellites heartily joined
on Moscow's side, the fervor of the engagement gradually
simmered down. During the first half of 1957 semi-polite
argumentation continued; a situation of stalemate seemed to
have been reached, broken by the Khrushchev-Tito meeting
in Rumania (1-2 August).
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614111111111.19.14.111ft
80. The leadership purge in the Kremlin has obvious-
ly reopened the game. Tito and his principal spokesmen,
who at least outwardly were surprised by the sudden and
complete nature of Khrushchev's triumph, have scarcely
concealed their elation. However, if they believe that they
now have an opportunity to propagate their example among
the Satellites, they may find themselves surprised and dis-
appointed. As noted above, it is most improbable that the
new leadership will extend the Leninist theses of the Twenti-
eth Party Congress to embrace "National Communism". Nor
is it likely to view with sympathy the Titoist allegation that
industrial decentralization, as Moscow has decreed it, re-
sembles, or was influenced by the Yugoslav model. The
Soviet leaders, not to mention the "Stalinists" in the Satel-
lites are especially mistrustful of the Yugoslav economic
panacea - the so-called Workers? Councils and Communes -
which are heralded as the true expression of industrial'Ele-
rnocracy" in the spirit of pure Leninism. The subversive
implications of the Workers' Councils were not lost on the
Communist leaders. at the time of the Hungarian revolt, and
by the same token, their appeal in countries such as Italy
was clearly seen as a potential deviation from Marxist ortho-
doxy. It was noteworthy that the Conference of Industrial
Workers Councils, held in Belgrade at the same time that
the purge was taking place in Moscow, was given short and
misleading coverage in the Soviet press. An important
Soviet official attended the conference as an "observer",
and a communique was issued stressing "international
workers' solidarity" and similar general themes, but the
significance of the Councils themselves was systematically
ignored in the Moscow treatment.
81. It would appear, therefore, that Soviet policy
toward Yugoslavia will not change sharply. The well-
mannered Party courtship will probably continue, punctuated
with highlights of reconciliation and estrangement. Since,
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13 i1TrIirnTTILL
however, Tito has shown that he can be wooed but not seduced,
Khru.shchev will probably not put too much sincerity or stren-
uousness into the pursuit. The tactic of the Kremlin will be
to by-pass Yugoslavia wherever possible, taking such meas-
ures as are required to keep Tito from drifting too far toward
the West, while relying on his basic faith in the world tri-
umph of Communism to keep him ultimately in the "Socialist
camp". Its hope must be that he will soon pass away, leav-
ing no formidable successor, and in the meantime that he
can be cut down to the stature of the "forgotten man" of Com-
munism. This, if it could be achieved, would be a major
victory for stabilization. But it will not be easy.
D. The Role of Communist China in the Stabilization
Campaign.
82.. Communist China, like the Soviet armed forces,
is both object and subject of stabilization. The internal
problems confronting the infant Communist giant concern
Moscow as well as Peiping, and the disturbances which have
rocked International Communism threaten both and demand
joint pacification endeavors. The year 1955 witnessed in
China an effort, without precedent even in the Soviet Union,
to bring about a total collectivization of agriculture and na-
tionalization of industry and trade. Inevitably such an up-
heaval would leave in its train a host of dislocations. The
current "rectification" drive, in which Mao personally has
asserted his leadership, must be viewed not only against
this internal background, but against the crisis in the Soviet
Union.
83. Peiping's reaction to the Twentieth Party Con-
gress was initially cautious. A marked reticence was dis-
played toward de-Stalinization, which appeared to indicate
that Mao was not pleased with the attack on the "cult of per-
sonality". The theme of "liberalization", however, which
had been broached even before the Moscow Congress, was
gradually developed in a Chinese version of the "road to
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Socialism", 'WW1 a characteristic - and as it is now clear,
a rather ironical - poetic touch in the "hundred flowers"
formulation. The Hungarian revolution shook the Chinese
from their relative aloofness, and brought them to the de-
fense of the international solidarity of the Marxist-Leninist
camp. In tie 29 December 1956 statement "More on the
Historical Experience of the International Proletariat", Pei-
ping endorsed Soviet repression of the Hungarian uprising
while condemning excesses of "great power chauvinism",
chided Tito for his deviation, and acknowledged Soviet pre-
eminence in World Communism. This was a welcome assist
to the sorely troubled Kremlin leaders for which they were
probably willing to pay handsomely in continued support of
Communist China in the diplomatic, military and economic
fields. The stabilizing effects of this pronouncement were
reinforced by Chou En-lai's visit to Eastern Europe, where
the efforts of Tito and the Poles to enlist his moral support
for "National Communism" were tactfully rebuffed or turned
aside.
84. And yet the role of Communist China remains
ambiguous. The assurance of tone, bordering on condescen-
sion, in the 29 December Declaration and in Mao's speech
of 27 February 1957, cannot have been entirely to the taste
of the Kremlin leaders. An ideologist of stature unmatched
in the Soviet Union, Mao stands as a voice of inspiration for
Communist parties throughout the World and particularly in
the underdeveloped countries of South Asia, Africa and in
Latin America., Subtle but significant differences have been
expressed on the theme of "contradictions", hardly contrib-
uting to the doctrinal harmony which stabilization presup-
poses. It would be dangerous to read into such hair-splitting
the indications of a Moscow-Peiping rift. The Kremlin is
much too heavily involved in practical worries to linger over
theoretical shades of emphasis. Communist China, in the
throes of "rectification", confronted with a bleak economic
situation, cannot afford to indulge the luxury of pontificating
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beyond its means. The ultimate shape of relations between
the two great powers is beyond our ken, but it surely con-
tains the potential of diverging interests and perhaps mortal
conflict Neither Party, however, has any present interest
in hastening the day of confrontation. China, like the Soviet
Union, must help stabilize itself by strengthening its partner,
and by seeking a common basis for co-hegemony within World
Communism. It would be prudent for the West to assume that
this phase will be of considerable duration.
E. The Stabilization of the International Position of
the USSR.
85, Between the death of Stalin and the summer of
1956, substantial progress had been made by the Kremlin in
stabilizing its international position. "Relaxation of tensions",
"mutual confidence and trust among nations", and "peaceful
co-existence" had roused hope, and even conviction, in many
areas that the Cold War was over. A new style of diplomacy
almost persuaded hardheaded Europeans that they "could do
business" with the Russians. Even the ugly eruptions during
the Khrushchev-Bulganin visits to India and the United King-
dom failed to disturb the increasingly tranquil surface of
world politics. As noted earlier, the Twentieth Party Con-
gress proclaimed that war was no longer "fatally inevitable",
though it gave no assurance that subversive efforts of the
Communist parties throughout the world would be suspended.
The most effective weapon of the new diplomacy proved to be
one which the United States had invented, economic aid. Un-
like that of the US, the Kremlin alleged, Soviet aid was free
of political strings and without exorbitant charges. The at-
tractiveness of Soviet proffers disarmed the suspicion of the
underdeveloped countries, confronting the US with a challenge
against which initially it could do little more than increase its
own commitments, protest against aid "blackmail" and utter
warnings to use a "long spoon".
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86. Hungary and Suez violently interrupted the order-
ly development of this Soviet campaign. Condemnation by
the United Nations in November 1956, reinforced in June 1957,
could not be averted. Nehru, whose partisanship in the Suez
crisis was matched with some measure of detachment in the
Hungarian issue, had ceased to be "neutral in favor of the
USSR". The Middle East policy of Shepilov, initially success-
ful in its aim of making trouble, ran into setbacks as the three
Arab Kings turned away from Nasser and accepted the Eisen-
hower Doctrine or US aid. The move of the US Sixth Fleet to
the East Mediterranean was a practical show of force which
made the Soviet nuclear-weapon rattling of early November
seem like an overblown bluff. In all quarters there were in-
dications that Soviet diplomacy had lost its power both to per-
suade and to intimidate. Efforts to set back the course of
European integration, to promote discord in NATO and re-
sistance to the offer of US nuclear arms, to undercut the
French pacification in Algeria, these and many others ran
into stiffer opposition than had been met since the death of
Stalin.
87. In the face of these mounting difficulties, the
Kremlin must have realized that it must increase the strength
of its diplomatic drive. The first step was to remove Shepil-
ov, against whom more ominous charges than foreign policy
failure were in the making; the influence of Molotov had been
significantly curbed in the second half of 1956. The next step
was to adopt a more flexible stance in disarmament negotia-
tions, playing a game, known to both sides, of volunteering
concessions matched with conditions which the other side
would be sure to reject, while punctuating "peaceful" ges-
tures with atom rattling. New approaches were made to
staunch friends of the Western alliance, such as Pakistan,
Turkey and even Greece. Economic and technological aid
was again offered, not prodigally, for the Bloc economy
could not afford it, but with an air of liberality. Only a
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careful scrutiny revealed that much sharp practice went
into this apparently open-handed dealing, not necessarily
by design, but as a result of the gaps arising between the
phases of diplomatic negotiation and actual implementation.
Some countries, notably Egypt and Syria, began to find
themselves hopelessly enmeshed in the economic web which
Moscow had woven; others, such as Afghanistan, Burma and
India, had mixed experiences, but found it expedient to accept
the bad with the good. Still others, Indonesia, Tunisia,
Ethiopia and other African countries, found it increasingly
difficult to withstand tempting offers of capital goods or mil-
itary equipment. In this steadily broadening campaign, the
Satellites have played almost as big a role as the Soviet
Union.
88. In the United Nations, the Soviet position needs
strengthening. Condemnation of the Hungarian repression
will be hard to sidetrack but it .will probably do little more
than tarnish Soviet prestige, predominantly in Europe.
Anticipating this, the USSR has already launched a counter-
attack against Western "aggression" in the Middle East and
it will almost certainly blame the West for failure to reach
a disarmament agreement.
89. On balance, the outlook for stabilization of the
international position of the Soviet Union and the Bloc is
relatively favorable. A tide is running steadily toward le-
gitimation of Communist China's position: acceptance into
the United Nations and removal of trade restrictions. The
Satellites are no less "sovereign" than they were before the
crisis of 1956. Neutralism has found powerful new voices
among the European Socialists. NATO strength and Euro-
pean integration are progressing unfavorably for the Krem-
lin, at the moment, but continue to display exploitable weak-
nesses. In the Middle East, Soviet penetration via Egypt,
Syria, and Yemen is making noteworthy strides despite
sharper Western and Arab reactions. In Southeast Asia,
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the Kremlin may contemplate with some satisfaction the
signs of instability in Thailand, Laos and Cambodia and of
incipient civil war or at best disintegration of federal ties
in Indonesia, with reasonable prospects of a "legal" Com-
munist assumption of power. The economic distress of
India offers an interesting field for manipulation. Japan is
poised in oscillation between the poles of US and Communist
attraction, seeking to find its own exit from these conflict-
ing pulls by projecting itself economically into the vast un-
charged area of Southeast Asia.
90. There is no dearth of opportunity for the newly
consolidated Kremlin to update the "Cold War". Khrush-
chev's dramatic essays in personal diplomacy, the New York
Times and CBS interviews, the Prague and Berlin visits,
show that he can play a versatile and beguiling double role
as respectable statesman and guide of Communism's inter-
national relations. "Cultural exchange" provides an apt
instrumentality for gestures of conciliation and persuasion
contrasted with charges that the Iron Curtain is maintained
only by the West. And, step by step with the advances of
overt diplomacy, the vast apparatus of Communist clandes-
tine subversion continues to extend its encroachments.
F. The Stabilization of Communist Parties:. and Front
Or a.n...i_L.z2_,doLl!3. e World.
91. The death of Stalin did not perceptibly affect
the CPs in the West. Nor did the proceedings of the Twenti-
eth Party Congress bring about immediate changes. Although
Stalin was implicitly denigrated in the public speeches of the
Soviet leaders, there was sufficient obfuscation of the issue
to leave their intention temporarily in doubt. It was not
until the contents of Khrushchev's secret speech began to
leak, and the full text was published on 5 June 1956, that
the latent crisis was revealed. The first reaction was one
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of distress and indignation that the US Government had
"scooped" the Kremlin; this was succeeded by doubt and
confusion, especially threatening among the intellectuals
and fellow-travelers. The question was posed with increas-
ing insistence: what was the responsibility of the Soviet
leaders in Stalin's crimes which they had revealed? Never-
theless, as A. Rossi said, there was "no collective revolt,
no moral crisis within the Communist ranks as a whole.
Public opinion was far more shaken by what had been learned
than were the Communists; and it was public opinion rising
to fever pitch, rather than the report itself, which jolted
and disturbed the Communists".
92. The reaction of the individual parties in the
West varied with the temper of their leaders and the degree
of discipline of the rank and file. The French CP remained
imperturbably Stalinist, paying only lip service to the theses
of the Twentieth Congress. It avoided denunciation of Stalin,
and indeed praised his achievements. There was some ini-
tial loss of members and sympathizers, intensified by the
Hungarian Revolution and Thorez' slavish adoption of the
Moscow line. As might have been expected in a country
where the role of the intellectual is important in political
life, there occurred a number of spectacular denunciations
of the Party by leading leftist literary figures, notably Jean-
Paul Sartre. An atmosphere of scandale , however, counter-
acted the profound moral indignation of public opinion, and
many waverers slid safely back into the ranks. Almost im-
mediately corrective mechanisms were put to work. The
virtual unanimity which had been displayed at the rigged
French Party Congress in July 1956 was exploited by the
Party leaders to maintain discipline. The party member-
ship, which had never been of truly mass proportions (of
the order of 300, 000), suffered a decline of perhaps 10%
without affecting the hard core of cadres and militants.
Indeed, the evidence is rather that militancy, which had
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declined perceptibly in recent years under the erosion of
prolonged political isolation, was considerably restored.
A Party which had survived the Hitler-Ribbentrop Pact of
1939 with an attendant loss of 22 parliamentary deputies was
not destined to be shattered even by Hungary; only one of the
present 149 PCF deputies has defected. The ease, amount-
ing almost to virtuosity, with which the PCF can reverse its
position has again been demonstrated by its straightfa.ced
acceptance of the purge of the Kremlin's "Stalinists".
93. In Italy reactions to the denigration of Stalin
were harder to contain. Even Togliatti, whether spontan-
eously or for tactical expedience, in an interview of 17 June
1956, permitted himself to cast doubts on the Soviet "system",
not merely the aberrations of its leader. The 30 June Resol-
ution set him right, and if there had been any wavering on his
part up to that time, there has apparently been none since.
During the summer and early fall of 1956, Togliatti followed
the policy of allowing considerable discussion within the
Party federations, thereby blowing off steam and quieting
the rank and file. The Hungarian uprising provoked a new
and more serious crisis which Togliatti skillfully moderated
by diverting attention from Hungary to Egypt. By December
he was able to face a badly divided Party in its Eighth Nation-
al Congress, disperse the most serious opposition within the
ranks, make gestures of greater "democracy" in the conduct
of affairs and launch a campaign of intra-party stabilization.
The course of this campaign during the first half of 1957 must
command admiration for its resourcefulness. Skillfully ex-
ploiting differences between the two Socialist parties which
had been edging toward merger in the last half of 1956, he
was able to exacerbate a series of mounting strains and ten-
sions within Italian politics, culminating in a prolonged gov-
ernmental. crisis in May and June. There is evidence that
the PCI (the largest and only deep-rooted mass Party outside
the Orbit - probably about 1, 500, 000 members) has suffered
a considerable drop in numbers and a decline in quality of
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membership, but this has not been accompanied by loss of
electoral support. Indeed, in Italy, as in France, the entire
crisis has only served to demonstrate that those who vote
Communist in protest against real or fancied social injus-
tices at home will not be swayed by the spectacle of vastly
greater injustice abroad.
94. Besides playing their appointed roles within
their respective countries, the French and Italian parties
have contributed actively to the stabilization campaign
abroad. French party leaders have paid several visits to
Moscow (January, February and August 1957) and have sent
delegations to the parties in all the Satellites. The PCI has
been equally active. Particularly interesting has been the
give and take between the Polish Party and its French and
Italian counterparts. The PCF sought to sway Gomulka some-
what away from "National Communist" inclinations. The PCI,
influenced perhaps by Togliatti's earlier and somewhat equiv-
ocal "polycentric" concept of International Communism,
appears to have avoided the exercise of any pressure on the
Polish leader, struggling to maintain his shaky equilibrium.
95. The vicissitudes of the minor West European
parties reveal a fairly consistent pattern. Nearly all have
suffered serious losses of rank and file membership and
numerous defections at higher levels. The Belgian and
Dutch parties, subject to tutelage by the French party, have
gradually drifted back to their status quo. Most of the other
minor parties (and this applies to the CPs in the United States
and the United Kingdom) still cannot be regarded as stabil-
ized. They tend to persist in their own interpretations of
the Twentieth Party Congress line, and have not fully ac-
cepted the Soviet explanation of the Hungarian Revolution.
Since their importance to the Kremlin is minimal at this
time, it is probable that no real effort has been made to
bring them fully back in line. However, if stabilization
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should progress favorably throughout the international move-
ment, it seems probable that even the least significant parties
will eventually have to face the choice of separating them-
selves from the Soviet camp or again subordinating them-
selves to strict Kremlin rule. The reconstitution of an I.nter-
national Communist roof organization (see above para. 67)
would probably be decisive in forcing the issue.
96. In other areas of the Free World, Communist
parties have been less sharply affected. In Latin America,
after some initial confusion and some dissenting notes in
the press, most parties fell into step behind their leaders
in support of the Soviet Line. The Brazilian Party, largest
in the Western Hemisphere, suffered a major blow in the
defection of its treasurer, who came out for "national" Com-
munism and blasted the leadership of the party's faltering
"Little Stalin", Luis Carlos Prestes. A new note has been
struck in the increasing attention devoted to Communist China
as a model of "socialist construction", perhaps better suited
to the relatively underdeveloped status of the area than is the
Soviet Union.
97. Throughout the Afro-Asian area, the Communist
press and leadership reacted slowly and cautiously to the
Twentieth CPSU Congress and the denigration of Stalin. Later
in 1956, the Suez crisis pushed the Hungarian blood bath into
the background. Soviet propaganda maintained an uproar over
"imperialism" which obscured the basic issues, with the result
that in the entire Afro-Asian area Soviet prestige suffered only
a slight setback. Party leadership, for the most part, has
remained intact, and Party membership, confused as it often
is between nationalist and "socialist" motives, has not been
seriously affected. Thus, while this area remains for the
Kremlin a prime target of stabilization in the political and
economic field, it probably does not require drastic meas-
ures in the Party field. The Sino-Soviet Bloc will continue
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to infiltrate countries in the "zone of peace", presenting
itself as the champion of their national "independence".
Whether it will make unusual efforts to strengthen a local
Party, will depend upon the existence of special opportuni-
ties not otherwise exploitable. The examples of Egypt and
Syria demonstrate that Soviet influence and penetration can
be greatly advanced in countries where the local CPs are
small, weak or repressed by the government. It is appar-
ent, however, that the USSR must proceed with caution in
areas of rampant nationalism, lest it destroy the image
Which it has created of itself.
98. As noted above (para. 26), the welfare of the
International Communist front organizations is a subject of
serious concern to the Soviet leadership. In the Free World,
these fronts are directed predominantly by trained and loyal
followers of Moscow, but large sections of their following
consist of fellow travelers rather than Party members. The
latter are ideologically motivated, but lack the discipline
which the Party imposes on its members. In times of Com-
munist success, they are loyal, but in adversity they may
weaken. At such times, the firmness of the leadership may
be sufficient to hold the fronts together, but their vulner-
ability remains serious.
99. Although the principal fronts do not appear to
have suffered greatly from the 1956 crisis, stabilization
efforts appear to be in process, especially in the World
Peace Council (WPC), the World Federation of Democratic
Youth (WFDY) and the World Federation of Trade Unions
(WFTU). The leadership of the WPC was split by the Hun-
garian crisis. At its meeting at Colombo in June 1957, an
effort was made to repair the rift; dissenters were not in-
vited to the conference, but the communique indicated that
not all differences of opinion were resolved. In contrast
to the previous meeting at Helsinki (18-19 November 1956)
which had displayed marked caution in advancing the usual
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Soviet themes, sharp attacks were leveled against th.e"war-
rnongering"United States. There is evidence that the organ-
ization is to be strengthened by decentralizing its activities.
By reorganizing along such lines, the WPC may hope to over-
come the serious difficulties that arose as a consequence of
its ejection from Vienna (February 1957). It appears to be
endeavoring to hide its Communist affiliations behind innoc-
uous "peace" associations such as the "International Insti-
tute for Peace" which took over WPC's former Vienna
offices. There are general indications that the WPC will
play a more aggressive role as an instrument of Soviet-
Communist propaganda. In its campaign against nuclear
testing, the WPC has succeeded in enlisting a number of
non-Communist Asiatic spokesmen, and has already cre-
ated an impact which is not paralleled in Europe.
100. The WFTU apparently will also be subject to
measures of stabilization. It is not easy to determine the
effectiveness of its overall international organization in
comparison with the National Centers and local affiliates
controlled by the Communists. The latter, especially in
Western Europe, have shown signs of slipping. In Italy,
shop steward elections over the past two years have steadily
reduced the strength of the Communist dominated CGIL.
The free trade unions, (CISL, Christian Democratic, and
UIL, Social Democratic) after an initial lack of success, have
recently begun to pick up membership from the attrition of
the COIL. Nenni Socialist (PSI) leaders in the CGIL have
defected to the free trade unions, in defiance of discipline
by their own party. COIL leader, Di Vittorio, has displayed
marked u.nhappiness with the political role dictated to him
by the PCI, and has sought to check dissidence in the ranks
by appearing to avoid a slavish pursuit of Moscow interests.
In France the Communist-dominated CGT was badly shaken
by the wave of outraged public opinion following Hungary.
Shying away from political agitation, it has for some time
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sought, not too successfully, to find labor issues on which
it could take common action with the Free Trade unions.
Communist trade union influence in countries where the
Party is small has generally declined. It is still too early
to determine whether this is an irreversible trend. The
persistent strength of the Communist electoral vote in France
and Italy suggests that labor, also, may again close ranks
behind the Party which professes to be its untiring champion.
101. One of the most difficult problems for the WFTU
was its expulsion from Vienna. It is not known, at this time,
what kind of organization has been set up in Prague but it is
believed that the WFTU lost considerable numbers of quali-
fied personnel. In its IV. World Trade Union Congress
(October 1957) it probably will announce and discuss a re-
organization after which a much more energetic program
may emerge.
102. In Asia, the influence of Communist or leftist-
dominated unions appears to have been less severely strained
by the crisis of 1956. SOHYO in Japan, though not directly
Communist-controlled, is dominated by a strong leftist fac-
tion working along lines favorable to Communist interest.
SOBSI in Indonesia, which is an affiliate of the WFTU and
directly Communist-controlled, is a major factor in the
startling recent political advances of the Communist Party
of Indonesia (PKI). Throughout this vast area, the WFTU
is assiduously spreading its propaganda, exploiting, wherever
possible, Bloc participation in the International Labor Organ-
ization (ILO) in Geneva and in other specialized agencies of
the UN as evidence of its respectability. The subversive
potential of these vast Asiatic unions, subtly stimulated by
nationalist and anti-imperialist agitation, must be a prom-
inent target of WFTU strategy.
103. International youth organizations remain a
primary concern of Communist stabilization. The denigra-
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tion of Stalin and the troubles of Eastern Europe caused
widespread disillusionment, and shook the fabric of the
World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International
Union of Students. These fronts, however, have displayed
extraordinary resilience. The Moscow Youth Festival,
which appeared to have been on the point of being cancelled
shortly after Hungary, was pushed as the "greatest ever".
It was probably, on the whole, a success in the eyes of the
Kremlin. Whether it will have satisfied the expectations
of its Soviet sponsors cannot yet be determined. In any case,
youth is in ferment throughout the Orbit, and strenuous meas-
ures have been taken to restore its calm. It seems unlikely
that the WFDY can restore its prestige and following outside
the Orbit for some time to come, but a successful outcome
of the Khrushchev policies, especially if they proceed in the
direction of "liberalization", would go far to strengthen its
position. With this, as with the other lesser professional
and special interest fronts, time will obliterate bitter mem-
ories and relieve emotional traumas: success, if it is
striking, will restore confidence and dedication.
104. In conclusion, we may cite the tasks which
Moscow has outlined for the Free World parties.and organ-
izations (Pravda, I May 1957). They consist of: anti-
militarist movements; actions in defense of economic demands
and against exploitation and enslavement; advancement of
national Freedom movements and prosecution of the anti-
imperialist struggle of the proletariat and peoples in colonial
and dependent countries; promoting the demand in social-
democratic ranks for abolition of atomic weapons and for
the unity of the working class; rallying CPs on the basis of
Marxist-Leninist international proletarianism. The article
admits that serious blows have been suffered by the Free
World parties since the Twentieth Congress, but claims
that the onslaught of reaction has been firmly repulsed. It
extols creative search in the application of the general prin-
ciples of Marxism-Leninism to different conditions in various
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countries, and again asserts that parliamentary institutions
may be used to reach the goal of socialism.
V. CONCLUSIONS
105. This study has undertaken to show that the
period since the death of Stalin may be viewed as a gigantic
crisis of International Communism, and especially of the
USSR, inextricably bound with efforts to achieve stabiliza-
tion as a basis for advance toward the goal of world domina-
tion. The basic strategic objectives have remained unchanged:
the destruction of NATO, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact and the
extension of Communist influence, and where possible, control
over the Afro-Asian areas, denying raw materials and markets
to the West, leading to its eventual economic strangulation
and political subversion. Such a strategy requires coordina-
tion and unity of purpose throughout the Sino-Soviet Bloc and
the "zone of peace", and it cannot be achieved so long as
contradictions" exist among Communist countries.
106. Central to the success of the campaign is the
maintenance of a powerful base of world Communist leader-
ship, and there can be no doubt that, in the eyes of the Krem-
lin, this base is the USSR. Nevertheless, China in some
measure now participates in the directing role exercised by
the Soviet Union. The potential "contradictions", both with-
in and between, these two forces, already display portents
which can no longer be ignored, but the community of inter-
est still predominates and makes the achievement of stabil-
ity within World Communism a mutually sustaining endeavor.
107. The wider focus of stabilization, including the
Satellites and the Communist parties outside the Bloc, cen-
ters in "proletarian internationalism". A new and subtle
approach has been evolved; "national Communism" is con-
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demned, but "local variations" on the "road to socialism"
are approved, always with firm insistence that the Soviet
model remains unique and governing. Ideology has been
restored to Leninist "purity", accompanied by astern cam-
paign against "revisionism". The organizational basis of
Communist Party strength is everywhere in process of con-
solidation, and dramatic gestures are being made to reaffirm
fraternal solidarity throughout International Communism.
Within the Bloc, the coercive instrument of Communist rule,
Without being dismantled, has been somewhat held in check,
and the benefits of "Socialist legality" are extended by meas-
ures sometimes real, sometimes spurious. Outside the Bloc,
respectability is sought for Communist parties, diplomatic
efforts are bent toward restoring the climate of "peaceful
coexistence" and "relaxation of tensions", without neglect-
ing the proven techniques of intermittent threats and atom-
rattling.
108. The economic thrust of the USSR, consolidated,
the Kremlin hopes, by benefits to be achieved from decen-
tralization, has now become a firm implement of its drive
to world domination. The campaign to outstrip the West in
production, especially of key foods, is almost certainly
conceived demagogically. But Khrushchev may believe that
It can achieve sufficient success to maintain good morale in
the USSR and to provide confirmation of the claim to under-
developed countries that the economic model of Soviet Com-
munism rather than that of capitalism is alone capable of
fulfilling their aspirations.
109. Although this study does not attempt a basic
projection of the stabilization campaign, it may appropriate-
ly conclude with a generalized consideration of certain hypo-
theses which should be examined if such a projection is to
be made:
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a. The stabilization campaign may stagnate
and ultimately fail. It is suggested that this will not
come about as the result of any deliberate Kremlin
relaxation. In our opinion Khrushchev, and what is
left of the "collective leadership" associated with him,
will not remit the essential drive of Communism, nor
willingly allow erosion of their despotic rule to take
place. If their efforts should bog down, it would be
not from lack of will and determination, but from the
inherent magnitude of the task, which may ultimately
prove insuperable. We do not, however, believe that
this is a likely outcome, though it must be included
among those which are logically possible.
b. The campaign will achieve limited success,
permitting International Communism to maintain
approximately its present level. It is difficult to
believe that Moscow and Peiping have set themselves
as a goal the mere restoration of the status quo 1956,
except as a temporary measure. It is possible that,
anticipating increased Western resistance, they would
eschew aggressive measures, involving risk of war,
and content themselves with gradual political pacifi-
cation and economic consolidation. But, even under
such a contingency, they would be unlikely to sacri-
fice any basic Marxist-Leninist principle, and would
continue to insist on the unity of "proletarian inter-
nationalism".
c. The campaign will be fully successful and
lead to a major drive for world domination. It is by
no means inconceivable that the current peace and
disarmament propaganda, under the mantle of nuclear
stalemate, would bring about the era of "peaceful
coexistence and competition" which the Kremlin has
proclaimed as its goal. The internal stabilization
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measures of the Bloc might be fruitful, and the image
of a prosperous and powerful "Socialist" congeries
of states might prove highly attractive to important
areas of the Free World. A new, flexible Interna-
tional Coxnmimist organization might succeed in
propagating Moscow's influence by persuasion, lead-
ing to its ultimate assumption of far broader areas
of control or at least subversion.
110. In evaluating the order of probability of these
three generalized hypotheses, it would be well to suspend
attitudes of even "cautious" optimism. Although the rever-
berations of 1956 have shaken Communism, and are still
perceptible, they are likely to fade rather rapidly as the
process of stabilization advances. At a minimum, Interna-
tional Communism seems likely to maintain its present
level, and it may proceed to higher levels of power. The
undiminished intensity of its drive and will is impressive,
as is its resourcefulness in the adjustment of strategy and
tactics to vicissitudes and setbacks. It is clear that this
dynamic movement can only be contained by a determined,
unremitting effort on the part of the Free World.
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